section_id,filing_id,heading,summary
205,28,I. Introduction,Pohl argues the court should deny Kassab's motion because Kassab fails to allege facts showing how the alleged RTPs are responsible for the harms underlying Pohl's tort claims. None of the eight designated persons 'caused or contributed to causing' the specific harms at issue. Texas has not adopted a 'butterfly effect' theory of proportionate responsibility. Only conversion and TUTSA claims are relevant tort claims.
206,28,II. Legal Standard,"A party seeking to designate RTPs must plead sufficient facts concerning responsibility under § 33.004(a) & (g). To withstand objection, movant must satisfy notice pleading standard with allegations of duty breached and causation (In re Cordish Co.). Responsibility for 'harm' (injury) is distinct from responsibility for 'damages' (In re Smith; City Nat'l Bank). The RTP must be responsible for the harm underlying the pled cause of action, not merely plausibly connected with damages (DLA Piper v. Linegar)."
207,28,III. Factual Background on Pohl's Claims,"Pohl asserts four claims: breach of contract (not subject to Ch. 33), conversion, TUTSA violations, and conspiracy (derivative). The conversion harm is Defendants' 'unlawful taking' of Pohl's property (Burns v. Rochon). Each wrongful possession is a separate conversion (Pemex v. BASF). The TUTSA harm is unauthorized 'use' of Pohl's trade secrets — commercial use by which the offending party seeks to profit (Berry-Helfand). Multiple TUTSA harms: (1) Favre/Precision/Nicholson's sale of trade secrets to Kassab/Montague, and (2) Kassab/Montague's use of stolen secrets to bring lawsuits against Pohl."
208,28,IV. Discussion — A. Shepherd,"Kassab's theory that Shepherd (Pohl's own attorney) failed to protect Pohl from Kassab's tortious conduct is 'as ridiculous as it sounds.' Kassab's factual allegations are limited to three paragraphs. Shepherd's duty only related to the Mississippi Litigation; no duty to prevent tortious activities by 'all third parties.' Even if a duty existed, Shepherd's conduct at most 'furnished a condition that made the injury possible' (Ambrosio) — not proximate cause."
209,28,IV. Discussion — B. Remaining Alleged RTPs,"Kassab fails to connect Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley, or Santana with the specific harms of Defendants' unlawful taking or use. The conclusory allegation that they 'placed Pohl's alleged trade secrets in the public domain' does not establish they caused Defendants' conversion or TUTSA violations. Dona has no particularized allegations at all. For Dona, Jaimes, Talley, and Santana, Kassab merely stated they could have breached a duty 'if' they 'had an agreement and/or duty' — without alleging such existed (fn. 1). Walker/Seymour/Ladner's prior ownership at most connects them with a separate conversion, not Defendants' conversion."
210,28,IV. Discussion — C. Untimely Disclosure,"Limitations on Pohl's tort claims have passed for the alleged RTPs. Kassab failed to timely identify them in discovery responses under Tex. R. Civ. P. 194.2(l). Conversion has a 2-year SOL (§ 16.003(a)); TUTSA has a 3-year SOL (§ 16.010(a)). Lawsuit filed in 2018 so all have run. Kassab's disclosure responses did not name Shepherd at all as a potential RTP. No addresses or telephone numbers provided for any alleged RTP. Per In re Dawson, failure to provide this information bars designation."
211,28,V. Conclusion,Pohl objects and requests the court deny the motion with leave for Kassab to attempt to replead.