section_id,filing_id,heading,summary
523,67,I. Introduction,"Kassab's motions repeat arguments previously considered and rejected at summary judgment, 166(g) hearings, pre-trial hearings, directed verdict, and otherwise. Jury verdict supported by nearly two weeks of trial evidence. Kassab recycles without adequate citation to trial record."
524,67,II. Standards,"New trial: jury's decision not to be tampered with lightly (In re Columbia); discretion has limits — must be for specific, significant, proper reasons; factual sufficiency requires finding so against great weight as to be manifestly unjust, shock conscience, or clearly demonstrate bias (In re C.H., Pool). New trial order cannot parrot pro forma template — must provide reasonably specific explanation (In re Munsch, In re Toyota, In re United Scaffolding, In re Bent). JNOV: proper only when directed verdict would have been proper (Tex. R. Civ. P. 301); evidence conclusive and one party entitled to prevail as matter of law (Zarate, Barrow-Shaver)."
525,67,III. Incorporation of Prior Briefing,"Lists 15 prior filings from 2021-2023 incorporated by reference, covering MSJ on counterclaims, motions to compel, expert witness motions, responsible third party objections, 166(g) motion, prior post-trial briefing, and mistrial response."
526,67,IV.A. Witness tampering allegations (MNT #1),Same arguments and evidence as Emergency Motion for Mistrial already rejected by Court. Walker is self-professed perjurer and extortionist who first tried to extort Pohl for share of judgment but Pohl refused; Walker then approached Kassab to sell testimony to help avoid judgment. Walker gave testimony in 2018 (different case) consistent with 2022 depositions in this case — demonstrably untrue that Walker reversed testimony 'in this case.' Kassab cannot establish entitlement to new trial based solely on unsworn statements of self-professed perjurer pitching story as part of offer to sell testimony.
527,67,"IV.B. Trade secret ownership (MNT #2, JNOV #1)","Jury properly found Pohl owned trade secrets after reviewing trial evidence. While client may have right to copy of individual contract, lawyer also has ownership right in each contract and collection. Attorney does not act as agent when fee contract is drafted or before signed. Client does not own collection of contracts or compilation of information. Pohl and other witnesses provided direct testimony on ownership. Arnold's opinion on what constitutes trade secrets is not relevant; she also testified Pohl owned contracts and lists. Jury heard evidence of reasonable secrecy steps — locked office above bank with security, workers understood confidentiality, value of knowing mass tort client identities. Kassab was willing to pay over six figures for the information, inconsistent with his claim it was publicly available."
528,67,IV.C. Q2 charge error waiver (MNT #3),"Kassab waived objection to Q2 by failing to object at charge conference. Charge conference transcript (Exhibit B) shows Court asked if Kassab had objections to Q2 and counsel stated 'Not to Number 2.' Cannot raise objection to jury question for first time in motion for new trial (Tex. R. Civ. P. 274; Mitchell v. Bank of Am.; Zermeno). On merits, evidence supported broad-form submission — Kassab helped induce breach of confidentiality by wrongfully purchasing trade secrets."
529,67,"IV.D. Misappropriation evidence (MNT #4, JNOV #2)","Jury found misappropriation after seeing ample evidence Kassab willfully and knowingly acquired trade secrets from persons he knew were violating confidentiality obligations. Kassab waived inconsistency objection by not asserting before jury dismissed (Bryan v. Papalia). Even if not waived, no inconsistency: jury could find Precision obtained information lawfully (working for Pohl) but Kassab misappropriated; could find misappropriation based on Kassab's post-acquisition use/disclosure. It was Kassab's burden, not Pohl's, to prove Precision engaged in misappropriation. Documents Kassab purchased were not sort properly purchased from non-lawyer; expert testimony on lawyer's duty of confidentiality; Kassab's cross-examination testimony could support inference of awareness."
530,67,IV.E. Q3 waiver (MNT #5),Kassab failed to timely object to Q3. Kassab himself insisted on including a wrongful conduct question at charge conference. He did not object on grounds that Q3 was not tied to other charge parts. Waived under Tex. R. Civ. P. 274; Mitchell.
531,67,IV.F. Proportionate responsibility question (MNT #6),"Kassab cites no legal authority. His proposed question was contrary to proportionate responsibility statute — Pohl could not have misappropriated his own trade secrets, so could not have violated 'applicable legal standard' (§ 33.011(4)). Question also improperly included Walker, Seymour, and Ladner despite lack of evidence at trial. Failure to tender legally proper question waived issue."
532,67,"IV.G. Limitations (MNT #7-8, JNOV #3)","Pohl's claims against Kassab could not accrue before Kassab engaged in wrongful conduct. Claims accrued no earlier than November 2016 when Kassab purchased Pohl's confidential information. TUTSA not being a continuing tort doesn't mean different people can't commit separate acts of misappropriation. Agar stands for proposition that for a specific party, limitations starts when that party first misappropriated — not when a third party did. Pohl filed suit less than 2 years after Kassab's first misappropriation. Court properly asked about misappropriation 'by Kassab.'"
533,67,"IV.H. Unlawful acts doctrine and privilege (MNT #9, JNOV #4-5)","Unlawful acts doctrine preempted by proportionate responsibility statute — in Dugger, Texas Supreme Court found doctrine 'no longer a viable defense.' Kassab cannot claim benefit of proportionate responsibility while also seeking unlawful acts doctrine. Even if not preempted, only applies if plaintiff needs to rely on illegal act to establish claims (Carcamo-Lopez) — Pohl did not need to establish barratry. Privilege defense: no Texas case law supports it; Kassab asks Court to be first in Texas to adopt privilege to engage in trade secret misappropriation; Alderson distinguishable (dealt with knowledge of how Medicare fraud occurred, not customer lists)."
534,67,"IV.I. Barratry evidence and causation (MNT #10, JNOV #10)",Barratry finding would have no legal effect on Pohl's right to recover. Not a defense to any aspect of Pohl's claims. Court properly limited opinion evidence on relevance grounds. On causation: reasonable royalty and development cost damages directly linked to Kassab wrongfully acquiring trade secrets. Attorney fee damages proximately caused by Kassab — he only successfully obtained clients after purchasing Pohl's trade secrets and using them for mass solicitation. Former clients' decisions to sue were foreseeable by Kassab as his specific goal (Dew v. Crown Derrick). Pohl has never been found by any adjudicatory body to have committed barratry.
535,67,"IV.J. Attorney immunity, grievance immunity, judicial proceedings privilege (MNT #11-12, JNOV #6-8)","Attorney immunity: Q6 language ('while in attorney client relationship') came from Texas Supreme Court (Youngkin v. Hines — 'existence of attorney-client relationship at the time'). No attorney-client relationship existed when Kassab used trade secrets for mass solicitation — cannot pre-date contact with prospective client. Jury rejected Kassab's argument on this point. Grievance immunity (Rule 17.09): lawsuit not 'predicated upon' grievance filing — claim accrued upon Kassab's acquisition/use of information, which occurred before any grievance filed. Judicial proceedings privilege: applies only to communications in due course of judicial proceeding and protects against libel/slander claims (Landry's). Pohl's claim is misappropriation, not reputational harm; misappropriation occurred before any proceeding existed."
536,67,"IV.K. TUTSA actual damages / attorney fees (MNT #13, JNOV #9(A))","Attorney fees from separate proceedings recoverable as 'actual losses' under TUTSA's flexible and imaginative approach (Sw. Energy). Tort of another doctrine also permits recovery (Dixon Fin. Servs. v. Chang). Kassab mischaracterizes LaCore — that case dealt with fees from same proceeding, not other cases. Kassab was warned about mischaracterizing this case but continues to cite it misleadingly."
537,67,"IV.L. Market value and development cost damages (MNT #14-15, JNOV #9(B))","Market value: Pohl provided competent owner opinion testimony informed by cost to obtain trade secrets, multiple purchase attempts, and contemporaneous actual sale (Red Sea Gaming). Property owner rule applies to intangible property (Custom Transit; Jabri v. Alsayyed). Documentary evidence: Favre affidavit on multiple offers; federal judge described document as purchase contract with lump sum and continuing payments; Kassab's own testimony on value he placed on trade secrets. Development costs: jury heard evidence of time Kassab's office spent compiling contact information for initial letters in 2015, hourly rates for Lance and David Kassab — $200,000 was reasonable inference of avoided costs."
538,67,IV.M. Willful and malicious misappropriation (MNT #16),"Jury unanimously found willful and malicious misappropriation by clear and convincing evidence. Kassab filed grievance and copied news outlets and DA — evidence of malice, not mere procedure. Kassab involved in drumming up seven failed grievances against Pohl; filed another even after knowing prior grievances were meritless. Publicized unreviewed grievance to TX AG, Harris County DA, Houston Chronicle, Texas Lawyer, and Bar President candidate — unprecedented. Kassab secretly purchased client files under guise of phony expert agreement; lied to jury about nature of contract despite federal judge calling it purchase agreement. Indemnified Favre against disclosure claims — demonstrating knowledge of breach. Kassab attacked Pohl professionally and personally beyond mere misappropriation."
539,67,"IV.N. Exemplary damages (MNT #17, JNOV #12)","Jury unanimously awarded exemplary damages. Prior briefing addresses unanimity argument (Sept. 18 and Sept. 22 filings). Jury's $3M award complies with statutory cap — actual damages over $2M, so 2x cap satisfied. Kassab's conclusory assertion that jury 'probably considered improper items' unsupported. Evidence showed: Kassab bore personal culpability as orchestrator of conspiracy; lied to jury about purchase contract; conduct offended justice — professed ethics enforcer who acted unethically and deceitfully. Jury well within rights to award $3M."
540,67,"IV.O. Conspiracy not preempted (MNT #18, JNOV #11)",Court previously ruled conspiracy not preempted. Conspiracy does not provide conflicting remedy — it makes same TUTSA remedy apply jointly and severally. No more inconsistent with TUTSA than proportionate responsibility (which Kassab argues is applicable). Texas trial courts continued submitting TUTSA and conspiracy claims together after TUTSA adoption. Kassab's argument inconsistent with his own position on proportionate responsibility.
541,67,IV.P. Responsible third parties (MNT #19),Court properly denied designation of five persons. Kassab failed to plead sufficient facts showing their responsibility. 189th District Court denied first motion; Kassab re-filed same facts with only cosmetic changes. Limitations had passed on claims against these persons. Kassab also failed to comply with timely disclosure obligations under § 33.004(d) (In re Dawson).
542,67,IV.Q. Abatement (MNT #20),Both 189th District Court and this Court properly denied abatement. Barratry is not a defense to Pohl's claims — even a finding in Cheatham would not change Pohl's right to recover. Kassab's attorney fee argument conflates two separate categories of fees. Does not establish abuse of discretion.
543,67,"IV.R. Privilege / offensive use / attorney fees evidence (MNT #21, #23)","Offensive use: Pohl did not satisfy three-part test (Republic Ins. Co. v. Davis). Shepherd became witness at Kassab's request — Kassab subpoenaed deposition and designated him trial witness; Shepherd produced nearly half million pages. Kassab sought to pierce privilege for fishing expedition. Redaction of invoices is common and proper (KBIDC Investments). Pohl's expert applied blanket 10% discount to account for any unnecessary/unrecoverable entries. Zavitsanos testimony not conclusory — Court found it sufficient to submit to jury when testimony was fresh. Desio distinguishable (dealt with fee affidavit without billing records, not trial testimony with records)."
544,67,IV.S. Barratry counterclaims (MNT #22),189th District Court properly dismissed on multiple grounds. (1) Res judicata: counterclaims were same claims resolved by prior final judgments; Marino distinguishable (addressed unrecognized cause of action). (2) § 16.069 inapplicable: claims don't arise from same transaction; Kassab failed to give fair notice within 30 days because he concealed identity of assignors. (3) Civil barratry is punitive statutory claim not expressly assignable; assignments procured from current clients to evade limitations in violation of ethical rules; court empowered to invalidate on public policy (Sw. Bell Tel.; PPG Indus.). Kassab withheld who assigned claims to conceal duplicative assertion in separate lawsuit.
545,67,V. Conclusion,Requests denial of both motions.