Filing Sections
Data license: Public court records
4 rows where filing_id = 62
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| section_id ▼ | filing_id | heading | summary |
|---|---|---|---|
| 462 | 62 62 | A. The Jury Verdict shows the Jury unanimously awarded exemplary damages | Two main arguments. (1) Burden: Under Menchaca, the party relying on the conflicting answer to avoid the effect of answers establishing liability bore the burden to object — that is Kassab. Bruce v. Oscar Renda directly holds the defendant (party opposing exemplary damages) had the burden to object to lack of unanimity certificate before jury was discharged. Post-Menchaca caselaw governs. (2) Caselaw analysis: Stover's reasoning is fatal to Kassab — the jury did not sign a unanimity certificate for questions 5 and 6 (threshold liability) but the court upheld exemplary damages because the jury certified unanimity on later predicate questions. The principle: not all predicate answers require a certificate of unanimity. Bruce demonstrates a signed certificate is not necessary for exemplary damages. Bryan shows defendant's counsel requested jury polling — Kassab should have done the same. Redwine (Kassab's 'most analogous' case) predates Menchaca and is facially not on point because the court polled the jury and confirmed non-unanimity; Kassab chose not to poll. |
| 463 | 62 62 | B. Pohl's attorneys' fees from prior litigation are recoverable as damages | First, under TUTSA plain text (§ 134A.004(a)), actual loss includes jury-found damages measured by attorneys' fees in other cases caused by Kassab's misappropriation. Second, on tort of another: (a) Kassab does not argue Pohl fails to satisfy the elements listed in Dixon; (b) there is no clean hands requirement — neither Texas Supreme Court (Akin Gump), published First Court of Appeals precedent (Dixon, Massey), nor other courts (Lesikar, Standard Fire, Symetra) include such a requirement; (c) the jury did not find Pohl had unclean hands — to establish unclean hands, Kassab must show injury to himself arising from Pohl's conduct (Wood v. Wiggins), and Q3's finding of unspecified 'wrongful conduct' contributing to unspecified 'injury' does not connect to any injury to Kassab. |
| 464 | 62 62 | C. Conspiracy is not preempted | Kassab argues proportionate responsibility applies to TUTSA but then argues conspiracy is preempted — fails to explain the inconsistency. Kassab falsely claims Pohl asserts no Texas caselaw supports preemption; Pohl actually said Kassab has no caselaw finding there can no longer be a conspiracy to misappropriate trade secrets. Kassab's letter confirms this by failing to cite any such case. Whitlock supports joint and several liability through conspiracy for trade secret misappropriation. |
| 465 | 62 62 | D. Kassab's liability is not predicated on the Jury finding that Precision misappropriated Pohl's trade secrets | Kassab's argument fails on its factual premise: the jury never found Kassab received trade secrets from Precision — evidence showed Favre sold them to Kassab. Jury found Favre misappropriated, which underscores falsity of Kassab's representation that 'those associated with Precision did not misappropriate anything.' The jury's 'No' on Precision could have many explanations — Pohl had no reason to present evidence of Precision's misconduct. Kassab designated Precision as responsible third party and should have put forward evidence and requested an affirmative finding. Kassab did not secure such a finding. |
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CREATE TABLE filing_sections (
section_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
filing_id INTEGER REFERENCES filings(filing_id),
heading TEXT,
summary TEXT
);