filing_id,date,doc_type,party,description,doc_type_detail,procedural_posture,chain,outcome,phase,filename,relief_requested,full_text
47,2022-11-30,OBJ,Pohl,Objection to Kassab supp. RTP,Pohl's Objection to Kassab's Supplemental Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties,"Filed November 30, 2022 in response to Kassab's Supplemental RTP Motion filed November 15, 2022. Judge Dollinger denied Kassab's original RTP Motion on October 31, 2022 (finding Pohl's objection was 'well taken') and gave Kassab 14 days to replead. Kassab filed 15 days later (one day late). Pohl argues the supplemental motion contains no new factual allegations. Pohl does not object to designation of Favre and Precision as RTPs.",RTP-1,N/A,Phase 3,2022-11-30_OBJ_Pohl-Objection-to-Kassab-Supp-RTP_FILED.pdf,"Deny Kassab's Supplemental RTP Motion without leave for Kassab to attempt to replead, as Kassab failed to plead sufficient facts after already being granted leave to replead","11/30/2022 4:26 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 70583280
By: Ashley Lopez
Filed: 11/30/2022 4:26 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et. al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
Plaintiffs, §
V. § HARRIS COUNTY,k TEXAS
§ e
LANCE CHRISTOPHER § C l
KASSAB, et. al § 
§ c
Defendants. § 189TH JUDrICIAL DISTRICT
POHL’S OBJECTION TO KASSAB’S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO DESIGNATE
RESPONSIBLE THIRD PARTsIES
Plaintiffs Michael Pohl and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl PLLC (collectively “Pohl”) file
this Objection to Defendants Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a
The Kassab Law Firm’s Supplemental Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties1 (the
“Supplemental RTP Motion”) and would showa the Court as follows:
Kassab’s Supplemental RTP Motion does not address the failings of the original RTP
Motion. The Court denied Kassab’se first RTP Motion2 because Kassab failed to plead sufficient
facts showing that the alleged resfponsible third parties were responsible for the harms underlying
Pohl’s claims. Kassab was ygiven a chance to replead with sufficient new facts to demonstrate
liability. However, thCe Supplemental RTP Motion contains the same factual allegations copied
and pasted from the briefing before the Court when it denied the RTP Motion. Kassab tried to
disguise this bfyf reordering and lightly paraphrasing or modifying the allegations. But Kassab
1 This Objection is primarily directed at Kassab’s Supplemental RTP Motion, filed Nov. 15, 2022. Kassab also filed
a Second Supplemental Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties, filed Nov. 22, 2022 (“Second Supplemental
RTP Motion”). Pohl does not object to the designation of Scott Favre and Precision Marketing Group, LLC as
responsible third parties. However, Pohl objects to the Second Supplemental RTP Motion, on the same grounds as
set forth in this briefing, to the extent that it seeks the same relief sought in the Supplemental RTP Motion or seeks to
designate anyone as a responsible third party other than Scott Favre and Precision Marketing Group, LLC.
2 See Kassab’s Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties, filed May 13, 2022 (the “RTP Motion”); see also Court
Order, dated Oct. 31, 2022 (denying the RTP Motion).
provided no new factual allegations since the Court ruled on the RTP Motion, and thus, the Court
should deny the Supplemental RTP Motion for the same reasons it denied the RTP Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Kassab seeks the same relief in the Supplemental RTP Motion as he soukght in the RTP
Motion—he seeks to designate eight allegedly responsible third parties—Billly Shepherd, Scott
Walker (“Walker”), Steve Seymour (“Seymour”) Kirk Ladner (“Ladncer”), Dona Pohl, Edgar
Jaimes, Ken Talley, and Magdalena Santana (collectively, the “Allesged RTPs”). See generally
RTP Motion; Supplemental RTP Motion. 
After Kassab filed the RTP Motion, on May 31, 2022, Pohl timely filed his Objection to
Kassab’s Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties (“Pohl’s Original RTP Objection”). It
clearly laid out how the allegations in Kassab’s original RTP Motion were deficient, and how none
of the Alleged RTPs “caused or contributed to causing” the harms underlying Pohl’s claims. See
generally Pohl’s Original RTP Objection (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.011(6)).
The Court was required to designate tehe Alleged RTPs as responsible third parties unless the Court
found that Pohl’s Original RTP Ofbjection demonstrated that Kassab had failed to “plead sufficient
facts concerning the alleged yresponsibility of the person to satisfy the pleading requirement of the
Texas Rules of Civil PCrocedure.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004(g)(1).
Kassab waiated until September 2022, to request a ruling on this issue. See generally
Kassab’s Motiofn to Rule on Plaintiffs’ Objection to Designation of Responsible Third Parties
(“MotionU to Rule”), filed Sept. 22, 2022. After Kassab’s Motion to Rule was filed, the Court held
an oral hearing, and the Court found that Pohl’s Original RTP Objection was “well taken,” and
denied Kassab’s RTP Motion. See Court Order, dated Oct. 31, 2022. Kassab was given leave to
“replead and seek the relief sought in the” RTP Motion “within 14 days of this ORDER.” Id.
Despite the Court’s deadline, Kassab took 15 days to file the Supplemental RTP Motion,3
and he then requested a continuance in part on the basis that responsible third parties had not been
designated. But even though he took 15 days, rending the request untimely, Kassab chose to
make no new material factual allegations when repleading. All of the factual akllegations in the
Supplemental Motion were contained in the RTP Motion and the Motion to Rulle. Thus, there are
no new factual allegations before the Court that the Court did not have in cfront of it when it denied
Kassab’s RTP Motion last month. s
II. COMPARISON OF THE ORIGINAL (ALREADY DENIEDs) RTP MOTION TO KASSAB’S
SUPPLEMENTAL RTP MO s TION
To assist the Court in understanding how Kassarb failed to plead new facts to justify
designating the Alleged RTPs as responsible third parties—and instead just copied and rearranged
prior allegations—Pohl provides the following dliscussion of how Kassab’s Supplemental RTP
Motion differs (or does not differ) from tMhe RTP Motion. The original RTP Motion and the
Supplemental RTP Motion are collectivoely referred to as the “Motions.”
The Motions are word-for-wcord identical for their first six and a half pages—excluding
references to the respective titles of the Motions. Compare RTP Motion, 1–7, with Supplemental
RTP Motion, 1–7. The “Facts” sections of both Motions are 100% identical to each other. See id.
The first set of real differences between the Motions are the opening three paragraphs of
the Supplementalc RTP Motion’s “Argument” section. These paragraphs discuss legal standards
and how the Court permitted Kassab to replead after the Court denied the RTP Motion. See
Supplemental RTP Motion ¶¶ 15–17. There are no new relevant factual allegations concerning
any Alleged RTP in these paragraphs. See id. Although these three paragraphs are not contained
3 The day before Kassab filed the Supplemental RTP Motion, Kassab filed an eighth amended answer containing the
same copied and pasted allegations found in his prior briefing. But Kassab did not replead and “seek the relief” he
sought in the RTP Motion until he filed the Supplemental RTP Motion after the Court-ordered deadline.
in the RTP Motion, they were copied almost word-for-word from Kassab’s Motion to Rule.
Compare id., with Motion to Rule, at 2–3.4
The only real addition of factual allegations comes with paragraph 18, which is not directly
copied and pasted from the prior RTP Motion. Compare Supplemental RTP Moktion ¶ 18, with
RTP Motion. This paragraph focuses exclusively on three Alleged RTPs—Wallker, Seymour, and
Ladner—it does not address the lack of allegations against other Alleged RcTPs. See Supplemental
RTP Motion ¶ 18. Furthermore, it is copied nearly word-for-word frosm Kassab’s brief asking the
Court to rule on the RTP Motion. Compare id., with Motion to sRule, at 3–4.5
The remaining seven paragraphs (paragraphs 19–25) of the Supplemental RTP Motion are
either directly copied from the RTP Motion, or they are lightly modified or paraphrased versions
of what was previously pled in the RTP Motion:
• Compare Supplemental RTP Maotion ¶ 19, with RTP Motion ¶ 19 (showing same
factual allegations were copMied and/or paraphrased).
• Compare Supplemental RoTfP Motion ¶ 20, with RTP Motion ¶ 17 (same).
• Compare Supplementeal RTP Motion ¶ 21, with RTP Motion ¶¶ 16–17 (same).
• Compare Supplemfeintal RTP Motion ¶ 22, with RTP Motion ¶ 18 (showing same
factual allegatioOns were copied and pasted with a few words deleted).
• Compare Supyplemental RTP Motion ¶ 23, with RTP Motion ¶ 20 (showing same
factual allegations were copied and/or paraphrased).
• Compare Supplemental RTP Motion ¶ 24, with RTP Motion ¶ 20 (showing same
factuaall allegations were copied and pasted with minor alterations or omissions).
• Co c mpare Supplemental RTP Motion ¶ 25, with RTP Motion ¶ 20 (showing same
ffactual allegations were copied and pasted with minor alterations).
4 Almost every word of these three paragraphs of the Supplemental RTP Motion was directly copied from the Kassab’s
Motion to Rule, other than a sentence noting that the Court denied the RTP Motion and granted leave to replead. See
Supplemental RTP Motion ¶ 16. This statement is not material.
5 The last clause of paragraph 18 adds: “as had Walker, Ladner and Seymour not stolen Pohl’s alleged trade secrets as
he alleges, they could not have sold the alleged trade secrets to Favre and thus, Favre could not have given the alleged
trade secrets to Kassab.” See Supplemental RTP Motion ¶ 18. However, this is not a new factual allegation, as it
simply lightly synthesizes other prior factual allegations. See generally RTP Motion.
There is one exception regarding those seven paragraphs. Paragraph 25 of the Supplemental RTP
Motion appears to be a combination of two different paragraphs—one from the RTP Motion, and
one from the Motion to Rule. Compare Supplemental RTP Motion ¶ 25 (containing new legal
arguments and citations), with RTP Motion ¶ 20, and Motion to Rule, at 4–5. Thkus, there are no
new substantive factual additions in the Supplemental RTP Motion. All thle facts alleged are
contained in the briefing that was before the Court when it ruled on the RcTP Motion.
III. DISCUSSION s
Resolution of Kassab’s Supplemental RTP Motion is easy. Despite the factual allegations
contained in the RTP Motion and the Motion to Rule, on October 31, 2022, this Court ruled that
Kassab had failed “plead sufficient facts concerning the alleged responsibility of the person to
satisfy the pleading requirement of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.” See Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code § 33.004(g)(1). Nothing has chaanged since the Court made this ruling.
Because this Court already found that Pohl’s Original RTP Objection demonstrated that
Kassab’s allegations were deficient uender the rules, it should also be sufficient as an objection to
the substantively identical Supplefmental RTP Motion. Pohl therefore incorporates by reference,
in its entirety, Pohl’s Originayl RTP Objection. The Court should reject Kassab’s “butterfly effect”
theory of proportionateC responsibility and deny Kassab’s Supplemental RTP Motion for the same
reason it denied Kaassab’s prior RTP Motion—because Kassab fails to allege facts showing how
the alleged respfonsible third parties are responsible for the harms underlying Pohl’s tort claims.
U IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons stated in Pohl’s Original RTP Objection,
Pohl objects to Kassab’s Supplemental RTP Motion and request that the Court deny the
Supplemental RTP Motion without leave for Kassab to attempt to replead, as Kassab failed to
plead sufficient facts after being granted leave to replead.
Dated: November 30, 2022 Respectfully submitted,
REYNOLDS FRIZZELL LLP
By: /s/ Jean C. Frizzell
Jean C. Frizzell
State Bar No. 07484650 k
1100 Louisiana St., Suite 3500 e
Houston, Texas 77002 l
Tel. 713.485.7200
Fax 713.485.7250 c
jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.rcom
Attorney for PlaintifDfs Michael Pohl
and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC
CERTIFICATE OF SERrVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document was served on all counsel of
record pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this 30th day of November, 2022.
M /s/ Jean C. Frizzell
 Jean C. Frizzell
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Suni Blue on behalf of Jean Frizzell
Bar No. 7484650
sblue@reynoldsfrizzell.com r
Envelope ID: 70583280
Status as of 12/1/2022 8:15 AM CST
Case Contacts r i
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldssfrizzell.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsogncoe.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Andrew Johnson ajohnson@thoumpsoncoe.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogleyr@foglerbrar.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Murray Fogler mfaogler@fbfog.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10607900ojefferson@mdjwlaw.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo 24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo f jason@ciofalolaw.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Todd Taylor p ttaylor@jandflaw.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Misty Davis C mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Non-Party Witness Billy Sahlepherd bshepherd@spcounsel.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Todd Taylor o ttaylor@jandflaw.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Scott M.FavreU scott@favrepa.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Lawyer Wade lawyerwade@hotmail.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Andrea Mendez andrea@kassab.law 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Lance Kassab lance@kassab.law 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
David Kassab david@kassab.law 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Nicholas Pierce nicholas@kassab.law 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
D Kassab david@kassab.law 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Suni Blue on behalf of Jean Frizzell
Bar No. 7484650
sblue@reynoldsfrizzell.com r
Envelope ID: 70583280
Status as of 12/1/2022 8:15 AM CST
Case Contacts r i
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
L Kassab lance@kassab.law s 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbgrar.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Lance Kassab eserve@kassuab.law 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT"
40,2022-09-19,OBJ,Kassab,Objection to Pohl’s MSJ evidence,"Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Evidence — joint filing by Kassab and Nicholson Defendants challenging admissibility of Pohl's summary judgment evidence including the Pohl Declaration (paragraphs 4, 6, 10-18, 20-32) and numerous exhibits, with additional deposition testimony offered under Rule 107","Evidentiary objections filed September 19, 2022 at 8:16 AM by Kassab and Nicholson defendants jointly, on the morning of the summary judgment hearing. Challenges admissibility of Pohl's September 12, 2022 declaration and exhibits attached to both the traditional and no-evidence MSJ responses. Attaches complete depositions of Ladner, Seymour, and Walker under Rule 107. Addressed to Judge Scot 'Dolli' Dollinger.",MSJ-3,N/A,Phase 3,2022-09-19_OBJ_Kassab-Objection-to-Pohl-MSJ-Evidence_FILED.pdf,"Sustain all objections, strike objectionable portions of Pohl Declaration and exhibits, and grant summary judgment for Kassab and Nicholson defendants","9/19/2022 8:16 AM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 68367189
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 9/19/2022 8:16 AM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIALk DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS TO C
PLAINTIFFS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE SCOT “DOLLI” DOLLINGEtR:
Defendants Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C.
d/b/a/ The Kassab Law Firm (“the Kassab Defendeants”) and Tina Nicholson and
Baker Nicholson, LLP (“Nicholson”) (both sets ouf Defendants collectively referred to
as “Defendants”) file this, their Objections to Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment
Evidence, and would respectfully show athe following.
OBJECTIONS TO POHL’S EVIDENCE IN RESPONSE TO TRADITIONAL MSJ
Plaintiffs Michael A. Pohel and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC (“Pohl”)
attached to his summary judfgment responses as Exhibit A a declaration from Pohl
dated September 12, 2022 with exhibits (“Pohl Declaration”). Defendants object to
the following statements or paragraphs in the Pohl Declaration for the following
reasons: i
Paoragraph/Statement Objection/Basis
¶ 4 – “During the period that I Conclusory. Unsupported by factual or
maintained office space in Mississippi, I legal basis.
shared that space only with contractors
and employees whom I employed full
time and were treated for privilege and
confidentiality purposes as functional
employees of my law firm.
¶ 6 – “I was informed that Maxwell- Hearsay.
Walker had retained Mississippi
attorneys to advise it and confirm that
its agreement with me as well as the
public relations and marketing services
it was anticipated to provide under the
agreement were in compliance with
Mississippi law.” e
¶ 10 – “Precision represented to me that Conclusory. Hearstay. Vague and
their independent attorney or attorneys ambiguous as to whio at “Precision” made
had reviewed and approved each of the alleged represtentations so this
contracts I signed with them. In fact, interested-witneiss testimony is not
Precision and/or their independent “clear, positive and direct” as required by
attorneys prepared or redrafted several Rule 166a(sc).
of the services agreements.” e
¶ 11 – “Precision also represented that, Conclusory. Hearsay. Vague and
in addition to their public relations ambiguous as to who at “Precision” made
services, they were competent to handle alleged representations so this
client liaison services and claims linterested-witness testimony from Pohl
management with respect to clients whao is not “clear, positive and direct” as
retained me and Jimmy WilliamsonM to required by Rule 166a(c).
investigate and potentially prosecute
their BP claims.”
¶ 12 – “I am and was the righitful owner Conclusory. Improper lay or expert
of all the confidential, pOrivileged and opinion on legal issues for which Pohl is
trade secret information and property not properly qualified or designated to
that Kassab, Montagupe and Nicholson provide testimony on. Unsupported by
obtained from Scott Foavre and Precision factual or legal basis. More specifically,
Marketing Group, LLC on which this Pohl’s statements that he is a rightful
lawsuit is baseda. l… as a lawyer, I am owner of the information, that the
also entitled tco imaintain a copy of the information is a “trade secret,” and that
files and havfei a possessory interest in he has a possessory and ownership
them. Moroeover, with respect to the interest in the information are
attorney-client contracts to which I was conclusory without any supporting basis.
a party, as a contracting party I likewise
have an ownership interest in each of
the attorney-client contracts.”
¶ 13 – “while a single client may have Conclusory. Improper lay or expert
the right to request and obtain his/her opinion on legal issues for which Pohl is
file, that client does not have the right to not properly qualified or designated to
possess or even access other client files. provide testimony on. Unsupported by
The compilation of my clients and their factual or legal basis.
contact information, or any subset of my
clients, belongs to me and is in fact a
‘customer list.’ This is equally true if the
materials consist of over 11,000
attorney-client contracts from which one
can ascertain my ‘client’ or ‘customer e
list’.” C
¶ 14 – “I repeatedly stressed to Precision Conclusory. Heairsay. Vague and
and its staff the importance of keeping ambiguous as to wtho at “Precision” made
client information confidential including alleged repreisentations so this
the attorney-client contracts and the interested-witness testimony from Pohl
corresponding files. In turn, Precision is not “clsear, positive and direct” as
represented to me that they would be required eby Rule 166a(c). Improper lay
providing their marketing and client or expert opinion on legal issues for
services exclusively to me and knew and which Pohl is not properly qualified or
understood that their work and designated to provide testimony on.
communications with clients including Unsupported by factual or legal basis.
the underlying information of the clients l
and any of my contracts with the clienats
were confidential and could not Mbe
disclosed without my express consent.
Although Precision was a third-party
provider of legal related services, for
purposes of privileged or cionfidential
information, they were eOffectively the
functional equivalent of employees
working full time for pme out of offices
arranged for and poaid for by me. I
considered them to be a ‘lawyer
representative’ asl that term is used in
the Texas Rules iof Civil Evidence.
¶ 15 – “I likoewise took additional steps to Conclusory. Improper lay or expert
safeguard my confidential and opinion on legal issues for which Pohl is
proprietary information. My offices, not properly qualified or designated to
where my information was kept, were at provide testimony on. Unsupported by
the top floor of a bank building which factual or legal basis.
had 24-hour security. The elevators were
programmed such that after hours a
person could only access a floor or floor
for which that person had authority. The
building itself contained numerous
security cameras. My firm would lock
and secure the offices after office hours,
and my files were therefore kept under
lock and key. I also made sure my
computers were password protected.
With respect to my contracts with my
clients, the contracts were written in a e
way that left no doubt that they were an C
agreement between a lawyer and a client t 
or clients for the rendition of legal
services.” t
¶ 16 – “I did not commit barratry. The Conclusory. Improper lay or expert
assertions made by the Defendants in opinion ons legal issues for which Pohl is
their motions for summary judgment not propeerly qualified or designated to
that I committed barratry and that I provide testimony on. Unsupported by
agreed to pay Precision any percentage factual or legal basis.
of the attorney’s fees I was to receive is
not true.”
¶ 17 – “At all times, I attempted tao Conclusory. Hearsay. Improper lay or
conform to the requirements relatinMg to expert opinion on legal issues for which
practicing in states in which I was not Pohl is not properly qualified or
licensed. I note that the filing process in designated to provide testimony on.
the BP Matter permitted the Unsupported by factual or legal basis.
participation of non-lawyers. iThere was
no requirement of bar Oadmission for
filing claims.” 
¶ 18 – “the assertionso that I ever agreed Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to
to pay any percentage of my attorney's who at “Precision” made alleged
fees to Precisiona lare not true. Instead, representations so this interested-
the May 25, c2i012 and July 15, 2012 witness testimony from Pohl is not
Contracts faiccurately reflect the “clear, positive and direct” as required by
agreement oorally discussed and Rule 166a(c). Unsupported by factual or
understood by all of the parties before legal basis.
their execution. The agreement required
that the Precision ""shall keep accurate
daily time records of all efforts expended
on behalf of LOMAP."" The %-of-
attorney's-fees clause was simply to
impose a ""cap"" on amounts that may be
due under the other terms of the
agreement, not an independent promise
to pay any percentage of the attorney's
fees earned by LOMAP on the subject
claims. This was orally discussed and
understood by the parties before the May
25, 2012 and July 15, 2012 Contracts
were executed.”
¶ 20 – “Further with respect to the terms Conclusory. Vague andC ambiguous as to
of agreement and services to be provided who at “Precisiont ” made alleged
under the May 25, 2012 Contract and representations sio this interested-
the July 15, 2012 Contract, I was witness testimonty from Pohl is not
informed by Precision that they wanted “clear, positive aind direct” as required by
to confer with their attorneys before Rule 166a(c). Unsupported by factual or
finalizing and executing the agreement legal basiss.
documentation. We specifically discussed e
that the inclusion of the agreed
maximum-price provisions was essential
to me in agreeing to either a ""reasonable
rate"" formula or a specified contract
rate. Precision subsequently confirmed l
to me that they had conferred with theiar
Mississippi attorneys, who had advMised
that the terms of the agreement and
anticipated services thereunder were
lawful, and executed the agreement
accordingly.” i
¶ 21 – “Precision and its members Hearsay.
agreed they would orpganize and host
festivals, town hall moeetings and other
gatherings to appropriately educate the
public as part of thleir marketing efforts.”
