section_id,filing_id,heading,summary
136,18,Objections to Pohl's Declaration,"Kassab objects to Pohl's Declaration paragraphs 4-10 and Exhibits 1-2 as conclusory, containing hearsay, lacking foundation for personal knowledge, and containing speculative and contradictory statements. Argues that conclusory affidavits do not raise fact issues and are incompetent evidence as a matter of law. Seeks to strike paragraphs 5-10 and Exhibits 1-2, which would leave Pohl without evidence to defeat summary judgment."
137,18,Objection to Paragraph 4 (Precision engagement),"Kassab objects that Pohl's statement about engaging Precision is conclusory because it lacks specifics: when, where, how he engaged Precision, who he met with, agreement details, timing, location, duration, and scope of work."
138,18,Objection to Paragraph 5 (Ownership of information),"Kassab objects that Pohl's claim of ownership of confidential information is conclusory. Pohl fails to describe what the information is, explain his ownership claim versus Favre/Precision's competing claim, or explain how it constitutes a trade secret. Under Texas law, 'a client owns the contents of his or her file.' Also cites Game Sys. for proposition that statement that software 'constitutes a trade secret' was conclusory."
139,18,Objection to Paragraph 6 (Conversion and sale),"Kassab objects on conclusory and hearsay grounds. Pohl fails to explain what 'sale' he refers to or provide details. The statement about Kirk Ladner 'absconding with files' is both hearsay (Tex. R. Evid. 801(c)) and conclusory. Pohl's description of information taken (contracts, client information, compilations) is conclusory because under Texas law the client, not the attorney, owns file contents."
140,18,Objection to Paragraph 7 (Computers),"Kassab objects that Pohl's statement about Precision refusing to return or converting computers is conclusory for lacking specific details about when purchased, how many, which were converted, type, and timing."
141,18,Objection to Paragraph 8 (Confidential understanding and sale to Kassab),"Three objections: (1) conclusory statement about Precision understanding confidential nature lacks who, how, when, where; (2) Precision's 'expressed understanding' is impermissible hearsay under Tex. R. Evid. 801(c); (3) statement that Precision 'purported to sell' or 'appears' to have sold information is speculation insufficient for summary judgment, citing Ryland and Essex."
142,18,Objection to Paragraph 9 (Unawareness of sale),Kassab objects as conclusory: Pohl provides no facts supporting conclusion that a sale occurred or that he was unaware of it. Pohl also states the sale occurred in November 2016 without explaining how he has personal knowledge of that date.
143,18,Objection to Paragraph 10 and Exhibits 1-2 (Federal Court Case and authentication),"Paragraph 10 is vague, ambiguous, not clear, positive or direct, and contradictory regarding parties to the Federal Court Case — Pohl says 'other entities and individuals' were parties but then says 'No other Defendants were parties.' Exhibits 1 (November 10, 2016 Agreement) and 2 (December 7, 2016 email) lack proper authentication because Pohl was not a party to either document, was not present at execution, and provides no basis for personal knowledge. Paragraphs 12 and 13 attempt to authenticate but fail. Requests striking under Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) and 166a(f)."
144,18,Reply A. Limitations,"Kassab reasserts that Pohl's own testimony conclusively establishes he knew of Kassab's involvement in 2014. Pohl testified under oath that Kassab and his 'crew' broke into his office in Gulfport, Mississippi and stole his stuff in 2014, but didn't file suit because he 'wanted to spend time to reflect on it.' Pohl does not dispute this testimony. Cause of action accrues when tortious act committed and caused injury, even if all damages not yet occurred. The December 2016 email is unauthenticated hearsay that does not mention Pohl by name. Pohl never pled the discovery rule, so it does not apply. Even if pled, nothing about an office break-in is 'inherently undiscoverable.'"
145,18,Reply B. Res Judicata,"Kassab maintains he established privity with Precision through Pohl's own allegations and judicial admissions that Favre, Precision, and Kassab are co-conspirators. Pohl sued Precision in the Federal Court Case for the same conversion and theft. Precision was owned by Favre during pendency and settlement. Cites additional authority: SED Holdings (5th Cir. 2021) and reiterates Palaxar, Seenyur, and RSM. Additionally argues he conclusively proved the claims in this case are the same: Pohl's own Mot. Exhibit 1 testimony identifies the same information, same alleged perpetrators, and same conduct."
146,18,Reply C. Attorney Immunity,"Kassab reasserts the immunity defense, emphasizing: (1) attorney immune from liability to nonclients for conduct within scope of representation, and inquiry focuses on kind of conduct not alleged wrongfulness; (2) even criminal conduct not categorically excepted from attorney civil immunity when connected with representing a client (Bethel); (3) Highland Capital dismissed claims for illegal acquisition of stolen proprietary information on attorney immunity; (4) attorney immunity applies outside the litigation context (Haynes & Boone, Cantey Hanger, Santiago); (5) the First Court of Appeals' characterization of Kassab's conduct as arising from 'a commercial transaction involving the type of legal services Kassab provides' is 'the law of the case' per footnote 1; (6) acquisition of clients and filing of lawsuits are actions protected by attorney immunity."