filing_id,date,doc_type,party,description,doc_type_detail,procedural_posture,chain,outcome,phase,filename,relief_requested,full_text
57,2023-08-14,RSP,Kassab,Response to Pohl Barratry MSJ,Kassab Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Rule 166(g) Motion on Barratry Liability and Specific Affirmative Defenses,"Filed August 14, 2023 in the 281st Judicial District Court, Harris County, Cause No. 2018-58419. Kassab responds to Pohl's Rule 166(g) pretrial motion seeking to exclude evidence of barratry and eliminate ten of Kassab's affirmative defenses. Kassab argues barratry evidence is central to both Pohl's claims and Kassab's defenses, and that Rule 166(g) is procedurally improper for this purpose.",MSJ-3,N/A,Phase 4,2023-08-14_RSP_Kassab-Response-to-Pohl-Partial-MSJ_FILED.pdf,Deny Plaintiffs' Rule 166(g) Motion on Barratry Liability and Specific Affirmative Defenses Asserted by the Kassab Defendants,"8/13/2023 12:21 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 78474030
By: Bonnie Lugo
Filed: 8/14/2023 12:00 AM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
§ k
§ e
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 281st JUDICCIAL DISTRICT
THE KASSAB DEFENDANTS’
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S RULE 166(g) tMOTION
Defendants Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C.
d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab”) files this Reseponse to Plaintiffs’ Michael Pohl
and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl PLLC’s (“Pohul”) Rule 166(g) Motion on Barratry
Liability and Specific Affirmative Defenses Asserted by the Kassab Defendants (“the
Motion”), and in support thereof, woulda show the following.
SUMMARY
Pohl asks the Court to rulee that the issue of whether Pohl committed barratry
is irrelevant and should be efxcluded from evidence. Pohl is so concerned about this
issue that he has made it the subject of several motions seeking similar relief. But
barratry is central not only to Kassab’s defenses; it is central to Pohl’s own claims.
As a preliiminary matter, Pohl’s latest motion is procedurally defective. Rule
166(g) is noot intended as a substitute for normal summary judgment practice. Indeed,
Pohl previously moved for summary judgment on Kassab’s affirmative defenses, later
withdrawing his request to have his summary judgment motion heard. The new
Motion improperly tries to backdoor the same relief.
More substantively, Pohl’s barratry is relevant to virtually every issue in the
case. Take his trade secret claim. He must prove that he is the “rightful, legal, or
equitable” owner of the alleged secrets. If Pohl himself obtained the alleged secrets
illegally, he cannot enjoy the benefits of the trade secret statute. Moreover, for Pohl
to recover his attorneys’ fees on his trade secret claim, he must provek “willful and
malicious misappropriation.” In other words, Pohl’s claim dependsC on Kassab’s state
of mind. Kassab is entitled to prove that his belief about Pohl’s barratry was well-
founded. i
Barratry is also directly linked to Pohl’s claim to recover his fees for defending
the barratry suits. Pohl claims those fees as damages for misappropriation of trade
secrets. How can he seek to recover fees for defending the barratry suits without
talking about the claims in those suits? Iln addition, Kassab asserts proportionate
responsibility for these alleged damaMges; he gets to demonstrate that Pohl incurred
those fees not because of any alleged misappropriation of trade secrets but because
Pohl engaged in barratry. Bariratry therefore hits the heart of the cause of Pohl’s own
damages.
Barratry is releovant to several of Kassab’s defenses, too. As we will explain,
the defenses of illlegality, unlawful acts, attorney immunity, judicial privilege, and
others all brinig the facts surrounding the barratry into the picture.
We understand why Pohl strives so mightily to exclude evidence of his own
contributing conduct. It mortally wounds his claims. But the facts relating to the
barratry underlie and intertwine with all the claims and defenses. The Motion must
be denied.
RESPONSE TO RULE 166(g) MOTION
I. Pohl’s belated use of Rule 166(g) as a last-minute effort to decide
the merits of Kassab’s affirmative defenses is improper.
Rule 166(g) provides that, “to assist in the disposition of thee case without
undue expense or burden to the parties, the court may in its discretion direct the
attorneys for the parties and the parties … to appear beforte it for a conference to
consider … [t]he identification of legal matters to be ruled on or decided by the
court[.]” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166(g). “The pretrial confereence contemplated by this rule
should not be used to determine issues involvinug controverted facts. It is a tool to
‘dispose of issues which are founded upon admitted or undisputed facts.’” McCreight
v. City of Cleburne, 940 S.W.2d 285, 288 a(Tex. App.—Waco 1997, writ denied) (quoting
Provident Life & Acci. Ins. Co. v. Hazlitt, 216 S.W.2d 805, 807 (1949)). Thus, “[t]here
is nothing in the rule authorizineg the trial court to determine the merits of the issues
raised by the pleadings at a pfre-trial hearing, where the parties do not agree to limit
the issues, and the issues raised by the pleadings are not disposed of by admissions.”
Mason v. Tobin, 408 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston 1966, no writ).
That is eixactly what Pohl wants the Court to do here; obtain summary-
judgment lioke dismissal of Kassab’s affirmative defenses (without providing Kassab
the requisite summary judgment notice), arguing that Kassab’s unlawful acts defense
is precluded under Texas law,1 that the defense of justification is “not available as a
1 Motion, at § B(1).
matter of law,”2 that immunity under the rules of disciplinary procedure does not
apply,3 and that “unclean hands is not a defense to legal claims.”4 Notably, Pohl
already sought to dismiss these defenses via traditional and no-evidence summary
judgment.5 Kassab, along with other defendants, responded.6 Althoughk Pohl set that
motion for hearing, he voluntarily withdrew the notice after KassabC filed his response
and it was never reset. Pohl had his opportunity to obtain dismissal on Kassab’s
affirmative defenses, but he squandered it. Pohl should noit now, at this late in the
game, be permitted to misuse Rule 166(g) as an untimely means to decide the merits
of Kassab’s affirmative defenses. See Mason, 408 S.W.2d at 245.
II. Evidence of Pohl’s barratrous conduct is directly relevant to
Pohl’s claims and his own proportionate responsibility.
Pohl’s Rule 166(g) motion is basead entirely on the false premise that “whether
barratry occurred” is “not legally relevant to the material issues in this case[.]”7
Whether Pohl committed barratery is relevant to establishing Pohl’s own claims, and
his own proportionate responfsibility.
Pohl has pursued claims under TUTSA, which requires a person claiming
ownership of a trade secret to demonstrate “rightful, legal, or equitable” title to the
information. Se
ei TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.002(3-a). Yet, a person cannot
2 Motion, at § B(2).
3 Motion, at §§ B(3).
4 Motion, at § B(4).
5 See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses that
Seek to Relitigate Failed Barratry Claims Against Plaintiffs and No-Evidence Motion for Summary
Judgment on the Remaining Affirmative Defenses, filed on August 29, 2022.
6 See Kassab’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Traditional and No-Evidence Summary
Judgment, filed September 12, 2022.
7 Motion, p. 2.
own or enforce rights in a trade secret for information about ongoing illegal activities.
See Alderson v. United States, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1200 (C.D. Cal. 2010), aff'd, 686
F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2012). In Alderson, the Court recognized that a trade secret “only
exists if the secret-holder takes reasonable efforts to maintain the skecrecy of the
information” and that “element simply cannot be satisfied with respCect to information
about ongoing illegality.” Id. The Alderson court noted that its “conclusion is
consistent with the underlying justifications of trade secretis law, which include ‘the
maintenance of standards of commercial ethics’” because “‘[c]ommercial ethics’ are
not maintained if businesses are able to conceal illegality.” Id. (quoting Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481-482 (1974)).
Therefore, Kassab is entitled to estalblish that Pohl acquired the information
he claims to be confidential trade secrMets – client lists and attorney-client contracts –
through barratry by unlawfully paying Precision and its members to develop the lists
of potential clients and solicitiing them to hire Pohl. If the client lists and contracts
were procured by barratry, then Pohl cannot be a legal, equitable or rightful owner
of the information. TEoX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.002(3-a). In that case, Pohl
cannot show he mlade reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of the information
because commiercial ethics are not maintained if Pohl is able to conceal his illegal
barratry. Alderson, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1200; A. Benjamini, Inc. v. Dickson, 2 S.W.3d
611, 613-14 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (a person who obtains
property by illegal means, such as theft, “acquires no title in the property”); Dynamic
Prod. v. Cima Energy Ltd., No. 4:17-CV-01032, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66987, at *21
(S.D. Tex. 2018) (company who obtained oil production by trespass was not rightful
owner of property).
Pohl also seeks attorney’s fees as damages under a “tort of another” theory.
This theory has never been embraced by the Texas Supreme Court ankd it has been
flatly rejected by the Houston Court of Appeals. Akin, Gump, StrauCss, Hauer & Feld,
L.L.P. v. Nat'l Dev. & Research Corp., 299 S.W.3d 106, 119 (Tex. 2009); Naschke v.
Gulf Coast Conference, 187 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex. App.—Hiouston [14th Dist.] 2006,
pet. denied). But to the extent it applies, it is an equitable doctrine that requires the
claimant to be an innocent party. See Brannan Paving GP, LLC v. Pavement
Markings, Inc., 446 S.W.3d 14, 27 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2013, pet. denied).
Whether Pohl committed barratry is rellevant to establishing that he is not an
innocent party, and negating Pohl’s cMlaimed damages under this theory. See Per-Se
Techs., Inc. v. Sybase, Inc., No. 01-03-01293-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 5096, at *24
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Disti.] June 30, 2005, no pet.) (declining to decide whether
exception applied, but holding even if it did, the plaintiff “is not a wholly innocent
party” because the satoellite litigation resulted due to their conduct).
Furthermorle, Pohl seeks his legal fees under TUTSA and exemplary damages,8
and can get th
iem only if he proves willful and malicious misappropriation. TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.004(b), 134A.005(3). That means Pohl must establish that
Kassab engaged in “intentional misappropriation resulting from the conscious
disregard of the rights of the owner of the trade secret.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
8 First Amended Petition, ¶¶ 46-47.
§ 134A.002(7). Thus, Kassab’s intent is highly relevant. If Kassab believed that Pohl
had committed barratry by paying Precision to acquire the information and,
therefore, the information was property of Precision or Pohl had no legal, rightful or
equitable title to the information, then Pohl cannot establish willful aknd malicious
misappropriation. Thus, whether Pohl committed barratry – orC at least whether
Kassab had a belief that Pohl did – is directly relevant to Pohl’s own affirmative
claims. i
Moreover, whether Pohl committed barratry is directly relevant to his
proportionate responsibility. Under the statute, “a claimant may not recover damages
if his percentage of responsibility is greater than 50 percent.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 33.001. The trier of fact must consilder whether Pohl caused or contributed to
causing “in any way the harm for wMhich recovery of damages is sought[.]” Id. at §
33.003(a)(1). Here, the harm for which recovery of damages is sought is the purported
taking or misuse of Pohl’s allegiedly confidential information by Precision and others,
and the alleged sale of that information to Kassab who, on behalf of his clients,
brought barratry claimos against Pohl.9 Pohl seeks more than $2.4 million as “actual
loss damages” thalt include “the reasonable fees and expenses [Pohl] incurred in
defending [thei] underlying barratry and grievance proceedings that were made
possible through the [alleged] misappropriation of Pohl’s trade secrets” plus the “the
amount paid [by Pohl] under a settlement agreement [with Precision in the
Mississippi litigation, which was $1 million] that should have prevented the further
9 First Amended Petition, at ¶ 29.
[alleged] misappropriation of Pohl’s trade secrets.”10 Whether Pohl committed the
barratry which gave rise to the barratry claim is relevant to establishing that Pohl is
“in any way” responsible for the harm for which recovery of damages is sought. Id. at
§ 33.003(a)(1). k
III. Evidence of Pohl’s barratrous conduct is directly rCelevant to
Kassab’s affirmative defenses. 
Whether barratry occurred is also relevant to sevteral of Kassab’s live
affirmative defenses for which Kassab will be requesting jury findings at trial.11
Recognizing this fact, Pohl argues that “[a]s a matteer of law, ten of those defenses do
not exist or do not apply in this case.”12 Thus, Puohl asks the Court to “find that the
ten defenses … are not legally viable and will not be considered at trial.”13 The Court
should not consider Pohl’s untimely raequest for summary judgment on Kassab’s
affirmative defenses disguised a Rule 166(g) motion. Mason, 408 S.W.2d at 245.
Regardless, Pohl cannot establiseh that Kassab’s affirmative defenses fail as a matter
of law.14
A. Whether Pohl committed barratry is directly relevant to
many oof Kassab’s defenses which Pohl has failed to
conclusively negate.
The unlawiful acts rule provides that “no action will lie to recover a claim for
10 ExhibitU 1, Pohl’s Amended Response to Disclosures, at 4.
11 Exhibit 2, Kassab’s Proposed Jury Charge.
12 Motion, p. 8.
13 Motion, p. 8.
14 In his Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment filed on August 29, 2022, Kassab demonstrated
that Pohl’s unlawful acts, criminal acts and the in pari delicto doctrines preclude Pohl’s claims as a
matter of law. Kassab incorporates that argument and evidence as if set forth verbatim herein. Kassab
also incorporates the argument and evidence relating to the unlawful acts doctrine (including illegal
or criminal acts or in pari delicto) set forth on pages 9-14 of Nicholson’s Response to Plaintiffs’
Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on September 12, 2022.
damages, if to establish it the plaintiff requires aid from an illegal transaction, or is
under the necessity of showing or in any manner depending upon an illegal act to
which he is a party.” Gulf, C. & S. F. RY. Co. v. Johnson, 621, 9 S.W. 602, 602-03
(1888). “Courts have interpreted this defense to mean that if the killegal act is
inextricably intertwined with the claim and the alleged damageCs would not have
occurred but for the illegal act, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover as a matter of
law.” Sharpe v. Turley, 191 S.W.3d 362, 366 (Tex. App.—Diallas 2006, pet. denied).
Courts have applied the doctrine without a conviction of a crime so long as “the
unlawful act barring the plaintiff's claim was in fact illegal conduct.” McNally v.
McNally, No. 02-18-00142-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 7211, at *27 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Sep. 3, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.l).
Pohl argues that the unlawful Macts doctrine is preempted by the proportionate
responsibility statute, relying on Dugger v. Arredondo, 408 S.W.3d 825 (Tex. 2013).15
But even Dugger recognized ithat unlawful acts doctrine still applied in certain
contexts, like legal malpractice cases. Id. at 833 (“While some courts of appeals have
extended that reasonoing to civil defendants bringing legal malpractice actions, we
have not directly laddressed that issue.”). Thus, the Court expressly “limit[ed] the
holding in th[ait] case to personal injury and wrongful death cases.” Id. at 833.
This is not a personal injury or wrongful death case; it is a conversion and theft
of trade secret case. In contexts outside the wrongful death and personal injury
context, Texas courts have refused to allow a plaintiff to profit from his or her own
15 Motion, p. 9.
illegal conduct. See Sharpe, 191 S.W.3d at 366 (precluding a plaintiff from recovering
from an attorney after a finding that summary judgment evidence established that
the plaintiff's conduct forming the basis of the underlying civil fraud claim was
unlawful). Texas courts have specifically refused to enforce agreemenkts relating to
the unlawful solicitation of clients under the unlawful acts ruCle. See Luong v.
McAllister, No. 01-17-00198-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 5998, at *7-8 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 2, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Aind when non-contractual
claims are inextricably intertwined with contracts or agreements to do illegal acts,
Texas courts have dismissed those claims as well because “no action may be
predicated upon an admittedly unlawful act of the party asserting it.” Denson v.
Dallas Cnty. Credit Union, 262 S.W.3d 84l6, 855 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.)
(barring “claims arising in tort becMause they are inextricably intertwined with
[plaintiff’s] illegal contract to sell automobiles in Dallas County without a license.”);
Villanueva v. Gonzalez, 123 S.iW.3d 461, 463 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.)
(holding claims for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud failed because they arose out
of an illegal contract tohat violated the occupation code).
Pohl arguesl that these doctrines do not apply because he “has not asserted any
contract claimi against Kassab, nor do any of his tort claims involve enforcing the
terms of an allegedly illegal contract.”16 But Pohl’s claims are inextricably
intertwined with his unlawful agreement with Precision. Pohl alleges that he
contracted with Precision to “to provide public relations services … to screen and
16 Motion, p. 10.
10
liaise with Pohl’s clients/prospective clients” – e.g. commit barratry – during which
time “Precision gained access to Pohl’s [allegedly] confidential and proprietary
information and property, included trade secret materials” – e.g. the client lists and
contracts that Precision accumulated during its unlawful solicitation ekfforts.17 Pohl
alleges that Precision “illegally misappropriated” this information Cand then “secretly
sold” the information to Kassab,18 who then “solicited [Pohl’s] clients/prospective
clients to act as plaintiffs … to bring cases against Pohl for ailleged barratry and other
claims.”19 Pohl’s claims fail because “they are inextricably intertwined with [Pohl’s]
illegal contract” with Precision. Denson, 262 S.W.3d at 855.
B. Whether Pohl committed barratry is directly relevant to
Kassab’s justification and immunity defenses which Pohl
either fails to address or falils to negate.
Recognizing that Kassab’s defeMnse of justification renders evidence relating to
Pohl’s acts of barratry relevant, Pohl contends that justification “is not a defense to
Pohl’s claims”20 because it is ani affirmative defense to a claim of tortious interference
with contract.”21 But just because the defense is commonly applied to one type of
claim does not mean, oas Pohl contends, that it is “not a recognized defense” to other
types of claims, sulch as theft of trade secrets or conversion. In fact, justification is
common appliied in conversion cases because the alleged theft must occur “without
justification.” Morey v. Page, 802 S.W.2d 779, 787 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no writ).
17 First Amended Petition, ¶ 20.
18 First Amended Petition, ¶ 21.
19 First Amended Petition, ¶ 29.
20 Motion, p. 10.
21 Motion, p. 11.
11
Regardless, Pohl conflates Kassab’s justification defense with the defense of
immunity or privilege – which Pohl has failed to negate – and which further renders
facts relating to Pohl’s barratry relevant to this litigation.
1. Barratry is relevant to Kassab’s defense of privkilege.
The Texas Supreme Court has often looked to the RestaCtement (Third) of
Unfair Competition and Restatement of Torts when defining Texas law governing
trade secret claims. See Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Cox Teix. Newspapers, L.P., 343
S.W.3d 112, 126 n.5 (Tex. 2011); In re Union Pac. R.R. Co., 294 S.W.3d 589, 592 (Tex.
2009). With respect to the issue of privilege, that Restatement provides:
The existence of a privilege to disclose another's trade secret depends
upon the circumstances of the particular case, including the nature of
the information, the purpose of the dlisclosure, and the means by which
the actor acquired the informaation. A privilege is likely to be
recognized, for example, inM connection with the disclosure of
information that is relevant to public health or safety, or to the
commission of a crime or tort, or to other matters of substantial
public concern. e
REST. 3D OF UNFAIR COMPEOT f ITION, § 40, cmt. c (emphasis added); RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 757 cmt. d
(“A privilege to disclose may also be given by the law,
independently of the other's consent, in order to promote some public interest.”). The
Reporters’ Notesi to Section 40 indicate that “the policies underlying the privilege are
similar to tohose supporting the numerous state and federal ‘whistleblower’ statutes
that prohibit retaliatory personnel actions by employers against employees who
disclose violations to public officials.” REST. 3D OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 40,
Reporters' Notes, cmt. c.
Here, even if the list identifying Pohl’s attorney-client agreements and lists
12
identifying Pohl’s clients and prospective clients are his trade secrets (and they are
not), and even if Pohl kept that information confidential (and he did not), Kassab was
privileged to obtain the information and use it to notify Pohl’s former clients or
prospective clients that the way they were solicited to hire Pohl waks illegal and
unethical. REST. 3D OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 40, cmt. c; PhiladeClphia Plaza-Phase
II v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Assoc. No. 322, 2002 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS
13, 2002 WL 1472338, at *5 (Pa. Com. Pl. May 30, 2002) i(citing Section 757 of the
Restatement of Torts to conclude that purported disclosure of trade secrets was
“proper, if not privileged.”); Sys. Operations, Inc. v. Sci. Games Dev. Corp., 425 F.
Supp. 130, 136 (D.N.J. 1977) (stating that “disclosure of trade secret information may
itself be privileged” and concluding that it lwas).
2. Barratry is relevMant to Kassab’s defenses of attorney
immunity and judicial proceedings privilege.
Kassab is also immune ferom Pohl’s claims under the doctrines of attorney
immunity and the judicial prfoceedings privilege, two defenses raised and established
as a matter of law by Kassab,22 which Pohl fails to address in the instant Motion.
Facts relating to whether Pohl committed barratry are directly relevant to those
defenses. i
Undeor the doctrine of attorney immunity, “an attorney does not have a right of
22 In his Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment filed June 8, 2021, Kassab established, as a matter
of law, the attorney immunity defense. In the Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment filed on
August 29, 2022, Kassab established, as a matter of law, the judicial proceedings privilege and
attorney immunity. Kassab incorporates those motions and the evidence attached thereto for all
purposes herein. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 58.
13
recovery, under any cause of action, against another attorney arising from conduct
the second attorney engaged in as part of the discharge of his duties in representing
a party.” Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 72 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ
denied) (emphasis added). “[A]n attorney is immune from liability to nkonclients for
conduct within the scope of his representation of his clients.” YounCgkin v. Hines, 546
S.W.3d 675, 681 (Tex. 2018). The inquiry “focuses on the kind of conduct at issue
rather than the alleged wrongfulness of said conduct.” Id.i “That is, a lawyer is no
more susceptible to liability for a given action merely because it is alleged to be
fraudulent or otherwise wrongful.” Id. “Merely labeling an attorney’s conduct
‘fraudulent’ does not and should not remove it from the scope of client representation
or render it ‘foreign to the duties of an attolrney.’” Id. at 483. Even “criminal conduct
is not categorically excepted from the Mprotections of attorney civil immunity when the
conduct alleged is connected with representing a client in litigation.” Bethel v.
Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Wiinslett & Moser, P.C., 595 S.W.3d 651, 657 (Tex. 2020);
Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 483 (Tex. 2015) (“an attorney’s conduct
may be wrongful but sotill fall within the scope of client representation”).
The case Talylor v. Tolbert, 644 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. 2022) is instructive on why
attorney immuinity applies here. In Taylor, the attorney was accused of violating state
and federal laws prohibiting wiretapping because the attorney obtained and used the
plaintiff’s communications in violation of the statute. Id. at 643. The plaintiff brought
a statutory claim against the attorney which permitted recovery of civil damages. Id.;
see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 18A.502. The attorney moved for traditional
14
summary judgment, “arguing she is immune from liability as a matter of law because
the plaintiffs’ claims all stem from her role as an attorney in the modification
proceeding.” Id. at 644. The trial court agreed, but the court of appeals reversed. Id.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. Id. It concluded thatk the attorney
was, “in all respects, engaging in the office, professional training, sCkill, and authority
of an attorney in the ways that she allegedly used and disclosed the materials her
client provided.” Id. at 649. “Because [the attorney’s] condiuct falls squarely within
the confines of attorney immunity, the alleged criminality or wrongfulness of the
conduct does not perforce preclude its availability as an affirmative defense.” Id. The
court also held that “Texas’s wiretap statute does not expressly repudiate the common
law or the attorney-immunity defense.” Id.l
Here too, Kassab’s conduct whicMh forms the basis of Pohl’s claims falls squarely
within the confines of attorney immunity, regardless of whether it is alleged to have
violated the TUTSA because tihat statute does not expressly repudiate the defense.
Pohl is suing Kassab because he allegedly obtained purportedly stolen information in
violation of the TUTSoA and then “solicited [Pohl’s] clients/prospective clients to act
as plaintiffs … to lbring cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and other claims.”23
The essence ofi Pohl’s claims against Kassab are “that Kassab bought Pohl’s client list
from [Precision] so that Kassab could send advertisements to Pohl’s former clients
and solicit them to become Kassab’s clients in barratry suits against Pohl.” Kassab v.
Pohl, 612 S.W.3d 571, 578 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied)
23 Amended Petition, ¶ 29.
15
(characterizing Pohl’s claims against Kassab). Pohl even seeks as damages “the
reasonable fees and expenses incurred in defending [the] underlying barratry and
grievance proceedings that were made possible through the misappropriation of
Pohl’s trade secrets.”24 k
Moreover, in this very case, the court of appeals opined tChat “the alleged
purchase of Pohl[’s] client list for those clients’ contact information,
followed by the mailing of attorney advertisementis to those individuals
about specific types of claims they might be able to pursue against a
specifically identified attorney, qualifies as statements or conduct that
arose out of a commercial transaction involving the type of legal services
Kassab provides.” Kassab, 612 S.W.3d atl 578 (emphasis added). The court opined
that, “the intended audience of [KaMssab’s alleged] statement or conduct were
individuals with potential legal claims who Kassab sought to represent in
barratry suits against Pohli.” Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
The acquisition of clients and filing of lawsuits are actions taken “to facilitate
the rendition of legalo services.” Youngkin, 546 S.W.3d at 682; Clayton v. Oldcastle
Materials Tex., Incl., No. 09-18-00063-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 1112, at *12, 15 (Tex.
App.—Beaumoint Feb. 14, 2019, no pet.) (applying attorney immunity to attorney’s
conduct which included “selling his legal services to the City as a potential client” and
subsequent conduct which “occurred in the course of his undertaking to represent”
those clients). The fact that Kassab is alleged to have committed the misconduct prior
24 Exhibit 1, Pohl’s Amended Responses to Disclosures, p. 4.
16
to any litigation is immaterial because “attorney immunity applies to claims based
on conduct outside the litigation context[.]” Haynes & Boone, LLP v. NFTD, LLC, 631
S.W.3d 65, 78-79, 81 (Tex. 2021); Cantey Hanger, 467 S.W.3d at 485 (concluding that
attorney was immune from conduct that occurred after litigation had enkded). In other
words, Pohl’s characterization of Kassab’s activities as part of a buCsiness transaction
that occurred prior to litigation does not negate attorney immunity because Kassab
engaged in the conduct as part of his ultimate provision of liegal services to his client.
See Haynes & Boone, 631 S.W.3d at 78-79, 81 (applying attorney immunity to lawyer
conduct committed as part of business transaction). Indeed, in this case, the court of
appeals concluded that all of Kassab’s conduct for which Pohl complains “arose out
of a commercial transaction involvinlg the type of legal services Kassab
provides.” Kassab, 612 S.W.3d at 57M8 (emphasis added).
Pohl also fails to address or negate the judicial proceedings privilege. “The
judicial-proceedings privilege iis an absolute privilege that covers any statement made
by the judge, jurors, counsel, parties or witnesses, and attaches to all aspects of the
proceedings, includinog statements made in open court, pre-trial hearings,
depositions, affidavlits and any of the pleadings or other papers in the case.” Landry's,
Inc. v. Animali Legal Def. Fund, 631 S.W.3d 40, 46 (Tex. 2021) (internal quotations
omitted). “The judicial-proceedings privilege exists to facilitate the proper
administration of the justice system. It does so by relieving the participants in the
judicial process from fear of retaliatory lawsuits for statements they make in
connection with the proceeding itself.” Id. at 48. It attaches even to “communications
17
preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding” if “the communication has some
relation to a proceeding that is actually contemplated in good faith and under serious
consideration by the witness or a possible party to the proceeding.” Id. at 48-49.
“Even in the pre-suit context, however, the privilegke protects
communications that are themselves preparatory to tChe lawsuit.” Id.
(emphasis added). The privilege protects all communications that are “necessary to
set the judicial machinery in motion.” Id. at 50 (quoti
nig RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 586 cmt. a) (emphasis added).
Here, Pohl has sued Kassab in retaliation for Kassab “solicit[ing] …
clients/prospective clients to act as plaintiffs … to bring cases against Pohl for alleged
barratry and other claims.”25 Pohl admitsl that he is suing Kassab for statements
Kassab made to prospective clients Mwhich spawned the litigation and grievance
proceedings:26
25 Amended Petition, at ¶ 29.
26 Exhibit 3, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 122.
18
Because Pohl’s claims against Kassab arise out of communications that Kassab
made in prospective (solicitation letters) and actual judicial proceedings (the barratry
litigation and grievance process), Pohl’s claims against Kassab are barred by the
judicial proceedings privilege. See Crain v. Smith, 22 S.W.3d 58, 62-63k (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.) (holding that statements in letteCr sent before the
lawsuit began were protected by the judicial-proceedings privilege); Highland Capital
Mgmt., LP v. Looper Reed & McGraw, P.C., No. 05-15-00i055-CV, 2016 Tex. App.
LEXIS 442, at *10-11 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 14, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(applying attorney immunity to claim that attorney engaged in “malicious conduct
with respect to its illegal acquisition, retention, use, and threatened disclosure of [the
plaintiff’s] proprietary and confidential inlformation” that “it knew to be stolen and
proprietary in furtherance of its scMheme to extort, slander, and disparage [the
plaintiff]” and “refusing to return and cease use of [the plaintiff’s] proprietary
information”). i
Both the defenses of attorney immunity and the judicial proceedings privilege
necessarily require dioscussion of facts relating to Pohl’s barratry. In fact, Question
No. 8 on Kassab’s lproposed jury charge incorporates these defenses and the concept
of privilege anid asks “Did Kassab use or disclose Pohl’s information for the purpose
of reporting, investigating, or filing a lawsuit relating to a suspected violation of law,
a commission of a crime, or other matters of substantial public concern?”27 The
question instructs the jury on Texas law relating to barratry.28 Thus, information
27 Exhibit 2, Kassab’s Proposed Jury Charge, p. 15.
28 Exhibit 2, Kassab’s Proposed Jury Charge, p. 15.
19
about whether barratry occurred and the facts and circumstances giving rise to the
barratry litigation is relevant. Pohl’s contention that “whether barratry occurred” is
“not legally relevant to the material issues in this case”29 is false.
3. Barratry is relevant to Kassab’s defenskes of
immunity under Texas Rule of Disceiplinary
Procedure 17.09. C
The only immunity defense that Pohl does address is Kassab’s claim that he is
immune under Rule 17.09 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinaryi Procedure.30 Pohl argues
that “Pohl’s claims, and thus the lawsuit, are not predicated on Kassab’s involvement
in the grievance process, [so] Rule 17.09 does not apply.”31 Kassab has already
explained why this is not true and why he is entitled to immunity as a matter of law.32
Pohl has sued Kassab because Kassab allelgedly “used information from [Pohl’s] files
in the grievance proceedings thatM [Kassab] personally filed or had clients file”33
and Pohl is suing Kassab to recover “the reasonable fees and expenses incurred in
defending [the] underlying bairratry and grievance proceedings that were made
possible through the misappropriation of Pohl’s trade secrets.”34 Thus, Pohl’s lawsuit
is, at least in part, “poredicated upon the filing of a Grievance or participation in the
attorney disciplin
alry and disability system.” TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 17.09.
Rule 17.09 proivides “absolute and unqualified” immunity for such conduct, which
29 Motion, p. 2.
30 Motion, p. 12-13.
31 Motion, p. 12.
32 In the Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment filed on August 29, 2022, Kassab established, as
a matter of law, the defense of immunity pursuant to Texas Rule of Disciplinary Procedure 17.09,
Kassab also incorporates that motion and the evidence attached thereto. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 58.
33 December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 122 (emphasis added).
34 Exhibit 1, Pohl’s Amended Responses to Disclosures, p. 4 (emphasis added).
20
“extends to all actions at law or in equity.” Id.
Pohl argues that Rule 17.09 applies only to “certain officials connected to the
State Bar” and not to Kassab because he “is not a State Bar official.”35 But the rule
plainly applies to “the Complainant or witness” involved in the grievancke process. Id.
(“No lawsuit may be instituted against any Complainant or wCitness predicated
upon the filing of a Grievance or participation in the attorney disciplinary and
disability system.”) (emphasis added). Pohl admits that Kassiab was both.36 Therefore,
no lawsuit may be instituted against Kassab that is predicated upon Kassab’s
involvement in the grievance process. See id. Because Pohl is suing Kassab to recover
fees Pohl incurred defending the grievances filed by Kassab or his clients against
Pohl, the claim is necessarily “predicated ulpon” the filing of the grievances, rendering
immunity provided by the rule applicMable to Kassab. See id.
Pohl concedes that a “small portion” of his damages “are connected to the
grievance process” but argues ithat is insufficient to trigger Rule 17.09 because Pohl’s
claims allege that Kassab engaged in other wrongful conduct unrelated to the
grievance process.37 Bout under Rule 17.09, “[n]o lawsuit” may be instituted if it is
“predicated upon” lthe filing of a grievance, and immunity “extends to all actions at
law or in equitiy.” Id. Because at least part of Pohl’s claims and request for damages
is predicated on the grievance proceedings, the entire suit is barred, regardless of
whether Pohl alleges that Kassab engaged in otherwise tortious or wrongful conduct.
35 Motion, pp. 12-13.
36 December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 122.
37 Motion, p. 13.
21
See Crampton v. Farris, 596 S.W.3d 267, 274-76 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019,
no pet.) (claim for destruction of evidence related to grievance proceeding barred by
immunity); Burch v. State Bar of Tex., No. 07-19-00224-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS
1409, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 19, 2020, pet. denied) (lawksuit against
attorneys for commission who purportedly “engaged in misconCduct related to a
bankruptcy proceeding in which [plaintiff] was involved” was barred by immunity
because it occurred in relation to a grievance proceeding). i
Accordingly, whether Pohl committed barratry and Kassab’s participation in
the grievance process relating to Pohl’s barratry is relevant to Kassab’s Rule 17.09
defense, and thus the instant Motion should be denied.
4. Barratry is relevant lto Kassab’s defenses of unclean
hands. a
The doctrine of unclean hands applies to claims involving equitable remedies.
See In re Nolle, 265 S.W.3d 48e7, 494 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, orig.
proceeding). Pohl initially
sofught “injunctive relief”38 and it is well-established that
“[i]njunctive relief is an equitable remedy.” Fetter v. Wells Fargo Bank Tex., N.A.,
110 S.W.3d 683, 688 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (emphasis
added). Recogniziing this, Pohl argues that he “previously pled injunctive relief in his
petition, to ostreamline issues for trial, Pohl will no longer seek this relief.”39 But Pohl
has not filed any amendment, and thus the claim seeking equitable relief is still live,
rendering Kassab’s unclean hands defense applicable. Moreover, Pohl has pursued
38 First Amended Petition, at ¶ 45.
39 Motion, p. 14.
22
claims under TUTSA, which requires a person claiming ownership of a trade secret
to demonstrate “legal, or equitable” title to the information. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 134A.002(3-a) (emphasis added). Because Pohl’s claim to ownership of
the information is grounded in equity, Kassab is entitled to show Pkohl’s unclean
hands after engaging in his illegal barratry scheme to acquire theC information that
Pohl claims are his trade secrets.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER D i
For these reasons, Defendants Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance
Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm ask the Court to deny Plaintiffs’
Rule 166(g) Motion on Barratry Liability and Specific Affirmative Defenses Asserted
by the Kassab Defendants. l
MTHE KASSAB LAW FIRM
/s/ David Eric Kassab
e David Eric Kassab
i Texas State Bar No. 24071351
f 1214 Elgin Street
Houston, Texas 77004
Telephone: (713) 522-7400
o E-service: eserve@kassab.law
l FOGLER, BRAR, O’NEIL & GRAY, LLP
i /s/ Murray Fogler
o Murray Fogler
mfogler@foglerbrar.com
Texas State Bar No. 07207300
909 Fannin, Suite 1640
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 481-1010
(713) 574-3224 (Fax)
ATTORNEYS FOR KASSAB DEFENDANTS
23
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document has been
forwarded to all parties pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this the
13th day of August, 2023.
/s/ David Eric Kassab k
David Eric Kassab e
24
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab
Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law r
Envelope ID: 78474030
Filing Code Description: Answer/ Response / Waiver
Filing Description: Kassab Defendants' Response to Plaintiffst' Rule 166(g)
Motion i
Status as of 8/14/2023 8:18 AM CST s
Case Contacts 
Name BarNumber Email g TimestampSubmitted Status
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Misty Davis mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfriazzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre c scott@favrepa.com 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Lawyer Wade f lawyerwade@hotmail.com 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas  cpappas@krcl.com 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Non-Party Witness Billy Shepherd bshepherd@spcounsel.com 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Non-Party Dona Pohl C DonaLyann@yahoo.com 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Non-Party Edgar Jaimesa edgarsroom@gmail.com 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Lance Kassab lance@kassab.law 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
David Kassab o david@kassab.law 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Nicholas PiercUe nicholas@kassab.law 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Lance Kassab eserve@kassab.law 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Andrea Mendez andrea@kassab.law 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrar.com 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.com 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Andrew Johnson ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.com 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10607900 jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab
Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law r
Envelope ID: 78474030
Filing Code Description: Answer/ Response / Waiver
Filing Description: Kassab Defendants' Response to Plaintiffst' Rule 166(g)
Motion i
Status as of 8/14/2023 8:18 AM CST s
Case Contacts 
Raul Herman Suazo 24003021 suazo@mdjwlawg.com 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
D Kassab david@kassab.law 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfaogler@foglerbrar.com 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Thallia Malespin tmalespin@reynoldsfrizzell.com 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Misty Davis mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
L Kassab c lance@kassab.law 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Kelly Skelton f reception@kassab.law 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT
Harris Wells  hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 8/13/2023 12:21:33 PM SENT"
34,2022-09-12,RSP,Kassab,Kassab’s response to Pohl no-evid MSJ,"Kassab's Response to Pohl's Motion for Partial Traditional and No-Evidence Summary Judgment on Affirmative Defenses — opposes Pohl's attempt to eliminate Kassab's affirmative defenses of justification, unclean hands, illegality, unlawful acts, criminal acts, and in pari delicto, and challenges Pohl's global no-evidence motion as procedurally defective under Timpte Industries v. Gish","Phase 3 response brief filed September 12, 2022 (same day as Kassab's declaration, Filing #33). Responds to Pohl's motion seeking to eliminate Kassab's key affirmative defenses before trial. Incorporates by reference Kassab's own MSJs (June 8, 2021 and August 29, 2022, i.e. Filing #30), the Nicholson MSJ (August 19, 2022), and Nicholson's response to Pohl's motion (September 12, 2022). Addressed to Judge Scot 'Dolli' Dollinger.",MSJ-3,N/A,Phase 3,2022-09-12_RSP_Kassab-Response-to-Pohl-No-Evid-MSJ_FILED.pdf,"Deny Pohl's Motion for Partial Traditional and No-Evidence Summary Judgment on Affirmative Defenses; alternatively, grant continuance under Rule 166a(g) to allow completion of discovery on illegality defense; grant summary judgment against Plaintiffs ordering they take nothing on their claims against Kassab","9/12/2022 6:16 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 68179652
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 9/12/2022 6:16 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIALk DISTRICT
THE KASSAB DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFSC’ MOTION FOR
PARTIAL TRADITIONAL AND NO-EVIDENCE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE SCOT “DOLLI” DOLLINGEtR:
Defendants, Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C.
d/b/a/ The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab”) file this, theeir Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Partial Traditional and No-Evidence Suummary Judgment on Affirmative
Defenses,1 and would respectfully show the following.
INTRaODUCTION
Pohl2 committed illegal and unethical barratry and he wants Kassab, who
brought the barratry litigation aend grievances against Pohl on behalf of more than
four hundred (400) of Pohl’fs illegally solicited clients, to pay for Pohl’s barratry
defense costs. But Pohl’s claims are barred for several reasons, including based on
several affirmative defenses. Pohl has filed the instant Motion, seeking partial
traditional summiary judgment on the affirmative defenses of justification, unclean
hands, illegoality, and unlawful acts. However, Pohl has not negated those defenses
as a matter of law. As to the other defenses, Pohl attempts to dispose of them
through a global and conclusory no-evidence challenge, which is insufficient.
1 The self-serving title of the pleading is “Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses that Seek to Relitigate Failed Barratry Claims Against Plaintiffs
and No-Evidence Motion on the Remaining Affirmative Defenses.”
2 This refers collectively to Plaintiffs Michael A. Pohl and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC.
Regardless, Kassab can demonstrate, either here or in incorporated summary
judgment briefing, that each of the defenses applicable to him apply, and that
evidence supports each of them. Accordingly, the Motion should be in all things
denied. k
GENERAL OBJECTION C
Pohl inappropriately suggests that all barratry suits were resolved on the
merits. That is incorrect. One of the lawsuits – the Berry caise – was settled,3 which
suggests that the case had merit. Another lawsuit – the Cheatham case – was
initially dismissed on summary judgment but recently reversed because fact issues
existed on whether Pohl and his co-counsel committed barratry. See Cheatham v.
Pohl, No. 01-20-00046-CV, 2022 Tex. Appl. LEXIS 6528 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Aug. 30, 2022, no pet. h.). TheM other two lawsuits – Brumfield and Gandy –
were dismissed, not on the merits, but on the affirmative defense of limitations. See
Brumfield v. Williamson, 634 iS.W.3d 170, 177 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021,
pet. denied) and Gandy v. Williamson, 634 S.W.3d 214 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2021, pet. denoied). “An affirmative defense presents a situation where a
plaintiff cannot relcover even if his claims are true because of some other fact that
the defendant ihas pled as a bar.” Man Engines & Components, Inc. v. Shows, 434
S.W.3d 132, 137 (Tex. 2014), In other words, none of the barratry suits have
been adjudicated on the merits, and neither has the issue of whether Pohl
committed barratry.
3 Exhibit 1, September 12, 2022 Declaration of Lance Kassab at ¶ 14.
Kassab incorporates and adopts by reference all evidence and argument in
his Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment filed on August 29, 2022. See TEX. R.
CIV. P. 58. Kassab also incorporate all evidence and argument in the Traditional
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Tina Nicholson and Baker Nikcholson, LLP
(“Nicholson”) on August 19, 2022, as well as Nicholson’s responsCe to Pohl’s Motion
filed September 12, 2022, to the extent that response is applicable to Kassab. The
combined evidence and argument of all those documents diemonstrate conclusively
that Pohl committed barratry and unauthorized practice of law, which bars him
from recovery in this retaliatory lawsuit.
RESPONSE TO TRADITIONAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Justification is a valid laffirmative defense to Pohl’s
claims. a
Kassab has asserted the affirmative defense of justification.4 Pohl contends
that justification “is not a defenese to any of Pohl’s claims.”5 Of course, Pohl fails to
support this statement with fany authority. Rather, he contends that justification “is
an affirmative defense to a claim of tortious interference with contract.”6 But just
because the defense is commonly applied to one type of claim does not mean, as Pohl
contends, that iti is “not a recognized defense” to other types of claims, such as theft
of trade secorets, conversion or conspiracy.7 In fact, the defense of justification has
been applied outside the context of tortious interference to anti-trust claims. See
Money Masters, Inc. v. TRW, Inc., No. 05-98-02017-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 622,
4 See Kassab’s Sixth Amended Answer, at ¶ 15(2).
5 Mot. at 2.
6 Mot. at 3.
7 Mot. at 3.
at *17 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 23, 2003, pet. denied) (mem. op.). And, Texas courts
have considered the defense in relation to theft of trade secrets. See Lamont v.
Vaquillas Energy Lopeno, Ltd., 421 S.W.3d 198, 220 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013,
pet. denied) (determining whether evidence supported defense of jukstification to
claim that seismic map of a gas prospect constituted a tradCe secret and was
acquired through improper means). Accordingly, Pohl has failed to demonstrate
that the defense of justification is inapplicable as a matter iof law.
Pohl argues that even if the defense applies, Kassab and Nicholson cannot
show that “Pohl took any action against them or that involved them before they
committed the torts that form the basis of Pohl’s claim.”8 But Pohl misunderstands
the nature of the justification defense, andl the factual basis giving rise to it.
Justification can be based on Mthe exercise of either (1) the party’s own legal
rights or (2) the party’s good faith claim to a colorable right, even though the claim
ultimately proves to be mistakien. Tex. Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203, 211
(Tex. 1996). When the party conclusively establishes it had a legal right to engage
in the complained-of oconduct, the party's motive for engaging in that conduct is
irrelevant. Id. l
Here, Kiassab was justified in obtaining the information that Pohl contends is
his purported trade secrets. The information was obtained by Kassab as part of his
investigation and ultimate pursuit of barratry claims against Pohl on behalf of
hundreds of clients.9 Kassab concluded, based on discussions he had with and
8 Mot. at 3.
9 Exhibit 1, September 12, 2022 Declaration of Lance Kassab at ¶¶ 5-8.
documents obtained from Scott Favre, the owner of Precision Marketing, that the
information was owned by Precision Marketing, and not Pohl.10 In fact, Favre
testified that Precision Marketing owned the information, including client lists and
files the company acquired while soliciting clients,11 and shared wkith Kassab a
purchase agreement demonstrating that Favre was the owner oCf that information
through his purchase of Precision Marketing.12
Kassab had a legal right to acquire evidence to supiport the barratry claims
that would be made against Pohl on behalf of his clients without making himself
liable. See Taylor v. Tolbert, 644 S.W.3d 637, 647 (Tex. 2022) (“lawyers must be able
to pursue legal rights they deem necessary and proper for their clients without the
menace of civil liability looming over theml and influencing their actions.”). And in
carrying out that lawyerly duty, KasMsab had the right and obligation to investigate
the potential claims against Pohl or risk sanctions for not investigating the claims.
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 13. Kassaib was also justified in obtaining the information to
report Pohl to the State B
ar of Texas, which he did.13 See TEX. DISC. R. PROF’L COND.
8.03 (“a lawyer havinog knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of
applicable rules ofl professional conduct that raises a substantial question as to that
lawyer's honesity, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall
inform the appropriate disciplinary authority.”); TEX. R. DISC. PROC. 17.09 (“No
lawsuit may be instituted against any Complainant or witness predicated upon the
10 Exhibit 1, September 12, 2022 Declaration of Lance Kassab at ¶¶ 8.
11 Exhibit 2, Affidavit of Scott Favre.
12 Exhibit 3, Purchase Agreement.
13 Exhibit 4, October 2018 Declaration of Lance Kassab, at p. 2; Exhibit 5, Grievance Complaint.
filing of a Grievance or participation in the attorney disciplinary and disability
system.”).
Under these circumstances, there are genuine issues of material fact as to
whether Kassab was justified in the actions that he took. k
B. Kassab may assert unclean hands as a defensCe because
Pohl seeks equitable relief. 
Kassab asserts unclean hands as a defense becauset Pohl seeks injunctive
relief and attorney’s fees as damages under the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(“TUTSA”). To the extent Pohl is permitted to seeke attorney’s fees as damages, his
unclean hands bar him from recovering under suuch an equitable exception.
Pohl’s summary judgment is based on the false premise that he “does not
seek equitable relief.”14 That contentioan is rebutted by Pohl’s own pleadings. Pohl
has pursued claims under TUTSA, which requires a person claiming ownership of a
trade secret to demonstrate “legeal, or equitable” title to the information. See TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§f 134A.002(3-a) (emphasis added). Additionally, “Pohl
seeks injunctive relief”15 and it is well-established that “[i]njunctive relief is an
equitable remedy.” Fetter v. Wells Fargo Bank Tex., N.A., 110 S.W.3d 683, 688
(Tex. App.—Houiston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (emphasis added). Moreover, Pohl’s
conclusion roequests “other and further or alternative relief (legal and equitable) to
which Pohl may be entitled,”16 for all of his causes of action. Because Pohl is seeking
equitable relief, he “must come into court with clean hands.” Fetter, 110 S.W.3d at
14 Mot. at 4.
15 See Pohl’s First Amended Petition, at ¶ 45.
16 Pohl’s First Amended Petition, at ¶ 50 (emphasis added).
688. Pohl’s contention that unclean hands is not a valid affirmative defense fails as
a matter of law.
C. Illegality.
1. Objection to Pohl’s lack of supporting evidencke.
Kassab objects to Pohl’s lack of evidence supporting his traCditional summary
judgment motion as to illegality. Pohl asserts that illegality does not apply because
it “is not part of a document,” and he “engaged in ‘illegal aicts” long before” Kassab
allegedly wronged Pohl.17 Pohl then incorrectly implies that his acts of barratry
“[have] largely been adjudicated” on the merits.18 That is untrue, as demonstrated
above. Pohl also asserts that his “claims do not seek to enforce any illegal contract
or other illegal action.”19 But Pohl prlovides no evidence in support of his
statements, and “motions and argumMents of counsel are not evidence.” Johnson v.
Scott, 113 S.W.3d 366, 373 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003, pet. denied). It is telling
that Pohl is unwilling to sweair to any of these facts in an affidavit. Kassab objects
to Pohl’s lack of summary judgment evidence.
2. Poohl has not negated the illegality defense.
Pohl arguesl that the illegality defense “is not a defense” to his claims, “and
even if it werei, it would not be available here.”20 Of course, Pohl does not cite any
case precluding the use of the illegality defense in claims arising from barratry.
This is because the defense has commonly been applied to bar claims stemming
17 Mot., at 4.
18 Mot., at 4-5.
19 Mot., at 5.
20 Mot., at 4.
from barratry. See Luong v. McAllister, No. 01-17-00198-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS
5998, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 2, 2018, pet. denied) (contract
between law firm and non-lawyer to solicit clients in exchange for share of
attorney’s fees was void due to illegality); Plumlee v. Paddock, 832 S.Wk.2d 757, 760
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1992, writ denied) (refusing equitable relCief where owner of
ambulance company had no basis to recover under fee-sharing agreement with
attorney without reliance on unlawful barratry agreemenit). And Pohl’s lawyers
are well aware of this doctrine. They recently used the illegality defense to
obtain summary judgment on a legal malpractice claim brought by an investor who
gave an attorney money in exchange for a share of attorneys’ fees from the BP
litigation. See Duncan Litig. Invs., LLC vl. Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell &
Berkowitz, No. 4:19-CV-3094, 2022 UM.S. Dist. LEXIS 147005, at *24-30 (S.D. Tex.
2022). Moreover, as demonstrated in the summary judgment briefing on file with
the Court, Pohl and his lawyeirs in the Mississippi Litigation also used the illegality
defense to Precisions Marketing’s claims against Pohl for failing to pay Precision
Marketing for referrinog thousands of BP cases.
The illegalitly defense applies here. To sustain his claims, Pohl must establish
a right to thei property he claims was misappropriated. The first element of a
TUTSA claim violation is that the plaintiff owned a trade secret. TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE §§ 134A.002(1), (3), (6), 134A.004(a). The statute defines “owner” to
mean “the person or entity in whom or in which rightful, legal, or equitable title to”
the trade secret. Id. at § § 134A.002(3-a). Because Pohl obtained the alleged trade
secret information illegally, through barratry and the unauthorized practice of law,
he necessarily does not have “rightful, legal, or equitable title” to the information.
Accordingly, Pohl’s illegal conduct necessarily negates his TUTSA claim.
Likewise, although common-law claims for conversion and conkspiracy are
preempted by TUTSA, Pohl would have to establish that hCe owned or had
possession of the property or entitlement to possession. See Freezia v. IS Storage
Venture, LLC, 474 S.W.3d 379, 386-87 (Tex. App.—Houstion [14th Dist.] 2015, no
pet.). Because Pohl’s claims rest on information acquired through illegal contracts,
Kassab can sustain an affirmative defense of illegality against Pohl.
Pohl provides a string cite of unrelated authority to improperly suggest that
illegality cannot be a defense in this casel. But none of the cases cited by Pohl are
relevant to the facts of this case or dMiscuss the interaction of the illegality defense
and the unlawful acts doctrine. See Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. White, 490 S.W.3d 468,
483 (Tex. 2016) (in unrelated ilandlord tenant case); Lewkowicz v. El Paso Apparel
Corp., 625 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex.1981) (holding that illegal actions concerning
leather production anod improper jailing in Mexico violate the public policy of Texas);
Niles v. Harris Colunty Fresh Water Supply Dist., 339 S.W.2d 562, 563 (Tex. Civ.
App.—Waco 19i60, writ ref’d) (affirming pleading of illegality was unnecessary over
water supply where the contract was illegal on its face); Reid v. Associated
Employers Lloyds, 164 S.W.2d 584, 585–586 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1942, writ
ref’d) (whether illegality must be affirmatively asserted as a defense to worker’s
compensation claim originating from unlading a keg of beer); Montgomery Ward &
Co. v. Lusk, 52 S.W.2d 1110 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1932, writ ref’d) (whether
contract requiring work for more than 9 hours a day violated a statute); Texas & P.
Coal Co. v. Lawson, 89 Tex. 394, 34 S.W. 919, 921 (1896) (concerning the legality of
a contract for the sale of liquor). k
Accordingly, this Court should deny Pohl’s traditional moCtion for summary
judgment on illegality as unsupported by law or fact.
D. Unlawful acts, criminal acts, and in pari dielicto.
1. Objection to Pohl’s lack of supporting evidence.
Kassab again objects to Pohl’s lack of evidence supporting his traditional
motion for summary judgment as to unlawful acts, criminal acts or in pari delicto.
Pohl asserts that “criminal acts,” “unlawlful acts,” and “in pari delicto” does not
apply because “(1) Pohl’s actions hMave been largely adjudicated and were not
‘admittedly’ criminal or unlawful; and (2) even if a fact issue remained regarding
the legality of Pohl’s acts, anyi wrongful act is not sufficiently tied to Pohl’s claims
here to give rise to a defense.”21 But Pohl’s barratry and unauthorized practice of
law in other states hoave not been disposed of on the merits. Instead, Pohl’s sole
evidence supportilng his motion is that “Pohl can certainly demonstrate the
elements of eaich of his claims without being required to prove any illegal act.”22 And
then he doesn’t—he provides no evidence whatsoever. Pohl is not even willing to
swear under oath that he did not commit barratry. Accordingly, Kassab objects to
Pohl’s lack of summary judgment evidence.
21 Mot., at 5.
22 Mot., at 6.
10
2. Kassab established that Pohl’s unlawful acts,
criminal acts and the doctrine of in pari delicto
preclude Pohl’s claims in prior summary judgment
briefing, which is incorporated herein.
In his Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment filed on August 29, 2022,
Kassab demonstrated that Pohl’s unlawful acts, criminal acts and thee in pari delicto
doctrines preclude Pohl’s claims as a matter of law. Kassab incorporates that
argument and evidence as if set forth verbatim herein. Kassatb also incorporates the
argument and evidence relating to the unlawful acts doctrine (including illegal or
criminal acts or in pari delicto) set forth on pages e9-14 of Nicholson’s Response to
Plaintiffs’ Traditional and No-Evidence Motionu for Summary Judgment, filed on
September 12, 2022.
In short, the Unlawful Acts ruale provides that “[i]f, at the time of the
plaintiff’s injury, the plaintiff was engaged in an illegal act, and that act contributed
to the injury, he may not recoveer.” Andrew Shebay & Co., P.L.L.C. v. Bishop, 429
S.W.3d 644, 648–49 (Tex. fApp.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). The
summary judgment evidence on file with the Court demonstrates that Pohl violated
Texas rules and laws governing lawyers by illegally soliciting clients, splitting fees
with a non-lawiyer, and failing to protect confidential client information. Pohl’s
former clienots then sued him for his barratry, and Pohl now seeks to recover fees
from defending his barratry.23 In sum, if Pohl had not been violating the law and
disciplinary rules by procuring the purported trade secret information through
23 In addition, Kassab attaches the expert reports from Lillian Hardwick (Exhibit 6), Benjamin
Cooper (Exhibit 7), and Joseph F. Cleveland, Jr. (Exhibit 8), which detail and explain why the
evidence in the summary judgment record establishes that Pohl committed barratry and other
unlawful acts which preclude his claims.
11
illegal and unethical means, he would not have been sued for barratry. The very
purpose of the doctrine is to make sure “that [Pohl] should not even entertain the
hope of indemnity for the offense committed.” Houston Ice & Brewing Co. v. Sneed,
63 Tex. Civ. App. 17, 21, 132 S.W. 386, 388 (1910, writ dism’d) (holdinkg that one of
two parties involved in the illegal sale of alcohol could not Csue the other for
misrepresentation).
Moreover, the First Court of Appeals has opined thait Pohl’s acts, if true—and
they are true—are illegal and preclude summary judgment. In the Cheatham case,
the court of appeals concluded that the same Walker deposition testimony as here
on the same allegations24 are “some evidence” that “Pohl and [his co-counsel]
coordinated the barratry scheme” and “thlat Pohl directly funded, and his wife and
her company further funded, the solMicitation of prospective clients” and that “Pohl
directed case runners to contact and solicit potential clients on his behalf, including
offering money from Pohl’s fiirm and his wife’s company.” Cheatham, 2022 WL
3720139, at *8. This evidence defeated the summary judgment filed by Pohl’s co-
counsel in the Cheathoam case, and is certainly enough to defeat it here.
Accordinglyl, this court can apply these doctrines to deny recovery to Pohl for
his illegal actis, even if the court holds that one or more defendants have also
committed an unlawful act. See Dover v. Baker, Brown, Sharman & Parker, 859
S.W.2d 441, 443, 450-51 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (denying
recovery to plaintiff who sued his attorney for malpractice claiming he signed a
24 Kassab attached Walker’s testimony as exhibits in his prior summary judgment motion, which is
incorporated by reference herein.
12
false affidavit on the advice of his attorney who knew the affidavit was unlawful).
This doctrine is not an “excuse” but a bar to Pohl bringing any claims that stem
from his own illegal and wrongful actions.
For these reasons, and those stated in the summary judgment bkriefing before
the Court, summary judgment on the affirmative defenses of unlawCful acts, criminal
acts and the in pari delicto should be denied.
RESPONSE TO NO-EVIDENCE SUMMARY J DUiDGMENT
A. Pohl’s global and conclusory no-evidence challenge is
defective and should not be consideered.
The no-evidence summary judgment rule uexplicitly requires Pohl to “state the
elements as to which there is no evidence.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i) (emphasis
added). “The motion must be specific ina challenging the evidentiary support for an
element of a claim or defense; paragraph (i) does not authorize conclusory
motions or general no-evideence challenges to an opponent’s case.” Timpte
Indus. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 30f6, 310 (Tex. 2009) (emphasis added).
Pohl’s no-evidence challenge violates this rule. His entire no-evidence
argument is as follows:
In additioin to the affirmative defenses set forth above, Defendants
assert tihe following affirmative defenses, some of which were already
consiodered and rejected by this Court and the court of appeals during
consideration of the Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss under the Texas
Citizens Participation Act: 1) Statute of limitations; 2) Estoppel; 3)
Waiver; 4) Ratification; 5) Release; 6) Contribution; 7) Failure to
mitigate; 8) Lack of standing; 9) Accord and Satisfaction; 10).
Assumption of the Risk; 11) First Amendment; 12) Attorney Immunity;
13) Res Judicata; 14) Defect of Parties; 15) Abandonment; 16) Subject
of a Valid Contract. Pohl is entitled to summary judgment pursuant to
Rule 166a(i) because after an adequate time for discovery, the
13
Defendants have no evidence to support any of these affirmative
defenses.
This conclusory no-evidence challenge is insufficient as a matter of law. See Dean v.
Aurora Bank, F.S.B., No. 01-15-00827-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 13472, at *9 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 20, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (e“A no-evidence
summary judgment is insufficient as a matter of law if the motion is conclusory or
fails to challenge a specific essential element of a cause of acttion for which the non-
movant would have the burden of proof at trial.”).
When a no-evidence motion for summary ejudgment, as here, does not
challenge specific elements, it must be treatued as a traditional motion under
166a(c), which imposes the burden on the movant. Weaver v. Highlands Ins. Co., 4
S.W.3d 826, 829 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houstaon [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). As he provides
no facts or law in support of his argument, Pohl has not met his burden to prove
“there is no genuine issue as to aeny material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of la
wf.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Hillis v. McCall, 602 S.W.3d
436, 439-40 (Tex. 2020). With Pohl not having met his burden, “the burden does not
shift and [Kassab] need not respond or present any evidence.” Chavez v. Kansas
City S. Ry. Co., 5i20 S.W.3d 898, 900 (Tex. 2017). Accordingly, the Court should deny
Pohl’s purpoorted “no-evidence” motion.
B. The court should deny Pohl’s “no-evidence” motion
because Kassab can provide sufficient evidence and law
to support his affirmative defenses.
In his Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment filed June 8, 2021, Kassab
established, as a matter of law, the defenses of limitations, res judicata, and
14
attorney immunity. Kassab incorporates that motion and the evidence attached
thereto for all purposes herein. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 58. In the Traditional Motion for
Summary Judgment filed on August 29, 2022, Kassab established, as a matter of
law, the defenses of immunity pursuant to Texas Rule of Disciplinakry Procedure
17.09, the judicial proceedings privilege, attorney immunity, limCitations, and that
Pohl’s claims are barred by illegal and unlawful acts. In that motion, Kassab also
demonstrated that the alleged trade secret information is niot owned by Pohl, but by
Precision Marketing or Pohl’s former clients, which demonstrates the lack of
standing and defect of parties affirmative defenses. Kassab also incorporates that
motion and the evidence attached thereto. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 58.
In addition, Kassab incorporates bly reference and adopts the response to
Pohl’s no-evidence motion for sumMmary judgment filed by the Nicholson on
September 12, 2022 as to those defenses which apply equally to Kassab, including
attorney immunity, limitationis, waiver, ratification and failure to mitigate. See TEX.
R. CIV. P. 58.
In addition, aos to the affirmative defense of standing or capacity and
ownership of the lpurportedly confidential information, the recent depositions of
Ladner and Wialker demonstrate that the information was Precision Marketing’s
work product and owned by Precision Marketing, not Pohl. Ladner testified that
“client information” was owned by Precision Marketing.25 Likewise, Walker testified
that his company owned the client list and documents containing information about
25 Exhibit 9, August 29, 2022 Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at 44-45.
15
clients with potential cases.26 Walker agreed that the client information was
Precision Marketing’s “work product.”27 Thus, Pohl does not have standing or
capacity to sue Kassab, and there is a defect of parties to this litigation.
As to the defense of assumption of the risk, Pohl assumed thek risk that his
purported trade secret information would be stolen when he placCed it in the hands
of Walker, a known convicted felon. Specifically, Walker pled guilty to “one count of
federal program fraud and one count of conspiracy to icommit federal program
fraud” because he “fraudulently diverted and misused both federal grants and
money belonging to the State of Mississippi.”28 Pohl knew that Walker was a
convicted felon.29 Yet, Pohl trusted Walker with his purported trade secrets, without
requiring Walker to sign a confidentiality lagreement or non disclosure agreement.30
Pohl did not require these agreemeMnts because the alleged trade secrets are not
trade secrets at all and Pohl has no ownership in the documents that are the subject
of this lawsuit. Thus, Pohl aissumed the risk that Walker, a convicted felon who
“diverted and misused” property belonging to the others, would divert and misuse
Pohl’s purportedly coonfidential information, if in fact the alleged confidential
information were hlis.
The remiaining contract-related affirmative defenses of release, accord and
satisfaction, estoppel do not apply to Kassab. But to the extent that they do, Kassab
26 Exhibit 10, August 31, 2022 Deposition of Scott Walker, at 250-251.
27 Exhibit 10, August 31, 2022 Deposition of Scott Walker, at 251.
28 https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/jackson/press-releases/2014/ocean-springs-businessman-pleads-
guilty-to-federal-program-fraud. The Court is requested to take judicial notice of this official press
release from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
29 Exhibit 11, December 10, 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 104-105, 159-160.
30 Exhibit 11, December 10, 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 22-23, 159-161.
16
incorporates the argument and evidence set forth by Nicholson in her September 12,
2022 response to Pohl’s purported no-evidence challenge.
ALTERNATIVE REQUEST FOR CONTINUANCE
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(g) allows a continuance of kthe summary
judgment hearing “to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositiCons to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.” T iEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(g).
To the extent the evidence is insufficient to raise a fact iissue on the affirmative
defense of illegality, Kassab objects and requests a continuance on the no-evidence
motion because Pohl has unreasonably resisted Kassab’s request for discovery
relating to that defense.
Pohl’s resistance prompted Kassab lto file his Motion to Compel Removal of
Pohl’s Objections and Properly RespMond to Discovery on August 25, 2022. Kassab
incorporates that motion as if set forth verbatim herein and asks the Court to take
judicial notice of it. See TEX. Ri. CIV. P. 58. As set forth in the motion to compel, Pohl
has refused to answer relevant and material discovery relating to his involvement
in the illegal barratroy scheme, which is discovery going to the heart of Kassab’s
illegality defense. lSpecifically, that discovery will aid in establishing that all of
Pohl’s purportiedly trade secret information was derived through illegal or unethical
conduct, such as barratry and the unauthorized practice of law.
Kassab used diligence in attempting to obtain this relevant discovery. Kassab
served the discovery requests beginning in May of 2021.31 Pohl amended his
31 See Motion to Compel, at Exhibit 1.
17
discovery responses through October 2021.32 Kassab attempted to seek additional
information and clarify or elaborate on certain discovery requests in later sets of
discovery, served September 2021 and December 2021.33 Pohl responded to that
discovery into January 2022.34 Over the course of the following moknths, Kassab
reviewed the discovery requests and then attempted to confer wiCth Pohl about the
discovery deficiencies. But Pohl refused to amend his discovery and produce
responsive information,35 thus necessitating the motion to ciompel.
Pohl cannot simultaneously withhold relevant discovery concerning his
illegal acts while, at the same time, move for summary judgment on illegality. See
Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. Fuqua, 29 S.W.3d 140, 145 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th
Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (“A party should nlot be able to abuse the discovery process,
withhold key evidence from their oppMonents, and then use that lack of evidence to
win a judgment.”). Accordingly, a continuance of the summary judgment hearing
(and trial) should be granted iuntil after the motion to compel is heard and Pohl is
compelled to produce the improperly withheld information. See McInnis v. Mallia,
261 S.W.3d 197, 204 o(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (the fact that
movant “withheldl information in discovery” is a factor that weighed “in favor of”
permitting addiitional time for discovery); Tempay, Inc. v. TNT Concrete & Constr.,
Inc., 37 S.W.3d 517, 522-23 (Tex. App. – Austin 2001, pet. denied) (holding that the
trial court abused its discretion in determining that adequate time for discovery had
32 See Motion to Compel, at Exhibit 2 and 3.
33 See Motion to Compel, at Exhibit 4 and 5.
34 See Motion to Compel, at Exhibit 7.
35 See Motion to Compel, at Exhibit 9.
18
passed because movant successfully resisted nonmovant's attempts to obtain
discovery).
CONCLUSION & PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Plaintiffs’ Motikon for Partial
Traditional and No-Evidence Summary Judgment on AffirmatCive Defenses and
grant summary judgment against Plaintiffs, ordering that they take nothing on
their claims against Lance Christopher Kassab and The Kaissab Law Firm.
Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
__________________________
lDAVID ERIC KASSAB
a Texas State Bar No. 24071351
M david@kassab.law
 LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 00794070
e lance@kassab.law
i NICHOLAS R. PIERCE
f Texas State Bar No. 24098263
nicholas@kassab.law
1214 Elgin Street
o Houston, Texas 77004
Telephone: 713-522-7400
l Facsimile: 713-522-7410
i E-Service: eserve@kassab.law
o ATTORNEYS FOR KASSAB DEFENDANTS
19
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date, September 12, 2022, I electronically filed this
document with the Clerk of the Court using the eFile.TXCourts.gov electronic filing
system which will send notification of such filing to all parties or counsel of record.
___________________C____
DAVID ERIC KASSAtB 
20
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this
document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below.
The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate
of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab e
Bar No. 24071351 C
david@kassab.law t
Envelope ID: 68179652 r
Status as of 9/13/2022 8:03 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email sTimestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com r 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Andrew Johnson ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Andrew J. Sarne asarne@krcl.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.conm 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Kathryn Laflin KLaflin@KRCL.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrrar.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Larry Newsom lnewsom@fkrcl.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo jason@ciofalolaw.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Todd Taylor titaylor@jandflaw.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Harris Wells fhwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Lawyer Wade y lawyerwade@hotmail.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@favrepa.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Andrea Mendez C andrea@kassab.law 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Lance Kassab  lance@kassab.law 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
David Kassab a david@kassab.law 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Nicholas Pierce c nicholas@kassab.law 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson f i 10607900 jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo o 24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
L Kassab lance@kassab.law 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Misty Davis mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Non-Party Witness Billy Shepherd bshepherd@spcounsel.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Deidre Hicks GWS_GROUP@spcounsel.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
E. MarieJamison jamison@wrightclosebarger.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Jessica Z.Barger barger@wrightclosebarger.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Katie Budinsky kbudinsky@krcl.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM ERROR
D Kassab david@kassab.law 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT"
23,2022-01-31,RSP,Kassab,Kassab’s response to Pohl MSJ on CC,The Kassab Parties' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendants' Counterclaims for Civil Barratry,"Kassab's opposition brief responding to Pohl's Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of Kassab's barratry counterclaims. Filed January 31, 2022, approximately 55 days after Pohl's motion. This is the response in the CC-1 motion chain. Attorneys: Lance Christopher Kassab, David Eric Kassab, and Nicholas R. Pierce of The Kassab Law Firm.",CC-1,N/A,Phase 2,2022-01-31_RSP_Kassab-Response-to-Pohl-MSJ-on-CC_FILED.pdf,Deny Pohl's Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendants' Counterclaims,"1/31/2022 3:03 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 61310680
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 1/31/2022 3:03 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIALk DISTRICT
THE KASSAB PARTIES’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MCOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANTS’ COUNTERCLAIMS
Defendants and Counter-Plaintiffs Lance Christophter Kassab and Lance
Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a/ The Kassab Law Firm (collectively, “Kassab”), files
this, their Response to Plaintiff and Counter-Defeendants Michael Pohl and Law
Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC’s Motion for Suummary Judgment on Defendants’
Counterclaims, and would respectfully show the following.
SUaMMARY
The Motion filed by Michael A. Pohl and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC
(“Pohl”) should be denied. Res jeudicata does not apply because facts have changed
and the relationship betweefn the parties has been altered. Specifically, Pohl sued
Kassab arising from the same transaction where the barratry occurred, and the
clients assigned the barratry claims to Kassab to be brought as counterclaims in
this action, thuis allowing Section 16.069 to revive the otherwise time-barred
barratry cloaims. Section 16.069 plainly applies because Pohl’s claims against
Kassab and the barratry counterclaims arise from the same transaction in which
Precision Marketing Group, LLC (“Precision”) solicited clients for Pohl and obtained
the alleged confidential information that Kassab is alleged to have obtained. The
clients’ assignments of their barratry counterclaims against Pohl to Kassab are not
invalid, either as a matter of law or for purported non-compliance with the
Disciplinary Rules. Regardless, the law is clear that technical non-compliance with
the Disciplinary Rules is insufficient to void otherwise valid contracts like the
Assignments. k
BACKGROUND C
On October 8, 2014, Scott Walker, Kirk Ladner, and their company Precision
sued Pohl and his law firm for breach of contract and fraiud, among other claims
(“the Federal Court Case”). See Walker v. Williamson, No. 1:14cv381-KS-JCG, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61185, at *5-6 (S.D. Miss. May 9, 2016). In the Federal Court
Case, Walker, Ladner and Precision (“the Runners”) alleged that Pohl contracted
with them to provide “public relations anld marketing services” to potential clients
impacted by the Deepwater HorizonM oil spill in exchange for “a percentage of the
attorney fees for the claims obtained from their efforts, along with expenses and a
flat fee.” Id. at *6-7. “There iis evidence that the [Runners] contacted people and
businesses in Mississippi to determine if they might have a claim against BP,
encouraged those peoople to retain Pohl as their attorney, and were paid over $5
million in ‘barratrly pass-through money’ for their services.” Kassab v. Pohl, 612
S.W.3d 571, 57i4 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied).
The Runners also alleged that they contracted with Pohl “to provide
marketing and public relations services in connection with claims for automobile
rollover accidents.” Walker v. Williamson, No. 1:14-CV-381-KS-MTP, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 59031, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 18, 2017). Among those solicited were two
families from Louisiana and Arkansas, who presented evidence that they were
illegally and unethically solicited by the Runners to hire Pohl. See Cheatham v.
Pohl, No. 01-20-00046-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 649, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Jan. 27, 2022, no pet.). They presented evidence that kPohl and his
associating attorney “were aware of the solicitation of potentiaCl clients and that
[Walker] had phone conversations with Pohl and [his associating counsel] from
inside potential clients’ hospital rooms to discuss the attorniey ‘marketing.’” Id.
The Runners eventually sued Pohl because they “procured thousands of
viable BP claims” and “approximately sixty motor vehicle accident cases” for Pohl
but that Pohl “did noy pay any of the agreed share of his fees” or all expenses
incurred. Walker v. Williamson, No. 1:14l-cv-381-KS-JCG, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
76488, at *5, 24 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 1, 20M16).
During discovery in the Federal Court Case, Pohl discovered that the
Runners allegedly “disclosedi confidential and proprietary information to third
parties without authorization” and proposed “the ‘sale’ of all of [his] accumulated
work product to thirod parties” while working for him.1 Pohl testifies that the
Runners “undertolok to convert, misappropriate for themselves and/or market to
third parties iclaimant files and other information and materials” that allegedly
belonged to Pohl2 – including “marketing information and other trade secrets”3 –
1 Exhibit 1, Pohl’s June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 18.
2 Exhibit 1, at ¶ 28.
3 Exhibit 1, at ¶ 28.
and then the new owner of Precision, Scott Favre, allegedly “sold those items and
the information” to Kassab.4
As a result, Pohl “asserted multiple claims against” the Runners in the
Federal Court Case based on their alleged “fraudulent and bad faith coknduct.”5 Pohl
did not assert any claims against Kassab in the Federal Court CasCe, even though he
testified under oath that he knew Kassab allegedly was part of the “team of thieves”
who broke into Pohl’s office in 2014 and stole his confiidential information and
purported trade secrets.6 Pohl eventually settled his claims against the Runners,
and the Federal Court Case was dismissed with prejudice on April 24, 2017.7
After hearing about Pohl’s client-solicitation activities, Kassab began
researching the matter and met with Favlre and his counsel, Tina Nicholson. Pohl,
612 S.W.3d at 574. Favre informedM Kassab that, when he bought Precision, he
acquired files related to Pohl and Favre transferred that information to Kassab. Id.
Kassab prepared advertisemenit letters approved by the State Bar of Texas and sent
it to the people who had been illegally solicited by Pohl, informing them that they
may have potential obarratry claims against Pohl. Id. at 575. “Hundreds of
Mississippi residenlts responded to Kassab’s advertisement letter”, “[m]ore than 400
signed represientation contracts with Kassab’s firm to pursue barratry claims
4 Exhibit 1, at ¶ 29.
5 Exhibit 1, at ¶ 19; Exhibit 2, Pohl’s Amended Counterclaim.
6 Exhibit 3, May 15, 2018 Deposition of Michael Pohl, pp. 85-93.
7 Exhibit 4, April 21, 2017 Judgment.
against Pohl”, and “Kassab filed four barratry suits against Pohl in Harris County
district courts, each with multiple named plaintiffs.” Id.
One of those lawsuits – the Berry case – settled for a confidential amount.8
Another of those lawsuits – the Cheatham case – was wrongly kdismissed on
summary judgment in favor of Pohl by the trial court and reversCed and remanded.
See Cheatham, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 649, at *34. The two other cases – Brumfield
and Gandy – were dismissed on summary judgment soliely based on limitations
grounds. See Brumfield v. Williamson, 634 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2021, pet. denied); Gandy v. Williamson, 634 S.W.3d 214 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2021, pet. denied).
Meanwhile, Pohl filed this litigatlion against Kassab, Favre, Nicholson,
Precision, and others, for conversMion, misappropriation of trade secrets and
conspiracy.9 Here, Pohl rehashes his allegations from the Federal Court Case,
claiming that “Precision gaiined access to Pohl’s confidential and proprietary
information and property, including trade secret materials” and “work product” and
“illegally misapproprioated” this information and then allegedly “secretly sold Pohl’s
confidential informlation to Kassab”10 who then “solicited clients/prospective clients
[of Pohl’s] to aict as Plaintiffs . . . to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and
other claims.”11
8 Exhibit 5, Declaration of Lance Kassab, at ¶ 5.
9 See Pohl’s First Amended Petition (“Petition”),
10 Petition, at ¶¶ 20-21.
11 Petition, at ¶ 29.
Seeing Pohl’s retaliatory suit as a means to potentially revive the barratry
claims dismissed on limitations in Brumfield and Gandy, Kassab and his clients
executed 242 Limited Assignments (“the Assignments”).12 The Assignments
assigned only the clients’ barratry claims against Pohl to Kassab, in kconsideration
of Kassab’s continued work on the claims.13 Importantly, howeveCr, Kassab and the
clients agreed that, in the event there was a recovery on the assigned barratry
claims against Pohl, Kassab would only deduct his 40% conitingency fee interest and
the remaining 60% of the recovery would go to the clients.14
Accordingly, within 30 days of his answer being due, Kassab filed his third
amended counterclaim, asserting 242 barratry claims against Pohl pursuant to the
Assignments. See Kassab 3rd Am. Countelrclaim at 11. Kassab affirmatively pled
Section 16.069 of the Texas Civil PraMctice & Remedies Code, which provides that a
counterclaim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the basis of
an action may be brought evein if it would be barred by limitations. Id. Kassab also
provided a multi-page statement of facts, explaining how the barratry claims arise
out of the same transoaction and occurrence as Pohl’s claims against Kassab. Id. at
4-11. Finally, Kalssab asserted several affirmative defenses, including unclean
hands, illegaliity, and in pari delicto. Id. at 3.
12 Kassab Declaration, at ¶ 11.
13 Kassab Declaration, at ¶ 11; Motion, at Exhibit J (example Assignments).
14 Kassab Declaration, at ¶ 11.
Pohl now moves for traditional summary judgment on the barratry
counterclaims. For the reasons stated herein, summary judgment should be denied.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
In a traditional summary judgment motion, the movant has tkhe burden to
show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the Ctrial court should
grant judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); KP
MG Peat Marwick v.
Harrison Cty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tiex. 1999). A defendant
moving for traditional summary judgment must negate at least one essential
element of each of the plaintiff's causes of action or establish each element of an
affirmative defense. Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex.
1997). The Court must (1) take as true all levidence favorable to the nonmovant and
(2) indulge every reasonable inferencMe and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's
favor. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005).
ARiGUMENT & AUTHORITIES
Pohl makes three arguments to support his request for dismissal of the
barratry counterclaimos: (1) res judicata; (2) limitations; and (3) the Assignments are
invalid as a mattler of law, based on public policy and because they purportedly
violate the Disiciplinary Rules. Each argument will be addressed, but none warrant
summary judgment.
A. Res judicata does not apply because facts have changed
and the relationship between the parties has been
altered.
The Texas Supreme Court has made clear that “a judgment in one suit will
not operate as res judicata to a subsequent suit on the same questionk between the
same parties where, in the interval, the facts have changed, oCr new facts have
occurred which may alter the legal rights or relations of the parties.” Marino v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 948, 949-i50 (Tex. 1990). In other
words, “res judicata is not a defense in a subsequent action if there has been a
change in the material facts” because “no judgment can affect subsequently arising
rights and duties.” Id. Simply put, “[e]stoppel by judgment extends only to facts in
issue as they existed at the time the judgmlent was rendered[.]” Lubbock v. Stubbs,
327 S.W.2d 411, 414 (1959). M
Even if the barratry claims were barred by the statute of limitations as the
prior judgments in Brumfield iand Gandy concluded, there was a change in material
facts when Pohl sued Kassab for claims arising from the same transaction that the
barratry occurred, anod the barratry claims were assigned to Kassab thereby giving
Kassab the abilityl to revive the once-barred claims pursuant to Section 16.069. In
other words, tihe prior judgments based on limitations are not res judicata on the
barratry counterclaims because Section 16.069 was not an available defense to the
clients in the prior litigation. See Marino, 787 S.W.2d at 950 (res judicata did not
bar insured’s subsequent suit for bad faith because claim was not available when
the first judgment was entered). Accordingly, res judicata does not apply.15
B. The barratry counterclaims are not barred by
limitations.
Even if the barratry claims were at one time barred by limietations, Section
16.069 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code revived those claims when Kassab
brought them as counterclaims to Pohl’s action. Section 16.06t9 section provides:
(a) If a counterclaim or cross claim arises out of the same
transaction or occurrence that is the basis of an action, a party
to the action may file the counterclaeim or cross claim even
though as a separate action it would be barred by limitation on
the date the party’s answer is requiured.
(b) The counterclaim or cross claim must be filed not later than the
30th day after the date on whlich the party’s answer is required.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.06M9. Pohl contends that Section 16.069 does not
apply here because (1) the barratry counterclaims “do not arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence” ias Pohl’s claims; (2) Kassab did not assert the
counterclaims within the 30-day deadline; and (3) the purpose of the statute would
be frustrated. Mot. ato 9-14. All three arguments fail.
15 Res judicata also does not apply because, according to Pohl, the barratry claims that were
dismissed “do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as Pohl’s claims.” Motion, at 9. If
that is true, then Pohl is not entitled to summary judgment on res judicata because that doctrine
only works to bar subsequent claims that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. See Barr v.
Resolution Trust Corp. ex rel. Sunbelt Fed. Sav., 837 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex. 1992) (“a final judgment
on an action extinguishes the right to bring suit on the transaction, or series of connected
transactions, out of which the action arose.”).
1. Both Pohl’s claims and Kassab’s counterclaims
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence:
Pohl’s engagement of Precision to “liaise” with
prospective clients.
Texas courts apply “a logical relationship test to determine whether
counterclaims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.” Comemint Technical
Servs., Inc. v. Quickel, 314 S.W.3d 646, 653 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2010,
no pet.). Pohl argues that the facts relevant to the barratry ctounterclaims are “in no
way relevant to Pohl’s claims of conversion and theft of trade secrets.” Mot. at 9.
But the facts for both claims need only arise frome the same “transaction,” which
courts define as a “flexible [and] comprehenduing a series of many occurrences
logically related to one another.” Wells v. Dotson, 261 S.W.3d 275, 281 (Tex. App.—
Tyler 2008, no pet.). The facts underlyinag Pohl’s conversion and theft of trade secret
claims are logically related to the same facts underlying the barratry counterclaims.
A comparison of the pleadings deemonstrates this point.
In his petition, Pohl aflleges that he “engaged Precision for a period of time to
provide public relations services, to gather and preserve evidence, and to screen and
liaise with Pohl’s clients/prospective clients” and that, during this engagement,
“Precision gaineid access to Pohl’s confidential and proprietary information and
property, inocluding trade secret materials, that included the identities of Pohl’s
clients/prospective clients, as well as their detailed contact information.” Pohl Am.
Pet. at ¶ 20. Pohl alleges that Precession and its subsequent owner Farve “secretly
sold Pohl’s stolen and confidential information” to Kassab, which is the basis of
Pohl’s theft and trade secret claims. Id. at ¶ 21.
10
In his counterclaim, Kassab alleges that Pohl’s engagement of Precision was
not to provide “public relations services” but was to illegally and unethically solicit
clients in violation of the laws and rules governing barratry. See Kassab 3rd Am.
Ans. and Counterclaim at 4-5. Kassab alleges that Pohl did not hirek Precision to
“liaise” with clients, but to unethically solicit them to retain PoChl. Id. at 5-6. The
barratry counterclaims are based on 242 Assignments that Kassab received from
the clients who were solicited by Precision, at Pohl’s instruiction, and are part of the
group of clients who own the information that Pohl alleges Kassab misappropriated.
Id. at 10-11.
Pohl’s claims against Kassab and Kassab’s counterclaims against Pohl both
arise from the relationship between Polhl and Precision. The facts relevant to
determining whether Precision gainMed access to Pohl’s confidential information
while “liaising” with prospective clients are also relevant to determining whether
the “liaising” conducted by Priecision – at Pohl’s direction – amounted to unlawful
barratry. Accordingly, the logical relationship test is satisfied. See Quickel, 314
S.W.3d at 653 (breaoch of contract claim and defamation claim met the logical
relationship test elven though one “span[ed] a longer time period and involve[d]
broader issuesi” because they both arose “from the breakdown of the employment
relationship between” the two parties).
Pohl cites several cases to argue that courts have refused to apply Section
16.069 “in cases involving much more related claims than the counterclaims Kassab
asserts.” Mot. at 10. But the cases that Pohl cites are clearly distinguishable.
11
Pohl first relies on Freeman v. Cherokee Water Co., 11 S.W.3d 480 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. denied). In Freeman, the Cherokee Water Company
brought a declaratory judgment action against the Freemans to interpret one
provision in a deed, pertaining to a grant of fishing rights. Id. at 483. Ikn response to
that action, the Freemans filed a counterclaim to set aside the enCtire deed based on
an alleged fraudulent execution of the deed. Id. at 483. The court concluded that the
Freemans’ counterclaim for fraud was not logically relaited to Cherokee’s action
because it “in no way relate[d] to the fishing rights [provision], or any other
interpretation of the deed.” Id.
Freeman has no application here. Pohl’s claims and Kassab’s counterclaims
are logically related, particularly becausel both claims depend on the manner in
which Precision worked for Pohl Mto procure client contact information. Pohl
contends that during the relationship, Precision obtained client information and
sold it to Kassab, while Kaissab contends that during that same relationship
Precision obtained the clients giving rise to the purportedly confidential information
illegally. Kassab’s couonterclaims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence –
the work providedl by Precision “marketing group” to acquire clients and client
information – iwhich is also the basis for Pohl’s action.
Pohl’s reliance on T&C Constr., Ltd. v. Brown Mech. Servs., No. 01-19-00041-
CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 5067 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 9, 2020, no
pet.) is also mistaken. The court in T&C Constriction declined to apply Section
16.069 to save an otherwise barred unjust enrichment claim because it related not
12
to the transaction underlying the breach of contract claim brought by the plaintiff,
but to “payments made for a separate job” relating to separate contract. Id. at
*16. Here, Kassab’s counterclaims for barratry and Pohl’s claim for theft of trade
secrets all arise from the same transaction or occurrence: Precision’s kmarketing to
to acquire clients and secure client information. It is immateriaCl that the claims
may also require a showing of different facts because only “some of the facts
surrounding the causes of action [need] arise from thie same transaction or
occurrence.” Encore Enters., Inc. v. Borderplex Realty Tr., 583 S.W.3d 713, 722 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.) (emphasis added).
Pohl argues that whether he solicited the clients in 2012 to 2014 has no
bearing on Kassab’s alleged misconduct inl 2016. Mot. at 11. But again, claims can
arise from the same transaction evenM if they involve “a series of many occurrences”
so long as they are “logically related to one another.” Wells, 261 S.W.3d at 281. That
is the case here. Pohl compilains that Kassab allegedly purchased confidential
information acquired by Precision while it was performing client acquisition
services, thus giving orise to Pohl’s claim for misappropriation. Kassab complains
that the client acqluisition performed by Precision was illegal and unethical, thus
giving rise to tihe barratry counterclaims. Simply put, Kassab’s alleged purchase of
client information from Precision (which is contested) derived out of the client
acquisition from Precision. Both claims are logically related to one another,
regardless of the time that elapsed between occurrences. See Rahlek, Ltd. v. Wells,
587 S.W.3d 57, 75 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, pet. denied) (concluding declaratory
13
judgment action to construe 2006 deed was logically related to unjust enrichment
counterclaim arising out of royalty payments made pursuant to the deed in 2013).
Accordingly, Section 16.069(a) is satisfied, and the statute of limitations on
the barratry counterclaims is tolled once Kassab complied with sectionk (b) by filing
the counterclaims not later than the 30th day after the date on Cwhich his answer
was due.
2. Kassab asserted valid and suifficiently pled
counterclaims within the 30-day deadline.
Pohl does not dispute that Kassab filed his baerratry counterclaims within the
30-day deadline. Mot. at 11. Instead, Pohl arugues that the counterclaims were
insufficiently alleged to “satisfy the requirements of the statute” because they did
not provide “any indication of who assiganed the claims” or provide “fair notice of the
facts giving rise to the claims[.]” Mot. at 11. This argument fails as well.
Pohl relies on Rogers v. eVeigel Inter Vivos Tr. No. 2, 162 S.W.3d 281 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2005, pet. defnied) to argue that Kassab’s pleadings were deficient.
Mot. at 11-12. Notably, Pohl does so without discussing the facts of Rogers. Pohl
fails to do so because Rogers is easily distinguishable.
Rogers wais an estate dispute. 162 S.W.3d at 285. The plaintiff, ANB, sued to
be removedo as trustee of the decedent’s estate. Id. The grandchildren of the
decedent, R.W., answered and asserted the following “averment” in their “answer”
as a purported counterclaim for damages:
[R.W.] denies that ANB should be removed as Trustee at this time, in
that there is a question as to acts of the Trustee under Ardella's
Intervivos Trust No. 2 and under the estate of Charles[.]
14
Id. at 289-290 (cleaned up). The Rogers court looked to Rule 47 and concluded that
the averment was insufficient to assert a counterclaim, reasoning:
There is no general prayer for relief, no allegation that the damages
were within the trial court's jurisdictional limits, and no description of
any particular cause of action. All [the defendant] did was deny [the
plaintiff’s] allegation that it should be allowed to resign as trustee.
And, he based that denial upon the mere suggestion thatt there were
“questions” about [the plaintiff’s] “acts.” What the “quesitions” or “acts”
were, what rights or interests of [the defendant], if asnty, were involved,
or the injury, if any, supposedly suffered by [the dDefiendant] due to the
unspecified acts went unmentioned. 
While Texas follows the theory of “notice pleadings,” … the concept
still requires the litigant to provide fair notice of the claims involved to
the accused. [citation omitted]. And, to be fair, the allegations must be
sufficient to inform a reasonably competent attorney of the nature and
basic issues of the controversy and of the potentially relevant evidence.
[citation omitted]. Merely stating tlhat ANB should not be allowed to
resign because of unspecified “quaestions” created by unspecified “acts”
hardly falls within that ambit.
Id. at 289.
The Rogers court also nioted that, after a discovery dispute arose relating to
the allegations in R.W.’s answer, R.W.’s counsel stated to the trial court that R.W.
“filed nothing seekingo affirmative relief from [ANB]” and “there is no affirmative
relief sought froma l [ANB].” Id. “Given the oblique nature of the allegations relied
upon by R.W.f,i their failure to satisfy the requirements of Rule 47, and R.W.’s own
representation to the trial court made in effort to defeat discovery, [the Rogers court
was] unable to say that the original answers of R.W. included counterclaims.” Id. at
289-290.
15
Rogers does not apply here. Unlike R.W., Kassab has not agreed that he is
not seeking affirmative relief. To the contrary, Kassab has plainly asserted a
counterclaim against Pohl:
See Kassab 3rd Am. Ans. and Counterclaim aBt 1. And unlike the pleading filed by
R.W., Kassab contained an allegation ythat the damages were within the
jurisdictional limitation of the Court:
Id. at 2. Moreover, unlpike R.W., Kassab included a specific cause of action against
Pohl: “a counterclaim for civil barratry.” Id. at 11. And unlike the single sentence
asserted by R.Wi., Kassab’s counterclaim is supported by seven pages of facts
discussing oconduct committed by Pohl which amounted to barratry.16 Id. at 4-11.
Finally, unlike R.W., Kassab asserted a prayer for affirmative relief:
16 For this reason, Pohl’s contention that Kassab’s counterclaim is “devoid of any of the facts giving
rise to the claims” is false, as with most of his factual assertions. Mot. at 12.
16
Id. at 13. Kassab’s counterclaim was more than suffiscient “to provide fair notice of
the claims involved to the accused.” Rogers, 162 S.rW.3d at 289.
In essence, Pohl’s argument is that Kassab’s counterclaim is insufficient to
provide fair notice because Kassab did notl specifically identify who the assignors of
the claims were. Mot. at 12. But there is no requirement under Rule 47 for an
assignee to state the identity of the assignor; rather, the claimant need only provide
“a short statement of the cauise of action sufficient to give fair notice of the claim
involved.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 47(a) (emphasis added). Nor does Rule 45 – the rule
stating what pleadingos must include – require the assignee to identify the assignor.
See TEX. R. CIV. Pa.l 45(b) (requiring only that the pleading “consist of a statement in
plain and conf icise language of the plaintiff’s cause of action or the defendant’s
grounds of defense.”). Rather, “Texas follows a ‘fair notice’ standard for pleading, in
which courts assess the sufficiency of pleadings by determining whether an
opposing party can ascertain from the pleading the nature, basic issues, and the
type of evidence that might be relevant to the controversy.” Low v. Henry, 221
17
S.W.3d 609, 612 (Tex. 2007). Kassab’s pleading met that fair notice standard, and
any details about the Assignments could be obtained by Pohl through discovery,
which he did.17
3. Pohl’s policy arguments about why Skection
16.069 should not apply here fail. e
Pohl next resorts to policy, arguing that the “object and purpose” of Section
16.069 would be frustrated if it is applied here. Mot. at t12-14. This last-resort
argument is also unavailing.
Pohl begins by relying on Holman St. Baptist eChurch v. Jefferson, 317 S.W.3d
540, 545 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 20u10, pet. denied) and Ball v. SBC
Communs., Inc., No. 04-02-00702-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 5286 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio June 25, 2003, pet. denied) tao argue that “courts have limited [Section
16.069’s] reach, such as ruling it does not revive claims made in response to
declarations not requesting aeffirmative relief.” Mot. at 13. But Ball has no
application here because Pofhl is not seeking a declaration which does not request
affirmative relief, and Holman contradicts Pohl’s argument.
The court in Ball concluded that Section 16.069 “does not revive or save
claims brought biy a party as counterclaims in a suit for declaratory judgment which
alleges thaot such claims are absolutely barred by limitations as a matter of law.”
2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 5286 at *16. The court held that to conclude otherwise would
lead to an “unjust and unreasonable” result not intended by the legislature because
it would allow otherwise barred claims to be revived in an action brought to declare
17 Moreover, Pohl could have obtained a hearing on his special exceptions if he actually believed that
Kassab’s pleadings were deficient. He failed to do so.
18
the claims barred by limitations. Id. at *11-13. “Were [the court] to hold that section
16.069 revives claims which are absolutely barred by limitations as a matter of law,
the result would be that a litigant would never be able to seek a declaratory
judgment based on limitations because a defendant could always use skection 16.069
to defeat such a suit.” Id. at *11. C
Holman relied on Ball to state that one party’s “mere seeking of a declaration
on limitations regarding his purported debt to [the otheir party] did not trigger
section 16.069(a).” 317 S.W.3d at 545. Importantly, however, the Holman court
recognized that if, “in addition to the declaration on limitations, [the party] also
sought affirmative relief”, than Section 16.069 would apply. Id. at 546. This is
because “[c]ourts have interpreted sectionl 16.069 as permitting a party’s otherwise
time-barred counterclaims or cross clMaims only when the opposing party has sought
‘affirmative relief,’ rather than just a declaration on a dispute between the parties.”
Id. at 545. The Holman courti concluded “the request for return of the stock [made
by the plaintiff] was a request for affirmative relief triggering section 16.069(a).” Id.
at 546. o
Ball is distilnguishable because this is not a suit brought by Pohl solely to
obtain a declairation that the assigned barratry claims are barred by limitations. In
fact, Pohl does not seek declaratory relief at all. Rather, just as in Holman, Pohl
seeks affirmative relief against Kassab for purported conversion and theft of trade
secrets arising out of the documents that evidence Pohl’s illegal barratry scheme.
19
Accordingly, Section 16.069 applies, and Pohl is not entitled to summary judgment
on limitations. See Holman, 317 S.W.3d at 545.
C. The Assignments are not invalid, do not violate public
policy or the Disciplinary Rules, and should be enforced.
Pohl’s last argument again resorts to public policy and asks theis Court to void
the Assignments because they are purportedly in “violation of ethical rules.” Mot. at
14. Although Pohl’s sudden regard for ethics is refreshing, Ttexas law is clear that a
purported violation of an ethical rule does not void an otherwise valid contract. And
Pohl’s reliance on cases prohibiting assignments eof claims under the DTPA is
unavailing because this is not a DTPA case. Moure fundamentally, Pohl has argued
that the Assignments are valid, and he should be estopped from taking a contrary
position in this case. We will address thaat point first.
1. Pohl should be estopped from arguing that the
Assignments are invalid.
Although Pohl arguesi that the Assignments are invalid here, he has
simultaneously argued to the Texas Supreme Court that the Assignments are valid.
Specifically, Pohl reqouested the Texas Supreme Court to dismiss the appeals filed
by the assignee cllients in Brumfield and Gandy because the barratry claims were
assigned to Kiassab.18 Pohl argued that, “[o]n its face, the documents [the
assignments] assign ‘any and all’ barratry claims [so] the Assignor retains no
justiciable interest in the claims.”19 Pohl should be estopped from playing “fast and
18 Exhibit 5-A, Brumfield Motion to Dismiss; Exhibit 5-B, Gandy Motion to Dismiss.
19 Exhibit 5-A, Brumfield Motion to Dismiss, at 5; Exhibit 5-B, Gandy Motion to Dismiss, at 5.
20
loose” with the judicial system by taking these two wholly inconsistent and contrary
positions. See Ferguson v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am., 295 S.W.3d 642, 643 (Tex.
2009) (stating that a litigant is estopped from taking inconsistent positions to obtain
an unfair advantage). k
2. The Assignments are not invalid as a mattCer of law.
A civil barratry claim under Section 82.0651(a) brought by a client is a
“contract-based” claim. See Cheatham, 2022 Tex. Appi. LEXIS 649, at *23.
Generally, claims sounding in contract are assignable, regardless of whether they
are created by statute. See Lindsay ex. rel. Lindsay v. South San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist., 983 S.W.2d 778, 779-80 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (claim for
statutory benefits was assignable becausel although the “cause of action exists by
virtue of statutory law, it bears signiMficant resemblance to a common law action for
breach of contract.”). Civil barratry claims under Section 82.0651(c) sound in tort.
Nguyen v. Watts, 605 S.W.3di 761, 781 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet.
denied). Generally, tort claims are also assignable. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 6o96, 707 (Tex. 1996). There are two exceptions to assignability
of claims that warlrant discussion, but neither applies here.
The firsit exception is that “an assignment of a legal malpractice action
arising from litigation is invalid.” Zuniga, Jr. v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d
313, 318 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ ref'd). However, Pohl has argued – and
the court of appeals has agreed – that a civil barratry claim “is not malpractice that
is committed in the prosecution or defense of a claim” resulting from litigation.
21
Brumfield, 634 S.W.3d at 206. In fact, the court in Brumfield rejected as
“misplaced” the clients’ effort to “analogize legal-malpractice claims to civil-barratry
claims … because any alleged improper solicitation would have occurred before the
formation of the attorney-client relationship[.]” Id. at 205 n. 34. Acckordingly, the
rule prohibiting assignments of legal malpractice claims has noC application here.
See id. (declining to extend the Hughes tolling rule – which tolls limitations on
claims against the attorney when he commits malpractiice in the prosecution or
defense of a claim that results in litigation – to civil barratry claims).
The second exception – which is principally relied on by Pohl20 – is that
“DTPA claims generally cannot be assigned by an aggrieved consumer to someone
else.” PPG Indus. v. JMB/Houston Ctrs. Lltd. P'ship, 146 S.W.3d 79, 92 (Tex. 2004).
That exception does not apply here foMr the simple fact that a civil barratry claim is
not a DTPA claim. In fact, in his briefing filed with the Texas Supreme Court in
Brumfield and Gandy, Pohli explicitly stated that “civil barratry claims are
different” than DTPA claims.21 Nonetheless, Pohl again attempts to play loose with
contrary arguments boy analogizing barratry claims to DTPA claims and asserting
that the “analysisl” of PPG “applies to the assignability of barratry claims in this
case.” Mot. at 1i6. Pohl’s reliance on PPG is mistaken for at least two reasons.
First, the court in PPG noted that its decision did “not prohibit equitable
assignments, such as a contingent-fee interest assigned to a consumer’s attorney.”
20 Mot. at 15-17.
21 Exhibit 5-C, Brumfield Response, at 22; Exhibit 5-D, Gandy Response, at 22.
22
146 S.W.3d at 91-92. The Assignments in this case were just that; equitable
assignments from Kassab’s clients to Kassab in exchange for continuing work that
Kassab would perform on the claims.22 The assignments were effectuated in an
attempt to salvage the clients’ barratry claims, with the intention okf paying any
proceeds from the assigned claims back to the clients in proportCion to the original
contingency fee agreement should Kassab obtain any recovery.23 The assignments
were equitable in nature, created to benefit the clients whoi were unknowing victims
of barratry committed by Pohl.24
Second, the concerns that the PPG court had with DTPA assignments are not
present here. The court noted that it had “prohibited assignments that may skew
the trial process, confuse or mislead thel jury, promote collusion among nominal
adversaries, or misdirect damages froMm more culpable to less culpable defendants.”
146 S.W.3d at 90. Those issues are not present in this case, under these unique
circumstances. Kassab and hiis clients who assigned the claims are not adversaries,
they are aligned. And the damages will not be misdirected from the more culpable
to less capable partieos, but will remain directed to the most culpable party: Pohl.
Finally, no jury colnfusion will occur. The PPG court noted that, because the DTPA
permits mentail anguish and exemplary damages, “[j]urors are bound to experience
some confusion in assessing mental anguish of a consumer, or punitive damages
22 Kassab Declaration, at ¶ 11.
23 Kassab Declaration, at ¶ 11.
24 Kassab Declaration, at ¶ 11; Given this evidence, Pohl’s contention that “[l]awyers like Kassab are
in a position to take advantage of clients by purchasing assignments far below their potential value
given statutory penalties” is unsupported and without merit.
23
based on the situation and sensibilities of the parties when the affected consumer is
not a party.” Id. Unlike the DTPA, the civil barratry statute does not provide for
mental anguish or punitive damages; it permits only actual damages, attorney’s
fees, disgorgement, and civil penalties. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 82.0651(bk), (d). These
remedies may be awarded regardless of the “situation and seCnsibilities” of the
solicited client.
Therefore, the reasoning of PPG is inapplicable to thie Assignments here, and
they are presumptively valid and should be enforced.
3. The Assignments do not violate public policy,
nor were they procuured in violation of the
ethical rules; regardless, the Assignments
cannot be voided on those grounds.
Suddenly struck by a sense of eathical responsibility which has been lacking
from Pohl’s moral compass for at least two decades,25 Pohl argues that the
Assignments are invalid becausee Kassab allegedly obtained them in violation of the
ethical rules. Mot. at 17. Of fcourse, Pohl cites no evidence for this proposition; only
argument of counsel. See Mot. at 17-19. While words from Pohl’s counsel may carry
great weight within the confines of their own office, it is well-settled that in the
court of law “coiunsel’s statements are not evidence.” Ex parte Ubadimma, 623
S.W.3d 530o, 533 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.). Regardless, Pohl’s
argument not only lacks evidentiary support, but legal support as well.
25 Pohl indisputably began committing barratry shortly after the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon when
he paid Precision and its members “over $5 million in ‘barratry pass-through money’ for their
services” which included “contact[ing] people and businesses in Mississippi to determine if they
might have a claim against BP [and] encourage[ing] those people to retain Pohl as their attorney[.]”
Pohl, 612 S.W.3d at 574. Later, in 2014, Pohl illegally and unethically solicited two families who lost
loved ones. See Cheatham, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 649, at *3.
24
Pohl argues that the Assignments purportedly violated Rule 1.08(h) because
they “concern causes of action and the subject matter of litigation where Kassab
represented those clients.” Mot. at 19. However, Rule 1.08(h) specifically allows a
lawyer to “acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer’s fee ork expenses[.]”
TEX. R. PROF’L COND. 1.08(h). The Assignments do not violate RuCle 1.08(h) because
they were effectuated to secure a lien in Kassab’s existing fee, and help Kassab
recover that fee, with the remainder from any recovery baised on the Assignments
going back to the clients.26
But even if the Assignments are noncompliant under sine unknown
technicality with Rule 1.08(h), that alone is insufficient to void them. This is
demonstrated by Wright v. Sydow – a clase cited by Pohl27 – which held that a
settlement agreement would be enforMced even if it were executed in violation of Rule
1.08 because a purported violation of the disciplinary rules does not void an
otherwise valid contract. See 1i73 S.W.3d 534, 549 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2004, pet. denied) (“We decline to use Disciplinary Rule 1.08 to void an otherwise
valid settlement agreoement entered into at arm’s length”). The Fourteenth Court of
Appeals very recenltly reiterated this holding and concluded that “an agreement is
not illegal, voiid, or unenforceable as against public policy when the agreement
contravenes [a Disciplinary Rule].” M.A. Mills, P.C. v. Kotts, No. 14-20-00395-CV,
2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 359, at *17 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 20, 2022,
no pet.). Therefore, even if the Assignments are unethical and in violation of Rule
26 Kassab Declaration, at ¶ 11.
27 See Mot. at 18.
25
1.08 (and they are not), the Court cannot void them. See id. at *21 (concluding that
an oral agreement between attorneys “was not illegal, void, and unenforceable
because it contravened Rule 1.08(a).”).
Pohl also contends that the Assignments should be declared invkalid based on
“equitable considerations” because they “injury the public good.C” Mot. at 18. But
“one who comes seeking equity must come with clean hands.” Omohundro v.
Matthews, 341 S.W.2d 401, 410 (1960). Pohl has the fiilthiest of hands, having
committed felony barratry28 by illegally and unethically soliciting the clients who
assigned their claims. See Pohl, 612 S.W.3d at 574 (noting the “evidence” that
Precision and its members were hired by Pohl to solicit clients and “paid over $5
million in ‘barratry pass-through money’ lfor their services.”). It would not “injure
the public good” to allow clients whosMe barratry claims may otherwise be barred by
limitations to assert those claims through an assignment to their attorney if it
means that the claims would ibe salvaged, and the clients could obtain a relief for
Pohl’s unethical conduct. To the contrary, voiding the Assignments only injures the
unknowing clients aond the public, because it rewards attorneys like Pohl who
knowingly commilt felony barratry and then breach their fiduciary duty of full
disclosure by cioncealing the crime so that limitations may expire.
The Court should not invalidate the Assignments, it should enforce them so
that Pohl may finally be held accountable for his reprehensible actions that the
Legislature has mandated courts like this one to protect against. See TEX. GOV’T
CODE § 82.0651(e) (providing for liberal construction and application of the civil
28 See TEX. PEN. CODE § 38.12.
26
barratry statute “to protect those in need of legal services against unethical,
unlawful solicitation and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure
that protection.”).
CONCLUSION & PRAYER k
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny MichaelC A. Pohl and Law
Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendants’
Counterclaims. i
Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
__________________________
lLANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
a Texas State Bar No. 00794070
M lance@kassab.law
 DAVID ERIC KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 24071351
e david@kassab.law
i NICHOLAS R. PIERCE
f Texas State Bar No. 24098263
nicholas@kassab.law
1214 Elgin Street
o Houston, Texas 77004
Telephone: 713-522-7400
l Facsimile: 713-522-7410
i E-Service: eserve@kassab.law
o ATTORNEYS FOR KASSAB PARTIES
27
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date, January 31, 2022, I electronically filed this
document with the Clerk of the Court using the eFile.TXCourts.gov electronic filing
system which will send notification of such filing to all parties or counsel of record.
______________________e_
DAVID ERIC KASSAB C
28
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab
Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law r
Envelope ID: 61310680
Status as of 1/31/2022 3:07 PM CST
Case Contacts r i
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com s1/31/2022 3:03:09 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com g1/31/2022 3:03:09 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@favrepa.com u 1/31/2022 3:03:09 PM SENT
Lance Kassab eserve@kassab.law  1/31/2022 3:03:09 PM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.comy 1/31/2022 3:03:09 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbarar.com 1/31/2022 3:03:09 PM SENT
Larry Newsom lnewsom@krcl.com 1/31/2022 3:03:09 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo jason@cioofalolaw.com 1/31/2022 3:03:09 PM SENT
Misty Davis mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 1/31/2022 3:03:09 PM SENT
Andrew J. Sarne asafrne@krcl.com 1/31/2022 3:03:09 PM SENT
Kathryn Laflin KLaflin@KRCL.com 1/31/2022 3:03:09 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10607900pjefferson@mdjwlaw.com 1/31/2022 3:03:09 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo 24003C021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 1/31/2022 3:03:09 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24a01l2371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 1/31/2022 3:03:09 PM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 1/31/2022 3:03:09 PM SENT
Solace Southwicko ssouthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 1/31/2022 3:03:09 PM SENT
E. MarieJamisUon jamison@wrightclosebarger.com 1/31/2022 3:03:09 PM SENT
Jessica Z.Barger barger@wrightclosebarger.com 1/31/2022 3:03:09 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 1/31/2022 3:03:09 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 1/31/2022 3:03:09 PM SENT
David R.Wade lawyerwade@hotmail.com 1/31/2022 3:03:09 PM SENT
Felicia Grace fgrace@krcl.com 1/31/2022 3:03:09 PM SENT"