filing_id,date,doc_type,party,description,doc_type_detail,procedural_posture,chain,outcome,phase,filename,relief_requested,full_text 42,2022-10-31,ORD,Court,Order: FOUR MSJs DENIED,"Order Denying All Four Motions for Summary Judgment (Kassab Traditional MSJ, Kassab No-Evidence MSJ, Nicholson Amended Traditional MSJ, and Nicholson/Kassab TUTSA Preemption MSJ)","Court order signed October 31, 2022 by Judge Scot Dollinger and filed November 2, 2022, denying all four pending motions for summary judgment in a single order with no stated reasoning.",MSJ-2,DENIED,Phase 3,2022-10-31_ORD_Denying-Kassab-Trad-and-No-Evid-MSJ_SIGNED.pdf,,"Filed 22 November 02 A10:22 Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County Pgs-1 CAUSE NO. 2018-58419 MFSJY POHL, MICHAEL, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff(s) § S VS. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS S FAVRE, SCOTT, § 189th JUDICIAL DISTRICT Defendant(s) § “ ORDER & SS Pending is THE KASSAB DEFENDANTS’ _ TRADITIONAL xipnion FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed August 29, 2022. & Motion DENIED. @ GP Pending is THE KASSAB DEFENDANTS’ NO-EYOENCE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed August 29, 2022. SS Motion DENIED. Pending is DEFENDANTS TINA NICHOL ( snp BAKER NICHOLSON, LLP D/B/A BAKER NICHOLSON LAW FIRM’S AMENDED TRAD AL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed August 29, 2022. ws Motion DENIED. © ® Pending is NICHOLSON b NDANTS AND KASSAB DEFENDANTS’ TRADITIONAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG, TON TUTSA PREEMPTION filed August 2, 2022. Motion DENIED. -=\ ow Signed October 31, 2022. . It Hulda & Ae) Hon. SCOT DOLLINGER & Judge, 189th District Court &" 30,2022-08-29,MSJ,Kassab,Trad. + No-Evidence MSJ (2nd attempt),"Kassab's Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment — comprehensive 80+ page dispositive motion raising seven independent grounds for dismissal: Rule 17.09 immunity, judicial proceedings privilege, attorney immunity, limitations, conclusive negation of TUTSA (no secrecy and no ownership), illegal acts bar, and improper damages (American Rule)","Phase 3 dispositive motion filed alongside the Seventh Amended Answer. This is Kassab's second MSJ attempt, substantially more detailed than the first. It adopts and incorporates the Nicholson Motion filed August 19, 2022, and presents extensive evidentiary support including 60+ exhibits (depositions, declarations, contracts, financial records, correspondence). Addressed to Judge Scot 'Dolli' Dollinger.",MSJ-2,DENIED,Phase 3,2022-08-29_MSJ_Kassab-Trad-and-No-Evid-MSJ_FILED.pdf,Grant traditional summary judgment dismissing all of Pohl's claims against Kassab; order that Pohl take nothing,"8/29/2022 5:07 PM Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No. 67771690 By: Ashley Lopez Filed: 8/29/2022 5:07 PM CAUSE NO. 2018-58419 MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIALk DISTRICT THE KASSAB DEFENDANTS’ TRADITIONACL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT  TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE SCOT “DOLLI” DOLLINGEtR: Defendants Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a/ The Kassab Law Firm file this, their Traeditional Motion for Summary Judgment, and would respectfully show the follouwing. SUMMARY Pohl committed illegal and uneathical barratry and he wants Kassab, who brought the barratry litigation and grievances against Pohl, to pay for Pohl’s barratry defense costs. But Pohel’s claims against Kassab are barred as a matter of law because: f • Pohl’s claims are predicated on Kassab’s filing of a grievance against Pohl for whicoh Kassab has absolute and unqualified immunity pursuant to Rule 17.09 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. • Pohl’s claiims against Kassab are barred by the judicial proceedings privilegie because they arise out of communications that Kassab made in proospective (solicitation letters) and actual judicial proceedings (the barratry litigation and grievance process) and Pohl seeks defamation- like damages including loss of reputation to his law firm and defense costs incurred because of the statements that Kassab made. • Pohl’s claims against Kassab are barred by attorney immunity. Under the doctrine of attorney immunity, an attorney does not have a right of recovery, under any cause of action, against another attorney arising from conduct the second attorney engaged in as part of the discharge of his duties in representing a party. • Pohl’s claims are barred by limitations because they accrued in 2014 and Pohl did not file suit until more than three years later. • Pohl’s claims are conclusively negated. Pohl’s TUTSA claim is conclusively negated because his alleged trade secrets weere not actually kept secret. Pohl’s claims also fail because Pohl dCoes not own the purportedly stolen property and trade secrets. t  • Pohl’s illegal acts (barratry and unauthorized ptractice of law) precludes any form of recovery against the whistlebilowers because his acts are inexorably intertwined with his crimes.  • Pohl is not permitted to recovery as damagees the attorney’s fees he incurred in the four barratry lawsuits and two disciplinary grievances. JOINDER AND INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE Defendants Tina Nicholson and Balker Nicholson, LLP (“Nicholson”) moved for traditional summary judgment oMn August 19, 2022 (“the Nicholson Motion”). Kassab adopts the arguments set forth in the Nicholson Motion and all evidence cited therein. See TEX. R. CIV.i P. 58 (“Statements in a pleading may be adopted by reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another pleading or in any motion, so long as theo pleading containing such statements has not been superseded by an amendment las provided by Rule 65 pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 58.”); Lockett vi. HB Zachry Co., 285 S.W.3d 63, 72 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“Texas courts have recognized adoption of a co-party's motion for summary judgment as a procedurally legitimate practice.”). Reference to exhibits attached to the Nicholson Motion will be “Nicholson Ex. [number], [description].” BACKGROUND Pohl engages in an illicit barratry scheme to personally solicit BP clients and victims of catastrophic auto accidents. Michael Pohl and his law firm retained two non-lawyers, Scott Walker and Kirk Ladner, and their company, Precision Marketing Group (e“Precision”), to “recruit clients for [Pohl] to represent against BP”1 and provide “marking services” to auto accident victims.2 Walker testified that although the and Pohl called it “marketing services” or “marketing money” it was “clear to [him] it was barratry.”3 In fact, Walker considered himself and his companey “a pass-through for barratry money.”4 All total, Walker, Ladner and Precisionu Marketing received over $5 million in “barratry pass-through money” from Pohl and other lawyers to solicit accident victims and potential clients with claaims, both auto-accident victims and those involved in the BP Deepwater Horizon litigation.5 They would use this money to pay contract workers to solicit clientes.6 They would locate and instruct contract workers on how to accomplish the s olficitation.7 They trained “40 or 50 people” on how to “go out and solicit contracts.”8 Walker would “get leads from a variety of sources” including “from Michael Pohl” and then hie and Ladner, or one of their employees, would go try to “find the 1 Exhibit U2, General Operating Agreement; Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, p. 19. 2 Exhibit 2, General Operating Agreement; Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 605- 607. 3 Exhibit 3-B, 2016 Deposition of Scott Walker, p. 149. 4 Exhibit 3-B, 2016 Deposition of Scott Walker, p. 197:6-7. 5 Exhibit 3-B, 2016 Deposition of Scott Walker, p. 73:21-25; 74:1-25; 75-1-15. 6 Exhibit 3-B, 2016 Deposition of Scott Walker, p. 199. 7 Exhibit 3-B, 2016 Deposition of Scott Walker, p. 77-78. 8 Exhibit 3-B, 2016 Deposition of Scott Walker, p. 196-197. family who had lost a loved one” and “just do marketing” to “let them know that there was help available.”9 The “help” available would be offering the victims money from Helping Hands Financing, LLC (“Helping Hands Financing”).10 Helping Hands Financing is owned by Pohl’s wife, Donalda Pohl (“Donalda”), and opekrated by her cousin, Jaimes.11 If one of the clients Precision Marketing Csolicited “needed monetary help” they would be referred to Jaimes and Jaimes would “work with them to -- to help them.”12 The funds from Helping Handsi Financing to pay to the auto accident victims “would have come through Edgar Jaimes.”13 In other words, if Walker or his team needed money to induce the auto accident victims, he would talk to Jaimes and seek his approval.14 Walker testified that Pohl would selnd him leads on the auto accident cases because he knew that Walker and MLadner “could go out and get those type of cases.”15 Either Ladner would go to solicit the clients, or they would send Magdalena Santana (“Magdaliena”), her brother Florian “Jay” Santana (“Florian”), or one of their other employees.16 Walker testified that these folks working for Precision Marketing owere soliciting the victims “on behalf of Mr. Pohl.”17 Walker 9 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 142-143. 10 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 734-735. 11 Exhibit 4, October 2018 Deposition of Edgar Jaimes, p. 28. 12 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 734-735. 13 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 201-203. 14 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 203-204, 207-208. 15 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 146-148. 16 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 146-148. 17 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 152. and his team solicited more than 50 auto accident cases for Pohl.18 Walker always kept Pohl informed on what he and his team were doing.19 Walker testified that the runners who solicited the clients would get “a bonus” if they got the client to sign a contract.20 Walker testified thakt he and his team would receive the bonus from either Helping Hands FinancinCg at the direction of Jaimes or Pohl and his law firm.21 The payment to the runner would come from Precision Marketing, but Walker would then “turn in an aimount that [they] spent during the that week … to Mr. Pohl’s office.”22 Either Pohl or Jaimes would then reimburse Precision Marketing.23 Financials obtained from Precision Marketing evidence this fact, reflecting incoming transfers from Pohl’s law firm or Helping Hands Financing with payments made tol various runners.24 At times, Pohl gave direction as to some of the bonuses Mor fees that Precision Marketing paid to the runners.25 And although Walker did not get “permission, per se” from Pohl to make the specific payments to thei runners, he “would tell [Pohl] after the fact what [Precision Marketing] had spent that week.”26 One runner, Moagdalena Santana, exposes the barratry scheme despite being paid $50,000 by Pohl to keep quiet. Magdalenia personally solicited two of the plaintiffs who would ultimately sue Pohl for baroratry: Heraclite Bikumbu (and his minor children) and Raymond Butts. 18 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 148-151. 19 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 153. 20 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 158-160, 556. 21 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 556. 22 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 160. 23 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 160-161, 556. 24 Exhibit 5, Precision Marketing Group Financials. 25 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 161-162. 26 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 162. In her September 24, 2016 affidavit, Magdalena testified that Pohl sent her on “dozens and dozens of car wreck cases all over the country.”27 Pohl would email Magdalena the link of news coverage depicting the accident and ask her “to go to the victim or the victim’s family and try to get them to sign up withk him.”28 Pohl offered to give Magdalena “$5,000 per case that [she] signed, pluCs a percentage of his attorney’s fees.”29 Magdalena was advised by Pohl to “be persistent even if the family ... rejected [her].”30 Magdalena was instructed byi Pohl to “approach the victims and their families while they were vulnerable, in the emergency room, their hospital rooms or at the funerals.”31 Pohl told Santana that minorities “were especially vulnerable since they tended not to know that the law prohibited barratry.”32 According to Pohl, they “werel easier to sign up.”33 Pohl would give Magdalena “mMoney to give to the victims or their families” but “only if they agreed to sign a Pohl representation contract.”34 Pohl advised Santana that the money wasi a “foot in the door” but instructed Santana not to mention that she was there on behalf of a lawyer “until after they agreed to take the money.”35 “If the clienot agreed to hire Pohl, then [Magdalena] was to have the client sign a ‘Helping Hlands’ contract.”36 Pohl would then give Magdalena the money to 27 ExhibitU 6, September 24, 2016 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana, ¶ 17. 28 Exhibit 6, September 24, 2016 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana, ¶ 17. 29 Exhibit 6, September 24, 2016 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana, ¶ 18. 30 Exhibit 6, September 24, 2016 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana, ¶ 19. 31 Exhibit 6, September 24, 2016 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana, ¶ 19. 32 Exhibit 6, September 24, 2016 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana, ¶ 19 (emphasis added). 33 Exhibit 6, September 24, 2016 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana, ¶ 19. 34 Exhibit 6, September 24, 2016 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana, ¶ 17. 35 Exhibit 6, September 24, 2016 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana, ¶ 24. 36 Exhibit 6, September 24, 2016 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana, ¶ 24. pay the client “from his own Helping Hands company.”37 When Magdalena questioned this, Pohl told her that it “was illegal for him to pay [her] directly for cases, and that’s why the money had to go through some company.”38 Pohl may take the position that Magdalena retracted this affidakvit through a subsequent December 19, 2017 affidavit. However, this purpoCrted retraction is likely the result of Pohl paying Magdalena to provide testimony, which is something they have done in the past.39 In fact, Jaimes testified that oin one occasion Pohl sent him to Florida with a case filled with $50,000 cash to give to Magdalena in exchange for her signing an statement for him.40 Jaimes testified that Magdalena would only get the money if she signed the statement.41 Jaimes testified that Magdalena signed the signed the statemenlt and got the money.42 Magdalena went into more deMtail about this in her deposition. Magdalena testified that that the statement was an agreement for her to keep quiet and not charge Pohl with any wrongdioing or criminal or unethical conduct.43 Magdalena testified that Pohl paid her $50,000 cash to sign this statement, which was delivered by Jaimes ion three bags marked “trick or treat.”44 Magdalena reiterated that if she didn’t slign the gag agreement, she wouldn’t get the money from Pohl.45 Magdalena attiempted to indicate on the agreement that she was receiving $50,000 37 Exhibit 6, September 24, 2016 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana, ¶ 24. 38 Exhibit 6, September 24, 2016 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana, ¶ 23. 39 Exhibit 7, June 2018 Deposition of Edgar Jaimes, pp. 371-373. 40 Exhibit 7, June 2018 Deposition of Edgar Jaimes, pp. 371-373. 41 Exhibit 7, June 2018 Deposition of Edgar Jaimes, pp. 373-374. 42 Exhibit 7, June 2018 Deposition of Edgar Jaimes, pp. 373-374. 43 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 153. 44 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 122-127. 45 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 131. to keep quiet, but Jaimes told her Pohl demanded that she state she only received nominal consideration, like $100.46 Magdalena did not write the statement but “just signed it”47 because she felt she was “forced to sign” it48 while “under duress.”49 Magdalena’s December 19, 2017 affidavit is likely the result of similakr duress and purchased testimony. C Regardless, nowhere in Magdalena’s December 19th affidavit does she state the testimony in her former affidavit is untrue, only that sihe does not “agree with” it and that the affidavit is not “reliable.”50 Although Magdalena states in her December 19th affidavit that her prior affidavit was drafted by a lawyer, Magdalena testified in her deposition that the September 24th affidavit was created voluntarily with her own “testimony.”51 Magdalena tesltified that, unlike with Pohl, she was not paid and had never been promisedM any money to provide the testimony in the September 24th affidavit.52 Magdalena reiterated to counsel for Pohl, Billy Shepherd, that she was therei in her deposition to tell the truth and would not be bullied by his questioning or his efforts to confuse her.53 Regardless, Maogdalena confirmed most of the facts set forth in her initial affidavit in her dleposition54 and this deposition testimony was not retracted.55 There, Magdailena confirmed that she was hired by Pohl to solicit auto accident 46 ExhibitU 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 346. 47 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 153. 48 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 155. 49 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 309. 50 Exhibit 9, December 19, 2017 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana. 51 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 270-271. 52 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 276-278. 53 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 176. 