filing_id,date,doc_type,party,description,doc_type_detail,procedural_posture,chain,outcome,phase,filename,relief_requested,full_text
45,2022-11-22,MTN,Kassab,2nd Supp. Motion to Designate RTP,"Kassab Defendants' Second Supplemental Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties (Adding Scott Favre and Precision Marketing Group, LLC)","Filed November 22, 2022 before Judge Scot Dollinger, 189th Judicial District, Harris County, Texas. Filed 13 days before the December 5, 2022 trial date, after Pohl dismissed Favre and Precision as defendants on November 21, 2022. Kassab seeks good cause to designate newly dismissed parties as responsible third parties within 60 days of trial.",RTP-1,N/A,Phase 3,2022-11-22_MTN_Kassab-2nd-Supp-Mtn-to-Designate-RTP_FILED.pdf,"Grant leave to designate Favre and Precision Marketing Group, LLC as additional responsible third parties, in addition to the eight individuals from prior supplemental motion, plus all other relief in law or equity","11/22/2022 3:51 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 70416484
By: Ashley Lopez
Filed: 11/22/2022 3:51 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIAkL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS, LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND LAlNCE
CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAW FIRM’S
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO DESIGNATE RcESPONSIBLE
THIRD PARTIES r
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE SCOT DOLLINGER: D
Defendants, Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Chsristopher Kassab, P.C. D/B/A The
Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab”), and file this, their Secornd Supplemental Motion to Designate
Responsible Third Parties.
REQUEaSTED RELIEF
1. Kassab files this Second Supplemental Motion to Designate Responsible Third
Parties to add Scott Favre (Favre) aned Precision Marketing Group, LLC (Precision) as additional
third parties. Favre and Precisionf were defendants in this lawsuit until Plaintiffs dismissed them
on November 21, 2022, jusyt 14 days prior to trail. Thus, Favre and Precision are no longer
parties to this suit. ThCus, there is good cause for designating Favre and Precision as responsible
Third Parties withina 60 days of trial due to the timing of Plaintiffs nonsuit of these parties.
2. Ffavre and Precision are central to this litigation as they purchased all of the
material Uand documents, which are the subject of Plaintiffs’ complaints, from Walker, Ladner
and Seymour, who previously owned Precision. Favre and Precision then gave some of the
material and documents to Kassab to notify Precision’s clients regarding Pohl’s illegal conduct
and potential claims they may have against Pohl. Thus, Favre and Pohl are central to this
litigation and are subject to potential third party liability, if there is liability at all.
3. Favre and Precision are outside of the subpoena power of this court. Although
Kassab has attempted to depose Favre and Precision for more than a year, Kassab has been
unsuccessful due to no fault of Kassab. Now that Plaintiffs have dismissed their claims against
Favre and Precision, Kassab cannot rely on Favre and Precision showing up to kthe trial in this
matter. l
II c
FACTS r
4. Pohl is a lawyer who commits barratry and has pDrayed on the less fortunate to
earn a living. On October 18, 2014, three Mississippi residensts, Scott Walker (“Walker”), Kirk
Ladner (“Ladner”) and Steve Seymour (“Seymour”),r and their related entities, including
Precision Marketing Group, LLC (“Precision”), filed suit against Michael Pohl (“Pohl”) and
others in Mississippi federal court (the “Misslissippi Litigation”). There, Precision, Walker,
Ladner and Seymour alleged that: (1) theyM had a joint venture with Pohl to sign up clients with
economic loss claims stemming fromo the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill and clients with
personal injury claims; (2) that they successfully obtained these clients for Pohl; and (3) that
Pohl breached their agreement by not paying them what was owed, including their agreed share
of Pohl’s attorney’s fees.
5. The evidence presented in the Mississippi Litigation established that Pohl
engaged in barractry. See TEX. PEN. CODE § 38.12 (defining barratry generally as the improper
solicitation of clients). During that litigation, Walker testified that Pohl retained him and
Precision to “provide marking services to auto accident victims[.]” Walker testified that although
he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or “marketing money,” it was “clear to [him] it was
barratry.” In fact, Walker considered himself and his company “a pass-through for barratry
money.” All told, Walker, Ladner and Precision received over $5 million in “barratry pass-
through money” from Pohl and other lawyers to solicit potential clients, both auto-accident
victims and those involved in the BP litigation. They would use this money to pay contract
workers to solicit clients. They would locate and instruct contract workers on how to accomplish
the solicitation. They trained “40 or 50 people” on how to “go out and solicit conktracts.”
6. Walker and his team at Precision were first retained by Pohl lto “recruit clients”
with losses resulting from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. When that lcitigation dwindled, Pohl
shifted his focus to auto accident cases, knowing that the group at Prsecision could go out and get
him those types of clients. To accomplish this task, individuals at Precision would receive
“Google alerts” or leads from Pohl on recent catastrophic auto accidents. Walker testified that he,
Ladner, or someone working for them would go to the victims of the auto accident to “do
marketing” by letting them know “there were attorneys [who] could help.” In exchange, these
runners – whoever visited the victims – whaere paid between $2,500 and $5,000 to solicit the
client. These payments flowed from Pohl through his wife’s wholly owned company, “Helping
Hands Financing,” to Precision, to eeach individual runner. Walker would simply submit to Pohl
the amount that Precision paid itsf runners and Pohl would reimburse Precision.
7. One of the ruynners, Santana, testified to the barratry in her September 24, 2016
affidavit filed in the MCississippi Litigation. She testified that Pohl sent her on “dozens and
dozens of car wrecak cases all over the country.” Pohl would email Santana the link of news
coverage depictfing the accident and ask her “to go to the victim or the victim’s family and try to
get them Uto sign up with him.” Pohl offered to pay Santana “$5,000 per case that [she] signed,
plus a percentage of his attorney’s fees.” Santana was advised by Pohl to “be persistent even if
the family ... rejected [her].” Santana was instructed by Pohl to “approach the victims and their
families while they were vulnerable, in the emergency room, their hospital rooms or at the
funerals.” Id. Pohl told Santana that minorities “were especially vulnerable since they tended not
to know that the law prohibited barratry.” According to Pohl, they “were easier to sign up.”
8. Pohl would pay Santana “money to give to the victims or their families” but “only
if they agreed to sign a Pohl representation contract.” Pohl advised Santana that thke money was a
“foot in the door” but instructed Santana not to mention that she was there onl behalf of a lawyer
“until after they agreed to take the money.” “If the client agreed to hire Pcohl, then [Santana] was
to have the client sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.” Pohl would thens give Santana the money to
pay the client “from his own Helping Hands company.” When Santana questioned this, Pohl told
Santana that it “was illegal for him to pay [her] directly for cases, and that’s why the money had
to go through some company.”
9. Santana further confirmed the barratry in her deposition taken in the Mississippi
Litigation. She testified that she was hired bay Pohl to solicit auto accident cases, the first one
was an accident where a woman and her unborn child lost their lives. Santana was instructed by
Walker, who was instructed by Pohl,e to personally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her
up to sue the tire manufacturer anfd, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000. Santana visited
the funeral of the deceased aynd got the family to feel comfortable with her. Although the mother
was grieving, Pohl toldC Santana: “take no prisoners, this is a cut-throat business, you get in there
and you do whatevaer it takes to get this client.” The solicitation was successful after Pohl gave
Santana $2,000 fto “give to the client to convince her into signing over with the firm.”
10U. Pohl later requested Santana to sign an agreement promising not to go to any law
enforcement, including various State Disciplinary boards regarding any wrongdoing, criminal or
unethical conduct. In fact, it is undisputed that Pohl paid Santana $50,000 in cash to sign this
agreement, which was delivered to her in Florida by Pohl’s paralegal, Jaimes. Santana confirmed
this in an affidavit and Jaimes confirmed this in his deposition. Santana signed the statement and
received the cash, although she believed she was “forced to sign” it while “under duress”.
11. Another runner, Talley, also testified in the Mississippi Litigation about the
barratry. Talley solicited over 20 auto accident cases for Pohl, including two famkilies who hired
Kassab to sue Pohl for barratry. Talley testified that he was first hired in relatilon to BP claims to
find “folks that lost money due to the oil spill” and “sign them up” and “cget a fee for it.” Talley
solicited and signed up more than 800 BP claims for Pohl and was spaid between $75 and $350
per client. 
12. Talley eventually transitioned to soliciting auto accident victims, “calling on folks
that had bad accidents.” Talley recalls that the first client he solicited was in “the hospital in
intensive care.” Talley maintained $1,000 in cash to pay the accident victims to “help them with
problems” and influence them to hire a lawyaer, because the victims received the money only if
they “were signed up.” Talley would advise the victims that he had attorneys who could help
them, and that one of those attorneyse was Pohl. For each auto accident case he solicited, Talley
was paid a fee of $1,400 plus hfis expenses by Pohl, through Walker and Precision. On some
cases, Talley was to receive ya portion of Pohl’s attorney’s fees, and even discussed with Pohl the
“percentage of settlemCents” he was to receive. When asked whether Pohl knew he was getting
paid to “contact vaehicle accident victims,” Talley responded, “the money was coming from
Edgar [Jaimes] fwho worked for him.” 1CR301. Although his paycheck was from Precision, “the
funding cUame by way of Edgar [Jaimes].” Talley testified that both he and Pohl knew what they
were doing was illegal.
13. In May of 2016, during the Mississippi Litigation, an insurance adjuster named
Scott Favre (“Favre”) purchased Precision and all the company’s assets, including client lists,
marketing lists, documents, files, computers, etc. from Walker, Seymore and Ladner. Included
in the purchase was the Mississippi Litigation, thus, Precision’s claims against Pohl in the
Mississippi Litigation were assigned to Favre. Favre and Precision were represented in the
Mississippi Litigation by Texas lawyer, Tina Nicholson and her firm, Baker Nicholson, LLP
(“Nicholson”). Pohl asserted counter claims in the Mississippi Litigation allegikng that Walker
and Precision (and other unknown defendants) converted his property. Polhl then moved to
dismiss the claims against him, arguing, among other things, that the acgreements between him
and the runners were illegal and unenforceable. More specifically, sPohl argued that under both
Texas and Mississippi law “it is illegal for a non-lawyer to accept or agree to accept money to
improperly solicit clients for a lawyer.” The Mississippi federal court rejected Pohl’s contention,
stating that the agreements to solicit clients would only be a violation of Texas law and Texas
disciplinary rules, which did not apply to Precision, a Mississippi company, and Walker and
Ladner, Mississippi residents. Having failead to obtain summary dismissal, Pohl settled the
Mississippi Litigation with all parties, including Favre, hoping to forever conceal his barratry
operation. Although Pohl had alreaedy paid the runners approximately $5,000,000 in barratry
money, Pohl paid the runners an fadditional $1,000,000 to settle the Mississippi Litigation.
14. Kassab heardy about the allegations being made by the runners in the Mississippi
Litigation. Kassab seaCrched PACER, the federal court’s online system, obtaining a plethora of
information relateda to the Mississippi Litigation. Kassab met with Favre and Precision’s
counsel, Nicholfson. Kassab obtained information directly from them, including the names and
addressesU of Pohl’s former clients or prospective clients from Precision’s marketing and client
lists. Precision, through Favre, informed Kassab that it owned all of its marketing lists and
information and also informed and verified that Precision was the main Plaintiff suing Pohl in
the Mississippi Litigation. Thereafter, Kassab used Precision’s marketing and client lists to
notify individuals who he believed may have been victims of Pohl’s barratry. Hundreds of
individuals responded, indicating that they had been personally solicited to hire Pohl in their auto
accident or BP claims. Kassab agreed to represent these clients, and more than 400 individuals
hired Kassab to represent them against Pohl and other lawyers involved in the illegal barratry
scheme. k
15. Kassab filed four petitions on behalf of these barratry victimsl in Harris County,
Texas (the “barratry lawsuits”). The barratry lawsuits communicated mcatters of public concern:
that Pohl conspired to commit barratry. After reviewing the esvidence obtained from the
Mississippi Litigation, Kassab believed he had a duty to file a grievance against Pohl pursuant to
Rule 8.03 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct,1 and he did. Kassab also
filed a grievance against Pohl on behalf of one of his clients. In the grievances, Kassab and his
client expressed matters of public concern relating to Pohl’s legal services in the marketplace and
petitioned the State Bar of Texas to reprimanad and discipline Pohl in order to protect the public
as is mandated by Rule 8.03. 
16. Unfortunately, in direect retaliation to the lawsuits and grievances filed against
Pohl, Pohl filed this retaliatoryf litigation against Kassab, Precision, Nicholson, Favre and
Montague, alleging breach yof contract, theft of trade secrets, conversion and civil conspiracy.
Specifically, Pohl alleCged that these parties were “acting in combination with the agreed
objective” to misapapropriate his trade secrets and convert the marketing lists and attorney-client
contracts that Pfohl hired Precision to obtain. Pohl alleges Favre and Precision, with Nicholson’s
assistanceU, converted this property and provided it to Kassab and Montague in order to solicit
Pohl’s former clients “to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and other claims.”
1 See TEX. DISC. R. PROF’L COND. 8.03(a) (except in circumstances which do not apply here, “a
lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of applicable rules of
professional conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness
or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate disciplinary authority.”).
III
ARGUMENT
17. “A defendant may seek to designate a person as a responsible third party by filing
a motion for leave to designate that person as a responsible third party. The motion must be filed
on or before the 60th day before the trial date unless the court finds good caruse to allow the
motion to be filed at a later date.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.0
04(a). That occurred
here, with Kassab filing his motion on May 13, 2022, more than 60 darys before the October 10,
2022 trial setting. The current trial setting is December 5, 2022.D Thus, the statute required the
Court to “grant leave to designate the named person as a ressponsible third party unless another
party files an objection to the motion for leave on or beforre the 15th day after the date the motion
is served.” Id. at § 33.004(f).
18. Kassab has good cause to desiglnate Favre and Pohl within 60 days of trial
because Plaintiff just dismissed Favre andM Pohl from this lawsuit 14 days prior to the current
scheduled trial. Kassab will be prejuodiced if Kassab is not allowed to designate Favre and
Precision at this late time due to the circumstances created by Plaintiff and at no fault of Kassab.
19. A responsible third party is “any person who is alleged to have caused or
contributed to causing in any way the harm for which recovery of damages is sought, whether by
negligent act or omission, by any defective or unreasonably dangerous product, by other conduct
or activity that vciolates an applicable legal standard, or by any combination of these.” Id. at §
33.011(6). Pohl claims that his harm is the allegedly “unlawful taking” or “use” of Pohl’s
purported trade secret information.2 Kassab denies Pohl’s allegations. But even assuming they
are true, Kassab’s designation satisfies the minimal notice pleading standard to demonstrate that
the Designated Parties caused or contributed to causing “in any way” the loss of or eventual
2 Pohl RTP Objection, at 2.
alleged misuse of purported trade secret information. See In re CVR Energy, Inc., 500 S.W.3d
67, 80 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (“The standard for designating a
potentially responsible third party is notice pleading under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
20. Kassab alleged that Walker, Ladner and Seymour are responsiblke for the harm
alleged to the extent they misappropriated Pohl’s trade secrets in the first instalnce and sold them
to Scott Favre and transferred Precision to Favre, who Pohl alleges thecn sold his alleged trade
secrets to Kassab to pursue the barratry litigation. In fact, Pohl himsself, swore under oath that
Walker, Lander and Seymour, who Pohl identified collectively as the “PR Consultants,”
attempted to sell his “accumulated work product to third parties”3 and “undertook to convert,
misappropriate for themselves and/or market to third parties claimant files and other information
and materials that belong to me.”4 Pohl testified that the purported information stolen by Walker,
Ladner and Seymour is the same informationa that Pohl claims is his trade secrets here: “original
client contingency fee contracts between [Pohl’s] clients and [Pohl], documentation of contact
and personal information, claim infoermation and supporting materials.”5 Pohl testified that this
purportedly trade secret informfation was delivered or sold Walker, Ladner and Seymour
“without his consent” to Fyavre.6 Pohl alleges in this lawsuit that Favre then sold that same
information to KassabC to pursue barratry claims against Pohl.7 If any loss or eventual misuse of
Pohl’s purported traade secret information did occur, Walker, Ladner and Seymour clearly caused
or contributed tfo causing it, as had Walker, Ladner and Seymour not stolen Pohl’s alleged trade
secrets asU he alleges, they could not have sold the alleged trade secrets to Favre and thus, Favre
could not have given the alleged trade secrets to Kassab.
3 Exhibit 1, Pohl June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 18.
4 Exhibit 1, Pohl June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 28.
5 Exhibit 1, Pohl June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 28.
6 Exhibit 1, Pohl June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶¶ 28-29.
7 Pohl’s First Amended Petition, at ¶ 24.
21. Additionally, if any loss or eventual misuse of Pohl’s purported trade secret
information occurred, Favre and Precision clearly caused or contributed to causing it, as Favre
and Precision certified and represented to Kassab that all of the material and documents given to
Kassab by Favre and Precision were owned by Favre and Precision after purchasking these items
from Walker, Ladner and Seymour. Walker, Ladner and Seymour certified land represented to
Favre that they owned all of the subject material when they sold it cand Precision to Favre.
Kassab relied on these representations when Kassab was given thes subject documents. Thus,
Kassab could not have misappropriated any alleged trade secret by improper means.
22. Walker testified under oath that he, Seymour and Ladner, through Precision,
owned all the assets/property, including computers and documents that were transferred to Favre.
Walker also testified that he had the legal right and authority, through Precision, to sell and
transfer all the subject assets/property to Faavre. Moreover, Walker, Seymour and Ladner
certified that they owned all of the subject property/assets and had authority to transfer all of the
subject property/assets to Favre. If Wealker, Seymour and Ladner did not have the legal right to
transfer all of the subject assets/pfroperty to Favre, then they caused or contributed to causing any
alleged harm for which recyovery of damages is sought by Pohl by selling the alleged trade
secrets to Favre. C
28. “Undaer the notice-pleading standard, fair notice is achieved if the opposing party
can ascertain frfom the pleading the nature and basic issues of the controversy, and what type of
evidence Umight be relevant.” In re CVR Energy, Inc., 500 S.W.3d at 80. “A trial court may not
review the truth of the allegations or consider the strength of the defendant's evidence.” Id.
Kassab satisfies this “low threshold” by alleging that the Designated Parties caused or
contributed to causing the alleged theft or misuse of Pohl’s purported trade secret information.
See id. Therefore, Shepherd, Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley, Santana are
10
persons who caused or contributed to causing any alleged harm for which recovery of damages is
sought by Pohl. Additionally, Favre and Precision are also persons who caused or contributed to
causing any alleged harm for which recovery of damages is sought by Pohl. Their conduct
caused or contributed to causing in part (if not entirely) the harm for which recovkery of damages
is sought by Pohl, and that conduct violated an applicable legal standard land/or constitutes
negligence. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.011(6). Thus, the jcury should be permitted
to consider apportioning fault in this case to Favre, Precision, Sshepherd, Walker, Seymour,
Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley, Santana. Their designation as responsible third parties is factually
justified and legally appropriate.8
PRAYER
For the reasons set forth herein, Defielndants, Counter-Plaintiffs, Lance Christopher
Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. D/B/A The Kassab Law Firm ask the Court to
grant the Kassab Defendants’ Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties, in addition to the
Supplements, and grant all otheir relief in law or in equity as the Court sees fit and as
Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs will forever pray.
8 It is also of no concern here that the Court might be unable to exert personal jurisdiction over either Walker,
Seymour, Ladner, Talley, Dona, Jaimes or Santana. In its 2003 revision of Chapter 33, the Legislature abolished the
predecessor law, which had defined responsible third parties to be only those over whom the court could exercise
jurisdiction, thus allowing the designation of those “who are not subject to the court’s jurisdiction or who are
immune from liability to the claimant.” See, e.g., In re Unitec Elevator Serv. Co., 178 S.W.3d 53, 58 & n. 5 (Tex.
App.-- Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding); accord Hix-Hernandez v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:20-cv-29-RP,
2021 WL 7632564, at *1 (W.D. Tex. May 6, 2021) (“A defendant may designate a responsible third party despite
the fact that the party has a defense to liability, cannot be joined as a defendant, or both. Even parties who are
outside the court’s jurisdiction or are immune from liability may be designated responsible third parties.”) (internal
citations omitted).
11
Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSABk
Texas State Bar No. 007940r70
lance@kassab.law l
DAVID ERIC KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. c24071351
david@kassab.lawr
NICHOLAS R. PIE s RCE
Texas State BDar No. 24098263
nicholas@kassab.law
1214 Elgisn Street
Houston, Texas 77004
Teleprhone: 713-522-7400
Facsimile: 713-522-7410
ATTORNEYS FOR THE KASSAB DEFENDANTS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true aned correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has
been forwarded to all known parties and/or counsel of record pursuant to the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure on this, the 22nd of f f November, 2022.
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
C Lance Christopher Kassab
12
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab
Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law r
Envelope ID: 70416484
Status as of 11/22/2022 3:54 PM CST
Case Contacts r i
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldssfrizzell.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldgsfrizzell.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@reynouldsfrizzell.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@yfavrepa.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Lawyer Wade lawayerwade@hotmail.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Andrea Mendez andrea@kassab.law 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Lance Kassab olance@kassab.law 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
David Kassab david@kassab.law 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo f jason@ciofalolaw.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Todd Taylor p ttaylor@jandflaw.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Misty Davis C mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Nicholas Pierce a l nicholas@kassab.law 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrar.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Murray Fogler o mfogler@fbfog.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Andrew JohnsUon ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Vilma Yanes vyanes@thompsoncoe.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10607900 jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo 24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
D Kassab david@kassab.law 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab
Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law r
Envelope ID: 70416484
Status as of 11/22/2022 3:54 PM CST
Case Contacts r i
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
L Kassab lance@kassab.law s 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbgrar.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Non-Party Witness Billy Shepherd bshepherd@supcounsel.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT"
44,2022-11-15,MTN,Kassab,1st Supp. Motion to Designate RTP,"Kassab Defendants' Supplemental Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties (Shepherd, Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona Pohl, Jaimes, Talley, Santana)","Filed November 15, 2022 before Judge Scot Dollinger, 189th Judicial District, Harris County, Texas. Kassab's original RTP motion was filed May 13, 2022 (more than 60 days before the October 10, 2022 trial setting). Pohl objected May 30, 2022. Court denied the original motion on October 31, 2022 but gave Kassab an opportunity to replead. Trial reset to December 5, 2022.",RTP-1,N/A,Phase 3,2022-11-15_MTN_Kassab-Supp-Mtn-to-Designate-RTP_FILED.pdf,"Grant the Kassab Defendants' Amended Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties (George W. (Billy) Shepherd, Scott Walker, Steve Seymour, Kirk Ladner, Dona Pohl, Edgar Jaimes, Ken Talley, Magdalena Santana) and grant all other relief in law or equity","11/15/2022 1:31 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 70189306
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 11/15/2022 1:31 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIAkL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS, LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND LAlNCE
CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAW FIRM’S
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO DESIGNATE RESPONSIBLEc THIRD PARTIES
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE SCOT DOLLINGER: s
Defendants, Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. D/B/A The
Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab”), and file this, their Amended Motion to Designate Responsible
Third Parties.
REQUESTElD RELIEF
1. Kassab seeks to designate GMeorge W. (Billy) Shepherd (Shepherd), Scott Walker
(Walker), Steve Seymour (Seymour) oand Kirk Ladner (Ladner), Dona Pohl (Dona), Edgar
Jaimes (Jaimes), Ken Talley (Talley), Magdalena Santana (Santana) as responsible third parties
in this litigation. Shepherd, Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley and Santana are all
persons who are alleged to have caused or contributed to causing in any way the harm for which
recovery of damages by Pohl is sought. Thus, they are all responsible third parties in this cause.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. &c REM. CODE § 33.011(6).
U FACTS
2. Pohl is a lawyer who commits barratry and has prayed on the less fortunate to
earn a living. On October 18, 2014, three Mississippi residents, Scott Walker (“Walker”), Kirk
Ladner (“Ladner”) and Steve Seymour (“Seymour”), and their related entities, including
Precision Marketing Group, LLC (“Precision”), filed suit against Michael Pohl (“Pohl”) and
others in Mississippi federal court (the “Mississippi Litigation”). There, Precision, Walker,
Ladner and Seymour alleged that: (1) they had a joint venture with Pohl to sign up clients with
economic loss claims stemming from the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill and clients with
personal injury claims; (2) that they successfully obtained these clients for Pohkl; and (3) that
Pohl breached their agreement by not paying them what was owed, includingl their agreed share
of Pohl’s attorney’s fees. c
3. The evidence presented in the Mississippi Litigastion established that Pohl
engaged in barratry. See TEX. PEN. CODE § 38.12 (defining b
arratry generally as the improper
solicitation of clients). During that litigation, Walker testified that Pohl retained him and
Precision to “provide marking services to auto accident victims[.]” Walker testified that although
he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or “marketing money,” it was “clear to [him] it was
barratry.” In fact, Walker considered himsealf and his company “a pass-through for barratry
money.” All told, Walker, Ladner and Precision received over $5 million in “barratry pass-
through money” from Pohl and otheer lawyers to solicit potential clients, both auto-accident
victims and those involved in tfhe BP litigation. They would use this money to pay contract
workers to solicit clients. Thyey would locate and instruct contract workers on how to accomplish
the solicitation. They tCrained “40 or 50 people” on how to “go out and solicit contracts.”
4. Walkaer and his team at Precision were first retained by Pohl to “recruit clients”
with losses resuflting from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. When that litigation dwindled, Pohl
shifted hiUs focus to auto accident cases, knowing that the group at Precision could go out and get
him those types of clients. To accomplish this task, individuals at Precision would receive
“Google alerts” or leads from Pohl on recent catastrophic auto accidents. Walker testified that he,
Ladner, or someone working for them would go to the victims of the auto accident to “do
marketing” by letting them know “there were attorneys [who] could help.” In exchange, these
runners – whoever visited the victims – where paid between $2,500 and $5,000 to solicit the
client. These payments flowed from Pohl through his wife’s wholly owned company, “Helping
Hands Financing,” to Precision, to each individual runner. Walker would simply submit to Pohl
the amount that Precision paid its runners and Pohl would reimburse Precision. k
5. One of the runners, Santana, testified to the barratry in her Sleptember 24, 2016
affidavit filed in the Mississippi Litigation. She testified that Pohl scent her on “dozens and
dozens of car wreck cases all over the country.” Pohl would emasil Santana the link of news
coverage depicting the accident and ask her “to go to the victim or the victim’s family and try to
get them to sign up with him.” Pohl offered to pay Santana “$5,000 per case that [she] signed,
plus a percentage of his attorney’s fees.” Santana was advised by Pohl to “be persistent even if
the family ... rejected [her].” Santana was instructed by Pohl to “approach the victims and their
families while they were vulnerable, in thea emergency room, their hospital rooms or at the
funerals.” Id. Pohl told Santana that minorities “were especially vulnerable since they tended not
to know that the law prohibited barraetry.” According to Pohl, they “were easier to sign up.”
6. Pohl would pay Safntana “money to give to the victims or their families” but “only
if they agreed to sign a Pohly representation contract.” Pohl advised Santana that the money was a
“foot in the door” but Cinstructed Santana not to mention that she was there on behalf of a lawyer
“until after they agraeed to take the money.” “If the client agreed to hire Pohl, then [Santana] was
to have the cliefnt sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.” Pohl would then give Santana the money to
pay the cUlient “from his own Helping Hands company.” When Santana questioned this, Pohl told
Santana that it “was illegal for him to pay [her] directly for cases, and that’s why the money had
to go through some company.”
7. Santana further confirmed the barratry in her deposition taken in the Mississippi
Litigation. She testified that she was hired by Pohl to solicit auto accident cases, the first one
was an accident where a woman and her unborn child lost their lives. Santana was instructed by
Walker, who was instructed by Pohl, to personally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her
up to sue the tire manufacturer and, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000. Santana visited
the funeral of the deceased and got the family to feel comfortable with her. Althokugh the mother
was grieving, Pohl told Santana: “take no prisoners, this is a cut-throat businelss, you get in there
and you do whatever it takes to get this client.” The solicitation was succcessful after Pohl gave
Santana $2,000 to “give to the client to convince her into signing ovesr with the firm.”
8. Pohl later requested Santana to sign an agreement promising not to go to any law
enforcement, including various State Disciplinary boards regarding any wrongdoing, criminal or
unethical conduct. In fact, it is undisputed that Pohl paid Santana $50,000 in cash to sign this
agreement, which was delivered to her in Florida by Pohl’s paralegal, Jaimes. Santana confirmed
this in an affidavit and Jaimes confirmed thisa in his deposition. Santana signed the statement and
received the cash, although she believed she was “forced to sign” it while “under duress”.
9. Another runner, Talleey, also testified in the Mississippi Litigation about the
barratry. Talley solicited over 20f auto accident cases for Pohl, including two families who hired
Kassab to sue Pohl for barraytry. Talley testified that he was first hired in relation to BP claims to
find “folks that lost moCney due to the oil spill” and “sign them up” and “get a fee for it.” Talley
solicited and signeda up more than 800 BP claims for Pohl and was paid between $75 and $350
per client. f
10U. Talley eventually transitioned to soliciting auto accident victims, “calling on folks
that had bad accidents.” Talley recalls that the first client he solicited was in “the hospital in
intensive care.” Talley maintained $1,000 in cash to pay the accident victims to “help them with
problems” and influence them to hire a lawyer, because the victims received the money only if
they “were signed up.” Talley would advise the victims that he had attorneys who could help
them, and that one of those attorneys was Pohl. For each auto accident case he solicited, Talley
was paid a fee of $1,400 plus his expenses by Pohl, through Walker and Precision. On some
cases, Talley was to receive a portion of Pohl’s attorney’s fees, and even discussed with Pohl the
“percentage of settlements” he was to receive. When asked whether Pohl knewk he was getting
paid to “contact vehicle accident victims,” Talley responded, “the money lwas coming from
Edgar [Jaimes] who worked for him.” 1CR301. Although his paycheck wcas from Precision, “the
funding came by way of Edgar [Jaimes].” Talley testified that both she and Pohl knew what they
were doing was illegal. 
11. In May of 2016, during the Mississippi Litigation, an insurance adjuster named
Scott Favre (“Favre”) purchased Precision and all the company’s assets, including client lists,
marketing lists, documents, files, computers, etc. from Walker, Seymore and Ladner. Included
in the purchase was the Mississippi Litigaation, thus, Precision’s claims against Pohl in the
Mississippi Litigation were assigned to Favre. Favre and Precision were represented in the
Mississippi Litigation by Texas laweyer, Tina Nicholson and her firm, Baker Nicholson, LLP
(“Nicholson”). Pohl asserted coufnter claims in the Mississippi Litigation alleging that Walker
and Precision (and other uynknown defendants) converted his property. Pohl then moved to
dismiss the claims agaCinst him, arguing, among other things, that the agreements between him
and the runners weare illegal and unenforceable. More specifically, Pohl argued that under both
Texas and Missfissippi law “it is illegal for a non-lawyer to accept or agree to accept money to
improperUly solicit clients for a lawyer.” The Mississippi federal court rejected Pohl’s contention,
stating that the agreements to solicit clients would only be a violation of Texas law and Texas
disciplinary rules, which did not apply to Precision, a Mississippi company, and Walker and
Ladner, Mississippi residents. Having failed to obtain summary dismissal, Pohl settled the
Mississippi Litigation with all parties, including Favre, hoping to forever conceal his barratry
operation. Although Pohl had already paid the runners approximately $5,000,000 in barratry
money, Pohl paid the runners an additional $1,000,000 to settle the Mississippi Litigation.
12. Kassab heard about the allegations being made by the runners in the Mississippi
Litigation. Kassab searched PACER, the federal court’s online system, obtaininkg a plethora of
information related to the Mississippi Litigation. Kassab met with Favrle and Precision’s
counsel, Nicholson. Kassab obtained information directly from them, icncluding the names and
addresses of Pohl’s former clients or prospective clients from Precsision’s marketing and client
lists. Precision, through Favre, informed Kassab that it owned all of its marketing lists and
information and also informed and verified that Precision was the main Plaintiff suing Pohl in
the Mississippi Litigation. Thereafter, Kassab used Precision’s marketing and client lists to
notify individuals who he believed may have been victims of Pohl’s barratry. Hundreds of
individuals responded, indicating that they haad been personally solicited to hire Pohl in their auto
accident or BP claims. Kassab agreed to represent these clients, and more than 400 individuals
hired Kassab to represent them agaienst Pohl and other lawyers involved in the illegal barratry
scheme. f
13. Kassab filed yfour petitions on behalf of these barratry victims in Harris County,
Texas (the “barratry laCwsuits”). The barratry lawsuits communicated matters of public concern:
that Pohl conspiread to commit barratry. After reviewing the evidence obtained from the
Mississippi Litifgation, Kassab believed he had a duty to file a grievance against Pohl pursuant to
Rule 8.03U of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct,1 and he did. Kassab also
filed a grievance against Pohl on behalf of one of his clients. In the grievances, Kassab and his
1 See TEX. DISC. R. PROF’L COND. 8.03(a) (except in circumstances which do not apply here, “a
lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of applicable rules of
professional conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness
or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate disciplinary authority.”).
client expressed matters of public concern relating to Pohl’s legal services in the marketplace and
petitioned the State Bar of Texas to reprimand and discipline Pohl in order to protect the public
as is mandated by Rule 8.03.
14. Unfortunately, in direct retaliation to the lawsuits and grievanceks filed against
Pohl, Pohl filed this retaliatory litigation against Kassab, Precision, Nichlolson, Favre and
Montague, alleging breach of contract, theft of trade secrets, conversiocn and civil conspiracy.
Specifically, Pohl alleged that these parties were “acting in cosmbination with the agreed
objective” to misappropriate his trade secrets and convert the marketing lists and attorney-client
contracts that Pohl hired Precision to obtain. Pohl alleges Favre and Precision, with Nicholson’s
assistance, converted this property and provided it to Kassab and Montague in order to solicit
Pohl’s former clients “to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and other claims.”
aIII
AMRGUMENT
15. “A defendant may seek too designate a person as a responsible third party by filing
a motion for leave to designate that person as a responsible third party. The motion must be filed
on or before the 60th day before the trial date unless the court finds good cause to allow the
motion to be filed at a later date.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004(a). That occurred
here, with Kassab filing his motion on May 13, 2022, more than 60 days before the October 10,
2022 trial settingc. The current trial setting is December 5, 2022. Thus, the statute required the
Court to “grant leave to designate the named person as a responsible third party unless another
party files an objection to the motion for leave on or before the 15th day after the date the motion
is served.” Id. at § 33.004(f).
16. Pohl filed his objection on May 30, 2022. Still, the Court was required to “grant
leave to designate the person as a responsible third party unless the objecting party establishes …
the defendant did not plead sufficient facts concerning the alleged responsibility of the person to
satisfy the pleading requirement of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure[.]” Id. at § 33.004(f). In
any event, the Court denied the Kassab Defendants’ Motion to Designate Responsible Third
Parties on October 31, 2022, but gave the Kassab Defendants an opportunity to rekplead.
17. A responsible third party is “any person who is alleged tlo have caused or
contributed to causing in any way the harm for which recovery of damagces is sought, whether by
negligent act or omission, by any defective or unreasonably dangerosus product, by other conduct
or activity that violates an applicable legal standard, or by any combination of these.” Id. at §
33.011(6). Pohl claims that his harm is the allegedly “unlawful taking” or “use” of Pohl’s
purported trade secret information.2 Kassab denies Pohl’s allegations. But even assuming they
are true, Kassab’s designation satisfies the minimal notice pleading standard to demonstrate that
the Designated Parties caused or contributeda to causing “in any way” the loss of or eventual
alleged misuse of purported trade secret information. See In re CVR Energy, Inc., 500 S.W.3d
67, 80 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st eDist.] 2016, no pet.) (“The standard for designating a
potentially responsible third partyf is notice pleading under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
18. Kassab allegeys that Walker, Ladner and Seymour are responsible for the harm
alleged to the extent thCey misappropriated Pohl’s trade secrets in the first instance and sold them
to Scott Favre, whoa Pohl alleges then sold them to Kassab to pursue the barratry litigation. In
fact, Pohl himsfelf, swore under oath that Walker, Lander and Seymour, who Pohl identified
collectiveUly as the “PR Consultants,” attempted to sell his “accumulated work product to third
parties”3 and “undertook to convert, misappropriate for themselves and/or market to third parties
2 Pohl RTP Objection, at 2.
3 Exhibit 1, Pohl June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 18.
claimant files and other information and materials that belong to me.”4 Pohl testified that the
purported information stolen by Walker, Ladner and Seymour is the same information that Pohl
claims is his trade secrets here: “original client contingency fee contracts between [Pohl’s]
clients and [Pohl], documentation of contact and personal information, claim iknformation and
supporting materials.”5 Pohl testified that this purportedly trade secret informaltion was delivered
or sold Walker, Ladner and Seymour “without his consent” to Favre.6 Poch t l alleges in this lawsuit
that Favre then sold that same information to Kassab to pursue barrsatry claims against Pohl.7 If
any loss or eventual misuse of Pohl’s purported trade secret information did occur, Walker,
Ladner and Seymour clearly caused or contributed to causing it, as had Walker, Ladner and
Seymour not stolen Pohl’s alleged trade secrets as he alleges, they could not have sold the
alleged trade secrets to Favre and thus, Favre could not have given the alleged trade secrets to
Kassab. a
19. Walker testified under oath that he, Seymour and Ladner, through Precision,
owned all the assets/property, includieng computers and documents that were transferred to Favre.
Walker also testified that he hafd the legal right and authority, through Precision, to sell and
transfer all the subject assyets/property to Favre. Moreover, Walker, Seymour and Ladner
certified that they ownCed all of the subject property/assets and had authority to transfer all of the
subject property/assaets to Favre. If Walker, Seymour and Ladner did not have the legal right to
transfer all of thfe subject assets/property to Favre, then they caused or contributed to causing any
alleged hUarm for which recovery of damages is sought by Pohl by selling the alleged trade
secrets to Favre.
4 Exhibit 1, Pohl June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 28.
5 Exhibit 1, Pohl June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 28.
6 Exhibit 1, Pohl June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶¶ 28-29.
7 Pohl’s First Amended Petition, at ¶ 24.
20. Kassab also sufficiently alleged how Pohl’s counsel in the Mississippi litigation,
Shepherd, caused or contributed to causing the purported loss or misuse of Pohl’s allegedly
confidential information. Specifically, Shepherd negotiated a settlement in thek litigation with
Walker, Ladner and Seymour but failed to protect Pohl by ensuring that all sulbject property was
gathered from all third parties and returned to Pohl or destroyed as pacrt of the any settlement
agreement, if in fact Pohl owned and/or desired to safeguard the subjsect property.
21. Shepherd knew that Walker, Seymour and Ladner had sold Precision to Favre and
knew that Walker, Seymour and Ladner had legally transferred Precision’s assets, including the
subject matter of Pohl’s conversion and theft of trade secrets claims, to Favre. Shepherd further
knew that Favre and/or his counsel had given documents to third parties, including Kassab and
others prior to negotiating a settlement in thae Mississippi Litigation. Thus, Shepherd failed to
protect Pohl’s alleged trade secrets by failing to include a provision in the settlement agreement
forcing all parties to gather the alleeged trade secrets from outside third parties like Kassab so
they could be returned to Pohl, fif in fact he owns them as alleged. This failure by Shepherd
caused and/or contributed toy causing the harm for which recovery of damages is sought by Pohl.
22. ShepherCd’s malfeasance was either negligent or intentional. If Shepherd knew
that the subject asseats/property were a point of contention in the Mississippi Litigation and knew
that the assets/pfroperty could be used by outside third parties to garner clients to sue Pohl, as
Pohl alleUges, Shepherd may have intentionally failed to protect Pohl’s interest so that he could
secure future lucrative employment for himself and his law firm for years to come by continuing
to represent Pohl in litigation to be brought against Pohl after the subject property was used to
garner clients to sue Pohl as Pohl alleges. Thus, Shepherd is a person who caused or contributed
to causing the harm for which recovery of damages is sought by Pohl.
10
23. Finally, Kassab sufficiently alleged how Dona Pohl, Jaimes, Tally and Santana
caused or contributed to causing the purported loss or misuse of Pohl’s alleged trade secret
information. Specifically, Kassab alleges that these persons failed to keep Pohl’s information
confidential because they routinely placed Pohl’s alleged trade secrets and dokcuments in the
public domain, circulating Precision’s marketing lists and other documents alllegedly belonging
to Pohl to numerous third parties rather than safeguard these documents acnd lists.
24. Additionally, if Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaismes, Talley or Santana had
an agreement and/or duty to safeguard any property allegedly owned by Pohl as Pohl alleges,
they are responsible for failing to safeguard the property. Additionally, Walker, Seymour,
Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley and Santana routinely placed Pohl’s alleged trade secrets and
documents in the public domain, circulating Precision’s marketing lists and other documents
allegedly belonging to Pohl to numerous thirda parties rather than safeguard these documents and
lists. 
25. “Under the notice-pleeading standard, fair notice is achieved if the opposing party
can ascertain from the pleading tfhe nature and basic issues of the controversy, and what type of
evidence might be relevant.y” In re CVR Energy, Inc., 500 S.W.3d at 80. “A trial court may not
review the truth of thCe allegations or consider the strength of the defendant's evidence.” Id.
Kassab satisfies thais “low threshold” by alleging that the Designated Parties caused or
contributed to cfausing the alleged theft or misuse of Pohl’s purported trade secret information.
See id. UTherefore, Shepherd, Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley, Santana are
persons who caused or contributed to causing any alleged harm for which recovery of damages is
sought by Pohl. Their conduct caused or contributed to causing in part (if not entirely) the harm
for which recovery of damages is sought by Pohl, and that conduct violated an applicable legal
standard and/or constitutes negligence. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.011(6). Thus, the
11
jury should be permitted to consider apportioning fault in this case to Shepherd, Walker,
Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley, Santana. Their designation as responsible third parties
is factually justified and legally appropriate.8 Accordingly, the Court should overrule Pohl’s
objection and grant leave to designate the requested third parties. See TEX. CIV.k PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 33.004(f) (providing that if pleadings are sufficient, the trial court “s
halll grant” leave).
IV c
PRAYER r
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs, Lance Christopher
Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. D/B/A The Kassab Law Firm ask the Court to
grant the Kassab Defendants’ Amended Motion to Dersignate Responsible Third Parties and
grant all other relief in law or in equity as the Court sees fit and as Defendants, Counter-
Plaintiffs will ever pray. i l
8 It is also of no concern here that the Court might be unable to exert personal jurisdiction over either Walker,
Seymour, Ladner, Talley, Dona, Jaimes or Santana. In its 2003 revision of Chapter 33, the Legislature abolished the
predecessor law, which had defined responsible third parties to be only those over whom the court could exercise
jurisdiction, thus allowing the designation of those “who are not subject to the court’s jurisdiction or who are
immune from liability to the claimant.” See, e.g., In re Unitec Elevator Serv. Co., 178 S.W.3d 53, 58 & n. 5 (Tex.
App.-- Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding); accord Hix-Hernandez v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:20-cv-29-RP,
2021 WL 7632564, at *1 (W.D. Tex. May 6, 2021) (“A defendant may designate a responsible third party despite
the fact that the party has a defense to liability, cannot be joined as a defendant, or both. Even parties who are
outside the court’s jurisdiction or are immune from liability may be designated responsible third parties.”) (internal
citations omitted).
12
Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSABk
Texas State Bar No. 007940r70
lance@kassab.law l
DAVID ERIC KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. c24071351
david@kassab.lawr
NICHOLAS R. PIE s RCE
Texas State BDar No. 24098263
nicholas@kassab.law
1214 Elgisn Street
Houston, Texas 77004
Teleprhone: 713-522-7400
Facsimile: 713-522-7410
ATTORNEYS FOR THE KASSAB DEFENDANTS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true aned correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has
been forwarded to all known parties and/or counsel of record pursuant to the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure on this, the 15th off f November, 2022.
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
C Lance Christopher Kassab
13
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab
Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law r
Envelope ID: 70189306
Status as of 11/15/2022 1:37 PM CST
Case Contacts r i
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldssfrizzell.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldgsfrizzell.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@reynouldsfrizzell.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@yfavrepa.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Lawyer Wade lawayerwade@hotmail.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Andrea Mendez andrea@kassab.law 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Lance Kassab olance@kassab.law 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
David Kassab david@kassab.law 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo f jason@ciofalolaw.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Todd Taylor p ttaylor@jandflaw.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Misty Davis C mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Nicholas Pierce a l nicholas@kassab.law 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrar.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Murray Fogler o mfogler@fbfog.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Andrew JohnsUon ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Vilma Yanes vyanes@thompsoncoe.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10607900 jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo 24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
D Kassab david@kassab.law 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab
Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law r
Envelope ID: 70189306
Status as of 11/15/2022 1:37 PM CST
Case Contacts r i
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
L Kassab lance@kassab.law s 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbgrar.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Non-Party Witness Billy Shepherd bshepherd@supcounsel.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT"
43,2022-11-14,OA,Kassab,8th Amended Answer (final),"Kassab Defendants' Eighth Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim (Final Pre-Trial Pleading)","Filed November 14, 2022 in Cause No. 2018-58419, 189th Judicial District, Harris County, Texas. This is Kassab's final amended answer asserting 23 affirmative defenses, responsible third-party designations (8 individuals), and a counterclaim for civil barratry based on assigned claims from 242 claimants. Filed approximately three weeks before the December 5, 2022 trial setting, after all four MSJs were denied on October 31, 2022.",PLEAD-1,N/A,Phase 3,2022-11-14_OA_Kassab-8th-Amended-Answer-CC_FILED.pdf,"That Pohl recover nothing on his claims; that Kassab recover on counterclaims including (i) actual and consequential damages, (ii) statutory damages, (iii) pre- and post-judgment interest, (iv) attorneys' fees and costs, and (v) all other appropriate relief","11/14/2022 3:25 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 70152760
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 11/14/2022 3:25 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIArL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS, LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AtND LANCE
CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAWi FIRM’S EIGHTH
AMENDED ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES ANsD COUNTERCLAIM
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: 
COMES NOW, Defendants, Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher
Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm and files this their Eighth Amended
Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim, and would respectfully show the
Court as follows; a
f  I
RULE 47 STATEMENT
1. The Kassab Deffendants, in their capacity as Counter-Plaintiffs, seek
monetary relief of more than $1,000,000.00.
C II
l PARTIES
2. Plaiintiff, Michael A. Pohl is an individual lawyer residing in Colorado
and is a paroty herein.
3. Plaintiff, Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl is a law firm set up for the
practice of law in various states of the union, including Texas and is a party herein.
4. Defendant, Scott Favre is a nonresident individual residing in
Mississippi and is a party herein.
5. Defendant, Scott M. Favre, PA, LLC is a nonresident limited liability
company located in Mississippi and is a party herein.
6. Defendant, Precision Marketing Group, LLC is a nonresident limited
liability company located in Mississippi and is a party herein. k
7. Defendant, F. Douglas Montague III is a nonresident iCndividual residing
in Mississippi.
8. Defendant, Montague, Pittman & Varnadoi, PA is a nonresident
professional association located in Mississippi.
9. Defendant, Tina Nicholson is an individual residing in Texas and is a
party herein.
10. Defendant, Baker Nicholson, lLLP, d/b/a Baker Nicholson Law Firm is a
limited liability partnership located inM Texas and is a party herein.
11. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab is an
individual residing in Texas anid is a party herein.
12. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The
Kassab Law Firm is ao professional corporation located in Texas and is a party herein.
l III
c i JURISDICTION AND VENUE
13. oThis matter is within the jurisdictional limits of this Court and
Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl
(“Pohl”) and Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs, Lance Christopher Kassab (“LCK”) and
Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab, P.C.”)
(collectively “Kassab”) are subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. Venue is proper in this
county because one or more of the defendants are residents of this county and because
a substantial part of the acts and/or omissions that form the basis of this suit occurred
in this county.
IV k
GENERAL DENIAL e
14. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab generally detnies all allegations
made by Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl ansdt Law Offices of Michael
A. Pohl, and requests the Court to require Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael
A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl to carry their burden of proof regarding
all allegations against Kassab.
AFFIRMATIViE l DEFENSES
15. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab pleads the following affirmative
defenses: 
1. Statute of limitationf is;
2. Justification; y 
3. Estoppel;
4. Waivera;
5. Ratiffication;
6.U Release;
7. Unclean hands;
8. Contribution;
9. Failure to mitigate;
10. Lack of standing;
11. Accord and Satisfaction;
12. Assumption of the Risk;
13. Illegality/Criminal Acts; k
14. First Amendment; C
15. Attorney Immunity;
16. Judicial Immunity; i
17. Immunity under Rule 17.09 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.
18. In Pari Delicto;
19. Res Judicata;
20. Defect of Parties; l
21. Abandonment; M
22. Subject of a Valid Contract; and
23. Preemption pursuanit to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.007(a).
SPECIFIC DENIALS
16. Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs specifically deny that all conditions
precedent regardiing Plaintiffs claims of conversion and theft of trade secrets have
been perforomed or occurred prior to Plaintiffs’ filing of suit against Kassab.
VII
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
17. LCK is a lawyer practicing law with The Kassab Law Firm, a law firm
in Houston, Texas focusing on plaintiffs’ legal malpractice cases. Kassab filed four
lawsuits on behalf of over four hundred clients against Pohl (the “Harris County
Lawsuits”). The main allegations against Pohl are civil barratry and conspiracy to
commit barratry, a third-degree felony in Texas. Pohl conspired with his wife,
Donalda Pohl (“Dona”), his paralegal, Edgar Jaimes (“Jaimes”) and thrkee runners in
Mississippi to illegally solicit clients on behalf of Pohl. Dona ownCs a sham lending
company in Texas called Helping Hands Financing, LLC (“HH Texas”). Jaimes rans
the day-to-day operations of HH Texas. The three ruinners are Scott Walker
(“Walker”), Steve Seymour (“Seymour”) and Kirk Ladner (“Ladner”) (collectively
“Runners”). The three Runners owned and operated two other sham companies called
Helping Hands Group, LLC and Helping Hands Financial, LLC (collectively “HH
Mississippi”). The three runners also olwned Precision Marketing Group, LLC
(“Precision”) which they sold to ScMott Favre and/or his companies (collectively
“Favre”). The runners had several other business entities from which they operated
and concealed their illegal soliicitation conspiracy.
18. With regard to the clients obtained in the BP Litigation, Walker,
Seymour and Ladnero hired other runners to literally go up and down streets in
specific locations klnocking on doors to solicit clients on behalf of Pohl for lawsuits
against Britishi Petroleum. Walker, Seymore and Ladner, through Precision and on
behalf of Pohl, paid these runners as much as $300-$400 for every potential client
they obtained. Pohl paid Precision as much as $1,500 for every client Precision
