Legal Theories
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136 rows where party = "Pohl"
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- Pohl · 136 ✖
| theory_id ▼ | filing_id | theory | party | role | basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1 1 | Breach of Contract — Settlement Agreement | Pohl | claim | Favre and Precision breached the Confidential Settlement Agreement by failing to return documents, failing to delete ESI, causing claims and legal actions to be filed against Pohl, and assisting Kassab and co-counsel in pursuing claims against Pohl |
| 2 | 1 1 | Conversion — common law tort | Pohl | claim | All Defendants wrongfully assumed and exercised dominion and control over Pohl's confidential information and property in contravention of Pohl's ownership rights — Favre/Precision/Nicholson by stealing it, Kassab/Montague by knowingly purchasing it, and all by maintaining and using it |
| 3 | 1 1 | Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (TUTSA) — Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 134A.001 et seq. | Pohl | claim | Defendants willfully and maliciously misappropriated Pohl's trade secrets by acquiring them through theft (§ 134A.002(2), (3)(A)), disclosing them without consent (§ 134A.002(3)(B)), and using them without consent (§ 134A.002(3)(B)) |
| 4 | 1 1 | Civil Conspiracy | Pohl | claim | Defendants acted in combination with the agreed object of misappropriating trade secrets and converting property, committing unlawful overt acts that proximately caused damages |
| 23 | 3 3 | Defense against barratry allegations — characterizing agreements as legitimate PR/marketing service contracts | Pohl | defense | Pohl asserts his contracts with PR Consultants were for legitimate hourly-rate public relations and client liaison services with a percentage-of-fees cap, not barratry fee-sharing agreements. PR Consultants' own claims in Federal Court Lawsuit confirmed hourly-rate basis. |
| 24 | 3 3 | PR Consultants acted independently and in violation of their contracts | Pohl | defense | PR Consultants were solely responsible for hiring, supervising, and controlling employees; any improper solicitation was done in violation of their contractual obligations to comply with all applicable rules. Their Mississippi attorneys reviewed and approved all contracts. |
| 25 | 3 3 | Theft and misappropriation by PR Consultants | Pohl | claim | PR Consultants stole client files (17 containers), computers (4), and data; sent falsified invoices; charged fictitious expenses; diverted clients to competitors; sold stolen property to Favre who sold to Kassab |
| 26 | 3 3 | Unauthorized use of Pohl's name by third parties | Pohl | defense | Julia Porter and Monica Chaney operated unauthorized website using Pohl's name; some client contacts may have been made by unauthorized individuals, not by or at direction of Pohl |
| 83 | 9 9 | TCPA Does Not Apply — Claims Not Based on Protected Conduct | Pohl | defense | Pohl's conversion, TUTSA, and conspiracy claims are based on wrongful acts (purchasing stolen property, misappropriating trade secrets), not on protected speech, petition, or association |
| 84 | 9 9 | TCPA Commercial Speech Exception (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.010(b)) | Pohl | defense | Even if TCPA applies, Kassab is primarily engaged in selling legal services, his solicitation of Pohl's clients arose from commercial transactions, and the intended audience was potential customers — satisfying all four Castleman elements |
| 85 | 9 9 | Conversion | Pohl | claim | Kassab knowingly purchased confidential information and materials stolen from Pohl and wrongfully exercised dominion and control over Pohl's property |
| 86 | 9 9 | Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (TUTSA) (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ch. 134A) | Pohl | claim | Kassab purchased Pohl's trade secrets knowing they had been acquired by improper means (theft) without Pohl's consent |
| 87 | 9 9 | Civil Conspiracy | Pohl | claim | Kassab acted in combination with Favre, Nicholson, Montague, and others to commit conversion and trade secret misappropriation |
| 88 | 9 9 | Statute of Limitations Not Expired | Pohl | defense | Favre-Kassab Agreement executed November 10, 2016; suit filed August 2018 — within 2-year conversion period and 3-year TUTSA period |
| 89 | 9 9 | Attorney Immunity Inapplicable | Pohl | defense | Attorney immunity protects conduct within scope of client representation; Kassab had no clients at the time of the wrongful purchase |
| 90 | 9 9 | Res Judicata Inapplicable | Pohl | defense | Kassab was not a party to the Mississippi settlement; claims against Kassab are not the 'same as' claims settled in that case |
| 141 | 14 14 | Breach of Contract | Pohl | claim | Favre and Precision breached the Confidential Settlement Agreement by causing claims to be made and filed against Pohl and failing to return confidential materials |
| 142 | 14 14 | Conversion | Pohl | claim | All defendants wrongfully assumed and exercised dominion and control over Pohl's confidential information and property in contravention of Pohl's ownership rights; damages exceed $250,000 |
| 143 | 14 14 | Misappropriation of Trade Secrets (TUTSA) — Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 134A.001 et seq. | Pohl | claim | Defendants willfully and maliciously misappropriated Pohl's trade secrets through acquisition by improper means (theft), disclosure via sale without consent, and unauthorized use |
| 144 | 14 14 | Civil Conspiracy | Pohl | claim | Defendants acted in combination with agreed object of unlawfully misappropriating trade secrets and converting property, committing overt unlawful acts that proximately caused damages |
| 145 | 15 15 | Mandatory Stay Under Interlocutory Appeal — Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(b) | Pohl | defense | Kassab's interlocutory appeal of TCPA denial triggers automatic stay of all trial court proceedings; actions taken during stay are voidable |
| 146 | 15 15 | TCPA Untimely Filing — Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.003(b) | Pohl | defense | TCPA motion must be filed within 60 days of service; Favre/Precision filed late without showing good cause; Defendants actually benefited from late filing |
| 147 | 15 15 | TCPA Inapplicability — Claims Not Based on Protected Conduct | Pohl | defense | Pohl's claims for conversion, TUTSA violations, conspiracy, and breach of contract target wrongful sale of stolen property, not exercise of free speech, petition, or association rights |
| 148 | 15 15 | TCPA Commercial Speech Exception — Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.010(b) | Pohl | defense | TCPA does not apply because Precision is primarily in the marketing business, conduct arose in that capacity, transaction involved marketing goods/services, and intended audience was Kassab as actual buyer |
| 149 | 15 15 | Prima Facie Case Under TCPA — Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.005(c) | Pohl | claim | Even if TCPA applies, Pohl establishes prima facie case by clear and specific evidence for all four causes of action (breach of contract, conversion, TUTSA, conspiracy) |
| 150 | 15 15 | Statute of Limitations Not Expired | Pohl | defense | Settlement Agreement executed April/May 2017 (4-year breach of contract period); Favre-Kassab Agreement November 10, 2016 (within 2-year and 3-year periods); Pohl was not aware of claims in the two-year period prior to filing |
| 154 | 17 17 | Limitations Rebuttal — Separate Accrual for Each Defendant | Pohl | defense | Claims against Kassab accrued from his specific conduct (November 2016 purchase and subsequent use), not from prior conduct of others. Each possession is a new conversion. TUTSA accrues upon commercial use. Kassab must conclusively establish accrual and negate the discovery rule, which he has not done. |
| 155 | 17 17 | Res Judicata Rebuttal — No Privity, Different Subject Matter | Pohl | defense | Kassab was not a party to the Federal Court Case. Under Texas three-part privity test, mere allegations of conspiracy are insufficient. Kassab provides no evidence of control, representation of interests, or successor-in-interest status. The factual bases differ: Federal Counterclaim addressed conversion of funds (billing fraud), not theft of confidential information. |
| 156 | 17 17 | Attorney Immunity Rebuttal — No Attorney-Client Relationship; Conduct Outside Scope | Pohl | defense | Kassab had no clients when he purchased stolen information. His conduct of buying stolen property is not uniquely lawyerly. The doctrine requires both scope of representation and attorney-client relationship at the time of conduct. Solicitation preceding the 'meeting of the minds' cannot be within scope of client representation. Kassab provided no evidence of an attorney-client relationship at the time of wrongful conduct. |
| 177 | 21 21 | Lack of Legal Capacity — Tex. R. Civ. P. 93(1) and 93(2) | Pohl | defense | Kassab lacks legal capacity to sue on assigned barratry claims because such assignments (whether complete or partial) are void |
| 178 | 21 21 | Special Exceptions for Defective Pleading — Texas fair notice pleading standard | Pohl | defense | Kassab's counterclaim is obscure and fails to provide fair notice of the nature, basic issues, and potentially relevant evidence of the controversy; fails to identify cause of action, assignors, or supporting facts |
