section_id,filing_id,heading,summary
483,65,Summary,Lists 10 grounds for JNOV plus arguments on exemplary damages and conspiracy preemption. Argues Pohl's claims are barred as a matter of law for each ground enumerated.
484,65,JNOV Standard (Argument intro),"JNOV proper when directed verdict would have been proper under Tex. R. Civ. P. 301. Should be granted when evidence is conclusive and one party entitled to recover as matter of law, or when legal principle precludes recovery."
485,65,I. Information not a trade secret owned by Pohl,"Three sub-arguments: (a) Attorney-client contracts belong to clients, not lawyer — Pohl as agent cannot claim trade secret in principal's property (In re George, In re McCann); (b) No independent economic value — no competitive advantage shown, Pohl can still use information, only interest was hiding unlawfully solicited identities (Fmc Techs., ERI Consulting); (c) No reasonable secrecy measures — contracts not secret or privileged as matter of law, shared freely with Precision and Favre, produced in discovery without protective order, Master List available on PACER for six years (Landry v. Burge, Borden v. Valdez, multiple cases on waiver of secrecy)."
486,65,II. No evidence Kassab engaged in misappropriation,"Pohl alleged indirect misappropriation through chain from Precision to Favre to Kassab. But jury found Precision did NOT misappropriate (Q2(a)(3), Q2(b)(3)) and assigned 0% fault to Precision (Q4(3)). If Precision's owners didn't misappropriate, Favre couldn't have acquired by improper means, and Kassab couldn't have known information was acquired by improper means. Favre certified to Kassab that information belonged to Precision, not Pohl. No evidence Kassab knew or had reason to know information was trade secret."
487,65,III. Claims barred by limitations,"TUTSA 3-year SOL (§ 16.010(a)). Misappropriation that continues over time is single cause of action — limitations runs from first act (§ 16.010(b)). Cause of action accrued when Precision's owners (Walker, Ladner, Seymour) allegedly stole information in June 2014, or at latest when they sold Precision to Favre in May 2015. Suit filed August 2018, more than 3 years after May 2015. Pohl's argument that claim accrued in November 2016 (Favre-Kassab retainer) fails because conspiracy claim against co-conspirators accrues when underlying tort accrues (Agar Corp.)."
488,65,IV. Unlawful acts doctrine,"Bars recovery when plaintiff's illegal act contributed to injury and is inextricably intertwined with claim (Dugger v. Arredondo). Doctrine remains viable outside personal injury/wrongful death cases. Jury found Pohl's wrongful conduct (barratry) contributed to his injury (Q3 Yes). Multiple cases applying doctrine to attorney misconduct, illegal business dealings (Truyen Luong, Denson, Sharpe, Farha)."
489,65,V. Privilege to disclose client information,"Three privilege sources: (1) Tex. R. Evid. 507(a) — privilege to reveal trade secrets when nondisclosure conceals fraud or works injustice; (2) Defense of Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1) — no liability for disclosures to government officials or in legal proceedings to report suspected violations; (3) Common-law privilege for disclosures relevant to public health/safety, crime, or substantial public concern (Bartnicki v. Vopper, Restatements). Kassab used information to report Pohl's barratry to State Bar, courts, and affected clients."
490,65,VI. Grievance immunity,"Tex. R. Disc. P. 17.09 provides absolute and unqualified immunity for filing grievances or participating in attorney disciplinary system. Extends to 'all actions at law or in equity.' Pohl's claims predicated on Kassab's grievances — jury awarded fees for defending grievances as proximate cause damages (Q7(1)(e), (f)). Crampton v. Farris confirms immunity extends to all actions connected to disciplinary system."
491,65,VII. Judicial proceedings privilege,"Absolute privilege covers all statements by counsel, parties, witnesses in judicial proceedings, including pre-trial, depositions, pleadings (Landry's v. Animal Legal Def. Fund). Extends to communications preliminary to contemplated proceedings and those 'necessary to set judicial machinery in motion.' Applied regardless of claim label — covers any claim where 'essence is damages flowing from communications in course of judicial proceeding' (Laub v. Pesikoff). Pohl's damages flow from Kassab's solicitation letters and barratry litigation/grievance filings."
492,65,VIII. Attorney immunity,"Attorney immune from liability to nonclients for conduct within scope of representation (Youngkin v. Hines). Inquiry focuses on kind of conduct, not alleged wrongfulness — even criminal conduct not categorically excepted (Bethel v. Quilling, Cantey Hanger v. Byrd). TUTSA does not expressly repudiate defense (Taylor v. Tolbert). Kassab's conduct (acquiring clients, filing lawsuits) fell within attorney immunity. Court of appeals previously noted Kassab's conduct 'arose out of commercial transaction involving type of legal services Kassab provides' (Kassab v. Pohl, 612 S.W.3d 571, 578). Jury answered Q6 'No' (attorney immunity question) but no evidence supports that finding — evidence conclusively showed Kassab used information while in attorney-client relationships (from Feb 2017) to file barratry claims."
493,65,IX. Unrecoverable damages / no evidence of actual loss,"Two sub-parts: (A) Attorney fees from other litigation not recoverable as 'actual loss' under TUTSA (§ 134A.004). No Texas definition, but sister-state cases define 'actual loss' as lost profits, lost customers, lost market share — not attorney fees (K3 Enter., GME v. Carter, multiple others). Pre-TUTSA Texas law same (Sw. Energy). Attorney fees in prior litigation not recoverable absent agreement (Martin-Simon, Tana Oil). 'Tort of another' exception never adopted by Texas Supreme Court, rejected by 14th COA (Naschke), and requires 'wholly innocent' plaintiff — jury found Pohl's wrongful conduct contributed (Q3). (B) No evidence for $250,000 fair market value (Q7(2)) — Pohl testified only to intrinsic value, not market value; purchase price alone insufficient (Pike v. Tex. EMC). No evidence for $200,000 development costs (Q7(3)) — no testimony from any witness about Kassab's development costs."
494,65,X. No causation — Pohl's barratry was sole cause,"No legally sufficient evidence of proximate cause. Pohl presented no evidence he would not have been sued for barratry absent Kassab's conduct. Pohl's criminal barratry was sole proximate cause (Peeler), or clients' decisions to sue were superseding/intervening cause (Stanfield). Kassab merely represented clients who decided to sue Pohl for committing barratry. Akin Gump standard: causation cannot be proved by conjecture or speculation."
495,65,XI. Conspiracy preempted by TUTSA,"TUTSA displaces conflicting tort law providing civil remedies for misappropriation (§ 134A.007). Pohl's conspiracy claim based entirely on alleged misappropriation of trade secrets — Q15 asked about conspiracy 'regarding conduct found in Q2.' Under Reynolds v. Sanchez Oil, claims 'primarily based on' misappropriation are preempted. Multiple federal courts agree conspiracy preempted by TUTSA (VEST Safety)."
496,65,XII. Exemplary damages non-unanimous,"Q19 (exemplary damages) predicated on unanimous 'Yes' to Q17 or Q18. Jury did not answer Q18. General verdict certificate showed 'ten of us agreed' — not unanimous. Additional certificate: presiding juror signed unanimity for Q2 and Q19 but conspicuously did NOT sign for Q17. Under Tex. R. Civ. P. 292 and § 41.003(d), exemplary damages require unanimous finding on liability and amount. Multiple cases enforce this: Cullum, Redwine, DeAtley."
497,65,Conclusion & Prayer,"Asks Court to grant motion, disregard jury findings, and enter take-nothing judgment in favor of Kassab, or alternatively reduce judgment by eliminating exemplary damages and conspiracy-based joint and several liability."