54 See, generally, Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II. 55 See Exhibit 9, December 19, 2017 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana. cases, the first one being an accident where a woman and her unborn child lost their lives.56 Magdalena was instructed by Walker, who was instructed by Pohl, to personally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her up to sue the tire manufacturer and, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000.57 Magdkalena visited the funeral of the deceased and got the family to feel comfoCrtable with her.58 Although the mother was grieving, Pohl told Magdalena: “take no prisoners, this is a cut throat business, you get in there and you do whatiever it takes to get this client.”59 The solicitation was successful after Pohl gave Magdalena $2,000 to “give to the client to convince her into signing over with the firm.”60 After that, Magdalena attempted to solicit about “forty to fifty” auto accident cases for Pohl in multiple states from Texlas to Florida.61 About fifteen to eighteen cases were actually signed up.62 JusMt like Walker, Magdalena testified that Pohl would send her a web link with information about the accident and where the potential client may be foundi and she would hit the ground running.63 Magdalena solicited clients for Pohl in “hospitals, funeral homes, you name it.”64 Pohl instructed Magdalenao to target minorities because they are “unrecognized to the law” and “they donl’t know the law.”65 In an effort to circumvent the law, Magdalena was instructedi to have the client call Pohl so that it would look like the client made 56 ExhibitU 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 37. 57 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 37-38. 58 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 37-38. 59 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 39. 60 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 40. 61 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 43. 62 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 46-47. 63 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 54. 64 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 52. 65 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 52. the initial contact with the lawyer.66 Magdalena would offer the clients money to sign with Pohl but had explicit instructions from Pohl: “If they don't sign they don't get no money.”67 Magdalena reiterated, “no signature, no money.”68 Magdalena testified in her deposition that she was paid $2,500 for every client skhe signed up and was “promised a percentage in the back end” by Pohl and WCalker.69 Pohl told Magdalena that the money would have to go through Walker’s company Precision Marketing because it “was illegal for him to give [her] the mioney directly.”70 After soliciting several cases, Magdalena asked Pohl to give her the money she was “owed” so she could “leave for good” to the Middle East to care for her father.71 Magdalena asked Pohl to “think it thru” if he “really wanted to take the bad route,” stating “I will go to the attornely General Texas bar ten [sic] bar Florida bar I’m not giving up … I want my mMoney and if I have to move mountains with the justice dept so be it.”72 Magdalena sent anotheir email to Ladner that was forwarded by Walker and addressed to Pohl, stating she was owed money on the cases she had solicited for them: o 66 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 60. 67 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 42. 68 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 66. 69 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 47. 70 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 72. 71 Exhibit 10, April 21, 2014 Email. 72 Exhibit 10, April 21, 2014 Email. 10 e 73 When Pohl did not respond, Magdalena complueted a questionnaire on Pohl’s law firm website, stating “the FBI” wanted to nknow the “link between helping hands and Scott Walker [and] Michael [P]ohl” and claiming that Pohl owed her “monies for securing victims of accident for him” and questioning how she is to “collect monies owed with Out contracting [sic] Tehe Texas bar[.]”74 It was these threats tfhat caused Pohl to agree to pay Magdalena, but only if she promised to keep quiet.75 Magdalena received the $50,000 cash but didn’t keep quiet. On September 1, 2014. Magdalena sent another email to Pohl through his website requestiing more money: Michoael now I have on top of reporters calling me I had a call from attorney general. The money given to me by Edgar [Jaimes] was to keep my mouth shut. Not what was owed that’s what happens when you ruined my life. If I get supena a [sic] don’t know what will happen. Send me another 50 pls.76 73 Exhibit 11, May 7, 2014 Email Exchange. 74 Exhibit 12, May 20, 2014 Contact Form. 75 Exhibit 7, June 2018 Deposition of Edgar Jaimes, pp. 373-374. 76 Exhibit 13, September 1, 2014 Contact Form. 11 Magdalena continued running cases for Pohl and sending him emails requesting payment on the cases she solicited.77 Another runner, Kenneth Talley, exposes the barratry scheme. Another runner was “Coach” Kenneth Talley (“Talley”), soliciteed over 800 BP cases and 20 auto accident cases for Pohl,78 including several families who would ultimately sue Pohl for barratry: Mark Cheatham, Sr., Markt Cheatham, Jr., Luella Miller, Mae Berry and Arthur Speck. Talley testified that he was first hired in relaetion to BP claims to find “folks that lost money due to the oil spill” and “sign theum up” and “get a fee for it.”79 Talley went to work “knocking on doors” looking for potential claimants for Pohl and his partner in the BP litigation, Jimmy Wialliamson.80 Talley solicited and signed up for Pohl and Williamson more than 800 BP claims.81 Talley was paid between $75 and $350 for each BP client he signeed up.82 Talley eventually swiftched to soliciting auto accident victims, “calling on folks that had bad accidents.” 83 Talley recalls that the first client he solicited was in “the hospital in intensive care.”84 Talley carried with him up to $1,000 to pay the accident victimsi to “help them with problems” but only once they “were signed 77 Exhibit 14, February 5, 2015 Email. 78 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 87. 79 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 10. 80 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 10-11. 81 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 11. 82 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 19. 83 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 37. 84 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 37. 12 up.”85 Talley kept a list of all the auto accident cases he solicited, including cases involving the Cheathams, Berry and Speck.86 Talley followed a checklist that instructed him to, among other things, bring flowers to the initial hospital visit (but to spend no more than $50) and to offer the victims money but to “mkake sure the funding schedule” from Helping Hands Financing “is filled ouCt properly before releasing any cash.”87 Talley would advise the victims that he had attorneys who could help them, and that one of those attorneys was Pohl.8i8 Talley was paid a fee of $1,400 plus his expenses by Pohl, through Walker, for any auto accident case he solicited.89 On some cases, Talley was to receive a portion of the fee paid to Helping Hands out of Pohl’s attorney’s fees.90 Talley discussed with Pohl the “percentage of settlements” he was to receive from the calses he solicited and Pohl told Talley that the money was being placed in an “esMcrow account” for him.91 When asked whether Pohl knew he was getting paid to “contact vehicle accident victims,” Talley responded, “the money was cioming from Edgar [Jaimes] who worked for him.”92 Although his paycheck was from Walker’s company, “the funding came by way of Edgar [Jaimes].”93 o 85 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 38. 86 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 43-44; Exhibit 15-A, Talley Deposition Exhibit 165. 87 Exhibit 15-B, Talley Deposition Exhibit 168. 88 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 47. 89 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 47-48. 90 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 97-98; 102. 91 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 99. 92 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 100. 93 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 100. 13 Personally soliciting clients for Pohl became so frequent that Talley began carrying with him blank Pohl contracts to each solicitation.94 Talley would refer the potential clients to “attorneys out of Houston that were the best at handling these types of accidents” and would offer to give the potential clients “moneky up front.”95 Talley would have no “reason not to mention Mr. Pohl’s nCame” during the solicitation.96 Talley would never recommend any lawyers other than Pohl.97 Talley would not tell the clients that he was getting paid to soliicit them.98 Talley would present a Pohl contract to the potential client.99 If the client did not agree to hire Pohl, the clients would not get the money.100 Talley testified that Jaimes and Donalda (the operators of Helping Hands Financing) would send him the money.101 Both Talley and Pohl knew that wlhat they were doing was illegal. In one instance, Talley was “run out of towMn” while soliciting clients for Pohl.102 Talley testified during the attempted solicitation he was told by a “lawyer or policeman” that “it was against the law wihat [he] was doing.”103 Talley mentioned this to Pohl and Pohl told him “you’ve just got to leave...some people you can’t help.”104 Pohl illegallyo solicited several clients who would later hire Kassab to sue Pohl for barratry. 94 Exhibit 15n, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 49. 95 ExhibitU 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 54. 96 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 108. 97 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 59. 98 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 58; 109. 99 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 89. 100 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 58-59. 101 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 86. 102 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 84. 103 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 84. 104 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 85. 14 One of the victims solicited by Talley at the instruction of Pohl was Mae Berry. Berry is the mother of Johnny Berry, a boy who died in a tragic auto accident on or about August 17, 2014. 105 Within days of the accident, Berry was visited at her home by Talley.106 The visit was unsolicited.107 Talley told Berryk that he was with “Helping Hands” and brought her a gift basket.108 Talley sCuggested that she may have a lawsuit against the make of the vehicle that Johnny was driving and told her he knew an attorney out of Texas named Pohl whio could represent her.109 Berry had never spoken with Talley or Pohl prior to this date and she did not request Talley to visit with her about the accident or any potential lawsuit.110 Talley could see that Berry was morning over the loss of Johnny and offered her $500 to pay for her son’s funeral, but only if she aglreed to hire Pohl.111 In need of the money to burry Johnny, Berry agreed to hireM Pohl.112 Walker sent Pohl an email on August 21, 2014 forwarding the Helping Hands Financing documents and stating, “Coach Ken will be getting the Pohl cointract signed this afternoon.”113 However, Pohl never ended up pursuing Berry’s case.114 105 ExhibiUt 16, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Mae Berry. 106 Exhibit 16, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Mae Berry. 107 Exhibit 16, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Mae Berry. 108 Exhibit 16, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Mae Berry. 109 Exhibit 16, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Mae Berry. 110 Exhibit 16, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Mae Berry. 111 Exhibit 16, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Mae Berry. 112 Exhibit 16, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Mae Berry. 113 Exhibit 17, August 21, 2014 Email re Mae Berry. 114 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 56. 15 Talley himself testified to this solicitation. Talley admits to soliciting Berry at her home just three days after the accident that took Johnny’s life.115 Talley testifies that he told Berry that Helping Hands “had attorneys out of Houston that were the best at handling these types of accidents” and that he gave Berry $500k “up front.”116 Talley solicited Berry after he got a call from Ladner who told hiCm that a “kid was killed and it should be a good case” and that “we needed to go check it out.”117 Talley testified that he was paid $250 to solicit Berry as a client iand was also reimbursed from Helping Hands the $500 he paid to Berry.118 Talley never told Berry he was getting paid to make contact with her.119 Berry did not know that the solicitation was wrongful or caused her legal injury until sometime in 2017 when she received an advertisement from the undersignedl counsel notifying her of her potential injury.120 M Talley also solicited Arthur and Lisa Speck to hire Pohl. The Specks are the parents of is Rebecca Speck, ain eighteen year old who died in July of 2010 as the result of a tragic auto accident.121 Talley testified that he was notified about this case by Ladner who toold him “there’s a case in the backyard he wanted [him] to go pursue.”122 Talley lfound the Specks’ address and he “went and knocked on their 115 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 51-53, 55 (“Q. Okay. So you approached her three days after the accident. A. Yes, ma’am.”). 116 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 54. 117 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 55. 118 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 57-58; see also Exhibit 5, Precision Financials. 119 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 58. 120 Exhibit 16, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Mae Berry. 121 Exhibit 18, September 14, 2018 Declaration of Arthur Speck. 122 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 105. 16 door.”123 The visit by Talley was unsolicited.124 The Specks answered, and Talley told them he was with Helping Hands and offered them $1,000 cash if they would hire Pohl to pursue their claim.125 Talley testified that he “didn’t have any reason not to mention Mr. Pohl’s name” at this visit because he “knew he wask the attorney handling things for us.”126 The Specks agreed, and signed two conCtracts with Pohl’s law firm and funding agreements with Helping Hands.127 Sometime in August of 2014, the Specks received a letter from Pohl stating hie would not pursue the claims.128 Talley never told the Specks that anyone was paying him to make contact with them.129 Alphonse Bethley and Sandra Johnson are the biological parents of Ashley Bethley.130 Ahsley was killed when she lolst control of her vehicle and it struck a utility pole.131 Ashley was only twenMty-four years old.132 In July of 2014, Ladner personally solicited the Bethleys at their home to hire Pohl.133 The visit by Ladner was unsolicited.134 The Bethleiys did not request Ladner to visit them, nor did they seek out the legal services of Pohl.135 Ladner offered them money if they would hire 123 Exhibit 15, Depcoisition of Kenneth Talley, p. 105. 124 Exhibit 18, Se f iptember 14, 2018 Declaration of Arthur Speck. 125 Exhibit 15,o Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 107-108. 126 Exhibit 1n5, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 108. 127 ExhibiUt 18, September 14, 2018 Declaration of Arthur Speck, at Exhibit 18-A, Speck Contracts and Exhibit 18-B, Speck Funding Agreement. 128 Exhibit 18, September 14, 2018 Declaration of Arthur Speck, 129 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 109. 130 Exhibit 19, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Alphonse Bethley. 131 Exhibit 19, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Alphonse Bethley. 132 Exhibit 19, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Alphonse Bethley. 133 Exhibit 19, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Alphonse Bethley. 134 Exhibit 19, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Alphonse Bethley. 135 Exhibit 19, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Alphonse Bethley. 17 Pohl to pursue their claims.136 The Bethleys agreed, and signed a blank contract with Pohl and his law firm that was provided to them by Ladner.137 In exchange, Ladner and Walker agreed to share $5,000 for every $1,000,000 of the received settlement from the Bethleys’ lawsuit.138 Ladner emailed Pohl and kJaimes facts concerning these newly solicited clients and also stated that hCe spoke with the mother of the passenger of the vehicle “and will follow up on signing that family.”139 Sometime in August of 2015, however, the Bethleyis received a letter from Pohl stating he would not be pursuing their claim.140 Years later, in 2017, the Bethleys received an advertisement from the undersigned counsel notifying them the way they were contacted by Ladner and solicited to hire Pohl may have been wrongful and may have caused them llegal injury.141 Prior to receiving this advertisement, the Bethleys did notM know that the way they were contacted was wrongful, or that it caused them legal injury or harm.142 Heraclite Bikumbu andi his two minor children Plovyt and David were also victims of Pohl’s illegal solicitation scheme. On or about July 6, 2013, Bikumbu and his children were travoeling with relatives from Missouri to Iowa when the rear tire on their van blew lout, causing the van to enter the median and roll several times.143 136 Exhibit 19, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Alphonse Bethley. 137 Exhibit 19, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Alphonse Bethley, and Exhibit 19-A, Bethley Pohl Contract. 138 Exhibit 20, Bethley Distribution Agreement. 139 Exhibit 21, July 23, 2014 Email re Ashley Bethley. 140 Exhibit 19, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Alphonse Bethley. 141 Exhibit 19, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Alphonse Bethley. 142 Exhibit 19, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Alphonse Bethley. 143 Exhibit 22, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Heraclite Bikumbu. 18 Bikumbu and his children were hospitalized with serious injuries.144 Their relative, Simon Kumeso, was killed in the accident.145 Just days after the accident, Magdalena and her brother Florian (also known as Jay) showed up at the hospital room to personally solicit Bikukmbu and his children to hire Pohl.146 The Santanas brought Bikumbu and Chis children gifts, including clothes, and stated they were with Helping Hands and worked for Pohl.147 The Santanas told Bikumbu that he had a viable laiwsuit against the tire manufacturer and offered Bikumbu $1,000 if he would sign a contract with Pohl to represent him and his children in the claim.148 The Santanas told Bikumbu that he would get the money only if he signed a contract of representation.149 Bikumbu agreed and signed a proposed contract withl Pohl.150 A friend of the relative who Mdied, Nsalambi Kkongolo, emailed Pohl days after the accident confirming the solicitation by the Santanas: I am helping a family wihose father (Mr. Simon Kumeso) was killed in a car accident. I was fthen contacted my [sic] Mr. F. Jay Santana and Maggie Santana from St Petersburg (FL) of Tower 7 Consulting Group. They came to Jefferson City, Missouri and we did some paperwork stating that youo will take the case and they also give $3000 to the wife of the deceased as financial aid to help with funeral (at 18% interest). I would like tlo make sure that Santana work with you, you will take the case and tihe papers the wife of the deceased signed are legitimate.151 144 Exhibit 22, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Heraclite Bikumbu. 145 Exhibit 22, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Heraclite Bikumbu. 146 Exhibit 22, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Heraclite Bikumbu. 147 Exhibit 22, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Heraclite Bikumbu. 148 Exhibit 22, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Heraclite Bikumbu. 149 Exhibit 22, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Heraclite Bikumbu. 150 Exhibit 22, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Heraclite Bikumbu and Exhibit 22-A, Bikumbu- Pohl Contract. 151 Exhibit 23, July 11, 2013 Email. 19 Pohl responded, confirming that he had been asked to represent the “victims of the tragic tire failure” and vouched for the Santanas, stating “Helping Hands and Jay Santana provide valuable assistance to families involved in these terrible accidents.”152 k Magdalena testified to the solicitation of Bikumbu and hCis children in her deposition, stating that she and her brother where there on behalf of Pohl and his law firm: i A. You were asking me about when I visited clients in the hospital. This was an example of one of the clieents that I had visited in the hospital. They had lost -- I think the husband died in a tire blow-out, roll-over. There were seveural kids in the hospital and a gentleman and a lady. And this was the e-mail I -- the point of contact was a professor from the university that was going to translate from English to Frlench to the client. And I guess he was reaching out to eithera Michael Pohl's firm or to -- yeah, to Mr. Pohl directly. He waMnted to make sure that we were who we said we were basically.  Q. And this e-mail refeerences Jay. Is that your brother? A. Yes, it is. f Q. Did he go with you to sign up that client? A. Yes, he did. l ... Q. Okaiy. And in it Mr. Pohl says, “I can vouch completely for Jay aind Maggie.” Do you know why he would be vouching for you? A. Because I'm representing him. Because I was there on his behalf.153 152 Exhibit 24, July 11, 2013 Response Email. 153 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II. 20 Florian also testified that he provided “marketing services” for auto accident cases,154 and specifically testifies to soliciting the Bikumbu family just days or weeks after the accident in Missouri occurred.155 The Santanas were paid “bonuses” for soliciting the “Kumeso” case.156 k Raymond Butts was the victim of a tragic automobile accCident on or about August 7, 2013 in Clear Spring, Maryland, which claimed the life of Brenda Adams, his fiancée. Just days after the accident, and while in the ihospital recovering from his injuries and grieving the loss of his fiancé, Butts received an unexpected phone call from Magdalena, who said she was working on behalf of Pohl. Magdalena testified about this solicitation in her deposition, calling it “a crazy one.”157 Magdalena testified that while she and Wlalker were “soliciting for Michael Pohl for the client to sign,” Butts’ family gotM “really irate and they called the security on [them] at the hospital.”158 The family told security that “these people are here soliciting for an attorney.”159 Miagdalena’s persistence eventually paid off and Butts agreed to hire Pohl, signing two contracts with his law firm.160 Magdalena also had Butts sign a funding aogreement with Helping Hands Financing to obtain the money Magdalena promisled to pay Butts if he hired Pohl.161 And of course, Magdalena had Butts executei the “Attorney Acknowledgement” listing Pohl as his lawyer and 154 Exhibit 25, November 9, 2016 Deposition of Florian Santana, pp. 63-67. 155 Exhibit 25, November 9, 2016 Deposition of Florian Santana, pp. 66-70. 156 Exhibit 5, Precision Financials. 157 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II p. 55. 158 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II p. 55. 159 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II p. 56. 160 Exhibit 26, Butts-Pohl Contracts. 161 Exhibit 27, Butts Funding Agreement. 21 authorizing Pohl to pay back Helping Hands Financing from any settlement.162 Magdalena was paid for this unlawful solicitation. Ultimately, however, Pohl never countersigned the contracts, and the claims were not pursued. On or about Saturday, February 15, 2014, LaDonna Cheathkam and her children, Destiny and Markus, were tragically killed after a tire onC the Kia Sorrento driven by LaDonna failed and caused the vehicle to cross the median and collide with an oncoming school bus.163 LaDonna’s other son, Marki Cheatham, Jr. survived the crash.164 Mark Cheatham, Sr. is the ex-husband of LaDonna, biological father to Markus and Mark, Jr., and father-figure to Destiny.165 Luella Miller is the surviving mother to LaDonna.166 LaDonna was only thirty-six years old, Markus was sixteen and Destiny was only six.167 l Less than a week after the Maccident, Pohl and his firm entered into an agreement with Walker, Ladner and Precision to provide “marketing services” – i.e. “barratry” – relating to the Ciheatham accident wherein Pohl agreed to pay these non-lawyers an unethical percentage of his attorney’s fees.168 Talley contracted with Precision to aid in prooviding these “marketing services” to Cheatham and Miller in exchange for $10l,000 for every $1,000,000 received in a settlement.169 Talley 162 Exhibit 28, Butts Attorney Acknowledgement. 163 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 1. 164 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 1. 165 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 1. 166 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 1. 167 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 1. 168 Exhibit 30, Cheatham Retention Services Agreement. 169 Exhibit 31, Cheatham Distribution Agreement. 22 testified that was paid a fee by Pohl, through Precision, to personally solicit and sign up the Cheatham family.170 And, Talley was successful. Talley testified in his deposition that days after the accident, he did some “snooping” and located the residence of Cheatham, Sr.171 Talley wkent out and “knocked on the door” and Cheatham, Sr. answered.172 Talley toCld Cheatham, Sr. and Miller that he was with “Helping Hands” and could help them with burial costs and “getting settlements.”173 Talley told Cheatham, Sr. thait he was “associated with attorneys out of Houston that were really experienced with multi-types of vehicle accidents and that [they] could do the best job of getting him a settlement.”174 Cheatham, Sr. and Miller signed the paperwork, including the contract with Pohl, right there.175 Talley testified that he gavel the Cheatham family $24,000 to sign up with the lawyers.176 Either Pohl or AMmmons brought the $24,000 and gave it to the family,177 $18,000 of which went to Cheatham, Sr., and all of which was paid by Helping Hands Financing.178 i Talley’s testimony is consistent with that of Cheatham, Sr. who testifies that, on or about Februaryo 19, 2014, just days after the accident, he and Miller were personally soliciteld by Talley at his home in Schriever, Louisiana and urged to hire 170 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 60-61. 171 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 64-65. 172 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 65. 173 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 64. 174 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 65-66. 175 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 66. 176 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 74. 177 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 77. 178 Exhibit 32, Helping Hands Check to Mark Cheatham. 23 Pohl and Ammons in a potential lawsuit against Kia Motors.179 Neither Cheatham, Sr. nor Miller had ever met Talley before and did not request him to visit with them about the accident.180 Cheatham, Sr. and Miller did not have a previous attorney- client relationship with Pohl or Ammons at the time they were personkally solicited by Talley.181 C At the visit, Talley encouraged Cheatham, Sr. and Miller to sign an agreement with a Helping Hands to investigate a potenitial lawsuit against Kia Motors in exchange for $400 per hour or 40% of any recovery in their case.182 Talley offered Cheatham, Sr. $2,000 if he would sign the agreement and hire Helping Hands to investigate the potential lawsuit and in turn the lawyers.183 Talley encouraged Cheatham, Sr. to sign the agrleement by stating that the money could defray funeral costs and the investigMation would reveal a viable claim against Kia Motors.184 Talley told Miller and Cheatham, Sr. that if there was a viable case, they could hire Pohl and Ammonsi to represent them in the lawsuit.185 Cheatham, Sr. agreed and signed the investigation agreement with Helping Hands.186 To get the money, Cheatham, Sro. was required to sign several documents with Helping Hands Financing, Donaldla Pohl’s company.187 179 Exhibit 30, Cheatham Retention Services Agreement. 180 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 1. 181 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., pp. 1-2. 182 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 2, and Cheatham Ex. 1. 183 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 2. 184 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 2. 185 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 2. 186 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 2, at Cheatham Ex. 2. 187 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 2. 24 Days later, on or about February 21, 2014, Pohl personally visited with Cheatham, Sr. and Miller and encouraged them to sign contingency fee agreements with his firm and also confirmed that he would associate Ammons on the case.188 Pohl said that Ammons was an expert on auto accident and auto dekfect cases.189 Pohl promised to pay Cheatham, Sr. $18,000 if he agreed to hire CPohl and Ammons in the auto accident case.190 Cheatham, Sr. and Miller agreed and signed contingency fee contracts for legal services with Pohil on this same day.191 Cheatham, Sr. signed the contract for legal services individually and on behalf of Destiny, Markus, and Mark, Jr., who were all minors.192 The $18,000 was paid to Cheatham, Sr. in exchange via a check written from Donalda Pohl’s company Helping Hands Financing.193 Cheathaml, Sr. and Miller later signed joint representation agreements with PohlM and Ammons.194 Cheatham, Sr. testified that he was offered and received an additional $500 to sign this joint agreement.195 Lacy Reese lost her huisband David Reese on or about July 2, 2014 in a vehicle accident that occurred outside of Anson, Texas.196 Reese buried her husband on July 7, 2014.197 Thoat same day, Ladner personally visited Reese’s home when she was not there andl left a business card stating he was the “Associate Director” of 188 Exhibit 29, A f ffiidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 2. 189 Exhibit 29,o Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 2. 190 Exhibit 2n9, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 2. 191 ExhibiUt 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 2, at Cheatham Ex. 3; Exhibit 33, Miller-Pohl Agreement. 192 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 2, at Cheatham Ex. 3. 193 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 2; Exhibit 32, Helping Hands Check to Mark Cheatham. 194 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., pp. 2-3, at Cheatham Ex. 5; Exhibit 34, Ammons- Miller Agreement. 195 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., pp.2-3. 196 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 1. 197 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 1. 25 Helping Hands.198 The next day, July 8, 2014, Ladner again visited Reese’s home in Paris, Arkansas and met with Reese and her mother, Karen Fairbanks.199 Ladner told Reese and her mother that he was with a company called “Helping Hands” that could investigate a potential lawsuit against the vehicle manufacturker or the tire company and sue them for the death of David.200 Ladner told ReeCse that if it looked like she had a lawsuit, Pohl and his co-counsel, Rob Ammons, could handle the case.201 Reese’s mother wrote down the names of these ilawyers on the back of Ladner’s business card during this meeting.202 Ladner offered Reese money if she would hire Helping Hands Group and these lawyers, telling her the money could help with the expenses relating to David’s death.203 Reese had never met Ladner, Pohl or Ammons, or requested them tol visit with her about the accident or requested them to contact her.204 M Although Reese was grieving over the loss of her husband, Ladner pressured Reese to sign the papers he ihad brought with him that day and she did.205 The agreement that Ladner had Reese sign provided Helping Hands Group $400 per hour or 40% of any reocovery in her case.206 To get the money, Reese was required to 198 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 1, and Reese Ex. 1. 199 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 1. 200 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, pp. 1-2. 201 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 1. 202 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, at Reese Ex. 1. 203 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, pp. 1-2. 204 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 2. 205 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 2. 206 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 2, and Reese Ex. 2. 26 sign several agreements with Helping Hands Financing, Donalda Pohl’s company.207 Reese was told she would get the money after a suit had been filed.208 On July 25, 2014, unbeknownst to Reese, Pohl and his firm entered into a “Retention of Services Agreement” with Walker, Ladner and Helping kHands Group to provide “marketing services” relating to the death of DavidC.209 Among other things, Ladner was to “conduct initial interview” of the victims and “maintain contact with the victims and their family.”210 In exchanige, Pohl agreed to pay Ladner and Helping Hands Group fees not to exceed 30% of his own attorney’s fees.211 Walker and Precision Marketing then contracted with Ladner to provide “public relations services pertaining to the cases of David Reese” in exchange for $5,000 for every $1,000,000 received frolm any settlement.212 The solicitation of Reese occurred pursuant to these agrMeements. On July 18, 2014, Ladner emailed Walker and Jaimes, the manager of Helping Hands Financing anid Pohl’s paralegal, concerning the “Reese Case.”213 Ladner described the accident that occurred on July 2nd – less than three weeks prior.214 On or about Aougust 16, 2014, Reese received an email from Ladner about a contract with Pohll.215 Ladner told Reese that Pohl’s contract would “take the place” of the one thati Reese had with Helping Hands Group and requested her to send the 207 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 2, and Reese Ex. 3. 208 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 2. 209 Exhibit 36, Reese Retention Services Agreement. 210 Exhibit 36, Reese Retention Services Agreement. 211 Exhibit 36, Reese Retention Services Agreement. 212 Exhibit 37, Reese Distribution Agreement. 213 Exhibit 38, July 18, 2014 Email re Reese Case. 214 Exhibit 38, July 18, 2014 Email re Reese Case. 215 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 2, and Reese Ex. 4. 27 contract directly to Pohl’s office.216 Reese received an email two days later from Walker forwarding her Pohl’s contract.217 Reese signed the contract and sent it to Pohl.218 Ladner does not dispute this. Ladner testified that he got an alkert about the death of Reese’s husband and flew to “nowhere Arkansas” withinC seven days of the accident and “knocked on the door” to solicit her.219 Ladner solicited Reese on behalf of Precision and “to get paid” by Pohl.220 Ladner referred ithe case to Pohl and got paid a “bonus” of $2,500.221 Ladner brought with him Helping Hands Financing forms he obtained from Jaimes.222 Although Ladner could not recall whether he offered Reese money to sign up with Pohl, it was his practice to do so and the money came from Jaimes and Helping Hands Finlancing, Donalda’s company.223 And Pohl acknowledged that Ladener “was opeMrating under [his] direction to … investigate[] the incident as part of an initial case evaluation process.”224 In other words, Ladner was soliciting Reese and evaluiating her potential claim at the direction of Pohl. 216 ExhibiUt 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 2, and Reese Ex. 4. 217 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 2, and Reese Ex. 5. 218 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 2, and Reese Ex. 6. 219 Exhibit 39, April 11, 2019 Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at p. 346-351. 220 Exhibit 39, April 11, 2019 Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at p. 347. 221 Exhibit 39, April 11, 2019 Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at p. 347, 358-359 222 Exhibit 39, April 11, 2019 Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at p. 349-350. 223 Exhibit 39, April 11, 2019 Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at p. 351-354. 224 Exhibit 40, January 19, 2016 Letter. 28 Pohl is sued by his Mississippi runners who expose the illegal and unethical barratry scheme and Pohl settles that litigation after unsuccessfully seeking to have it dismissed based on the illegality of his agreements. On October 8, 2014, Walker and Ladner and their company Precision sued Pohl and his law firm for breach of contract and fraud, among oteher claims (the “Mississippi Litigation”).225 There, Walker and Ladner alleged they had a joint venture with Pohl to sign up clients with economic loss claitms stemming from the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill.226 See Walker v. Williamson, No. 1:14cv381-KS- JCG, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61185, at *5-6 (S.D. eMiss. May 9, 2016). They also alleged that they had “conducted marketing effourts to obtain personal injury clients” for Pohl227 and that Pohl received attorney’sn fees from the cases they signed up, but that “Pohl did not pay any of the agreed share of his fees to Walker [and] Ladner.”228  More specifically, Walkere, Ladner and Precision (“the Runners”) alleged that Pohl contracted with them tfo provide “public relations and marketing services” to potential clients impacted by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in exchange for “a percentage of the attorney fees for the claims obtained from their efforts, along with expenses and ai flat fee.” Walker, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61185, at *6-7. The Runners aloso alleged that they contracted with Pohl “to provide marketing and public relations services in connection with claims for automobile rollover 225 Nicholson Exhibit 4, Walker Complaint. 226 Exhibit 41, Walker Second Amended Complaint. 227 Exhibit 41, Walker Second Amended Complaint. ¶ 118. 228 Exhibit 41, Walker Second Amended Complaint. ¶ 136. 29 accidents.” Walker v. Williamson, No. 1:14-CV-381-KS-MTP, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59031, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 18, 2017). “There is evidence that the [Runners] contacted people and businesses in Mississippi to determine if they might have a claim against BP, encouraged those people to retain Pohl as their akttorney, and were paid over $5 million in ‘barratry pass-through money’ foCr their services.” Kassab v. Pohl, 612 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied). However, the Runners sued Pohl because theyi “procured thousands of viable BP claims” and “approximately sixty motor vehicle accident cases” for Pohl but that Pohl “did noy pay any of the agreed share of his fees” or all expenses incurred. Walker v. Williamson, No. 1:14-cv-381-KS-JCG, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76488, at *5, 24 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 1, 2016). l Precision transfers and asMsigns its assets and claims against Pohl to Favre – Pohl counterclaims for conversion in the Mississippi Litigation but settles when he cannot obtain summary dismissal. e During discovery in fthe Mississippi Litigation, Pohl discovered that the Runners allegedly “disclosed confidential and proprietary information to third parties without authorization” and proposed “the ‘sale’ of all of [his] accumulated work product toi third parties” while working for him.229 Pohl testifies that the Runners “uondertook to convert, misappropriate for themselves and/or market to third parties claimant files and other information and materials” that allegedly belonged to Pohl230 – including “marketing information and other trade secrets”231 – 229 Exhibit 42, Pohl’s June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 18. 230 Exhibit 42, Pohl’s June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 28. 231 Exhibit 42, Pohl’s June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 28. 30 and then the new owner of Precision, Scott Favre, allegedly “sold those items and the information” to Kassab.232 As a result, Pohl “asserted multiple claims against” the Runners in the Federal Court Case based on their alleged “fraudulent and bad faithk conduct.”233 Pohl did not assert claims against Kassab in the Federal Court CCase, even though he testified under oath that he knew Kassab allegedly was part of the “team of thieves” who broke into Pohl’s office in 2014 and stole hisi confidential information and purported trade secrets.234 Pohl attempted to dismiss the Mississippi Litigation, arguing the agreements between he and the runners were illegal and unenforceable.235 More specifically, Pohl argued that under both Texas andl Mississippi law “it is illegal for a non- lawyer to accept or agree to accepMt money to improperly solicit clients for a lawyer.”236 The Mississippi federal court denied Pohl’s motion to dismiss and concluded that he was in a ipartnership with Walker and Ladner and further concluded that the agreements to solicit clients would only be a violation of the Texas disciplinary roules and Texas law, which did not apply to Walker and Ladner.237 Havingl failed to obtain summary dismissal, Pohl settled the Mississippi 232 Exhibit 42, Pohl’s June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 29. 233 Exhibit 42, Pohl’s June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 19; see also Exhibit 43, Pohl’s Amended Counterclaim. 234 Exhibit 44, May 15, 2018 Deposition of Michael Pohl, pp. 85-93. 235 Exhibit 45, Walker Memorandum Opinion (Doc. No. 475); Exhibit 46, Walker Pohl Memorandum (Doc. No. 175). 236 Exhibit 46, Walker Pohl Memorandum, at ¶ 18. 237 Exhibit 47, Walker Order on Pohl Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 252). 31 Litigation, hoping to forever conceal the barratry operation.238 The Mississippi Litigation was dismissed with prejudice on April 24, 2017.239 Kassab exposes Pohl’s illegal and unethical barratry and more than 400 victims of Pohl’s barratry scheme hire Kassab to file civil claims and grievances against Pohl. k Kassab was tipped off to the allegations in the MississippCi Litigation by an acquaintance of his, F. Douglas Montague of the Mississippi law firm Montague Pittman & Varnado, PA (“Montague”).240 Kassab obtained miuch information related to the Mississippi Litigation from the federal court’s online system, PACER.241 Kassab also associated Precision and its owner, Favre, and its counsel, Nicholson, and obtained information directly from them, including the names and addresses of Pohl’s former clients or prospective clientsl.242 Favre informed Kassab that, when he bought Precision, he acquired files Mrelated to Pohl and Favre transferred that information to Kassab.243 Kassab prepared adveritisement letters approved by the State Bar of Texas and sent it to the people who had been illegally solicited by Pohl, informing them that they may havoe potential barratry claims against Pohl.244 Hundreds of Mississippi residelnts responded to Kassab’s advertisement letter and more than 400 signed repiresentation contracts with Kassab’s firm to pursue barratry claims 238 Exhibit 48, Walker Judgment (Doc. No. 499). 239 Exhibit 48, Walker Judgment (Doc. No. 499). 240 Exhibit 49, Declaration of Lance Christopher Kassab, at 2-3. 241 Exhibit 49, Declaration of Lance Christopher Kassab, at 2-3. 242 Exhibit 49, Declaration of Lance Christopher Kassab, at 2-3. 243 Exhibit 49, Declaration of Lance Christopher Kassab, at 2; Exhibit 50, Affidavit of Scott Favre. 244 Exhibit 49, Declaration of Lance Christopher Kassab, at 2; Exhibit 51, Advertisement Letters. 32 against Pohl.245 Kassab filed four separate lawsuits on behalf of these barratry victims in Harris County, Texas (the “Barratry Lawsuits”).246 Additionally, due to the egregiousness of Pohl’s violation of the Texas Penal Code and violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, Kassab was requiredk to notify the Texas State Bar pursuant to disciplinary rule 8.03.247 Thus, KassaCb filed grievances against Pohl pursuant to this rule, and also at the request of some of Pohl’s former clients.248 i Pohl files this retaliatory lawsuit against Kassab seeking as damages the costs he incurred to defende against the Barratry Lawsuits and grievances filed against him. In retaliation, Pohl filed this litigation against Kassab, Favre, Nicholson, Precision, and others, for conversion, lmisappropriation of trade secrets and conspiracy.249 Pohl rehashes his aMllegations from the Mississippi Litigation, claiming that “Precision gained access to Pohl’s confidential and proprietary information and property, incliuding trade secret materials” and “work product” and “illegally misappropriated” this information and then allegedly “secretly sold Pohl’s confidential informatoion to Kassab and [another lawyer named] Montague”250 who then “solicited clielnts/prospective clients [of Pohl’s] to act as Plaintiffs . . . to bring 245 Exhibit 4n9, Declaration of Lance Christopher Kassab, at 2. 246 ExhibiUt 52 (Brumfield Third Amended Petition), Exhibit 53 (Gandy Second Amended Petition), Exhibit 54 (Berry Fifth Amended Petition), Exhibit 55 (Cheatham Fourth Amended Petition) (without exhibits). 247 Exhibit 49, Declaration of Lance Christopher Kassab, at 1. 248 Rule 8.03 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct provides: “. . . a lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of applicable rules of professional conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate disciplinary authority.” 249 See Pohl’s First Amended Petition (on file with the Court). 250 First Amended Petition, at ¶¶ 20-21. 33 cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and other claims.”251 As damages, Pohl seeks the costs and expenses he incurred defending against the Barratry Lawsuits and grievances filed against him. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD k The purpose of summary judgments is to eliminate patenCtly unmeritorious claims and untenable defenses. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlie v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004). To prevail on a traditionial motion for summary judgment, the movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Lujan v. Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2018). “If the movant carries this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a lgenuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.” Lujan, 555 S.WM.3d at 84; see Maldonado v. Maldonado, 556 S.W.3d 407, 414 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). “A genuine issue of material fact exists if more thian a scintilla of evidence establishing the existence of the challenged element is produced.” Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). o l ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES Althougih Pohl’s claims against Kassab lack merit because Kassab did not misappropriate Pohl’s trade secrets or otherwise engage in any misconduct, the Court need not decide that issue to dispose of Pohl’s claims against Kassab. Rather, Pohl’s claims can be dismissed for several independent reasons. 251 First Amended Petition, at ¶ 29. 34 A. Pohl’s claims against Kassab are barred by immunity under Rule 17.09 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. First, Pohl’s claims against Kassab must be dismissed based on immunity provided in Rule 17.09 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedurke. That rule provides: C No lawsuit may be instituted against any Complainant or witness predicated upon the filing of a Grievance ort participation in the attorney disciplinary and disability system. … iThe immunity is absolute and unqualified and extends to all actions at law or in equity. TEX. R. DISC. P. 17.09 (emphasis added). Even “allegations of wrongdoing” done “in connection with [the] prosecution of disciplinary actions” are absolutely immune, so long as they are “predicated upon” the filinlg of a grievance. Crampton v. Farris, 596 S.W.3d 267, 274-75 (Tex. App.—HousMton [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.). Here, it is undisputed that Pohl’s allegations of wrongdoing against Kassab are predicated upon Kassab’s ifiling of grievances against Pohl. Pohl testified that he has sued Kassab because Kassab allegedly “used information from [Pohl’s] files in the grievance proceeodings that [Kassab] personally filed or had clients file and [Kassab allegedly]l shared [Pohl’s] stolen property with Ms. Nicholson so she could defend a grieviance against herself, according to her own testimony.”252 Pohl seeks as damages in the form of “costs and expenses of … serial grievances that arose from the use of the [allegedly] misappropriated trade secrets.”253 Pohl intends to 252 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 122. 253 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 122. (emphasis added). 35 have his bias expert, John Zavitsanos,254 “testify that Defendants, including [Kassab], sought to profit from the use of [Pohl’s information] by … using it … to facilitate the bringing of grievances and litigation against Pohl.”255 Zavitsanos is purportedly going to “opine that [Pohl’s] attorneys’ fees and expenses ikncurred … in defending related matters including against invalid grievanCces … are fair, reasonable, necessary and recoverable under the circumstances.”256 But Rule 17.09 makes clear that “[n]o lawsuit” miay be instituted against Kassab that is “predicated upon” the filing of a grievance or participation in the attorney disciplinary and disability system. TEX. R. DISC. P. 17.09. Because Pohl’s claims against Kassab and the damages that he seeks are “predicated upon” the grievances that Kassab caused to file algainst Pohl, the claims are barred by “absolute and unqualified” immunitMy that “extends to all actions at law or in equity.” Id.; Crampton, 596 S.W.3d at 276 (claim for destruction of evidence and property related to grievancei proceeding barred by immunity under Rule 17.09); Burch v. State Bar of Tex., No. 07-19-00224-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 1409, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo oFeb. 19, 2020, pet. denied) (immunity under Rule 17.09 barred claim that attornelys for commission, in relation to a grievance proceeding, who purportedly “eingaged in misconduct related to a bankruptcy proceeding in which [plaintiff] was involved”). 254 Mr. Zavitsanos is bias because he was an advocate for Pohl’s co-defendant in the underlying barratry cases that Kassab brought and because Kassab had previously sued Mr. Zavitsanos and his firm. See Cause No. 20191510, Bragg v. Zavitsanos, in the 270th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas. The Court is requested to take judicial notice of this case. 255 Exhibit 57, Pohl’s Second Amended Designation of Expert Witnesses, at 5. 256 Exhibit 57, Pohl’s Second Amended Designation of Expert Witnesses, at 6. 36 B. Pohl’s claims against Kassab are barred by the judicial proceedings privilege. “The judicial-proceedings privilege is an absolute privilege that covers any statement made by the judge, jurors, counsel, parties or witnesses, and attaches to all aspects of the proceedings, including statements made in opene court, pre-trial hearings, depositions, affidavits and any of the pleadings or other papers in the case.” Landry's, Inc. v. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 631 S.Wt.3d 40, 46 (Tex. 2021) (internal quotations omitted). “The judicial-proceedings privilege exists to facilitate the proper administration of the justice systeme. It does so by relieving the participants in the judicial process from fear ofu retaliatory lawsuits for statements they make in connection with the proceeding itself.” Id. at 48. Moreover, the judicial-proceaedings privilege attaches even to “communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding” if “the communication has some relatieon to a proceeding that is actually contemplated in good faith and under seriousf consideration by the witness or a possible party to the proceeding.” Id. at 48-49. “Even in the pre-suit context, however, the privilege protects communications that are themselves preparatory to the lawsuit.” Id. The privilege protecits all communications that are “necessary to set the judicial machinery oin motion.” Id. at 50 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 cmt. a). Here, Pohl has sued Kassab in retaliation for Kassab “solicit[ing] … clients/prospective clients to act as plaintiffs … to bring cases against Pohl for 37 alleged barratry and other claims.”257 Pohl’s admits that he is suing Kassab for statements Kassab made to prospective clients which spawned the litigation and grievance proceedings:258 Because Pohl’s claims against eKassab arise out of communications that Kassab made in prospective (soliciftation letters) and actual judicial proceedings (the barratry litigation and grievance process), Pohl’s claims against Kassab are barred by the judicial proceedings privilege. See Crain v. Smith, 22 S.W.3d 58, 62-63 (Tex. App.—Corpus Cihristi 2000, no pet.) (holding that statements in letter sent before the lawsuito began were protected by the judicial-proceedings privilege). It matters not how Pohl characterized his claims against Kassab because “the privilege should be extended beyond defamation when the essence of a claim is damages that flow from communications made in the course of a judicial 257 Amended Petition, at ¶ 29. 258 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 122. 38 proceeding.” Laub v. Pesikoff, 979 S.W.2d 686, 691 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). Here, Pohl seeks as damages “the costs and expenses of serial litigations and serial grievances” that Kassab filed against Pohl, including attorney’s fees for his lawyers who represented him in that litigatiokn and “[a]ny fees, any expenses [Pohl] had, hotel rooms, long-distance phoneC calls, copy costs, [Pohl] intend[s] to sue Mr. Kassab for all of it.”259 Because Pohl’s alleged damages “flow from” communications that Kassab made in the ibarratry litigation and grievance proceedings, his claims are barred regardless of label. See id. (holding privilege applied to claims for “intentional interference, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and constitutional violations”); Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ray Ferguson Interests, Inc., Nol. 01-02-00807-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 2001, at *27-28 (Tex. App.—HoustonM [1st Dist.] Mar. 16, 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that absolute privilege applied in deceptive insurance practices claim under Texas Insurance Code biecause “although [plaintiff] did not plead defamation, its theory of damages was that its clients, creditors, and bonding companies abandoned it, in part,o because of the [insurer's] allegations and assertions . . . made in the course of thils judicial proceeding”). C. Piohl’s claims against Kassab are barred by attorney oimmunity. Under the doctrine of attorney immunity, “an attorney does not have a right of recovery, under any cause of action, against another attorney arising from conduct the second attorney engaged in as part of the discharge of his duties in 259 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 121. 39 representing a party.” Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 72 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (emphasis added). “[A]n attorney is immune from liability to nonclients for conduct within the scope of his representation of his clients.” Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 681 (Tex. 2018). The inquiry “fokcuses on the kind of conduct at issue rather than the alleged wrongfulness ofC said conduct.” Id. “That is, a lawyer is no more susceptible to liability for a given action merely because it is alleged to be fraudulent or otherwise wrongfuli.” Id. “Merely labeling an attorney’s conduct ‘fraudulent’ does not and should not remove it from the scope of client representation or render it ‘foreign to the duties of an attorney.’” Id. at 483. Even “criminal conduct is not categorically excepted from the protections of attorney civil immunity when the conduct alleged ils connected with representing a client in litigation.” Bethel v. Quilling, SelandeMr, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C., 595 S.W.3d 651, 657 (Tex. 2020); Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 483 (Tex. 2015) (“an attorney’s conduct may ibe wrongful but still fall within the scope of client representation”). Although the Coourt previously denied Kassab summary judgment on this defense, the Texasl Supreme Court’s recent decision in Taylor v. Tolbert, 644 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. 2022i) requires reconsideration. Taylor held that even “conduct prohibited by statute” is subject to attorney immunity if the “statute does not expressly, or by necessary implication, abrogate the immunity defense, and the attorney met her burden to establish its applicability to the conduct at issue.” Id. at 642. 40 In Taylor, the attorney was accused of violating state and federal laws prohibiting wiretapping because the attorney obtained and used the plaintiff’s communications in violation of the statute. Id. at 643. The plaintiff brought a statutory claim against the attorney which permitted recovery of civil kdamages. Id.; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 18A.502. The attorney movCed for traditional summary judgment, “arguing she is immune from liability as a matter of law because the plaintiffs’ claims all stem from her role ias an attorney in the modification proceeding.” Id. at 644. The trial court agreed, but the court of appeals reversed. Id. The Supreme Court granted review and reversed the court of appeals. Id. It concluded that the attorney was, “in all respects, engaging in the office, professional training, skill, and authoritly of an attorney in the ways that she allegedly used and disclosed the mateMrials her client provided.” Id. at 649. “Because [the attorney’s] conduct falls squarely within the confines of attorney immunity, the alleged criminality or wrongfiulness of the conduct does not perforce preclude its availability as an affirmative defense.” Id. The court also held that “Texas’s wiretap statute does not exporessly repudiate the common law or the attorney-immunity defense.” Id. l Here toio, Kassab’s conduct which forms the basis of Pohl’s claims fall squarely within the confines of attorney immunity, regardless of whether it is alleged to have violated the TUTSA because that statute does not expressly repudiate the defense. 41 Pohl is suing Kassab because he obtained purportedly stolen information in violation of the TUTSA and then “solicited [Pohl’s] clients/prospective clients to act as plaintiffs … to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and other claims.”260 The essence of Pohl’s claims against Kassab are “that Kassab boughtk Pohl’s client list from [Precision] so that Kassab could send advertisementsC to Pohl’s former clients and solicit them to become Kassab’s clients in barratry suits against Pohl.” Kassab v. Pohl, 612 S.W.3d 571, 578 (Tex. App.—Houstion [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied) (characterizing Pohl’s claims against Kassab). Pohl seeks as damages “the costs and expenses of serial litigations and serial grievances” that Kassab filed against Pohl, including attorney’s fees for his lawyers who represented him in that litigation and “[a]ny fees, any expenses [Polhl] had, hotel rooms, long-distance phone calls, copy costs, [Pohl] intend[s] to sMue Mr. Kassab for all of it.”261 Pohl has even designated Mr. Zavitsanos to testify to these damages, and “the reasonableness and necessity of the attorneys’ feeis, costs, and expenses incurred by Pohl in defending against invalid grievances and stale claims.”262 Moreover, in tohis very case, the court of appeals opined that “the alleged purchase of Pohl[’sl] client list for those clients’ contact information, followed by the mailing of attiorney advertisements to those individuals about specific types of claims they might be able to pursue against a specifically identified attorney, qualifies as statements or conduct that arose out of a commercial transaction involving the type of legal services Kassab provides.” Kassab, 612 S.W.3d at 578. 260 Amended Petition, ¶ 29. 261 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 121. 262 Exhibit 57, Pohl’s Second Amended Designation of Experts, at 3. 42 The court opined that, “the intended audience of [Kassab’s alleged] statement or conduct were individuals with potential legal claims who Kassab sought to represent in barratry suits against Pohl.” Id. at 579. The acquisition of clients and filing of lawsuits are actions takenk “to facilitate the rendition of legal services.” Youngkin, 546 S.W.3d at 682; ClCayton v. Oldcastle Materials Tex., Inc., No. 09-18-00063-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 1112, at *12, 15 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 14, 2019, no pet.) (applyinig attorney immunity to attorney’s conduct which included “selling his legal services to the City as a potential client” and subsequent conduct which “occurred in the course of his undertaking to represent” those clients). The fact that Kassab is alleged to have committed the misconduct prior to any liltigation is immaterial because “attorney immunity applies to claims based Mon conduct outside the litigation context[.]” Haynes & Boone, LLP v. NFTD, LLC, 631 S.W.3d 65, 78-79, 81 (Tex. 2021); Cantey Hanger, 467 S.W.3d at 485 (iconcluding that attorney was immune from conduct that occurred after litigation had ended). In other words, Pohl’s characterization of Kassab’s activities aso part of a business transaction that occurred prior to litigation does not negate atltorney immunity because Kassab engaged in the conduct as part of his ultimatie provision of legal services to his client. See Haynes & Boone, 631 S.W.3d at 78-79, 81 (applying attorney immunity to lawyer conduct committed as part of business transaction). Indeed, in this case, the court of appeals concluded that all of Kassab’s conduct for which Pohl complains “arose out of a commercial 43 transaction involving the type of legal services Kassab provides.” Kassab, 612 S.W.3d at 578. Accordingly, Pohl’s claims against Kassab are barred by attorney immunity. See Taylor, 644 S.W.3d at 648 (attorney could not be held civilly liablke for conduct which was “criminal in nature” because it was committed while dCischarging duties to client); Highland Capital Mgmt., LP v. Looper Reed & McGraw, P.C., No. 05-15- 00055-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 442, at *10-11 (Tex. Appi.—Dallas Jan. 14, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (applying attorney immunity to claim that attorney engaged in “malicious conduct with respect to its illegal acquisition, retention, use, and threatened disclosure of [the plaintiff’s] proprietary and confidential information” that “it knew to be stolen and proprietarly in furtherance of its scheme to extort, slander, and disparage [the plaintiff]M” and “refusing to return and cease use of [the plaintiff’s] proprietary information”). D. Pohl’s claims arie barred by limitations. A defendant moving for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of limitations bears theo burden of conclusively establishing the elements of that defense. Schlumbelrger Tech. Corp. v. Pasko, 544 S.W.3d 830, 833 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam). To dio so, the defendant must (1) conclusively prove when the cause of action accrued and (2) negate the discovery rule if it applies and has been pleaded or otherwise raised. KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cnty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999). A cause of action accrues when (1) “the allegedly tortious act was committed and caused an injury;” or (2) “facts come into existence 44 that authorize a party to seek a judicial remedy.” United Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. First St. Hosp. LP, 570 S.W.3d 323, 335 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (citing Pasko, 544 S.W.2d at 834). This is true even if all resulting damages have not yet occurred. Pasko, 544 S.W.3d at 834. Determining the acckrual date is a question of law. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.WC.3d 211, 221 (Tex. 2003). As demonstrated below, all of Pohl’s claims against Kassab are barred by limitations. i 1. Facts relevant to limitations. Pohl testified that he and Precision shared an office in Gulfport, Mississippi from 2013-2014.263 Pohl called this his “satellite law office.”264 The owners of Precision in 2014 were Scott Walker, Kirk lLadner, and Steve Seymour.265 Pohl testified that he closed Mhis Gulfport, Mississippi office in 2014.266 He testified that he asked Precision to arrange to have his office equipment and files sent to him in Houston, Texasi.267 Pohl testified that Precision made excuses for why they could not get his property moved to Houston.268 In June or July of 2014, Pohl “gave up” asking Preocision to arrange the move and hired his own mover to go to Gulfport and get elverything that was in the office: “every pencil, every paper, every file, every file icabinet, every icebox.”269 Pohl testified that the mover was to bring 263 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 7-10. 264 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 6-8. 265 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 16. 266 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 11. 267 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 12. 268 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 12. 269 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 12. 45 the property back to Pohl in Houston, Texas.270 When the mover arrived in Gulfport, he found the office almost empty, and Precision told him Pohl’s “client files” had been removed by Precision, who was holding it “as evidence.”271 Pohl testified that he contacted Precision and was told Precision was “keepking” the files for their lawsuit.272 C Pohl asserts that Kassab and other Defendants orchestrated and participated directly in the 2014 theft.273 Pohl testified that Kassab aind the other Defendants “robbed my office [and] stole my clients’ names” in 2014.274 He further testified: A. That group of criminals stole about 11,000 files out of my Mississippi office. They also stoleu my computers and hired a third party, whose name slips my mind right now, to hack into my office computers and steal all of my confidential information, internal documlents. And they also stole my forms that I created for BaP and other litigation, among other things. M Q. And when you’re saoying “this group of criminals,” who did that include? e A. It would be Scoftft Favre, Tina Nicholson, Lance Kassab, Doug Montague, and potentially the people that they either bribed or coerced iynto doing their dirty work.275 Pohl alleges that Kassab is a co-conspirator with Nicholson to unlawfully misappropriate hais trade secrets.276 Pohl testified that “Tina Nicholson demanded that Scott Wfalker steal my files or, because he got in trouble with the law, Tina 270 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 12. 271 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 6, 12-14. 272 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 15. 273 Amended Petition, at ¶¶ 21-24. 274 Exhibit 58, May 2018 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 94-97. 275 Exhibit 59, April 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 37-39. 276 Amended Petition, at ¶ 43. 46 Nicholson was going to take his two baby children away from him and forced him to cooperate with [Kassab’s] crew to rob me and hack my computers.”277 Pohl testified that the alleged theft of trade secret information occurred in 2014 when Kassab and his “crew” allegedly broke into Pohl’s office in Gkulf Port and hacked his computers, stole his clients’ names and information, Cand then solicited his clients: Q. Okay. And you think I'm an unethical lawyer?i A. Yes. You stole my files. You robbed me. You tried to destroy my practice. So I don't believe you sheould submit any more materials, particularly false affidavits that have been retracted by the witnesses who made themu and other verifiably false accusations. And you've solicited my clients like Mr. Cheatham, and you've told him lies to get him to sue me. A. If the question is did youa steal my files and rob my office, the answer is that you and yMour co-counsel and your crew robbed my office, stole my clients' names, contacted my clients and told them lies to initiate suits against me. Q. Okay. How did iI steal your files, sir? Did I break into your house? f A. You broke into my law office. Q. I did personally? A. Youi and your crew. Q. oAnd when did I do that? A. I don't know the exact date, but I believe it was in 2014 when you robbed me. Q. I robbed you in 2014? A. Yes, sir. 277 Exhibit 58, May 2018 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 94. 47 Q. So I broke into your office and stole your stuff in 2014 at your Gulfport, Mississippi office, right? A. You and your crew.278 In this case, Pohl admitted under oath that he knew in 2014 that his ktrade secrets had been misappropriated: C Q. You knew as of the summer of 2014, then, that the trade secrets that you claim in this lawsuit were taketn by Precision Marketing. Is that correct? i A. Yes, I knew they were not being made available to me.279 Pohl also expressly testified that he knew in the sugmmer 2014 that his files – which he claims are the purported trade secrets – hadB been stolen from him: Q. Who stole the files? y A. Well, originally it would have been Precision Marketing. Q. Did you form the opinifon that they had stolen the files when Mr. Blanton informed you that he learned that the files were not available to be moved to Houston? A. Well, I certaiOnly had a suspicion, so I followed up and spoke to somebody at Precision about it. Q. And onceo you spoke to the person at Precision, that’s when you formed your opinion that the files had been stolen from you. Is that clorrect? A. Yies. Q. n And that would have been sometime in the summer of 2014? A. Yes.280 278 Exhibit 58, May 2018 Deposition of Michael Pohl, pp. 85-93. 279 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 14. 280 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 18-19. 48 Accordingly, it is undisputed that the alleged trade secret property was removed from the Gulfport office no later than July 2014, that Precision – who Pohl alleges was part of Kassab’s “crew” – took it, and that by July 2014 Pohl was aware that Precision had taken it. k After Pohl discovered the taking of the alleged trade secretsC in summer 2014, he took no immediate action to recover it, find out what happened to it, or find out if anyone else was involved in the taking. Pohl testified thait although he knew the alleged conduct by Kassab occurred in 2014, he did not file a lawsuit against Kassab because he “wanted to spend time to reflect on it before taking action [and] didn’t want to do anything that was precipitous.”281 On October 8, 2014, Precision and itls owners, Scott Walker, Kirk Ladner and Steve Seymour, filed a breach of conMtract lawsuit against Pohl in federal court in Mississippi.282 Pohl’s only reaction to the lawsuit was to send Walker and Ladner a mild email two days later askiing them to return his “original documents, evidence and keys.”283 From that point forward, Precision and its owners proceeded to publish Pohl’s allegeod proprietary information in the lawsuit. For example, in November 2014, olne month after filing the lawsuit, they published his marketing materials,284 ciommunications and contracts between Pohl and other lawyers,285 281 Exhibit 58, May 2018 Deposition of Michael Pohl, p. 93. 282 Nicholson Ex. 4, Federal Original Complaint. 283 Nicholson Ex. 5, Doc. 19-1. 284 Nicholson Ex. 6, Doc. 19-5 and 19-6. 285 Nicholson Ex. 7, Doc. 19-3. 49 communications between Pohl and his clients or potential clients,286 and Pohl’s BP client solicitation letter,287 all without any complaint from Pohl. Pohl took no action to recover his allegedly stolen property nor attempt to stop the dissemination of this alleged trade secrets: he did not file a kcounterclaim for theft, conversion, or violation of a trade secrets act, nor Cdid he move for injunctive or other relief to reacquire or protect his trade secrets, nor did move for a protective order regarding his alleged trade secrets ori (until the March 2017 confidentiality order that was expressly made not retroactive) enter into a confidentiality agreement to protect and keep secret the documents produced during the lawsuit.288 In short, Pohl failed to do any of the things that a person exercising reasonable diligence regarding the theft ofl trade secrets would do. On or about May 12, 2015, WMalker, Ladner and Seymour sold Precision to Scott Favre, and in conjunction with the sale, they transferred the allegedly misappropriated materials to Fiavre’s office in Kiln, Mississippi.289 On May 12, 2015, Nicholson entered an appearance in the Mississippi litigation as the attorney for Precision.290 o The sale ofl Precision to Favre apparently stimulated Pohl to determine whether Nichoilson had the alleged trade secret materials. On May 15, 2015, Pohl’s attorney sent Nicholson a letter demanding that Walker, Ladner and Seymour turn over to Pohl the contracts between him and his BP clients. The letter stated, “The 286 Nicholson Ex. 8, Doc. 19-7. 287 Nicholson Ex. 9, Doc. 19-10. 288 Nicholson Ex. A, Nicholson Affidavit. 289 Nicholson Ex. 10, Doc. 396-2. 290 Nicholson Ex. 11, Doc. 77. 50 contracts do not belong to your clients.”291 Pohl’s attorney sent Nicholson a second letter on May 20, 2015. The letter repeated Pohl’s demand that Nicholson provide the contracts to him. By way of explanation, the letter said, “As you may know, the British Petroleum claim filing deadline is June 8, 2015. Mr. Pohkl needs the contracts to address client matters relating to the deadline.”292 C On May 27, 2015, Nicholson emailed a letter to Pohl’s attorney, confirming that the contracts were being held at the office of Scotit Favre, Precision’s new owner.293 In pertinent part, it said: This letter responds to your faxed letters and addresses matters which we discussed in our telephone conversatuion last Friday. Your client, Michael Pohl, has demanded that my client, Precision Marketing Group, LLC, hand over the originals and copies of . . . contracts between him . . . and the BP/Deepwlater Horizon claimants. . . Mr. Pohl asserts that the documents doa not belong to PMG or the other Plaintiffs.294 M Nicholson’s letter went on to state that “PMG will not relinquish possession of the original contracts at this timei.”295 Nicholson stated that the documents in question were being held at the office of Scott Favre, Precision’s new owner.296 Nicholson also mentioned that a comoputer containing some of the information had been sent to a forensic expert forl recovery of date.297 Pohl swiore to his lawyer’s letters being sent to Nicholson requesting return of the materials in his interrogatory answers: 291 Nicholson Ex. 12, 2015 Communications. 292 Nicholson Ex. 12, 2015 Communications. 293 Nicholson Ex. 12, 2015 Communications. 294 Nicholson Ex. 12, 2015 Communications. 295 Nicholson Ex. 12, 2015 Communications. 296 Nicholson Ex. 12, 2015 Communications. 297 Nicholson Ex. 12, 2015 Communications. 51 298 Accordingly, at least as of May 2015, Pohl knew that Walker and CLadner (who Pohl contends was part of Kassab’s “crew”) had transferred the alileged trade secrets to Favre who was represented by Nicholson (who Pohl contDenids are other members of Kassab’s “crew”), and that Nicholson had refused Poshl’s demand for return of the information. More than 3 years later, on August 28, 2018, Pohl filed this lawsuit. As explained below, Pohl’s TUTSA claim against Kassab, along with his conversion and conspiracy claim, are barred by the statutel of limitations. 2. Pohl’s TUTSA is barred by the three-year statute of limitations.  TUTSA has a three-year statute of limitations: “A person must bring suit for misappropriation of traOde secrets not later than three years after the misappropriation is dipscovered or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.010(a). “Misappropriation” means, among oither definitions, the acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person whoo knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means. Id. at § 134A.002(3). “Improper means” includes theft. Id. at § 134A.002(2). “A misappropriation of trade secrets that continues over time is a 298 Nicholson Ex. 13, Pohl’s Interrogatory Answers at No. 4. 52 single cause of action and the limitations period … begins running without regard to whether the misappropriation is a single or continuing act.” Id. at § 16.010(b). Accordingly, the first act of misappropriation is when the statute of limitation accrues for misappropriation of a trade secret. See Gen. Unikversal Sys. v. HAL Inc., 500 F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2007) (recognizing the TCUTSA “explicitly precludes treating trade secret misappropriation as a continuing tort.”); Guajardo v. Freddie Records, Inc., No. CV H-10-02024, 2014 WL 12603i179, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 15, 2014) (“[T]he Texas Legislature decided not to make this type of claim a continuing tort. Specifically, the Texas Legislature enacted a three-year statute of limitations for suits alleging misappropriation of trade secrets in May 1997.”). Accordingly, “the tort of misappropriation,l as viewed under Texas law, occurs at the moment of misappropriation.” BiancoM v. Globus Med., Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 929, 938 (E.D. Tex. 2014) In this case, the limitiation period on the TUTSA claim began to run in summer 2014, when Precision, to use Pohl’s own word, “stole” the trade secrets.299 Pohl testified that heo had actual knowledge of the misappropriation of his claimed property no later lthan July 2014.300 Accordingly, the misappropriation occurred more than foiur years before Pohl filed this lawsuit in August 2018. This is not a case where the date of the misappropriation is unclear. This is not an instance where an employee secretly copies information from an employer, stealthily shares it with a competitor, and the owner of the trade secret finds out in 299 Exhibit 58, May 2018 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 18-19. 300 Exhibit 58, May 2018 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 18-19. 53 a roundabout way at some later point in time when a similar product hits the market. In this case, Precision physically removed all of the documents from the office it shared with Pohl. Pohl admits that he unequivocally discovered the alleged theft of the trade secrets no later than July 2014. And what’s more, Pkohl testified, that Kassab and his “crew” participated in the theft of his trade Csecrets in 2014. If so, then Pohl’s TUTSA claim against Kassab expired in July 2017, over a year before Pohl filed this lawsuit. i The statutory language is very specific as to when the statute begins to run. It says that the limitation period starts when “misappropriation is discovered or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 16.010(a). Pohl discovered thel theft of his trade secrets no later than July 2014. Accordingly, the statute Mbegan to run on the misappropriation in July 2014, meaning Pohl’s TUTSA claim was barred by the time he filed suit in August 2018. i Alternatively, even if the statute began to run in May 2015, Pohl’s claim is still barred. The Mayo 2015 letters prove that Pohl knew in May 2015 that Walker, Ladner and Seymlour had transferred the disputed documents and information to Favre and Niicholson.301 Nicholson’s letter of May 27, 2015, informed Pohl that Favre had the hard copies of the trade secret documents at his Kiln, Mississippi office, they also had the computer with the alleged trade secrets, and that Nicholson refused to return Pohl’s alleged information.302 Hence, Pohl “discovered” Nicholson’s 301 Nicholson Ex. 12, 2015 Communications. 302 Nicholson Ex. 12, 2015 Communications. 54 alleged “misappropriation” when he received her May 2015 letter confirming her refusal to give them to Pohl, despite his assertion of ownership. However, Pohl did not file this lawsuit until August 28, 2018, around three months after the latest possible limitation period expired on May 27, 2018. k It is also important to understand that the alleged subseCquent use, sale or purchase of the trade secrets did not restart the clock on the TUTSA limitations period. The fact that, after the trade secrets were purporitedly misappropriated in 2014, or alternatively 2015, they were allegedly subsequently used or transferred did not restart the limitation period. The case Agar Corp. v. Electro Circuits Int'l, LLC, 565 S.W.3d 12 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 580 S.W.3d 136 (Tlex. 2019) is instructive on this point. In Agar, the plaintiff initially sued moMre than a dozen defendants in April 2008 in connection with the defendants’ alleged misappropriation of the plaintiff’s proprietary information and uise of that information to create knock-off products for sale to its customers. Id. at 19. The plaintiff added alleged co-conspirators who allegedly purchased aond sold some of the trade secrets as defendants to the existing lawsuit in Novembler 2011 — more than three years after plaintiff initially filed suit for the misapipropriation. Id. The plaintiff argued that his claim against the co- conspirators did not accrue until July 2009 because that is when the co-conspirators were still selling the allegedly stollen trade secret information. Id. The court rejected this argument, stating: “[a] continuing tort does not arise from one’s copyrighting a song that another wrote and then repeatedly selling the song and 55 reaping profit from each sale. While it may be said that the injury continues with each sale and receipt of a royalty, the act that caused the continuing injury was the one act of copyrighting the song.” Id. at 21 (quoting Rogers v. Ardella Veigel Inter Vivos Trust No. 2, 162 S.W.3d 281, 290 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2005, pet. kdenied)). Pohl “discovered” “the misappropriation” in the suCmmer 2014, or alternatively when he exchanged letters with Nicholson in May and June 2015. If anyone subsequently disclosed the trade secrets, it did noti give rise to a new cause of action. The express language of the TUTSA statute of limitation expressly precludes “continuing tort” theories. Accordingly, Pohl’s TUTSA claim against Kassab is barred by limitations. 3. Pohl’s conversioMn and conspiracy claims are barred by limitations.  Pohl’s common-law claimes against Kassab for conversion and civil conspiracy are also barred by the statutfe of limitations. A person must bring suit for the conversion of personal property “not later than two years after the day the cause of action accrues.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003( ai). Generally, the limitations period for a conversion claim begins to run at the toime of the unlawful taking. Wells Fargo Bank Nw., N.A. v. RPK Capital XVI, L.L.C., 360 S.W.3d 691, 700 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). As established above, whether his claim accrued in 2014 or 2015, more than two years had passed by the time Pohl filed suit in August 2018. Therefore, his conversation claim is barred. 56 Pohl’s conspiracy claim is also barred by limitations. The Texas Supreme Court has established that a claim for civil conspiracy accrues when the underlying tort accrues, and the limitation period for the conspiracy claim begins to run at the same time as that for the underlying tort. Agar Corp., Inc. v. Electro kCircuits Int’l, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136, 138 (Tex. 2019). “Understanding that civCil conspiracy is a theory of derivative liability, it follows that a civil conspiracy claim should share both accrual and the limitations period of the underlyiing wrong.” Id. at 144. Because the underlying conversion and TUTSA claims are barred by limitations, Pohl’s derivative conspiracy claim against Kassab is barred as well. E. Pohl’s claims are conclusively negated. 1. Pohl’s TUTSA clalim is conclusively negated because his allegead trade secrets were not actually kept secret. M Kassab adopts the argument made and evidence identified on pages 45-49 of the Nicholson Motion as if seit forth verbatim herein. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 58. That argument and evidence is equally applicable to Kassab and establishes that, as a matter of law, Pohl doid not take any measures, let alone reasonable measures, to keep his alleged inlformation or client lists secret. Accordingly, Poh’s TUTSA claim against Kassaib fails as a matter of law, especially regarding the four barratry lawsuits. 2. Pohl’s claims fail because Pohl does not own the purportedly stolen property and trade secrets. “To bring a successful TUTSA claim, the claimant must first show that it owns a trade secret in the information it seeks to protect.” Title Source, Inc. v. 57 HouseCanary, Inc., 612 S.W.3d 517, 527 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. denied); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.002(3-a), (6); Morgan v. Clements Fluids S. Tex., Inc., 589 S.W.3d 177, 186-87 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2018, no pet.). The claimant must also demonstrate that it is “the person or entity in whomk or in which rightful, legal, or equitable title to, or the right to enforce rights iCn, the trade secret is reposed.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.002(3-a). S imilarly, “[a] plaintiff who has not shown title or some other right to possession iof the property allegedly converted may not maintain a suit in conversion.” Catania v. Garage de Le Paix, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Pohl’s TUTSA and conversion claims against Kassab fail because he is not the owner of the purportedly stolen property and trade lsecret information. Pohl alleges that his trade seMcrets that were allegedly misappropriated are “attorney–client fee agreements with clients/prospective clients, compilations of clients, other confidential comimunications between the clients/prospective clients and Pohl, specialized legal forms …, … proprietary administrative client forms, fee- agreement forms …, ionternal emails, propriety marketing information … and other work product relatling to claims of Pohl’s clients and prospective clients.”303 But this information miakes up the client file that is the property of the client, not Pohl, under Texas law. “[T]he Texas Supreme Court recognized explicitly that an attorney is an agent of his client and implicitly that a client owns the contents of his or her file.” In re McCann, 422 S.W.3d 701, 704-705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing 303 Amended Petition, at ¶ 20. 58 Thomson v. Findlater Hardware Co., 205 S.W. 831, 832 (Tex. 1918)) (emphasis added). “The attorney is the agent of the client, and the work product generated by the attorney in representing the client belongs to the client.” In re George, 28 S.W.3d 511, 516 (Tex. 2000) (emphasis added). Under the disciplinkary rules, an attorney does not own and is therefore required to promptly surrCender “papers and property to which the client is entitled.” TEX. DISC. R. PROFi 'L COND. 1.15. Texas courts have interpreted the word “property” to mean “the iclient’s papers and other documents that the lawyer had in his file.” TEX. COMsM. ON PROF'L ETHICS Op. 570 (citing Hebisen v. State, 615 S.W. 2d 866 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ)). In other words, all documents and information in the client file is property of the client and not Pohl. See George, 28 S.Wl.3d at 516. Moreover, work product and Mattorney-client communications are owned by the client as part of the client’s file, and not the attorney. See TEX. COMM. ON PROF'L ETHICS Op. 570 (noting that coimmunications made to or on behalf of a client is work product); Resolution Tr. Corp. v. H___, P.C., 128 F.R.D. 647, 648 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (considering the issueo of the ownership of files generated by a law firm during its representation of al client and determining that the entire contents of the law firm’s files concerninig the representation of the client belonged to the client and ordering the law firm to turn over the entire contents of the firm’s files, including work product generated by the lawyer such as notes and legal memoranda). Therefore, Pohl does not own the “internal emails … and other work product relating to claims of Pohl’s clients and prospective clients” that he claims is a trade secret. 59 While client lists can be considered a trade secret, the lists that Precision solicited to hire Pohl are owned by Precision, not Pohl.304 Scott Favre, the owner of Precision, testifies that Precision “solicited many of the marketing contacts (individuals and businesses) on these lists for representation” by Pkohl.305 Favre testified that the “marketing lists contain the names of thousanCds of persons who eventually became [Pohl’s] former clients, and/or whom [Pohl] solicited for representation.”306 Favre made clear that the very informaition that Pohl claims are the trade secretes converted by Kassab “were and are solely the work product and property of Precision, developed during the normal course of its marketing business.”307 Because Pohl does not own the purlported trade secrets or property that he alleges had been converted, his TUTMSA and conversion claims fail as a matter of law. And because the conversion and statutory claims fail, Pohl’s claim for civil conspiracy also fails. See Tramimel Crow Co. No. 60 v. Harkinson, 944 S.W.2d 631, 635 (Tex. 1997) (to prevail on a civil conspiracy claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant was liaoble for some underlying tort). Accordingly, Kassab is entitled to judgment as a mlatter of law. 304 Exhibit 50, August 10, 2016 Affidavit of Scott Favre, ¶ 15. 305 Exhibit 50, August 10, 2016 Affidavit of Scott Favre, ¶ 15. 306 Exhibit 50, August 10, 2016 Affidavit of Scott Favre, ¶ 15. 307 Exhibit 50, August 10, 2016 Affidavit of Scott Favre, ¶ 12 (emphasis added). 60 F. Pohl’s illegal acts (barratry and unauthorized practice of law) precludes any form of recovery against the whistleblowers because his acts are inexorably intertwined with his crimes. Pohl committed barratry and wants his whistleblowers to pay for his barratry defense costs. But the well-established and common-sense unlawfuel acts doctrine that precludes any recovery for Pohl’s crimes. Pohl violated the Texas laws and rules governing lawyers by committing barratry andt practicing in other jurisdictions without a license, sharing an office and fees with non-lawyers, and he failed to protect confidential client information in thee process. Pohl also committed the unauthorized practice of law states in muultiple states, including Louisiana, Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi where he maintained an unauthorized law office. All of Pohl’s claims for recovery are inaextricably intertwined with his violations of the laws of Texas and other jurisdictions. According, his claims are barred by their illegality. e 1. The Unlafwful Acts Doctrine. More than a century, Texas developed the Unlawful Acts Rule, which provides: no action iwill lie to recover a claim for damages, if to establish it the plaintiffi requires aid from an illegal transaction, or is under the necesosity of showing or in any manner depending upon an illegal act to which he is a party. Gulf, C. & S. F. RY. Co. v. Johnson, 621, 9 S.W. 602, 602-03 (1888). Courts have simplified this analysis to whether the claim or damages are “inextricably intertwined” with the illegal act or whether the illegal act “contributed to the 61 injury.” McNally v. McNally, No. 02-18-00142-CV, 2020 WL 5241189, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 3, 2020, pet. denied) (recognizing that the Unlawful Acts Rule remains good law and using intertwined language); Andrew Shebay & Co., P.L.L.C. v. Bishop, 429 S.W.3d 644, 648–49 (Tex. App.—Houston [1skt Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). The purpose of this rule is to deter unlawful acts bCy making certain “that the person should not even entertain the hope of indemnity for the offense committed.” Dover v. Baker, Brown, Sharman & Parker, 8i59 S.W.2d 441, 450 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (internal quotations omitted). The rule can be applied even if one or more defendants have also committed an unlawful act. Id. at 450-451 (denying recovery to plaintiff who sued his attorney for malpractice claiming he signed a false affidavit on tlhe advice of his attorney who knew the affidavit was unlawful). M 2. Pohl knew his acts were illegal. Pohl is well aware thiat his barratry precludes his claims. He asserted “illegality and/or public policy” as a defense to paying his runners in the Mississippi Litigation. As Pohl hoimself explains in his Motion to Dismiss Precision’s Amended Complaint: l The gisft of Precision’s claims, as plead in the Amended Complaint, is that Walker/Seymour/Ladner agreed to accept or accepted money to imUproperly solicit BP clients for the alleged “Pohl/Williamson joint venture” and automobile accident clients for the alleged “Pohl/Ammons joint venture.” Neither Walker/Seymour/Ladner nor Precision, as their assignee, can recover from Pohl under any cause of action. This is because: (1) under Mississippi law, it is illegal and against public policy for a non-lawyer to accept or agree to accept money to improperly solicit clients for a 62 lawyer; (2) under Mississippi law, it is illegal and against public policy for lawyers to share legal fees with non-lawyers; and (3) under Mississippi law, a claimant may not recover under any theory (including contract, tort, or equity) for illegal conduct or conduct that is violative of public policy.308 And as Pohl himself further argued, he should be judicially estopped kfrom arguing against this position now. To allow him to do so, as he says, “woCuld allow [him] to ‘play fast and loose with the Court,’ which, in turn, would negatively impact the reputation of the judicial system.”309 i The Mississippi Litigation court agreed that illegality would apply to law firms because Mississippi laws “make it illegal to accept or agree to accept money to commence or further prosecute a judicial action.”310 Additionally, the court went onto explain that the Mississippi Rules ofl Professional conduct 5.4(a), 7.2(i), 7.3(a), and 8.4(a) preclude attorneys from Mentering into fee-splitting arrangements with non-lawyers. Precision could not violate attorney misconduct rules “as they are neither lawyers nor a law firmi. The only ‘immoral or illegal act,’ then, would have been committed by [Pohl].”311 Pohl’s illegal acts precluded him and his co- conspirators from aosserting a defense of illegality because of his unlawful conduct.312 l 308 Nicholson Ex. 23, Pohl’s Motion to Dismiss in the Mississippi Litigation, Doc. 192 ¶ 6. 309 Nicholson Ex. 23, Ex. 23: Doc. 192 ¶ 5 310 Nicholson Ex. 25, Order on Pohl’s Motion to Dismiss in the Mississippi Litigation, Doc. 252 at 5. 311 Nicholson Ex. 25, Doc. 252 at 6. 312 Nicholson Ex. 25, Doc. 252 at 6. 63 3. Texas courts have applied the Unlawful Acts Rule to preclude claims arising from barratry. Texas courts have also applied Unlawful Acts Rule in BP solicitation cases. In Truyen Luong v. McAllister, the appellate court affirmed summary judgment where, as here, solicitation was an essential purpose of a fee-shaering agreement that rendered the contract void for illegality. No. 01-17-00198-CV, 2018 WL 3651103, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 2, 2018t, pet. denied). Luong, a paralegal, sued attorney McAllister for work performed on Gulf Coast Claims Facility, BP, and Deepwater Horizon claims. Id. eat *1. Luong alleged that he brought a lot of customers to McAllister in retuurn for an oral agreement to split attorney’s fees. Id. at *1-2. McAllister moved to dispose of the claim arguing that any summary judgment claim was baarred by illegality, which the trial court granted. Id. The court of appeals agreed, stating “[t]his type of barratry contract is prohibited by statute as well as eby disciplinary rule.” Id. at *3. The court explained: [A] contract between fan attorney and one not an attorney, providing that the [non-attorney] shall procure the employment of the [attorney] by a third person for the prosecution of suits to be commenced in consideration oof a fee to be procured or collected therein, is void as against public policy, independent of statutes prohibiting the same. Id. at *3. In turin, any such contract is void “to benefit and protect the public.” Id. Luong’s agroeement to solicit was an “essential purpose” of their agreement, much as the solicitation was an essential part of Pohl’s barratry practice. Id. at *4. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for McAllister, and this trial court should grant summary judgment here. 64 4. Texas courts have applied the Unlawful Acts Rule to preclude claims for those who obtain property illegally. Pohl is precluded from recovering damages on trade secrets that he obtained through illegal solicitation and the unauthorized practice of law. The ckase Sharpe v. Turley, 191 S.W.3d 362 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) is iCnstructive on this point. In Sharpe, the plaintiff, Sharpe, removed financial documents from a Roman Catholic Diocese’s dumpster before alerting attorney Turiley, who was suing the Diocese. Turley obtained the documents from Sharpe via subpoena, and following the lawsuit both the Diocese and Sharpe contended they were the rightful owners of the documents. Sharpe subsequently sued Turley for obtaining the documents through fraud. The trial court granted sumlmary judgment under the Unlawful Acts Rule and Fort Worth Court of AppeMals affirmed. Id. at 363-364. As the appellate court explained, “Because [Sharpe’s] conduct in removing the Diocese’s items from Diocesan property without itsi permission is the foundation of his allegation that he has a superior right to the items and that alleged right is the basis of his fraud claim against Turley, othe trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Turley [under the lunlawful-acts rule].” Id. at 369. As disciussed above, Pohl admits to engaging runners to illegally solicit clients with offers to pay legal fees and bounties to the runners in states where he is not licensed. Ladner, Talley, Santana, and Maxwell also testified that Pohl offered to pay them bounties for signing up clients. Former clients who hired Pohl, including Barry, Speck, Bethley, Bikumbu, Cheatham Sr. and Reese, all testified 65 that they were illegally and unethically solicited to hire Pohl. And Pohl admitted in the Mississippi Litigation that such conduct would be illegal and against public policy. Accordingly, Pohl cannot recover against anyone for anything because be acquired his client files and purportedly confidential and protectedk information through illegal solicitation and unauthorized practice of law. C 5. Pohl is precluded from claiming protection over information he obtained through thet unauthorized practice of law. i Moreover, Texas courts have consistently applied the Unlawful Acts Rule to preclude recovery by one who unlawfully practices a profession or occupation without a required license, even if the illegal practice was not the direct cause of the injury. Rule 5.05 of the Texas Rules of Prolfessional Conduct makes it unlawful for a Texas lawyer to commit the unauthorMized practice of law in any other jurisdiction or to assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the unauthorized practice of law. See TEX. DISC. R. PROF’L iCOND. 5.05. Consequently, this Court should preclude recovery for any claim arising from his unlawful practice in other jurisdictions. For instance, tohe Dallas Court of Appeals refused to permit a car dealership to recover from a slales agent that fraudulently withheld money relating to the sale of cars becausei the dealership did not have the proper county license to sell cars: Appellants argue allowing the Credit Union to prevail on the illegality defense allows it to walk away with a windfall. Although this may be true under these facts, to hold otherwise would allow individuals to indirectly profit from a business they are directly prohibited from engaging in unless properly licensed by statute. This we will not do. . . . We agree with the Credit Union that the rule applies and bars appellants’ claims arising in tort because they are 66 inextricably intertwined with their illegal contract to sell automobiles in Dallas County without a license. Denson v. Dallas Cnty. Credit Union, 262 S.W.3d 846, 855 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (emphasis added). The law is even stricter when applied to regulated professiones. The Supreme Court of Texas refused to permit an engineer to recover a fee where he had failed to pay the renewal fee for his license and was, therefore, tpracticing engineering without a current license and in violation of the Texas Occupational Code. The Court noted that the requirement of proper liecensure for engineers was to “safeguard life, health and property.” M. M. M.u, Inc., v. Mitchell, 265 S.W.2d 584, 585–86 (1954). Similarly, the Fort Worth Court oaf Appeals affirmed a denial of recovery for a person who practiced architecture without a license and then sued his partner in the architectural firm. The Couert stated that to permit recovery was to undermine the purpose of licensure, wfhich was “to safeguard life, health, property and the public welfare, and to protect the public against the irresponsible practice of the profession of architecture.” Farha v. Elam, 385 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex. Civ. App.— Fort Worth 1964i, writ ref’d n.r.e.). As moember of Texas Bar, Pohl is subject to the requirements imposed by the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 5.05 prohibits Texas attorneys from committing the unauthorized practice of law in other jurisdictions: Rule 5.05. Unauthorized Practice of Law A lawyer shall not: 67 (a) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction; or (b) assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. TEX. DISC. R. PROF’L COND. 5.05. The comment to the Rule exeplains, “Courts generally have prohibited the unauthorized practice of law because of a perceived need to protect individuals and the public from the mistakets of the untrained and the schemes of the unscrupulous, who are not subject to the judicially imposed disciplinary standards of competence, responsibilitye and accountability. . . Limiting the practice of law to members of the bar protuects the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified persons.” Id. at cmt. 1. By his own admission, Pohl hasa never been licensed to practice law in any state except Texas and Colorado.313 Yet, Pohl solicited and signed up auto accident clients in Mississippi,314 Louiesiana,315 Missouri,316 and Arkansas.317 Santana testified that she solicited BfP clients for Pohl all across the Gulf Coast, including Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi.318 Further, Pohl assisted Walker, Ladner, and the other runners in engaging in the unauthorized practice of law through soliciting and signing up cilients in those jurisdictions. In doing so, Pohl has violated the laws regulating oTexas lawyers. Accordingly, Pohl cannot recover any fee related to his 313 Nicholson Ex. 31, Pohl Aug 2016 Depo at 8. 314 Exhibit 16, Declaration of Mae Berry; Exhibit 18, Declaration of Arthur Speck. 315 Exhibit 19, Declaration of Alphonse Bethley; Exhibit 29, Declaration of Mark Cheatham, Sr. 316 Exhibit 22, Declaration of Heraclite Bikumbu. 317 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese. 318 Exhibit 6, September 26, 2016 Affidavit; Exhibit 8, Santana Depositions. 68 unauthorized practice of law states in Louisiana, Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi where he maintained an unauthorized law office. Pohl alleges that the Defendants “stole” his documents and information from his “satellite law office” in Mississippi in 2014. In Mississippi, it is a kmisdemeanor for a person to practice law without a license. The Mississippi SCupreme Court has established that “the ‘practice of law’ has been defined to be as little as advising a person of his legal rights.” In re Williamson, 838 So.2d 226i, 234 (Miss. 2002) (citing Darby v. Miss. State Bar, 185 So.2d 684, 687 (Miss. 1966)). The practice of law also includes the solicitation of clients and the investigation of a potential client’s claim. Forbes v. St. Martin, 145 So.3d 1184 (Miss. App. 2013). Pohl’s admitted solicitation of Misslissippi clients and his admitted visits to Mississippi to confer with actual andM potential clients constituted the unauthorized practice of law in Mississippi. Pohl’s operation of that “law office”, and even its very existence, violated Mississippii law. He admitted that he was not admitted to practice law in Mississippi and the law office was not associated with any Mississippi lawyer.319o Further, Pohl violated the law by sharing his office with non- lawyers. Pohl admlitted that he unlawfully shared his office space, telephones and computers witih a non-lawyer company, Precision, in violation of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct.320 In addition to his practice of law in the Mississippi office and his meetings with potential and actual Mississippi clients, Pohl admits 319 See Nicholson Ex. 2, Pohl May 2018 Depo 112:19-13:10. 320 Nicholson Ex. 1, Pohl Dec 2021 Depo at 16:15-21. 69 that, in 2012-2014, he spent the majority of his time practicing law at his Mississippi “law office.”321 Further, Pohl assisted Walker, Ladner and the other runners in engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in Mississippi by paying them for skoliciting and signing up clients on his behalf. Pohl admits that he gave WCalker and Ladner advertising brochures for them to distribute as widely as possible in Mississippi and other states. He admits that he gave Walker and Ladner bilank contracts that they were to use to sign up clients for him. Walker, Ladner and the other runners illegally solicited on Pohl’s behalf all of the Mississippians listed in the Gandy and Brumfield Petitions.322 Of the 133 plaintiffs in the Gandy lawsuit, 103 of tlhem were Mississippians.323 Of the 272 Brumfield plaintiffs, 153 were MissisMsippians. Those Petitions list people whom Pohl illegally solicited in Mississippi, either directly or through his runiners. Since solicitation of work for an attorney constitutes the unauthorized practice of law in Mississippi, Pohl committed that crime, or assisted theo runners in committing it, as to every one of the Mississippi plaintiffs in those ltwo Petitions. Pohl alsio committed the unauthorized practice of law in regard to Mae Berry and Lisa and Arthur Speck, former clients who subsequently sued Pohl plaintiff for illegally soliciting them in Mississippi.324 Pohl sent a runner, Ken Talley, to each of 321 Exhibit 60, Sept. 17 2018 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 292-293. 322 Nicholson Ex. 29, Brumfield Petition and Nicholson Ex. 30, Gandy Petition. 323 Nicholson Ex. 30, Gandy Petition at 2-6. 324 Nicholson Ex. 32, Berry Petition at 9-12. 70 their homes to solicit them as clients for Pohl regarding their personal injury claims. Talley solicited these people for Pohl and induced them to sign a Pohl attorney-client contract. Pohl committed a misdemeanor and violated other Mississkippi laws by engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in Mississippi whiCle soliciting these clients. Since all of the “trade secret” information regarding Mississippians was gathered during Pohl’s illegal solicitation activities, he caninot show his ownership of the information without referencing his illegal activities. Pohl cannot show that documents at his Mississippi “law office” were misappropriated without showing that he operated an illegal law office in Mississippi. Consequently, the Unlawful Acts Rule precludes Pohl from recoveringl in this court for the misappropriation of “trade secrets” relating to MississippiMans. In Louisiana, it is a felony for a person or any entity not licensed to practice law in Louisiana to engage ini the practice of law; hold oneself out as being entitled to practice law; provide legal advice; use language in advertising suggesting the person is a lawyer oro in any way suggesting that the person is entitled to practice law; or advertise tlhe existence of a “law office of any kind.” LA Rev. Stat. 37:213. Further, it is aigainst Louisiana law for anyone not licensed to practice law to solicit and sign up clients, or to investigate claims, in that state. In re Guirard, 11 So.3d 1017 (La. 2009). Walker, Ladner and the other runners illegally solicited on Pohl’s behalf all of the Louisianans listed in the Gandy and Brumfield Petitions. Of the 133 71 plaintiffs in the Gandy lawsuit, 7 of them were Louisianans.325 Of the 272 Brumfield plaintiffs, 54 were Louisianans.326 Those Petitions list people whom Pohl illegally solicited in Louisiana, either directly or through his runners. Since solicitation of work for kan attorney constitutes the unauthorized practice of law in Louisiana, PohCl committed that crime, or assisted the runners in committing it, as to every one of the Louisiana plaintiffs in those two Petitions. i In addition, Pohl committed the unauthorized practice of law in Louisiana in relation to Mark Cheatham, Mark Cheatham, Jr. and Luella Miller, Louisianans who filed the Cheatham lawsuit against Pohl. As demonstrated above, Pohl sent runner Ken Talley to solicit them in Louilsiana, which means he assisted Talley in engaging in the unauthorized practicMe of law in Louisiana. Pohl personally traveled to Louisiana to solicit and give legal advice to the Cheathams on at least two occasions. i Pohl also committed the unauthorized practice of law in regard to Sandra Johnson and Alphonsoe Bethley, Louisiana residents who filed the Gandy lawsuit against Pohl. Pohll sent runner Kirk Ladner to their home in Louisiana, where he solicited them ito hire Pohl for their personal injury claim and induced them to sign a Pohl attorney-client contract. Accordingly, Pohl assisted Ladner in engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in Louisiana. 325 Nicholson Ex. 30, Gandy Petition at 2-9. 326 Nicholson Ex. 29, Brumfield Petition at 2-6. 72 Pohl committed a misdemeanor and violated other Louisiana laws by engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in Louisiana while soliciting these clients. Since all of the “trade secret” information regarding Louisianans was gathered during Pohl’s illegal solicitation activities, he cannot show hkis ownership of the information without referencing his illegal activities. CConsequently, the Unlawful Acts Rule precludes Pohl from recovering in this court for the misappropriation of “trade secrets” relating to Louisianansi. It is a misdemeanor in Alabama to engage in the unauthorized practice of law. AL Code § 34-3-1 (2021). It is also against Alabama law to provide assistance to a person engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, which includes soliciting, interviewing and signing up clients. Davlis v. Alabama State Bar, 676 So.2d 306 (Ala. 1996). M Walker, Ladner and the other runners illegally solicited on Pohl’s behalf all of the Alabamians listed in thei Gandy and Brumfield Petitions. Of the 133 plaintiffs in the Gandy lawsuit, 21 of them were Alabamians.327 Of the 272 Brumfield plaintiffs, 39 were Alaobamians.328 Those Petitlions list people whom Pohl illegally solicited in Alabama, either directly or thirough his runners. Since solicitation of work for an attorney constitutes the unauthorized practice of law in Alabama, Pohl committed that crime, or assisted the runners in committing it, as to every one of the Alabama plaintiffs in those two Petitions. 327 Nicholson Ex. 30, Gandy Petition at 2-9. 328 Nicholson Ex. 29, Brumfield Petition at 2-6. 73 The unauthorized practice of law in Florida is a felony. Fla. Stat. 454.23. The practice of law includes soliciting and interviewing clients. The Florida Bar v. Meserve, 372 So.2d 1373 (Fla. 1979). It is a violation of Florida law to assist someone engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. Id. k Walker, Ladner and the other runners illegally solicited oCn Pohl’s behalf all of the Floridians listed in the Gandy and Brumfield Petitions. Of the 133 plaintiffs in the Gandy lawsuit, 3 of them were Floridians.329 Of the i272 Brumfield plaintiffs, 22 were Floridians.330 Those Petitions list people whom Pohl illegally solicited in Florida, either directly or through his runners. Since solicitation of work for an attorney constitutes the unauthorized practice of lalw in Florida, Pohl committed that crime, or assisted the runners in committinMg it, as to every one of the Florida plaintiffs in those two Petitions. 6. ALL of Piohl’s claims fail because he cannot show ownershfip of the alleged trade secrets or damages without showing that he acquired the information through barratry or the unauthorized practice of laow. Simply putl, Pohl cannot prove that he is the owner of the trade secret information wiithout showing how he acquired it. The evidence presented herein, and in the Nicholson Motion, demonstrates that Pohl acquired the information through illegal activity which included barratry and the unauthorized practice of law in multiple states and assisting others to engage in the unauthorized practice of 329 Nicholson Ex. 30, Gandy Petition at 2-9. 330 Nicholson Ex. 29, Brumfield Petition at 2-6. 74 law. Since Pohl cannot prove his case without relying on his illegal activity, the Unlawful Acts Rules bars his claims. Pohl claims as damages his expenses in defending against the Cheatham, Berry, Gandy and Brumfield lawsuits. He claims as damages the kexpenses he incurred in defending against the Barratry Litigation and gCrievance filed by Kassab. Pohl also claims that publicity about his illegal activities caused economic harm to his “law practice.” Thus, Pohl’s claimed damagesi flow solely from the fact that people discovered his unlawful acts. Pohl cannot claim the expense of defending against the Cheatham, Berry, Gandy and Brumfield lawsuits without addressing what the lawsuits are about. All four of those lawsuits were filed against hlim by persons who were illegally solicited by him, including some of his formerM clients. One of the cases (Barry) settled, and two of the cases (Brumfield and Gandy) were dismissed on limitations. See Brumfield v. Williamson, 634 iS.W.3d 170 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, pet. denied); Gandy v. Williamson, 634 S.W.3d 214, 219 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, pet. denied). Alothough the last case (Cheatham) was dismissed on summary judgment, the coulrt of appeals recently reversed because there was evidence of a “barratry scheime.” See Cheatham v. Pohl, No. 01-20-00046-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 649, at *25-26 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 27, 2022, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Pohl cannot claim that Defendants caused him to defend against these lawsuits without showing these people sued him for committing barratry. 75 Likewise, the Texas Bar grievance which Kassab submitted against Pohl is based on Pohl’s illegal acts, which included barratry. Pohl cannot claim that Defendants caused him to defend against a bar complaint without showing that it concerned his unlawful activities. Regardless, Pohl’s claim for damagesk arising from any grievances are barred by immunity, as stated above. C Finally, Pohl claims that publicity about his illegal activities damaged his law practice. Pohl cannot prove these damages without shiowing that he committed unlawful acts. Since his claimed damages all spring from his former clients and others becoming aware of his barratry and other illegal activities, he cannot prove any of his damages without discussing barratry. G. Pohl is not permitted lto recovery as damages the attorney’s fees he incurared in the four barratry lawsuits and two disciplinary gMrievances. Damages in a TUTSA suit are generally comprised of losses such as “the value of the plaintiff’s lost proifits, the defendant’s actual profits from the use of the secret, the value a reasonably prudent investor would have paid for the trade secret, the development cosots the defendant avoided by the misappropriation, and a reasonable royaltyl.” Sw. Energy Prod. Co. v. Berry-Helfand, 491 S.W.3d 699, 710–11 (Tex. 2016). i There are no differences between existing Texas common law and TUTSA regarding the economic damages available for trade secret misappropriation. Under Texas common law, the plaintiff was permitted to recover damages based on the value of what has been lost by the plaintiff (lost profits) or the value of what has been gained by the defendant (unjust enrichment). The plaintiff also could recover a reasonable royalty for the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s trade secret. 76 Joseph F. Cleveland, Jr., J. Heath Coffman, The Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Tex. J. Bus. L. 323, 328 (2013). Nonetheless, Pohl here seeks as damages the fees he incurred in defending against the four underlying barratry suits and two disciplinary grievankces. Nothing the TUTSA statute permits recovery of such “damages”—indeeCd, the prevailing party is not even entitled to recovery of its attorney’s fee under TUTSA, but instead, the trial court has discretion whether to award fees and onily if willful and malicious misappropriation exists. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. COsDE § 134A.005. If the TUTSA plaintiff is not guaranteed recovery of fees in the actual TUTSA suit, there is no reason to permit the TUTSA plaintiff to recover fees incurred in other suits. Moreover, even applying common-lalw, Pohl is not entitled to attorney’s fees as damages. “Whether a party is Mentitled to attorney’s fees is a question of law.” Sunchase IV Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Atkinson, 643 S.W.3d 420, 422 (Tex. 2022). “In Texas, attorney’s ifees expended in prior litigation generally are not recoverable as damages; attorney’s fees are recoverable only when an agreement between the parties soo provides.” Martin-Simon v. Womack, 68 S.W.3d 793, 797–98 (Tex. App.—Houstlon [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). As the Supreme Court has explained, “Foir more than a century, Texas law has not allowed recovery of attorney’s fees unless authorized by statute or contract. This rule is so venerable and ubiquitous in American courts it is known as ‘the American Rule.’” Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 310–11 (Tex. 2006). The Supreme Court of Texas has never adopted that equitable “tort of another” exception to the American 77 Rule. See Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. Nat’l Dev. & Research Corp., 299 S.W.3d 106, 119 (Tex. 2009) (declining to address whether the “tort of another” exception set out in section 914(2) of the Restatement should be adopted in Texas); see also Alvarez v. Agyemang, No. 02-19-00301-CV, 2020 WL k719440, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 13, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“WeC do not hold that the equitable exception allows the recovery of a prevailing party’s attorney’s fees even in the absence of a contracti or authorizing statute. Indeed, the Texas Supreme Court’s language in Gullo and that court’s failure to expressly adopt or reject this equitable theory indicate that equity does not extend this far.”); Riner v. Neumann, 353 S.W.3d 312, 323 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (“Given the supreme court’s faithful adherlence to the American Rule, and its strong statement in Tony Gullo that triaMl courts lack the inherent authority to award attorney’s fees contrary to the Rule, we decline to adopt a new equitable exception to thie Rule.”); Naschke v. Gulf Coast Conference, 187 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (declining to adopt the “tort of anotoher” exception to the American Rule because “we are bound to follow the existingl laws of the State, we are not at liberty to adopt a theory of recovery that ihas not been enacted by the Legislature or adopted by the Texas Supreme Court”).331 331 Prior to Tony Gullo and Akin Gump, the First Court of Appeals recognized the equitable “tort of another” exception to the general rule. See Massey v. Columbus State Bank, 35 S.W.3d 697, 701 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.). Tony Gullo and Akin Gump have driven home that the general rule against allowing recovery of fees as damages is firm and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals’ rejection of the “tort of another” exception in Martin-Simon and Naschke should be applied here, especially because Pohl’s own wrongdoing caused him to be sued for barratry. See also Stumhoffer v. Perales, 459 S.W.3d 158, 168 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) 78 No statute or contract provides Pohl the right to recover his attorney’s fees in the two barratry suits he prevailed on, nor on the barratry suit he settled and the ongoing suit. Application of the American Rule to preclude Pohl’s request for attorney’s fees damages makes sense here especially because Pohl kwas sued by persons accusing him of improperly soliciting them in violation of Cbarratry laws and ethical rules—those persons exercised their right and choice to file suit against Pohl for his wrongdoing. Under such circumstances, it would bie inequitable and violate public policy to allow Pohl to insulate himself from responsibility for his wrongdoing. In a similar vein, even if some equitable exception could apply here to permit a plaintiff to recover its attorney’s fees dlefending an underlying lawsuit, it would apply only if Pohl were wholly iMnnocent relative to the barratry suits and grievances. See Per-Se Techs., Inc. v. Sybase, Inc., No. 01-03-01293-CV, 2005 WL 1539291, at *8 (Tex. App.—Hiouston [1st Dist.] June 30, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[U]nder the ‘tort of another’ exception, BSG is not entitled to recover attorney’s feeso incurred in the arbitration because it is not a wholly innocent party.”); Placesetter Pools, Inc. v. Pierce Homes, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 827, 834–35 (Tex. App.—Auistin 2002, no pet.) (holding trial court properly refused to award fees to plaintiff because it was found partly negligent in underlying suit); Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Eldridge, 742 S.W.2d 482, 488 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ denied) (“Therefore, in the present case, Eldridge is not an innocent party forced to (“Texas has long adhered to the American Rule with respect to awards of attorney’s fees, which prohibits the recovery of attorney’s fees from an opposing party in legal proceedings unless authorized by statute or contract.”). 79 incur costs and expenses, including attorneys’ fees, to be treated as the legal consequences of some original wrongful act of another and permitted to be recovered as damages.”). As an initial matter, the Cheatham barratry suit is ongoinkg, with Pohl recently losing the appeal in that case (the appeal is in rehearingC stage presently), meaning, putting aside all the other reasons why his claims fail, it is premature for him to be seeking fees related to Cheatham. Regardless, tihe fact the Pohl violated ethical rules and committed barratry in having others solicit the persons who filed the barratry suits proves he was not wholly innocent. Finally, because, as established above, Pohl failed to maintain the secrecy of his alleged trade secrets, he cannot recovler any damages involving those alleged trade secrets even if attorney’s fees coMuld be recovered as damages: Like injunctive relief, a monetary recovery for trade secret misappropriation is apepropriate only for the period in which information is entitledi to protection as a trade secret, plus the additional period, if fany, in which a misappropriator retains an advantage over good faith competitors because of misappropriation. Actual damage to a complainant and unjust benefit to a misappropriatoor are caused by misappropriation during this time alone. See Conmar Products Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150 (ClA2, 1949) (no remedy for period subsequent to disclosure of trade secriet by issued patent); Carboline Co. v. Jarboe, 454 S.W.2d 540 (Mo. 197i0) (recoverable monetary relief limited to period that it would haveo taken misappropriator to discover trade secret without misappropriation). Uniform Trade Secrets Act at § 3 DAMAGES, comment. Hence, for numerous reasons, Pohl’s cannot recover his attorney’s fees as damages in this suit. 80 CONCLUSION & PRAYER For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant this motion and order that Plaintiffs Michael A. Pohl and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC take nothing on their claims against Lance Christopher Kassab and The Kassab Law Fkirm. Respectfully submitted,C THE KASSAB LAW FIiRM __________________________ LANCE C sHRISTOPHER KASSAB Texas Setate Bar No. 00794070 lance@kassab.law DA u VID ERIC KASSAB Texas State Bar No. 24071351 david@kassab.law lNICHOLAS R. PIERCE a Texas State Bar No. 24098263 M nicholas@kassab.law  1214 Elgin Street Houston, Texas 77004 e Telephone: 713-522-7400 i Facsimile: 713-522-7410 f E-Service: eserve@kassab.law ATTORNEYS FOR KASSAB DEFENDANTS i CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I cerotify that on this date, August 29, 2022, I electronically filed this document with the Clerk of the Court using the eFile.TXCourts.gov electronic filing system which will send notification of such filing to all parties or counsel of record. _______________________ DAVID ERIC KASSAB 81 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. David Kassab e Bar No. 24071351 C david@kassab.law t Envelope ID: 67771690 r Status as of 8/30/2022 8:41 AM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimsestampSubmitted Status Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com r8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Harris Wells hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com  8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Scott M.Favre scott@favrepa.com 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Lawyer Wade lawyerwade@hotmail.coml 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Lance Kassab eserve@kassab.law a 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Lance Kassab lance@kassab.lawM 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT David Kassab david@kassab.law 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Larry Newsom lnewsom@krcl.com 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Jason M.Ciofalo jason@ciofaelolaw.com 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Jessica Z.Barger barger@wrightclosebarger.com 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Nicholas Pierce nicholafs@kassab.law 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrar.com 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.com 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Andrew Johnson oajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Andrew J. Sarne Casarne@krcl.com 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Kathryn Laflin  KLaflin@KRCL.com 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.com 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Dale Jefferson 10f607900 jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Raul Herman Suazo n24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Kevin Graham CainU24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT D Kassab david@kassab.law 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT L Kassab lance@kassab.law 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT Katie Budinsky kbudinsky@krcl.com 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM ERROR Misty Davis mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT E. MarieJamison jamison@wrightclosebarger.com 8/29/2022 5:07:20 PM SENT"