| 179 | 21 21 | Statute of Limitations | Pohl | affirmative_defense | Barratry claims are time-barred |
| 180 | 21 21 | Laches | Pohl | affirmative_defense | Unreasonable delay in asserting claims |
| 181 | 21 21 | Lack of Standing | Pohl | affirmative_defense | Kassab does not have standing to assert assigned barratry claims |
| 182 | 21 21 | Illegality | Pohl | affirmative_defense | The assignments themselves are illegal/void |
| 183 | 21 21 | Res Judicata | Pohl | affirmative_defense | The assigned claims may be the same claims previously asserted and adjudicated in Brumfield and Gandy cases |
| 184 | 21 21 | Estoppel | Pohl | affirmative_defense | Defense to Kassab's counterclaims |
| 185 | 21 21 | Failure to Mitigate | Pohl | affirmative_defense | Defense to Kassab's counterclaims |
| 186 | 21 21 | Waiver | Pohl | affirmative_defense | Defense to Kassab's counterclaims |
| 187 | 22 22 | Res Judicata | Pohl | defense | Prior final judgments on the merits in Brumfield and Gandy cases dismissed the same barratry claims; Kassab is in privity with Assignors as successor-in-interest; Kassab admits claims are the same; judgment final even if appealed; dismissal on limitations is on the merits |
| 188 | 22 22 | Statute of Limitations (four-year bar on barratry claims) | Pohl | defense | Claims accrued when clients were solicited (no later than May 2013 for most; no later than 2014 for Clemons and Riggs), making them time-barred by May 2017 or 2016 respectively, before this lawsuit or the counterclaim was filed |
| 189 | 22 22 | Section 16.069 Inapplicability — Same Transaction or Occurrence Not Met | Pohl | defense | The logical relationship test is not satisfied because facts of alleged barratry (2012-2014) are not significant and logically relevant to Pohl's conversion/trade secret claims regarding Kassab's 2016 conduct; separated by years, different parties, no common elements of proof |
| 190 | 22 22 | Section 16.069 Inapplicability — No Fair Notice Within 30 Days | Pohl | defense | Kassab's counterclaim failed to identify the assignors or state facts giving rise to the claims, failing the Rule 47 fair notice requirement under Rogers; Pohl could not determine until discovery in 2021 that claims were identical to those rejected |
| 191 | 22 22 | Section 16.069 Inapplicability — Post-Lawsuit Assignment Cannot Revive Claims | Pohl | defense | The statute's purpose of preventing tactical delay is not served when claims were assigned after litigation commenced; applying Code Construction Act factors (Ball), allowing this would frustrate the object, purpose, and public interest underlying § 16.069 |
| 192 | 22 22 | Non-Assignability of Punitive Statutory Claims (PPG Industries framework) | Pohl | defense | Civil barratry claims are personal and punitive statutory claims analogous to DTPA claims; the statute is silent on assignability; the legislature knew how to make them assignable but did not; purpose is to protect a specific class (clients); penalties are punitive in nature; assignments increase litigation |
| 193 | 22 22 | Public Policy Invalidity of Assignments | Pohl | defense | Assignments that tend to increase or prolong litigation unnecessarily, serve as transparent devices to circumvent limitations, or injure the public good violate public policy and are void (Sw. Bell, LAKXN, Am. Homeowner, Wright v. Sydow, State Farm v. Gandy) |
| 194 | 22 22 | Violation of Ethical Rules — Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof'l Conduct 1.08(h) | Pohl | defense | A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client; Kassab obtained assignments from his own clients concerning their pending litigation |
| 201 | 24 24 | Res Judicata — Dispositive | Pohl | defense | Kassab confirmed his counterclaims are the same claims previously adjudicated; Marino (subsequently recognized claim) and Stubbs (new ordinance, different land use) are distinguishable because the barratry claims existed and were dismissed before the second action; under Hernandez, focus is on whether claim existed and could have been raised |
| 202 | 24 24 | Statute of Limitations — Section 16.069 Inapplicable | Pohl | defense | Kassab does not dispute the underlying claims are time-barred; § 16.069 does not apply because the claims are from different transactions, fair notice was not given, and post-lawsuit assignments cannot trigger the savings clause |
| 203 | 24 24 | Logical Relationship Test — 'Significant' Requirement | Pohl | defense | Kassab selectively omitted the requirement that facts must be 'significant and logically relevant' (not merely logically relevant) to both claims; how Precision acquired information is not significant to Pohl's claims about Kassab's 2016 purchase and use |
| 204 | 24 24 | Non-Assignability of Punitive Statutory Claims (PPG framework) | Pohl | defense | PPG's four-factor analysis applies beyond DTPA claims to any statutory punitive claims; barratry claims are personal and punitive; legislature was silent on assignability; risks of distortion apply to the class of claims; Kassab ignored the four factors |
| 205 | 24 24 | Public Policy Invalidity — Assignments as Transparent Devices | Pohl | defense | Kassab's own admissions show the Assignments 'tend to increase or prolong litigation' and are 'transparent devices' to circumvent limitations, violating public policy under Sw. Bell and LAKXN; Kassab's 'unclean hands' argument is not competent evidence |
| 206 | 24 24 | Judicial Estoppel Inapplicable to Pohl | Pohl | defense | Pohl did not take an inconsistent position (referred to 'purported' assignments) and did not prevail on the argument in the Texas Supreme Court; Ferguson requires 'successfully maintained' position, which Kassab selectively omitted |
| 232 | 28 28 | Insufficiency of RTP Designation — Fair Notice Pleading Standard | Pohl | objection | Movant must satisfy notice pleading standard with allegations of duty breached and sufficient allegations of causation so parties can ascertain the nature and basic issues of the controversy (In re Cordish Co.) |
| 233 | 28 28 | Harm vs. Damages Distinction (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.011(6)) | Pohl | objection | A potential RTP must be responsible for the harm (injury) underlying the pled cause of action, not merely plausibly connected with damages (In re Smith; City Nat'l Bank; DLA Piper v. Linegar) |
| 234 | 28 28 | Failure to Timely Disclose RTPs (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004(d)) | Pohl | objection | When limitations have passed on claims against the alleged RTPs, movant cannot designate them if they failed to timely disclose their identities under Tex. R. Civ. P. 194.2(l) (In re Dawson) |
| 235 | 28 28 | Separate Conversion — Each Wrongful Possession Doctrine | Pohl | objection | Each wrongful possession of converted property is a separate conversion; Walker/Seymour/Ladner's prior possession is distinct from Defendants' possession and does not make them responsible for Defendants' conversion (Pemex v. BASF) |
| 272 | 35 35 | Civil Conspiracy | Pohl | claim | Defendants combined to accomplish conversion and trade secret misappropriation, reaching meeting of the minds through emails and agreements starting September 2016, engaging in overt unlawful acts (conversion and misappropriation), causing damages including attorneys' fees and market value of property |
| 273 | 35 35 | Conversion | Pohl | claim | Defendants assumed unauthorized dominion and control over Pohl's personal property (client lists, contracts, files, computers) to the exclusion of Pohl's rights, without permission, and refused demands for return |
| 274 | 35 35 | TUTSA - Trade Secret Misappropriation | Pohl | claim | Defendants knowingly acquired Pohl's trade secrets (client lists, contracts, proprietary information) by improper means through scheme with Favre, then used them to solicit Pohl's clients for barratry claims; trade secrets had independent economic value and were protected by reasonable measures |
| 277 | 36 36 | Conversion | Pohl | claim | Defendants purchased and used Pohl's stolen confidential information, client contracts, and files without authorization |
| 278 | 36 36 | TUTSA - Trade Secret Misappropriation | Pohl | claim | Defendants knowingly acquired and used Pohl's trade secrets obtained through improper means; damages include actual loss from defending barratry litigation |
| 279 | 36 36 | Civil Conspiracy | Pohl | claim | Defendants combined to accomplish conversion and misappropriation of Pohl's trade secrets |
| 290 | 38 38 | Future damages do not justify abatement (rebuttal) | Pohl | claim | Texas law requires parties to bring claims even when all damages have not occurred (Schlumberger v. Pasko); future damages assessed by reasonable probability standard (GTE Mobilnet v. Pascouet) |
| 291 | 38 38 | Unlawful Acts Doctrine preemption (rebuttal) | Pohl | claim | Texas Supreme Court in Dugger v. Arredondo held the doctrine is 'no longer a viable defense' under § 33.003; confirmed in Boerjan v. Rodriguez; Kassab himself acknowledged this in Beatty v. Knighton |
| 297 | 41 41 | Privilege claims under Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.4 | Pohl | claim | Pohl asserts privilege objections to discovery requests and files supporting declaration as required by Rule 193.4 |
| 328 | 46 46 | Barratry irrelevance to tort claims | Pohl | claim | Establishing barratry does not constitute a denial or defense to conversion, TUTSA, or conspiracy claims; does not impact trade secret ownership |
| 329 | 46 46 | Trade secret ownership unaffected by barratry | Pohl | claim | Even if barratry occurred, attorney retains ownership of client list compilations and contract copies; voidability affects enforceability against client, not ownership; TUTSA defines 'owner' as person with rightful, legal, or equitable title per § 134A.002(3-a) |
| 330 | 46 46 | No standing to assert barratry | Pohl | claim | Only State Bar (disciplinary), State of Texas (criminal), and affected clients (civil) have standing to enforce barratry rules; Kassab has none |
| 331 | 46 46 | Unlawful Acts Doctrine preemption | Pohl | claim | Preempted by proportionate responsibility statute per Dugger v. Arredondo, 408 S.W.3d 825 (Tex. 2013); 'plain language of section 33.003 clearly indicates that the common law unlawful acts doctrine is no longer a viable defense' |
| 332 | 46 46 | Illegality / In Pari Delicto inapplicable | Pohl | claim | These defenses apply to enforcement of illegal contracts; Pohl asserts no contract claims against Kassab; even if relevant, Pohl's contracts are voidable not void, and none have been voided |
| 333 | 46 46 | Justification defense inapplicable | Pohl | claim | Justification is a defense to tortious interference with contract only (Tex. Beef Cattle, Knox v. Taylor), not conversion, TUTSA, or conspiracy; if acts are 'tortious in themselves,' justification never arises (Prudential) |
| 334 | 46 46 | Rule 17.09 Immunity inapplicable | Pohl | claim | Pohl's claims predate Kassab's grievance participation and are not 'predicated upon' the grievance filing; Kassab is not a State Bar official with official-duties immunity |
| 335 | 46 46 | Unclean hands inapplicable | Pohl | claim | Applies only to equitable relief (Pohl no longer seeks any); requires nexus and injury to person raising defense (Wood v. Wiggins); alleged barratry did not injure Kassab |
| 336 | 46 46 | Contract-related defenses inapplicable | Pohl | claim | Release, accord and satisfaction, estoppel apply to contract claims — Pohl asserts none; 'subject to valid contract' (express contract defense) applies only to quantum meruit (Pepi Corp.); Kassab admitted these don't apply |
| 337 | 46 46 | Assumption of risk / contribution eliminated | Pohl | claim | Texas Supreme Court held these common law defenses no longer exist; concepts survive only in proportionate responsibility statute (Austin v. Kroger, 465 S.W.3d at 209-10) |
| 339 | 47 47 | Insufficient pleading of responsible third party allegations under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004(g)(1) | Pohl | defense | Pohl argues Kassab failed to plead sufficient facts showing the alleged RTPs were responsible for the harms underlying Pohl's claims, and the Supplemental RTP Motion merely recycles previously rejected allegations with no new factual content |
| 377 | 52 52 | Insufficient pleading of responsible third party allegations | Pohl | opposition | Kassab's supplemental RTP motion contains the same prior factual allegations found deficient by Judge Dollinger, just reordered. No new factual allegations to fix the pleading defect. |
| 378 | 52 52 | Abatement is improper — future damages and unrelated litigation | Pohl | opposition | Future damages do not justify abatement. The Cheatham case outcome cannot establish Kassab's defenses in this lawsuit because Kassab is not a party to Cheatham. |
| 379 | 52 52 | Preemption of unlawful acts doctrine by proportionate responsibility statute | Pohl | opposition | Kassab's unlawful acts defense has been preempted and does not apply, as established in Pohl's prior briefing on the Motion to Abate. |
| 380 | 52 52 | Attorney-client privilege not waived under offensive use doctrine | Pohl | opposition | Kassab failed to show how the legal elements of the offensive-use doctrine were met. Pohl's privilege over communications with Billy Shepherd remains intact. |
| 381 | 52 52 | Trial court discretion over discovery scope | Pohl | opposition | Scope of discovery is within the trial court's discretion. Judge Dollinger reasonably exercised that discretion, especially given Kassab sought privileged materials from his own opposing counsel in related litigation and failed to show diligent pursuit. |
| 382 | 53 53 | Prohibition of leading questions on direct examination under Tex. R. Evid. 611(c) | Pohl | opposition | Leading questions should not be used on direct examination; exception for hostile/adverse witnesses requires a showing Kassab has not made. Favre has been aligned with Kassab throughout the case. |
| 384 | 53 53 | Form objections to DWQ questions are proper on their face | Pohl | opposition | Evidence is not always necessary to support form objections (In re Union Pac.). Questions with typos, vagueness, lack of temporal scope, and calls for speculation are facially objectionable. |
| 389 | 55 55 | Motion to reconsider under 281st Court Procedure I(I) | Pohl | opposition | The Amended Motion is substantively a motion to reconsider because it seeks the same relief with the same arguments as the denied MSJs; such motions must be heard by submission only under court procedures. |
| 390 | 55 55 | No-evidence summary judgment — futility of repeated challenges after evidence showing | Pohl | opposition | Once a party has presented sufficient evidence to defeat a no-evidence motion, further no-evidence challenges on the same elements are futile. Pohl's prior 30+ exhibits addressed every element. |
| 391 | 55 55 | Preemption of unlawful acts doctrine by proportionate responsibility statute (Dugger v. Arredondo) | Pohl | opposition | The Texas Supreme Court explicitly found the common law unlawful acts doctrine is 'no longer a viable defense,' preempted by the proportionate responsibility statute. |
| 392 | 55 55 | Trade secret protection — reasonable measures to maintain secrecy (disputed facts) | Pohl | opposition | Pohl testified about reasonable steps taken. Same witnesses Kassab relies on also testified Pohl limited access and ensured confidentiality. Disputed material facts preclude summary judgment. |
| 393 | 55 55 | Ownership of trade secrets — disputed facts preclude summary judgment | Pohl | opposition | Walker, Ladner, and Seymour gave conflicting testimony on whether information belonged to them or Pohl. Disputed material facts preclude summary judgment. |
| 394 | 55 55 | Unlawful acts doctrine inapplicable when claims don't require reliance on illegal acts | Pohl | opposition | When the illegal conduct arises in a defense and not in the plaintiff's case, the unlawful acts rule will not bar a plaintiff's claims (Carcamo-Lopez). Pohl's claims don't require reference to any illegal act. |
| 408 | 58 58 | Trade Secret Misappropriation under TUTSA (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 134A) | Pohl | claim | Kassab misappropriated Pohl's trade secrets including attorney-client fee contracts and client identity/contact information lists. Jury found in Pohl's favor on Q1 and Q2. |
| 409 | 58 58 | Conversion | Pohl | claim | One of three claims tried at trial (alongside trade secrets and conspiracy). Referenced in procedural history at trial commencement on August 21, 2023. |
| 410 | 58 58 | Civil Conspiracy | Pohl | claim | Kassab conspired with Favre, Nicholson, and Montague to misappropriate trade secrets (Q15), creating joint and several liability that eliminates proportionate fault reduction. |
| 411 | 58 58 | Exemplary Damages for Willful and Malicious Misappropriation (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 134A.005) | Pohl | claim | Jury unanimously found willful and malicious misappropriation (Q8 and Q17), authorizing $3,000,000 in exemplary damages (Q19). |
| 412 | 58 58 | Statutory Attorneys' Fees under TUTSA (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 134A.005(3)) | Pohl | claim | TUTSA authorizes attorneys' fees when willful and malicious misappropriation exists; jury found this in Q8. |
| 413 | 58 58 | Prejudgment Interest (Tex. Fin. Code § 304.104) | Pohl | claim | Prejudgment interest accrues from date suit is filed to day before judgment at rate equal to postjudgment rate (8.50%). |
| 414 | 58 58 | Postjudgment Interest (Tex. Fin. Code § 304.001) | Pohl | claim | Statute mandates money judgment specify postjudgment interest rate; rate is 8.50% based on prime rate. |
| 423 | 60 60 | Presumption jury followed instructions (Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare) | Pohl | claim | Jury presumed to follow instructions requiring unanimity for Q17; Q19 predicated on unanimous Q17 answer provides affirmative evidence of unanimity |
| 424 | 60 60 | Waiver of jury verdict objection (USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca; Tex. R. Civ. P. 295) | Pohl | claim | Party seeking to avoid effect of jury answers must object before jury is discharged; Kassab failed to do so, waiving the alleged conflict |
| 425 | 60 60 | TUTSA actual loss encompasses attorneys' fees from separate proceedings | Pohl | claim | Broad definition of actual loss under TUTSA includes consequential damages; flexible and imaginative approach to trade secret damages; Akin Gump confirms fees from separate proceedings are recoverable as actual damages |
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CREATE TABLE legal_theories (
theory_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
filing_id INTEGER REFERENCES filings(filing_id),
theory TEXT,
party TEXT,
role TEXT,
basis TEXT
);