¶ 22- “On my cbiehalf, Precision and its Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to
members agrfeied they would organize who at “Precision” Pohl is referring to, so
and host foestivals, town hall meetings this interested-witness testimony from
and other gatherings to appropriately Pohl is not “clear, positive and direct” as
educate the public as part of their required by Rule 166a(c). Unsupported
marketing efforts. Precision was also by factual or legal basis.
responsible for training and supervising
their staff to ensure optimal results and
compliance with the rules governing
their marketing activities.”
¶ 22 – “This included Precision sending Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to
me falsified and inflated invoices and who at “Precision” Pohl is referring to, so
expense information. It was also later this interested-witness testimony from
discovered that Precision had Pohl is not “clear, positive and direct” as
systematically overcharged me on all required by Rule 166a(c). Unsupported
amounts I paid them under the public by factual or legal basis.
relations agreement.”
¶ 23 – “Precision admitted that they had Conclusory. Vague andC ambiguous as to
been stealing from me. Thus, from the who at “Precision” otr “PR Consultants”
inception of my relationship with PR Pohl is referring tio, so this interested-
Consultants, they consistently witness testimonty from Pohl is not
overstated to me the amount of the “clear, positive aind direct” as required by
actual costs they charged me for, and Rule 166a(c). Unsupported by factual or
then misappropriated, converted and/or legal basiss.
stole the inflated amounts for their own e
use and benefit.”
¶ 24 – “Precision took my property Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to
including my engagement agreements, who at “Precision” Pohl is referring to, so
client files, contact information, lthis interested-witness testimony from
computers and other informatioan Pohl is not “clear, positive and direct” as
without my permission. These files wMere required by Rule 166a(c). Unsupported
at one time maintained in approximately by factual or legal basis. Hearsay as to
seventeen clear plastic file containers. what Ladner – who is not a party to this
Ladner admitted absconding with those case – stated.
files from my satellite law ioffice and,
without my consent, keptO them at his
residence until they were later delivered,
also without my consenpt, to Scott Favre,
who had purchasedo Precision (from
Walker, Seymour, and Ladner) and
became its managilng member.”
¶ 24 – “Precf iision and Tina Nicholson Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to
refused to roeturn and converted to their who at “Precision” Pohl is referring to, so
own use my computers that I purchased this interested-witness testimony from
for my office and which Precision used Pohl is not “clear, positive and direct” as
while there performing services for me. required by Rule 166a(c). Improper lay
Those computers held software and or expert opinion on legal issues for
stored data that I had paid for, which Pohl is not properly qualified or
specialized legal forms (that had been designated to provide testimony on.
prepared in compliance with various Unsupported by factual or legal basis.
state law after consultation with local
counsel in those jurisdictions),
marketing information and other trade
secrets, my proprietary administrative
client forms, various fee-agreement
forms prepared in accordance with the
laws of various states, internal emails
and other work product relating to the
BP claims and other matters for which e
Precision rendered services in connection C
with our services agreements.” t 
¶ 25 – “This theft and unlawful Conclusory. Heatrsay. Vague and
disclosure was made even more ambiguous as toi who at “Precision” Pohl
egregious by the fact that, from the is referring to, so this interested-witness
outset of their contractual relationship testimony sfrom Pohl is not “clear,
with me, Precision expressed their positive aend direct” as required by Rule
understanding of the confidential nature 166a(c). Pohl’s statement about what
of the information based on their prior “appears” to have occurred is not
experience in providing litigation related competent summary judgment evidence,
services to attorneys, a field in which and his statement about a “barratry
Precision held themselves out to me as lscheme” is conclusory and unsupported
experienced professionals. Neverthelesas, by factual or legal basis. Moreover, not
without my consent, and without lMegal designated to opine on the issue of legal
title to the contracts, documents, title.
computers, passwords or data stored
thereon, Precision sold the contracts,
documents, computer, passwoirds and/or
stored data to Scott FavreO (even after I
had informed Favre that the materials
had been stolen from pme by Precision),
who it appears eventoually sold some or
all of those items and the information
therein to Kaslsab, Montague and
Nicholson for theiir barratry scheme.
¶ 26 – “Aso part of that enforcement of Conclusory and unsupported by factual
the settlement agreement, certain or legal basis.
Defendants were sanctioned.”
¶ 27 – “The materials at issue have Conclusory. Improper lay or expert
independent economic value from not opinion on legal issues for which Pohl is
being generally known to or not properly qualified or designated to
ascertainable through proper means by provide testimony on. Unsupported by
another person who can obtain economic factual or legal basis.
value from them.”
¶ 27 – “I agree with this valuation and Conclusory. Improper lay or expert
believe it constitutes the fair market opinion on legal issues for which Pohl is
price for what an investor would pay for not properly qualified or designated to
such information. However, the provide testimony on. Pohl’s statement
conversion and misappropriation of my about what he “believes” is not
client information has deprived me of competent summary judgement evidence.
this value.” Unsupported by factuaCl or legal basis.
¶ 28 – “I have suffered injury as a result Conclusory. Impropter lay or expert
of the Defendants’ misappropriation of opinion on legal issiues for which Pohl is
my trade secrets and conversion of my not properly quatlified or designated to
property. My injury includes the costs I provide testimDoiny on. Unsupported by
have incurred in legal fees and expenses factual or legal basis. Pohl fails to
that I would never have incurred but for provide susfficient factual support about
the conversion of my property and the fees hee alleges as damages.
misappropriation of my trade secrets. I
have personally incurred hundreds of
thousands of dollars in attorneys’ fees
and expenses in relation to defending
the lawsuits orchestrated by Defendants, l
including the Berry, Brumfielad,
Cheatham, and Gandy lawsuits. I Mwas
also harmed, as I paid a substantial sum
of money as part of a settlement
agreement under which certain
Defendants were required to ireturn my
materials and not fomOent litigation
against me. But I did not receive those
benefits.” p
¶ 29 – “The filing process in the BP Conclusory. Hearsay. Improper lay or
Matter permitteadl the participation of expert opinion on legal issues for which
non-lawyers. Tchiere was no requirement Pohl is not properly qualified or
of bar admissfioin for filing claims.” designated to provide testimony on.
o Unsupported by factual or legal basis.
¶ 30 – “At no time did I knowingly Conclusory. Unsupported by factual or
participate in any illegal solicitation of legal basis.
clients in Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas
or elsewhere. I always instructed
everyone in my employ to abide by the
laws of the state in which they were
acting. I, at all times, attempted to
adhere to the rules of the State Bar of
Texas and other relevant states
regarding the solicitation of clients.
¶ 31 – “Prior to the two year period Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to
leading up to the filing of this case, I was who at “Precision” Pohl is referring to, so
unaware that Scott Favre and Precision, this interested-witness testimony from
with the assistance of Tina Nicholson, Pohl is not “clear, positivee and direct” as
had sold my information to Kassab and required by Rule 166Ca(c). Unsupported
Montague. And, in fact, that sale by factual or legal bast is.
occurred in November of 2016, less than i
two years before this suit was filed. t
¶ 32 – “The grievances involved those Conclusory. 
same allegations.” s
Defendants request the Court to sustain these objections and strike these
objectionable portions of the Pohl Declaration. With those statements struck, Pohl
has no evidence to support his claimls against Kassab, rendering summary
judgment appropriate. M
In addition, Defendants object to several of Pohl’s summary judgment
exhibits on the following grounds.
Exhibit/Description Objection/Basis
Exhibit F - November 15, 2019 letter Hearsay. Irrelevant because outcomes of
from Office of Cohief Disciplinary grievance proceedings are not res
Counsel. judicata in civil matters. See Charles v.
l Diggs, No. 14-19-00725-CV, 2020 Tex.
Exhibit G – Feibruary 24, 2020 letter App. LEXIS 8502, at *5 (Tex. App.—
from Office iof Chief Disciplinary Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 29, 2020, pet.
Counsel. o denied) (client’s claim against lawyer
Exhibit H – May 14, 2020 Letter from was not precluded by dismissal of
Board of Disciplinary Appeals. grievance because “the disciplinary rules
do not set the standard for civil
Exhibit I – January 14, 2020 letter from liability”); TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R.
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel. 17.03 (“Neither the Complainant nor the
Respondent is affected by the doctrines
Exhibit J – April 10, 2020 Letter from of res judicata or estoppel by judgment
Board of Disciplinary Appeals. from any Disciplinary Action.”).
Exhibit K – January 9, 2020 letter from
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel.
Exhibit L – April 10, 2020 Letter from
Board of Disciplinary Appeals.
Exhibit M – January 9, 2020 letter from e
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel. C
Exhibit N – April 10, 2020 Letter from
Board of Disciplinary Appeals. t
Exhibit O – January 9, 2020 letter from 
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel.
Exhibit P – April 10, 2020 Letter from
Board of Disciplinary Appeals.
Exhibit T – January 9, 2020 letter from
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel. l
Exhibit R – October 3, 2017 Letter fMrom Hearsay.
Magdalena Santana 
Exhibit S – Transcription of audiotaped Hearsay as to statements made by
conversation between Lance Kiassab and Magdalena Santana.
Magdalena Santana. O
Exhibit Y – emails and letter from Hearsay
counsel p
Additionalalyl, Pohl attached to his response only portions of the depositions of
Scott Walker f(iExhibit D), Kirk Ladner (Exhibit V), and Steve Seymour (Exhibit W),
taken August 29-31, 2022, after Defendants filed their motions for summary
judgment. For purposes of optional completeness, Defendants attach the entire
depositions of these witnesses as Exhibits 1 (Ladner), 2 (Seymour) and 3 (Walker) to
this pleading and asks the Court to consider those depositions part of the summary
10
judgment record. See TEX. R. EVID. 107 (“If a party introduces part of an act,
declaration, conversation, writing, or recorded statement, an adverse party may …
introduce any other act, declaration, conversation, writing, or recorded statement
that is necessary to explain or allow the trier of fact to fully understkand the part
offered by the opponent.”). This exhibits include, for example, adCditional proof for
Defendants’ summary-judgment arguments, such as Kirk Ladner’s following
testimony: i
• Precision owned the marketing and client lists. Ex. 1 at 44-45.
• Helping hands decided which law firms to refer clients to. Ex. 1 at 55-56, 62-
64
• Ladner did his own research to find lthe motor vehicle accident cases. Ex. 1 at
97, 285-89. M
• Pohl was really splitting attorney’s fees with Precision and his contracts were
a deceptive smokescreein to make the scheme appear legal. Ex. 1 at 77-79,
83-85, 94-95, 269-271, 276, 287-288, 398-416, 443
• Forms and maroketing lists used by Precision belonged to Precision. Ex. 1 at
128-29. l
• Pohl nef iver told Lander to return the documents, which belonged to ladner.
Ex. 1 at 133, 173-74
• The BP claimants were clients of Precision first. Ex. 1 at 214-215.
• Pohl never told Ladner to keep the information confidential. Ex. 1 at 232-35,
264-65, 500-502
11
• Spreadsheets of claimants and pre-questionnaire forms belonged to Precision.
Ex. 1 at 244-245, 262-263.
• Pohl committed barratry. Ex. 1 at 274-280, 285-86
• Helping Hands and GM Verification signed up the claimants as their own
clients. 444 C
Additionally, Steve Seymour testified that Walker creaited claimant lists but
Pohl never said the client lists were confidential. Ex. 2 ati 96-98, 147-149, 221-222.
Walker testified that the marketing lists were Precission’s work product and so was
the initial screening forming Precision had claimants compete. Ex. 3 at 232-33,
237-242.
OBJECTIONS TO POHL’S EVIDENCE INl RESPONSE TO NO-EVIDENCE MSJ
Because the Pohl DefendantsM use the same declaration to support their
Response to the No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants
incorporate by reference all thie above-stated objections and assert them as to Pohl’s
declaration attached to the No-Evidence Response as Exhibit A.
EXHIBIT/DES o CRIPTION EXHIBIT/BASIS
Exhibit BB – Omnibus Transcript Hearsay
Exhibit D – Grcieivance documents Hearsay. Irrelevant because outcomes of
f i grievance proceedings are not res
o judicata in civil matters. See Charles v.
Diggs, No. 14-19-00725-CV, 2020 Tex.
App. LEXIS 8502, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 29, 2020, pet.
denied) (client’s claim against lawyer
was not precluded by dismissal of
grievance because “the disciplinary rules
do not set the standard for civil
liability”); TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R.
12
17.03 (“Neither the Complainant nor the
Respondent is affected by the doctrines
of res judicata or estoppel by judgment
from any Disciplinary Action.”).
Exhibit S – Zavitsanos Report Hearsay, unsworn.
Exhibit T – Pohl Deposition at 115-116 Hearsay regarding what third-parties
allegedly told Nicholson. Also, Pohl’s
testimony was nonresponsive.
Exhibit Y – Pohl Declaration
¶ 4 Conclusory. Improiper lay or expert
opinion on legal sitssues for which Pohl is
not properly Dquialified or designated to
provide testimony on. Unsupported by
factual or slegal basis. More specifically,
Pohl’s statements that he is a rightful
owner of the information, that the
information is a “trade secret,” and that
he has a possessory and ownership
interest in the information are
lconclusory without any supporting basis.
¶¶ 5, 6 Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to
 who at “Precision” Pohl is referring to, so
this interested-witness testimony from
Pohl is not “clear, positive and direct” as
i required by Rule 166a(c). Unsupported
O by factual or legal basis. Hearsay as to
 what Ladner – who is not a party to this
p case – stated.
¶ 7 Conclusory. Hearsay. Vague and
a l ambiguous as to who at “Precision” Pohl
c i is referring to, so this interested-witness
f i testimony from Pohl is not “clear,
o positive and direct” as required by Rule
166a(c). Pohl’s statement about what
“appears” to have occurred is not
competent summary judgment evidence,
and his statement about a barratry
scheme is conclusory and unsupported
by factual or legal basis. Moreover, not
designated to opine on issue of legal
¶ 8 title.
13
¶ 9 Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to
who at “Precision” Pohl is referring to, so
this interested-witness testimony from
Pohl is not “clear, positive and direct” as
required by Rule 166a(c). Unsupported
by factual or legal basis. e
¶¶ 10, 13, 14 Not designated as an expert on damages,
and his damages topines are conclusory,
speculative, unireliable, and lack any
factual support.
¶ 11 Conclusoery
CONCLUSION & PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should sustain these objections to Pohl’s
summary judgment evidence. With the aobjections sustained, the Court should grant
Kassab’s request for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment and order that
Pohl take nothing his claims against Kassab.
O Respectfully submitted,
p THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
/s/ David Eric Kassab
l DAVID ERIC KASSAB
i Texas State Bar No. 24071351
i david@kassab.law
o LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 00794070
lance@kassab.law
NICHOLAS R. PIERCE
Texas State Bar No. 24098263
nicholas@kassab.law
1214 Elgin Street
Houston, Texas 77004
Telephone: 713-522-7400
14
Facsimile: 713-522-7410
E-Service: eserve@kassab.law
ATTORNEYS FOR KASSAB DEFENDANTS
THOMPSON, COE, COUSINS & IRONS, LLP
By: /s/ Andrew L. Johneson
Andrew L. Johnson C
State Bar No.: 24060025
Zandra E. Foley
State Bar No.: 2t4032085
Benjamin S. Riitz
State Bar No.: 24096147
One Riverway, Suite 1400
Houstoen, Texas 77056
(713) 403-8210 – Telephone
(71u3) 403-8299 – Facsimile
ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com
zfoley@thompsoncoe.com
lbritz@thompsoncoe.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS TINA
NICHOLSON AND BAKER
fNICHOLSON, LLP
OCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that onp this date, September 19, 2022, I electronically filed this
document with the Clerk of the Court using the eFile.TXCourts.gov electronic filing
system which will send notification of such filing to all parties or counsel of record.
f /s/ David Eric Kassab
DAVID ERIC KASSAB
15
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this
document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below.
The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate
of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab e
Bar No. 24071351 C
david@kassab.law t
Envelope ID: 68367189 r
Status as of 9/19/2022 8:41 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email sTimestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com r 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Andrew Johnson ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Andrew J. Sarne asarne@krcl.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.conm 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Kathryn Laflin KLaflin@KRCL.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10607900 jefferson@mdjwlarw.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo 24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Larry Newsom lnewsom@fkrcl.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo jason@ciofalolaw.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Todd Taylor titaylor@jandflaw.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Misty Davis fmdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Non-Party Witness Billy Shepherd bshepherd@spcounsel.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Deidre Hicks y GWS_GROUP@spcounsel.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell C jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Todd Taylor  ttaylor@jandflaw.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Lawyer Wade a lawyerwade@hotmail.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Scott M.Favre c scott@favrepa.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Andrea Mendez f i andrea@kassab.law 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Lance Kassab o lance@kassab.law 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
David Kassab david@kassab.law 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Nicholas Pierce nicholas@kassab.law 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Katie Budinsky kbudinsky@krcl.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM ERROR
E. MarieJamison jamison@wrightclosebarger.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Jessica Z.Barger barger@wrightclosebarger.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT"
28,2022-05-31,OBJ,Pohl,Pohl’s objection to RTP designation,"Pohl's Objection to Kassab's Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties, arguing the designated persons did not cause or contribute to the harms underlying Pohl's tort claims and that Kassab failed to satisfy pleading requirements","Phase 3 response to Kassab's RTP motion. Pohl objects on grounds that the designated persons are not responsible for the specific harms underlying Pohl's conversion and TUTSA claims, distinguishing between harm to Pohl and general connection to events. Also argues Kassab failed to timely disclose RTP identities in discovery. Filed by Reynolds Frizzell LLP.",RTP-1,N/A,Phase 3,2022-05-31_OBJ_Pohl-Objection-to-Kassab-RTP-Designation_FILED.pdf,Deny Kassab's Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties with leave for Kassab to attempt to replead,"5/31/2022 5:00 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 64998436
By: cassie combs
Filed: 5/31/2022 5:00 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL AND LAW OFFICE OF § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
MICHAEL A. POHL, PLLC, §
Plaintiffs, §
V. § k
§ r
SCOTT FAVRE and SCOTT M. FAVRE PA, § l
LLC; PRECISION MARKETING GROUP, § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
LLC; LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB and § c
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. d/b/a § r
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM; TINA § s
NICHOLSON and BAKER NICHOLSON, § D
LLP d/b/a BAKER NICHOLSON LAW § 
FIRM; and DOUGLAS MONTAGUE III and § s
MONTAGUE PITTMAN & VARNADO, P.A., §
Defendants. § r189TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
POHL’S OBJECTION TO KASSAB’S MOTION TO DESIGNATE RESPONSIBLE
THIRD PARTIES
Plaintiffs Michael Pohl and Law Officae of Michael A. Pohl (collectively “Pohl”) file this
Objection to Defendants Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The
Kassab Law Firm’s Motion to Desiegnate Responsible Third Parties (the “Motion”) and would
show the Court as follows: f
y I. INTRODUCTION
The Court shouCld deny Kassab’s Motion because he fails to allege facts showing how the
alleged responsiblea third parties are responsible for the harms underlying Pohl’s tort claims.
Kassab seeks tfo designate eight different allegedly responsible third parties—Billy Shepherd
(“ShepheUrd”), Scott Walker (“Walker”), Steve Seymour (“Seymour”) Kirk Ladner (“Ladner”),
Dona Pohl (“Dona”), Edgar Jaimes (“Jaimes”), Ken Talley (“Talley”), and Magdalena Santana
(“Santana”) (collectively, the “Alleged RTPs”). None of the Alleged RTPs “caused or contributed
to causing” the harms underlying Pohl’s claims. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.011(6).
Reading Kassab’s Motion, one might be forgiven for thinking that a responsible third party
is any person who bears some (or any) connection with events related to a lawsuit and whose
actions could allegedly have impacted the amount of damages suffered by a claimant. See
generally Motion. But Texas has not adopted a “butterfly effect” theory okf proportionate
responsibility. Texas’s proportionate responsibility statute requires sufficielnt allegations of a
party’s responsibility for the harm underlying a plaintiff’s cause of acction before designation
as a responsible third party is proper. s
The statute applies only to tort claims and requires that potential responsibility be
determined as to each cause of action asserted. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 33.002,
33.003. The tort claims relevant to this analysis are Pohl’s claims for (1) conversion and (2)
violations of the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“TUTSA”).
In his Motion, Kassab fails to sufficieantly plead the Alleged RTPs “caused or contributed
to causing . . . the harm for which recovery of damages is sought.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 33.011(6). The Alleged RTPes did not cause or contribute to the harm underlying Pohl’s
conversion claim—Defendants’ f“unlawful taking” of Pohl’s property. Nor did they cause or
contribute to Defendants’ “yuse” of Pohl’s trade secrets, which is the harm underlying Pohl’s
TUTSA claim. SimpCly put, Kassab’s allegations about the Alleged RTPs’ conduct do not
sufficiently plead thaat the Alleged RTPs meet the statutory definition of a responsible third party.
f II. LEGAL STANDARD
AU party seeking to designate responsible third parties must timely file “a motion for leave
to designate” that pleads sufficient facts concerning those parties’ responsibility as responsible
third parties. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004(a) & (g). A party can object to the
motion on the basis that the movant did satisfy their pleading obligations. Id. § 33.004(g).
To withstand an objection, the movant must satisfy the notice pleading standard with its
allegations regarding the responsibility of potential responsible third parties. In re Cordish Co.,
617 S.W.3d 909, 913 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, orig. proceeding). This requires the
movant to provide notice of the alleged duty breached and sufficient allegations kof causation, so
that the parties to the lawsuit “can ascertain from [the allegations] the nature land basic issues of
the controversy regarding causation, and what type of evidence might be rcelevant.” See id. at 915.
The statute defines a responsible third party, as a person whso “caused or contributed to
causing in any way the harm for which recovery of damages is sought, whether by negligent act
or omission, by any defective or unreasonably dangerous product, by other conduct or activity that
violates an applicable legal standard, or by any comb
ination of these.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 33.011(6). Importantly, responsibility for “harm” in this context is not the same as
responsibility for “damages.” See In re Smitah, 366 S.W.3d 282, 286 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012,
orig. proceeding); City Nat’l Bank of Sulphur Springs v. Smith, No. 06-15-00013-CV, 2016 WL
2586607, at *7 (Tex. App.—Texarkeana May 4, 2016, pet. denied) (discussing how “harm” is
synonymous with “injury” and hafs a meaning distinct from “damages”).
A potential responsibyle third party must allegedly be responsible for the harm underlying
the pled cause of actionC, not merely be plausibly connected with the damages associated with that
harm. See City Nata’l Bank of Sulphur Springs, 2016 WL 2586607, at *7–9 (“to be a responsible
third party, onef must contribute to the harm for which damages are sought, not to the damages
themselvUes”); DLA Piper LLP (US) v. Linegar, 539 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2017,
pet. denied).
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ON POHL’S CLAIMS
In Pohl’s First Amended Petition, the live pleading, he asserts four different causes of
action: (1) A breach of contract claim; (2) conversion; (3) violations of TUTSA; and (4)
conspiracy. See Plaintiffs Michael Pohl and Law Office of Michael A. Pohlk, PLLC’s First
Amended Petition (the “Petition”) ¶¶ 35–43, filed Nov. 30, 2018. l
Pohl’s first claim, for breach of contract, is not subject to the procportionate responsibility
statute. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.002 (“This chapters applies to: (1) any cause of
action based on tort . . . .”). The harm underlying Pohl’s conspiracy claim is entirely derivative of
the conversion and TUTSA claims, and thus there is no need to analyze it independently from
those claims. Thus, the only claims relevant to the responsible third party analysis are Pohl’s
claims for (1) conversion and (2) violations of TUTSA. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §
33.003 (stating trier of fact shall determine reasponsibility “as to each cause of action asserted”).
A. The harm or injury for Pohl’s conversion claim is the “unlawful taking” of his property.
Pohl’s conversion claim ceneters around his allegations that “Kassab and Montague
knowingly purchased [Pohl’s] stolfen information/property.” Petition ¶ 38. The “injury” or “harm”
that gives rise to a claim fyor conversion is a defendant’s “unlawful taking” of the plaintiff’s
property. See Burns v. Rochon, 190 S.W.3d 263, 271 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no
pet.). Each wrongfaul possession is a separate conversion. See Pemex Exploracion y Produccion
v. BASF Corp., fCIV.A. H-10-1997, 2013 WL 5514944, at *31 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2013) (applying
Texas law).
The conversions that Pohl complains about involve the Defendants in this lawsuit, not any
of the Alleged RTPs. See Petition ¶¶ 36–38. Thus, the alleged harms or injuries for which Pohl
seeks recovery for in relation to his conversion claim are the “unlawful takings” by Defendants in
this lawsuit.
B. The harm or injury for Pohl’s TUTSA claim is the wrongful “use” of his property.
Pohl’s TUTSA claim is based on the improper acquisition and sale of Pohl’s trade secrets,
particularly in relation to the sale and subsequent use of them by Kassab and Montague. See
Petition ¶¶ 39–42. The harm or injury giving rise to a trade-secret misappropriation claim, like
Pohl’s TUTSA claim, is the unauthorized use of the trade secrets. See Sw. Elnergy Prod. Co. v.
Berry-Helfand, 491 S.W.3d 699, 721 (Tex. 2016). c t
There are multiple harms or injuries for which Pohl seekss recovery of damages in
connection with his TUTSA claim. One such harm is when Pohl’s trade secrets were used by
Favre, Precision, and Nicholson in their sale of the trade secrets to Kassab and Montague. See
Petition ¶ 41; Berry-Helfand, 491 S.W.3d at 722 (discussing how “[u]se of the trade secret means
commercial use by which the offending party seeks to profit from the use of the secret.” (citation
omitted)). Another harm is Kassab and Montrague’s use of Pohl’s stolen trade secrets to bring
unfounded lawsuits against him. See Petition ¶¶ 26–29; Motion ¶ 12 (confirming Kassab used the
alleged stolen materials to solicit clieents to bring claims against Pohl).
fIV. DISCUSSION
Kassab does not bothyer to identify which Alleged RTP is responsible for which of Pohl’s
claims, nor does he identify the harms underlying Pohl’s claims that the Alleged RTPs are
supposed to have caaused or contributed to. See generally Motion. Kassab’s conclusory and vague
allegations do nfot meet the fair notice standard because Pohl cannot ascertain the nature and basic
issues of the potential controversies with the Alleged RTPs. Kassab has not sufficiently pled that
the Alleged RTPs violated legal duties in a way that proximately caused Pohl’s harms. Finally,
Kassab failed to timely provide notice of the identity of potential responsible third parties in his
discovery responses.
A. Shepherd is not a responsible third party.
Kassab’s allegations against Pohl’s attorney, Billy Shepherd, are especially tortured.
Kassab apparently contends that in the scope of Shepherd’s representation of Pohl in a separate
lawsuit, Shepherd failed to protect Pohl from Kassab’s intentionally tortious conduct. This theory
is as ridiculous as it sounds. Such a tenuous connection to the harm on its face ldoes not satisfy the
definition of a responsible third party. Kassab has not sufficiently pled cthtat Shepherd possessed
any legal duty that he violated, nor has he adequately alleged that Shespherd’s conduct proximately
caused Pohl’s harms. 
Kassab’s factual allegations concerning Shepherd are limited to three paragraphs. See
Motion ¶¶ 16–18. The only allegations relevant to establishing a duty are that Shepherd was
“Pohl’s attorney in the Mississippi Litigation,” and he negotiated a settlement with certain person
connected to that litigation. Id. ¶ 17. But Kassrab’s allegations only suggest that Shepherd owed
a duty in relation to “the Mississippi Litigation,” and nothing pled supports a duty on Shepherd’s
part to go out and prevent tortious acetivities “from all third parties” who may have gained access
to Pohl’s information. Id. Nor cafn Kassab allege in good faith that Shepherd was retained to do
so. Without adequate alleygations that Shepherd violated an applicable duty, he cannot be
designated as a respons
ible third party. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.011(6).
Even if Kasasab’s conclusory allegations were sufficient at this stage to allege a legal duty,
he has not sufficfiently alleged that any breach of that duty proximately caused the harms suffered
by Pohl. Even if Kassab’s allegations were true, Shepherd’s conduct in relation to negotiating the
settlement in the Mississippi Litigation wase not a substantial and foreseeable factor in bringing
about the harms for which Pohl seeks recovery in connection with his conversion and TUTSA
claims. In fact, Kassab’s allegations actively undermine proximate cause, as Shepherd’s alleged
failure to go out and prevent the intentionally tortious conduct of third parties at most suggests
Shepherd “furnish[ed] a condition that made the injury possible.” Ambrosio v. Carter’s Shooting
Ctr., Inc., 20 S.W.3d 262, 266 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). Alleging in
a conclusory manner that Shepherd could have stopped unspecified parties from engaging in
tortious conduct outside the litigation in which he represented Pohl does not sufkficiently allege
causation. l
Ultimately, there are not sufficient allegations that Shepherd vicolated a legal duty that
existed in a way that proximately caused Defendants’ “unlawful taksing” of (for the conversion
claim) or use of (for the TUTSA claim) Pohl’s confidential and trade secret information. See
generally Motion. Without sufficient allegations that Shepherd “caused or contributed to causing”
these harms, he cannot be designated as a responsibl
e third party. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 33.011(6).
B. The remaining Alleged RTPs do naot meet the definition of responsible third parties.
Kassab’s theory of why the other Alleged RTPs—Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes,
Talley and Santana—are responsiblee third parties is similarly lacking. Kassab fails to make any
factual allegations connecting onef Alleged RTP with the claims in this lawsuit, and for others,
Kassab makes the conclusoyry allegation that they independently “placed Pohl’s alleged trade
secrets and documents in the public domain,” not that they caused or contributed to Defendants’
unlawful taking or ause of those materials. See Motion ¶ 20. These allegations are not sufficient
to designate thefse persons as responsible third parties.
One of the most egregious examples of Kassab’s failure to satisfy the pleading requirement
is in relation to Dona. Kassab makes no particularized allegations concerning Dona at all. See
generally Motion. There is no explanation of who she is, what conduct she engaged in, why she
possessed a legal duty that she violated, or how she proximately caused or contributed to Pohl’s
harms. See id. Kassab’s single conclusory allegation that Dona, listed with six other Alleged
RTPs, “routinely placed Pohl’s alleged trade secrets and documents in the public domain,
circulating Precision’s marketing lists and other documents allegedly belonging to Pohl to
numerous third parties rather than safeguard these documents and lists,” is not sufficient to satisfy
the fair notice pleading standard. Id. ¶ 20. Even if that conclusory allegation wkere true, it does
not even suggest that Dona caused or contributed to the harms at issue in this lawlsuit—Defendants’
unlawful taking and/or use of Pohl’s materials. c
Kassab provides slightly more information in connection withs his allegations about Jaimes,
Talley and Santana. See Motion ¶¶ 5–10. However, none of those allegations connect Jaimes,
Talley or Santana with the harms underlying Pohl’s claims—Defendants’ unlawful taking and/or
use of Pohl’s materials. Like with Dona, the closest Kassab comes is the conclusory allegation
that these individuals “routinely placed Pohl’s alleged trade secrets and documents in the public
domain . . . . Id. ¶ 20. But this allegation doaes not provide fair notice of how these individuals
caused or contributed to the relevant harms in this lawsuit.1
Finally, Kassab alleges that eWalker, Seymour, and Ladner were previous owners of
Precision, allegedly making themf responsible for conversion by Defendants in the case. See
Motion ¶ 19. However, aty most, their ownership connects them with a separate instance of
conversion, which givCes rise to its own harm. See Pemex Exploracion y Produccion v. BASF
Corp., CIV.A. H-10a-1997, 2013 WL 5514944, at *31 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2013) (stating that when
property is allegfed to have been converted and then transferred to another party, “each possession
is a new cUonversion.” applying Texas law)). Movant’s allegations against Walker, Seymour, and
1 For many of the Alleged RTPs—such as Dona, Jaimes, Talley and Santana—Kassab did not allege that they had a
legal duty that they violated that proximately caused Pohl’s harms. See Motion ¶ 20. Instead, Kassab merely states
that these persons could have breached a duty “if” they “had an agreement and/or duty to safeguard any property,” but
without ever alleging such an agreement or duty existed. See generally id.
Ladner are not sufficient to demonstrate they are responsible for or contributed to the relevant
harms giving rise to the conversion and TUTSA claims against Defendants in this lawsuit.
C. Kassab has not timely disclosed the identities of responsible third parties.
Kassab cannot designate the Alleged RTPs as responsible third parties because the
limitations periods on Pohl’s torts claims have passed with respect the Allegedl RTPs, and Kassab
failed to comply with his obligations “to timely disclose that the[se] perscont[s] may be designated
as a responsible third party under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedusre.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 33.004(d). Pohl’s conversion and TUTSA claims are subject to two and three-year
statutes of limitations respectively. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a) (conversion);
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.010(a) (trade secrets). Given that Pohl filed this lawsuit in
2018, these limitations periods have all run.
In response to Pohl’s requests for disclorsure, Kassab was required to provide “the name,
address, and telephone number of any person who may be designated as a responsible third party.”
TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.2(l) (rule in effecet for cases filed prior to Jan. 1, 2021). However, Kassab’s
responses do not provide this infofrmation.2 A party’s failure to provide any of the three pieces of
information in their disclosuyre responses can show they did not satisfy their “obligations under
Rule 194.2(l) and section 33.004(d).” See In re Dawson, 550 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex. 2018).
Kassab’s disaclosure responses do not name Shepherd as a person that may be designated
as a third partyf.
The responses also do not provide the address or telephone number for any
Alleged RTP.4 As a result, Kassab “may not designate [any Alleged RTP] as a responsible third
2 See Kassab Defendants’ First Amended Response to Plaintiffs’ Request for Disclosure, at 3, attached as Exhibit A.
3 See id.
4 See id.
party,” because he has not timely disclosed any Alleged RTP under the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004(d); Dawson, 550 S.W.3d at 630.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Michael Pohl and Law Offices of Mkichael A. Pohl
object to Kassab’s Motion and request that the Court deny the Motion with lleave for Kassab to
attempt to replead. c
Dated: May 31, 2022 Respectfully submitted,
REYNOLDS FRIZZELL LLP
By: /s/ Jean C. Frizzell
Jean C. Frizzell
State Bar No. 07484650
1100l Louisiana St., Suite 3500
Haouston, Texas 77002
MTel. 713.485.7200
Fax 713.485.7250
ojfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com
c Attorney for Plaintiffs Michael Pohl
f and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby ccertify that a true and correct copy of this document was served on all counsel of
record pursuantf to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this 31st day of May, 2022.
/s/ Jean C. Frizzell
Jean C. Frizzell
10
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Suni Blue on behalf of Jean Frizzell
Bar No. 7484650
sblue@reynoldsfrizzell.com r
Envelope ID: 64998436
Status as of 6/1/2022 8:30 AM CST
Case Contacts r i
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com s5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Andrew Johnson ajohnson@thompsoncoe.comg5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.coum 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrar.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Andrew J. Sarne asarne@krcl.com y 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10607900 jefferson@mdjwalaw.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Larry Newsom lnewsom@krcl.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo jason@cioofalolaw.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Solace Southwick ssofuthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
E. MarieJamison jamison@wrightclosebarger.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Todd Taylor pttaylor@jandflaw.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo 24003C021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24a01l2371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Jessica Z.Barger barger@wrightclosebarger.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas o cpappas@krcl.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Todd Taylor U ttaylor@jandflaw.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
David R.Wade lawyerwade@hotmail.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Katie Budinsky kbudinsky@krcl.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@favrepa.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Lance Kassab eserve@kassab.law 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Kathryn Laflin KLaflin@KRCL.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT"