Legal Theories

509 claims, defenses, counterclaims, and affirmative defenses

Data license: Public court records

157 rows where role = "defense"

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theory_id ▼ filing_id theory party role basis
23 3 3 Defense against barratry allegations — characterizing agreements as legitimate PR/marketing service contracts Pohl defense Pohl asserts his contracts with PR Consultants were for legitimate hourly-rate public relations and client liaison services with a percentage-of-fees cap, not barratry fee-sharing agreements. PR Consultants' own claims in Federal Court Lawsuit confirmed hourly-rate basis.
24 3 3 PR Consultants acted independently and in violation of their contracts Pohl defense PR Consultants were solely responsible for hiring, supervising, and controlling employees; any improper solicitation was done in violation of their contractual obligations to comply with all applicable rules. Their Mississippi attorneys reviewed and approved all contracts.
26 3 3 Unauthorized use of Pohl's name by third parties Pohl defense Julia Porter and Monica Chaney operated unauthorized website using Pohl's name; some client contacts may have been made by unauthorized individuals, not by or at direction of Pohl
27 4 4 Special Appearance — lack of personal jurisdiction (Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a) Montague defense Montague Defendants are non-residents of Texas and challenge the court's personal jurisdiction over them via previously filed special appearance; this answer filed subject to that special appearance
56 7 7 Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA/Anti-SLAPP) — Right of Free Speech (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001(3)) Kassab defense Pohl's lawsuit targets communications made in connection with matters of public concern — barratry lawsuits and grievances discussing illegal attorney conduct; legal services constitute 'services in the marketplace'
57 7 7 TCPA — Right to Petition (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001(4)) Kassab defense Filing barratry lawsuits and State Bar grievances are communications made in or about judicial and governmental proceedings
58 7 7 TCPA — Right of Association (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001(2)) Kassab defense Kassab joined with his clients to collectively pursue their common interest in bringing barratry claims against Pohl
62 7 7 Failure to Establish Conversion — Lack of Ownership Kassab defense Precision Marketing, not Pohl, owned the client lists and marketing information according to Favre's testimony
63 7 7 Failure to Establish TUTSA Claim — Not Trade Secrets Kassab defense Client names and addresses are publicly known and not trade secrets; Kassab reasonably believed Precision Marketing owned the materials
83 9 9 TCPA Does Not Apply — Claims Not Based on Protected Conduct Pohl defense Pohl's conversion, TUTSA, and conspiracy claims are based on wrongful acts (purchasing stolen property, misappropriating trade secrets), not on protected speech, petition, or association
84 9 9 TCPA Commercial Speech Exception (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.010(b)) Pohl defense Even if TCPA applies, Kassab is primarily engaged in selling legal services, his solicitation of Pohl's clients arose from commercial transactions, and the intended audience was potential customers — satisfying all four Castleman elements
88 9 9 Statute of Limitations Not Expired Pohl defense Favre-Kassab Agreement executed November 10, 2016; suit filed August 2018 — within 2-year conversion period and 3-year TUTSA period
89 9 9 Attorney Immunity Inapplicable Pohl defense Attorney immunity protects conduct within scope of client representation; Kassab had no clients at the time of the wrongful purchase
90 9 9 Res Judicata Inapplicable Pohl defense Kassab was not a party to the Mississippi settlement; claims against Kassab are not the 'same as' claims settled in that case
91 10 10 Evidentiary Objection — Defective Affidavit (Lack of Personal Knowledge) Kassab defense Shepherd's affidavit fails to meet requirements of Tex. R. Evid. 602 because it is not based on personal knowledge and does not state facts are true and correct — perjury does not attach
92 10 10 Evidentiary Objection — Failed Business Records Foundation (Tex. R. Evid. 803(6), 902(10)) Kassab defense Shepherd fails to establish all six elements required for business records exception; fails to show he is custodian of records; failed to provide requisite notice
93 10 10 Evidentiary Objection — Hearsay Upon Hearsay Kassab defense All documents attached to the Shepherd affidavit are inadmissible hearsay upon hearsay
94 10 10 Evidentiary Objection — Conclusory Affidavit (No Evidence as Matter of Law) Kassab defense Pohl's declaration paragraphs 3-9 contain only conclusions without underlying facts, which do not raise fact issues and are incompetent evidence
95 10 10 Client Ownership of Files (Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof'l Conduct 1.15(d)) Kassab defense Attorney files belong to the client, not the attorney; Pohl has no ownership claim over client files; attorney is agent of client
96 10 10 Lack of Standing — Pohl Never Owned Subject Documents Kassab defense Documents came from Precision Marketing Group (owned by Favre), not Pohl; even if they were Pohl's legal files, client files belong to clients; Pohl lacks standing to sue for conversion or trade secret theft
97 10 10 TCPA Commercial Exception Inapplicable (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.010(b)) Kassab defense Pohl has not proven all four Castleman elements; purchasing marketing lists is not a commercial transaction involving legal services; Kassab is not primarily engaged in purchasing marketing lists; party asserting exemption bears burden of proving applicability
100 11 11 Designation of Responsible Third Parties Kassab defense Billy Shepherd, Walker, Seymour, and Ladner are the sole or proximate cause of any damages alleged by Pohl; Shepherd failed to protect Pohl's interests in Federal Litigation settlement; the runners sold and transferred all property to Favre
120 12 12 Designation of Responsible Third Parties Kassab defense Shepherd, Walker, Seymour, and Ladner are sole or proximate cause of Pohl's damages; enhanced with Shepherd's knowledge of pre-settlement document transfers to third parties including Kassab
138 13 13 Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) — Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ch. 27 Kassab defense Kassab argues Pohl's lawsuit is based on, related to, and in response to rights of free speech, petition, and association, and should be dismissed under the TCPA
145 15 15 Mandatory Stay Under Interlocutory Appeal — Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(b) Pohl defense Kassab's interlocutory appeal of TCPA denial triggers automatic stay of all trial court proceedings; actions taken during stay are voidable
146 15 15 TCPA Untimely Filing — Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.003(b) Pohl defense TCPA motion must be filed within 60 days of service; Favre/Precision filed late without showing good cause; Defendants actually benefited from late filing
147 15 15 TCPA Inapplicability — Claims Not Based on Protected Conduct Pohl defense Pohl's claims for conversion, TUTSA violations, conspiracy, and breach of contract target wrongful sale of stolen property, not exercise of free speech, petition, or association rights
148 15 15 TCPA Commercial Speech Exception — Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.010(b) Pohl defense TCPA does not apply because Precision is primarily in the marketing business, conduct arose in that capacity, transaction involved marketing goods/services, and intended audience was Kassab as actual buyer
150 15 15 Statute of Limitations Not Expired Pohl defense Settlement Agreement executed April/May 2017 (4-year breach of contract period); Favre-Kassab Agreement November 10, 2016 (within 2-year and 3-year periods); Pohl was not aware of claims in the two-year period prior to filing
154 17 17 Limitations Rebuttal — Separate Accrual for Each Defendant Pohl defense Claims against Kassab accrued from his specific conduct (November 2016 purchase and subsequent use), not from prior conduct of others. Each possession is a new conversion. TUTSA accrues upon commercial use. Kassab must conclusively establish accrual and negate the discovery rule, which he has not done.
155 17 17 Res Judicata Rebuttal — No Privity, Different Subject Matter Pohl defense Kassab was not a party to the Federal Court Case. Under Texas three-part privity test, mere allegations of conspiracy are insufficient. Kassab provides no evidence of control, representation of interests, or successor-in-interest status. The factual bases differ: Federal Counterclaim addressed conversion of funds (billing fraud), not theft of confidential information.
156 17 17 Attorney Immunity Rebuttal — No Attorney-Client Relationship; Conduct Outside Scope Pohl defense Kassab had no clients when he purchased stolen information. His conduct of buying stolen property is not uniquely lawyerly. The doctrine requires both scope of representation and attorney-client relationship at the time of conduct. Solicitation preceding the 'meeting of the minds' cannot be within scope of client representation. Kassab provided no evidence of an attorney-client relationship at the time of wrongful conduct.
157 18 18 Evidentiary Objections — Conclusory Affidavits as No Evidence Kassab defense Conclusory affidavits do not raise fact issues and are incompetent evidence as a matter of law; statements must provide underlying facts to support conclusions; Pohl's Declaration paragraphs 4-10 all fail this standard
158 18 18 Evidentiary Objections — Hearsay Kassab defense Statements by third parties (Ladner's admissions, Precision's expressed understanding) are inadmissible hearsay under Tex. R. Evid. 801(c)
159 18 18 Evidentiary Objections — Lack of Personal Knowledge and Authentication Kassab defense Pohl was not a party to the agreement or email, was not present at execution, and provides no basis for authenticating Exhibits 1-2; affidavit must show competency under Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(f)
165 19 19 Traditional Summary Judgment Kassab defense Kassab moved for traditional summary judgment; denied by the court
176 20 20 Responsible Third Party Designation — Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004 Kassab defense Third parties including Shepherd, Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona Pohl, Jaimes, Talley, Santana, and their entities are the sole or proximate cause of any damages
177 21 21 Lack of Legal Capacity — Tex. R. Civ. P. 93(1) and 93(2) Pohl defense Kassab lacks legal capacity to sue on assigned barratry claims because such assignments (whether complete or partial) are void
178 21 21 Special Exceptions for Defective Pleading — Texas fair notice pleading standard Pohl defense Kassab's counterclaim is obscure and fails to provide fair notice of the nature, basic issues, and potentially relevant evidence of the controversy; fails to identify cause of action, assignors, or supporting facts
187 22 22 Res Judicata Pohl defense Prior final judgments on the merits in Brumfield and Gandy cases dismissed the same barratry claims; Kassab is in privity with Assignors as successor-in-interest; Kassab admits claims are the same; judgment final even if appealed; dismissal on limitations is on the merits
188 22 22 Statute of Limitations (four-year bar on barratry claims) Pohl defense Claims accrued when clients were solicited (no later than May 2013 for most; no later than 2014 for Clemons and Riggs), making them time-barred by May 2017 or 2016 respectively, before this lawsuit or the counterclaim was filed
189 22 22 Section 16.069 Inapplicability — Same Transaction or Occurrence Not Met Pohl defense The logical relationship test is not satisfied because facts of alleged barratry (2012-2014) are not significant and logically relevant to Pohl's conversion/trade secret claims regarding Kassab's 2016 conduct; separated by years, different parties, no common elements of proof
190 22 22 Section 16.069 Inapplicability — No Fair Notice Within 30 Days Pohl defense Kassab's counterclaim failed to identify the assignors or state facts giving rise to the claims, failing the Rule 47 fair notice requirement under Rogers; Pohl could not determine until discovery in 2021 that claims were identical to those rejected
191 22 22 Section 16.069 Inapplicability — Post-Lawsuit Assignment Cannot Revive Claims Pohl defense The statute's purpose of preventing tactical delay is not served when claims were assigned after litigation commenced; applying Code Construction Act factors (Ball), allowing this would frustrate the object, purpose, and public interest underlying § 16.069
192 22 22 Non-Assignability of Punitive Statutory Claims (PPG Industries framework) Pohl defense Civil barratry claims are personal and punitive statutory claims analogous to DTPA claims; the statute is silent on assignability; the legislature knew how to make them assignable but did not; purpose is to protect a specific class (clients); penalties are punitive in nature; assignments increase litigation
193 22 22 Public Policy Invalidity of Assignments Pohl defense Assignments that tend to increase or prolong litigation unnecessarily, serve as transparent devices to circumvent limitations, or injure the public good violate public policy and are void (Sw. Bell, LAKXN, Am. Homeowner, Wright v. Sydow, State Farm v. Gandy)
194 22 22 Violation of Ethical Rules — Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof'l Conduct 1.08(h) Pohl defense A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client; Kassab obtained assignments from his own clients concerning their pending litigation
196 23 23 Res Judicata Inapplicability — Changed Material Facts (Marino doctrine) Kassab defense Res judicata does not apply when material facts have changed; Section 16.069 was not an available defense in prior litigation, constituting a change in legal rights; also logically inconsistent for Pohl to argue both different transaction (for § 16.069) and same transaction (for res judicata)
197 23 23 Judicial Estoppel Against Pohl Kassab defense Pohl argued to the Texas Supreme Court that the Assignments were valid (seeking dismissal of Brumfield and Gandy appeals) but argues here they are invalid; judicial estoppel precludes such inconsistent positions under Ferguson
199 23 23 Unclean Hands Against Pohl's Equitable Arguments Kassab defense Pohl committed felony barratry and cannot invoke equitable considerations to void the Assignments; one who seeks equity must come with clean hands (Omohundro)
200 23 23 Ethical Rules Cannot Void Otherwise Valid Contracts Kassab defense Under Wright v. Sydow and M.A. Mills v. Kotts, a violation of Disciplinary Rules does not void an otherwise valid contract; Rule 1.08(h) specifically allows liens to secure fees
201 24 24 Res Judicata — Dispositive Pohl defense Kassab confirmed his counterclaims are the same claims previously adjudicated; Marino (subsequently recognized claim) and Stubbs (new ordinance, different land use) are distinguishable because the barratry claims existed and were dismissed before the second action; under Hernandez, focus is on whether claim existed and could have been raised
202 24 24 Statute of Limitations — Section 16.069 Inapplicable Pohl defense Kassab does not dispute the underlying claims are time-barred; § 16.069 does not apply because the claims are from different transactions, fair notice was not given, and post-lawsuit assignments cannot trigger the savings clause
203 24 24 Logical Relationship Test — 'Significant' Requirement Pohl defense Kassab selectively omitted the requirement that facts must be 'significant and logically relevant' (not merely logically relevant) to both claims; how Precision acquired information is not significant to Pohl's claims about Kassab's 2016 purchase and use
204 24 24 Non-Assignability of Punitive Statutory Claims (PPG framework) Pohl defense PPG's four-factor analysis applies beyond DTPA claims to any statutory punitive claims; barratry claims are personal and punitive; legislature was silent on assignability; risks of distortion apply to the class of claims; Kassab ignored the four factors
205 24 24 Public Policy Invalidity — Assignments as Transparent Devices Pohl defense Kassab's own admissions show the Assignments 'tend to increase or prolong litigation' and are 'transparent devices' to circumvent limitations, violating public policy under Sw. Bell and LAKXN; Kassab's 'unclean hands' argument is not competent evidence
206 24 24 Judicial Estoppel Inapplicable to Pohl Pohl defense Pohl did not take an inconsistent position (referred to 'purported' assignments) and did not prevail on the argument in the Texas Supreme Court; Ferguson requires 'successfully maintained' position, which Kassab selectively omitted
207 26 26 Proportionate Responsibility / Responsible Third Party Designation (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.011(6)) Kassab defense A responsible third party is someone who caused or contributed to causing in any way the harm for which recovery of damages is sought, whether by negligent act or omission or other conduct violating an applicable legal standard
208 26 26 Civil Barratry (Tex. Penal Code § 38.12) Kassab defense Pohl engaged in the improper solicitation of clients through paid runners, constituting barratry which is a third-degree felony in Texas
209 26 26 Failure to Safeguard Property Kassab defense Designated third parties had an agreement and/or duty to safeguard property allegedly owned by Pohl, failed to do so, and routinely placed Pohl's alleged trade secrets in the public domain
240 30 30 Immunity Under Rule 17.09 of Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure Kassab defense Absolute and unqualified immunity for lawsuits predicated upon the filing of a grievance or participation in the attorney disciplinary system. Pohl admits claims are predicated on grievance filing.
241 30 30 Judicial Proceedings Privilege Kassab defense Absolute privilege covering statements in judicial proceedings and communications preliminary to proposed proceedings. Extends beyond defamation when damages flow from litigation communications. Covers pre-suit solicitation letters and barratry litigation.
242 30 30 Attorney Immunity (Youngkin / Taylor v. Tolbert) Kassab defense Attorney immune from liability to nonclients for conduct within scope of representation, even if alleged criminal or wrongful. TUTSA does not expressly abrogate the defense. Taylor (2022) requires reconsideration of court's prior denial.
243 30 30 Statute of Limitations (TUTSA 3-year; Conversion 2-year; Conspiracy derivative) Kassab defense Misappropriation discovered by Pohl no later than July 2014; alternatively May 2015 letters. Suit filed August 28, 2018. TUTSA expressly precludes continuing tort theories (§ 16.010(b)). Subsequent use/sale does not restart clock. Conspiracy shares accrual of underlying tort.
244 30 30 Conclusive Negation — No Trade Secret (Failure to Maintain Secrecy) Kassab defense Pohl failed to take reasonable measures to keep information secret — no confidentiality agreements with runners, information freely shared, no protective measures despite knowing of dissemination. Incorporates Nicholson Motion.
245 30 30 Conclusive Negation — No Ownership Kassab defense Client files are property of clients under Texas law (In re McCann, In re George). Marketing lists belonged to Precision as its work product (Favre testimony). TUTSA requires ownership (Title Source v. HouseCanary). Conversion requires title or right of possession (Catania).
246 30 30 Unlawful Acts Rule / Illegality Bar Kassab defense Texas public policy prohibits recovery for damages inextricably intertwined with illegal acts. Pohl committed barratry (third-degree felony) and unauthorized practice of law in Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, and Florida. Cannot prove ownership or damages without referencing illegal activity.
247 30 30 Improper Damages — American Rule on Attorney's Fees Kassab defense Attorney's fees from prior litigation not recoverable as damages absent statute or contract (Tony Gullo Motors). Texas Supreme Court has not adopted 'tort of another' exception. Even if exception existed, Pohl is not wholly innocent. TUTSA damages limited to lost profits, unjust enrichment, reasonable royalty.
255 32 32 Abatement Pending Related Proceedings Kassab defense A court may exercise sound discretion to abate proceedings to await a relevant ruling from another proceeding (Kallinen v. City of Houston). Abatement required when damage theories remain fluid until underlying litigations conclude (In re Tex. Collegiate Baseball). Also required when claims could be rendered moot by outcome of underlying proceedings (U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Millard).
256 32 32 Unlawful Acts Bar / Illegality Defense Kassab defense Texas public policy prohibits a plaintiff from recovering damages from his own illegal acts (Andrew Shebay v. Bishop). If Cheatham establishes barratry, Pohl's claims are barred and Kassab's illegality, unclean hands, and other affirmative defenses are definitively established.
257 33 33 Work Product Privilege Kassab defense Communications between Kassab, Montague, and Nicholson are work product because litigation against Pohl was anticipated no later than January 2015; they began discussing litigation in late 2014 and circulated a joint venture agreement by January 15, 2015
258 33 33 Attorney-Client Privilege Kassab defense Communications with barratry clients are privileged as attorney-client communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services in pursuit of barratry claims against Pohl
259 33 33 Confidentiality under Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct Kassab defense Communications between co-counsel (Kassab, Montague, Nicholson) and with clients are confidential under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct
289 38 38 Abatement for pending related litigation Kassab defense Kassab argues Cheatham case outcome will impact his illegality defense and that Pohl is still incurring damages
293 40 40 Evidentiary insufficiency after objections sustained Kassab/Nicholson defense If objections to Pohl Declaration are sustained and objectionable evidence struck, Pohl has no competent evidence to support claims
294 40 40 Interested-witness testimony standard Kassab/Nicholson defense Under Rule 166a(c), interested-witness testimony must be 'clear, positive and direct' — Pohl's vague references to 'Precision' without identifying individuals fail this standard
295 40 40 Grievance proceedings not res judicata Kassab/Nicholson defense Dismissal of disciplinary grievance does not preclude civil claims based on same conduct (Charles v. Diggs; Tex. R. Disc. P. 17.03)
296 40 40 Rule of Optional Completeness Kassab/Nicholson defense Under Rule 107, defendants entitled to introduce complete depositions when Pohl attached only portions, to allow court to fully understand testimony
321 43 43 Specific Denial of Conditions Precedent Kassab defense Kassab specifically denies that all conditions precedent regarding Pohl's conversion and trade secrets claims were performed or occurred prior to filing suit
324 43 43 Proportionate Responsibility / Responsible Third Parties Kassab defense Walker, Ladner, Seymour, Shepherd, Dona Pohl, Jaimes, Talley, and Santana caused or contributed to causing Pohl's alleged harm under Chapter 33, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.011(6)
325 44 44 Proportionate Responsibility — Responsible Third Party Designation Kassab defense Under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004 and § 33.011(6), persons who caused or contributed to causing harm may be designated as responsible third parties for fault apportionment. Notice-pleading standard applies. Court 'shall grant' leave if pleading is sufficient under § 33.004(f).
326 45 45 Proportionate Responsibility — Late RTP Designation with Good Cause Kassab defense Under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004(a), court may allow designation within 60 days of trial for good cause; Pohl's dismissal of Favre and Precision 14 days before trial constitutes good cause
327 45 45 Reliance on Representations of Ownership / No Improper Means Kassab defense Kassab could not have misappropriated trade secrets by improper means because Favre and Precision represented they owned all materials, and Kassab relied on those representations (para 21)
338 47 47 Proportionate responsibility / Responsible Third Party designation under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004 Kassab defense Kassab seeks to designate eight individuals as responsible third parties to reduce his proportionate share of liability
339 47 47 Insufficient pleading of responsible third party allegations under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004(g)(1) Pohl defense Pohl argues Kassab failed to plead sufficient facts showing the alleged RTPs were responsible for the harms underlying Pohl's claims, and the Supplemental RTP Motion merely recycles previously rejected allegations with no new factual content
352 48 48 No-evidence summary judgment — Conversion Kassab defense No evidence of: ownership/possession, unauthorized control, demand and refusal, damages.
353 48 48 No-evidence summary judgment — TUTSA Kassab defense No evidence of: trade secret ownership (lawyers don't own client files), misappropriation, proximate cause damages, reasonable measures to keep secret, willful/malicious intent.
354 48 48 No-evidence summary judgment — Conspiracy Kassab defense No evidence of: combination, object, meeting of minds, unlawful overt acts, proximate damages.
355 49 49 Abatement pending related barratry litigation (Cheatham case) Kassab defense This case should be abated because the Cheatham barratry case against Pohl is still ongoing after reversal and remand, damages are not yet known, and the outcome could definitively establish Kassab's defenses
356 49 49 Responsible Third Party designation under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004 Kassab defense Kassab replead his RTP motion after Judge Dollinger denied the original with leave to replead, but no ruling was entered on the supplemental motion
357 49 49 Offensive use doctrine / waiver of attorney-client privilege Kassab defense Pohl cannot sue for affirmative relief claiming trade secret theft (client information) while simultaneously asserting privilege to block discovery of pertinent information
372 50 50 No-evidence summary judgment on conversion Kassab defense No evidence of: (1) ownership or entitlement to possession, (2) unauthorized control by Kassab, (3) demand for return to Kassab, (4) refusal by Kassab, or damages (loss of use value or property value).
373 50 50 No-evidence summary judgment on TUTSA violations Kassab defense No evidence of: (1) ownership of trade secret, (2) misappropriation by Kassab, (3) proximate cause damages, reasonable secrecy measures, independent economic value, rightful title, or willful/malicious intent. No evidence Pohl legally obtained the clients.
374 50 50 No-evidence summary judgment on civil conspiracy Kassab defense No evidence of: (1) combination of two or more persons, (2) object or course of action, (3) meeting of the minds, (4) unlawful overt acts, (5) proximate cause damages.
375 51 51 Responsible Third Party designation under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004 Kassab defense Favre and Precision are alleged to have caused or contributed to causing the harm for which Pohl seeks damages. Pohl's own pleadings establish their potential responsibility by alleging they misappropriated and sold trade secrets to Kassab.
376 51 51 Proportionate responsibility under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.011(6) Kassab defense Favre and Precision are persons alleged to have caused or contributed to causing 'in any way' the harm for which recovery is sought, whether by conduct violating an applicable legal standard.
395 56 56 Responsible Third Party designation under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004 Kassab defense Court grants leave to designate nonsuited former co-defendants as responsible third parties for proportionate responsibility purposes
396 57 57 Improper use of Rule 166(g) pretrial conference Kassab defense Rule 166(g) should not be used to determine merits of controverted issues — it is a tool for disposing of issues founded on admitted or undisputed facts. Pohl previously sought summary judgment on these defenses but withdrew; this is an improper backdoor attempt.
397 57 57 TUTSA ownership requires rightful, legal, or equitable title (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 134A.002(3-a)) Kassab defense If Pohl acquired trade secrets through barratry, he cannot demonstrate rightful ownership. A person cannot own or enforce rights in a trade secret for information about ongoing illegal activities. A person who obtains property by illegal means acquires no title.
398 57 57 Willful and malicious misappropriation — relevance of Kassab's state of mind Kassab defense Kassab's belief about Pohl's barratry is relevant to negating willful and malicious misappropriation element required for TUTSA fees and exemplary damages under §§ 134A.004(b) and 134A.005(3)

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CREATE TABLE legal_theories (
    theory_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
    filing_id INTEGER REFERENCES filings(filing_id),
    theory TEXT,
    party TEXT,
    role TEXT,
    basis TEXT
);