obtained and referred to Pohl. Walker, Seymore and Ladner paid the other runners
from this amount and pocketed the balance. Pohl also offered and agreed to pay
Walker, Seymour and Ladner a percentage of his legal fees once cases settled. This
percentage was disguised as an hourly rate of $1,500.00 per hour, but the percentage
of the “settlement” payment was never below the agreed percentage. For example,
no matter how much “hourly” time was actually spent on a case, thek agreed upon
percentage was always achieved by simply dividing the percentagCe amount of Pohl’s
legal fees by $1,500.00 to calculate the imaginary number of hours, and then the
Runners would submit an invoice for those imaginary numbier of hours. Whether the
Runners actually spent five (5) or fifty (50) hours on a particular case was not the
measure of the “settlement” fees to be paid to the Runners, it was always the agreed
upon percentage of attorney’s fees earned by Pohl regardless of actual hours spent on
a case. l
19. With regard to auto accidMents, Pohl set up a “Google Alerts” to be notified
whenever there was a horrific rollover or other type of horrific vehicle crash across
the nation. Pohl would then imimediately send the alert to the Runners so they could
arrange to visit hospitals, homes and funerals to contact the families of the injured
in order to solicit theom as clients. The Runners would use their sham companies,
“Helping Hands” tlo act as though they were approaching these victims to genuinely
help them rathier than solicit them. The Runners would falsely tell these victims that
they were there to provide money for burial services, food, clothing, lodging, etc. In
reality however, the Runners’ contacted these families under these false pretenses
with the sole objective of talking advantage of these victims and their families while
they were emotionally distraught and not thinking straight in order to lock them into
contracts which allowed the runners to select a lawyer for the victim. The victims
and the family members were encouraged to hire Pohl and told they could not get the
money unless they agreed to hire Pohl. Pohl would pay the Runners as much as
$7,500 per client they signed up and Pohl also promised the runners ask much as 33%
of Pohl’s legal fees on the back end when the case settled. AdditCionally, HH Texas
would pay HH Mississippi $2,500 for every client referred to HH Texas to “loan”
money to these victims and their family. Pohl used this priocedure as an attempt to
put an additional buffer between him and the actual Runners.
20. Pohl also helped the Runners form another sham entity, the GM
Settlement Verification Team (“GM Team”) after General Motors, Inc. issued a recall
on cars due to faulty ignition switches whiclh effected the safe operation of the airbag
systems on vehicles. Thus, the GM MTeam was designed to look official as if it was
part of General Motors. This conspiracy was to form an official looking entity from
GM as if GM was wanting to ciompensate people who had been harmed when airbags
failed to deploy in relation to the ignition recall. In reality, this was just another
sham company used too solicit and trick potential clients into hiring Pohl. Again, Pohl
would pay Walkerl and Ladner, through their sham entity, the GM Team, a fee for
every potentiail client it referred to Pohl, in addition to a percentage of his attorney’s
fees on the back end.
21. Pohl knew what he was doing was illegal barratry. Accordingly, he
knowingly formed entities that he perceived would insulate him from liability. In
fact, Walker testified that although he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or
“marketing money” it was “clear to [him] it was barratry.” In fact, Walker considered
himself and his company “a pass-through for barratry money.” All total, Walker,
Ladner and Precision received over $5 million in “barratry pass-through money” from
Pohl and other lawyers to solicit potential clients with claims, both kauto-accident
victims and those involved in the BP Deepwater Horizon litigationC.
22. One of the runners hired by Pohl and Walker to illegally solicit clients
on behalf of Pohl was Magdalena Santana (“Santana”). Ini her September 24, 2016
affidavit, Santana testified that Pohl sent her on “dozens and dozens of car wreck
cases all over the country.” Pohl would email Santana the link of news coverage he
obtained through Google Alerts depicting an accident and asked her “to go to the
victim or the victim’s family and try to get lthem to sign up with him.” Santana swore
under oath that Pohl agreed to pay Mher “$5,000 per case that [she] signed, plus a
percentage of his attorney’s fees.” Santana was advised by Pohl to “be persistent even
if the family ... rejected [her]i.” Santana was instructed by Pohl to “approach the
victims and their families while they were vulnerable, in the emergency room, their
hospital rooms or at thoe funerals.” Pohl told Santana that minorities “were especially
vulnerable since tlhey tended not to know that the law prohibited barratry.”
According to Piohl, they “were easier to sign up.”
23. Pohl would give Santana “money to give to the victims or their families”
but would only give the money to the potential client “if they agreed to sign a Pohl
representation contract.” Pohl advised Santana that the money was a “foot in the
door” but instructed Santana not to mention anything about hiring a lawyer “until
after they agreed to take the money.” “If the client agreed to hire Pohl, then [Santana]
was to have the client sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.” Santana would then give
money to the client “from his own Helping Hands company.” When Santana
questioned this, Pohl told Santana that it “was illegal for him to pay [hekr] directly for
cases, and that’s why the money had to go through some company.C”
24. Pohl and/or his co-conspirators had Santana retract this affidavit
through a December 19, 2017 affidavit. This purported rietraction was likely the
result of Pohl paying Santana to retract the first affidavit, which is similar to
something Pohl had done in the past. In fact, Pohl’s own paralegal, Jaimes, testified
that on one occasion Pohl sent him to Florida with a suitcase containing $50,000 in
cash to give to Santana in exchange for lher agreement not to turn Pohl into the
authorities. Jaimes testified that SanMtana would only get the money if she signed a
statement agreeing not to mention Pohl’s illegal activity. Jaimes testified that
Santana signed the statementi and then he gave her the $50,000.
25. Santana’s deposition was even more detailed. Santana testified at her
deposition that the staotement was an agreement for her to keep quiet and not charge
Pohl with any wronlgdoing, criminal or unethical conduct. Santana testified that Pohl
paid her $50,0i00 in cash to sign this statement, which was delivered by Jaimes in
three bags marked “trick or treat.” Very symbolic given that Santana had been
tricked by Pohl into soliciting potential clients for him and was now being treated the
money she claimed was due under their agreement just to stay quiet. Santana
reiterated in her deposition that if she didn’t sign the gag agreement, she would not
have received the money from Pohl. Santana attempted to indicate on the agreement
that she was receiving $50,000 to keep quiet, but Jaimes told her Pohl demanded that
she state she only received nominal consideration, like $100. Santana did not write
the statement but “just signed it” because she felt she was being “forcked to sign” it
while “under duress.” C
26. Notably, nowhere in Santana’s December 19th affidavit does she state
the testimony in her former affidavit is untrue, only that shie does not “agree with” it
and that the affidavit is not “reliable.” Although Santana states in her December 19th
affidavit that her prior affidavit was drafted by a lawyer, Santana testified in her
deposition that the September 24th affidavit was created voluntarily with her own
“testimony.” Santana testified that, unlike lwith Pohl, she was not paid and had never
been promised any money to provideM the testimony in the September 24th affidavit.
Santana reiterated to counsel for Pohl, Billy Shepherd, that she was there for her
deposition to tell the truth andi would not be bullied by his questioning or his efforts
to confuse her.
27. Regardleoss, Santana’s sworn deposition testimony confirmed most, if
not all of the factsl set forth in her initial affidavit and this deposition testimony has
never been retiracted. Therefore, Santana confirmed that she was hired by Pohl to
solicit auto accident cases, the first one being an accident where a woman and her
unborn child lost their lives. Santana was instructed by Walker, who was instructed
by Pohl, to personally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her up to sue the tire
manufacturer and, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000. Following Walker
10
and Pohl’s instructions, Santana visited the funeral of the deceased and got the family
to feel comfortable with her. Although the mother was grieving, Pohl told Santana:
“take no prisoners, this is a cut throat business, you get in there and you do whatever
it takes to get this client.” The solicitation was successful after Pohl gkave Santana
$2,000 to “give to the client to convince her into signing over with Cthe firm.”
28. “Coach” Kenneth Talley (“Talley”) was another runner hired by Pohl
and Walker who solicited over 20 auto accident cases for Pohil. Talley has sworn under
oath that he was first hired in relation to BP claims to find “folks that lost money due
to the oil spill” and “sign them up” and “get a fee for it.” Talley testified that he went
to work “knocking on doors” looking for potential claimants for Pohl and his partner
in the BP litigation. Talley solicited and siglned up more than 800 BP claims for Pohl
and his co-conspirators. Talley was pMaid between $75 and $350 for each BP client he
signed up for Pohl and his partners.
29. Talley eventuallyi switched to illegally soliciting auto accident victims
for Pohl, “calling on folks that had bad accidents.” Talley recalls that the first client
he solicited for Pohl woas in “the hospital in intensive care.” Talley carried with him
up to $1,000 to paly the accident victims to “help them with problems” but paid the
potential clienit only once they “were signed up.” Talley kept a list of all the auto
accident cases he solicited so he could keep track of the cases that he was due a
percentage from Pohl’s attorney’s fees on the back end after the case settled. Talley
also followed a checklist that instructed him to, among other things, bring flowers to
the initial hospital visit (but to spend no more than $50) and to offer the victims
11
money but to “make sure the funding schedule” from HH Texas “is filled out properly
before releasing any cash.” Talley would advise the victims that he had attorneys who
could help them such as Pohl. Talley was paid a fee of $1,400 plus his expenses by
Pohl, through Walker and/or one of his sham business entities for any kauto accident
case he solicited and referred to Pohl. On some cases, Talley was tCo receive a portion
of the fee paid to Helping Hands out of Pohl’s attorney’s fees. Talley discussed with
Pohl the “percentage of settlements” he was to receive from ithe cases he solicited and
referred, and Pohl told Talley that the money was being placed in an “escrow account”
for him. When asked whether Pohl knew he was getting paid to “contact vehicle
accident victims,” Talley responded, “the money was coming from Edgar [Jaimes] who
worked for him.” And, although his paylcheck was from Walker’s company, “the
funding came by way of Edgar [JaimeMs].”
30. Talley testified that personally soliciting clients for Pohl became so
frequent that he began carryinig blank contracts to each solicitation. Talley testified
that he never recommended any lawyers other than Pohl. However, Talley never told
the clients that he waos getting paid to solicit them. Talley would present a contract
to the potential clilent. If the client did not agree to hire Pohl, the clients would not
get the moneyi. Talley testified that Jaimes and Dona (the operators of HH Texas)
would send him the money.
31. Talley further testified that both he and Pohl knew what they were
doing was illegal. In one instance, Talley was “run out of town” while soliciting clients
for Pohl. Talley testified that during the attempted solicitation he was told by a
12
“lawyer or policeman” that “it was against the law what [he] was doing.” Talley
mentioned this to Pohl and Pohl told him “you’ve just got to leave...some people you
can’t help.”
32. Walker was eventually indicted and sent to prison. Beking afraid of
where Walker’s indictment might lead, Pohl and his lawyer partneCrs stopped paying
Walker and the other runners the illegal fees as Pohl had promised. Therefore,
Walker, Seymour, Ladner and Precision filed a lawsuit in Miississippi Federal Court
(“Federal Litigation”) against Pohl and his law partners claiming they were owed
millions of dollars in promised fees.
33. The above facts were compiled during the Federal Litigation.
Thereafter, more than four hundred clientsl who were illegally solicited contacted the
Kassab Law Firm and requested KassMab to represent them in litigation against Pohl
and his partners. Kassab filed lawsuits on behalf of these clients in four different
courts in Harris County. Addiitionally, due to the egregiousness of Pohl’s violation of
the Texas Penal Code and violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct, Kassab was orequired to notify the Texas State Bar pursuant to Rule 8.03 of
the Texas Disciplinlary Rules of Professional Conduct. Due to this mandate, Kassab
filed grievanceis against Pohl pursuant to Rule 8.03. some of Pohl’s clients also
prepared and filed grievances against Pohl arising out of his egregious conduct.
34. Because of these actions in representing clients against Pohl and the
grievances filed against Pohl, Pohl filed this retaliatory lawsuit against Kassab
alleging conversion and theft of trade secrets. Pohl alleges that Kassab and others
13
stole his property and used it to bring lawsuits and grievances against Pohl.
Specifically, Pohl alleges in his petition that, “Kassab is a lawyer who specializes in
suing other lawyers”1 and “Kassab solicited clients/prospective clients [of Pohl’s] to
act as Plaintiffs . . . to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and okther claims.”2
Thus, Pohl has judicially admitted that he has brought his suit agaiCnst Kassab simply
because Kassab contacted illegally solicited clients to notify them of Pohl’s illegal
conduct and to offer to represent them in suits against Pohli.
35. The lawsuit is frivolous and without merit as it is based upon false
pretenses and was brought solely for retaliation and harassment purposes.
Specifically, Kassab did not steal anything from Pohl. Additionally, Kassab did not
purchase any stolen documents belonging tlo Pohl. Nor did Kassab purchase anything
belonging to Pohl. Moreover, Pohl isM not the owner of documents received, if any,
from Precision, Favre, Nicholson, Montague or anyone else. Lastly, none of the
documents and/or informatioin that Kassab may have received from various
individuals or entities are Pohl’s trade secrets as Pohl alleges. Furthermore, Pohl
has failed to complyo with conditions precedent to filing his retaliatory suit for
conversion and thleft of trade secrets. Specifically, Pohl has never requested from
Kassab, the reiturn of his alleged property. Rather, Pohl abandoned all of the alleged
documents he now accuses Kassab of stealing and/or purchasing. Pohl abandoned all
of the documents he alleges were stolen and/or purchased because he knew that the
documents were not his and that he had no ownership interest in the documents. If
1 Pohl Original Petition, p. 6
2 Id. at p. 6-7
14
Pohl actually believed the subject documents were his, he would have safeguarded
the documents rather than abandon them with a convicted felon (Walker) and his
cohorts (Seymore and Ladner). Even as of today, the subject documents sit in a
warehouse, unattended and not safeguarded. k
VIII C
RESPONSIBLE THIRD PARTIES
36. A responsible third party is “any person who isst alleged to have caused
or contributed to causing in any way the harm for which recovery of damages is
sought, whether by negligent act or omission, by any defective or unreasonably
dangerous product, by other conduct or activity that violates an applicable legal
standard, or by any combination of these.” Id. at § 33.011(6). Pohl claims that his
harm is the allegedly “unlawful takinag” or “use” of Pohl’s purported trade secret
information.3 Kassab denies Pohl’sf allegations. But even assuming they are true,
Kassab’s designation satisfies the minimal notice pleading standard to demonstrate
that the Designated PartieOs caused or contributed to causing “in any way” the loss of
or eventual alleged mipsuse of purported trade secret information. See In re CVR
Energy, Inc., 500 S.W.3d 67, 80 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (“The
standard for dceisignating a potentially responsible third party is notice pleading
under the Toexas Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
37. Kassab alleges that Walker, Ladner and Seymour are responsible for
the harm alleged to the extent they misappropriated Pohl’s trade secrets in the first
3 Pohl RTP Objection, at 2.
15
instance and sold them to Scott Favre, who Pohl alleges then sold them to Kassab to
pursue the barratry litigation. In fact, Pohl himself, swore under oath that Walker,
Lander and Seymour, who Pohl identified collectively as the “PR Consultants,”
attempted to sell his “accumulated work product to third parties”4 and k“undertook to
convert, misappropriate for themselves and/or market to third parCties claimant files
and other information and materials that belong to me.”5 Pohl testified that the
purported information stolen by Walker, Ladner and iSeymour is the same
information that Pohl claims is his trade secrets here: “original client contingency fee
contracts between [Pohl’s] clients and [Pohl], documentation of contact and personal
information, claim information and supporting materials.”6 Pohl testified that this
purportedly trade secret information wals delivered or sold Walker, Ladner and
Seymour “without his consent” to FavMre.7 Pohl alleges in this lawsuit that Favre then
sold that same information to Kassab to pursue barratry claims against Pohl.8 If any
loss or eventual misuse of Piohl’s purported trade secret information did occur,
Walker, Ladner and Seymour clearly caused or contributed to causing it, as had
Walker, Ladner and oSeymour not stolen Pohl’s alleged trade secrets as he alleges,
they could not havle sold the alleged trade secrets to Favre and thus, Favre could not
have given thei alleged trade secrets to Kassab.
4 Exhibit 1, Pohl June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 18.
5 Exhibit 1, Pohl June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 28.
6 Exhibit 1, Pohl June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 28.
7 Exhibit 1, Pohl June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶¶ 28-29.
8 Pohl’s First Amended Petition, at ¶ 24.
16
38. Walker testified under oath that he, Seymour and Ladner, through
Precision, owned all the assets/property, including computers and documents that
were transferred to Favre. Walker also testified that he had the legal right and
authority, through Precision, to sell and transfer all the subject assetks/property to
Favre. Moreover, Walker, Seymour and Ladner certified that theCy owned all of the
subject property/assets and had authority to transfer all of the subject property/assets
to Favre. If Walker, Seymour and Ladner did not have thei legal right to transfer all
of the subject assets/property to Favre, then they caused or contributed to causing
any alleged harm for which recovery of damages is sought by Pohl by selling the
alleged trade secrets to Favre.
39. Kassab also sufficiently allegled how Pohl’s counsel in the Mississippi
litigation, Shepherd, caused or contribMuted to causing the purported loss or misuse of
Pohl’s allegedly confidential information. Specifically, Shepherd negotiated a
settlement in the litigation wiith Walker, Ladner and Seymour but failed to protect
Pohl by ensuring that all subject property was gathered from all third parties and
returned to Pohl or deostroyed as part of the any settlement agreement, if in fact Pohl
owned and/or desirled to safeguard the subject property.
40. Sihepherd knew that Walker, Seymour and Ladner had sold Precision to
Favre and knew that Walker, Seymour and Ladner had legally transferred
Precision’s assets, including the subject matter of Pohl’s conversion and theft of trade
secrets claims, to Favre. Shepherd further knew that Favre and/or his counsel had
given documents to third parties, including Kassab and others prior to negotiating a
17
settlement in the Mississippi Litigation. Thus, Shepherd failed to protect Pohl’s
alleged trade secrets by failing to include a provision in the settlement agreement
forcing all parties to gather the alleged trade secrets from outside third parties like
Kassab so they could be returned to Pohl, if in fact he owns them as aklleged. This
failure by Shepherd caused and/or contributed to causing the harmC for which recovery
of damages is sought by Pohl.
40. Shepherd’s malfeasance was either negligient or intentional. If
Shepherd knew that the subject assets/property were a point of contention in the
Mississippi Litigation and knew that the assets/property could be used by outside
third parties to garner clients to sue Pohl, as Pohl alleges, Shepherd may have
intentionally failed to protect Pohl’s interelst so that he could secure future lucrative
employment for himself and his law fiMrm for years to come by continuing to represent
Pohl in litigation to be brought against Pohl after the subject property was used to
garner clients to sue Pohl as Piohl alleges. Thus, Shepherd is a person who caused or
contributed to causing the harm for which recovery of damages is sought by Pohl.
41. Finally, oKassab sufficiently alleged how Dona Pohl, Jaimes, Tally and
Santana caused olr contributed to causing the purported loss or misuse of Pohl’s
alleged trade siecret information. Specifically, Kassab alleges that these persons failed
to keep Pohl’s information confidential because they routinely placed Pohl’s alleged
trade secrets and documents in the public domain, circulating Precision’s marketing
lists and other documents allegedly belonging to Pohl to numerous third parties
rather than safeguard these documents and lists.
18
42. Additionally, if Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley or
Santana had an agreement and/or duty to safeguard any property allegedly owned
by Pohl as Pohl alleges, they are responsible for failing to safeguard the property.
Additionally, Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley and Santkana routinely
placed Pohl’s alleged trade secrets and documents in the public dComain, circulating
Precision’s marketing lists and other documents allegedly belonging to Pohl to
numerous third parties rather than safeguard these documients and lists.
43. “Under the notice-pleading standard, fair notice is achieved if the
opposing party can ascertain from the pleading the nature and basic issues of the
controversy, and what type of evidence might be relevant.” In re CVR Energy, Inc.,
500 S.W.3d at 80. “A trial court may not revliew the truth of the allegations or consider
the strength of the defendant's evidenMce.” Id. Kassab satisfies this “low threshold” by
alleging that the Designated Parties caused or contributed to causing the alleged
theft or misuse of Pohl’s puriported trade secret information. See id. Therefore,
Shepherd, Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley, Santana are persons who
caused or contributedo to causing any alleged harm for which recovery of damages is
sought by Pohl. Thleir conduct caused or contributed to causing in part (if not entirely)
the harm for wihich recovery of damages is sought by Pohl, and that conduct violated
an applicable legal standard and/or constitutes negligence. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 33.011(6). Thus, the jury should be permitted to consider apportioning
fault in this case to Shepherd, Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley,
19
Santana. Their designation as responsible third parties is factually justified and
legally appropriate.9
COUNTERCLAIM FOR CIVIL BARRATRY
44. Within the lawsuits that Kassab has filed against PoChll on behalf of his
former clients and/or potential clients, Pohl has judicially admcitted that a claim for
barratry is not a legal malpractice case. Pohl has also admitted that a because a
claim for barratry is not a claim for “legal malpractice,s” the Discovery Rule does not
apply to a barratry claim. Therefore, based upogn Pohl’s judicial admissions, the
assignment of a barratry claim is permitted unBder Texas law.
45. Thus, based upon express assignments of interest given to Kassab,
Kassab brings counterclaims againstM Pohl and his law firm pursuant to Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code, Sectioon 16.069. Section 16.069 provides:
(a) If a counterclaim or ccross claim arises out of the same transaction or
occurrence that is fthe basis of an action, a party to the action may
file the counterclaim or cross claim even though as a separate action
it would be baryred by limitations on the date the party’s answer is
required.
(b) The counterclaim or cross claim must be filed not later than the 30th
day after the date on which the party’s answer is required.
9 It is also onf no concern here that the Court might be unable to exert personal jurisdiction over
either WaUlker, Seymour, Ladner, Talley, Dona, Jaimes or Santana. In its 2003 revision of Chapter
33, the Legislature abolished the predecessor law, which had defined responsible third parties to be
only those over whom the court could exercise jurisdiction, thus allowing the designation of those
“who are not subject to the court’s jurisdiction or who are immune from liability to the claimant.”
See, e.g., In re Unitec Elevator Serv. Co., 178 S.W.3d 53, 58 & n. 5 (Tex. App.-- Houston [1st Dist.]
2005, orig. proceeding); accord Hix-Hernandez v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:20-cv-29-RP, 2021 WL
7632564, at *1 (W.D. Tex. May 6, 2021) (“A defendant may designate a responsible third party
despite the fact that the party has a defense to liability, cannot be joined as a defendant, or both.
Even parties who are outside the court’s jurisdiction or are immune from liability may be designated
responsible third parties.”) (internal citations omitted).
20
Kassab has been assigned barratry claims on behalf of 242 claimants. These
counterclaims are timely because they were filed within 30 days of the date
Kassab filed his original answer.
X k
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES e
46. Defendants contend that all or some of Plaintiffs’ claims for
misappropriate under TUTSA were made in bad faith, enablitng Defendants to
recover their reasonable attorney’s fees. See TEX. CIV. P RAC. & REM. CODE §
134A.005. e
XI u
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, Defendants, Counter-Pllaintiffs respectfully pray that Plaintiffs
recover nothing on their claims and that the Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs recover
on their claims against the Plaintiffs and/or any Third-Party Defendants as follows:
i) actual and conseqiuential damages;
ii) statutory damages;
iii) pre- and ppost-judgment interest;
iv) attorneys’ fees and costs; and
v) all other relief to which the Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs may be justly
entitled.
21
Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASS k AB
Texas State Bar No. 00e794070
lance@kassab.law C
DAVID ERIC KASSABt 
Texas State Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.latw
1214 Elgin Stireet
Houston, Texas 77004
Telephone: 713.522.7400
Facsimeile: 713.522.7410
ATTOR u NEYS FOR LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB AND THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
lFOGLER, BRAR, O’NEIL AND GRAY, LLP
M /s/ Murray Fogler
 Murray Fogler
State Bar No. 07207300
e mfogler@foglerbrar.com
i 909 Fannin, Suite 1640
f Houston, Texas 77010
Telephone: 713-481-1010
Facsimile: 713-574-3224
ATTORNEY FOR LANCE
a l CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND THE
c i KASSAB LAW FIRM REGARDING
i PLAINTIFFS’ AFFIRMATIVE CLAIMS
22
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
instrument has been forwarded to all parties pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure on this the 14th day of November 2022.
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
Lance Christopher KCassab
23
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab
Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law r
Envelope ID: 70152760
Status as of 11/14/2022 3:36 PM CST
Case Contacts r i
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldssfrizzell.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldgsfrizzell.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@reynouldsfrizzell.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@yfavrepa.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Lawyer Wade lawayerwade@hotmail.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Andrea Mendez andrea@kassab.law 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Lance Kassab olance@kassab.law 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
David Kassab david@kassab.law 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo f jason@ciofalolaw.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Todd Taylor p ttaylor@jandflaw.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Misty Davis C mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Nicholas Pierce a l nicholas@kassab.law 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrar.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Murray Fogler o mfogler@fbfog.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Andrew JohnsUon ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Vilma Yanes vyanes@thompsoncoe.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10607900 jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo 24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
D Kassab david@kassab.law 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab
Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law r
Envelope ID: 70152760
Status as of 11/14/2022 3:36 PM CST
Case Contacts r i
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
L Kassab lance@kassab.law s 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbgrar.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Non-Party Witness Billy Shepherd bshepherd@supcounsel.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT"
40,2022-09-19,OBJ,Kassab,Objection to Pohl’s MSJ evidence,"Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Evidence — joint filing by Kassab and Nicholson Defendants challenging admissibility of Pohl's summary judgment evidence including the Pohl Declaration (paragraphs 4, 6, 10-18, 20-32) and numerous exhibits, with additional deposition testimony offered under Rule 107","Evidentiary objections filed September 19, 2022 at 8:16 AM by Kassab and Nicholson defendants jointly, on the morning of the summary judgment hearing. Challenges admissibility of Pohl's September 12, 2022 declaration and exhibits attached to both the traditional and no-evidence MSJ responses. Attaches complete depositions of Ladner, Seymour, and Walker under Rule 107. Addressed to Judge Scot 'Dolli' Dollinger.",MSJ-3,N/A,Phase 3,2022-09-19_OBJ_Kassab-Objection-to-Pohl-MSJ-Evidence_FILED.pdf,"Sustain all objections, strike objectionable portions of Pohl Declaration and exhibits, and grant summary judgment for Kassab and Nicholson defendants","9/19/2022 8:16 AM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 68367189
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 9/19/2022 8:16 AM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIALk DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS TO C
PLAINTIFFS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE SCOT “DOLLI” DOLLINGEtR:
Defendants Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C.
d/b/a/ The Kassab Law Firm (“the Kassab Defendeants”) and Tina Nicholson and
Baker Nicholson, LLP (“Nicholson”) (both sets ouf Defendants collectively referred to
as “Defendants”) file this, their Objections to Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment
Evidence, and would respectfully show athe following.
OBJECTIONS TO POHL’S EVIDENCE IN RESPONSE TO TRADITIONAL MSJ
Plaintiffs Michael A. Pohel and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC (“Pohl”)
attached to his summary judfgment responses as Exhibit A a declaration from Pohl
dated September 12, 2022 with exhibits (“Pohl Declaration”). Defendants object to
the following statements or paragraphs in the Pohl Declaration for the following
reasons: i
Paoragraph/Statement Objection/Basis
¶ 4 – “During the period that I Conclusory. Unsupported by factual or
maintained office space in Mississippi, I legal basis.
shared that space only with contractors
and employees whom I employed full
time and were treated for privilege and
confidentiality purposes as functional
employees of my law firm.
¶ 6 – “I was informed that Maxwell- Hearsay.
Walker had retained Mississippi
attorneys to advise it and confirm that
its agreement with me as well as the
public relations and marketing services
it was anticipated to provide under the
agreement were in compliance with
Mississippi law.” e
¶ 10 – “Precision represented to me that Conclusory. Hearstay. Vague and
their independent attorney or attorneys ambiguous as to whio at “Precision” made
had reviewed and approved each of the alleged represtentations so this
contracts I signed with them. In fact, interested-witneiss testimony is not
Precision and/or their independent “clear, positive and direct” as required by
attorneys prepared or redrafted several Rule 166a(sc).
of the services agreements.” e
¶ 11 – “Precision also represented that, Conclusory. Hearsay. Vague and
in addition to their public relations ambiguous as to who at “Precision” made
services, they were competent to handle alleged representations so this
client liaison services and claims linterested-witness testimony from Pohl
management with respect to clients whao is not “clear, positive and direct” as
retained me and Jimmy WilliamsonM to required by Rule 166a(c).
investigate and potentially prosecute
their BP claims.”
¶ 12 – “I am and was the righitful owner Conclusory. Improper lay or expert
of all the confidential, pOrivileged and opinion on legal issues for which Pohl is
trade secret information and property not properly qualified or designated to
that Kassab, Montagupe and Nicholson provide testimony on. Unsupported by
obtained from Scott Foavre and Precision factual or legal basis. More specifically,
Marketing Group, LLC on which this Pohl’s statements that he is a rightful
lawsuit is baseda. l… as a lawyer, I am owner of the information, that the
also entitled tco imaintain a copy of the information is a “trade secret,” and that
files and havfei a possessory interest in he has a possessory and ownership
them. Moroeover, with respect to the interest in the information are
attorney-client contracts to which I was conclusory without any supporting basis.
a party, as a contracting party I likewise
have an ownership interest in each of
the attorney-client contracts.”
¶ 13 – “while a single client may have Conclusory. Improper lay or expert
the right to request and obtain his/her opinion on legal issues for which Pohl is
file, that client does not have the right to not properly qualified or designated to
possess or even access other client files. provide testimony on. Unsupported by
The compilation of my clients and their factual or legal basis.
contact information, or any subset of my
clients, belongs to me and is in fact a
‘customer list.’ This is equally true if the
materials consist of over 11,000
attorney-client contracts from which one
can ascertain my ‘client’ or ‘customer e
list’.” C
¶ 14 – “I repeatedly stressed to Precision Conclusory. Heairsay. Vague and
and its staff the importance of keeping ambiguous as to wtho at “Precision” made
client information confidential including alleged repreisentations so this
the attorney-client contracts and the interested-witness testimony from Pohl
corresponding files. In turn, Precision is not “clsear, positive and direct” as
represented to me that they would be required eby Rule 166a(c). Improper lay
providing their marketing and client or expert opinion on legal issues for
services exclusively to me and knew and which Pohl is not properly qualified or
understood that their work and designated to provide testimony on.
communications with clients including Unsupported by factual or legal basis.
the underlying information of the clients l
and any of my contracts with the clienats
were confidential and could not Mbe
disclosed without my express consent.
Although Precision was a third-party
provider of legal related services, for
purposes of privileged or cionfidential
information, they were eOffectively the
functional equivalent of employees
working full time for pme out of offices
arranged for and poaid for by me. I
considered them to be a ‘lawyer
representative’ asl that term is used in
the Texas Rules iof Civil Evidence.
¶ 15 – “I likoewise took additional steps to Conclusory. Improper lay or expert
safeguard my confidential and opinion on legal issues for which Pohl is
proprietary information. My offices, not properly qualified or designated to
where my information was kept, were at provide testimony on. Unsupported by
the top floor of a bank building which factual or legal basis.
had 24-hour security. The elevators were
programmed such that after hours a
person could only access a floor or floor
for which that person had authority. The
building itself contained numerous
security cameras. My firm would lock
and secure the offices after office hours,
and my files were therefore kept under
lock and key. I also made sure my
computers were password protected.
With respect to my contracts with my
clients, the contracts were written in a e
way that left no doubt that they were an C
agreement between a lawyer and a client t 
or clients for the rendition of legal
services.” t
¶ 16 – “I did not commit barratry. The Conclusory. Improper lay or expert
assertions made by the Defendants in opinion ons legal issues for which Pohl is
their motions for summary judgment not propeerly qualified or designated to
that I committed barratry and that I provide testimony on. Unsupported by
agreed to pay Precision any percentage factual or legal basis.
of the attorney’s fees I was to receive is
not true.”
¶ 17 – “At all times, I attempted tao Conclusory. Hearsay. Improper lay or
conform to the requirements relatinMg to expert opinion on legal issues for which
practicing in states in which I was not Pohl is not properly qualified or
licensed. I note that the filing process in designated to provide testimony on.
the BP Matter permitted the Unsupported by factual or legal basis.
participation of non-lawyers. iThere was
no requirement of bar Oadmission for
filing claims.” 
¶ 18 – “the assertionso that I ever agreed Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to
to pay any percentage of my attorney's who at “Precision” made alleged
fees to Precisiona lare not true. Instead, representations so this interested-
the May 25, c2i012 and July 15, 2012 witness testimony from Pohl is not
Contracts faiccurately reflect the “clear, positive and direct” as required by
agreement oorally discussed and Rule 166a(c). Unsupported by factual or
understood by all of the parties before legal basis.
their execution. The agreement required
that the Precision ""shall keep accurate
daily time records of all efforts expended
on behalf of LOMAP."" The %-of-
attorney's-fees clause was simply to
impose a ""cap"" on amounts that may be
due under the other terms of the
agreement, not an independent promise
to pay any percentage of the attorney's
fees earned by LOMAP on the subject
claims. This was orally discussed and
understood by the parties before the May
25, 2012 and July 15, 2012 Contracts
were executed.”
¶ 20 – “Further with respect to the terms Conclusory. Vague andC ambiguous as to
of agreement and services to be provided who at “Precisiont ” made alleged
under the May 25, 2012 Contract and representations sio this interested-
the July 15, 2012 Contract, I was witness testimonty from Pohl is not
informed by Precision that they wanted “clear, positive aind direct” as required by
to confer with their attorneys before Rule 166a(c). Unsupported by factual or
finalizing and executing the agreement legal basiss.
documentation. We specifically discussed e
that the inclusion of the agreed
maximum-price provisions was essential
to me in agreeing to either a ""reasonable
rate"" formula or a specified contract
rate. Precision subsequently confirmed l
to me that they had conferred with theiar
Mississippi attorneys, who had advMised
that the terms of the agreement and
anticipated services thereunder were
lawful, and executed the agreement
accordingly.” i
¶ 21 – “Precision and its members Hearsay.
agreed they would orpganize and host
festivals, town hall moeetings and other
gatherings to appropriately educate the
public as part of thleir marketing efforts.”
¶ 22- “On my cbiehalf, Precision and its Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to
members agrfeied they would organize who at “Precision” Pohl is referring to, so
and host foestivals, town hall meetings this interested-witness testimony from
and other gatherings to appropriately Pohl is not “clear, positive and direct” as
educate the public as part of their required by Rule 166a(c). Unsupported
marketing efforts. Precision was also by factual or legal basis.
responsible for training and supervising
their staff to ensure optimal results and
compliance with the rules governing
their marketing activities.”
¶ 22 – “This included Precision sending Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to
me falsified and inflated invoices and who at “Precision” Pohl is referring to, so
expense information. It was also later this interested-witness testimony from
discovered that Precision had Pohl is not “clear, positive and direct” as
systematically overcharged me on all required by Rule 166a(c). Unsupported
amounts I paid them under the public by factual or legal basis.
relations agreement.”
¶ 23 – “Precision admitted that they had Conclusory. Vague andC ambiguous as to
been stealing from me. Thus, from the who at “Precision” otr “PR Consultants”
inception of my relationship with PR Pohl is referring tio, so this interested-
Consultants, they consistently witness testimonty from Pohl is not
overstated to me the amount of the “clear, positive aind direct” as required by
actual costs they charged me for, and Rule 166a(c). Unsupported by factual or
then misappropriated, converted and/or legal basiss.
stole the inflated amounts for their own e
use and benefit.”
¶ 24 – “Precision took my property Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to
including my engagement agreements, who at “Precision” Pohl is referring to, so
client files, contact information, lthis interested-witness testimony from
computers and other informatioan Pohl is not “clear, positive and direct” as
without my permission. These files wMere required by Rule 166a(c). Unsupported
at one time maintained in approximately by factual or legal basis. Hearsay as to
seventeen clear plastic file containers. what Ladner – who is not a party to this
Ladner admitted absconding with those case – stated.
files from my satellite law ioffice and,
without my consent, keptO them at his
residence until they were later delivered,
also without my consenpt, to Scott Favre,
who had purchasedo Precision (from
Walker, Seymour, and Ladner) and
became its managilng member.”
¶ 24 – “Precf iision and Tina Nicholson Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to
refused to roeturn and converted to their who at “Precision” Pohl is referring to, so
own use my computers that I purchased this interested-witness testimony from
for my office and which Precision used Pohl is not “clear, positive and direct” as
while there performing services for me. required by Rule 166a(c). Improper lay
Those computers held software and or expert opinion on legal issues for
stored data that I had paid for, which Pohl is not properly qualified or
specialized legal forms (that had been designated to provide testimony on.
prepared in compliance with various Unsupported by factual or legal basis.
state law after consultation with local
counsel in those jurisdictions),
marketing information and other trade
secrets, my proprietary administrative
client forms, various fee-agreement
forms prepared in accordance with the
laws of various states, internal emails
and other work product relating to the
BP claims and other matters for which e
Precision rendered services in connection C
with our services agreements.” t 
¶ 25 – “This theft and unlawful Conclusory. Heatrsay. Vague and
disclosure was made even more ambiguous as toi who at “Precision” Pohl
egregious by the fact that, from the is referring to, so this interested-witness
outset of their contractual relationship testimony sfrom Pohl is not “clear,
with me, Precision expressed their positive aend direct” as required by Rule
understanding of the confidential nature 166a(c). Pohl’s statement about what
of the information based on their prior “appears” to have occurred is not
experience in providing litigation related competent summary judgment evidence,
services to attorneys, a field in which and his statement about a “barratry
Precision held themselves out to me as lscheme” is conclusory and unsupported
experienced professionals. Neverthelesas, by factual or legal basis. Moreover, not
without my consent, and without lMegal designated to opine on the issue of legal
title to the contracts, documents, title.
computers, passwords or data stored
thereon, Precision sold the contracts,
documents, computer, passwoirds and/or
stored data to Scott FavreO (even after I
had informed Favre that the materials
had been stolen from pme by Precision),
who it appears eventoually sold some or
all of those items and the information
therein to Kaslsab, Montague and
Nicholson for theiir barratry scheme.
¶ 26 – “Aso part of that enforcement of Conclusory and unsupported by factual
the settlement agreement, certain or legal basis.
Defendants were sanctioned.”
¶ 27 – “The materials at issue have Conclusory. Improper lay or expert
independent economic value from not opinion on legal issues for which Pohl is
being generally known to or not properly qualified or designated to
ascertainable through proper means by provide testimony on. Unsupported by
another person who can obtain economic factual or legal basis.
value from them.”
¶ 27 – “I agree with this valuation and Conclusory. Improper lay or expert
believe it constitutes the fair market opinion on legal issues for which Pohl is
price for what an investor would pay for not properly qualified or designated to
such information. However, the provide testimony on. Pohl’s statement
conversion and misappropriation of my about what he “believes” is not
client information has deprived me of competent summary judgement evidence.
this value.” Unsupported by factuaCl or legal basis.
¶ 28 – “I have suffered injury as a result Conclusory. Impropter lay or expert
of the Defendants’ misappropriation of opinion on legal issiues for which Pohl is
my trade secrets and conversion of my not properly quatlified or designated to
property. My injury includes the costs I provide testimDoiny on. Unsupported by
have incurred in legal fees and expenses factual or legal basis. Pohl fails to
that I would never have incurred but for provide susfficient factual support about
the conversion of my property and the fees hee alleges as damages.
misappropriation of my trade secrets. I
have personally incurred hundreds of
thousands of dollars in attorneys’ fees
and expenses in relation to defending
the lawsuits orchestrated by Defendants, l
including the Berry, Brumfielad,
Cheatham, and Gandy lawsuits. I Mwas
also harmed, as I paid a substantial sum
of money as part of a settlement
agreement under which certain
Defendants were required to ireturn my
materials and not fomOent litigation
against me. But I did not receive those
benefits.” p
¶ 29 – “The filing process in the BP Conclusory. Hearsay. Improper lay or
Matter permitteadl the participation of expert opinion on legal issues for which
non-lawyers. Tchiere was no requirement Pohl is not properly qualified or
of bar admissfioin for filing claims.” designated to provide testimony on.
o Unsupported by factual or legal basis.
¶ 30 – “At no time did I knowingly Conclusory. Unsupported by factual or
participate in any illegal solicitation of legal basis.
clients in Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas
or elsewhere. I always instructed
everyone in my employ to abide by the
laws of the state in which they were
acting. I, at all times, attempted to
adhere to the rules of the State Bar of
Texas and other relevant states
regarding the solicitation of clients.
¶ 31 – “Prior to the two year period Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to
leading up to the filing of this case, I was who at “Precision” Pohl is referring to, so
unaware that Scott Favre and Precision, this interested-witness testimony from
with the assistance of Tina Nicholson, Pohl is not “clear, positivee and direct” as
had sold my information to Kassab and required by Rule 166Ca(c). Unsupported
Montague. And, in fact, that sale by factual or legal bast is.
occurred in November of 2016, less than i
two years before this suit was filed. t
¶ 32 – “The grievances involved those Conclusory. 
same allegations.” s
Defendants request the Court to sustain these objections and strike these
objectionable portions of the Pohl Declaration. With those statements struck, Pohl
has no evidence to support his claimls against Kassab, rendering summary
judgment appropriate. M
In addition, Defendants object to several of Pohl’s summary judgment
exhibits on the following grounds.
Exhibit/Description Objection/Basis
Exhibit F - November 15, 2019 letter Hearsay. Irrelevant because outcomes of
from Office of Cohief Disciplinary grievance proceedings are not res
Counsel. judicata in civil matters. See Charles v.
l Diggs, No. 14-19-00725-CV, 2020 Tex.
Exhibit G – Feibruary 24, 2020 letter App. LEXIS 8502, at *5 (Tex. App.—
from Office iof Chief Disciplinary Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 29, 2020, pet.
Counsel. o denied) (client’s claim against lawyer
Exhibit H – May 14, 2020 Letter from was not precluded by dismissal of
Board of Disciplinary Appeals. grievance because “the disciplinary rules
do not set the standard for civil
Exhibit I – January 14, 2020 letter from liability”); TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R.
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel. 17.03 (“Neither the Complainant nor the
Respondent is affected by the doctrines
Exhibit J – April 10, 2020 Letter from of res judicata or estoppel by judgment
Board of Disciplinary Appeals. from any Disciplinary Action.”).
Exhibit K – January 9, 2020 letter from
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel.
Exhibit L – April 10, 2020 Letter from
Board of Disciplinary Appeals.
Exhibit M – January 9, 2020 letter from e
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel. C
Exhibit N – April 10, 2020 Letter from
Board of Disciplinary Appeals. t
Exhibit O – January 9, 2020 letter from 
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel.
Exhibit P – April 10, 2020 Letter from
Board of Disciplinary Appeals.
Exhibit T – January 9, 2020 letter from
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel. l
Exhibit R – October 3, 2017 Letter fMrom Hearsay.
Magdalena Santana 
Exhibit S – Transcription of audiotaped Hearsay as to statements made by
conversation between Lance Kiassab and Magdalena Santana.
Magdalena Santana. O
Exhibit Y – emails and letter from Hearsay
counsel p
Additionalalyl, Pohl attached to his response only portions of the depositions of
Scott Walker f(iExhibit D), Kirk Ladner (Exhibit V), and Steve Seymour (Exhibit W),
taken August 29-31, 2022, after Defendants filed their motions for summary
judgment. For purposes of optional completeness, Defendants attach the entire
depositions of these witnesses as Exhibits 1 (Ladner), 2 (Seymour) and 3 (Walker) to
this pleading and asks the Court to consider those depositions part of the summary
10
judgment record. See TEX. R. EVID. 107 (“If a party introduces part of an act,
declaration, conversation, writing, or recorded statement, an adverse party may …
introduce any other act, declaration, conversation, writing, or recorded statement
that is necessary to explain or allow the trier of fact to fully understkand the part
offered by the opponent.”). This exhibits include, for example, adCditional proof for
Defendants’ summary-judgment arguments, such as Kirk Ladner’s following
testimony: i
• Precision owned the marketing and client lists. Ex. 1 at 44-45.
• Helping hands decided which law firms to refer clients to. Ex. 1 at 55-56, 62-
64
• Ladner did his own research to find lthe motor vehicle accident cases. Ex. 1 at
97, 285-89. M
• Pohl was really splitting attorney’s fees with Precision and his contracts were
a deceptive smokescreein to make the scheme appear legal. Ex. 1 at 77-79,
83-85, 94-95, 269-271, 276, 287-288, 398-416, 443
• Forms and maroketing lists used by Precision belonged to Precision. Ex. 1 at
128-29. l
• Pohl nef iver told Lander to return the documents, which belonged to ladner.
Ex. 1 at 133, 173-74
• The BP claimants were clients of Precision first. Ex. 1 at 214-215.
• Pohl never told Ladner to keep the information confidential. Ex. 1 at 232-35,
264-65, 500-502
11
• Spreadsheets of claimants and pre-questionnaire forms belonged to Precision.
Ex. 1 at 244-245, 262-263.
• Pohl committed barratry. Ex. 1 at 274-280, 285-86
• Helping Hands and GM Verification signed up the claimants as their own
clients. 444 C
Additionally, Steve Seymour testified that Walker creaited claimant lists but
Pohl never said the client lists were confidential. Ex. 2 ati 96-98, 147-149, 221-222.
Walker testified that the marketing lists were Precission’s work product and so was
the initial screening forming Precision had claimants compete. Ex. 3 at 232-33,
237-242.
OBJECTIONS TO POHL’S EVIDENCE INl RESPONSE TO NO-EVIDENCE MSJ
Because the Pohl DefendantsM use the same declaration to support their
Response to the No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants
incorporate by reference all thie above-stated objections and assert them as to Pohl’s
declaration attached to the No-Evidence Response as Exhibit A.
EXHIBIT/DES o CRIPTION EXHIBIT/BASIS
Exhibit BB – Omnibus Transcript Hearsay
Exhibit D – Grcieivance documents Hearsay. Irrelevant because outcomes of
f i grievance proceedings are not res
o judicata in civil matters. See Charles v.
Diggs, No. 14-19-00725-CV, 2020 Tex.
App. LEXIS 8502, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 29, 2020, pet.
denied) (client’s claim against lawyer
was not precluded by dismissal of
grievance because “the disciplinary rules
do not set the standard for civil
liability”); TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R.
12
17.03 (“Neither the Complainant nor the
Respondent is affected by the doctrines
of res judicata or estoppel by judgment
from any Disciplinary Action.”).
Exhibit S – Zavitsanos Report Hearsay, unsworn.
Exhibit T – Pohl Deposition at 115-116 Hearsay regarding what third-parties
allegedly told Nicholson. Also, Pohl’s
testimony was nonresponsive.
Exhibit Y – Pohl Declaration
¶ 4 Conclusory. Improiper lay or expert
opinion on legal sitssues for which Pohl is
not properly Dquialified or designated to
provide testimony on. Unsupported by
factual or slegal basis. More specifically,
Pohl’s statements that he is a rightful
owner of the information, that the
information is a “trade secret,” and that
he has a possessory and ownership
interest in the information are
lconclusory without any supporting basis.
¶¶ 5, 6 Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to
 who at “Precision” Pohl is referring to, so
this interested-witness testimony from
Pohl is not “clear, positive and direct” as
i required by Rule 166a(c). Unsupported
O by factual or legal basis. Hearsay as to
 what Ladner – who is not a party to this
p case – stated.
¶ 7 Conclusory. Hearsay. Vague and
a l ambiguous as to who at “Precision” Pohl
c i is referring to, so this interested-witness
f i testimony from Pohl is not “clear,
o positive and direct” as required by Rule
166a(c). Pohl’s statement about what
“appears” to have occurred is not
competent summary judgment evidence,
and his statement about a barratry
scheme is conclusory and unsupported
by factual or legal basis. Moreover, not
designated to opine on issue of legal
¶ 8 title.
13
¶ 9 Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to
who at “Precision” Pohl is referring to, so
this interested-witness testimony from
Pohl is not “clear, positive and direct” as
required by Rule 166a(c). Unsupported
by factual or legal basis. e
¶¶ 10, 13, 14 Not designated as an expert on damages,
and his damages topines are conclusory,
speculative, unireliable, and lack any
factual support.
¶ 11 Conclusoery
CONCLUSION & PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should sustain these objections to Pohl’s
summary judgment evidence. With the aobjections sustained, the Court should grant
Kassab’s request for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment and order that
Pohl take nothing his claims against Kassab.
O Respectfully submitted,
p THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
/s/ David Eric Kassab
l DAVID ERIC KASSAB
i Texas State Bar No. 24071351
i david@kassab.law
o LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 00794070
lance@kassab.law
NICHOLAS R. PIERCE
Texas State Bar No. 24098263
nicholas@kassab.law
1214 Elgin Street
Houston, Texas 77004
Telephone: 713-522-7400
14
Facsimile: 713-522-7410
E-Service: eserve@kassab.law
ATTORNEYS FOR KASSAB DEFENDANTS
THOMPSON, COE, COUSINS & IRONS, LLP
By: /s/ Andrew L. Johneson
Andrew L. Johnson C
State Bar No.: 24060025
Zandra E. Foley
State Bar No.: 2t4032085
Benjamin S. Riitz
State Bar No.: 24096147
One Riverway, Suite 1400
Houstoen, Texas 77056
(713) 403-8210 – Telephone
(71u3) 403-8299 – Facsimile
ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com
zfoley@thompsoncoe.com
lbritz@thompsoncoe.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS TINA
NICHOLSON AND BAKER
fNICHOLSON, LLP
OCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that onp this date, September 19, 2022, I electronically filed this
document with the Clerk of the Court using the eFile.TXCourts.gov electronic filing
system which will send notification of such filing to all parties or counsel of record.
f /s/ David Eric Kassab
DAVID ERIC KASSAB
15
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this
document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below.
The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate
of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab e
Bar No. 24071351 C
david@kassab.law t
Envelope ID: 68367189 r
Status as of 9/19/2022 8:41 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email sTimestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com r 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Andrew Johnson ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Andrew J. Sarne asarne@krcl.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.conm 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Kathryn Laflin KLaflin@KRCL.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10607900 jefferson@mdjwlarw.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo 24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Larry Newsom lnewsom@fkrcl.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo jason@ciofalolaw.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Todd Taylor titaylor@jandflaw.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Misty Davis fmdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Non-Party Witness Billy Shepherd bshepherd@spcounsel.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Deidre Hicks y GWS_GROUP@spcounsel.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell C jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Todd Taylor  ttaylor@jandflaw.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Lawyer Wade a lawyerwade@hotmail.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Scott M.Favre c scott@favrepa.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Andrea Mendez f i andrea@kassab.law 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Lance Kassab o lance@kassab.law 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
David Kassab david@kassab.law 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Nicholas Pierce nicholas@kassab.law 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Katie Budinsky kbudinsky@krcl.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM ERROR
E. MarieJamison jamison@wrightclosebarger.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Jessica Z.Barger barger@wrightclosebarger.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT"
33,2022-09-12,DECL,Kassab,Lance Kassab’s declaration,"Declaration of Lance Christopher Kassab in support of Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to Pohl's MSJ — sworn testimony under penalty of perjury establishing Kassab's professional background, the joint venture with Montague and Nicholson, the source of client information from Precision Marketing, the four barratry lawsuits and their outcomes, and assertion of work product and attorney-client privilege over communications","Phase 3 evidentiary filing supporting Kassab's MSJ (Filing #30) and his Response to Pohl's No-Evidence MSJ (Filing #34). This is a sworn declaration under penalty of perjury providing foundational facts for Kassab's immunity and justification defenses. Filed September 12, 2022.",MSJ-2,N/A,Phase 3,2022-09-12_DECL_Lance-Kassab-Declaration_FILED.pdf,,"9/12/2022 3:28:03 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk
Harris County
Envelope No: 68168171
By: LOPEZ, ASHLEY V
Filed: 9/12/2022 3:28:03 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
§
§
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
ae
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th SUDIGIAL DISTRICT
DECLARATION OF LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
1. My name is Lance Christopher Kassab. My date of. ~ is March 12,
1961. My business address is 1214 Elgin Street, H on, Texas 77004.
I am of sound mind and have never been conWicted of a felony or
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude anda erwise competent to
make this declaration. I declare under pe y of perjury that the
statements of fact made herein are within personal knowledge and
true and correct. 6)

2. Iam an attorney licensed to practice:iaie in the State of Texas. I have
been licensed to practice law by theState of Texas since 1995 and I am
in good standing. I graduated a a school with honors and was
editor-in-chief of Law Review also licensed to practice before the
United States Supreme Court, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals and the United States District Court of Texas, Southern,
Eastern and Western Dagens. I was formerly a Briefing Attorney for
the First Judicial Disc ourt of Appeals in Houston, Texas and Iam
a former intern for Texas Supreme Court and the First Judicial District
Court of Appeals.

pp ©)

3. For more thaw twenty-five (25) years I have been in private practice

handling complex legal malpractice cases. I have been involved in and/or
handled appvoximately 2,300 legal malpractice cases and have been
alee numerous appeals regarding numerous legal malpractice
issues Th e vast majority of these cases have been on the Plaintiff's side.
Ho I have also handled the defense of legal malpractice cases. I
have. andled cases for clients all over Texas and in numerous other
states within the Union such as California, Utah, Nevada, Oregon,
Idaho, Arkansas, Colorado, Virginia, Alabama, Louisiana, Florida and
Mississippi.

4. I am the owner of Lance Christopher Kassab, PC d/b/a The Kassab Law
Firm. I have associated with Hattiesburg attorney F. Douglas Montague

1

(“Montague”) in the past. For instance, Montague and I were co-counsel
in lawsuits we brought against John O’Quinn, which we filed on behalf
of more than a thousand of O’Quinn’s former silicosis clients. That
litigation was filed in 2011 and litigated through 2015. Communications
between me or my office on the one hand and Montague and his office
on the other hand concerning or relating to that litigation are privileged
under the attorney-client and work product privileges and confidéntial
under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. @

5. Sometime in the fall of 2014, Montague notified me of litigation filed
against Michael A. Pohl (“Pohl”) in Mississippi, styled Cause No. 1:14-
cv-381-KS-JCG: Scott Walker, et al. v. Jimmy Williamson, et al.; In the
United States District Court for the Southern Dis ib of Mississippi,
Southern Division (the “Mississippi Litigation. The Mississippi
Litigation was filed by Scott Walker, Kirk Ladnefand Steve Seymore,
the then owners of a company named Precision Marketing Group, LLC
(“Precision Marketing”). Walker, Ladner and Symore alleged that Pohl
had hired their marketing company, Precision arketing, to find and
solicit clients to refer to Pohl in excharige for a percentage of Pohl’s
attorney’s fees. Precision Marketing algo. alleged that it would receive,
from Pohl, a sum certain for each client it referred to Pohl. Walker,
Ladner and Seymore alleged that hey acquired thousands of clients
relating to the BP Deepwater Hofigpn Oil Spill and referred those clients
to Pohl. They also alleged ne ey referred numerous auto accident
cases to Pohl. Walker, Ladner, eymore and Precision Marketing sued
Pohl claiming he breached ¢heir agreement by refusing to pay them for
all of the referrals. &

6. Upon learning of thé Mississippi Litigation, I and staff at my office
obtained a large amount of information related to the Mississippi
Litigation from ederal court’s online public access to court records
system, PACHR.;Falso met with Scott Favre (“Favre”), who I understood
became the, owner of Precision Marketing through a_ purchase
agreements be had with the prior owners. Upon reviewing the
informatior obtained from PACER and through my discussions with
Favre oncluded that the clients who were solicited to hire Pohl had
pote claims against him for civil barratry pursuant to Section
82.08 1 of the Texas Government Code.

7. On November 11, 2016, I entered into a joint venture agreement with
Montague and another lawyer named Tina Nicholson (“Nicholson”). A
copy of that agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The purpose of
the joint venture was to pursue causes of action against Pohl and others
for civil barratry.

2

8. Thereafter, Favre and his counsel, Nicholson, provided me with
information from Precision Marketing’s files, including the names and
addresses of Pohl’s former clients or prospective clients. This
information was provided to me prior to Favre and Precision Marketing
settlement of the Mississippi Litigation with Pohl. I understood that this
information belonged to and was the property of Precision Markéting,
not Pohl or any other person or entity. The basis of this understanding
is the purchase and sale agreements, where Walker, Letper and
Seymore stated they were the owners of all the assets ,of recision
Marketing, including all of the documents in _ thei)possession,
computers, computer files, client lists, etc. and that alkof those assets
were sold to Favre when her purchased Precision Mpxtsting

9. Pohl has alleged that all of Precision Marketing’sGssets, such as client
lists, marketing information and all other doc nts within Precision
Marketing’s possession was somehow acqui y improper means. I
did not know that the information I we provided by Precision
Marketing had been allegedly acquired from ohl by improper means or
misappropriated by anyone. In fact, Ichad reviewed agreements that
indicated the former owners of Precision Marketing, Scott Walker, Kirk
Ladner and Steve Seymour sediment had sold, conveyed, or
otherwise transferred all of theirGdeuments, lists, marketing materials,
and all other documents and ass s in their possession to Favre and/or
his companies. ©

10. Pursuant to the joint v & with Montague and Nicholson, I used the
information from th “Mississippi Litigation to send advertisement
letters to Precision Mayketine’s clients, informing them that they may
have been a victim-of barratry, that barratry is illegal and unethical in
Texas, and that, fact they were victims of barratry, they would be
entitled to fileciyil claims against Pohl. I sent the advertisement letters
to the Texas. tate Bar and the bars of other states in which the
advertiseménts were distributed for approval. Literally hundreds of
individ esponded, indicating that they had been, in fact, personally
solicit hire Pohl in their auto accident or BP claims.

11. Beginning at least by February 2017, my firm and the law firms of
Montague and Nicholson entered into contracts with more than four
hundred individuals to represent them in their claims against Pohl for
civil barratry. Attached hereto as Exhibit B are the contracts that we
received pertaining to Dezzie Brumfield (signed February 28, 2017),
Alice Marie Gandy (signed August 21, 2017), Mark Cheatham, Sr.
(signed April 20, 2017) and Mae Berry (signed April 14, 2017) who would

3

become the lead plaintiffs in the four barratry lawsuits that Montague,
Nicholson and I were hired to pursue against Pohl.
12.Pursuant to the joint venture, I filed the four separate barratry lawsuits
against Pohl (collectively, “the Barratry Litigation”). The Berry case was
filed on June 5, 2017, and ultimately included seven plaintiffs that were
alleged to have been solicited by Pohl to pursue auto accident claims.
The Cheatham case was filed on June 20, 2017, and ultimately gpitided
four plaintiffs who were alleged to have been solicited to hess ohl to
pursue auto accident claims. The Brumfield case was fil June 8,
2017, and by July 26, 2017, that suit had vopronimatoly. 62 plaintiffs
who were alleged to have been solicited to hire Pohl to pursue BP claims.
The Gandy case was filed on October 16, 2017, an that suit included
approximately 135 plaintiffs who were alleged to ve) been solicited to
hire Pohl to pursue BP claims. &
13. Pohl filed this lawsuit against me, Nicholso and Montague on August
28, 2018, while the Barratry Litigation wag Spdoing
6)
14.The Berry case was settled on Decombges0 2019 with Pohl agreeing to
pay the plaintiffs a substantial sumof money. The Cheatham case was
initially dismissed on summary jidement, but the court of appeals
recently reversed, concluding oes ismissal of the case was erroneous.
See Cheatham v. Pohl, No. 01- 046-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 6528
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dit Aug. 30, 2022, no pet. h.). Thus, the
Cheatham case is ongoi he Brumfield and Gandy cases were
dismissed on summary-iidement based on an affirmative defense of
limitations. See Brumfield v. Williamson, 634 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2027, pet. denied); Gandy v. Williamson, 634 S.W.3d
214 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, pet. denied). We represented
the plaintiffs 1 Appeals through the Texas Supreme Court. The
appellate courf affirmed on May 27, 2021, and the Texas Supreme Court
denied review on January 28, 2022. Our representation of the Brumfield
and Gandy @eintifis concluded shortly thereafter.
Sou a.
15.In thi wsuit, Pohl has requested communications and documents
exc ed between me or my firm on the one hand and Nicholson and
ague or their firms on the other hand. Those communications and
documents exchanged are protected by the work product privilege
because I anticipated litigation against Pohl no later than January of
2015. In fact, Montague and I started discussing litigation against Pohl
and others in late 2014 and started circulating a joint venture
agreement by January 15, 2015. Nicholson was brought in because she
was licensed to practice law in many of the gulf states where we
4

contemplated filing lawsuits against Pohl. Communications and
documents exchanged between Montague, Nicholson and I after we
anticipated litigation consist of work product.

16. Pohl has also requested communications between me or my firm on the
one hand and my clients in the Barratry Litigation on the other hand.
Those communications are protected by the attorney-client angers
product privileges and are confidential communications under the: exas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. The communicg iis were
made for the purposes of facilitating the rendition of profess} al legal
services to my clients in their pursuit of barratry claims Ggainst Pohl.
Likewise, the internal work product of my firm is eon: idential and
consists of mental impressions, opinions, conclusion eahétes and/or legal
theories concerning the Barratry Litigation. Ke)

®
Executed in Harris County, State of Texas, on the 12tday of September, 2022.
Z x te. Z
Lance Christopher Kassab
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LAW FIRM )
| November 11, 2016 GO
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| Via Email dmontague@mpviaw.com °@
| F, Douglas Montague, HI Z )
| MONTAGUE, PirrMAN & VARNADO, P_A, ®
| 525 Main Street @
Hattiesburg, MS 39403 SO
Via Email nicholson@ bakernicholson.com
Tina Nicholson s\
BAKER NICHOLSON LAW FIRM &
2402 Dunlavy Street Or
Houston, Texas 77006 ~\S
Re: Joint venture for cause{QF action against Jimmy Williamson, Michael
Pohl and any and all afGiiated entities, for violations of the Texas Barratry
Statute or any act@eVhegligence arising out of the Deep Water Horizon
Oil Disaster, ve accident cases, and any other types of cases solicited
by Willamson\and/or Pohl in violation of the Texas Barratry statute by
these lawyers,
Dear Doug and Tina: ou
Please alloy this letter to reflect our agreement regarding our joint venture for suits.
against Jimmy Vijtiamson (Williamson), Michael Pohl (Pohl) and any other lawyer or law firm
connected wig m responsible for violating of the Texas Barratry Statute arising out of the
Deep iene) tl Disaster, vehicle accident cases, and any other types of cases solicited by them
in Violation the Texas Barratry statute.
~) agreement is made between our respective law firms, The Kassab Law Firm
(Kassab), Montague, Pitman & Varnado, P.A. (Montague} and The Baker Nicholson Law Firm
(Baker). We have agreed to bring lawsuits on behalf of clients who were wrongfully solicited on
behalf of Williamson and/or Pohl. their respective law firms and anyone else that may be fiable
for these actions. Kassab agrees to send out solicitation letters and sign up clients for the
lawsuit. Kassab also agrees to drafi relevant petitions, do the bulk of the work in drafting and
responding to motions and other filed documents. litigate and try the cases. Kassab also agrees
to front fifty percent (50%) of the case expenses. Montague agrees to help manage the clients
and help with strategy and litigation where necessary. Montague also agrees to help try cases as
second chair if necessary, Montague also agrees to front fifty percent (50%) of the case
expenses. Baker agrees to help manage clients, strategize and participate or help in filing suits
1426 Alabanza Street | Houston | Texas | 77004 ~
£.733.929.7400 | f. 713.922.7410
sanane: Poseae) coalthda hives whines fev

F. Douglas Montague
November 11, 2076 ‘ ft
Page 2 of 2 Oy
where necessary, including, but not limited to other states where Baker’s atthendys are licensed.
Baker also agrees to provide previously prepared solicitation letter templates, thai comply with
the ethics rules of each applicable state. We have agreed to split any all attorney's fees
generated trom this joint effort in the following way: fifty perce: 30%) to Kassab, forty
percent (40%) to Montague and ten percent (10%) to Baker. In ea’és’ where Baker makes an
| appearance on the pleadings in States such as Florida and/or Alabina, the parties herein agree to
| the following split of fees regarding those cases only: fifty percept 50%) to Kassab, twenty five
| percent (25%) to Montague and twenty five percent (25%) (Baker. Cases in which Baker
| assumes primary responsibility for litigation as lead coun eli any, shall be negotiated on an
| individual basis. ©
| There may also be cases that arise from the RB Bractice of these lawyers including, but
| not limited to, negligence claims. The Parties her€it agree to the same arrangement outlined
above with regard to the litigation of these CaBRR, dditionally, some of the clients that have
been solicited by these potential defendants ns cancel their contracts and thus, need counsel
regarding their cases. Furthermore, some ts may have malpractice actions arising out of
Pohi/Williamson’s failure to timely file and@ursue their claims. The Parties herein agree to use
their best efforts to either find these cis counsel to handle their cases, in which we agree to
split any and all referral fees as outlin ove or we will handle their cases. In either event, the
Parties hereto agree to the same auogiess fee split as outlined above.
: u
SS
If this letter accurately owtfines our agreement, please indicate by signing below.
w la p Y
S Sincerely, .
IN THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
© ae el
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2O ag Kgs apie
© “~~ Lance Christopher Kassab
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EXHIBIT B.
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LAW FIRM
1420 Alabama Street | Houston | Texas | 77004
p. 713.522.7400 | f. 713.522.7410
www. TexasLegalMalpractice.com
POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
@
” * —F- FD ~
Client(s) full legal name: Dz Z2Z14EL Lam onl Lf. turn PIE I. of 3
Client(s) address: —__
Client(s) home phone number:_ ee x number: 2
Cell number: P| ‘lient(s) Email:
Client(s) social security number(s): : ss oe (Confidential)
@
This agreement is between the above client(s), hereinafiet referred to as “Client” and LANCE
CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB oda FIRM, MONTAGUE, PITTMAN &
VARNADO, P.A. and the BAKER NICHOLSON LAW ne ereinafter referred to as “Attorneys.”
1. SCOPE OF SERVICES. Attorneys are hereby employed and appointed as Client’s true and
lawzul attorneys to act for Client and to prosgepite Client’s claims or causes of action against:
JIMMY WILLIAMSON, JIMMY WILLIAMSO - AND/OR MICHAEL A. POHL (Defendants) and
all other persons, firms, corporations, or byst ss entities legally responsible for causing Client’s
damages resulting from such acts as follows;
BARRATRY, LEGAL pRacrice AND/OR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
ARISING O THE BP DEEP HORIZON LITIGATION
Client understands that Client’s case may be filed and litigated jointly with other clients
who are similarly situate ient and/or who have similar claims against Defendants. As
such, Client is aware rees that Client’s confidential information may necessarily be
disclosed among otherclients in order to effectuate a settlement. Client further
understands and a s that if a disagreement or dispute arises between any of the
common clients to sharing of the confidential information, the attorney-client privilege
may not be available for assertion by any of them against the other(s) on certain issues.
Finally, if a ca on or aggregate sett:ement is effectuated, Client understands and agrees
that the of demand may require ue consent of all commonly-represented clients and
the failure‘of one or a few members of the group to consent to the settlement may result in
the withdrawal of the settlement or offer.
Client further understands that Attorneys are not specialized in, nor do they give, tax advice,
bankruptcy advice, family law or estate planning advice or any other advice involving other non-
civil or non-personal injury areas of specialized practice of law and they would recommend the
retention of a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) or qualified tax lawyer with regard to any
questions as to the taxability of any proceeds that are received pursuant to this agreement.
Client(s) Initials: D LB Page 1 of 6

2. AUTHORITY. Client authorizes Attorneys to act as Client’s negotiator, to file pleadings
and appear in courts of law in Client’s behalf, to prosecute Client’s claims or causes of action to
settlement or final judgment, and to take any appropriate legal action they deem reasonably
necessary in the preservation of Client’s rights and claims. Client further authorizes attorneys to
do all things that Client might lawfully do in Client’s behalf, and ratifies and confirms all such
lawful acts that Attorneys may do or cause to be done on behalf of Client. Provided, however,
that no settlement shall be made by attorneys without Client’s approval. If C refuses an
offer of settlement against Attorney’s recommendation, then Client agrees to e responsible
for paying all costs and expenses of the case, and must reimburse Attoméy for expenses and
costs already incurred within seven (7) days of a written demand for such reimbursement. If
Client fails to timely reimburse Attorney after receiving such written e, then such failure
constitutes a termination of the representation by the Client. In the pave such termination,
Attorneys are entitled to retain their entire contingency fee meee
3. CONTINGENT FEE. In consideration of the services rémlered and to be rendered by
Attorneys, Client assigns and conveys to Attorneys the followiag present undivided interest in
and to Client’s claims or causes of action: S)
S
33-1/3% of any sum collected betes sui is filed; OR
40% of any sum collected suit is filed and settlement is
made without a ria OR
45% of any sum coll after the day prior to the first day
trial begins a lement is made or judgment is paid
without appéal.
The above percentages shall be calcul On the gross total settlement and/or recovery of cash,
property, reduction of debt or any, oi calculable benefit Client obtains through Attorney’s
representation, whether paid by pace ic payments, lump sum payment, transfer of property (real
or personal) or calculated by the cost of a structured settlement, or any combination
thereof. The contingent fee will be calculated on the gross recovery before the deduction of
costs and expenses. The co ent fee granted to attorneys based on the foregoing percentages
shall be and does hereby constitute a lien upon said claims or causes of action and any proceeds
of settlement or judgment, Client further understands that this Contract of Employment and
Power of Attorney extends through the trial of this cause and the post-trial motions leading to the
entry of a final trial Soot judgment. However, Attorneys will not have any duty to undertake an
appeal under this Co tract of Employment and Power of Attorney unless and until there is an
agreement bet eon Client and the Attorneys to undertake same for an additional fee. If there is
to be an ap cal; of this case and the Client and the Attorneys agree to appeal this case, then
Attorneys! feos for the consummation and handling of that appeal will be negotiated at that time.
4, REFERRAL FEE. Client understands that no one has an interest in this case as a referring
attorney included in the fees to be paid as described above. The referring attorney’s interest is
n/a of the gross attorney’s fees collected by Attorneys.
5. CosTS, EXPENSES AND COMMON EXPENSES. Client understands that Client’s claims may
be litigated together with similarly situated clients. Client therefore understands that Attorney
Client Initials: D Lf Page 2 of 6

may advance sums to.cover reasonable and necessary expenses which in his opinion are
reasonably necessary for the development of the Client’s case including any client-specific
expenses as well as Client’s share of various “common expenses.” Common expenses are
expenses that benefit multiple clients who are involved in the same litigation. Examples of
common expenses include costs associated with expert witnesses, consultants, investigators or
witnesses who will testify on common issues, deposition costs for deposing Defendants and
witnesses (i.e. the main defendants or the staff members of defendants), travel costs associated
with common depositions and with attending hearings at which motions on co issues are
heard, copying charges for copying or scanning documents that pertain to on issues or
clients, court reporter and deposition fees that pertain to common issues of ohents, as well as
miscellaneous costs such as parking costs, certified mail, delivery charges, and postage for
motions and briefings which pertain to common issues or clients. Client “spécific costs” are costs
that will likely be incurred that benefit only the one specific Sent eee would not be
incurred if that particular client did not exist. Examples of speéifié costs include physical
examinations, costs associated with deposition of the particulaf<client, costs associated with
expert witness testimony that will only benefit the specific cliént, copy charges, postage for
motions, letters, correspondence or other briefs which only benéfit the specific client as well as
travel costs to attend hearings, depositions or other legal eheening which only benefit the
specific client. Client understands and agrees that if Attomiey advance any court costs and other
litigation expenses incident to the handling of Clients) aims, including common expenses,
Client will be responsible for reimbursing Attorneys‘out of any recovery made in client’s
lawsuit. Common expense deductions will be called as follows:
S

At the time of settlement or resolutio of Clients’ case, Client will be responsible

for its percentage of the common expenses which will be deducted from any

recovery after the deduction of any attorneys’ fees. The percentage will be

calculated by taking the total nuriber of clients and dividing this number by the

total amount of common expenses. As an example, if there are 100 clients and

common expenses amoun 0,000.00, then each client would be required to

pay $100.00 in common pens (100 clients / $10,000.00 = $100). As another

example, if there are 150\cHents and the common expenses amount to $30,000.00,

then each client woul fe required to pay $200.00 in common expenses (150

clients / $30,000.00 < 00).
Client further agrees meat sums advanced by Attorneys to cover such necessary court costs and
other litigation expenses incident to the preparation and prosecution of Client’s claims or causes
of action will beetaid to Attorneys out of any sum collected in addition to any contingent fee
set forth hereii ient agrees that any advancement of costs or expenses by Attorneys shall
also constitut ien on Client’s claims and any proceeds of any settlement or judgment. If
there is n very for Client, Client will not be responsible for any costs and/or expenses
to develop the case.
6. WARRANTIES AND REPRESENTATIONS. Attorneys agree to use the firm’s best efforts in
representing Client. Client understands that Attorneys make no warranties or representations
regarding the successful outcome of Client’s claims or causes of action, the value thereof, or any
expected recovery, and any expression relative thereto is a matter of Attorney's opinion only.
Attorneys do not guarantee any timeframe within which Client’s claims or causes of action will
be resolved.
Client Initials: DL (2 Page 3 of 6

7. CLIENT OBLIGATIONS. Client agrees to tell Attorneys the truth, to cooperate with and
keep Attorneys informed of any developments relative to Client’s claims or causes of action, to
faithfully comply with this agreement, and to keep Attorneys advised of any changes to Client’s
address or telephone number.
8. FICTITIOUS, GROUNDLESS, OR BAD FAITH. Client understands that in the event a suit
filed in Client’s behalf is found to be frivolous, fictitious, groundless, or brought in bad faith,
Client may be liable for defendant's attorney's fees. NZ)
9. SANCTIONS. Client agrees that Client must timely comply with diyeSPory requests from
opposing counsel. Client understands that Client’s failure to comply -with discovery requests
could result in the court imposing sanctions in the form of a fine or 0 penalty. Client agrees
that in the event sanctions are imposed, Client will be solely responsible for paying any and all
sanctions, and Client further agrees that Attorneys will not be onsible or liable for any
sanction award. ®
oP
10. LIABILITY FOR CourT CosTs. Client understands ht in the event a lawsuit is filed in
Client’s behalf and such lawsuit is not ultimately resolve Client’s favor, court costs could be
assessed against Client. Client understands that aap costs will not be paid by Attorneys
and agrees to pay such court costs should they be impage .
11. IF NO RECOVERY. Client further undeiSiands that if Attorneys are unable to recover
anything either by settlement or trial, Client alfjowe Attorneys nothing as a fee and Client shall
not be obligated to reimburse Attorneys rege advanced on Client’s behalf.
12. | CONSENT TO ASSOCIATE. Clier understands and agrees to the association of Lance
Kassab of The Kassab Law Firm, Ress Montague of the law firm Montague, Pittman &
Varnado, P.A. and Tina Nicholsosef the Baker Nicholson Law Firm to represent Client and
other similarly situated Clients ini gation and/or potential claims. Attorneys have agreed to
split all attorney’s fees in the RN ing manner:
Fifty percent (50%) the Kassab Law Firm:
Forty percent (40%) 0 Montague, Pittman & Varnado, P.A.: and
Ten percent Ce to The Baker Nicholson Law Firm.
of
However, if The a Nicholson Law Firm assumes primary responsibility for litigation as lead
counsel in Cli case, then the Attorney’s have agreed to split all attorney’s fees in the
following m :
Fis cent (50%) to The Kassab Law Firm
Twenty-Five percent (25%) to Montague, Pitman & Varnado, P.A.; and
Twenty-Five percent (25%) to The Baker Nicholson Law Firm.
The lawyers and law firms listed above have agreed to assume joint responsibility for the
representation of Client. Client understands and agrees to the association of these law firms and
the percentages of fees allocated to each law firm as stated above. The division of fees between
Client Initials: | yay, Page 4 of 6

the lawyers and law firms listed above will not increase or change the amount of attorneys’
fees charged to the Client as outlined in Paragraph 3 above.

13. TERMINATION AND WITHDRAWAL. Client understands and agrees that Attorneys may
terminate the attorney-Client relationship created by this agreement and withdraw from Client’s
representation with or without Client’s consent for any reason Attorneys deem necessary.

14. CONTROVERSY AND DISPUTES. Any controversy arising out of or relating to
Attorneys’ representation of Client or this contract or any modificatidg) or extension
thereof, including any claim for breach of contract, tort, for damages, Gr for rescission or
reformation of this contract, or any other claim shall be settled by ‘a_court of law with
competent jurisdiction in Harris County, Texas without a jury. ©

SS
15. CLIENT REQUESTS. Client understands that if requests by t are not consistent with
the standard of care required of Attorneys, the Texas Disciplinary s of Professional Conduct,
the Texas Supreme Court’s Mandate of Professionalism, or¢ommon courtesies expected
between Attorneys and other lawyers or third parties, Attorneys are entitled to refuse without
breaching this agreement.
)

16. DISCIPLINARY ISSUES. Client understands oa other alternative remedies against
Defendant attorneys may exist. For that reason th ployment of Attorneys are not for the
purpose of prosecuting other alternative remedie she criminal, disciplinary, or other civil
matters. However, Client is hereby specifically a ised in accordance with the Disciplinary
Rules of Texas that the State Bar of Texas i vest gates and prosecutes professional misconduct
committed by Texas attorneys. Although nak ever complaint against or dispute with a lawyer
involves professional misconduct, the St ar's Office of General Counsel will provide you
with information about how to file a complaint. You may call the State Bar's General Counsel
Office toll free at 1-800-932-1900 fo re information. The complaint that may be filed by the
State Bar's General Counsel’s officesot by you as part of a disciplinary proceeding is NOT the
same thing as a legal malpracticg e¢ that may be prosecuted on your behalf by Attorneys.

17. CONTRACT SURVIV TY. This agreement and the powers and authority granted
herein shall survive and cs inate upon Client’s death, mental incapacity, or legal disability.
18. | SINGULAR ANDXPLURAL. When the context requires, singular nouns and pronouns used
herein include the phi:

wS

19. Savina ann SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this agreement is held void and/or
unenforceabl en such provision will be modified to reflect the parties’ intention. All
remaining gibpisions of this agreement shall remain in full force and effect.

20. | COMPLETE AGREEMENT. This document sets forth the complete agreement between
Attorneys and Client and may be modified only by a written instrument signed by both a legal
representative of LANCE CHRISTOPHER KAssaB, P.C. and Client. It is agreed that there are no
oral representations of any kind.
21. COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING. By signing below and initialing each page, Client
acknowledges he has fully read this agreement, its terms, effects and consequences and that its
Client Initials: | ye Page 5 of 6

terms, effects and consequences have been fully and completely explained to Client by Attorneys
to Client’s full satisfaction.
PLEASE INITIAL EACH PAGE, PRINT NAME, SIGN AND DATE
patep: A~Z28 - _, 2017.
é
E226 Ames | Lv wt EY
CLIENT: (Printed Name)
SS
CLIENT: (Si re)
®
GP
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A S)
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM, MONTAGUE, PITTMAN & Varna ; P.A.
BAKER NICHOLSON LAW FIRM
=a JZ- <£&
©
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Se
IN
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Client Initials: 9) Lts Page 6 of 6

LAW FIRM
1214 Elgin Street | Houston | Texas | 77004
p. 713.522.7400 | f. 713.522.7410
www.TexasLegalMalpractice.com
POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
Client(s) full legal name: Al, cL M avit - 1th. ( Lawn Ws /Seadin Salon
Client(s) home phone number: i work number: ,
Cell number: ED ient(s) Emait:
Client(s) social security number(s): Po (Confidential)
p This agreement is between the above client(s), hereinafter referred to as “Client” and LANCE
Sy, CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAW FIRM, MONTAGUE, PITTMAN &
wo) D VARNADO, P.A. and the BAKER NICHOLSON LAW FIRM hereinafter referred to as “Attorneys.”
“Qe. 1. SCOPE OF SERVICES. Attorneys are hereby employed and appointed as Client’s true and
“(apt attorneys to act for Client and to prosecute Client’s claims or causes of action against:
Asie WILLIAMSON, JIMMY WILLIAMSON, P.C. AND/OR MICHAEL A. POHL (Defendants) and
all ersons, firms, corporations, or business entities legally responsible for causing Client’s
damage sulting from such acts as follows:
Bagh Y, LEGAL MALPRACTICE AND/OR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
CAxisiNc OUT OF THE BP DEEP HORIZON LITIGATION
My
Client understands that t’s case may be filed and litigated jointly with other clients
who are similarly situated fo wR and/or who have similar claims against Defendants. As
such, Client is aware and agr (Chat Client’s confidential information may necessarily be
disclosed among other clients i (Sbrder to effectuate a settlement. Client further
understands and agrees that if a di iafeement or dispute arises between any of the
common clients to the sharing of the co dential information, the attorney-client privilege
may not be available for assertion by any of thea against the other(s) on certain issues.
Finally, if a common or aggregate settlement is ffesuatd, Client understands and agrees
that the offer or demand may require the consent 0 call) commonly-represented clients and
the failure of one or a few members of the group to consent to the settlement may result in
the withdrawal of the settlement or offer. 3 wy
Client further understands that Attorneys are not specialized in, nor y give, tax advice,
bankruptcy advice, family law or estate planning advice or any other advicé j volving other non-
civil or non-personal injury areas of specialized practice of law and they would recommend the
retention of a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) or qualified tax lawyer with regard to any
questions as to the taxability of any proceeds that are received pursuant to this agreement.
Client(s) Initials: fim CG, Page 1 of 6

2. AUTHORITY. Client authorizes Attomeys to act as Client’s negotiator, to file pleadings
and appear in courts of law in Client’s behalf, to prosecute Client’s claims or causes of action to
settlement or final judgment, and to take any appropriate legal action they deem reasonably
necessary in the preservation of Client’s rights and claims. Client further authorizes attorneys to
do all things that Client might lawfully do in Client’s behalf, and ratifies and confirms all such
lawful acts that Attorneys may do or cause to’be done on behalf of Client. Provided, however,
that no settlement shall be made by attorneys without Client’s approval. If Client refuses an
offer of settlement against Attorney’s recommendation, then Client agrees to become responsible
for paying all costs and expenses of the case, and must reimburse Attorney for expenses and
costs already incurred within seven (7) days of a written demand for such reimbursement. If
Client fails to timely reimburse Attorney after receiving such. written notice, then such failure
constitutes a termination of the representation by the Client. In the event of such termination,
Attorneys are entitled to retain their entire contingency fee interest.
3. CONTINGENT FEE. In consideration of the services rendered and to be rendered by
Attorneys, Client assigns and conveys to Attorneys the following present undivided interest in
and to Client’s claims or causes of action:
?.
% 33-1/3% of any sum collected before suit is filed; OR
XD 40% of any sum collected after suit is filed and settlement is
“Qe. made without a trial; OR
o, 45% of any sum collected after the day prior to the first day
Q trial begins and settlement is made or judgment is paid
SS) without appeal.
The above pee ntages shall be calculated on the gross total settlement and/or recovery of cash,
property, retin of debt or any other calculable benefit Client obtains through Attorney’s
representation, W ether aid by periodic payments, lump sum payment, transfer of property (real
or personal) or cli by using the cost of a structured settlement, or any combination
thereof. The continge ill be calculated on the gross recovery before the deduction of
costs and expenses. The c ent fee granted to attorneys based on the foregoing percentages
shall be and does hereby cons tutéalien upon said claims or causes of action and any proceeds
of settlement or judgment. Client t understands that this Contract of Employment and
Power of Attorney extends through tne hay f this cause and the post-trial motions leading to the
entry of a final trial court judgment. Hover Artomey will not have any duty to undertake an
appeal under this Contract of Employment akd’Power of Attorney unless and until there is an
agreement between Client and the Attorneys to wade e same for an additional fee. If there is
to be an appeal of this case and the Client and the eys agree to appeal this case, then
Attorneys’ fees for the consummation and handling of th RY, will be negotiated at that time.
4, REFERRAL FEE. Client understands that no one has an ie in this case as a referring
attorney included in the fees to be paid as described above. The F attorney’s interest is
n/a of the gross attorney’s fees collected by Attorneys. 7)
5. Costs, EXPENSES AND COMMON EXPENSES. Client understands that Client’s claims may
be litigated together with similarly situated clients. Client therefore understands that Attorney
Client Initials: Rife Page 2 of 6

may advance sums to cover reasonable and necessary expenses which in his opinion are
reasonably necessary for the development of the Client’s case including any client-specific
expenses as well as Client’s share of various “common expenses.” Common expenses are
expenses that benefit multiple clients who are involved in the same litigation. Examples of
common expenses include costs associated with expert witnesses, consultants, investigators or
witnesses who will testify on common issues, deposition costs for deposing Defendants and
witnesses (i.e. the main defendants or the staff members of defendants), travel costs associated
with common depositions and with attending hearings at which motions on common issues are
heard, copying charges for copying or scanning documents that pertain to common issues or
clients, court reporter and deposition fees that pertain to common issues or clients, as well as
miscellaneous costs such as parking costs, certified mail, delivery charges, and postage for
motions and briefings which pertain to common issues or clients. Client “specific costs” are costs
that will likely be incurred that benefit only the one specific client and likely would not be
incurred if that particular client did not exist. Examples of specific costs include physical
examinations, costs associated with deposition of the particular client, costs associated with
expert witness testimony that will only benefit the specific client, copy charges, postage for
motions, letters, correspondence or other briefs which only benefit the specific client as well as
travel costs to attend hearings, depositions or other legal proceedings which only benefit the
S) specific client. Client understands and agrees that if Attorneys advance any court costs and other
A) litigation expenses incident to the handling of Client’s claims, including common expenses,
Ae) Client will be responsible for reimbursing Attorneys out of any recovery made in client’s
Kp lawsuit. Common expense deductions will be calculated as follows:
""© At the time of settlement or resolution of Clients’ case, Client will be responsible
Sigfor its percentage of the common expenses which will be deducted from any
@eveyery after the deduction of any attomeys’ fees. The percentage will be
c ed by taking the total number of clients and dividing this number by the
= of common expenses. As an example, if there are 100 clients and
commo ses amount to $10,000.00, then each client would be required to
pay $100.00 ""6 on expenses (100 clients / $10,000.00 = $100). As another
example, if thee 50 clients and the common expenses amount to $30,000.00,
then each client veal required to pay $200.00 in common expenses (150
clients / $30,000.00 =
Client further agrees that all sums advan by Attomeys to cover such necessary court costs and
other litigation expenses incident to the rep and prosecution of Client’s claims or causes
of action will be repaid to Attorneys out 0 uncollected in addition to any contingent fee
set forth herein. Client agrees that any advancéient of costs or expenses by Attorneys shall
also constitute a lien on Client’s claims and any procel of any settlement or judgment. If
there is no recovery for Client, Client will not be response for any costs and/or expenses
to develop the case. Ye
6. WARRANTIES AND REPRESENTATIONS. Attorneys agree toisé the firm’s best efforts in
representing Client. Client understands that Attorneys make no vara or representations
regarding the successful outcome of Client’s claims or causes of action, theWalue thereof, or any
expected recovery, and any expression relative thereto is a matter of Attomey's opinion only.
Attorneys do not guarantee any timeframe within which Client’s claims or causes of action will
be resolved.
Client Initials: By WAG, Page 3 of 6

7. CLIENT OBLIGATIONS. Client agrees to tell Attorneys the truth, to cooperate with and
keep Attorneys informed of any developments relative to Client’s claims or causes of action, to
faithfully comply with this agreement, and to keep Attorneys advised of any changes to Client’s
address or telephone number.
8. FICTITIOUS, GROUNDLESS, OR BAD FAITH. Client understands that in the event a suit
filed in Client’s behalf is found to be frivolous, fictitious, groundless, or brought in bad faith,
Client may be liable for defendant's attorney's fees.
9, SANCTIONS. Client agrees that Client must timely comply with discovery requests from
opposing counsel. Client understands that Client’s failure to comply with discovery requests
could result in the court imposing sanctions in the form of a fine or other penalty. Client agrees
that in the event sanctions are imposed, Client will be solely responsible for paying any and all
sanctions, and Client further agrees that Attorneys will not be responsible or liable for any
sanction award.
10. LIABILITY FOR CourT Costs. Client understands that in the event a lawsuit is filed in
S) Client’s behalf and such lawsuit is not ultimately resolved in Client’s favor, court costs could be
A) assessed against Client. Client understands that such court costs will not be paid by Attorneys
Ae) and agrees to pay such court costs should they be imposed.
Z
“LG. IF NO RECOVERY. Client further understands that if Attorneys are unable to recover
° (apything either by settlement or trial, Client shall owe Attorneys nothing as a fee and Client shall
orb gbligated to reimburse Attorneys for expenses advanced on Client’s behalf.
12. Conse TO ASSOCIATE. Client understands and agrees to the association of Lance
Kassab of rn Law Firm, Doug Montague of the law firm Montague, Pittman &
Varnado, P.A.‘and Tina Nicholson of the Baker Nicholson Law Firm to represent Client and
other similarly situa jents in its litigation and/or potential claims. Attorneys have agreed to
split all attorney’s fees ollowing manner:
Fifty percent (50%) Hea Law Firm:
Forty percent (40%) to Mo gus Pittman & Varnado, P.A.: and
Ten percent (10%) to The Baker Nicholson Law Firm.
However, if The Baker Nicholson Law Firm sstimes primary responsibility for litigation as lead
counsel in Client’s case, then the Attorney’s ha’ (a eed to split all attorney’s fees in the
following manner: 5
Fifty percent (50%) to The Kassab Law Firm A Cy
Twenty-Five percent (25%) to Montague, Pitman & Varnad?.. and
Twenty-Five percent (25%) to The Baker Nicholson Law ©) GY
The lawyers and law firms listed above have agreed to assume joint reéponsibility for the
representation of Client. Client understands and agrees to the association of these law firms and
the percentages of fees allocated to each law firm as stated above. The division of fees between
Client Initials: (\\\G. Page 4 of 6

the lawyers and law firms listed above will not increase or change the amount of attorneys’
fees charged to the Client as outlined in Paragraph 3 above.
13. | TERMINATION AND WITHDRAWAL. Client understands and agrees that Attorneys may
terminate the attorney-Client relationship created by this agreement and withdraw from Client’s
representation with or without Client’s consent for any reason Attorneys deem necessary.
14. | CONTROVERSY AND DISPUTES. Any controversy arising out of or relating to
Attorneys’ representation of Client or this contract or any modification or extension
thereof, including any claim for breach of contract, tort, for damages, or for rescission or
reformation of this contract, or any other claim shall be settled by a court of law with
competent jurisdiction in Harris County, Texas without a jury.
15. | CLIENT REQUESTS. Client understands that if requests by Client are not consistent with
the standard of care required of Attorneys, the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct,
the Texas Supreme Court’s Mandate of Professionalism, or common courtesies expected
between Attorneys and other lawyers or third parties, Attorneys are entitled to refuse without
breaching this agreement.
?.
% 16. DISCIPLINARY ISSUES. Client understands that other alternative remedies against
Wi, Defendant attorneys may exist. For that reason the employment of Attorneys are not for the
Y, purpose of prosecuting other alternative remedies whether criminal, disciplinary, or other civil
° LS matters. However, Client is hereby specifically advised in accordance with the Disciplinary
° Cae of Texas that the State Bar of Texas investigates and prosecutes professional misconduct
ommutted by Texas attorneys. Although not every complaint against or dispute with a lawyer
invol essional misconduct, the State Bar's Office of General Counsel will provide you
with info ion about how to file a complaint. You may call the State Bar's General Counsel
Office toll ee 1-500-932-1900 for more information. The complaint that may be filed by the
State Bar's Ge Cpel's office or by you as part of a disciplinary proceeding is NOT the
same thing as a lega ‘appractice case that may be prosecuted on your behalf by Attorneys.
17. CONTRACT Sunvivainsty, This agreement and the powers and authority granted
herein shall survive and not te unBSS upon Client’s death, mental incapacity, or legal disability.
18. SINGULAR AND PLURAL. When tbe context requires, singular nouns and pronouns used
herein include the plural. &
19. SAVINGS AND SEVERABILITY. If any this i6n of this agreement is held void and/or
unenforceable, then such provision will be modi o reflect the parties' intention. All
remaining provisions of this agreement shall remain in TE effect.
O
20. © COMPLETE AGREEMENT. This document sets forth We plete agreement between
Attorneys and Client and may be modified only by a written insta signed by both a legal
representative of LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. and Client. It is seed that there are no
oral representations of any kind.
21. COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING. By signing below and initialing each page, Client
acknowledges he has fully read this agreement, its terms, effects and consequences and that its
Client Initials: AY \\ (, Page 5 of 6

terms, effects and consequences have been fully and completely explained to Client by Attorneys
to Client’s full satisfaction.
PLEASE INITIAL EACH PAGE, PRINT NAME, SIGN AND DATE
patep: -2\ 2017.
CLIENT: (Printed Name)
CLIENT: (Signature)
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A
S) THE KASSAB LAW FIRM, MONTAGUE, PITTMAN & VARNADO, P.A.
A) BAKER NICHOLSON LAW FIRM
&, ; F
“se i ‘a,
©
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Ae
We
MO
&
Qo
“Q5
<),
“SY
Ly
Client Initials: Qs Page 6 of 6

LAW FIRM
1420 Alabama Street | Houston | Texas | 77004
p. 713.522.7400 | f. 713.522.7410
www.TexasLegalMalpractice.com
POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
@
Client(s) full legal name:
Client(s) address: _
Client(s) home phone number TE ork number; -_
Cell number: Client(s) Email:
Client(s) social security number(s): ____ (Confidential)
@
This agreement is between the above client(s), herein > ered to as “Client” and LANCE
CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASS FIRM, MONTAGUE, PITTMAN &
VARNADO, P.A. and the BAKER NICHOLSON LAW ereinafter referred to as “Attorneys.”
1. SCOPE OF SERVICES. Attorneys are perdy npoyed and appointed as Client’s true and
lawful attorneys to act for Client and to pr égute Client’s claims or causes of action against:
MICHAEL A. POHL (Defendant) and all other persons, firms, corporations, or business entities
legally responsible for causing Client’s damages resulting from such acts as follows:
BARRATRY, LEGAL MAL TICE AND/OR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
ARISING F A ROLLOVER CASE INCIDENT
Client understands that Cli ®) case may be filed and litigated jointly with other clients
who are similarly situated lient and/or who have similar claims against Defendants. As
such, Client is aware an rees that Client’s confidential information may necessarily be
disclosed among other) clients in order to effectuate a settlement. Client further
understands and agrees that if a disagreement or dispute arises between any of the
common clients to sharing of the confidentiai information, the attorney-client privilege .
may not be av ale e for assertion by any of them against the other(s) on certain issues.
inally,if-a corn on or-ageregate settlemen effectuated,-Client-understands-and-agrees———
that the off or oF demand may require the consent of all commonly-represented clients and
the failu ¢ of one or a few members of the group to consent to the settlement may result in
the withdrawal of the settlement or offer.
Client further understands that Attorneys are not specialized in, nor do they give, tax advice,
bankruptcy advice, family law or estate planning advice or any other advice involving other non-
civil or non-personal injury areas of specialized practice of law and they would recommend the
retention of a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) or qualified tax lawyer with regard to any
questions as to the taxability of any proceeds that are received pursuant to this agreement.
Client(s) Initials: MN C Page 1 of 6

2. AUTHORITY. Client authorizes Attorneys to act as Client’s negotiator, to file pleadings
and appear in courts of law in Client’s behalf, to prosecute Client’s claims or causes of action to
settlement or final judgment, and to take any appropriate legal action they deem reasonably
necessary in the preservation of Client’s rights and claims. Client further authorizes attorneys to
do all things that Client might lawfully do in Client’s behalf, and ratifies and confirms all such
lawful acts that Attorneys may do or cause to be done on behalf of Client. Provided, however,
that no settlement shall be made by attorneys without Client’s approval. If Client refuses an
offer of settlement against Attorney’s recommendation, then Client agrees to becaite responsible
for paying all costs and expenses of the case, and must reimburse Actornes expenses and
costs already incurred within seven (7) days of a written demand for sucheimbursement. If
Client fails to timely reimburse Attorney after receiving such written n , then such failure
constitutes a termination of the representation by the Client. In the event of such termination,
Attomeys are entitled to retain their entire contingency fee interest. . &
3. | CONTINGENT FEE. In consideration of the services renteved and to be rendered by
Attorneys, Client assigns and conveys to Attorneys the following present undivided interest in
and to Client’s claims or causes of action: &
33-1/3% of any sum collected before shit is filed; OR
40% of any sum collected afiereuit is filed and settlement is
made without a na ge
45% of any sum collected er the day prior to the first day
trial begins an ement is made or judgment is paid
without app nae
The above percentages shall be caleulaedn the gross total settlement and/or recovery of cash,
property, reduction of debt or any other calculable benefit Client obtains through Attorney’s
representation, whether paid by peri payments, lump sum payment, transfer of property (real
or personal) or calculated > cost of a structured settlement, or any combination
thereof. The contingent fee e calculated on the gross recovery before the deduction of
costs and expenses. The contingent fee granted to attorneys based on the foregoing percentages
shall be and does hereby constitute a lien upon said claims or causes of action and any proceeds
of settlement or jud ~” Client further understands that this Contract of Employment and
Power of Attorney exis through the trial of this cause and the post-trial motions leading to the
entry of a final trial ¢oyirt judgment. However, Attorneys will not have any duty to undertake an
appeal under thi Contract of Employment and Power of Attorney unless and until there is an
agreement betwss Client and the Attorneys to undertake same for an additional fee. If there is
to be an appe4lof this case and the Client and the Attorneys agree to appeal this case, then
Attomeys fees for the consummation and handling of that appeal will be negotiated at that time.
4. REFERRAL FEE. Client understands that no one has an interest in this case as a referring
attorney included in the fees to be paid as described above. The referring attorney’s interest is
n/a of the gross attorney’s fees collected by Attorneys.
5. Costs, EXPENSES AND COMMON EXPENSES. Client understands that Client’s claims may
be litigated together with similarly situated clients. Client therefore understands that Attorney
may advance sums to cover reasonable and necessary expenses which in his opinion are
Client Initials: me _ Page 2 of 6

reasonably necessary for the development of the Client’s case including any client-specific
expenses as well as Client’s share of various “common expenses.” Common expenses are
expenses that benefit multiple clients who are involved in the same litigation. Examples of
common expenses include costs associated with expert witnesses, consultants, investigators or
witnesses who will testify on common issues, deposition costs for deposing Defendants and
witnesses (i.e. the main defendants or the staff members of defendants), travel costs associated
with common depositions and with attending hearings at which motions on common issues are
heard, copying charges for copying or scanning documents that pertain to contin issues or
clients, court reporter and deposition fees that pertain to common issues or clients, as well as
miscellaneous costs such as parking costs, certified mail, delivery charges,))and postage for
motions and briefings which pertain to common issues or clients. Client “specific costs” are costs
that will likely be incurred that benefit only the one specific client i tikes would not be
incurred if that particular client did not exist. Examples of specificocosts include physical
examinations, costs associated with deposition of the particul tent, costs associated with
expert witness testimony that will only benefit the specific client/ copy charges, postage for
motions, letters, correspondence or other briefs which only be the specific client as well as
travel costs to attend hearings, depositions or other legal edings which only benefit the
specific client. Client understands and agrees that if Atto advance any court costs and other
litigation expenses incident to the handling of Client’s¢ aims, including common expenses,
Client will be responsible for reimbursing Attomne¥s_jout of any recovery made in client’s
lawsuit. Common expense deductions will be “— as follows:

At the time of settlement or resolution Clients case, Client will be responsible

for its percentage of the common expense which will be deducted from any

recovery after the deduction of attorneys’ fees. The percentage will be

calculated by taking the total number of clients and dividing this number by the

total amount of common expenses. As an example, if there are 100 clients and

common expenses amount tet 0,000.00, then each client would be required to

pay $100.00 in common expenses (100 clients / $10,000.00 = $100). As another

example, if there are 15G gents and the common expenses amount to $30,000.00,

then each client would be required to pay $200.00 in common expenses (150

clients / $0 000.00= $20
Client further agrees nit.all sums advanced by Attorneys to cover such necessary court costs and
other litigation expe incident to the preparation and prosecution of Client’s claims or causes
of action will be repaid to Attorneys out of any sum collected in addition to any contingent fee
set forth herein. ient agrees that any advancement of costs or expenses by Attorneys shall
also constitute@ ‘lien on Client’s claims and any proceeds of any settlement or judgment. If
there is n very for Client, Client will not be responsible for any costs and/or expenses
to re Ha ne feeover:
6. WARRANTIES AND REPRESENTATIONS. Attorneys agree to use the firm’s best efforts in
representing Client. Client understands that Attorneys make no warranties or representations
regarding the successful outcome of Client’s claims or causes of action, the value thereof, or any
expected recovery, and any expression relative thereto is a matter of Attorney's opinion only.
Attorneys do not guarantee any timeframe within which Client’s claims or causes of action will
be resolved.
Client Initials: Nn Page 3 of 6

7. CLIENT OBLIGATIONS. Client agrees to tell Attorneys the truth, to cooperate with and
keep Attorneys informed of any developments relative to Client’s claims or causes of action, to
faithfully comply with this agreement, and to keep Attorneys advised of any changes to Client’s
address or telephone number.
8. FICTITIOUS, GROUNDLESS, OR BAD FAITH. Client understands that in the event a suit
filed in Client’s behalf is found to be frivolous, fictitious, groundless, or broughtin bad faith,
Client may be liable for defendant's attorney's fees. RQ
@
9. SANCTIONS. Client agrees that Client must timely comply with discovery requests from
opposing counsel. Client understands that Client’s failure to comply | discovery requests
could result in the court imposing sanctions in the form of a fine or ot enalty. Client agrees
that in the event sanctions are imposed, Client will be solely responsible for paying any and all
sanctions, and Client further agrees that Attorneys will not be gesponsible or liable for any
sanction award.
&

10. LIABILITY FOR COURT Costs. Client understands thatin the event a lawsuit is filed in
Client’s behalf and such lawsuit is not ultimately sven Ce favor, court costs could be
assessed against Client. Client understands that such costs will not be paid by Attorneys
and agrees to pay such court costs should they be imposed.
11. IF NO RECOVERY. Client further indent that if Attorneys are unable to recover
anything either by settlement or trial, Client sh owe Attorneys nothing as a fee and Client shall
not be obligated to reimburse Attorneys for ¢ ses advanced on Client’s behalf.
12. CONSENT TO ASSOCIATE. Clieat understands and agrees to the association of Lance
Kassab of The Kassab Law Firm, Doug Montague of the law firm Montague, Pittman &
Vamado, P.A. and Tina Nicholso rhe Baker Nicholson Law Firm to represent Client and
other similarly situated Clients ins litigation and/or potential claims. Attorneys have agreed to
split all attorney’s fees in the following manner:

Fifty percent (50% The Kassab Law Firm:

Forty percent (4 0 Montague, Pittman & Varnado, P.A.: and

Ten percent a The Baker Nicholson Law Firm.
However, if The Baker Nicholson Law Firm assumes primary responsibility for litigation as lead
counsel in Client's case, then the Attorney’s have agreed to split all attorney’s fees in the
following mee

Pitty percent (50%) to The Kassab Law Firm

Twenty-Five percent (25%) to Montague, Pitman & Varnado, P.A.; and

Twenty-Five percent (25%) to The Baker Nicholson Law Firm.
The lawyers and law firms listed above have agreed to assume joint responsibility for the
representation of Client. Client understands and agrees to the association of these law firms and
the percentages of fees allocated to each law firm as stated above. The division of fees between
the lawyers and law firms listed above will not increase or change the amount of attorneys’
fees charged to the Client as outlined in Paragraph 3 above.
Client Initials: | hf Page 4 of 6

13. TERMINATION AND WITHDRAWAL. Client understands and agrees that Attorneys may
terminate the attorney-Client relationship created by this agreement and withdraw from Client’s
representation with or without Client’s consent for any reason Attorneys deem necessary.
14. CONTROVERSY AND DISPUTES. Any controversy arising out of or relating to
Attorneys’ representation of Client or this contract or any modification Ns extension
thereof, including any claim for breach of contract, tort, for damages, or fora scission or
reformation of this contract, or any other claim shall be settled by a colt of law with
competent jurisdiction in Harris County, Texas without a jury. GS
XS

15. CLIENT REQUESTS. Client understands that if requests by Clie not consistent with
the standard of care required of Attorneys, the Texas Disciplinary Rul Professional Conduct,
the Texas Supreme Court’s Mandate of Professionalism, or on courtesies expected
between Attorneys and other lawyers or third parties, Attorneys entitled to refuse without
breaching this agreement. &

16. DISCIPLINARY ISSUES. Client understands that ther alternative remedies against
Defendant attorneys may exist. For that reason the empJoyment of Attorneys are not for the
purpose of prosecuting other alternative remedies whether criminal, disciplinary, or other civil
matters. However, Client is hereby specifically advised in accordance with the Disciplinary
Rules of Texas that the State Bar of Texas investigates and prosecutes professional misconduct
committed by Texas attorneys. Although not complaint against or dispute with a lawyer
involves professional misconduct, the State s Office of General Counsel will provide you
with information about how to file a co t. You may call the State Bar's General Counsel
Office toll free at 1-800-932-1900 for moresinformation, The complaint that may be filed by the
State Bar's General Counsel’s office ox,by you as part of a disciplinary proceeding is NOT the
same thing as a legal malpractice ner may be prosecuted on your behalf by Attorneys.

17. CONTRACT SURVIVABILITY. This agreement and the powers and authority granted
herein shall survive and not tefquinate upon Clients death, mental incapacity, or legal disability.
18. SINGULAR AND Pian When the context requires, singular nouns and pronouns used
herein include the plugat

19. SaviNcs, 4) SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this agreement is held void and/or
unenforceable, (then such provision will be modified to reflect the parties’ intention. All
remaining Peon of this agreement shall remain in full force and effect.

20. COmDLETE AGREEMENT. This document sets forth the complete agreement between
Attorneys and Client and may be modified only by a written instrument signed by both a legal
representative of LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. and Client. It is agreed that there are no
oral representations of any kind.

21. COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING. By signing below and initialing each page, Client
acknowledges he has fully read this agreement, its terms, effects and consequences and that its
terms, effects and consequences have been fully and completely explained to Client by Attorneys
to Client’s full satisfaction.

Client Initials: / Zi Page 5 of 6

PLEASE INITIAL EACH PAGE, PRINT NAME, SIGN AND DATE
DATED: Agvil) ZO, , 2017.
CLIENT: (Printed Name) <o
~~
CLIENT: (Signature)>
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A Z)
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM, MONTAGUE, PITTMAN & VARNADQ; PA.
BAKER NICHOLSON LAW FIRM
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LAW FIRM
1420 Alabama Street | Houston | Texas | 77004
p. 713.522.7400 | f. 713.522.7410
www.TexasLegalMalpractice.com
POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
Client(s) full legal name: MEP a Fi OAAS o WO -

(s) = —e- a
Client(s) home phone number: work number: XG a —
Cel! number a i ©
Client(s) social security number(s): cr (Confidential)

. ° : bd @ it . 39

This agreement is between the above client(s), hereinaft ferred to as “Client” and LANCE

CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB RM, MONTAGUE, PITTMAN &
VARNADO, P.A. and the BAKER NICHOLSON LAW FI ereinafter referred to as “Attorneys.”
1, SCOPE OF SERVICES. Attorneys are here Snployed and appointed as Client’s true and
lawful attorneys to act for Client and to prose lient’s claims or causes of action against:
MICHAEL A. POHL (Defendant) and all ot rsons, firms, corporations, or business entities
legally responsible for causing Client’s d: e s resulting from such acts as follows:

BARRATRY, LEGAL MALPR¢ on AND/OR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
ARISING Our oF A ROLLOVER CASE INCIDENT
ca

Client understands that re ase may be filed and litigated jointly with other clients
who are similarly situated to.Client and/or who have similar claims against Defendants. As
such, Client is aware and es that Client’s confidential information may necessarily be
disclosed among other nts in order to effectuate a settlement. Client further
understands and agrées) that if a disagreement or dispute arises between any of the
common clients to the sharing of the confidential information, the attorney-client privilege
may not be available for assertion by any of them against the other(s) on certain issues.
Finally, if a co NRG i or aggregate settlement is effectuated, Client understands and agrees
that the offer ore lemand may require the consent of all commonly-represented clients and
the failure of on e or a few members of the group to consent to the settlement may result in
the withdraw al of the settlement or offer.

Client further understands that Attorneys are not specialized in, nor do they give, tax advice,
bankruptcy advice, family law or estate planning advice or any other advice involving other non-
civil or non-personal injury areas of specialized practice of law and they would recommend the
retention of a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) or qualified tax lawyer with regard to any
questions as to the taxability of any proceeds that are received pursuant to this agreement.
Client(s) Initials: WS Page 1 of 6

2. AUTHORITY. Client authorizes Attorneys to act as Client’s negotiator, to file pleadings
and appear in courts of law in Client’s behalf, to prosecute Client’s claims or causes of action to
settlement or final judgment, and to take any appropriate legal action they deem reasonably
necessary in the preservation of Client’s rights and claims. Client further authorizes attorneys to
do all things that Client might lawfully do in Client’s behalf, and ratifies and confirms all such
lawful acts that Attorneys may do or cause to be done on behalf of Client. Provided, however,
that no settlement shall be made by attorneys without Client’s approval. If Client refuses an
offer of settlement against Attorney’s recommendation, then Client agrees to becothe responsible
for paying all costs and expenses of the case, and must reimburse Attorne expenses and
costs already incurred within seven (7) days of a written demand for ok nen If
Client fails to timely reimburse Attorney after receiving such written notive/ then such failure
constitutes a termination of the representation by the Client. In the overt of such termination,
Attomeys are entitled to retain their entire contingency fee interest. eS
3. CONTINGENT FEE. In consideration of the services wa and to be rendered by
Attomeys, Client assigns and conveys to Attorneys the followjag resent undivided interest in
and to Client’s claims or causes of action: SF
33-1/3% of any sum collected before suitis filed; OR
40% of any sum collected ate suit is filed and settlement is
made without a trial; Re
45% of any sum collected:after the day prior to the first day
trial begins and settlement is made or judgment is paid
without oe
The above percentages shall be calculated.o the gross total settlement and/or recovery of cash,
property, reduction of debt or any oth& calculable benefit Client obtains through Attorney’s
representation, whether paid by periodié)payments, lump sum payment, transfer of property (real
or personal) or calculated by usi e cost of a structured settlement, or any combination
thereof. The contingent fee wi calculated on the gross recovery before the deduction of
costs and expenses. The conti t fee granted to attorneys based on the foregoing percentages
shall be and does hereby constignte a lien upon said claims or causes of action and any proceeds
of settlement or judgmen ke ient further understands that this Contract of Employment and
Power of Attorney ete hh the trial of this cause and the post-trial motions leading to the
entry of a final trial cour udgment. However, Attorneys will not have any duty to undertake an
appeal under this Coftiract of Employment and Power of Attomey unless and until there is an
agreement betw: ient and the Attorneys to undertake same for an additional fee. If there is
to be an appea' this case and the Client and the Attorneys agree to appeal this case, then
Attorneys' fep@r the consummation and handling of that appeal will be negotiated at that time.
4. Rikebean FEE. Client understands that no one has an interest in this case as a referring
attorney included in the fees to be paid as described above. The referring attorney’s interest is
n/a of the gross attorney’s fees collected by Attorneys.
5. COSTS, EXPENSES AND COMMON EXPENSES. Client understands that Client’s claims may
be litigated together with similarly situated clients. Client therefore understands that Attorney
may advance sums to cover reasonable and necessary expenses which in his opinion are
Client Initials: INS Page 2 of 6

reasonably necessary for the development of the Client’s case including any client-specific
expenses as well as Client’s share of various “common expenses.” Common expenses are
expenses that benefit multiple clients who are involved in the same litigation. Examples of
common expenses include costs associated with expert witnesses, consultants, investigators or
witnesses who will testify on common issues, deposition costs for deposing Defendants and
witnesses (i.e. the main defendants or the staff members of defendants), travel costs associated
with common depositions and with attending hearings at which motions on common issues are
heard, copying charges for copying or scanning documents that pertain to oo issues or
clients, court reporter and deposition fees that pertain to common issues or RO Ss, as well as
miscellaneous costs such as parking costs, certified mail, delivery char. d postage for
motions and briefings which pertain to common issues or clients. Client “s cific costs” are costs
that will likely be incurred that benefit only the one specific client and likely would not be
incurred if that particular client did not exist. Examples of specifig. cost include physical
examinations, costs associated with deposition of the particular Ko , costs associated with
expert witness testimony that will only benefit the specific cliget) opy charges, postage for
motions, letters, correspondence or other briefs which only benefit the specific client as well as
travel costs to attend hearings, depositions or other legal wedtsadings which only benefit the
specific client. Client understands and agrees that if Attorn dvance any court costs and other
litigation expenses incident to the handling of Client’s s, including common expenses,
Client will be responsible for reimbursing Attorne cout of any recovery made in client’s
lawsuit. Common expense deductions will be sels follows:

At the time of settlement or resolution of Clients case, Client will be responsible

for its percentage of the common expenses which will be deducted from an

P ge Mi

recovery after the deduction of ee fees. The percentage will be

calculated by taking the total nume of clients and dividing this number by the

total amount of common expensé§;’As an example, if there are 100 clients and

common expenses amount to $10,000.00, then each client would be required to

pay $100.00 in common e es (100 clients / $10,000.00 = $100). As another

example, if there are 3 do and the common expenses amount to $30,000.00,

then each client would\be required to pay $200.00 in common expenses (150

clients / $30,000.00 78200).
Client further agrees ht advanced by Attorneys to cover such necessary court costs and
other litigation expensessincident to the preparation and prosecution of Client’s claims or causes
of action will be r iF t0 Attorneys out of any sum collected in addition to any contingent fee
set forth herein, Client agrees that any advancement of costs or expenses by Attorneys shall
also constitute a lien on Client’s claims and any proceeds of any settlement or judgment. If
there is no reéovery for Client, Client will not be responsible for any costs and/or expenses
to develop the case.
6. WARRANTIES AND REPRESENTATIONS. Attorneys agree to use the firm’s best efforts in
representing Client. Client understands that Attorneys make no warranties or representations
regarding the successful outcome of Client’s claims or causes of action, the value thereof, or any
expected recovery, and any expression relative thereto is a matter of Attorney's opinion only.
Attorneys do not guarantee any timeframe within which Client’s claims or causes of action will
be resolved.
Client Initials: TY “ Page 3 of 6

7. CLIENT OBLIGATIONS. Client agrees to tell Attorneys the truth, to cooperate with and
keep Attorneys informed of any developments relative to Client’s claims or causes of action, to
faithfully comply with this agreement, and to keep Attorneys advised of any changes to Client’s
address or telephone number.
8. FICTITIOUS, GROUNDLESS, OR BAD FAITH. Client understands that in the event a suit
filed in Client’s behalf is found to be frivolous, fictitious, groundless, or brought in bad faith,
Client may be liable for defendant's attorney's fees. AS
9. SANCTIONS. Client agrees that Client must timely comply with disso requests from
opposing counsel. Client understands that Client’s failure to comply withsdiscovery requests
could result in the court imposing sanctions in the form of a fine or other penal Client agrees
that in the event sanctions are imposed, Client will be solely responsi or paying any and all
sanctions, and Client further agrees that Attorneys will not be responsible or liable for any
sanction award. &y
10. ‘LIABILITY FOR Court Costs. Client understands that ja the event a lawsuit is filed in
Client’s behalf and such lawsuit is not ultimately resolved inClient’s favor, court costs could be
assessed against Client. Client understands that such couthabsts will not be paid by Attorneys
and agrees to pay such court costs should they be imps
11. IF NO RECOVERY. Client further underst that if Attorneys are unable to recover
anything either by settlement or trial, Client sha Attorneys nothing as a fee and Client shall
not be obligated to reimburse Attorneys for expenses advanced on Client’s behalf.
12. CONSENT TO ASSOCIATE. Clint ndesands and agrees to the association of Lance
Kassab of The Kassab Law Firm, Dotg”’ Montague of the law firm Montague, Pittman &
Varnado, P.A. and Tina Nicholson ofthe Baker Nicholson Law Firm to represent Client and
other similarly situated Clients in its litigation and/or potential claims. Attorneys have agreed to
split all attorney’s fees in the owing manner:

Fifty percent (50%) tothe Kassab Law Firm:

Forty percent Orgs ontague, Pittman & Varnado, P.A.: and

Ten percent (0); e Baker Nicholson Law Firm.
However, if The Baker Nicholson Law Firm assumes primary responsibility for litigation as lead
counsel in Client’ sease, then the Attorney’s have agreed to split all attorney’s fees in the
following manrier:,""

©

Fifty percent (50%) to The Kassab Law Firm

T y-Five percent (25%) to Montague, Pitman & Varnado, P.A.; and

Twenty-Five percent (25%) to The Baker Nicholson Law Firm.
The lawyers and law firms listed above have agreed to assume joint responsibility for the
representation of Client. Client understands and agrees to the association of these law firms and
the percentages of fees allocated to each law firm as stated above. The division of fees between
the lawyers and law firms listed above will not increase or change the amount of attorneys’
fees charged to the Client as outlined in Paragraph 3 above.
Client Initials: TIt4 Page 4 of 6

13. TERMINATION AND WITHDRAWAL. Client understands and agrees that Attorneys may
terminate the attorney-Client relationship created by this agreement and withdraw from Client’s
representation with or without Client’s consent for any reason Attorneys deem necessary.

14, CONTROVERSY AND DISPUTES. Any controversy arising out of or relating to
Attorneys’ representation of Client or this contract or any modification or extension
thereof, including any claim for breach of contract, tort, for damages, or foxirescission or
reformation of this contract, or any other claim shall be settled by a cout of law with
competent jurisdiction in Harris County, Texas without a jury. )

15, CLIENT REQUESTS. Client understands that if requests by Clien not consistent with
the standard of care required of Attorneys, the Texas Disciplinary Rul rofessional Conduct,
the Texas Supreme Court’s Mandate of Professionalism, or co n courtesies expected
between Attorneys and other lawyers or third parties, Attomeys(are entitled to refuse without
breaching this agreement. S

16. DISCIPLINARY ISSUES. Client understands that oo alternative remedies against
Defendant attorneys may exist. For that reason the em ent of Attorneys are not for the
purpose of prosecuting other alternative remedies whee rime disciplinary, or other civil
matters. However, Client is hereby specifically advised in accordance with the Disciplinary
Rules of Texas that the State Bar of Texas investigates and prosecutes professional misconduct
committed by Texas attorneys. Although not ope opin against or dispute with a lawyer
involves professional misconduct, the State ‘s’ Office of General Counsel will provide you
with information about how to file a complaint’ You may call the State Bar's General Counsel
Office toll free at 1-800-932-1900 for m ormation. The complaint that may be filed by the
State Bar's General Counsel’s office or epyou as part of a disciplinary proceeding is NOT the
same thing as a legal malpractice case that may be prosecuted on your behalf by Attorneys.

17. CONTRACT sunvivanases This agreement and the powers and authority granted
herein shall survive and not tertninlate upon Client’s death, mental incapacity, or legal disability.
18. SINGULAR AND Pua When the context requires, singular nouns and pronouns used
herein include the plural‘

19. SAVINGS AND) SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this agreement is held void and/or
unenforceable, thenysuch provision will be modified to reflect the parties’ intention. All
remaining provisions of this agreement shall remain in full force and effect.

20. Contry AGREEMENT. This document sets forth the complete agreement between
Attorneys Client and may be modified only by a written instrument signed by both a legal
representative of LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. and Client. It is agreed that there are no
oral representations of any kind.

21. COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING. By signing below and initialing each page, Client
acknowledges he has fully read this agreement, its terms, effects and consequences and that its
terms, effects and consequences have been fully and completely explained to Client by Attorneys
to Client’s full satisfaction.

Client Initials: “7 f, “3 Page 5 of 6

PLEASE INITIAL EACH PAGE, PRINT NAME, SIGN AND DATE
J. /
DATED: “/ LE f -_, 2017.
Wise ~ faerry
CLIENT: (Printed Name) _<C (
CLIENT: (Signature) /
© [/
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A Q
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM, MONTAGUE, PITTMAN & VARNADO PA.
BAKER NICHOLSON LAW FIRM
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Client Initials: / 7 aa Page 6 of 6"
34,2022-09-12,RSP,Kassab,Kassab’s response to Pohl no-evid MSJ,"Kassab's Response to Pohl's Motion for Partial Traditional and No-Evidence Summary Judgment on Affirmative Defenses — opposes Pohl's attempt to eliminate Kassab's affirmative defenses of justification, unclean hands, illegality, unlawful acts, criminal acts, and in pari delicto, and challenges Pohl's global no-evidence motion as procedurally defective under Timpte Industries v. Gish","Phase 3 response brief filed September 12, 2022 (same day as Kassab's declaration, Filing #33). Responds to Pohl's motion seeking to eliminate Kassab's key affirmative defenses before trial. Incorporates by reference Kassab's own MSJs (June 8, 2021 and August 29, 2022, i.e. Filing #30), the Nicholson MSJ (August 19, 2022), and Nicholson's response to Pohl's motion (September 12, 2022). Addressed to Judge Scot 'Dolli' Dollinger.",MSJ-3,N/A,Phase 3,2022-09-12_RSP_Kassab-Response-to-Pohl-No-Evid-MSJ_FILED.pdf,"Deny Pohl's Motion for Partial Traditional and No-Evidence Summary Judgment on Affirmative Defenses; alternatively, grant continuance under Rule 166a(g) to allow completion of discovery on illegality defense; grant summary judgment against Plaintiffs ordering they take nothing on their claims against Kassab","9/12/2022 6:16 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 68179652
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 9/12/2022 6:16 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIALk DISTRICT
THE KASSAB DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFSC’ MOTION FOR
PARTIAL TRADITIONAL AND NO-EVIDENCE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE SCOT “DOLLI” DOLLINGEtR:
Defendants, Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C.
d/b/a/ The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab”) file this, theeir Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Partial Traditional and No-Evidence Suummary Judgment on Affirmative
Defenses,1 and would respectfully show the following.
INTRaODUCTION
Pohl2 committed illegal and unethical barratry and he wants Kassab, who
brought the barratry litigation aend grievances against Pohl on behalf of more than
four hundred (400) of Pohl’fs illegally solicited clients, to pay for Pohl’s barratry
defense costs. But Pohl’s claims are barred for several reasons, including based on
several affirmative defenses. Pohl has filed the instant Motion, seeking partial
traditional summiary judgment on the affirmative defenses of justification, unclean
hands, illegoality, and unlawful acts. However, Pohl has not negated those defenses
as a matter of law. As to the other defenses, Pohl attempts to dispose of them
through a global and conclusory no-evidence challenge, which is insufficient.
1 The self-serving title of the pleading is “Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses that Seek to Relitigate Failed Barratry Claims Against Plaintiffs
and No-Evidence Motion on the Remaining Affirmative Defenses.”
2 This refers collectively to Plaintiffs Michael A. Pohl and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC.
Regardless, Kassab can demonstrate, either here or in incorporated summary
judgment briefing, that each of the defenses applicable to him apply, and that
evidence supports each of them. Accordingly, the Motion should be in all things
denied. k
GENERAL OBJECTION C
Pohl inappropriately suggests that all barratry suits were resolved on the
merits. That is incorrect. One of the lawsuits – the Berry caise – was settled,3 which
suggests that the case had merit. Another lawsuit – the Cheatham case – was
initially dismissed on summary judgment but recently reversed because fact issues
existed on whether Pohl and his co-counsel committed barratry. See Cheatham v.
Pohl, No. 01-20-00046-CV, 2022 Tex. Appl. LEXIS 6528 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Aug. 30, 2022, no pet. h.). TheM other two lawsuits – Brumfield and Gandy –
were dismissed, not on the merits, but on the affirmative defense of limitations. See
Brumfield v. Williamson, 634 iS.W.3d 170, 177 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021,
pet. denied) and Gandy v. Williamson, 634 S.W.3d 214 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2021, pet. denoied). “An affirmative defense presents a situation where a
plaintiff cannot relcover even if his claims are true because of some other fact that
the defendant ihas pled as a bar.” Man Engines & Components, Inc. v. Shows, 434
S.W.3d 132, 137 (Tex. 2014), In other words, none of the barratry suits have
been adjudicated on the merits, and neither has the issue of whether Pohl
committed barratry.
3 Exhibit 1, September 12, 2022 Declaration of Lance Kassab at ¶ 14.
Kassab incorporates and adopts by reference all evidence and argument in
his Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment filed on August 29, 2022. See TEX. R.
CIV. P. 58. Kassab also incorporate all evidence and argument in the Traditional
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Tina Nicholson and Baker Nikcholson, LLP
(“Nicholson”) on August 19, 2022, as well as Nicholson’s responsCe to Pohl’s Motion
filed September 12, 2022, to the extent that response is applicable to Kassab. The
combined evidence and argument of all those documents diemonstrate conclusively
that Pohl committed barratry and unauthorized practice of law, which bars him
from recovery in this retaliatory lawsuit.
RESPONSE TO TRADITIONAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Justification is a valid laffirmative defense to Pohl’s
claims. a
Kassab has asserted the affirmative defense of justification.4 Pohl contends
that justification “is not a defenese to any of Pohl’s claims.”5 Of course, Pohl fails to
support this statement with fany authority. Rather, he contends that justification “is
an affirmative defense to a claim of tortious interference with contract.”6 But just
because the defense is commonly applied to one type of claim does not mean, as Pohl
contends, that iti is “not a recognized defense” to other types of claims, such as theft
of trade secorets, conversion or conspiracy.7 In fact, the defense of justification has
been applied outside the context of tortious interference to anti-trust claims. See
Money Masters, Inc. v. TRW, Inc., No. 05-98-02017-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 622,
4 See Kassab’s Sixth Amended Answer, at ¶ 15(2).
5 Mot. at 2.
6 Mot. at 3.
7 Mot. at 3.
at *17 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 23, 2003, pet. denied) (mem. op.). And, Texas courts
have considered the defense in relation to theft of trade secrets. See Lamont v.
Vaquillas Energy Lopeno, Ltd., 421 S.W.3d 198, 220 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013,
pet. denied) (determining whether evidence supported defense of jukstification to
claim that seismic map of a gas prospect constituted a tradCe secret and was
acquired through improper means). Accordingly, Pohl has failed to demonstrate
that the defense of justification is inapplicable as a matter iof law.
Pohl argues that even if the defense applies, Kassab and Nicholson cannot
show that “Pohl took any action against them or that involved them before they
committed the torts that form the basis of Pohl’s claim.”8 But Pohl misunderstands
the nature of the justification defense, andl the factual basis giving rise to it.
Justification can be based on Mthe exercise of either (1) the party’s own legal
rights or (2) the party’s good faith claim to a colorable right, even though the claim
ultimately proves to be mistakien. Tex. Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203, 211
(Tex. 1996). When the party conclusively establishes it had a legal right to engage
in the complained-of oconduct, the party's motive for engaging in that conduct is
irrelevant. Id. l
Here, Kiassab was justified in obtaining the information that Pohl contends is
his purported trade secrets. The information was obtained by Kassab as part of his
investigation and ultimate pursuit of barratry claims against Pohl on behalf of
hundreds of clients.9 Kassab concluded, based on discussions he had with and
8 Mot. at 3.
9 Exhibit 1, September 12, 2022 Declaration of Lance Kassab at ¶¶ 5-8.
documents obtained from Scott Favre, the owner of Precision Marketing, that the
information was owned by Precision Marketing, and not Pohl.10 In fact, Favre
testified that Precision Marketing owned the information, including client lists and
files the company acquired while soliciting clients,11 and shared wkith Kassab a
purchase agreement demonstrating that Favre was the owner oCf that information
through his purchase of Precision Marketing.12
Kassab had a legal right to acquire evidence to supiport the barratry claims
that would be made against Pohl on behalf of his clients without making himself
liable. See Taylor v. Tolbert, 644 S.W.3d 637, 647 (Tex. 2022) (“lawyers must be able
to pursue legal rights they deem necessary and proper for their clients without the
menace of civil liability looming over theml and influencing their actions.”). And in
carrying out that lawyerly duty, KasMsab had the right and obligation to investigate
the potential claims against Pohl or risk sanctions for not investigating the claims.
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 13. Kassaib was also justified in obtaining the information to
report Pohl to the State B
ar of Texas, which he did.13 See TEX. DISC. R. PROF’L COND.
8.03 (“a lawyer havinog knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of
applicable rules ofl professional conduct that raises a substantial question as to that
lawyer's honesity, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall
inform the appropriate disciplinary authority.”); TEX. R. DISC. PROC. 17.09 (“No
lawsuit may be instituted against any Complainant or witness predicated upon the
10 Exhibit 1, September 12, 2022 Declaration of Lance Kassab at ¶¶ 8.
11 Exhibit 2, Affidavit of Scott Favre.
12 Exhibit 3, Purchase Agreement.
13 Exhibit 4, October 2018 Declaration of Lance Kassab, at p. 2; Exhibit 5, Grievance Complaint.
filing of a Grievance or participation in the attorney disciplinary and disability
system.”).
Under these circumstances, there are genuine issues of material fact as to
whether Kassab was justified in the actions that he took. k
B. Kassab may assert unclean hands as a defensCe because
Pohl seeks equitable relief. 
Kassab asserts unclean hands as a defense becauset Pohl seeks injunctive
relief and attorney’s fees as damages under the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(“TUTSA”). To the extent Pohl is permitted to seeke attorney’s fees as damages, his
unclean hands bar him from recovering under suuch an equitable exception.
Pohl’s summary judgment is based on the false premise that he “does not
seek equitable relief.”14 That contentioan is rebutted by Pohl’s own pleadings. Pohl
has pursued claims under TUTSA, which requires a person claiming ownership of a
trade secret to demonstrate “legeal, or equitable” title to the information. See TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§f 134A.002(3-a) (emphasis added). Additionally, “Pohl
seeks injunctive relief”15 and it is well-established that “[i]njunctive relief is an
equitable remedy.” Fetter v. Wells Fargo Bank Tex., N.A., 110 S.W.3d 683, 688
(Tex. App.—Houiston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (emphasis added). Moreover, Pohl’s
conclusion roequests “other and further or alternative relief (legal and equitable) to
which Pohl may be entitled,”16 for all of his causes of action. Because Pohl is seeking
equitable relief, he “must come into court with clean hands.” Fetter, 110 S.W.3d at
14 Mot. at 4.
15 See Pohl’s First Amended Petition, at ¶ 45.
16 Pohl’s First Amended Petition, at ¶ 50 (emphasis added).
688. Pohl’s contention that unclean hands is not a valid affirmative defense fails as
a matter of law.
C. Illegality.
1. Objection to Pohl’s lack of supporting evidencke.
Kassab objects to Pohl’s lack of evidence supporting his traCditional summary
judgment motion as to illegality. Pohl asserts that illegality does not apply because
it “is not part of a document,” and he “engaged in ‘illegal aicts” long before” Kassab
allegedly wronged Pohl.17 Pohl then incorrectly implies that his acts of barratry
“[have] largely been adjudicated” on the merits.18 That is untrue, as demonstrated
above. Pohl also asserts that his “claims do not seek to enforce any illegal contract
or other illegal action.”19 But Pohl prlovides no evidence in support of his
statements, and “motions and argumMents of counsel are not evidence.” Johnson v.
Scott, 113 S.W.3d 366, 373 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003, pet. denied). It is telling
that Pohl is unwilling to sweair to any of these facts in an affidavit. Kassab objects
to Pohl’s lack of summary judgment evidence.
2. Poohl has not negated the illegality defense.
Pohl arguesl that the illegality defense “is not a defense” to his claims, “and
even if it werei, it would not be available here.”20 Of course, Pohl does not cite any
case precluding the use of the illegality defense in claims arising from barratry.
This is because the defense has commonly been applied to bar claims stemming
17 Mot., at 4.
18 Mot., at 4-5.
19 Mot., at 5.
20 Mot., at 4.
from barratry. See Luong v. McAllister, No. 01-17-00198-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS
5998, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 2, 2018, pet. denied) (contract
between law firm and non-lawyer to solicit clients in exchange for share of
attorney’s fees was void due to illegality); Plumlee v. Paddock, 832 S.Wk.2d 757, 760
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1992, writ denied) (refusing equitable relCief where owner of
ambulance company had no basis to recover under fee-sharing agreement with
attorney without reliance on unlawful barratry agreemenit). And Pohl’s lawyers
are well aware of this doctrine. They recently used the illegality defense to
obtain summary judgment on a legal malpractice claim brought by an investor who
gave an attorney money in exchange for a share of attorneys’ fees from the BP
litigation. See Duncan Litig. Invs., LLC vl. Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell &
Berkowitz, No. 4:19-CV-3094, 2022 UM.S. Dist. LEXIS 147005, at *24-30 (S.D. Tex.
2022). Moreover, as demonstrated in the summary judgment briefing on file with
the Court, Pohl and his lawyeirs in the Mississippi Litigation also used the illegality
defense to Precisions Marketing’s claims against Pohl for failing to pay Precision
Marketing for referrinog thousands of BP cases.
The illegalitly defense applies here. To sustain his claims, Pohl must establish
a right to thei property he claims was misappropriated. The first element of a
TUTSA claim violation is that the plaintiff owned a trade secret. TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE §§ 134A.002(1), (3), (6), 134A.004(a). The statute defines “owner” to
mean “the person or entity in whom or in which rightful, legal, or equitable title to”
the trade secret. Id. at § § 134A.002(3-a). Because Pohl obtained the alleged trade
secret information illegally, through barratry and the unauthorized practice of law,
he necessarily does not have “rightful, legal, or equitable title” to the information.
Accordingly, Pohl’s illegal conduct necessarily negates his TUTSA claim.
Likewise, although common-law claims for conversion and conkspiracy are
preempted by TUTSA, Pohl would have to establish that hCe owned or had
possession of the property or entitlement to possession. See Freezia v. IS Storage
Venture, LLC, 474 S.W.3d 379, 386-87 (Tex. App.—Houstion [14th Dist.] 2015, no
pet.). Because Pohl’s claims rest on information acquired through illegal contracts,
Kassab can sustain an affirmative defense of illegality against Pohl.
Pohl provides a string cite of unrelated authority to improperly suggest that
illegality cannot be a defense in this casel. But none of the cases cited by Pohl are
relevant to the facts of this case or dMiscuss the interaction of the illegality defense
and the unlawful acts doctrine. See Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. White, 490 S.W.3d 468,
483 (Tex. 2016) (in unrelated ilandlord tenant case); Lewkowicz v. El Paso Apparel
Corp., 625 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex.1981) (holding that illegal actions concerning
leather production anod improper jailing in Mexico violate the public policy of Texas);
Niles v. Harris Colunty Fresh Water Supply Dist., 339 S.W.2d 562, 563 (Tex. Civ.
App.—Waco 19i60, writ ref’d) (affirming pleading of illegality was unnecessary over
water supply where the contract was illegal on its face); Reid v. Associated
Employers Lloyds, 164 S.W.2d 584, 585–586 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1942, writ
ref’d) (whether illegality must be affirmatively asserted as a defense to worker’s
compensation claim originating from unlading a keg of beer); Montgomery Ward &
Co. v. Lusk, 52 S.W.2d 1110 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1932, writ ref’d) (whether
contract requiring work for more than 9 hours a day violated a statute); Texas & P.
Coal Co. v. Lawson, 89 Tex. 394, 34 S.W. 919, 921 (1896) (concerning the legality of
a contract for the sale of liquor). k
Accordingly, this Court should deny Pohl’s traditional moCtion for summary
judgment on illegality as unsupported by law or fact.
D. Unlawful acts, criminal acts, and in pari dielicto.
1. Objection to Pohl’s lack of supporting evidence.
Kassab again objects to Pohl’s lack of evidence supporting his traditional
motion for summary judgment as to unlawful acts, criminal acts or in pari delicto.
Pohl asserts that “criminal acts,” “unlawlful acts,” and “in pari delicto” does not
apply because “(1) Pohl’s actions hMave been largely adjudicated and were not
‘admittedly’ criminal or unlawful; and (2) even if a fact issue remained regarding
the legality of Pohl’s acts, anyi wrongful act is not sufficiently tied to Pohl’s claims
here to give rise to a defense.”21 But Pohl’s barratry and unauthorized practice of
law in other states hoave not been disposed of on the merits. Instead, Pohl’s sole
evidence supportilng his motion is that “Pohl can certainly demonstrate the
elements of eaich of his claims without being required to prove any illegal act.”22 And
then he doesn’t—he provides no evidence whatsoever. Pohl is not even willing to
swear under oath that he did not commit barratry. Accordingly, Kassab objects to
Pohl’s lack of summary judgment evidence.
21 Mot., at 5.
22 Mot., at 6.
10
2. Kassab established that Pohl’s unlawful acts,
criminal acts and the doctrine of in pari delicto
preclude Pohl’s claims in prior summary judgment
briefing, which is incorporated herein.
In his Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment filed on August 29, 2022,
Kassab demonstrated that Pohl’s unlawful acts, criminal acts and thee in pari delicto
doctrines preclude Pohl’s claims as a matter of law. Kassab incorporates that
argument and evidence as if set forth verbatim herein. Kassatb also incorporates the
argument and evidence relating to the unlawful acts doctrine (including illegal or
criminal acts or in pari delicto) set forth on pages e9-14 of Nicholson’s Response to
Plaintiffs’ Traditional and No-Evidence Motionu for Summary Judgment, filed on
September 12, 2022.
In short, the Unlawful Acts ruale provides that “[i]f, at the time of the
plaintiff’s injury, the plaintiff was engaged in an illegal act, and that act contributed
to the injury, he may not recoveer.” Andrew Shebay & Co., P.L.L.C. v. Bishop, 429
S.W.3d 644, 648–49 (Tex. fApp.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). The
summary judgment evidence on file with the Court demonstrates that Pohl violated
Texas rules and laws governing lawyers by illegally soliciting clients, splitting fees
with a non-lawiyer, and failing to protect confidential client information. Pohl’s
former clienots then sued him for his barratry, and Pohl now seeks to recover fees
from defending his barratry.23 In sum, if Pohl had not been violating the law and
disciplinary rules by procuring the purported trade secret information through
23 In addition, Kassab attaches the expert reports from Lillian Hardwick (Exhibit 6), Benjamin
Cooper (Exhibit 7), and Joseph F. Cleveland, Jr. (Exhibit 8), which detail and explain why the
evidence in the summary judgment record establishes that Pohl committed barratry and other
unlawful acts which preclude his claims.
11
illegal and unethical means, he would not have been sued for barratry. The very
purpose of the doctrine is to make sure “that [Pohl] should not even entertain the
hope of indemnity for the offense committed.” Houston Ice & Brewing Co. v. Sneed,
63 Tex. Civ. App. 17, 21, 132 S.W. 386, 388 (1910, writ dism’d) (holdinkg that one of
two parties involved in the illegal sale of alcohol could not Csue the other for
misrepresentation).
Moreover, the First Court of Appeals has opined thait Pohl’s acts, if true—and
they are true—are illegal and preclude summary judgment. In the Cheatham case,
the court of appeals concluded that the same Walker deposition testimony as here
on the same allegations24 are “some evidence” that “Pohl and [his co-counsel]
coordinated the barratry scheme” and “thlat Pohl directly funded, and his wife and
her company further funded, the solMicitation of prospective clients” and that “Pohl
directed case runners to contact and solicit potential clients on his behalf, including
offering money from Pohl’s fiirm and his wife’s company.” Cheatham, 2022 WL
3720139, at *8. This evidence defeated the summary judgment filed by Pohl’s co-
counsel in the Cheathoam case, and is certainly enough to defeat it here.
Accordinglyl, this court can apply these doctrines to deny recovery to Pohl for
his illegal actis, even if the court holds that one or more defendants have also
committed an unlawful act. See Dover v. Baker, Brown, Sharman & Parker, 859
S.W.2d 441, 443, 450-51 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (denying
recovery to plaintiff who sued his attorney for malpractice claiming he signed a
24 Kassab attached Walker’s testimony as exhibits in his prior summary judgment motion, which is
incorporated by reference herein.
12
false affidavit on the advice of his attorney who knew the affidavit was unlawful).
This doctrine is not an “excuse” but a bar to Pohl bringing any claims that stem
from his own illegal and wrongful actions.
For these reasons, and those stated in the summary judgment bkriefing before
the Court, summary judgment on the affirmative defenses of unlawCful acts, criminal
acts and the in pari delicto should be denied.
RESPONSE TO NO-EVIDENCE SUMMARY J DUiDGMENT
A. Pohl’s global and conclusory no-evidence challenge is
defective and should not be consideered.
The no-evidence summary judgment rule uexplicitly requires Pohl to “state the
elements as to which there is no evidence.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i) (emphasis
added). “The motion must be specific ina challenging the evidentiary support for an
element of a claim or defense; paragraph (i) does not authorize conclusory
motions or general no-evideence challenges to an opponent’s case.” Timpte
Indus. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 30f6, 310 (Tex. 2009) (emphasis added).
Pohl’s no-evidence challenge violates this rule. His entire no-evidence
argument is as follows:
In additioin to the affirmative defenses set forth above, Defendants
assert tihe following affirmative defenses, some of which were already
consiodered and rejected by this Court and the court of appeals during
consideration of the Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss under the Texas
Citizens Participation Act: 1) Statute of limitations; 2) Estoppel; 3)
Waiver; 4) Ratification; 5) Release; 6) Contribution; 7) Failure to
mitigate; 8) Lack of standing; 9) Accord and Satisfaction; 10).
Assumption of the Risk; 11) First Amendment; 12) Attorney Immunity;
13) Res Judicata; 14) Defect of Parties; 15) Abandonment; 16) Subject
of a Valid Contract. Pohl is entitled to summary judgment pursuant to
Rule 166a(i) because after an adequate time for discovery, the
13
Defendants have no evidence to support any of these affirmative
defenses.
This conclusory no-evidence challenge is insufficient as a matter of law. See Dean v.
Aurora Bank, F.S.B., No. 01-15-00827-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 13472, at *9 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 20, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (e“A no-evidence
summary judgment is insufficient as a matter of law if the motion is conclusory or
fails to challenge a specific essential element of a cause of acttion for which the non-
movant would have the burden of proof at trial.”).
When a no-evidence motion for summary ejudgment, as here, does not
challenge specific elements, it must be treatued as a traditional motion under
166a(c), which imposes the burden on the movant. Weaver v. Highlands Ins. Co., 4
S.W.3d 826, 829 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houstaon [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). As he provides
no facts or law in support of his argument, Pohl has not met his burden to prove
“there is no genuine issue as to aeny material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of la
wf.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Hillis v. McCall, 602 S.W.3d
436, 439-40 (Tex. 2020). With Pohl not having met his burden, “the burden does not
shift and [Kassab] need not respond or present any evidence.” Chavez v. Kansas
City S. Ry. Co., 5i20 S.W.3d 898, 900 (Tex. 2017). Accordingly, the Court should deny
Pohl’s purpoorted “no-evidence” motion.
B. The court should deny Pohl’s “no-evidence” motion
because Kassab can provide sufficient evidence and law
to support his affirmative defenses.
In his Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment filed June 8, 2021, Kassab
established, as a matter of law, the defenses of limitations, res judicata, and
14
attorney immunity. Kassab incorporates that motion and the evidence attached
thereto for all purposes herein. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 58. In the Traditional Motion for
Summary Judgment filed on August 29, 2022, Kassab established, as a matter of
law, the defenses of immunity pursuant to Texas Rule of Disciplinakry Procedure
17.09, the judicial proceedings privilege, attorney immunity, limCitations, and that
Pohl’s claims are barred by illegal and unlawful acts. In that motion, Kassab also
demonstrated that the alleged trade secret information is niot owned by Pohl, but by
Precision Marketing or Pohl’s former clients, which demonstrates the lack of
standing and defect of parties affirmative defenses. Kassab also incorporates that
motion and the evidence attached thereto. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 58.
In addition, Kassab incorporates bly reference and adopts the response to
Pohl’s no-evidence motion for sumMmary judgment filed by the Nicholson on
September 12, 2022 as to those defenses which apply equally to Kassab, including
attorney immunity, limitationis, waiver, ratification and failure to mitigate. See TEX.
R. CIV. P. 58.
In addition, aos to the affirmative defense of standing or capacity and
ownership of the lpurportedly confidential information, the recent depositions of
Ladner and Wialker demonstrate that the information was Precision Marketing’s
work product and owned by Precision Marketing, not Pohl. Ladner testified that
“client information” was owned by Precision Marketing.25 Likewise, Walker testified
that his company owned the client list and documents containing information about
25 Exhibit 9, August 29, 2022 Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at 44-45.
15
clients with potential cases.26 Walker agreed that the client information was
Precision Marketing’s “work product.”27 Thus, Pohl does not have standing or
capacity to sue Kassab, and there is a defect of parties to this litigation.
As to the defense of assumption of the risk, Pohl assumed thek risk that his
purported trade secret information would be stolen when he placCed it in the hands
of Walker, a known convicted felon. Specifically, Walker pled guilty to “one count of
federal program fraud and one count of conspiracy to icommit federal program
fraud” because he “fraudulently diverted and misused both federal grants and
money belonging to the State of Mississippi.”28 Pohl knew that Walker was a
convicted felon.29 Yet, Pohl trusted Walker with his purported trade secrets, without
requiring Walker to sign a confidentiality lagreement or non disclosure agreement.30
Pohl did not require these agreemeMnts because the alleged trade secrets are not
trade secrets at all and Pohl has no ownership in the documents that are the subject
of this lawsuit. Thus, Pohl aissumed the risk that Walker, a convicted felon who
“diverted and misused” property belonging to the others, would divert and misuse
Pohl’s purportedly coonfidential information, if in fact the alleged confidential
information were hlis.
The remiaining contract-related affirmative defenses of release, accord and
satisfaction, estoppel do not apply to Kassab. But to the extent that they do, Kassab
26 Exhibit 10, August 31, 2022 Deposition of Scott Walker, at 250-251.
27 Exhibit 10, August 31, 2022 Deposition of Scott Walker, at 251.
28 https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/jackson/press-releases/2014/ocean-springs-businessman-pleads-
guilty-to-federal-program-fraud. The Court is requested to take judicial notice of this official press
release from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
29 Exhibit 11, December 10, 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 104-105, 159-160.
30 Exhibit 11, December 10, 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 22-23, 159-161.
16
incorporates the argument and evidence set forth by Nicholson in her September 12,
2022 response to Pohl’s purported no-evidence challenge.
ALTERNATIVE REQUEST FOR CONTINUANCE
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(g) allows a continuance of kthe summary
judgment hearing “to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositiCons to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.” T iEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(g).
To the extent the evidence is insufficient to raise a fact iissue on the affirmative
defense of illegality, Kassab objects and requests a continuance on the no-evidence
motion because Pohl has unreasonably resisted Kassab’s request for discovery
relating to that defense.
Pohl’s resistance prompted Kassab lto file his Motion to Compel Removal of
Pohl’s Objections and Properly RespMond to Discovery on August 25, 2022. Kassab
incorporates that motion as if set forth verbatim herein and asks the Court to take
judicial notice of it. See TEX. Ri. CIV. P. 58. As set forth in the motion to compel, Pohl
has refused to answer relevant and material discovery relating to his involvement
in the illegal barratroy scheme, which is discovery going to the heart of Kassab’s
illegality defense. lSpecifically, that discovery will aid in establishing that all of
Pohl’s purportiedly trade secret information was derived through illegal or unethical
conduct, such as barratry and the unauthorized practice of law.
Kassab used diligence in attempting to obtain this relevant discovery. Kassab
served the discovery requests beginning in May of 2021.31 Pohl amended his
31 See Motion to Compel, at Exhibit 1.
17
discovery responses through October 2021.32 Kassab attempted to seek additional
information and clarify or elaborate on certain discovery requests in later sets of
discovery, served September 2021 and December 2021.33 Pohl responded to that
discovery into January 2022.34 Over the course of the following moknths, Kassab
reviewed the discovery requests and then attempted to confer wiCth Pohl about the
discovery deficiencies. But Pohl refused to amend his discovery and produce
responsive information,35 thus necessitating the motion to ciompel.
Pohl cannot simultaneously withhold relevant discovery concerning his
illegal acts while, at the same time, move for summary judgment on illegality. See
Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. Fuqua, 29 S.W.3d 140, 145 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th
Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (“A party should nlot be able to abuse the discovery process,
withhold key evidence from their oppMonents, and then use that lack of evidence to
win a judgment.”). Accordingly, a continuance of the summary judgment hearing
(and trial) should be granted iuntil after the motion to compel is heard and Pohl is
compelled to produce the improperly withheld information. See McInnis v. Mallia,
261 S.W.3d 197, 204 o(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (the fact that
movant “withheldl information in discovery” is a factor that weighed “in favor of”
permitting addiitional time for discovery); Tempay, Inc. v. TNT Concrete & Constr.,
Inc., 37 S.W.3d 517, 522-23 (Tex. App. – Austin 2001, pet. denied) (holding that the
trial court abused its discretion in determining that adequate time for discovery had
32 See Motion to Compel, at Exhibit 2 and 3.
33 See Motion to Compel, at Exhibit 4 and 5.
34 See Motion to Compel, at Exhibit 7.
35 See Motion to Compel, at Exhibit 9.
18
passed because movant successfully resisted nonmovant's attempts to obtain
discovery).
CONCLUSION & PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Plaintiffs’ Motikon for Partial
Traditional and No-Evidence Summary Judgment on AffirmatCive Defenses and
grant summary judgment against Plaintiffs, ordering that they take nothing on
their claims against Lance Christopher Kassab and The Kaissab Law Firm.
Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
__________________________
lDAVID ERIC KASSAB
a Texas State Bar No. 24071351
M david@kassab.law
 LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 00794070
e lance@kassab.law
i NICHOLAS R. PIERCE
f Texas State Bar No. 24098263
nicholas@kassab.law
1214 Elgin Street
o Houston, Texas 77004
Telephone: 713-522-7400
l Facsimile: 713-522-7410
i E-Service: eserve@kassab.law
o ATTORNEYS FOR KASSAB DEFENDANTS
19
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date, September 12, 2022, I electronically filed this
document with the Clerk of the Court using the eFile.TXCourts.gov electronic filing
system which will send notification of such filing to all parties or counsel of record.
___________________C____
DAVID ERIC KASSAtB 
20
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this
document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below.
The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate
of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab e
Bar No. 24071351 C
david@kassab.law t
Envelope ID: 68179652 r
Status as of 9/13/2022 8:03 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email sTimestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com r 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Andrew Johnson ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Andrew J. Sarne asarne@krcl.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.conm 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Kathryn Laflin KLaflin@KRCL.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrrar.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Larry Newsom lnewsom@fkrcl.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo jason@ciofalolaw.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Todd Taylor titaylor@jandflaw.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Harris Wells fhwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Lawyer Wade y lawyerwade@hotmail.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@favrepa.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Andrea Mendez C andrea@kassab.law 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Lance Kassab  lance@kassab.law 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
David Kassab a david@kassab.law 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Nicholas Pierce c nicholas@kassab.law 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson f i 10607900 jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo o 24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
L Kassab lance@kassab.law 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Misty Davis mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Non-Party Witness Billy Shepherd bshepherd@spcounsel.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Deidre Hicks GWS_GROUP@spcounsel.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
E. MarieJamison jamison@wrightclosebarger.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Jessica Z.Barger barger@wrightclosebarger.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Katie Budinsky kbudinsky@krcl.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM ERROR
D Kassab david@kassab.law 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT"
32,2022-09-06,MTA,Kassab,Motion to Abate Trial,"Kassab's Motion to Abate Trial Setting pending resolution of the related Cheatham v. Pohl barratry case, which was reversed on appeal August 30, 2022 and remanded for further proceedings","Phase 3 procedural motion filed one week after the Traditional MSJ and Seventh Amended Answer. Kassab argues trial should be abated because the still-pending Cheatham case will determine the full extent of Pohl's alleged damages and may establish Pohl's barratry, which would bar his claims entirely. Addressed to Judge Scot 'Dolli' Dollinger. Counsel for Plaintiffs (Jean Frizzell) opposed.",MTA-1,N/A,Phase 3,2022-09-06_MTA_Kassab-Mtn-to-Abate-Trial_FILED.pdf,Abate the trial setting in this case pending the resolution of the Cheatham v. Pohl barratry case,"9/6/2022 8:41 AM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 67958716
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 9/6/2022 8:41 AM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIALk DISTRICT
THE KASSAB DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO ABATE TRIACL SETTING
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE SCOT “DOLLI” DOLLINGER:
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs Lance Christopheir Kassab and Lance
Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a/ The Kassab Law Firm files this, Motion to Abate
Trial Setting, and would respectfully show the following.
BACKGROUND
Lance Kassab and his firm were hlired by more than 400 of Michael Pohl’s
former clients to sue Pohl and othersM for barratry – the illegal solicitation of clients.
Kassab v. Pohl, 612 S.W.3d 571, 575 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet.
denied). Kassab field four sieparate lawsuits against Pohl, two of which Pohl
successfully dismissed on limitations. See Brumfield v. Williamson, 634 S.W.3d 170,
177 (Tex. App.—Houoston [1st Dist.] 2021, pet. denied) and Gandy v. Williamson,
634 S.W.3d 214 (Tlex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, pet. denied). Another of the
cases settled, iwith Pohl paying a substantial sum of money to Kassab and his
clients. The fourth case – the Cheatham case – was dismissed by the trial court but
recently reversed by the Houston Court of Appeals and remanded for further
proceedings. See Cheatham v. Pohl, No. 01-20-00046-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS
6528, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 30, 2022, no pet. h.).
In retaliation, Pohl filed this litigation against Kassab and others, alleging
specious claims for conversion and misappropriation of trade secrets.1 Specifically,
Pohl alleges that the runners he hired to commit the barratry “gained access to
[Pohl’s] confidential and proprietary information and property, inckluding trade
secret materials” and “work product” and “illegally misapCpropriated” that
information and then allegedly “secretly sold [it] to Kassab”2 who then “solicited
clients/prospective clients [of Pohl’s] to act as [p]laintiffs . i. . to bring cases against
Pohl for alleged barratry and other claims.”3 Pohl seeks as damages “costs and
expenses of serial litigations” that Kassab filed against Pohl, including “[a]ny fees
[and] any expenses [Pohl] had, hotel rooms, long-distance phone calls, copy costs” –
“[Pohl] intend[s] to sue Mr. Kassab for all olf it.”4
RGUMENT
Pohl has no basis to obtain attorney’s fees and expenses incurred by Pohl in
the underlying barratry litigaition when Pohl never requested and was not entitled
to recover those fees. But since Pohl asserts that he can, then the extent of Pohl’s
alleged damages are onot yet known because the Cheatham case is still ongoing. In
fact, the outcome olf Cheatham could result in a judgment against Pohl for barratry,
which will deifinitively establish Kassab’s illegality, unclean hands and other
affirmative defenses. In that case, Pohl would be entitled to no damages from
Kassab. Rather, Kassab would be entitled to attorney’s fees from Pohl in addition to
1 See Pohl’s First Amended Petition (on file with the Court) (“Petition”),
2 Petition, at ¶¶ 20-21.
3 Petition, at ¶ 29.
4 Exhibit 1, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 121.
the disgorgement of Pohl’s fees and expenses in the underlying cases. Thus, for the
reasons stated below, the Court should exercise its discretion and abate the trial of
this case until the Cheatham case is finally resolved. See Kallinen v. City of Hous.,
462 S.W.3d 25, 28 (Tex. 2015) (a court may decide, exercising sound kdiscretion, to
abate proceedings to await a relevant ruling from another proceedCing).
The case In re Tex. Collegiate Baseball League, Ltd., 367 S.W.3d 462 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.) demonstrates why abatemient is required. There, a
client sued its attorney to enforce a settlement agreement concerning legal fees that
the attorney claimed he was owed. Id. at 464. The attorney counterclaimed for
attorney’s fees. Id. The client amended its pleadings to assert malpractice against
the attorney and then sought to abate lthe case pending the resolution of the
underlying litigation from which the Mmalpractice and fee claims arose. Id. The trial
court denied the motion to abate, and the client filed a petition for writ of
mandamus. Id. The court of aippeals agreed, and conditionally granted mandamus
relief. It agreed that if the malpractice and fee claims were not abated, the parties
would be required too pursue claims “for which their alleged damages are not yet
known.” Id. at 46l5. The court of appeals reasoned that the “damage theories will
remain fluid uintil the [underlying] litigations conclude.” Id. at 468. The court of
appeals believed it made “little sense” for the parties to “prepare for trial concerning
the fee claim” when the underlying litigation giving rise to the fee claim was still
pending. Id.
Here too it makes “little sense” for the parties to prepare for and proceed to
trial without knowing the full extent of Pohl’s alleged damages, if any, stemming
from the still-pending Cheatham case. Just as in Tex. Collegiate Baseball, the extent
of Pohl’s alleged damages are not yet known and remain fluid unktil the final
resolution of the Cheatham case. Accordingly, the Court would aCbuse its discretion
by declining to abate the trial of this matter until after the Cheatham case is
resolved. See Tex. Collegiate Baseball, 367 S.W.3d at 468-69i.
Moreover, the Cheatham case will have a substantial impact on whether Pohl
can recover anything because of his illegal and other conduct. In Cheatham, two
groups of clients sued Pohl and his co-counsel Robert Ammons for barratry after the
clients were illegally and unethically soliclited. 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 6528, at *2-3.
The trial court granted no-evidence aMnd traditional summary judgment in favor of
Pohl and Ammons. Id. at *4-5. But the court of appeals reversed, concluding that
the clients “presented more thian a scintilla of evidence to support their allegations”
of barratry, rendering summary judgment improper. Id. at *17 n. 7. That evidence
included proof that “Poohl and Ammons coordinated the barratry scheme” and “that
Pohl directly fundled, and his wife and her company further funded, the solicitation
of prospective iclients” and that “Pohl directed case runners to contact and solicit
potential clients on his behalf, including offering money from Pohl’s firm and his
wife's company.” Id. at *17. If the Cheatham plaintiffs establish these barratry
claims against Pohl, then Pohl cannot be permitted to recover any damages arising
from his unlawful conduct. See Andrew Shebay & Co., P.P.L.C. v. Bishop, 429
S.W.3d 644, 648 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (“Texas public
policy prohibits a plaintiff from recovering damages from his own illegal acts.”).
Accordingly, the outcome of the Cheatham case will have a direct impact on
Kassab’s illegality and other defenses, and Pohl’s ability to recover in kthis case. For
this reason too, abatement of the trial is required. See Tex. CollegCiate Baseball, 367
S.W.3d at 467 (abating case because defense to fee claim was “unripe” while
underlying litigation was pending); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Miillard, 847 S.W.2d 668,
673 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding) (requiring abatement of
bad faith claims when they could be rendered moot by outcome of underlying
contract proceedings).
CONCLUSIONl & PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, the MCourt should grant this motion and abate the
trial setting in this case pending the resolution of the Cheatham case.
i Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
__________________________
l LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
i Texas State Bar No. 00794070
i lance@kassab.law
o DAVID ERIC KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law
NICHOLAS R. PIERCE
Texas State Bar No. 24098263
nicholas@kassab.law
1214 Elgin Street
Houston, Texas 77004
Telephone: 713-522-7400
Facsimile: 713-522-7410
E-Service: eserve@kassab.law
ATTORNEYS FOR KASSAB PARTIES
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE k
I certify that I conferred with Jean Frizzell, counsel for PlCaintiffs, and he is
opposed to the relief requested in this motion. 
_____________i__________
DAVID ERIC KASSAB
CERTIFICATE OF SE u RVICE
I certify that on this date, September 6, 2022, I electronically filed this
document with the Clerk of the Court usinlg the eFile.TXCourts.gov electronic filing
system which will send notification of suach filing to all parties or counsel of record.
_______________________
e DAVID ERIC KASSAB
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this
document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below.
The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate
of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab e
Bar No. 24071351 C
david@kassab.law t
Envelope ID: 67958716 r
Status as of 9/6/2022 8:47 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimsestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com r9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com  9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@favrepa.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Lawyer Wade lawyerwade@hotmail.coml 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Lance Kassab eserve@kassab.law a 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbraMr.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Larry Newsom lnewsom@krcl.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo jason@ciofaelolaw.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Jessica Z.Barger barger@wrightclosebarger.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappafs@krcl.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Misty Davis mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Andrew Johnson oajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Andrew J. Sarne Casarne@krcl.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Kathryn Laflin  KLaflin@KRCL.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10f607900 jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo n24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Kevin Graham CainU24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
D Kassab david@kassab.law 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
L Kassab lance@kassab.law 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Katie Budinsky kbudinsky@krcl.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM ERROR
E. MarieJamison jamison@wrightclosebarger.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT"
31,2022-08-29,OA,Kassab,7th Amended Answer,"Kassab's Seventh Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim — adds Judicial Immunity (#16) and Immunity under Rule 17.09 (#17) as new affirmative defenses, expands Illegality to include 'Unlawful Acts Rule' (#13), bringing total to 23 defenses. Filed same day as Traditional MSJ.","Phase 3 amended pleading superseding the Sixth Amended Answer, filed the same day as the Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing #30). Expands affirmative defenses from 21 to 23, adding Judicial Immunity (#16), Rule 17.09 disciplinary immunity (#17), and expanding #13 to include the Unlawful Acts Rule. This becomes the live answer going into the MSJ hearing.",PLEAD-1,N/A,Phase 3,2022-08-29_OA_Kassab-7th-Amended-Answer-CC_FILED.pdf,"That Pohl recover nothing; that Kassab recover (i) actual and consequential damages, (ii) statutory damages, (iii) pre- and post-judgment interest, (iv) attorneys' fees and costs, and (v) all other just relief","8/29/2022 4:43 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 67770941
By: Ashley Lopez
Filed: 8/29/2022 4:43 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIArL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS, LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AtND LANCE
CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAWi FIRM’S SEVENTH
AMENDED ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES ANsD COUNTERCLAIM
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: 
COMES NOW, Defendants, Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher
Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm and files this their Seventh Amended
Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim, and would respectfully show the
Court as follows; a
f  I
RULE 47 STATEMENT
1. The Kassab Deffendants, in their capacity as Counter-Plaintiffs, seek
monetary relief of more than $1,000,000.00.
C II
l PARTIES
2. Plaiintiff, Michael A. Pohl is an individual lawyer residing in Colorado
and is a paroty herein.
3. Plaintiff, Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl is a law firm set up for the
practice of law in various states of the union, including Texas and is a party herein.
4. Defendant, Scott Favre is a nonresident individual residing in
Mississippi and is a party herein.
5. Defendant, Scott M. Favre, PA, LLC is a nonresident limited liability
company located in Mississippi and is a party herein.
6. Defendant, Precision Marketing Group, LLC is a nonresident limited
liability company located in Mississippi and is a party herein. k
7. Defendant, F. Douglas Montague III is a nonresident iCndividual residing
in Mississippi.
8. Defendant, Montague, Pittman & Varnadoi, PA is a nonresident
professional association located in Mississippi.
9. Defendant, Tina Nicholson is an individual residing in Texas and is a
party herein.
10. Defendant, Baker Nicholson, lLLP, d/b/a Baker Nicholson Law Firm is a
limited liability partnership located inM Texas and is a party herein.
11. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab is an
individual residing in Texas anid is a party herein.
12. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The
Kassab Law Firm is ao professional corporation located in Texas and is a party herein.
l III
c i JURISDICTION AND VENUE
13. oThis matter is within the jurisdictional limits of this Court and
Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl
(“Pohl”) and Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs, Lance Christopher Kassab (“LCK”) and
Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab, P.C.”)
(collectively “Kassab”) are subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. Venue is proper in this
county because one or more of the defendants are residents of this county and because
a substantial part of the acts and/or omissions that form the basis of this suit occurred
in this county.
IV k
GENERAL DENIAL e
14. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab generally detnies all allegations
made by Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl ansdt Law Offices of Michael
A. Pohl, and requests the Court to require Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael
A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl to carry their burden of proof regarding
all allegations against Kassab.
AFFIRMATIViE l DEFENSES
15. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab pleads the following affirmative
defenses: 
1. Statute of limitationf is;
2. Justification; y 
3. Estoppel;
4. Waivera;
5. Ratiffication;
6.U Release;
7. Unclean hands;
8. Contribution;
9. Failure to mitigate;
10. Lack of standing;
11. Accord and Satisfaction;
12. Assumption of the Risk;
13. Illegality/Criminal Acts/Unlawful Acts Rule; k
14. First Amendment; C
15. Attorney Immunity;
16. Judicial Immunity; i
17. Immunity under Rule 17.09 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.
18. In Pari Delicto;
19. Res Judicata;
20. Defect of Parties; l
21. Abandonment; M
22. Subject of a Valid Contract; and
23. Preemption pursuanit to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.007(a).
SPECIFIC DENIALS
16. Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs specifically deny that all conditions
precedent regardiing Plaintiffs claims of conversion and theft of trade secrets have
been perforomed or occurred prior to Plaintiffs’ filing of suit against Kassab.
VII
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
17. LCK is a lawyer practicing law with The Kassab Law Firm, a law firm
in Houston, Texas focusing on plaintiffs’ legal malpractice cases. Kassab filed four
lawsuits on behalf of over four hundred clients against Pohl (the “Harris County
Lawsuits”). The main allegations against Pohl are civil barratry and conspiracy to
commit barratry, a third-degree felony in Texas. Pohl conspired with his wife,
Donalda Pohl (“Dona”), his paralegal, Edgar Jaimes (“Jaimes”) and thrkee runners in
Mississippi to illegally solicit clients on behalf of Pohl. Dona ownCs a sham lending
company in Texas called Helping Hands Financing, LLC (“HH Texas”). Jaimes rans
the day-to-day operations of HH Texas. The three ruinners are Scott Walker
(“Walker”), Steve Seymour (“Seymour”) and Kirk Ladner (“Ladner”) (collectively
“Runners”). The three Runners owned and operated two other sham companies called
Helping Hands Group, LLC and Helping Hands Financial, LLC (collectively “HH
Mississippi”). The three runners also olwned Precision Marketing Group, LLC
(“Precision”) which they sold to ScMott Favre and/or his companies (collectively
“Favre”). The runners had several other business entities from which they operated
and concealed their illegal soliicitation conspiracy.
18. With regard to the clients obtained in the BP Litigation, Walker,
Seymour and Ladnero hired other runners to literally go up and down streets in
specific locations klnocking on doors to solicit clients on behalf of Pohl for lawsuits
against Britishi Petroleum. Walker, Seymore and Ladner, through Precision and on
behalf of Pohl, paid these runners as much as $300-$400 for every potential client
they obtained. Pohl paid Precision as much as $1,500 for every client Precision
obtained and referred to Pohl. Walker, Seymore and Ladner paid the other runners
from this amount and pocketed the balance. Pohl also offered and agreed to pay
Walker, Seymour and Ladner a percentage of his legal fees once cases settled. This
percentage was disguised as an hourly rate of $1,500.00 per hour, but the percentage
of the “settlement” payment was never below the agreed percentage. For example,
no matter how much “hourly” time was actually spent on a case, thek agreed upon
percentage was always achieved by simply dividing the percentagCe amount of Pohl’s
legal fees by $1,500.00 to calculate the imaginary number of hours, and then the
Runners would submit an invoice for those imaginary numbier of hours. Whether the
Runners actually spent five (5) or fifty (50) hours on a particular case was not the
measure of the “settlement” fees to be paid to the Runners, it was always the agreed
upon percentage of attorney’s fees earned by Pohl regardless of actual hours spent on
a case. l
19. With regard to auto accidMents, Pohl set up a “Google Alerts” to be notified
whenever there was a horrific rollover or other type of horrific vehicle crash across
the nation. Pohl would then imimediately send the alert to the Runners so they could
arrange to visit hospitals, homes and funerals to contact the families of the injured
in order to solicit theom as clients. The Runners would use their sham companies,
“Helping Hands” tlo act as though they were approaching these victims to genuinely
help them rathier than solicit them. The Runners would falsely tell these victims that
they were there to provide money for burial services, food, clothing, lodging, etc. In
reality however, the Runners’ contacted these families under these false pretenses
with the sole objective of talking advantage of these victims and their families while
they were emotionally distraught and not thinking straight in order to lock them into
contracts which allowed the runners to select a lawyer for the victim. The victims
and the family members were encouraged to hire Pohl and told they could not get the
money unless they agreed to hire Pohl. Pohl would pay the Runners as much as
$7,500 per client they signed up and Pohl also promised the runners ask much as 33%
of Pohl’s legal fees on the back end when the case settled. AdditCionally, HH Texas
would pay HH Mississippi $2,500 for every client referred to HH Texas to “loan”
money to these victims and their family. Pohl used this priocedure as an attempt to
put an additional buffer between him and the actual Runners.
20. Pohl also helped the Runners form another sham entity, the GM
Settlement Verification Team (“GM Team”) after General Motors, Inc. issued a recall
on cars due to faulty ignition switches whiclh effected the safe operation of the airbag
systems on vehicles. Thus, the GM MTeam was designed to look official as if it was
part of General Motors. This conspiracy was to form an official looking entity from
GM as if GM was wanting to ciompensate people who had been harmed when airbags
failed to deploy in relation to the ignition recall. In reality, this was just another
sham company used too solicit and trick potential clients into hiring Pohl. Again, Pohl
would pay Walkerl and Ladner, through their sham entity, the GM Team, a fee for
every potentiail client it referred to Pohl, in addition to a percentage of his attorney’s
fees on the back end.
21. Pohl knew what he was doing was illegal barratry. Accordingly, he
knowingly formed entities that he perceived would insulate him from liability. In
fact, Walker testified that although he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or
“marketing money” it was “clear to [him] it was barratry.” In fact, Walker considered
himself and his company “a pass-through for barratry money.” All total, Walker,
Ladner and Precision received over $5 million in “barratry pass-through money” from
Pohl and other lawyers to solicit potential clients with claims, both kauto-accident
victims and those involved in the BP Deepwater Horizon litigationC.
22. One of the runners hired by Pohl and Walker to illegally solicit clients
on behalf of Pohl was Magdalena Santana (“Santana”). Ini her September 24, 2016
affidavit, Santana testified that Pohl sent her on “dozens and dozens of car wreck
cases all over the country.” Pohl would email Santana the link of news coverage he
obtained through Google Alerts depicting an accident and asked her “to go to the
victim or the victim’s family and try to get lthem to sign up with him.” Santana swore
under oath that Pohl agreed to pay Mher “$5,000 per case that [she] signed, plus a
percentage of his attorney’s fees.” Santana was advised by Pohl to “be persistent even
if the family ... rejected [her]i.” Santana was instructed by Pohl to “approach the
victims and their families while they were vulnerable, in the emergency room, their
hospital rooms or at thoe funerals.” Pohl told Santana that minorities “were especially
vulnerable since tlhey tended not to know that the law prohibited barratry.”
According to Piohl, they “were easier to sign up.”
23. Pohl would give Santana “money to give to the victims or their families”
but would only give the money to the potential client “if they agreed to sign a Pohl
representation contract.” Pohl advised Santana that the money was a “foot in the
door” but instructed Santana not to mention anything about hiring a lawyer “until
after they agreed to take the money.” “If the client agreed to hire Pohl, then [Santana]
was to have the client sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.” Santana would then give
money to the client “from his own Helping Hands company.” When Santana
questioned this, Pohl told Santana that it “was illegal for him to pay [hekr] directly for
cases, and that’s why the money had to go through some companyC.”
24. Pohl and/or his co-conspirators had Santana retract this affidavit
through a December 19, 2017 affidavit. This purported rietraction was likely the
result of Pohl paying Santana to retract the first affidavit, which is similar to
something Pohl had done in the past. In fact, Pohl’s own paralegal, Jaimes, testified
that on one occasion Pohl sent him to Florida with a suitcase containing $50,000 in
cash to give to Santana in exchange for lher agreement not to turn Pohl into the
authorities. Jaimes testified that SanMtana would only get the money if she signed a
statement agreeing not to mention Pohl’s illegal activity. Jaimes testified that
Santana signed the statementi and then he gave her the $50,000.
25. Santana’s deposition was even more detailed. Santana testified at her
deposition that the staotement was an agreement for her to keep quiet and not charge
Pohl with any wronlgdoing, criminal or unethical conduct. Santana testified that Pohl
paid her $50,0i00 in cash to sign this statement, which was delivered by Jaimes in
three bags marked “trick or treat.” Very symbolic given that Santana had been
tricked by Pohl into soliciting potential clients for him and was now being treated the
money she claimed was due under their agreement just to stay quiet. Santana
reiterated in her deposition that if she didn’t sign the gag agreement, she would not
have received the money from Pohl. Santana attempted to indicate on the agreement
that she was receiving $50,000 to keep quiet, but Jaimes told her Pohl demanded that
she state she only received nominal consideration, like $100. Santana did not write
the statement but “just signed it” because she felt she was being “forcked to sign” it
while “under duress.” C
26. Notably, nowhere in Santana’s December 19th affidavit does she state
the testimony in her former affidavit is untrue, only that shie does not “agree with” it
and that the affidavit is not “reliable.” Although Santana states in her December 19th
affidavit that her prior affidavit was drafted by a lawyer, Santana testified in her
deposition that the September 24th affidavit was created voluntarily with her own
“testimony.” Santana testified that, unlike lwith Pohl, she was not paid and had never
been promised any money to provideM the testimony in the September 24th affidavit.
Santana reiterated to counsel for Pohl, Billy Shepherd, that she was there for her
deposition to tell the truth andi would not be bullied by his questioning or his efforts
to confuse her.
27. Regardleoss, Santana’s sworn deposition testimony confirmed most, if
not all of the factsl set forth in her initial affidavit and this deposition testimony has
never been retiracted. Therefore, Santana confirmed that she was hired by Pohl to
solicit auto accident cases, the first one being an accident where a woman and her
unborn child lost their lives. Santana was instructed by Walker, who was instructed
by Pohl, to personally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her up to sue the tire
manufacturer and, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000. Following Walker
10
and Pohl’s instructions, Santana visited the funeral of the deceased and got the family
to feel comfortable with her. Although the mother was grieving, Pohl told Santana:
“take no prisoners, this is a cut throat business, you get in there and you do whatever
it takes to get this client.” The solicitation was successful after Pohl gkave Santana
$2,000 to “give to the client to convince her into signing over with Cthe firm.”
28. “Coach” Kenneth Talley (“Talley”) was another runner hired by Pohl
and Walker who solicited over 20 auto accident cases for Pohil. Talley has sworn under
oath that he was first hired in relation to BP claims to find “folks that lost money due
to the oil spill” and “sign them up” and “get a fee for it.” Talley testified that he went
to work “knocking on doors” looking for potential claimants for Pohl and his partner
in the BP litigation. Talley solicited and siglned up more than 800 BP claims for Pohl
and his co-conspirators. Talley was pMaid between $75 and $350 for each BP client he
signed up for Pohl and his partners.
29. Talley eventuallyi switched to illegally soliciting auto accident victims
for Pohl, “calling on folks that had bad accidents.” Talley recalls that the first client
he solicited for Pohl woas in “the hospital in intensive care.” Talley carried with him
up to $1,000 to paly the accident victims to “help them with problems” but paid the
potential clienit only once they “were signed up.” Talley kept a list of all the auto
accident cases he solicited so he could keep track of the cases that he was due a
percentage from Pohl’s attorney’s fees on the back end after the case settled. Talley
also followed a checklist that instructed him to, among other things, bring flowers to
the initial hospital visit (but to spend no more than $50) and to offer the victims
11
money but to “make sure the funding schedule” from HH Texas “is filled out properly
before releasing any cash.” Talley would advise the victims that he had attorneys who
could help them such as Pohl. Talley was paid a fee of $1,400 plus his expenses by
Pohl, through Walker and/or one of his sham business entities for any kauto accident
case he solicited and referred to Pohl. On some cases, Talley was tCo receive a portion
of the fee paid to Helping Hands out of Pohl’s attorney’s fees. Talley discussed with
Pohl the “percentage of settlements” he was to receive from ithe cases he solicited and
referred, and Pohl told Talley that the money was being placed in an “escrow account”
for him. When asked whether Pohl knew he was getting paid to “contact vehicle
accident victims,” Talley responded, “the money was coming from Edgar [Jaimes] who
worked for him.” And, although his paylcheck was from Walker’s company, “the
funding came by way of Edgar [JaimeMs].”
30. Talley testified that personally soliciting clients for Pohl became so
frequent that he began carryinig blank contracts to each solicitation. Talley testified
that he never recommended any lawyers other than Pohl. However, Talley never told
the clients that he waos getting paid to solicit them. Talley would present a contract
to the potential clilent. If the client did not agree to hire Pohl, the clients would not
get the moneyi. Talley testified that Jaimes and Dona (the operators of HH Texas)
would send him the money.
31. Talley further testified that both he and Pohl knew what they were
doing was illegal. In one instance, Talley was “run out of town” while soliciting clients
for Pohl. Talley testified that during the attempted solicitation he was told by a
12
“lawyer or policeman” that “it was against the law what [he] was doing.” Talley
mentioned this to Pohl and Pohl told him “you’ve just got to leave...some people you
can’t help.”
32. Walker was eventually indicted and sent to prison. Beking afraid of
where Walker’s indictment might lead, Pohl and his lawyer partneCrs stopped paying
Walker and the other runners the illegal fees as Pohl had promised. Therefore,
Walker, Seymour, Ladner and Precision filed a lawsuit in Miississippi Federal Court
(“Federal Litigation”) against Pohl and his law partners claiming they were owed
millions of dollars in promised fees.
33. The above facts were compiled during the Federal Litigation.
Thereafter, more than four hundred clientsl who were illegally solicited contacted the
Kassab Law Firm and requested KassMab to represent them in litigation against Pohl
and his partners. Kassab filed lawsuits on behalf of these clients in four different
courts in Harris County. Addiitionally, due to the egregiousness of Pohl’s violation of
the Texas Penal Code and violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct, Kassab was orequired to notify the Texas State Bar pursuant to Rule 8.03 of
the Texas Disciplinlary Rules of Professional Conduct. Due to this mandate, Kassab
filed grievanceis against Pohl pursuant to Rule 8.03. some of Pohl’s clients also
prepared and filed grievances against Pohl arising out of his egregious conduct.
34. Because of these actions in representing clients against Pohl and the
grievances filed against Pohl, Pohl filed this retaliatory lawsuit against Kassab
alleging conversion and theft of trade secrets. Pohl alleges that Kassab and others
13
stole his property and used it to bring lawsuits and grievances against Pohl.
Specifically, Pohl alleges in his petition that, “Kassab is a lawyer who specializes in
suing other lawyers”1 and “Kassab solicited clients/prospective clients [of Pohl’s] to
act as Plaintiffs . . . to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and okther claims.”2
Thus, Pohl has judicially admitted that he has brought his suit agaiCnst Kassab simply
because Kassab contacted illegally solicited clients to notify them of Pohl’s illegal
conduct and to offer to represent them in suits against Pohli.
35. The lawsuit is frivolous and without merit as it is based upon false
pretenses and was brought solely for retaliation and harassment purposes.
Specifically, Kassab did not steal anything from Pohl. Additionally, Kassab did not
purchase any stolen documents belonging tlo Pohl. Nor did Kassab purchase anything
belonging to Pohl. Moreover, Pohl isM not the owner of documents received, if any,
from Precision, Favre, Nicholson, Montague or anyone else. Lastly, none of the
documents and/or informatioin that Kassab may have received from various
individuals or entities are Pohl’s trade secrets as Pohl alleges. Furthermore, Pohl
has failed to complyo with conditions precedent to filing his retaliatory suit for
conversion and thleft of trade secrets. Specifically, Pohl has never requested from
Kassab, the reiturn of his alleged property. Rather, Pohl abandoned all of the alleged
documents he now accuses Kassab of stealing and/or purchasing. Pohl abandoned all
of the documents he alleges were stolen and/or purchased because he knew that the
documents were not his and that he had no ownership interest in the documents. If
1 Pohl Original Petition, p. 6
2 Id. at p. 6-7
14
Pohl actually believed the subject documents were his, he would have safeguarded
the documents rather than abandon them with a convicted felon (Walker) and his
cohorts (Seymore and Ladner). Even as of today, the subject documents sit in a
warehouse, unattended and not safeguarded. k
VIII C
COUNTERCLAIM FOR CIVIL BARRATRY
36. Within the lawsuits that Kassab has filed agaisntst Pohl on behalf of his
former clients and/or potential clients, Pohl has judicially admitted that a claim for
barratry is not a legal malpractice case. Pohl has also admitted that a because a
claim for barratry is not a claim for “legal malpractice,” the Discovery Rule does not
apply to a barratry claim. Therefore, based upon Pohl’s judicial admissions, the
assignment of a barratry claim is permiatted under Texas law.
37. Thus, based upon expfress assignments of interest given to Kassab,
Kassab brings counterclaims against Pohl and his law firm pursuant to Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies CodOe, Section 16.069. Section 16.069 provides:
(a) If a counterclpaim or cross claim arises out of the same transaction or
occurrence tohat is the basis of an action, a party to the action may
file the counterclaim or cross claim even though as a separate action
it woulad lbe barred by limitations on the date the party’s answer is
requicreid.
(b) Tohe counterclaim or cross claim must be filed not later than the 30th
day after the date on which the party’s answer is required.
Kassab has been assigned barratry claims on behalf of 242 claimants. These
counterclaims are timely because they were filed within 30 days of the date
Kassab filed his original answer.
15
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
38. Defendants contend that all or some of Plaintiffs’ claims for
misappropriate under TUTSA were made in bad faith, enabling Defendants to
recover their reasonable attorney’s fees. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM e. CODE §
134A.005. 
X t
PRAYER FOR RELIEF D i
Wherefore, Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs resspectfully pray that Plaintiffs
recover nothing on their claims and that the Deferndants, Counter-Plaintiffs recover
on their claims against the Plaintiffs and/or any Third-Party Defendants as follows:
i) actual and consequential damlages;
ii) statutory damages; M
iii) pre- and post-judgmentf interest;
iv) attorneys’ fees and costs; and
v) all other relief tof f which the Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs may be justly
entitled.
p Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
c / s / David Eric Kassab
f LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 00794070
U lance@kassab.law
DAVID ERIC KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law
1214 Elgin Street
Houston, Texas 77004
Telephone: 713.522.7400
Facsimile: 713.522.7410
16
ATTORNEYS FOR LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB AND THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
FOGLER, BRAR, O’NEIL AND GRAY, LLP
/s/ Murray Fogler k
Murray Fogler e
State Bar No. 072073C00
mfogler@foglerbrar.com
909 Fannin, Suite 1640
Houston, Texast 77010
Telephone: 71i3-481-1010
Facsimile: 713-574-3224
ATTORNEY e FOR LANCE
CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND THE
KASSA u B LAW FIRM REGARDING
PLAINTIFFS’ AFFIRMATIVE CLAIMS
CERTIFICAaTE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
instrument has been forwarded to all parties pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure on this the 29th day ofe August 2022.
 / s / Lance Christopher Kassab
p Lance Christopher Kassab
17
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this
document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below.
The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate
of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab e
Bar No. 24071351 C
david@kassab.law t
Envelope ID: 67770941 r
Status as of 8/30/2022 8:18 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimsestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com r8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com  8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@favrepa.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Lawyer Wade lawyerwade@hotmail.coml 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Lance Kassab eserve@kassab.law a 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Lance Kassab lance@kassab.lawM 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
David Kassab david@kassab.law 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Larry Newsom lnewsom@krcl.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo jason@ciofaelolaw.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Jessica Z.Barger barger@wrightclosebarger.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Nicholas Pierce nicholafs@kassab.law 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrar.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Andrew Johnson oajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Andrew J. Sarne Casarne@krcl.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Kathryn Laflin  KLaflin@KRCL.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10f607900 jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo n24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Kevin Graham CainU24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
D Kassab david@kassab.law 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
L Kassab lance@kassab.law 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Katie Budinsky kbudinsky@krcl.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Misty Davis mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
E. MarieJamison jamison@wrightclosebarger.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT"
29,2022-08-02,OA,Kassab,6th Amended Answer,"Kassab's Sixth Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim — adds 21st affirmative defense (TUTSA preemption under § 134A.007(a)) and attorney's fees claim for bad faith TUTSA prosecution under § 134A.005; otherwise substantively identical to the Fifth Amended Answer","Phase 3 amended pleading superseding the Fifth Amended Answer. Key additions over Filing #27: (1) new affirmative defense #21 for preemption under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 134A.007(a), and (2) new section claiming attorney's fees under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 134A.005 for bad faith TUTSA claims by Pohl. All prior content maintained including 20 affirmative defenses, factual background, and barratry counterclaim.",PLEAD-1,N/A,Phase 3,2022-08-02_OA_Kassab-6th-Amended-Answer-CC_FILED.pdf,"That Pohl recover nothing; that Kassab recover (i) actual and consequential damages, (ii) statutory damages, (iii) pre- and post-judgment interest, (iv) attorneys' fees and costs, and (v) all other just relief","8/2/2022 4:00 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 66899970
By: Ashley Lopez
Filed: 8/2/2022 4:00 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIrAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS, LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAW FIRM’S SIXTH AMENDED
ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND COUNtTERCLAIM
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
COMES NOW, Defendants, Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab,
P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm and files this their Sixth Armended Answer, Affirmative Defenses,
and Counterclaim, and would respectfully show the Court as follows;
iIl
RULE 47a STATEMENT
1. The Kassab Defendantso, in their capacity as Counter-Plaintiffs, seek monetary
relief of more than $1,000,000.00.
y PARTIES
2. Plaintiff, Michael A. Pohl is an individual lawyer residing in Colorado and is a
party herein. c i
3. oPlaintiff, Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl is a law firm set up for the practice of
law in various states of the union, including Texas and is a party herein.
4. Defendant, Scott Favre is a nonresident individual residing in Mississippi and is a
party herein.
5. Defendant, Scott M. Favre, PA, LLC is a nonresident limited liability company
located in Mississippi and is a party herein.
6. Defendant, Precision Marketing Group, LLC is a nonresident limited liability
company located in Mississippi and is a party herein. k
7. Defendant, F. Douglas Montague III is a nonresident indilvidual residing in
Mississippi. c
8. Defendant, Montague, Pittman & Varnado, PA is sa nonresident professional
association located in Mississippi. 
9. Defendant, Tina Nicholson is an individual residing in Texas and is a party herein.
10. Defendant, Baker Nicholson, LLP, d/b/a Baker Nicholson Law Firm is a limited
liability partnership located in Texas and is a party herein.
11. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Laance Christopher Kassab is an individual residing
in Texas and is a party herein. 
12. Defendant, Counter-Pelaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The Kassab
Law Firm is a professional corpofration located in Texas and is a party herein.
y III
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
13. Thisa matter is within the jurisdictional limits of this Court and Plaintiffs, Counter-
Defendants, Mifcihael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl (“Pohl”) and Defendants,
Counter-Plaintiffs, Lance Christopher Kassab (“LCK”) and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a
The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab, P.C.”) (collectively “Kassab”) are subject to the Court’s
jurisdiction. Venue is proper in this county because one or more of the defendants are residents of
this county and because a substantial part of the acts and/or omissions that form the basis of this
suit occurred in this county.
GENERAL DENIAL
14. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab generally denies all allegations made by
Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl, and requests
the Court to require Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Oeffices of Michael
A. Pohl to carry their burden of proof regarding all allegations against Kassab.
V r
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
15. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab pleads the fsollowing affirmative defenses:
1. Statute of limitations; g
2. Justification; B
3. Estoppel; y
4. Waiver;
5. Ratification; f
6. Release;
7. Unclean hands; O
8. Contribution;
9. Failure to mitigate;
10. Lack ofi standing;
11. Accford and Satisfaction;
12. Assumption of the Risk;
13. Illegality/Criminal Acts;
14. First Amendment;
15. Attorney Immunity;
16. In Pari Delicto;
17. Res Judicata;
18. Defect of Parties;
19. Abandonment; k
20. Subject of a Valid Contract; and l
21. Preemption pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134Ac.007(a).
VI s
SPECIFIC DENIALS D
16. Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs specifically dseny that all conditions precedent
regarding Plaintiffs claims of conversion and theft of rtrade secrets have been performed or
occurred prior to Plaintiffs’ filing of suit against Kassab.
VIlI
FACTUAL BACKGROUNDa AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
17. LCK is a lawyer practicinog law with The Kassab Law Firm, a law firm in Houston,
Texas focusing on plaintiffs’ legal mcalpractice cases. Kassab filed four lawsuits on behalf of over
four hundred clients against Pohl (the “Harris County Lawsuits”). The main allegations against
Pohl are civil barratry andp conspiracy to commit barratry, a third-degree felony in Texas. Pohl
conspired with his wife, Donalda Pohl (“Dona”), his paralegal, Edgar Jaimes (“Jaimes”) and three
runners in Missiscsiippi to illegally solicit clients on behalf of Pohl. Dona owns a sham lending
company in Toexas called Helping Hands Financing, LLC (“HH Texas”). Jaimes rans the day-to-
day operations of HH Texas. The three runners are Scott Walker (“Walker”), Steve Seymour
(“Seymour”) and Kirk Ladner (“Ladner”) (collectively “Runners”). The three Runners owned and
operated two other sham companies called Helping Hands Group, LLC and Helping Hands
Financial, LLC (collectively “HH Mississippi”). The three runners also owned Precision
Marketing Group, LLC (“Precision”) which they sold to Scott Favre and/or his companies
(collectively “Favre”). The runners had several other business entities from which they operated
and concealed their illegal solicitation conspiracy.
18. With regard to the clients obtained in the BP Litigation, Walkerk, Seymour and
Ladner hired other runners to literally go up and down streets in specific localtions knocking on
doors to solicit clients on behalf of Pohl for lawsuits against British Petrolceum. Walker, Seymore
and Ladner, through Precision and on behalf of Pohl, paid these runnesrs as much as $300-$400 for
every potential client they obtained. Pohl paid Precision as much as $1,500 for every client
Precision obtained and referred to Pohl. Walker, Seymore and Ladner paid the other runners from
this amount and pocketed the balance. Pohl also offered and agreed to pay Walker, Seymour and
Ladner a percentage of his legal fees once cases settled. This percentage was disguised as an
hourly rate of $1,500.00 per hour, but the percaentage of the “settlement” payment was never below
the agreed percentage. For example, no matter how much “hourly” time was actually spent on a
case, the agreed upon percentage wase always achieved by simply dividing the percentage amount
of Pohl’s legal fees by $1,500.00 fto calculate the imaginary number of hours, and then the Runners
would submit an invoice for tyhose imaginary number of hours. Whether the Runners actually spent
five (5) or fifty (50) hoCurs on a particular case was not the measure of the “settlement” fees to be
paid to the Runnersa, it was always the agreed upon percentage of attorney’s fees earned by Pohl
regardless of acftual hours spent on a case.
19U. With regard to auto accidents, Pohl set up a “Google Alerts” to be notified
whenever there was a horrific rollover or other type of horrific vehicle crash across the nation.
Pohl would then immediately send the alert to the Runners so they could arrange to visit hospitals,
homes and funerals to contact the families of the injured in order to solicit them as clients. The
Runners would use their sham companies, “Helping Hands” to act as though they were
approaching these victims to genuinely help them rather than solicit them. The Runners would
falsely tell these victims that they were there to provide money for burial services, food, clothing,
lodging, etc. In reality however, the Runners’ contacted these families under thesek false pretenses
with the sole objective of talking advantage of these victims and their famililes while they were
emotionally distraught and not thinking straight in order to lock them intoc contracts which allowed
the runners to select a lawyer for the victim. The victims and the familsy members were encouraged
to hire Pohl and told they could not get the money unless they agreed to hire Pohl. Pohl would pay
the Runners as much as $7,500 per client they signed up and Pohl also promised the runners as
much as 33% of Pohl’s legal fees on the back end when the case settled. Additionally, HH Texas
would pay HH Mississippi $2,500 for every client referred to HH Texas to “loan” money to these
victims and their family. Pohl used this procedaure as an attempt to put an additional buffer between
him and the actual Runners. 
20. Pohl also helped thee Runners form another sham entity, the GM Settlement
Verification Team (“GM Team”)f after General Motors, Inc. issued a recall on cars due to faulty
ignition switches which effeycted the safe operation of the airbag systems on vehicles. Thus, the
GM Team was designeCd to look official as if it was part of General Motors. This conspiracy was
to form an official laooking entity from GM as if GM was wanting to compensate people who had
been harmed wfhen airbags failed to deploy in relation to the ignition recall. In reality, this was
just anothUer sham company used to solicit and trick potential clients into hiring Pohl. Again, Pohl
would pay Walker and Ladner, through their sham entity, the GM Team, a fee for every potential
client it referred to Pohl, in addition to a percentage of his attorney’s fees on the back end.
21. Pohl knew what he was doing was illegal barratry. Accordingly, he knowingly
formed entities that he perceived would insulate him from liability. In fact, Walker testified that
although he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or “marketing money” it was “clear to [him]
it was barratry.” In fact, Walker considered himself and his company “a pass-throkugh for barratry
money.” All total, Walker, Ladner and Precision received over $5 million in “balrratry pass-through
money” from Pohl and other lawyers to solicit potential clients with clacims, both auto-accident
victims and those involved in the BP Deepwater Horizon litigation. s
22. One of the runners hired by Pohl and Walker to illegally solicit clients on behalf of
Pohl was Magdalena Santana (“Santana”). In her September 24, 2016 affidavit, Santana testified
that Pohl sent her on “dozens and dozens of car wreck cases all over the country.” Pohl would
email Santana the link of news coverage he obtained through Google Alerts depicting an accident
and asked her “to go to the victim or the victima’s family and try to get them to sign up with him.”
Santana swore under oath that Pohl agreed to pay her “$5,000 per case that [she] signed, plus a
percentage of his attorney’s fees.” Sanetana was advised by Pohl to “be persistent even if the family
... rejected [her].” Santana was insftructed by Pohl to “approach the victims and their families while
they were vulnerable, in they emergency room, their hospital rooms or at the funerals.” Pohl told
Santana that minoritiesC “were especially vulnerable since they tended not to know that the law
prohibited barratray.” According to Pohl, they “were easier to sign up.”
23. Pfohl would give Santana “money to give to the victims or their families” but would
only giveU the money to the potential client “if they agreed to sign a Pohl representation contract.”
Pohl advised Santana that the money was a “foot in the door” but instructed Santana not to mention
anything about hiring a lawyer “until after they agreed to take the money.” “If the client agreed to
hire Pohl, then [Santana] was to have the client sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.” Santana would
then give money to the client “from his own Helping Hands company.” When Santana questioned
this, Pohl told Santana that it “was illegal for him to pay [her] directly for cases, and that’s why
the money had to go through some company.”
24. Pohl and/or his co-conspirators had Santana retract this affidkavit through a
December 19, 2017 affidavit. This purported retraction was likely the result of Plohl paying Santana
to retract the first affidavit, which is similar to something Pohl had done icn the past. In fact, Pohl’s
own paralegal, Jaimes, testified that on one occasion Pohl sent hims to Florida with a suitcase
containing $50,000 in cash to give to Santana in exchange for her agreement not to turn Pohl into
the authorities. Jaimes testified that Santana would only get the money if she signed a statement
agreeing not to mention Pohl’s illegal activity. Jaimes testified that Santana signed the statement
and then he gave her the $50,000.
25. Santana’s deposition was evena more detailed. Santana testified at her deposition
that the statement was an agreement for her to keep quiet and not charge Pohl with any
wrongdoing, criminal or unethical coenduct. Santana testified that Pohl paid her $50,000 in cash to
sign this statement, which was dfelivered by Jaimes in three bags marked “trick or treat.” Very
symbolic given that Santanay had been tricked by Pohl into soliciting potential clients for him and
was now being treatedC the money she claimed was due under their agreement just to stay quiet.
Santana reiterated ian her deposition that if she didn’t sign the gag agreement, she would not have
received the mfoney from Pohl. Santana attempted to indicate on the agreement that she was
receivingU $50,000 to keep quiet, but Jaimes told her Pohl demanded that she state she only received
nominal consideration, like $100. Santana did not write the statement but “just signed it” because
she felt she was being “forced to sign” it while “under duress.”
26. Notably, nowhere in Santana’s December 19th affidavit does she state the testimony
in her former affidavit is untrue, only that she does not “agree with” it and that the affidavit is not
“reliable.” Although Santana states in her December 19th affidavit that her prior affidavit was
drafted by a lawyer, Santana testified in her deposition that the September 24kth affidavit was
created voluntarily with her own “testimony.” Santana testified that, unlike witlh Pohl, she was not
paid and had never been promised any money to provide the testimoncy t in the September 24th
affidavit. Santana reiterated to counsel for Pohl, Billy Shepherd, sthat she was there for her
deposition to tell the truth and would not be bullied by his questioning or his efforts to confuse
her.
27. Regardless, Santana’s sworn deposition testimony confirmed most, if not all of the
facts set forth in her initial affidavit and this deposition testimony has never been retracted.
Therefore, Santana confirmed that she was haired by Pohl to solicit auto accident cases, the first
one being an accident where a woman and her unborn child lost their lives. Santana was instructed
by Walker, who was instructed by Poehl, to personally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her
up to sue the tire manufacturer fand, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000. Following
Walker and Pohl’s instructioyns, Santana visited the funeral of the deceased and got the family to
feel comfortable withC her. Although the mother was grieving, Pohl told Santana: “take no
prisoners, this is a acut throat business, you get in there and you do whatever it takes to get this
client.” The solficitation was successful after Pohl gave Santana $2,000 to “give to the client to
convinceU her into signing over with the firm.”
28. “Coach” Kenneth Talley (“Talley”) was another runner hired by Pohl and Walker
who solicited over 20 auto accident cases for Pohl. Talley has sworn under oath that he was first
hired in relation to BP claims to find “folks that lost money due to the oil spill” and “sign them
up” and “get a fee for it.” Talley testified that he went to work “knocking on doors” looking for
potential claimants for Pohl and his partner in the BP litigation. Talley solicited and signed up
more than 800 BP claims for Pohl and his co-conspirators. Talley was paid between $75 and $350
for each BP client he signed up for Pohl and his partners. k
29. Talley eventually switched to illegally soliciting auto accidenlt victims for Pohl,
“calling on folks that had bad accidents.” Talley recalls that the first clicent he solicited for Pohl
was in “the hospital in intensive care.” Talley carried with him up tos $1,000 to pay the accident
victims to “help them with problems” but paid the potential client only once they “were signed
up.” Talley kept a list of all the auto accident cases he solicited so he could keep track of the cases
that he was due a percentage from Pohl’s attorney’s fees on the back end after the case settled.
Talley also followed a checklist that instructed him to, among other things, bring flowers to the
initial hospital visit (but to spend no more thaan $50) and to offer the victims money but to “make
sure the funding schedule” from HH Texas “is filled out properly before releasing any cash.”
Talley would advise the victims thate he had attorneys who could help them such as Pohl. Talley
was paid a fee of $1,400 plus his efxpenses by Pohl, through Walker and/or one of his sham business
entities for any auto accidenyt case he solicited and referred to Pohl. On some cases, Talley was to
receive a portion of theC fee paid to Helping Hands out of Pohl’s attorney’s fees. Talley discussed
with Pohl the “peracentage of settlements” he was to receive from the cases he solicited and
referred, and Pofhl told Talley that the money was being placed in an “escrow account” for him.
When askUed whether Pohl knew he was getting paid to “contact vehicle accident victims,” Talley
responded, “the money was coming from Edgar [Jaimes] who worked for him.” And, although
his paycheck was from Walker’s company, “the funding came by way of Edgar [Jaimes].”
10
30. Talley testified that personally soliciting clients for Pohl became so frequent that
he began carrying blank contracts to each solicitation. Talley testified that he never recommended
any lawyers other than Pohl. However, Talley never told the clients that he was getting paid to
solicit them. Talley would present a contract to the potential client. If the client dkid not agree to
hire Pohl, the clients would not get the money. Talley testified that Jaimes and Dlona (the operators
of HH Texas) would send him the money. c
31. Talley further testified that both he and Pohl knew whast they were doing was illegal.
In one instance, Talley was “run out of town” while soliciting clients for Pohl. Talley testified that
during the attempted solicitation he was told by a “lawyer or policeman” that “it was against the
law what [he] was doing.” Talley mentioned this to Pohl and Pohl told him “you’ve just got to
leave...some people you can’t help.”
32. Walker was eventually indicteda and sent to prison. Being afraid of where Walker’s
indictment might lead, Pohl and his lawyer partners stopped paying Walker and the other runners
the illegal fees as Pohl had promisede. Therefore, Walker, Seymour, Ladner and Precision filed a
lawsuit in Mississippi Federal Cfourt (“Federal Litigation”) against Pohl and his law partners
claiming they were owed miyllions of dollars in promised fees.
33. The aboCve facts were compiled during the Federal Litigation. Thereafter, more
than four hundred aclients who were illegally solicited contacted the Kassab Law Firm and
requested Kassfab to represent them in litigation against Pohl and his partners. Kassab filed
lawsuits oUn behalf of these clients in four different courts in Harris County. Additionally, due to
the egregiousness of Pohl’s violation of the Texas Penal Code and violations of the Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, Kassab was required to notify the Texas State Bar
pursuant to Rule 8.03 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. Due to this
11
mandate, Kassab filed grievances against Pohl pursuant to Rule 8.03. some of Pohl’s clients also
prepared and filed grievances against Pohl arising out of his egregious conduct.
34. Because of these actions in representing clients against Pohl and the grievances
filed against Pohl, Pohl filed this retaliatory lawsuit against Kassab alleging convkersion and theft
of trade secrets. Pohl alleges that Kassab and others stole his property and usedl it to bring lawsuits
and grievances against Pohl. Specifically, Pohl alleges in his petition thcat, “Kassab is a lawyer
who specializes in suing other lawyers”1 and “Kassab solicited clsients/prospective clients [of
Pohl’s] to act as Plaintiffs . . . to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and other claims.”2
Thus, Pohl has judicially admitted that he has brought his suit against Kassab simply because
Kassab contacted illegally solicited clients to notify them of Pohl’s illegal conduct and to offer to
represent them in suits against Pohl.
35. The lawsuit is frivolous and waithout merit as it is based upon false pretenses and
was brought solely for retaliation and harassment purposes. Specifically, Kassab did not steal
anything from Pohl. Additionally, Keassab did not purchase any stolen documents belonging to
Pohl. Nor did Kassab purchase afnything belonging to Pohl. Moreover, Pohl is not the owner of
documents received, if any, yfrom Precision, Favre, Nicholson, Montague or anyone else. Lastly,
none of the documents Cand/or information that Kassab may have received from various individuals
or entities are Pohl’as trade secrets as Pohl alleges. Furthermore, Pohl has failed to comply with
conditions precfedent to filing his retaliatory suit for conversion and theft of trade secrets.
SpecificaUlly, Pohl has never requested from Kassab, the return of his alleged property. Rather,
Pohl abandoned all of the alleged documents he now accuses Kassab of stealing and/or purchasing.
Pohl abandoned all of the documents he alleges were stolen and/or purchased because he knew
1 Pohl Original Petition, p. 6
2 Id. at p. 6-7
12
that the documents were not his and that he had no ownership interest in the documents. If Pohl
actually believed the subject documents were his, he would have safeguarded the documents rather
than abandon them with a convicted felon (Walker) and his cohorts (Seymore and Ladner). Even
as of today, the subject documents sit in a warehouse, unattended and not safeguarkded.
VIII l
COUNTERCLAIM FOR CIVIL BARRATRY
36. Within the lawsuits that Kassab has filed against Pohl on brehalf of his former clients
and/or potential clients, Pohl has judicially admitted that a claim for barratry is not a legal
malpractice case. Pohl has also admitted that a because a claim for barratry is not a claim for
“legal malpractice,” the Discovery Rule does not apply to ra barratry claim. Therefore, based upon
Pohl’s judicial admissions, the assignment of a barratry claim is permitted under Texas law.
37. Thus, based upon express assignmlents of interest given to Kassab, Kassab brings
counterclaims against Pohl and his law firm pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,
Section 16.069. Section 16.069 provides:
(a) If a counterclaim or cross claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence
that is the basis of an faction, a party to the action may file the counterclaim or
cross claim even though as a separate action it would be barred by limitations
on the date the party’s answer is required.
(b) The counteCrclaim or cross claim must be filed not later than the 30th day after
the date on which the party’s answer is required.
Kassab has been assigned barratry claims on behalf of 242 claimants. These counterclaims
are timely because they were filed within 30 days of the date Kassab filed his original
answer.
13
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
38. Defendants contend that all or some of Plaintiffs’ claims for misappropriate
under TUTSA were made in bad faith, enabling Defendants to recover their reasonable
attorney’s fees. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.005.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF c
Wherefore, Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs respectfully pray that Plaintiffs recover nothing
on their claims and that the Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs rescover on their claims against the
Plaintiffs and/or any Third-Party Defendants as follows:
i) actual and consequential damages; B
ii) statutory damages; n
iii) pre- and post-judgment interest; i
iv) attorneys’ fees and costs; anMd
v) all other relief to which tohe Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs may be justly entitled.
O Respectfully submitted,
p THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
l LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
i Texas State Bar No. 00794070
i lance@kassab.law
o f DAVID ERIC KASSAB
n Texas State Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law
1214 Elgin Street
Houston, Texas 77004
Telephone: 713.522.7400
Facsimile: 713.522.7410
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS,
14
COUNTER-PLAINTIFFS LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB AND THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
/s/ Murray Fogler
Murray Fogler k
State Bar No. 07207300 r
mfogler@foglerbrar.com l
FOGLER, BRAR, O’NEIL AND GRAY, LLP
909 Fannin, Suite 16c40
Houston, Texas 77r010
Telephone: 713-s481-1010
Facsimile: 71D3-574-3224
ATTORNEsY FOR LANCE
CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND THE
KASSrAB LAW FIRM REGARDING
P BLAINTIFFS’ AFFIRMATIVE CLAIMS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct caopy of the above and foregoing instrument has been
forwarded to all parties pursuant to the TexaMs Rules of Civil Procedure on this the 2nd day of August
2022. 
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
f Lance Christopher Kassab
15
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this
document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below.
The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate
of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab e
Bar No. 24071351 C
david@kassab.law t
Envelope ID: 66899970 r
Status as of 8/2/2022 4:19 PM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimsestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com r8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com  8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@favrepa.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Lawyer Wade lawyerwade@hotmail.coml 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Lance Kassab eserve@kassab.law a 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Lance Kassab lance@kassab.lawM 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
David Kassab david@kassab.law 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Nicholas Pierce nicholas@kassab.law 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbefog.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrar.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Kathryn Laflin KLaflinf@KRCL.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Andrew Johnson ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Larry Newsom lnewsom@krcl.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo ojason@ciofalolaw.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Jessica Z.Barger Cbarger@wrightclosebarger.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas  cpappas@krcl.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
E. MarieJamison jamison@wrightclosebarger.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Andrew J. Sarne f asarne@krcl.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Benjamin Ritz n britz@thompsoncoe.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley U zfoley@thompsoncoe.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10607900 jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo 24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
D Kassab david@kassab.law 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
L Kassab lance@kassab.law 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Katie Budinsky kbudinsky@krcl.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM ERROR"
26,2022-05-13,MTN,Kassab,Motion to Designate RTP,Kassab's Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties seeking to add eight non-party individuals to the verdict form for proportionate responsibility allocation,"Phase 3 procedural motion filed after counterclaims were dismissed and before trial, seeking to designate eight individuals as responsible third parties under Texas proportionate responsibility statute to reduce potential damages allocation against Kassab.",RTP-1,N/A,Phase 3,2022-05-13_MTN_Kassab-Mtn-to-Designate-RTP_FILED.pdf,"Designate George W. (Billy) Shepherd, Scott Walker, Steve Seymour, Kirk Ladner, Dona Pohl, Edgar Jaimes, Ken Talley, and Magdalena Santana as responsible third parties for proportionate responsibility allocation, and grant all other relief in law or equity","5/13/2022 6:22 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 64509093
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 5/13/2022 6:22 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIAkL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND LAlNCE
CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAW FIRM’S
MOTION TO DESIGNATE RESPONSIBLE THIRD PcARTIES
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE SCOT DOLLINGER: s
Defendants, Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. D/B/A The
Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab”), and file this, their Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties.
REQUESTED R ELIEF
1. Kassab seeks to designate Georgel W. (Billy) Shepherd (Shepherd), Scott Walker
(Walker), Steve Seymour (Seymour) andM Kirk Ladner (Ladner), Dona Pohl (Dona), Edgar
Jaimes (Jaimes), Ken Talley (Talley), Moagdalena Santana (Santana) as responsible third parties
in this litigation. Shepherd, Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley and Santana are all
persons who are alleged to have caused or contributed to causing in any way the harm for which
recovery of damages by Pohl is sought. Thus, they are all responsible third parties in this cause.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.011(6).
c II
f FACTS
2.U Pohl is a lawyer who commits barratry and has prayed on the less fortunate to
earn a living. On October 18, 2014, three Mississippi residents, Scott Walker (“Walker”), Kirk
Ladner (“Ladner”) and Steve Seymour (“Seymour”), and their related entities, including
Precision Marketing Group, LLC (“Precision”), filed suit against Michael Pohl (“Pohl”) and
others in Mississippi federal court (the “Mississippi Litigation”). There, Precision, Walker,
Ladner and Seymour alleged that: (1) they had a joint venture with Pohl to sign up clients with
economic loss claims stemming from the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill and clients with
personal injury claims; (2) that they successfully obtained these clients for Pohl; and (3) that
Pohl breached their agreement by not paying them what was owed, including thekir agreed share
of Pohl’s attorney’s fees. l
3. The evidence presented in the Mississippi Litigationc established that Pohl
engaged in barratry. See TEX. PEN. CODE § 38.12 (defining barratrsy generally as the improper
solicitation of clients). During that litigation, Walker testified that Pohl retained him and
Precision to “provide marking services to auto accident victims[.]” Walker testified that
although he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or “marketing money,” it was “clear to [him]
it was barratry.” In fact, Walker considered himself and his company “a pass-through for barratry
money.” All told, Walker, Ladner and Precaision received over $5 million in “barratry pass-
through money” from Pohl and other lawyers to solicit potential clients, both auto-accident
victims and those involved in the BeP litigation. They would use this money to pay contract
workers to solicit clients. They wfould locate and instruct contract workers on how to accomplish
the solicitation. They traineyd “40 or 50 people” on how to “go out and solicit contracts.”
4. Walker Cand his team at Precision were first retained by Pohl to “recruit clients”
with losses resultinag from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. When that litigation dwindled, Pohl
shifted his focufs to auto accident cases, knowing that the group at Precision could go out and get
him thosUe types of clients. To accomplish this task, individuals at Precision would receive
“Google alerts” or leads from Pohl on recent catastrophic auto accidents. Walker testified that he,
Ladner, or someone working for them would go to the victims of the auto accident to “do
marketing” by letting them know “there were attorneys [who] could help.” In exchange, these
runners – whoever visited the victims – where paid between $2,500 and $5,000 to solicit the
client. These payments flowed from Pohl through his wife’s wholly owned company, “Helping
Hands Financing,” to Precision, to each individual runner. Walker would simply submit to Pohl
the amount that Precision paid its runners and Pohl would reimburse Precision.
5. One of the runners, Santana, testified to the barratry in her Septekmber 24, 2016
affidavit filed in the Mississippi Litigation. She testified that Pohl sent helr on “dozens and
dozens of car wreck cases all over the country.” Pohl would email Sacntana the link of news
coverage depicting the accident and ask her “to go to the victim or thse victim’s family and try to
get them to sign up with him.” Pohl offered to pay Santana “$5,000 per case that [she] signed,
plus a percentage of his attorney’s fees.” Santana was advised by Pohl to “be persistent even if
the family ... rejected [her].” Santana was instructed by Pohl to “approach the victims and their
families while they were vulnerable, in the emergency room, their hospital rooms or at the
funerals.” Id. Pohl told Santana that minoritieas “were especially vulnerable since they tended not
to know that the law prohibited barratry.”  According to Pohl, they “were easier to sign up.”
6. Pohl would pay Santaena “money to give to the victims or their families” but “only
if they agreed to sign a Pohl reprefsentation contract.” Pohl advised Santana that the money was a
“foot in the door” but instruycted Santana not to mention that she was there on behalf of a lawyer
“until after they agreedC to take the money.” “If the client agreed to hire Pohl, then [Santana] was
to have the client siagn a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.” Pohl would then give Santana the money to
pay the client “ffrom his own Helping Hands company.” When Santana questioned this, Pohl told
Santana tUhat it “was illegal for him to pay [her] directly for cases, and that’s why the money had
to go through some company.”
7. Santana further confirmed the barratry in her deposition taken in the Mississippi
Litigation. She testified that she was hired by Pohl to solicit auto accident cases, the first one
was an accident where a woman and her unborn child lost their lives. Santana was instructed by
Walker, who was instructed by Pohl, to personally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her
up to sue the tire manufacturer and, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000. Santana visited
the funeral of the deceased and got the family to feel comfortable with her. Although the mother
was grieving, Pohl told Santana: “take no prisoners, this is a cut-throat business, kyou get in there
and you do whatever it takes to get this client.” The solicitation was successlful after Pohl gave
Santana $2,000 to “give to the client to convince her into signing over wicth the firm.”
8. Pohl later requested Santana to sign an agreement prosmising not to go to any law
enforcement, including various State Disciplinary boards regarding any wrongdoing, criminal or
unethical conduct. In fact, it is undisputed that Pohl paid Santana $50,000 in cash to sign this
agreement, which was delivered to her in Florida by Pohl’s paralegal, Jaimes. Santana confirmed
this in an affidavit and Jaimes confirmed this in his deposition. Santana signed the statement and
received the cash, although she believed she waas “forced to sign” it while “under duress”.
9. Another runner, Talley, also testified in the Mississippi Litigation about the
barratry. Talley solicited over 20 auteo accident cases for Pohl, including two families who hired
Kassab to sue Pohl for barratry. fTalley testified that he was first hired in relation to BP claims to
find “folks that lost money dyue to the oil spill” and “sign them up” and “get a fee for it.” Talley
solicited and signed upC more than 800 BP claims for Pohl and was paid between $75 and $350
per client. a
10. Tfalley eventually transitioned to soliciting auto accident victims, “calling on folks
that had Ubad accidents.” Talley recalls that the first client he solicited was in “the hospital in
intensive care.” Talley maintained $1,000 in cash to pay the accident victims to “help them with
problems” and influence them to hire a lawyer, because the victims received the money only if
they “were signed up.” Talley would advise the victims that he had attorneys who could help
them, and that one of those attorneys was Pohl. For each auto accident case he solicited, Talley
was paid a fee of $1,400 plus his expenses by Pohl, through Walker and Precision. On some
cases, Talley was to receive a portion of Pohl’s attorney’s fees, and even discussed with Pohl the
“percentage of settlements” he was to receive. When asked whether Pohl knew he was getting
paid to “contact vehicle accident victims,” Talley responded, “the money waks coming from
Edgar [Jaimes] who worked for him.” 1CR301. Although his paycheck was frlom Precision, “the
funding came by way of Edgar [Jaimes].” Talley testified that both he acnd Pohl knew what they
were doing was illegal. s
11. In May of 2016, during the Mississippi Litigation, an insurance adjuster named
Scott Favre (“Favre”) purchased Precision and all the company’s assets, including client lists,
marketing lists, documents, files, computers, etc. from Walker, Seymore and Ladner. Included
in the purchase was the Mississippi Litigation, thus, Precision’s claims against Pohl in the
Mississippi Litigation were assigned to Favare. Favre and Precision were represented in the
Mississippi Litigation by Texas lawyer, Tina Nicholson and her firm, Baker Nicholson, LLP
(“Nicholson”). Pohl asserted counteer claims in the Mississippi Litigation alleging that Walker
and Precision (and other unknofwn defendants) converted his property. Pohl then moved to
dismiss the claims against hyim, arguing, among other things, that the agreements between him
and the runners were iCllegal and unenforceable. More specifically, Pohl argued that under both
Texas and Mississiappi law “it is illegal for a non-lawyer to accept or agree to accept money to
improperly solicfit clients for a lawyer.” The Mississippi federal court rejected Pohl’s contention,
stating thUat the agreements to solicit clients would only be a violation of Texas law and Texas
disciplinary rules, which did not apply to Precision, a Mississippi company, and Walker and
Ladner, Mississippi residents. Having failed to obtain summary dismissal, Pohl settled the
Mississippi Litigation with all parties, including Favre, hoping to forever conceal his barratry
operation. Although Pohl had already paid the runners approximately $5,000,000 in barratry
money, Pohl paid the runners an additional $1,000,000 to settle the Mississippi Litigation.
12. Kassab heard about the allegations being made by the runners in the Mississippi
Litigation. Kassab searched PACER, the federal court’s online system, obtaininkg a plethora of
information related to the Mississippi Litigation. Kassab met with Favrle and Precision’s
counsel, Nicholson. Kassab obtained information directly from them, icncluding the names and
addresses of Pohl’s former clients or prospective clients from Precsision’s marketing and client
lists. Precision, through Favre, informed Kassab that it owned all of its marketing lists and
information and also informed and verified that Precision was the main Plaintiff suing Pohl in
the Mississippi Litigation. Thereafter, Kassab used Precision’s marketing and client lists to
notify individuals who he believed may have been victims of Pohl’s barratry. Hundreds of
individuals responded, indicating that they haad been personally solicited to hire Pohl in their auto
accident or BP claims. Kassab agreed to represent these clients, and more than 400 individuals
hired Kassab to represent them agaienst Pohl and other lawyers involved in the illegal barratry
scheme. f
13. Kassab filed yfour petitions on behalf of these barratry victims in Harris County,
Texas (the “barratry laCwsuits”). The barratry lawsuits communicated matters of public concern:
that Pohl conspiread to commit barratry. After reviewing the evidence obtained from the
Mississippi Litifgation, Kassab believed he had a duty to file a grievance against Pohl pursuant to
Rule 8.03U of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct,1 and he did. Kassab also
filed a grievance against Pohl on behalf of one of his clients. In the grievances, Kassab and his
1 See TEX. DISC. R. PROF’L COND. 8.03(a) (except in circumstances which do not apply here, “a
lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of applicable rules of
professional conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness
or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate disciplinary authority.”).
client expressed matters of public concern relating to Pohl’s legal services in the marketplace and
petitioned the State Bar of Texas to reprimand and discipline Pohl in order to protect the public
as is mandated by Rule 8.03.
14. Unfortunately, in direct retaliation to the lawsuits and grievanceks filed against
Pohl, Pohl filed this retaliatory litigation against Kassab, Precision, Nichlolson, Favre and
Montague, alleging breach of contract, theft of trade secrets, conversiocn and civil conspiracy.
Specifically, Pohl alleged that these parties were “acting in cosmbination with the agreed
objective” to misappropriate his trade secrets and convert the marketing lists and attorney-client
contracts that Pohl hired Precision to obtain. Pohl alleges Favre and Precision, with Nicholson’s
assistance, converted this property and provided it to Kassab and Montague in order to solicit
Pohl’s former clients “to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and other claims.”
aIII
AMRGUMENT
15. A responsible third paorty is someone “who [is] alleged to have caused or
contributed to causing in any way the harm for which recovery of damages is sought, whether by
negligent act or omission . . . [or] by other conduct or activity that violates an applicable legal
standard,” making them responsible third parties in this cause. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §
33.011(6). Shepherd, Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley and Santana are all
persons who havce caused or contributed to causing the harm for which Pohl seeks to recover
damages.
16. Shepherd knew that Walker, Seymour and Ladner had sold Precision to Favre and
knew that Walker, Seymour and Ladner had legally transferred Precision’s assets, including the
subject matter of Pohl’s conversion and theft of trade secrets claims, to Favre. Shepherd further
knew that Favre and/or his counsel had given documents to third parties, including Kassab and
others prior to negotiating a settlement in the Mississippi Litigation.
17. Shepherd negotiated the settlement in the Federal Litigation between Walker,
Seymour, Ladner, Favre and Precision on the one hand and Pohl on the other hankd. If Pohl now
complains in this lawsuit that he was entitled to the return and/or dlestruction of said
assets/property, Shepherd, as Pohl’s attorney in the Mississippi Liticgation wholly failed to
protect Pohl by ensuring that all subject property was gathered from sall third parties and returned
to Pohl or destroyed as part of the any settlement agreement, if in fact Pohl owned and/or desired
to safeguard the subject property.
18. Shepherd’s malfeasance was either negligent or intentional. If Shepherd knew
that the subject assets/property were a point of contention in the Mississippi Litigation and knew
that the assets/property could be used by ouatside third parties to garner clients to sue Pohl, as
Pohl alleges, Shepherd may have intentionally failed to protect Pohl’s interest so that he could
secure future lucrative employment feor himself and his law firm for years to come by continuing
to represent Pohl in litigation to fbe brought against Pohl after the subject property was used to
garner clients to sue Pohl yas Pohl alleges. Thus, Shepherd is a person who is caused or
contributed to causing Cin any way the harm for which recovery of damages is sought by Pohl.
19. Walkaer, Seymour and Ladner sold Precision to Favre. Walker, Seymour and
Ladner also tranfsferred the subject assets/property of Precision to Favre. Walker testified under
oath thatU he, Seymour and Ladner, through Precision, owned all the assets/property, including
computers and documents that were transferred to Favre. Walker also testified that he had the
legal right and authority, through Precision, to sell and transfer all the subject assets/property to
Favre. Moreover, Walker, Seymour and Ladner certified that they owned all of the subject
property/assets and had authority to transfer all of the subject property/assets to Favre. If
Walker, Seymour and Ladner did not have the legal right to transfer all of the subject
assets/property to Favre, then they caused or contributed to causing any alleged harm for which
recovery of damages is sought by Pohl.
20. Additionally, if Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley kor Santana had
an agreement and/or duty to safeguard any property allegedly owned bly Pohl, they are
responsible for failing to safeguard the property. Additionally, Walker, Sceymour, Ladner, Dona,
Jaimes, Talley and Santana routinely placed Pohl’s alleged trade sescrets and documents in the
public domain, circulating Precision’s marketing lists and other documents allegedly belonging
to Pohl to numerous third parties rather than safeguard these documents and lists. Therefore,
Shepherd, Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley, Santana are persons who caused or
contributed to causing any alleged harm for which recovery of damages is sought by Pohl. Their
conduct caused or contributed to causing in paart (if not entirely) the harm for which recovery of
damages is sought by Pohl, and that conduct violated an applicable legal standard and/or
constitutes negligence. See Tex. Civ.e Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.011(6). Therefore, the jury should
be permitted to consider apportiofning fault in this case to Shepherd, Walker, Seymour, Ladner,
Dona, Jaimes, Talley, Sanytana. Their designation as responsible third parties is factually
justified and legally apCpropriate.2
2 It is also of no concern here that the Court might be unable to exert personal jurisdiction over either Walker,
Seymour, Ladner, Talley, Dona, Jaimes or Santana. In its 2003 revision of Chapter 33, the Legislature abolished the
predecessor law, which had defined responsible third parties to be only those over whom the court could exercise
jurisdiction, thus allowing the designation of those “who are not subject to the court’s jurisdiction or who are
immune from liability to the claimant.” See, e.g., In re Unitec Elevator Serv. Co., 178 S.W.3d 53, 58 & n. 5 (Tex.
App.-- Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding); accord Hix-Hernandez v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:20-cv-29-RP,
2021 WL 7632564, at *1 (W.D. Tex. May 6, 2021) (“A defendant may designate a responsible third party despite
the fact that the party has a defense to liability, cannot be joined as a defendant, or both. Even parties who are
outside the court’s jurisdiction or are immune from liability may be designated responsible third parties.”) (internal
citations omitted).
PRAYER
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs, Lance Christopher
Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. D/B/A The Kassab Law Firm ask the Court to
grant this Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties and grant all other reelief in law or in
equity as the Court sees fit and as Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs will ever pray.
Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAeB LAW FIRM
rLANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
M Texas State Bar No. 00794070
 lance@kassab.law
o DAVID ERIC KASSAB
e Texas State Bar No. 24071351
c david@kassab.law
f f NICHOLAS R. PIERCE
Texas State Bar No. 24098263
y nicholas@kassab.law
1214 Elgin Street
Houston, Texas 77004
 Telephone: 713-522-7400
a Facsimile: 713-522-7410
f ATTORNEYS FOR THE KASSAB DEFENDANTS
10
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has
been forwarded to all known parties and/or counsel of record pursuant to the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure on this, the 13th of May, 2022.
/ s / Lance Christopher Kalssab
Lance Christopher Kassab
11
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab
Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law r
Envelope ID: 64509093
Status as of 5/16/2022 7:55 AM CST
Case Contacts r i
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com s5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@favrepa.com g5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Lance Kassab eserve@kassab.law u 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrar.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.comy 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Andrew Johnson ajohnson@thomapsoncoe.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Larry Newsom lnewsom@krcl.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo jason@cioofalolaw.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Andrew J. Sarne asarne@krcl.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Kathryn Laflin KLafflin@KRCL.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10607900pjefferson@mdjwlaw.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo 24003C021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24a01l2371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Solace Southwicko ssouthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
E. MarieJamisUon jamison@wrightclosebarger.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
David R.Wade lawyerwade@hotmail.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Katie Budinsky kbudinsky@krcl.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Jessica Z.Barger barger@wrightclosebarger.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT"
27,2022-05-13,OA,Kassab,5th Amended Answer,"Kassab's Fifth Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim — live pleading asserting 20 affirmative defenses, general and specific denials, detailed factual background of Pohl's barratry scheme, and counterclaim for civil barratry on behalf of 242 assigned claimants","Phase 3 amended pleading filed simultaneously with the Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties. This is Kassab's fifth iteration of his answer, expanding affirmative defenses and maintaining the barratry counterclaim based on assigned claims from 242 of Pohl's former clients.",PLEAD-1,N/A,Phase 3,2022-05-13_OA_Kassab-5th-Amended-Answer-CC_FILED.pdf,"That Pohl recover nothing; that Kassab recover (i) actual and consequential damages, (ii) statutory damages, (iii) pre- and post-judgment interest, (iv) attorneys' fees and costs, and (v) all other just relief on counterclaims","5/13/2022 6:22 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 64509093
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 5/13/2022 6:22 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIrAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS, LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAW FIRM’S FIFTH AMENDED
ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND COUNtTERCLAIM
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
COMES NOW, Defendants, Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab,
P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm and files this their Fifth Armended Answer, Affirmative Defenses,
and Counterclaim, and would respectfully show the Court as follows;
iIl
RULE 47a STATEMENT
1. The Kassab Defendantso, in their capacity as Counter-Plaintiffs, seek monetary
relief of more than $1,000,000.00.
y PARTIES
2. Plaintiff, Michael A. Pohl is an individual lawyer residing in Colorado and is a
party herein. c i
3. oPlaintiff, Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl is a law firm set up for the practice of
law in various states of the union, including Texas and is a party herein.
4. Defendant, Scott Favre is a nonresident individual residing in Mississippi and is a
party herein.
5. Defendant, Scott M. Favre, PA, LLC is a nonresident limited liability company
located in Mississippi and is a party herein.
6. Defendant, Precision Marketing Group, LLC is a nonresident limited liability
company located in Mississippi and is a party herein. k
7. Defendant, F. Douglas Montague III is a nonresident indilvidual residing in
Mississippi. c
8. Defendant, Montague, Pittman & Varnado, PA is sa nonresident professional
association located in Mississippi. 
9. Defendant, Tina Nicholson is an individual residing in Texas and is a party herein.
10. Defendant, Baker Nicholson, LLP, d/b/a Baker Nicholson Law Firm is a limited
liability partnership located in Texas and is a party herein.
11. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Laance Christopher Kassab is an individual residing
in Texas and is a party herein. 
12. Defendant, Counter-Pelaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The Kassab
Law Firm is a professional corpofration located in Texas and is a party herein.
y III
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
13. Thisa matter is within the jurisdictional limits of this Court and Plaintiffs, Counter-
Defendants, Mifcihael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl (“Pohl”) and Defendants,
Counter-Plaintiffs, Lance Christopher Kassab (“LCK”) and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a
The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab, P.C.”) (collectively “Kassab”) are subject to the Court’s
jurisdiction. Venue is proper in this county because one or more of the defendants are residents of
this county and because a substantial part of the acts and/or omissions that form the basis of this
suit occurred in this county.
GENERAL DENIAL
14. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab generally denies all allegations made by
Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl, and requests
the Court to require Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Oeffices of Michael
A. Pohl to carry their burden of proof regarding all allegations against Kassab.
V r
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
15. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab pleads the fsollowing affirmative defenses:
1. Statute of limitations; g
2. Justification; B
3. Estoppel; y
4. Waiver;
5. Ratification; f
6. Release;
7. Unclean hands; O
8. Contribution;
9. Failure to mitigate;
10. Lack ofi standing;
11. Accford and Satisfaction;
12. Assumption of the Risk;
13. Illegality/Criminal Acts;
14. First Amendment;
15. Attorney Immunity;
16. In Pari Delicto;
17. Res Judicata;
18. Defect of Parties;
19. Abandonment; and k
20. Subject of a Valid Contract. l
VI c
SPECIFIC DENIALS r
16. Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs specifically deny Dthat all conditions precedent
regarding Plaintiffs claims of conversion and theft of trades secrets have been performed or
occurred prior to Plaintiffs’ filing of suit against Kassab. r
VII
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
17. LCK is a lawyer practicing lMaw with The Kassab Law Firm, a law firm in Houston,
Texas focusing on plaintiffs’ legal malporactice cases. Kassab filed four lawsuits on behalf of over
four hundred clients against Pohl (tche “Harris County Lawsuits”). The main allegations against
Pohl are civil barratry and conspiracy to commit barratry, a third-degree felony in Texas. Pohl
conspired with his wife, Dopnalda Pohl (“Dona”), his paralegal, Edgar Jaimes (“Jaimes”) and three
runners in Mississippi to illegally solicit clients on behalf of Pohl. Dona owns a sham lending
company in Texacs icalled Helping Hands Financing, LLC (“HH Texas”). Jaimes rans the day-to-
day operationos of HH Texas. The three runners are Scott Walker (“Walker”), Steve Seymour
(“Seymour”) and Kirk Ladner (“Ladner”) (collectively “Runners”). The three Runners owned and
operated two other sham companies called Helping Hands Group, LLC and Helping Hands
Financial, LLC (collectively “HH Mississippi”). The three runners also owned Precision
Marketing Group, LLC (“Precision”) which they sold to Scott Favre and/or his companies
(collectively “Favre”). The runners had several other business entities from which they operated
and concealed their illegal solicitation conspiracy.
18. With regard to the clients obtained in the BP Litigation, Walker, Seymour and
Ladner hired other runners to literally go up and down streets in specific locatiokns knocking on
doors to solicit clients on behalf of Pohl for lawsuits against British Petroleum.l Walker, Seymore
and Ladner, through Precision and on behalf of Pohl, paid these runners acs much as $300-$400 for
every potential client they obtained. Pohl paid Precision as muchs as $1,500 for every client
Precision obtained and referred to Pohl. Walker, Seymore and Ladner paid the other runners from
this amount and pocketed the balance. Pohl also offered and agreed to pay Walker, Seymour and
Ladner a percentage of his legal fees once cases settled. This percentage was disguised as an
hourly rate of $1,500.00 per hour, but the percentage of the “settlement” payment was never below
the agreed percentage. For example, no mattaer how much “hourly” time was actually spent on a
case, the agreed upon percentage was always achieved by simply dividing the percentage amount
of Pohl’s legal fees by $1,500.00 to caelculate the imaginary number of hours, and then the Runners
would submit an invoice for thosef imaginary number of hours. Whether the Runners actually spent
five (5) or fifty (50) hours oyn a particular case was not the measure of the “settlement” fees to be
paid to the Runners, itC was always the agreed upon percentage of attorney’s fees earned by Pohl
regardless of actuala hours spent on a case.
19. Wfith regard to auto accidents, Pohl set up a “Google Alerts” to be notified
wheneverU there was a horrific rollover or other type of horrific vehicle crash across the nation.
Pohl would then immediately send the alert to the Runners so they could arrange to visit hospitals,
homes and funerals to contact the families of the injured in order to solicit them as clients. The
Runners would use their sham companies, “Helping Hands” to act as though they were
approaching these victims to genuinely help them rather than solicit them. The Runners would
falsely tell these victims that they were there to provide money for burial services, food, clothing,
lodging, etc. In reality however, the Runners’ contacted these families under these false pretenses
with the sole objective of taling advantage of these victims and their families wkhile they were
emotionally distraught and not thinking straight in order to lock them into contrlacts which allowed
the runners to select a lawyer for the victim. The victims and the family mcembers were encouraged
to hire Pohl and told they could not get the money unless they agreed sto hire Pohl. Pohl would pay
the Runners as much as $7,500 per client they signed up and Pohl also promised the runners as
much as 33% of Pohl’s legal fees on the back end when the case settled. Additionally, HH Texas
would pay HH Mississippi $2,500 for every client referred to HH Texas to “loan” money to these
victims and their family. Pohl used this procedure as an attempt to put an additional buffer between
him and the actual Runners. a
20. Pohl also helped the Runners form another sham entity, the GM Settlement
Verification Team (“GM Team”) afteer General Motors, Inc. issued a recall on cars due to faulty
ignition switches which effected fthe safe operation of the airbag systems on vehicles. Thus, the
GM Team was designed to lyook official as if it was part of General Motors. This conspiracy was
to form an official lookCing entity from GM as if GM was wanting to compensate people who had
been harmed when aairbags failed to deploy in relation to the ignition recall. In reality, this was
just another shafm company used to solicit and trick potential clients into hiring Pohl. Again, Pohl
would paUy Walker and Ladner, through their sham entity, the GM Team, a fee for every potential
client it referred to Pohl, in addition to a percentage of his attorney’s fees on the back end.
21. Pohl knew what he was doing was illegal barratry. Accordingly, he knowingly
formed entities that he perceived would insulate him from liability. In fact, Walker testified that
although he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or “marketing money” it was “clear to [him]
it was barratry.” In fact, Walker considered himself and his company “a pass-through for barratry
money.” All total, Walker, Ladner and Precision received over $5 million in “barratry pass-through
money” from Pohl and other lawyers to solicit potential clients with claims, botkh auto-accident
victims and those involved in the BP Deepwater Horizon litigation. l
22. One of the runners hired by Pohl and Walker to illegally soclicit clients on behalf of
Pohl was Magdalena Santana (“Santana”). In her September 24, 201s6 affidavit, Santana testified
that Pohl sent her on “dozens and dozens of car wreck cases all over the country.” Pohl would
email Santana the link of news coverage he obtained through Google Alerts depicting an accident
and asked her “to go to the victim or the victim’s family and try to get them to sign up with him.”
Santana swore under oath that Pohl agreed to pay her “$5,000 per case that [she] signed, plus a
percentage of his attorney’s fees.” Santana waas advised by Pohl to “be persistent even if the family
... rejected [her].” Santana was instructed by Pohl to “approach the victims and their families while
they were vulnerable, in the emergenecy room, their hospital rooms or at the funerals.” Pohl told
Santana that minorities “were espfecially vulnerable since they tended not to know that the law
prohibited barratry.” Accoyrding to Pohl, they “were easier to sign up.”
23. Pohl woCuld give Santana “money to give to the victims or their families” but would
only give the moneay to the potential client “if they agreed to sign a Pohl representation contract.”
Pohl advised Safntana that the money was a “foot in the door” but instructed Santana not to mention
anything Uabout hiring a lawyer “until after they agreed to take the money.” “If the client agreed to
hire Pohl, then [Santana] was to have the client sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.” Santana would
then give money to the client “from his own Helping Hands company.” When Santana questioned
this, Pohl told Santana that it “was illegal for him to pay [her] directly for cases, and that’s why
the money had to go through some company.”
24. Pohl and/or his co-conspirators had Santana retract this affidavit through a
December 19, 2017 affidavit. This purported retraction was likely the result of Pohlk paying Santana
to retract the first affidavit, which is similar to something Pohl had done in the lpast. In fact, Pohl’s
own paralegal, Jaimes, testified that on one occasion Pohl sent him toc Florida with a suitcase
containing $50,000 in cash to give to Santana in exchange for her agrseement not to turn Pohl into
the authorities. Jaimes testified that Santana would only get the money if she signed a statement
agreeing not to mention Pohl’s illegal activity. Jaimes testified that Santana signed the statement
and then he gave her the $50,000.
25. Santana’s deposition was even more detailed. Santana testified at her deposition
that the statement was an agreement for haer to keep quiet and not charge Pohl with any
wrongdoing, criminal or unethical conduct. Santana testified that Pohl paid her $50,000 in cash to
sign this statement, which was deliveered by Jaimes in three bags marked “trick or treat.” Very
symbolic given that Santana had fbeen tricked by Pohl into soliciting potential clients for him and
was now being treated the myoney she claimed was due under their agreement just to stay quiet.
Santana reiterated in hCer deposition that if she didn’t sign the gag agreement, she would not have
received the moneya from Pohl. Santana attempted to indicate on the agreement that she was
receiving $50,00f0 to keep quiet, but Jaimes told her Pohl demanded that she state she only received
nominal cUonsideration, like $100. Santana did not write the statement but “just signed it” because
she felt she was being “forced to sign” it while “under duress.”
26. Notably, nowhere in Santana’s December 19th affidavit does she state the testimony
in her former affidavit is untrue, only that she does not “agree with” it and that the affidavit is not
“reliable.” Although Santana states in her December 19th affidavit that her prior affidavit was
drafted by a lawyer, Santana testified in her deposition that the September 24th affidavit was
created voluntarily with her own “testimony.” Santana testified that, unlike with Pohl, she was not
paid and had never been promised any money to provide the testimony in the kSeptember 24th
affidavit. Santana reiterated to counsel for Pohl, Billy Shepherd, that she lwas there for her
deposition to tell the truth and would not be bullied by his questioning cor his efforts to confuse
her. s
27. Regardless, Santana’s sworn deposition testimony confirmed most, if not all of the
facts set forth in her initial affidavit and this deposition testimony has never been retracted.
Therefore, Santana confirmed that she was hired by Pohl to solicit auto accident cases, the first
one being an accident where a woman and her unborn child lost their lives. Santana was instructed
by Walker, who was instructed by Pohl, to perasonally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her
up to sue the tire manufacturer and, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000. Following
Walker and Pohl’s instructions, Santeana visited the funeral of the deceased and got the family to
feel comfortable with her. Althfough the mother was grieving, Pohl told Santana: “take no
prisoners, this is a cut throayt business, you get in there and you do whatever it takes to get this
client.” The solicitatioCn was successful after Pohl gave Santana $2,000 to “give to the client to
convince her into siagning over with the firm.”
28. f“Coach” Kenneth Talley (“Talley”) was another runner hired by Pohl and Walker
who solicUited over 20 auto accident cases for Pohl. Talley has sworn under oath that he was first
hired in relation to BP claims to find “folks that lost money due to the oil spill” and “sign them
up” and “get a fee for it.” Talley testified that he went to work “knocking on doors” looking for
potential claimants for Pohl and his partner in the BP litigation. Talley solicited and signed up
more than 800 BP claims for Pohl and his co-conspirators. Talley was paid between $75 and $350
for each BP client he signed up for Pohl and his partners.
29. Talley eventually switched to illegally soliciting auto accident victims for Pohl,
“calling on folks that had bad accidents.” Talley recalls that the first client he soklicited for Pohl
was in “the hospital in intensive care.” Talley carried with him up to $1,000 lto pay the accident
victims to “help them with problems” but paid the potential client only conce they “were signed
up.” Talley kept a list of all the auto accident cases he solicited so he scould keep track of the cases
that he was due a percentage from Pohl’s attorney’s fees on the back end after the case settled.
Talley also followed a checklist that instructed him to, among other things, bring flowers to the
initial hospital visit (but to spend no more than $50) and to offer the victims money but to “make
sure the funding schedule” from HH Texas “is filled out properly before releasing any cash.”
Talley would advise the victims that he had aattorneys who could help them such as Pohl. Talley
was paid a fee of $1,400 plus his expenses by Pohl, through Walker and/or one of his sham business
entities for any auto accident case he esolicited and referred to Pohl. On some cases, Talley was to
receive a portion of the fee paid tfo Helping Hands out of Pohl’s attorney’s fees. Talley discussed
with Pohl the “percentage yof settlements” he was to receive from the cases he solicited and
referred, and Pohl toldC Talley that the money was being placed in an “escrow account” for him.
When asked whethear Pohl knew he was getting paid to “contact vehicle accident victims,” Talley
responded, “thef money was coming from Edgar [Jaimes] who worked for him.” And, although
his paychUeck was from Walker’s company, “the funding came by way of Edgar [Jaimes].”
30. Talley testified that personally soliciting clients for Pohl became so frequent that
he began carrying blank contracts to each solicitation. Talley testified that he never recommended
any lawyers other than Pohl. However, Talley never told the clients that he was getting paid to
10
solicit them. Talley would present a contract to the potential client. If the client did not agree to
hire Pohl, the clients would not get the money. Talley testified that Jaimes and Dona (the operators
of HH Texas) would send him the money.
31. Talley further testified that both he and Pohl knew what they were doking was illegal.
In one instance, Talley was “run out of town” while soliciting clients for Pohl. Tlalley testified that
during the attempted solicitation he was told by a “lawyer or policeman”c that “it was against the
law what [he] was doing.” Talley mentioned this to Pohl and Pohl stold him “you’ve just got to
leave...some people you can’t help.” 
32. Walker was eventually indicted and sent to prison. Being afraid of where Walker’s
indictment might lead, Pohl and his lawyer partners stopped paying Walker and the other runners
the illegal fees as Pohl had promised. Therefore, Walker, Seymour, Ladner and Precision filed a
lawsuit in Mississippi Federal Court (“Fedearal Litigation”) against Pohl and his law partners
claiming they were owed millions of dollars in promised fees.
33. The above facts weree compiled during the Federal Litigation. Thereafter, more
than four hundred clients who fwere illegally solicited contacted the Kassab Law Firm and
requested Kassab to represeynt them in litigation against Pohl and his partners. Kassab filed
lawsuits on behalf of thCese clients in four different courts in Harris County. Additionally, due to
the egregiousness aof Pohl’s violation of the Texas Penal Code and violations of the Texas
Disciplinary Rufles of Professional Conduct, Kassab was required to notify the Texas State Bar
pursuant Uto Rule 8.03 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. Due to this
mandate, Kassab filed grievances against Pohl pursuant to Rule 8.03. some of Pohl’s clients also
prepared and filed grievances against Pohl arising out of his egregious conduct.
11
34. Because of these actions in representing clients against Pohl and the grievances
filed against Pohl, Pohl filed this retaliatory lawsuit against Kassab alleging conversion and theft
of trade secrets. Pohl alleges that Kassab and others stole his property and used it to bring lawsuits
and grievances against Pohl. Specifically, Pohl alleges in his petition that, “Kasksab is a lawyer
who specializes in suing other lawyers”1 and “Kassab solicited clients/proslpective clients [of
Pohl’s] to act as Plaintiffs . . . to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barcra t try and other claims.”2
Thus, Pohl has judicially admitted that he has brought his suit agasinst Kassab simply because
Kassab contacted illegally solicited clients to notify them of Pohl’s illegal conduct and to offer to
represent them in suits against Pohl.
35. The lawsuit is frivolous and without merit as it is based upon false pretenses and
was brought solely for retaliation and harassment purposes. Specifically, Kassab did not steal
anything from Pohl. Additionally, Kassab daid not purchase any stolen documents belonging to
Pohl. Nor did Kassab purchase anything belonging to Pohl. Moreover, Pohl is not the owner of
documents received, if any, from Preecision, Favre, Nicholson, Montague or anyone else. Lastly,
none of the documents and/or infofrmation that Kassab may have received from various individuals
or entities are Pohl’s trade syecrets as Pohl alleges. Furthermore, Pohl has failed to comply with
conditions precedent Cto filing his retaliatory suit for conversion and theft of trade secrets.
Specifically, Pohl haas never requested from Kassab, the return of his alleged property. Rather,
Pohl abandonedf all of the alleged documents he now accuses Kassab of stealing and/or purchasing.
Pohl abanUdoned all of the documents he alleges were stolen and/or purchased because he knew
that the documents were not his and that he had no ownership interest in the documents. If Pohl
actually believed the subject documents were his, he would have safeguarded the documents rather
1 Pohl Original Petition, p. 6
2 Id. at p. 6-7
12
than abandon them with a convicted felon (Walker) and his cohorts (Seymore and Ladner). Even
as of today, the subject documents sit in a warehouse, unattended and not safeguarded.
VIII
COUNTERCLAIM FOR CIVIL BARRATRY
36. Within the lawsuits that Kassab has filed against Pohl on behalf of his former clients
and/or potential clients, Pohl has judicially admitted that a claim for btarratry is not a legal
malpractice case. Pohl has also admitted that a because a claim fosr barratry is not a claim for
“legal malpractice,” the Discovery Rule does not apply to a barratry claim. Therefore, based upon
Pohl’s judicial admissions, the assignment of a barratry claime is permitted under Texas law.
37. Thus, based upon express assignments ouf interest given to Kassab, Kassab brings
counterclaims against Pohl and his law firm pursuannt to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,
Section 16.069. Section 16.069 provides: r
(a) If a counterclaim or cross claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence
that is the basis of an action,o a party to the action may file the counterclaim or
cross claim even though as a separate action it would be barred by limitations
on the date the party’s ancswer is required.
(b) The counterclaim o O r cross claim must be filed not later than the 30th day after
the date on whichy the party’s answer is required.
Kassab has been assigned barratry claims on behalf of 242 claimants. These counterclaims
are timely because athey were filed within 30 days of the date Kassab filed his original
answer. f i
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs respectfully pray that Plaintiffs recover nothing
on their claims and that the Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs recover on their claims against the
Plaintiffs and/or any Third-Party Defendants as follows:
13
i) actual and consequential damages;
ii) statutory damages;
iii) pre- and post-judgment interest;
iv) attorneys’ fees and costs; and
v) all other relief to which the Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs may ber justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW
FIRM
/ s / Lance sChristopher Kassab
LANCE C eHRISTOPHER KASSAB
Texasg State Bar No. 00794070
lancer@kassab.law
DBAVID ERIC KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 24071351
ydavid@kassab.law
i l1214 Elgin Street
a Houston, Texas 77004
Telephone: 713.522.7400
f Facsimile: 713.522.7410
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS,
i COUNTER-PLAINTIFFS LANCE CHRISTOPHER
O f KASSAB AND THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
C /s/ Murray Fogler
l  Murray Fogler
State Bar No. 07207300
mfogler@foglerbrar.com
f FOGLER, BRAR, O’NEIL AND GRAY, LLP
n 909 Fannin, Suite 1640
U Houston, Texas 77010
Telephone: 713-481-1010
Facsimile: 713-574-3224
ATTORNEY FOR THE KASSAB LAW
FIRM REGARDING PLAINTIFFS’
AFFIRMATIVE CLAIMS
14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has been
forwarded to all parties pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this the 13th day of May
2022.
/ s / Lance Christopher Kasesab
Lance Christopher KassCabl
15
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab
Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law r
Envelope ID: 64509093
Status as of 5/16/2022 7:55 AM CST
Case Contacts r i
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com s5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com g5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@favrepa.com u 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Lance Kassab eserve@kassab.law  5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrar.cyom 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.caom 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Larry Newsom lnewsom@krcl.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Andrew Johnson ajohnson@othompsoncoe.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Andrew J. Sarne asarne@krcl.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Kathryn Laflin KLafflin@KRCL.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10607900pjefferson@mdjwlaw.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo 24003C021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24a01l2371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo jason@ciofalolaw.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Harris Wells o hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Solace SouthwUick ssouthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
E. MarieJamison jamison@wrightclosebarger.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Jessica Z.Barger barger@wrightclosebarger.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
David R.Wade lawyerwade@hotmail.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Katie Budinsky kbudinsky@krcl.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT"