filing_id,date,doc_type,party,description,doc_type_detail,procedural_posture,chain,outcome,phase,filename,relief_requested,full_text
46,2022-11-30,MSJ,Pohl,Partial MSJ on Barratry Liability,Plaintiffs' Rule 166(g) Motion on Barratry Liability and Specific Affirmative Defenses Asserted by the Kassab Defendants,"Pre-trial motion filed November 30, 2022 by Pohl, five days before the December 5, 2022 trial setting. Seeks legal rulings under Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(g) to narrow trial issues by: (1) finding barratry is not legally relevant to this lawsuit, and (2) striking 10+ of Kassab's affirmative defenses as barred as a matter of law.",MSJ-3,N/A,Phase 3,2022-11-30_MSJ_Pohl-Partial-MSJ-Barratry-Liability_FILED.pdf,"Find that: (1) establishing whether barratry occurred is not legally relevant to this lawsuit; (2) Kassab's affirmative defenses of unlawful acts, illegality, criminal acts, in pari delicto, justification, immunity under Rule 17.09, unclean hands, release, accord and satisfaction, estoppel, subject to a valid contract, assumption of the risk, and contribution are barred as a matter of law","11/30/2022 8:20 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 70589892
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 11/30/2022 8:20 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et. al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
Plaintiffs, §
V. § HARRIS COUNTY,k TEXAS
§ r
LANCE CHRISTOPHER § l
KASSAB, et. al §
§ c
Defendants. § 189TH JUDrICIAL DISTRICT
PLAINTIFFS’ RULE 166(g) MOTION ON BARRATRY LIDABILITY AND SPECIFIC
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES ASSERTED BY THE KASSAB DEFENDANTS
Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166(g), Plaintiffs Michael Pohl and Law Office of
Michael A. Pohl PLLC (collectively “Pohl”) file this Motion on the issues of the relevance of
barratry liability and the legal viability of specific affirmative defenses asserted by the Kassab
defendants (the “Motion”). Pohl requests tahat the Court find Defendants Lance Christopher
Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab P.C.’s (collectively, “Kassab”) theories regarding
establishing barratry and certain otheer legal defenses fail as a matter of law.
f I. STANDARD
Under Texas Rule ofy Civil Procedure 166(g), this Court can decide legal issues at pretrial
“to assist in the disposition of the case without undue expense or burden to the parties . . . .” See
Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(g). Allowing this trial to subsume the question of whether Pohl committed
barratry, in connfection with clients whose information Kassab later misappropriated, would greatly
extend the length of trial, and it would needlessly complicate the issues presented to the jury. A
legal determination by this Court that whether barratry did in fact occur is immaterial to Pohl’s
claims—whether as a matter of denial or as a defense—would assist in disposing of this case with
less undue burden and expense. Furthermore, determining whether certain defenses fail as a matter
of law is a set of legal questions the Court can decide to appropriately focus the trial in this case.
II. DISCUSSION
To prevent “undue expense” and additional “burden to the parties,” and to ensure that trial
does not proceed for longer than is necessary, this Court should find that establishing whether
barratry occurred is not legally relevant to the material issues in this case and that ten of Kassab’s
affirmative defenses are not legally viable and have no bearing at trial. l
A. The alleged existence of barratrous conduct by Pohl is not ac dtenial of or defense to
Pohl’s claims, and Kassab’s desire to present evidence on irti is not material.
Barratry does not constitute a defense to claims for theft oDf tirade secrets,1 conversion,2 or
conspiracy.3 Even if Kassab could show that all of Pohl’s fosrmer and prospective clients were
obtained through barratry—and he cannot—it would not prevent, nor is it material to, Pohl’s ability
to establish the elements of his claims. 4 Because the alleged existence of barratry does not impact
Pohl’s ability to establish his claims, nor does it constitute a defense to Pohl’s claims if established,
the Court should find that as a matter of lawM, establishing barratry is not legally relevant at trial.
Kassab’s position is that, as oa lawyer, he was entitled or otherwise justified in
misappropriating and converting ncot only another lawyer’s proprietary information, but also
confidential and privileged information about another lawyer’s clients simply because Kassab
hoped to find evidence of bparratry claims to pursue against Pohl. Kassab likewise suggests that it
was appropriate to solicit and entice the employees or contractors of another lawyer to violate their
1 A trade secrets cfl f aim under the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“TUTSA”) involves the following elements: (1)
a plaintiff owned trade secrets; (2) a defendant misappropriated the trade secrets; and (3) that the misappropriation
caused the plaintiff damages. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 134A.002 & 134A.004.
2 A conversion claim can include the following elements: “(1) the plaintiff owned, had legal possession of, or was
entitled to possession of the property; (2) the defendant assumed and exercised dominion and control over the property
in an unlawful and unauthorized manner, to the exclusion of and inconsistent with the plaintiff’s rights; and [applicable
in some cases] (3) the defendant refused the plaintiff’s demand for return of the property.” Akin v. Santa Clara Land
Co., Ltd., 34 S.W.3d 334, 344 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. denied); see also Hunt v. Baldwin, 68 S.W.3d 117,
131 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
3 The elements of conspiracy are familiar: (1) a combination of at least two persons; (2) the persons seek to accomplish
an object or course of action; (3) there is a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or more
unlawful, overt acts are taken in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (5) damages occur.
4 Pohl asserts claims for conversion, TUTSA violations, and conspiracy. Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition ¶¶ 35–43.
obligations by disclosing confidential information, simply because Kassab believed it could help
support a claim against Pohl. However, the law does not authorize tortious conduct because a
person may believe that conduct could help them uncover some other allegedly wrongful acts.
As will be discussed further in the motions in limine and before the Coukrt, the topic of
barratry is relevant to this case in certain, limited respects. The fact that Kassabl wanted to and did
pursue barratry claims against Pohl necessarily will be a part of this casec. But evidence trying to
prove the merits of such claims for barratry should not be presented sto the jury. However, since
the start of this lawsuit, Kassab has attempted to inject the broader question of whether barratry
did in fact occur into this lawsuit—Kassab even surreptitiously asserted claims pending in other
lawsuits as counterclaims in this lawsuit. But there is a reason that Kassab uses bombastic
language and allegations rather than clear and plain language to articulate the relevance of
barratry—Kassab is intent on using this issuea to paint Pohl in a negative light in front of the jury.
Still, any presentation of evidence directed at establishing whether Pohl violated rules against
barratry is not material to the issues ine this case, because establishing barratry does not (1) prevent
Pohl from establishing the elemenfts of his claims; and (2) is not a defense to Pohl’s claims.
1. Establishing barryatry does not deny the factual bases of Pohl’s claims or prevent Pohl
from establishing the elements of his claims.
On their face, the elements necessary to establish a TUTSA claim, a conversion claim, and
the existence of ac conspiracy have nothing to do with barratry. Kassab conflates the idea that a
client contract procured through barratry is voidable (in an action brought by the client who is a
party to the contract) with the distinct issue of ownership of trade secret information. Establishing
that barratry occurred does not entail revoking an attorney’s ownership of compilations of
information about clients the attorney has represented. Nor does a contract’s voidability impact
the ownership of information reflected in the contract. Thus, whether Pohl committed barratry is
not a relevant matter that could deny Pohl the ability to establish the elements of his claims.
Kassab incorrectly appears to believe that barratry may implicate Pohl’s ownership of the
trade secrets. There is no legal basis for this position. Because establishing that bakrratry occurred
will not operate to deny Pohl the ability to establish his claims, it is not a relelvant issue that the
jury needs to consider or receive evidence on. c
i. The alleged barratry does not impact Pohl’s ownershisp of the trade secrets.
To prevail on his TUTSA claim, Pohl must be an owner of trade secrets. The statute
provides that owner “means, with respect to a trade secret, the person or entity in whom or in which
rightful, legal, or equitable title to, or the right to enforce rights in, the trade secret is reposed.”
See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 134A.002(3 n -a).5 To the extent that Kassab argues that
establishing that Pohl committed barratry impracts Pohl’s ability to be the owner of any trade
secrets, that argument fails as a matter of law. Kassab has conflated the enforceability of a client
contract against a client allegedly eobtained through barratry with whether Pohl owns the
information regarding with whomf Pohl has contracted—information reflected on copies of Pohl’s
own client contracts. y
Pohl has legal or equitable title to the information that comprises his client list, as well as
the collection of coapies of attorney-client fee agreements, and the other files misappropriated by
Kassab regardlefss of how clients listed in those files were obtained. Based on his prior arguments,
Kassab appears to believe that Pohl cannot prevail on his claims without showing that every client
5 To the extent that Kassab suggests that the phrase “equitable title” imports some form of equitable analysis to whether
Pohl owns the trade secrets, there is no legal support for this position. The reference to “equitable title,” especially in
connection with the reference to “legal title,” simply incorporates the idea of beneficial ownership into the statutory
definition. Equitable title is a “title that indicates a beneficial interest in property and that gives the holder the right to
acquire formal legal title.” See Title: Equitable Title, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
behind each client contract was procured without barratry. That is not the case, and Kassab cannot
demonstrate that the existence of barratry is legally material to this lawsuit.
To understand why establishing barratry is not material, it may be useful to contemplate
what the impact would be if one assumed that Kassab can show that Pohl had obktained some, or
even all, of his clients and potential clients through barratry. Even if a client hlas a valid claim for
barratry, there is no legal support for the idea that simply because barractry occurred, the former
lawyer loses (1) ownership of the collection of information constitutisng the lawyer’s client list; or
(2) ownership of the attorney’s copy of the client contract. Rather, the statutory scheme suggests
the precise opposite. A client contract is not rendered void even if it is established that barratry
occurred. It is merely voidable if the client brings an action to have the contract declared void.
See Tex. Gov’t Code § 82.0651(a). There is no dispute that none of Pohl’s client contracts have
been declared void. This would not change eaven if Kassab established that barratry occurred in
this lawsuit, because only the client can have a contract declared void. See id.
But the lack of relevance exteends a step further. Even in a hypothetical world where some
of Pohl’s clients had their client cfontracts declared void, that would not mean that Pohl’s client list
and copies of client contractsy no longer belong to him. It would simply mean that a client contract
that was declared voidC is not enforceable against the client. There is no support for the idea once
a contract has been daeclared void, an attorney is divested of ownership of the information regarding
with whom he hfas contracted. Nor would an attorney be divested of ownership of all copies of the
void clienUt contract in his possession. Nor would the fact that a contract was declared void impact
an attorney’s ownership of a compilation of information about clients that included the information
about one client whose contract was declared void. There simply is no support for the idea that a
finding of barratry, even if it voids a client contract, results in relief, finding, or a circumstance
where an attorney must then purge his or her records of all references to that client and their
information.
Kassab’s arguments around barratry rely on obfuscating the issues that are actually before
the Court. Kassab has conflated the voidability of a contract—which can preveknt that contract
from being enforced—with ownership of trade secrets that include the compilaltion of information
contained in those contracts. Regardless of whether barratry occurred, Pohcl owned the information
about with whom he has done business, whether that information toosk the form of client contracts
or client lists. While Kassab may dispute if Pohl owned those trade secrets, whether barratry
occurred will not impact that determination.
2. Establishing barratry is not a standalone defense to Pohl’s claims.
While Kassab’s various other pled defenses are discussed below, it is important to note that
despite Kassab’s framing of this case, establishirng barratry is not an affirmative defense to Pohl’s
claims. There are no “outlaws” under Texas law. Kassab’s unsubstantiated belief that Pohl
engaged in barratry does not give Kaessab the right to ignore Pohl’s legal rights (and to treat Pohl
as outside the law’s protections) bfy misappropriating and converting Pohl’s property.
“An affirmative defeynse is defined as ‘a denial of the plaintiff’s right to judgment even if
the plaintiff establishes every allegation in its pleadings.’ An affirmative defense allows the
defendant to introdauce evidence to establish an independent reason why the plaintiff should not
prevail; it does fnot rebut the factual proposition of the plaintiff’s pleading.” Hassell Constr. Co.,
Inc. v. Stature Commercial Co., Inc., 162 S.W.3d 664, 667 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005,
no pet.) (citations omitted).
Despite prior insinuations from Kassab, establishing barratry is not a standalone defense to
Pohl’s claims, nor has Kassab pled it as a standalone defense. See generally Kassab’s Eighth
Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim (“Kassab’s Eighth Answer”). Even if
Kassab could prove that Pohl committed barratry, that is not an independent basis for denying Pohl
recovery on his claims in this lawsuit. Kassab’s desire to focus on allegations of barratry is part
of his strategy to distract and prejudice the jury against Pohl through Kassab’s repetitive,
inaccurate, and inflammatory claims that Pohl is a criminal or has violated felony crkiminal statutes.
Kassab’s attempts to use his allegations of barratry as a defense are novell and without legal
support. Kassab cannot cite to any Texas cases involving a claim for thceft of trade secrets or a
claim for conversion where barratry was found to be an affirmatisve defense to those claims.
Instead, what Kassab has pointed to are cases where courts have stated that they will not enforce
a contract that is void for illegality. The defenses of illegality and unlawful acts are discussed
more thoroughly below. See infra Part II(B)(1). But the Court should not be confused by Kassab’s
attempt to cite inapplicable caselaw in this context. Pohl is not seeking to enforce any client
contract, nor is he seeking to recover the procaeeds generated under any of those client contracts.
Because it does not constitute a defense and has not been explicitly pled as a defense, the Court
should find that establishing barratry eis not a standalone defense to Pohl’s claims.
3. Kassab should not be fpermitted to prejudice the jury through unconnected allegations
of prior bad acts that Kassab has no standing to assert.
The rules against barratry can only be enforced by specific parties against a lawyer through
specific and limited avenues. The Texas State Bar can enforce disciplinary rules involving barratry
through disciplincary proceedings brought against a lawyer. The State of Texas can enforce
criminal statutes prohibiting barratry by bringing criminal charges against a lawyer. And finally,
Texas allows clients who were solicited through barratry to sue under a civil statute. Kassab has
no standing under any of these three avenues to allege and prove that Pohl committed barratry.
If the Court permits Kassab to introduce evidence to try and establish that barratry
occurred, it would be allowing Kassab to enforce the disciplinary rules, criminal statutes, or the
civil liability statute even though Kassab would have no ability to do so in any other proceeding.
This would be improper and distract from the issues that the jury must decide in this case.
To the extent that evidence concerning, relating to, or mentioning barratry is permitted, it
should be limited, and be accompanied by a limiting instruction, to evidence thatk can be directly
linked to the plaintiffs who seek civil liability against Pohl (which are all reprelsented by Kassab).
These are the only clients for which allegations of barratry have any placusible bearing. But this
should be very carefully limited to prevent the use of the evidence as simproper character evidence
or to suggest that Pohl procured all of his clients through barratry.
B. Ten of Kassab’s so-called affirmative defenses fail as a matter of law.
In his eighth amended answer, Kassab asserted numerous affirmative defenses. As a matter
of law, ten of those defenses do not exist or do not apply in this case. To streamline the issues
presented at trial, the Court should find that the rten defenses discussed below are not legally viable
and will not be considered at trial. 
1. Kassab’s Unlawful Acts Deoctrine defense—whether called illegality, criminal acts, or
“in pari delicto”—is preccluded under clear Texas Supreme Court Precedent.
Kassab’s current pleading asserts a defense of “Illegality/Criminal Acts,” but his prior
answer described it as thep “Illegality/Criminal Acts/Unlawful Acts Rule” defense. Compare
Kassab’s Eighth Answer, at 4, with Kassab’s Seventh Answer, at 4. Separately, Kassab also asserts
a defense of “in pcairi delicto.” See Kassab’s Eighth Answer, at 4. Regardless of the title Kassab
uses to descroibe it, the unlawful acts doctrine has been supplanted under Texas law. As for
illegality and in pari delicto, they apply when a plaintiff seeks to enforce an illegal contract.
Because none of Pohl’s claims involve a request to enforce any contract—let alone one that is
allegedly illegal—the defenses of in pari delicto and illegality have no application to this case.
First, to the extent that the unlawful acts doctrine could have any relevance, it is preempted
by Texas’s proportionate responsibility statute. In Dugger v. Arredondo, the Texas Supreme Court
considered “whether the common law unlawful acts doctrine is available as an affirmative defense
under the proportionate responsibility framework.” 408 S.W.3d 825, 831–32 (Tekx. 2013). The
Court found that “it is not,” and that “[t]he plain language of section 33.003 cllearly indicates that
the common law unlawful acts doctrine is no longer a viable defense.” Idc. at 832.
Pohl laid out the preemption problem in his response to Kasssab’s affirmative motion for
traditional summary judgment.6 Kassab likely changed his description of this defense due to that
prior briefing and Pohl pointing out that Kassab acknowledged this defense was preempted in prior
briefing.7 However, Kassab describing the defense differently does not make a difference. While
this defense would fail on the merits, that question is not reached, as the defense is preempted. A
defense does not become un-preempted becauase a party calls it a different name.
Second, there are other related defenses that go by the name of “illegality,” or sometimes
“in pari delicto.” Kassab’s assertionse of these defenses also fail as a matter of law. Those defenses
apply to a party seeking to enforfce an illegal contract. Because it is undisputed that Pohl is not
attempting to enforce any coyntract, let alone an illegal contract, these defenses do not apply.
Illegality or theC in pari delicto defense apply when a party comes into court seeking to have
the court enforce ana illegal agreement. See Jefferson Cnty. v. Jefferson Cnty. Constables Ass’n,
546 S.W.3d 661f, 666 (Tex. 2018) (discussing illegality defense); Geis v. Colina Del Rio, LP, 362
S.W.3d 1U00, 106 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied) (“The defense of in pari delicto
requires Texas Courts, as a general rule, to decline to enforce illegal contracts when the contracting
6 Pohl incorporates that briefing and its evidence as it pertains to the issue of the Unlawful Acts Doctrine. See
Plaintiffs’ Response In Opposition to the Traditional Motions for Summary Judgment Filed by the Kassab Defendants
and the Nicholson Defendants, at 19–27, filed Sept. 12, 2022.
7 See Plaintiffs’ Response to the Kassab Defendants’ Motion to Abate Trial Setting, at 6–7, filed Sept. 15, 2022.
parties are equally blameworthy.”). These defenses are related to the unlawful acts doctrine. See
Dugger, 408 S.W.3d at 829 (unlawful acts “doctrine originated with the principle of in pari delicto
or ‘unclean hands’ in the contract context, but was extended to tort causes of action”).
Pohl has not asserted any contract claim against Kassab, nor do any ofk his tort claims
involve enforcing the terms of any allegedly illegal contract. See generallly Pohl’s Amended
Petition. Even if the enforceability of Pohl’s client fee agreements were rcelevant, that condition is
satisfied here. The Texas legislature provided that agreements prsocured through barratry are
voidable, not void, and that a client may obtain a finding that voids the agreement.8 It is undisputed
that not a single one of Pohl’s client fee agreements have been declared void.
Because the unlawful acts doctrine has been preempted it cannot apply, regardless of what
name Kassab uses to describe it. And because there is no contract the Court could decline to
enforce, the defenses of illegality and in pari daelicto do not apply as a matter of law. Alternatively,
even if such defenses could apply, they would not be triggered absent the statutory finding that a
contract was void, which has not ocecurred and cannot occur in this lawsuit. For these and the
reasons discussed above, the Coufrt should find that these defenses do not apply as matter of law.
2. The defense of “jyustification” is not available as a matter of law.
Kassab also asserts the defense of “justification.” Kassab’s Eighth Answer, at 3. Kassab
presumably contendas that he was “justified” in stealing Pohl’s client lists and other trade secrets
because he beliefves Pohl committed barratry. The problem with this theory is that “justification”
is not a defense to Pohl’s claims. Even if it were, Kassab could not arguably be “justified” in
stealing Pohl’s trade secrets because Kassab does not allege that Pohl’s barratry involved Kassab.
8 See Tex. Gov’t Code § 82.0651(a) (stating that “client may bring an action to void a contract for legal services that
was procured as a result of conduct” often described as barratry).
10
Justification is an affirmative defense to a claim of tortious interference with contract. See
Tex. Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203, 210 (Tex. 1996) (describing defense); Knox v.
Taylor, 992 S.W. 2d 40, 59 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (justification is an
affirmative defense to tortious interference). “Justification” is not a recognized dekfense to theft of
trade secrets, conversion, or conspiracy. The defense is an assertion that the deflendant was legally
justified in interfering with the plaintiff’s contract through either a contracctual or legal right. See
Tex. Beef Cattle, 921 S.W.2d at 210. It is not a generally available dsefense to all torts.9 Even for
claims where the justification is available as a defense, if a party’s acts “are tortious in themselves,
then the issue of privilege or justification never arises.” See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fin.
Review Servs., Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74, 81 (Tex. 2000).
Even if Texas recognized “justification” as a defense to claims of theft of trade secrets,10
conversion, or conspiracy, Kassab has not anad could not allege a basis on which to assert such a
defense. First, Pohl’s allegations are that Kassab’s actions were tortious in themselves, and thus,
justification does not apply. See Prudeential, 29 S.W.3d at 81. Second, Kassab cannot legitimately
contend that Pohl took any actionf against them or that involved them before they committed the
torts that form the basis of Pyohl’s claim. The notion that Kassab was “justified” in committing
torts to obtain confidenCtial trade secrets so he could pursue claims of barratry, on behalf of third
9 There is one case, previously cited by Kassab, that states justification is an affirmative defense in the antitrust context.
See Money Mastefrs, Inc. v. TRW, Inc., No. 05-98-02017-CV, 2003 WL 152770, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 23,
2003, pet. denied). However, this case further supports the conclusion that justification is not a generally applicable
defense that can be asserted against any tort claim. In finding that “[j]ustification is an affirmative defense to both an
antitrust claim and a claim for tortious interference,” the court cited to a specific statute that provides that a party is
justified in engaging in activities that may otherwise violate antitrust law if those activities are required under certain
statutory or regulatory authority. See id. (citing Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 15.05(g)). Pohl does not dispute that the
Texas legislature could create a statutory justification defense to additional claims. However, the legislature has not
extended the applicability of the defense of justification to any of the claims asserted by Pohl in this case.
10 Kassab has also argued that “Texas courts have considered the defense in relation to theft of trade secrets” in his
prior briefing and cited to one case. See Lamont v. Vaquillas Energy Lopeno Ltd., LLP, 421 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2013, pet. denied). While that case involved a claim for theft of trade secrets, the defense of justification
was not applied to that claim, rather, the court applied it to a tortious interference claim and stated that “[l]egal
justification or privilege ‘is an affirmative defense to tortious interference with contract.’” See id. at 218.
11
parties, fails as a matter of law and as a matter of logic. To the extent that Kassab argues that he
was justified in engaging in this tortious conduct on behalf of clients that did not exist at the time
he committed the relevant tortious activity, there is no support to his interpretation of this defense.
To streamline the issues presented at trial, the Court should find that this defense fkails legally.
3. The so-called defense of “Immunity under Rule 17.09 of thel Texas Rules of
Disciplinary Procedure” does not apply as a matter of law.
Kassab asserts that “Immunity under Rule 17.09 of the Texrais Rules of Disciplinary
Procedure” protects him from liability for his actions in this lawsuiDt. See Kassab’s Eighth Answer,
at 4. However, Kassab misunderstands Rule 17.09. It providess immunity to certain officials, such
as members of the Texas Commission for Lawyer Discipline. It also limits a plaintiff’s ability to
file a lawsuit predicated on a person’s involvement in the grievance process when that person is
the complainant or a witness. However, because Pohl’s claims, and thus the lawsuit, are not
predicated on Kassab’s involvement in the Mgrievance process, Rule 17.09 does not apply.
Rule 17.09 provides that: “Noo lawsuit may be instituted against any Complainant or
witness predicated upon the filing ocf a Grievance or participation in the attorney disciplinary and
disability system.” TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 17.09. It does not provide immunity simply
because there is some connection between a case and the grievance process. The immunity that is
provided under the rule is limited to certain officials connected to the State Bar, and such officials
“are immune fromc suit for any conduct in the course of their official duties.” Id. For a lawsuit to
be “predicate o d upon” something, that something must be what the lawsuit is based or founded on.11
Kassab’s involvement in the grievance process does not give rise to Pohl’s claims. Pohl’s
claims against Kassab are based on his misappropriation and conversion of Pohl’s property—
11 Predicate, Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/predicate (accessed
Nov. 28, 2022) (listing “FOUND, BASE” as a definition of “predicated”).
12
including his improper purchase and/or acquisition of Pohl’s client list, which included actual
attorney-client fee agreements. See generally Amended Petition. These claims accrued upon
Kassab’s acquisition of the client information or use of the client information to solicit those
clients. Thus, Pohl’s claims accrued prior to any grievance being filed by Kassakb. Because the
claims asserted pre-date the filing or participation in any grievance by Kassab, lthis lawsuit cannot
have been “predicated upon the filing of a Grievance,” and Rule 17.09 doces not apply.
Based on Kassab’s prior briefing on this subject, he appears tos believe (or wish through his
selective quotations) that Rule 17.09 provides absolute immunity to him for anything he can
connect to the grievance process—even though he is not a State Bar official. But that is not what
the rule provides. A simple hypothetical shows how this lawsuit is not predicated on Kassab’s
participation in the grievance process. If Kassab had never filed or participated in the grievance
process, would Pohl’s claims in this lawsuit satill exist? Given that Pohl’s claims accrued prior to
Kassab’s participation in the grievance process (starting in 2028), the answer is clearly yes. The
fact that Kassab has taken the positioen on multiple occasions that Pohl’s claims accrued prior to
2018 and are barred by limitationfs shows that the fact that the basis or predicate of Pohl’s claims
predates the grievances is noyt something that can be disputed.12
Pohl anticipateCs that Kassab may argue that a small portion of Pohl’s damages are
connected to the griaevance process, and that this triggers application of Rule 17.09. However, the
fact that there isf some connection that can be drawn between a grievance and a lawsuit does not
implicateU Rule 17.09. There must be a showing that the lawsuit is predicated upon the grievance,
not merely connected to it, especially when the claims accrued prior to the filing of any grievance.
Participating in the grievance process is not a get-out-of-jail-free card for prior wrongful conduct.
12 See, e.g., Kassab’s Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment, at 2, 44–57, filed Aug. 29, 2022 (arguing that Kassab
had conclusively established that Pohl’s claims against Kassab accrued years prior to the filing of this lawsuit).
13
A party’s participation in the grievance process is protected. But a person who commits a tort and
then subsequently files a grievance is not somehow absolved for what they did prior to their
involvement in the grievance process.
Because this lawsuit is not predicated on Kassab’s participation in the grikevance process,
the Court should find that Rule 17.09 does not apply as a matter of law. l
4. Unclean hands is not a defense to legal claims. c
Kassab asserts “unclean hands” as an affirmative defense. Ssee Kassab’s Eighth Answer,
at 3. Here again, Kassab presumably hopes to inject his claims of barratry to muddy the issues in
the trial of this case. But unclean hands is not available as a defense to the claims asserted here,
nor is it applicable to the type of relief currently sought by Pohl.
Texas law provides that unclean hands is an affirmative defense that may bar a party with
unclean hands from obtaining equitable relief. r See Wood v. Wiggins, 650 S.W.3d 533, 556 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, pet. denied). However, there is both a nexus requirement, and a
requirement that the party invoking tehe defense “must show an injury to himself arising from the
conduct.” Id. “‘The clean hands mfaxim should not be applied when the defendants have not been
seriously harmed and the wryong complained of can be corrected without applying the doctrine.’”
Id. (citation omitted).
Kassab’s usae and dissemination of Pohl’s trade secrets is a bell that cannot be unrung.
Thus, while Pohfl previously pled injunctive relief in his petition, to streamline issues for trial, Pohl
will no longer seek this relief. Because Pohl does not seek any equitable relief, and the defense is
not available to Pohl’s tort claims, the Court should preclude consideration of the “unclean hands”
defense at trial as a matter of law.
To the extent that Kassab can show that the defense still has legal application for some
other reason, the Court can still narrow the issues for trial by finding that Kassab cannot use
14
allegations of barratry, improper solicitation, or other supposed conduct relating to Pohl’s former
and prospective clients to prove up this defense. There is no plausible theory by which that conduct
caused Kassab an injury, rather than an alleged injury to Pohl’s former clients. See Wiggins, 650
S.W.3d at 556 (party asserting defense “must show an injury to himself arising fromk the conduct.”).
Because the defense of unclean hands does not apply to Pohl’s claims orl the relief he seeks,
the Court should find that as a matter of law, the defense has no applicaction or relevance to the
trial in this matter. In the alternative, the Court should find that, as as matter of law, any theory of
unclean hands based on Kassab’s allegations that Pohl committed barratry or other misconduct
relating to Pohl’s former and prospective clients is not relevant, as it did not harm Kassab.
5. The defenses of release, accord and satisfaction, estoppel, and “subject to a valid
contract” are not available as a matter of law.
Kassab’s current answer also purports to assert defenses of “release,” “accord and
satisfaction,” “estoppel,” and “subject to a Mvalid contract.” See Kassab’s Eighth Answer, at 3–4.
However, in his prior summary judgmoent briefing, Kassab acknowledged that “contract-related
affirmative defenses of release, accocrd and satisfaction, estoppel do not apply to Kassab.”13 Pohl
agrees, and thus, this Court should find that because Pohl has not pled a contract claim against
Kassab, the defenses of release, accord and satisfaction, and estoppel do not apply in this case as
a matter of law. See Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition ¶¶ 35–43 (not asserting any claims
sounding in contrcact against Kassab).
As for Kassab’ assertion of the defense of “subject to a valid contract,” this defense appears
to be a rewording of the express contract defense. That defense has no application here as a matter
of law. The express contract defense applies to prevent a plaintiff from recovering in quantum
13 See The Kassab Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Traditional and No-Evidence Summary
Judgment, at 16, filed Sept. 12, 2022.
15
meruit when a plaintiff seeks “to recover the reasonable value of services rendered or materials
supplied” but “there is an express contract that covers those services or materials.” See Pepi Corp.
v. Galliford, 254 S.W.3d 457, 462 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). Pohl has
not pled or argued claims that would support such a defense, nor has Kassab madek any allegations
that could plausibly support this defense. l
Because these affirmative defenses relate to claims made in conctract, and Pohl has not
alleged any contract claims against Kassab, the Court should find sthat the defenses of release,
accord and satisfaction, estoppel, and “subject to a valid contract” do not apply as a matter of law.
6. Affirmative defenses of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence are no
longer independent defenses apart from proporrtionate responsibility.
Kassab asserts “assumption of the risk” and “contribution”14 as affirmative defenses. See
Kassab’s Eighth Answer, at 3–4. Neither of these defenses are proper defenses to the claims in
this case. The Texas Supreme Court has dMeclared that “the common law affirmative defenses of
assumption of the risk and contributory onegligence no longer exist under Texas law,” rather, their
“underlying concepts remain relevacnt under Texas’s proportionate-responsibility statute.” Austin
v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 465 S.W.3d 193, 209–10 (Tex. 2015) (footnote and citation omitted). To
narrow the issues at trial, the Court should find that these defenses are not legally viable.
PRAYER
For the recaisons set forth herein, Pohl asks the Court to find that establishing whether
barratry occuorred is not legally relevant to this lawsuit and that Kassab’s affirmative defenses of
unlawful acts; illegality; criminal acts; in pari delicto; justification; immunity under Rule 17.09;
unclean hands; release; accord and satisfaction; estoppel; subject to a valid contract; assumption
of the risk; and contribution are barred as a matter of law.
14 It is unclear what defense Kassab’s reference to “Contribution” could refer to other than contributory negligence.
16
Dated: November 30, 2022 Respectfully submitted,
REYNOLDS FRIZZELL LLP
By: /s/ Jean C. Frizzell
Jean C. Frizzell
State Bar No. 07484650 k
1100 Louisiana St., Suite 3500 r
Houston, Texas 77002 l
Tel. 713.485.7200
Fax 713.485.7250 c
jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.rcom
Attorney for PlaintifDfs Michael Pohl
and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document was served on all counsel of
record pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this 30th day of November, 2022.
M /s/ Jean C. Frizzell
 Jean C. Frizzell
17
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Suni Blue on behalf of Jean Frizzell
Bar No. 7484650
sblue@reynoldsfrizzell.com r
Envelope ID: 70589892
Status as of 12/1/2022 8:34 AM CST
Case Contacts r i
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldssfrizzell.com 11/30/2022 8:20:45 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsogncoe.com 11/30/2022 8:20:45 PM SENT
Andrew Johnson ajohnson@thoumpsoncoe.com 11/30/2022 8:20:45 PM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.com 11/30/2022 8:20:45 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogleyr@foglerbrar.com 11/30/2022 8:20:45 PM SENT
Murray Fogler mfaogler@fbfog.com 11/30/2022 8:20:45 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10607900 jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 11/30/2022 8:20:45 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo 24003021osuazo@mdjwlaw.com 11/30/2022 8:20:45 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 11/30/2022 8:20:45 PM SENT
Misty Davis f mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 11/30/2022 8:20:45 PM SENT
Non-Party Witness Billy Shepherd bshepherd@spcounsel.com 11/30/2022 8:20:45 PM SENT
Lance Kassab p eserve@kassab.law 11/30/2022 8:20:45 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell C jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com 11/30/2022 8:20:45 PM SENT
Harris Wells a l hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 11/30/2022 8:20:45 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@favrepa.com 11/30/2022 8:20:45 PM SENT
Lawyer Wade o lawyerwade@hotmail.com 11/30/2022 8:20:45 PM SENT
Andrea MendeUz andrea@kassab.law 11/30/2022 8:20:45 PM SENT
Lance Kassab lance@kassab.law 11/30/2022 8:20:45 PM SENT
David Kassab david@kassab.law 11/30/2022 8:20:45 PM SENT
Nicholas Pierce nicholas@kassab.law 11/30/2022 8:20:45 PM SENT
D Kassab david@kassab.law 11/30/2022 8:20:45 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 11/30/2022 8:20:45 PM SENT
L Kassab lance@kassab.law 11/30/2022 8:20:45 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 11/30/2022 8:20:45 PM SENT"
47,2022-11-30,OBJ,Pohl,Objection to Kassab supp. RTP,Pohl's Objection to Kassab's Supplemental Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties,"Filed November 30, 2022 in response to Kassab's Supplemental RTP Motion filed November 15, 2022. Judge Dollinger denied Kassab's original RTP Motion on October 31, 2022 (finding Pohl's objection was 'well taken') and gave Kassab 14 days to replead. Kassab filed 15 days later (one day late). Pohl argues the supplemental motion contains no new factual allegations. Pohl does not object to designation of Favre and Precision as RTPs.",RTP-1,N/A,Phase 3,2022-11-30_OBJ_Pohl-Objection-to-Kassab-Supp-RTP_FILED.pdf,"Deny Kassab's Supplemental RTP Motion without leave for Kassab to attempt to replead, as Kassab failed to plead sufficient facts after already being granted leave to replead","11/30/2022 4:26 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 70583280
By: Ashley Lopez
Filed: 11/30/2022 4:26 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et. al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
Plaintiffs, §
V. § HARRIS COUNTY,k TEXAS
§ e
LANCE CHRISTOPHER § C l
KASSAB, et. al § 
§ c
Defendants. § 189TH JUDrICIAL DISTRICT
POHL’S OBJECTION TO KASSAB’S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO DESIGNATE
RESPONSIBLE THIRD PARTsIES
Plaintiffs Michael Pohl and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl PLLC (collectively “Pohl”) file
this Objection to Defendants Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a
The Kassab Law Firm’s Supplemental Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties1 (the
“Supplemental RTP Motion”) and would showa the Court as follows:
Kassab’s Supplemental RTP Motion does not address the failings of the original RTP
Motion. The Court denied Kassab’se first RTP Motion2 because Kassab failed to plead sufficient
facts showing that the alleged resfponsible third parties were responsible for the harms underlying
Pohl’s claims. Kassab was ygiven a chance to replead with sufficient new facts to demonstrate
liability. However, thCe Supplemental RTP Motion contains the same factual allegations copied
and pasted from the briefing before the Court when it denied the RTP Motion. Kassab tried to
disguise this bfyf reordering and lightly paraphrasing or modifying the allegations. But Kassab
1 This Objection is primarily directed at Kassab’s Supplemental RTP Motion, filed Nov. 15, 2022. Kassab also filed
a Second Supplemental Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties, filed Nov. 22, 2022 (“Second Supplemental
RTP Motion”). Pohl does not object to the designation of Scott Favre and Precision Marketing Group, LLC as
responsible third parties. However, Pohl objects to the Second Supplemental RTP Motion, on the same grounds as
set forth in this briefing, to the extent that it seeks the same relief sought in the Supplemental RTP Motion or seeks to
designate anyone as a responsible third party other than Scott Favre and Precision Marketing Group, LLC.
2 See Kassab’s Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties, filed May 13, 2022 (the “RTP Motion”); see also Court
Order, dated Oct. 31, 2022 (denying the RTP Motion).
provided no new factual allegations since the Court ruled on the RTP Motion, and thus, the Court
should deny the Supplemental RTP Motion for the same reasons it denied the RTP Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Kassab seeks the same relief in the Supplemental RTP Motion as he soukght in the RTP
Motion—he seeks to designate eight allegedly responsible third parties—Billly Shepherd, Scott
Walker (“Walker”), Steve Seymour (“Seymour”) Kirk Ladner (“Ladncer”), Dona Pohl, Edgar
Jaimes, Ken Talley, and Magdalena Santana (collectively, the “Allesged RTPs”). See generally
RTP Motion; Supplemental RTP Motion. 
After Kassab filed the RTP Motion, on May 31, 2022, Pohl timely filed his Objection to
Kassab’s Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties (“Pohl’s Original RTP Objection”). It
clearly laid out how the allegations in Kassab’s original RTP Motion were deficient, and how none
of the Alleged RTPs “caused or contributed to causing” the harms underlying Pohl’s claims. See
generally Pohl’s Original RTP Objection (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.011(6)).
The Court was required to designate tehe Alleged RTPs as responsible third parties unless the Court
found that Pohl’s Original RTP Ofbjection demonstrated that Kassab had failed to “plead sufficient
facts concerning the alleged yresponsibility of the person to satisfy the pleading requirement of the
Texas Rules of Civil PCrocedure.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004(g)(1).
Kassab waiated until September 2022, to request a ruling on this issue. See generally
Kassab’s Motiofn to Rule on Plaintiffs’ Objection to Designation of Responsible Third Parties
(“MotionU to Rule”), filed Sept. 22, 2022. After Kassab’s Motion to Rule was filed, the Court held
an oral hearing, and the Court found that Pohl’s Original RTP Objection was “well taken,” and
denied Kassab’s RTP Motion. See Court Order, dated Oct. 31, 2022. Kassab was given leave to
“replead and seek the relief sought in the” RTP Motion “within 14 days of this ORDER.” Id.
Despite the Court’s deadline, Kassab took 15 days to file the Supplemental RTP Motion,3
and he then requested a continuance in part on the basis that responsible third parties had not been
designated. But even though he took 15 days, rending the request untimely, Kassab chose to
make no new material factual allegations when repleading. All of the factual akllegations in the
Supplemental Motion were contained in the RTP Motion and the Motion to Rulle. Thus, there are
no new factual allegations before the Court that the Court did not have in cfront of it when it denied
Kassab’s RTP Motion last month. s
II. COMPARISON OF THE ORIGINAL (ALREADY DENIEDs) RTP MOTION TO KASSAB’S
SUPPLEMENTAL RTP MO s TION
To assist the Court in understanding how Kassarb failed to plead new facts to justify
designating the Alleged RTPs as responsible third parties—and instead just copied and rearranged
prior allegations—Pohl provides the following dliscussion of how Kassab’s Supplemental RTP
Motion differs (or does not differ) from tMhe RTP Motion. The original RTP Motion and the
Supplemental RTP Motion are collectivoely referred to as the “Motions.”
The Motions are word-for-wcord identical for their first six and a half pages—excluding
references to the respective titles of the Motions. Compare RTP Motion, 1–7, with Supplemental
RTP Motion, 1–7. The “Facts” sections of both Motions are 100% identical to each other. See id.
The first set of real differences between the Motions are the opening three paragraphs of
the Supplementalc RTP Motion’s “Argument” section. These paragraphs discuss legal standards
and how the Court permitted Kassab to replead after the Court denied the RTP Motion. See
Supplemental RTP Motion ¶¶ 15–17. There are no new relevant factual allegations concerning
any Alleged RTP in these paragraphs. See id. Although these three paragraphs are not contained
3 The day before Kassab filed the Supplemental RTP Motion, Kassab filed an eighth amended answer containing the
same copied and pasted allegations found in his prior briefing. But Kassab did not replead and “seek the relief” he
sought in the RTP Motion until he filed the Supplemental RTP Motion after the Court-ordered deadline.
in the RTP Motion, they were copied almost word-for-word from Kassab’s Motion to Rule.
Compare id., with Motion to Rule, at 2–3.4
The only real addition of factual allegations comes with paragraph 18, which is not directly
copied and pasted from the prior RTP Motion. Compare Supplemental RTP Moktion ¶ 18, with
RTP Motion. This paragraph focuses exclusively on three Alleged RTPs—Wallker, Seymour, and
Ladner—it does not address the lack of allegations against other Alleged RcTPs. See Supplemental
RTP Motion ¶ 18. Furthermore, it is copied nearly word-for-word frosm Kassab’s brief asking the
Court to rule on the RTP Motion. Compare id., with Motion to sRule, at 3–4.5
The remaining seven paragraphs (paragraphs 19–25) of the Supplemental RTP Motion are
either directly copied from the RTP Motion, or they are lightly modified or paraphrased versions
of what was previously pled in the RTP Motion:
• Compare Supplemental RTP Maotion ¶ 19, with RTP Motion ¶ 19 (showing same
factual allegations were copMied and/or paraphrased).
• Compare Supplemental RoTfP Motion ¶ 20, with RTP Motion ¶ 17 (same).
• Compare Supplementeal RTP Motion ¶ 21, with RTP Motion ¶¶ 16–17 (same).
• Compare Supplemfeintal RTP Motion ¶ 22, with RTP Motion ¶ 18 (showing same
factual allegatioOns were copied and pasted with a few words deleted).
• Compare Supyplemental RTP Motion ¶ 23, with RTP Motion ¶ 20 (showing same
factual allegations were copied and/or paraphrased).
• Compare Supplemental RTP Motion ¶ 24, with RTP Motion ¶ 20 (showing same
factuaall allegations were copied and pasted with minor alterations or omissions).
• Co c mpare Supplemental RTP Motion ¶ 25, with RTP Motion ¶ 20 (showing same
ffactual allegations were copied and pasted with minor alterations).
4 Almost every word of these three paragraphs of the Supplemental RTP Motion was directly copied from the Kassab’s
Motion to Rule, other than a sentence noting that the Court denied the RTP Motion and granted leave to replead. See
Supplemental RTP Motion ¶ 16. This statement is not material.
5 The last clause of paragraph 18 adds: “as had Walker, Ladner and Seymour not stolen Pohl’s alleged trade secrets as
he alleges, they could not have sold the alleged trade secrets to Favre and thus, Favre could not have given the alleged
trade secrets to Kassab.” See Supplemental RTP Motion ¶ 18. However, this is not a new factual allegation, as it
simply lightly synthesizes other prior factual allegations. See generally RTP Motion.
There is one exception regarding those seven paragraphs. Paragraph 25 of the Supplemental RTP
Motion appears to be a combination of two different paragraphs—one from the RTP Motion, and
one from the Motion to Rule. Compare Supplemental RTP Motion ¶ 25 (containing new legal
arguments and citations), with RTP Motion ¶ 20, and Motion to Rule, at 4–5. Thkus, there are no
new substantive factual additions in the Supplemental RTP Motion. All thle facts alleged are
contained in the briefing that was before the Court when it ruled on the RcTP Motion.
III. DISCUSSION s
Resolution of Kassab’s Supplemental RTP Motion is easy. Despite the factual allegations
contained in the RTP Motion and the Motion to Rule, on October 31, 2022, this Court ruled that
Kassab had failed “plead sufficient facts concerning the alleged responsibility of the person to
satisfy the pleading requirement of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.” See Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code § 33.004(g)(1). Nothing has chaanged since the Court made this ruling.
Because this Court already found that Pohl’s Original RTP Objection demonstrated that
Kassab’s allegations were deficient uender the rules, it should also be sufficient as an objection to
the substantively identical Supplefmental RTP Motion. Pohl therefore incorporates by reference,
in its entirety, Pohl’s Originayl RTP Objection. The Court should reject Kassab’s “butterfly effect”
theory of proportionateC responsibility and deny Kassab’s Supplemental RTP Motion for the same
reason it denied Kaassab’s prior RTP Motion—because Kassab fails to allege facts showing how
the alleged respfonsible third parties are responsible for the harms underlying Pohl’s tort claims.
U IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons stated in Pohl’s Original RTP Objection,
Pohl objects to Kassab’s Supplemental RTP Motion and request that the Court deny the
Supplemental RTP Motion without leave for Kassab to attempt to replead, as Kassab failed to
plead sufficient facts after being granted leave to replead.
Dated: November 30, 2022 Respectfully submitted,
REYNOLDS FRIZZELL LLP
By: /s/ Jean C. Frizzell
Jean C. Frizzell
State Bar No. 07484650 k
1100 Louisiana St., Suite 3500 e
Houston, Texas 77002 l
Tel. 713.485.7200
Fax 713.485.7250 c
jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.rcom
Attorney for PlaintifDfs Michael Pohl
and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC
CERTIFICATE OF SERrVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document was served on all counsel of
record pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this 30th day of November, 2022.
M /s/ Jean C. Frizzell
 Jean C. Frizzell
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Suni Blue on behalf of Jean Frizzell
Bar No. 7484650
sblue@reynoldsfrizzell.com r
Envelope ID: 70583280
Status as of 12/1/2022 8:15 AM CST
Case Contacts r i
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldssfrizzell.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsogncoe.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Andrew Johnson ajohnson@thoumpsoncoe.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogleyr@foglerbrar.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Murray Fogler mfaogler@fbfog.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10607900ojefferson@mdjwlaw.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo 24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo f jason@ciofalolaw.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Todd Taylor p ttaylor@jandflaw.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Misty Davis C mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Non-Party Witness Billy Sahlepherd bshepherd@spcounsel.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Todd Taylor o ttaylor@jandflaw.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Scott M.FavreU scott@favrepa.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Lawyer Wade lawyerwade@hotmail.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Andrea Mendez andrea@kassab.law 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Lance Kassab lance@kassab.law 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
David Kassab david@kassab.law 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Nicholas Pierce nicholas@kassab.law 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
D Kassab david@kassab.law 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Suni Blue on behalf of Jean Frizzell
Bar No. 7484650
sblue@reynoldsfrizzell.com r
Envelope ID: 70583280
Status as of 12/1/2022 8:15 AM CST
Case Contacts r i
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
L Kassab lance@kassab.law s 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbgrar.com 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT
Lance Kassab eserve@kassuab.law 11/30/2022 4:26:40 PM SENT"
45,2022-11-22,MTN,Kassab,2nd Supp. Motion to Designate RTP,"Kassab Defendants' Second Supplemental Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties (Adding Scott Favre and Precision Marketing Group, LLC)","Filed November 22, 2022 before Judge Scot Dollinger, 189th Judicial District, Harris County, Texas. Filed 13 days before the December 5, 2022 trial date, after Pohl dismissed Favre and Precision as defendants on November 21, 2022. Kassab seeks good cause to designate newly dismissed parties as responsible third parties within 60 days of trial.",RTP-1,N/A,Phase 3,2022-11-22_MTN_Kassab-2nd-Supp-Mtn-to-Designate-RTP_FILED.pdf,"Grant leave to designate Favre and Precision Marketing Group, LLC as additional responsible third parties, in addition to the eight individuals from prior supplemental motion, plus all other relief in law or equity","11/22/2022 3:51 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 70416484
By: Ashley Lopez
Filed: 11/22/2022 3:51 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIAkL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS, LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND LAlNCE
CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAW FIRM’S
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO DESIGNATE RcESPONSIBLE
THIRD PARTIES r
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE SCOT DOLLINGER: D
Defendants, Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Chsristopher Kassab, P.C. D/B/A The
Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab”), and file this, their Secornd Supplemental Motion to Designate
Responsible Third Parties.
REQUEaSTED RELIEF
1. Kassab files this Second Supplemental Motion to Designate Responsible Third
Parties to add Scott Favre (Favre) aned Precision Marketing Group, LLC (Precision) as additional
third parties. Favre and Precisionf were defendants in this lawsuit until Plaintiffs dismissed them
on November 21, 2022, jusyt 14 days prior to trail. Thus, Favre and Precision are no longer
parties to this suit. ThCus, there is good cause for designating Favre and Precision as responsible
Third Parties withina 60 days of trial due to the timing of Plaintiffs nonsuit of these parties.
2. Ffavre and Precision are central to this litigation as they purchased all of the
material Uand documents, which are the subject of Plaintiffs’ complaints, from Walker, Ladner
and Seymour, who previously owned Precision. Favre and Precision then gave some of the
material and documents to Kassab to notify Precision’s clients regarding Pohl’s illegal conduct
and potential claims they may have against Pohl. Thus, Favre and Pohl are central to this
litigation and are subject to potential third party liability, if there is liability at all.
3. Favre and Precision are outside of the subpoena power of this court. Although
Kassab has attempted to depose Favre and Precision for more than a year, Kassab has been
unsuccessful due to no fault of Kassab. Now that Plaintiffs have dismissed their claims against
Favre and Precision, Kassab cannot rely on Favre and Precision showing up to kthe trial in this
matter. l
II c
FACTS r
4. Pohl is a lawyer who commits barratry and has pDrayed on the less fortunate to
earn a living. On October 18, 2014, three Mississippi residensts, Scott Walker (“Walker”), Kirk
Ladner (“Ladner”) and Steve Seymour (“Seymour”),r and their related entities, including
Precision Marketing Group, LLC (“Precision”), filed suit against Michael Pohl (“Pohl”) and
others in Mississippi federal court (the “Misslissippi Litigation”). There, Precision, Walker,
Ladner and Seymour alleged that: (1) theyM had a joint venture with Pohl to sign up clients with
economic loss claims stemming fromo the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill and clients with
personal injury claims; (2) that they successfully obtained these clients for Pohl; and (3) that
Pohl breached their agreement by not paying them what was owed, including their agreed share
of Pohl’s attorney’s fees.
5. The evidence presented in the Mississippi Litigation established that Pohl
engaged in barractry. See TEX. PEN. CODE § 38.12 (defining barratry generally as the improper
solicitation of clients). During that litigation, Walker testified that Pohl retained him and
Precision to “provide marking services to auto accident victims[.]” Walker testified that although
he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or “marketing money,” it was “clear to [him] it was
barratry.” In fact, Walker considered himself and his company “a pass-through for barratry
money.” All told, Walker, Ladner and Precision received over $5 million in “barratry pass-
through money” from Pohl and other lawyers to solicit potential clients, both auto-accident
victims and those involved in the BP litigation. They would use this money to pay contract
workers to solicit clients. They would locate and instruct contract workers on how to accomplish
the solicitation. They trained “40 or 50 people” on how to “go out and solicit conktracts.”
6. Walker and his team at Precision were first retained by Pohl lto “recruit clients”
with losses resulting from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. When that lcitigation dwindled, Pohl
shifted his focus to auto accident cases, knowing that the group at Prsecision could go out and get
him those types of clients. To accomplish this task, individuals at Precision would receive
“Google alerts” or leads from Pohl on recent catastrophic auto accidents. Walker testified that he,
Ladner, or someone working for them would go to the victims of the auto accident to “do
marketing” by letting them know “there were attorneys [who] could help.” In exchange, these
runners – whoever visited the victims – whaere paid between $2,500 and $5,000 to solicit the
client. These payments flowed from Pohl through his wife’s wholly owned company, “Helping
Hands Financing,” to Precision, to eeach individual runner. Walker would simply submit to Pohl
the amount that Precision paid itsf runners and Pohl would reimburse Precision.
7. One of the ruynners, Santana, testified to the barratry in her September 24, 2016
affidavit filed in the MCississippi Litigation. She testified that Pohl sent her on “dozens and
dozens of car wrecak cases all over the country.” Pohl would email Santana the link of news
coverage depictfing the accident and ask her “to go to the victim or the victim’s family and try to
get them Uto sign up with him.” Pohl offered to pay Santana “$5,000 per case that [she] signed,
plus a percentage of his attorney’s fees.” Santana was advised by Pohl to “be persistent even if
the family ... rejected [her].” Santana was instructed by Pohl to “approach the victims and their
families while they were vulnerable, in the emergency room, their hospital rooms or at the
funerals.” Id. Pohl told Santana that minorities “were especially vulnerable since they tended not
to know that the law prohibited barratry.” According to Pohl, they “were easier to sign up.”
8. Pohl would pay Santana “money to give to the victims or their families” but “only
if they agreed to sign a Pohl representation contract.” Pohl advised Santana that thke money was a
“foot in the door” but instructed Santana not to mention that she was there onl behalf of a lawyer
“until after they agreed to take the money.” “If the client agreed to hire Pcohl, then [Santana] was
to have the client sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.” Pohl would thens give Santana the money to
pay the client “from his own Helping Hands company.” When Santana questioned this, Pohl told
Santana that it “was illegal for him to pay [her] directly for cases, and that’s why the money had
to go through some company.”
9. Santana further confirmed the barratry in her deposition taken in the Mississippi
Litigation. She testified that she was hired bay Pohl to solicit auto accident cases, the first one
was an accident where a woman and her unborn child lost their lives. Santana was instructed by
Walker, who was instructed by Pohl,e to personally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her
up to sue the tire manufacturer anfd, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000. Santana visited
the funeral of the deceased aynd got the family to feel comfortable with her. Although the mother
was grieving, Pohl toldC Santana: “take no prisoners, this is a cut-throat business, you get in there
and you do whatevaer it takes to get this client.” The solicitation was successful after Pohl gave
Santana $2,000 fto “give to the client to convince her into signing over with the firm.”
10U. Pohl later requested Santana to sign an agreement promising not to go to any law
enforcement, including various State Disciplinary boards regarding any wrongdoing, criminal or
unethical conduct. In fact, it is undisputed that Pohl paid Santana $50,000 in cash to sign this
agreement, which was delivered to her in Florida by Pohl’s paralegal, Jaimes. Santana confirmed
this in an affidavit and Jaimes confirmed this in his deposition. Santana signed the statement and
received the cash, although she believed she was “forced to sign” it while “under duress”.
11. Another runner, Talley, also testified in the Mississippi Litigation about the
barratry. Talley solicited over 20 auto accident cases for Pohl, including two famkilies who hired
Kassab to sue Pohl for barratry. Talley testified that he was first hired in relatilon to BP claims to
find “folks that lost money due to the oil spill” and “sign them up” and “cget a fee for it.” Talley
solicited and signed up more than 800 BP claims for Pohl and was spaid between $75 and $350
per client. 
12. Talley eventually transitioned to soliciting auto accident victims, “calling on folks
that had bad accidents.” Talley recalls that the first client he solicited was in “the hospital in
intensive care.” Talley maintained $1,000 in cash to pay the accident victims to “help them with
problems” and influence them to hire a lawyaer, because the victims received the money only if
they “were signed up.” Talley would advise the victims that he had attorneys who could help
them, and that one of those attorneyse was Pohl. For each auto accident case he solicited, Talley
was paid a fee of $1,400 plus hfis expenses by Pohl, through Walker and Precision. On some
cases, Talley was to receive ya portion of Pohl’s attorney’s fees, and even discussed with Pohl the
“percentage of settlemCents” he was to receive. When asked whether Pohl knew he was getting
paid to “contact vaehicle accident victims,” Talley responded, “the money was coming from
Edgar [Jaimes] fwho worked for him.” 1CR301. Although his paycheck was from Precision, “the
funding cUame by way of Edgar [Jaimes].” Talley testified that both he and Pohl knew what they
were doing was illegal.
13. In May of 2016, during the Mississippi Litigation, an insurance adjuster named
Scott Favre (“Favre”) purchased Precision and all the company’s assets, including client lists,
marketing lists, documents, files, computers, etc. from Walker, Seymore and Ladner. Included
in the purchase was the Mississippi Litigation, thus, Precision’s claims against Pohl in the
Mississippi Litigation were assigned to Favre. Favre and Precision were represented in the
Mississippi Litigation by Texas lawyer, Tina Nicholson and her firm, Baker Nicholson, LLP
(“Nicholson”). Pohl asserted counter claims in the Mississippi Litigation allegikng that Walker
and Precision (and other unknown defendants) converted his property. Polhl then moved to
dismiss the claims against him, arguing, among other things, that the acgreements between him
and the runners were illegal and unenforceable. More specifically, sPohl argued that under both
Texas and Mississippi law “it is illegal for a non-lawyer to accept or agree to accept money to
improperly solicit clients for a lawyer.” The Mississippi federal court rejected Pohl’s contention,
stating that the agreements to solicit clients would only be a violation of Texas law and Texas
disciplinary rules, which did not apply to Precision, a Mississippi company, and Walker and
Ladner, Mississippi residents. Having failead to obtain summary dismissal, Pohl settled the
Mississippi Litigation with all parties, including Favre, hoping to forever conceal his barratry
operation. Although Pohl had alreaedy paid the runners approximately $5,000,000 in barratry
money, Pohl paid the runners an fadditional $1,000,000 to settle the Mississippi Litigation.
14. Kassab heardy about the allegations being made by the runners in the Mississippi
Litigation. Kassab seaCrched PACER, the federal court’s online system, obtaining a plethora of
information relateda to the Mississippi Litigation. Kassab met with Favre and Precision’s
counsel, Nicholfson. Kassab obtained information directly from them, including the names and
addressesU of Pohl’s former clients or prospective clients from Precision’s marketing and client
lists. Precision, through Favre, informed Kassab that it owned all of its marketing lists and
information and also informed and verified that Precision was the main Plaintiff suing Pohl in
the Mississippi Litigation. Thereafter, Kassab used Precision’s marketing and client lists to
notify individuals who he believed may have been victims of Pohl’s barratry. Hundreds of
individuals responded, indicating that they had been personally solicited to hire Pohl in their auto
accident or BP claims. Kassab agreed to represent these clients, and more than 400 individuals
hired Kassab to represent them against Pohl and other lawyers involved in the illegal barratry
scheme. k
15. Kassab filed four petitions on behalf of these barratry victimsl in Harris County,
Texas (the “barratry lawsuits”). The barratry lawsuits communicated mcatters of public concern:
that Pohl conspired to commit barratry. After reviewing the esvidence obtained from the
Mississippi Litigation, Kassab believed he had a duty to file a grievance against Pohl pursuant to
Rule 8.03 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct,1 and he did. Kassab also
filed a grievance against Pohl on behalf of one of his clients. In the grievances, Kassab and his
client expressed matters of public concern relating to Pohl’s legal services in the marketplace and
petitioned the State Bar of Texas to reprimanad and discipline Pohl in order to protect the public
as is mandated by Rule 8.03. 
16. Unfortunately, in direect retaliation to the lawsuits and grievances filed against
Pohl, Pohl filed this retaliatoryf litigation against Kassab, Precision, Nicholson, Favre and
Montague, alleging breach yof contract, theft of trade secrets, conversion and civil conspiracy.
Specifically, Pohl alleCged that these parties were “acting in combination with the agreed
objective” to misapapropriate his trade secrets and convert the marketing lists and attorney-client
contracts that Pfohl hired Precision to obtain. Pohl alleges Favre and Precision, with Nicholson’s
assistanceU, converted this property and provided it to Kassab and Montague in order to solicit
Pohl’s former clients “to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and other claims.”
1 See TEX. DISC. R. PROF’L COND. 8.03(a) (except in circumstances which do not apply here, “a
lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of applicable rules of
professional conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness
or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate disciplinary authority.”).
III
ARGUMENT
17. “A defendant may seek to designate a person as a responsible third party by filing
a motion for leave to designate that person as a responsible third party. The motion must be filed
on or before the 60th day before the trial date unless the court finds good caruse to allow the
motion to be filed at a later date.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.0
04(a). That occurred
here, with Kassab filing his motion on May 13, 2022, more than 60 darys before the October 10,
2022 trial setting. The current trial setting is December 5, 2022.D Thus, the statute required the
Court to “grant leave to designate the named person as a ressponsible third party unless another
party files an objection to the motion for leave on or beforre the 15th day after the date the motion
is served.” Id. at § 33.004(f).
18. Kassab has good cause to desiglnate Favre and Pohl within 60 days of trial
because Plaintiff just dismissed Favre andM Pohl from this lawsuit 14 days prior to the current
scheduled trial. Kassab will be prejuodiced if Kassab is not allowed to designate Favre and
Precision at this late time due to the circumstances created by Plaintiff and at no fault of Kassab.
19. A responsible third party is “any person who is alleged to have caused or
contributed to causing in any way the harm for which recovery of damages is sought, whether by
negligent act or omission, by any defective or unreasonably dangerous product, by other conduct
or activity that vciolates an applicable legal standard, or by any combination of these.” Id. at §
33.011(6). Pohl claims that his harm is the allegedly “unlawful taking” or “use” of Pohl’s
purported trade secret information.2 Kassab denies Pohl’s allegations. But even assuming they
are true, Kassab’s designation satisfies the minimal notice pleading standard to demonstrate that
the Designated Parties caused or contributed to causing “in any way” the loss of or eventual
2 Pohl RTP Objection, at 2.
alleged misuse of purported trade secret information. See In re CVR Energy, Inc., 500 S.W.3d
67, 80 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (“The standard for designating a
potentially responsible third party is notice pleading under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
20. Kassab alleged that Walker, Ladner and Seymour are responsiblke for the harm
alleged to the extent they misappropriated Pohl’s trade secrets in the first instalnce and sold them
to Scott Favre and transferred Precision to Favre, who Pohl alleges thecn sold his alleged trade
secrets to Kassab to pursue the barratry litigation. In fact, Pohl himsself, swore under oath that
Walker, Lander and Seymour, who Pohl identified collectively as the “PR Consultants,”
attempted to sell his “accumulated work product to third parties”3 and “undertook to convert,
misappropriate for themselves and/or market to third parties claimant files and other information
and materials that belong to me.”4 Pohl testified that the purported information stolen by Walker,
Ladner and Seymour is the same informationa that Pohl claims is his trade secrets here: “original
client contingency fee contracts between [Pohl’s] clients and [Pohl], documentation of contact
and personal information, claim infoermation and supporting materials.”5 Pohl testified that this
purportedly trade secret informfation was delivered or sold Walker, Ladner and Seymour
“without his consent” to Fyavre.6 Pohl alleges in this lawsuit that Favre then sold that same
information to KassabC to pursue barratry claims against Pohl.7 If any loss or eventual misuse of
Pohl’s purported traade secret information did occur, Walker, Ladner and Seymour clearly caused
or contributed tfo causing it, as had Walker, Ladner and Seymour not stolen Pohl’s alleged trade
secrets asU he alleges, they could not have sold the alleged trade secrets to Favre and thus, Favre
could not have given the alleged trade secrets to Kassab.
3 Exhibit 1, Pohl June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 18.
4 Exhibit 1, Pohl June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 28.
5 Exhibit 1, Pohl June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 28.
6 Exhibit 1, Pohl June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶¶ 28-29.
7 Pohl’s First Amended Petition, at ¶ 24.
21. Additionally, if any loss or eventual misuse of Pohl’s purported trade secret
information occurred, Favre and Precision clearly caused or contributed to causing it, as Favre
and Precision certified and represented to Kassab that all of the material and documents given to
Kassab by Favre and Precision were owned by Favre and Precision after purchasking these items
from Walker, Ladner and Seymour. Walker, Ladner and Seymour certified land represented to
Favre that they owned all of the subject material when they sold it cand Precision to Favre.
Kassab relied on these representations when Kassab was given thes subject documents. Thus,
Kassab could not have misappropriated any alleged trade secret by improper means.
22. Walker testified under oath that he, Seymour and Ladner, through Precision,
owned all the assets/property, including computers and documents that were transferred to Favre.
Walker also testified that he had the legal right and authority, through Precision, to sell and
transfer all the subject assets/property to Faavre. Moreover, Walker, Seymour and Ladner
certified that they owned all of the subject property/assets and had authority to transfer all of the
subject property/assets to Favre. If Wealker, Seymour and Ladner did not have the legal right to
transfer all of the subject assets/pfroperty to Favre, then they caused or contributed to causing any
alleged harm for which recyovery of damages is sought by Pohl by selling the alleged trade
secrets to Favre. C
28. “Undaer the notice-pleading standard, fair notice is achieved if the opposing party
can ascertain frfom the pleading the nature and basic issues of the controversy, and what type of
evidence Umight be relevant.” In re CVR Energy, Inc., 500 S.W.3d at 80. “A trial court may not
review the truth of the allegations or consider the strength of the defendant's evidence.” Id.
Kassab satisfies this “low threshold” by alleging that the Designated Parties caused or
contributed to causing the alleged theft or misuse of Pohl’s purported trade secret information.
See id. Therefore, Shepherd, Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley, Santana are
10
persons who caused or contributed to causing any alleged harm for which recovery of damages is
sought by Pohl. Additionally, Favre and Precision are also persons who caused or contributed to
causing any alleged harm for which recovery of damages is sought by Pohl. Their conduct
caused or contributed to causing in part (if not entirely) the harm for which recovkery of damages
is sought by Pohl, and that conduct violated an applicable legal standard land/or constitutes
negligence. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.011(6). Thus, the jcury should be permitted
to consider apportioning fault in this case to Favre, Precision, Sshepherd, Walker, Seymour,
Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley, Santana. Their designation as responsible third parties is factually
justified and legally appropriate.8
PRAYER
For the reasons set forth herein, Defielndants, Counter-Plaintiffs, Lance Christopher
Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. D/B/A The Kassab Law Firm ask the Court to
grant the Kassab Defendants’ Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties, in addition to the
Supplements, and grant all otheir relief in law or in equity as the Court sees fit and as
Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs will forever pray.
8 It is also of no concern here that the Court might be unable to exert personal jurisdiction over either Walker,
Seymour, Ladner, Talley, Dona, Jaimes or Santana. In its 2003 revision of Chapter 33, the Legislature abolished the
predecessor law, which had defined responsible third parties to be only those over whom the court could exercise
jurisdiction, thus allowing the designation of those “who are not subject to the court’s jurisdiction or who are
immune from liability to the claimant.” See, e.g., In re Unitec Elevator Serv. Co., 178 S.W.3d 53, 58 & n. 5 (Tex.
App.-- Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding); accord Hix-Hernandez v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:20-cv-29-RP,
2021 WL 7632564, at *1 (W.D. Tex. May 6, 2021) (“A defendant may designate a responsible third party despite
the fact that the party has a defense to liability, cannot be joined as a defendant, or both. Even parties who are
outside the court’s jurisdiction or are immune from liability may be designated responsible third parties.”) (internal
citations omitted).
11
Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSABk
Texas State Bar No. 007940r70
lance@kassab.law l
DAVID ERIC KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. c24071351
david@kassab.lawr
NICHOLAS R. PIE s RCE
Texas State BDar No. 24098263
nicholas@kassab.law
1214 Elgisn Street
Houston, Texas 77004
Teleprhone: 713-522-7400
Facsimile: 713-522-7410
ATTORNEYS FOR THE KASSAB DEFENDANTS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true aned correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has
been forwarded to all known parties and/or counsel of record pursuant to the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure on this, the 22nd of f f November, 2022.
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
C Lance Christopher Kassab
12
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab
Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law r
Envelope ID: 70416484
Status as of 11/22/2022 3:54 PM CST
Case Contacts r i
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldssfrizzell.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldgsfrizzell.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@reynouldsfrizzell.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@yfavrepa.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Lawyer Wade lawayerwade@hotmail.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Andrea Mendez andrea@kassab.law 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Lance Kassab olance@kassab.law 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
David Kassab david@kassab.law 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo f jason@ciofalolaw.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Todd Taylor p ttaylor@jandflaw.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Misty Davis C mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Nicholas Pierce a l nicholas@kassab.law 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrar.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Murray Fogler o mfogler@fbfog.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Andrew JohnsUon ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Vilma Yanes vyanes@thompsoncoe.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10607900 jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo 24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
D Kassab david@kassab.law 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab
Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law r
Envelope ID: 70416484
Status as of 11/22/2022 3:54 PM CST
Case Contacts r i
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
L Kassab lance@kassab.law s 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbgrar.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT
Non-Party Witness Billy Shepherd bshepherd@supcounsel.com 11/22/2022 3:51:15 PM SENT"
44,2022-11-15,MTN,Kassab,1st Supp. Motion to Designate RTP,"Kassab Defendants' Supplemental Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties (Shepherd, Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona Pohl, Jaimes, Talley, Santana)","Filed November 15, 2022 before Judge Scot Dollinger, 189th Judicial District, Harris County, Texas. Kassab's original RTP motion was filed May 13, 2022 (more than 60 days before the October 10, 2022 trial setting). Pohl objected May 30, 2022. Court denied the original motion on October 31, 2022 but gave Kassab an opportunity to replead. Trial reset to December 5, 2022.",RTP-1,N/A,Phase 3,2022-11-15_MTN_Kassab-Supp-Mtn-to-Designate-RTP_FILED.pdf,"Grant the Kassab Defendants' Amended Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties (George W. (Billy) Shepherd, Scott Walker, Steve Seymour, Kirk Ladner, Dona Pohl, Edgar Jaimes, Ken Talley, Magdalena Santana) and grant all other relief in law or equity","11/15/2022 1:31 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 70189306
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 11/15/2022 1:31 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIAkL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS, LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND LAlNCE
CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAW FIRM’S
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO DESIGNATE RESPONSIBLEc THIRD PARTIES
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE SCOT DOLLINGER: s
Defendants, Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. D/B/A The
Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab”), and file this, their Amended Motion to Designate Responsible
Third Parties.
REQUESTElD RELIEF
1. Kassab seeks to designate GMeorge W. (Billy) Shepherd (Shepherd), Scott Walker
(Walker), Steve Seymour (Seymour) oand Kirk Ladner (Ladner), Dona Pohl (Dona), Edgar
Jaimes (Jaimes), Ken Talley (Talley), Magdalena Santana (Santana) as responsible third parties
in this litigation. Shepherd, Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley and Santana are all
persons who are alleged to have caused or contributed to causing in any way the harm for which
recovery of damages by Pohl is sought. Thus, they are all responsible third parties in this cause.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. &c REM. CODE § 33.011(6).
U FACTS
2. Pohl is a lawyer who commits barratry and has prayed on the less fortunate to
earn a living. On October 18, 2014, three Mississippi residents, Scott Walker (“Walker”), Kirk
Ladner (“Ladner”) and Steve Seymour (“Seymour”), and their related entities, including
Precision Marketing Group, LLC (“Precision”), filed suit against Michael Pohl (“Pohl”) and
others in Mississippi federal court (the “Mississippi Litigation”). There, Precision, Walker,
Ladner and Seymour alleged that: (1) they had a joint venture with Pohl to sign up clients with
economic loss claims stemming from the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill and clients with
personal injury claims; (2) that they successfully obtained these clients for Pohkl; and (3) that
Pohl breached their agreement by not paying them what was owed, includingl their agreed share
of Pohl’s attorney’s fees. c
3. The evidence presented in the Mississippi Litigastion established that Pohl
engaged in barratry. See TEX. PEN. CODE § 38.12 (defining b
arratry generally as the improper
solicitation of clients). During that litigation, Walker testified that Pohl retained him and
Precision to “provide marking services to auto accident victims[.]” Walker testified that although
he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or “marketing money,” it was “clear to [him] it was
barratry.” In fact, Walker considered himsealf and his company “a pass-through for barratry
money.” All told, Walker, Ladner and Precision received over $5 million in “barratry pass-
through money” from Pohl and otheer lawyers to solicit potential clients, both auto-accident
victims and those involved in tfhe BP litigation. They would use this money to pay contract
workers to solicit clients. Thyey would locate and instruct contract workers on how to accomplish
the solicitation. They tCrained “40 or 50 people” on how to “go out and solicit contracts.”
4. Walkaer and his team at Precision were first retained by Pohl to “recruit clients”
with losses resuflting from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. When that litigation dwindled, Pohl
shifted hiUs focus to auto accident cases, knowing that the group at Precision could go out and get
him those types of clients. To accomplish this task, individuals at Precision would receive
“Google alerts” or leads from Pohl on recent catastrophic auto accidents. Walker testified that he,
Ladner, or someone working for them would go to the victims of the auto accident to “do
marketing” by letting them know “there were attorneys [who] could help.” In exchange, these
runners – whoever visited the victims – where paid between $2,500 and $5,000 to solicit the
client. These payments flowed from Pohl through his wife’s wholly owned company, “Helping
Hands Financing,” to Precision, to each individual runner. Walker would simply submit to Pohl
the amount that Precision paid its runners and Pohl would reimburse Precision. k
5. One of the runners, Santana, testified to the barratry in her Sleptember 24, 2016
affidavit filed in the Mississippi Litigation. She testified that Pohl scent her on “dozens and
dozens of car wreck cases all over the country.” Pohl would emasil Santana the link of news
coverage depicting the accident and ask her “to go to the victim or the victim’s family and try to
get them to sign up with him.” Pohl offered to pay Santana “$5,000 per case that [she] signed,
plus a percentage of his attorney’s fees.” Santana was advised by Pohl to “be persistent even if
the family ... rejected [her].” Santana was instructed by Pohl to “approach the victims and their
families while they were vulnerable, in thea emergency room, their hospital rooms or at the
funerals.” Id. Pohl told Santana that minorities “were especially vulnerable since they tended not
to know that the law prohibited barraetry.” According to Pohl, they “were easier to sign up.”
6. Pohl would pay Safntana “money to give to the victims or their families” but “only
if they agreed to sign a Pohly representation contract.” Pohl advised Santana that the money was a
“foot in the door” but Cinstructed Santana not to mention that she was there on behalf of a lawyer
“until after they agraeed to take the money.” “If the client agreed to hire Pohl, then [Santana] was
to have the cliefnt sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.” Pohl would then give Santana the money to
pay the cUlient “from his own Helping Hands company.” When Santana questioned this, Pohl told
Santana that it “was illegal for him to pay [her] directly for cases, and that’s why the money had
to go through some company.”
7. Santana further confirmed the barratry in her deposition taken in the Mississippi
Litigation. She testified that she was hired by Pohl to solicit auto accident cases, the first one
was an accident where a woman and her unborn child lost their lives. Santana was instructed by
Walker, who was instructed by Pohl, to personally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her
up to sue the tire manufacturer and, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000. Santana visited
the funeral of the deceased and got the family to feel comfortable with her. Althokugh the mother
was grieving, Pohl told Santana: “take no prisoners, this is a cut-throat businelss, you get in there
and you do whatever it takes to get this client.” The solicitation was succcessful after Pohl gave
Santana $2,000 to “give to the client to convince her into signing ovesr with the firm.”
8. Pohl later requested Santana to sign an agreement promising not to go to any law
enforcement, including various State Disciplinary boards regarding any wrongdoing, criminal or
unethical conduct. In fact, it is undisputed that Pohl paid Santana $50,000 in cash to sign this
agreement, which was delivered to her in Florida by Pohl’s paralegal, Jaimes. Santana confirmed
this in an affidavit and Jaimes confirmed thisa in his deposition. Santana signed the statement and
received the cash, although she believed she was “forced to sign” it while “under duress”.
9. Another runner, Talleey, also testified in the Mississippi Litigation about the
barratry. Talley solicited over 20f auto accident cases for Pohl, including two families who hired
Kassab to sue Pohl for barraytry. Talley testified that he was first hired in relation to BP claims to
find “folks that lost moCney due to the oil spill” and “sign them up” and “get a fee for it.” Talley
solicited and signeda up more than 800 BP claims for Pohl and was paid between $75 and $350
per client. f
10U. Talley eventually transitioned to soliciting auto accident victims, “calling on folks
that had bad accidents.” Talley recalls that the first client he solicited was in “the hospital in
intensive care.” Talley maintained $1,000 in cash to pay the accident victims to “help them with
problems” and influence them to hire a lawyer, because the victims received the money only if
they “were signed up.” Talley would advise the victims that he had attorneys who could help
them, and that one of those attorneys was Pohl. For each auto accident case he solicited, Talley
was paid a fee of $1,400 plus his expenses by Pohl, through Walker and Precision. On some
cases, Talley was to receive a portion of Pohl’s attorney’s fees, and even discussed with Pohl the
“percentage of settlements” he was to receive. When asked whether Pohl knewk he was getting
paid to “contact vehicle accident victims,” Talley responded, “the money lwas coming from
Edgar [Jaimes] who worked for him.” 1CR301. Although his paycheck wcas from Precision, “the
funding came by way of Edgar [Jaimes].” Talley testified that both she and Pohl knew what they
were doing was illegal. 
11. In May of 2016, during the Mississippi Litigation, an insurance adjuster named
Scott Favre (“Favre”) purchased Precision and all the company’s assets, including client lists,
marketing lists, documents, files, computers, etc. from Walker, Seymore and Ladner. Included
in the purchase was the Mississippi Litigaation, thus, Precision’s claims against Pohl in the
Mississippi Litigation were assigned to Favre. Favre and Precision were represented in the
Mississippi Litigation by Texas laweyer, Tina Nicholson and her firm, Baker Nicholson, LLP
(“Nicholson”). Pohl asserted coufnter claims in the Mississippi Litigation alleging that Walker
and Precision (and other uynknown defendants) converted his property. Pohl then moved to
dismiss the claims agaCinst him, arguing, among other things, that the agreements between him
and the runners weare illegal and unenforceable. More specifically, Pohl argued that under both
Texas and Missfissippi law “it is illegal for a non-lawyer to accept or agree to accept money to
improperUly solicit clients for a lawyer.” The Mississippi federal court rejected Pohl’s contention,
stating that the agreements to solicit clients would only be a violation of Texas law and Texas
disciplinary rules, which did not apply to Precision, a Mississippi company, and Walker and
Ladner, Mississippi residents. Having failed to obtain summary dismissal, Pohl settled the
Mississippi Litigation with all parties, including Favre, hoping to forever conceal his barratry
operation. Although Pohl had already paid the runners approximately $5,000,000 in barratry
money, Pohl paid the runners an additional $1,000,000 to settle the Mississippi Litigation.
12. Kassab heard about the allegations being made by the runners in the Mississippi
Litigation. Kassab searched PACER, the federal court’s online system, obtaininkg a plethora of
information related to the Mississippi Litigation. Kassab met with Favrle and Precision’s
counsel, Nicholson. Kassab obtained information directly from them, icncluding the names and
addresses of Pohl’s former clients or prospective clients from Precsision’s marketing and client
lists. Precision, through Favre, informed Kassab that it owned all of its marketing lists and
information and also informed and verified that Precision was the main Plaintiff suing Pohl in
the Mississippi Litigation. Thereafter, Kassab used Precision’s marketing and client lists to
notify individuals who he believed may have been victims of Pohl’s barratry. Hundreds of
individuals responded, indicating that they haad been personally solicited to hire Pohl in their auto
accident or BP claims. Kassab agreed to represent these clients, and more than 400 individuals
hired Kassab to represent them agaienst Pohl and other lawyers involved in the illegal barratry
scheme. f
13. Kassab filed yfour petitions on behalf of these barratry victims in Harris County,
Texas (the “barratry laCwsuits”). The barratry lawsuits communicated matters of public concern:
that Pohl conspiread to commit barratry. After reviewing the evidence obtained from the
Mississippi Litifgation, Kassab believed he had a duty to file a grievance against Pohl pursuant to
Rule 8.03U of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct,1 and he did. Kassab also
filed a grievance against Pohl on behalf of one of his clients. In the grievances, Kassab and his
1 See TEX. DISC. R. PROF’L COND. 8.03(a) (except in circumstances which do not apply here, “a
lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of applicable rules of
professional conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness
or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate disciplinary authority.”).
client expressed matters of public concern relating to Pohl’s legal services in the marketplace and
petitioned the State Bar of Texas to reprimand and discipline Pohl in order to protect the public
as is mandated by Rule 8.03.
14. Unfortunately, in direct retaliation to the lawsuits and grievanceks filed against
Pohl, Pohl filed this retaliatory litigation against Kassab, Precision, Nichlolson, Favre and
Montague, alleging breach of contract, theft of trade secrets, conversiocn and civil conspiracy.
Specifically, Pohl alleged that these parties were “acting in cosmbination with the agreed
objective” to misappropriate his trade secrets and convert the marketing lists and attorney-client
contracts that Pohl hired Precision to obtain. Pohl alleges Favre and Precision, with Nicholson’s
assistance, converted this property and provided it to Kassab and Montague in order to solicit
Pohl’s former clients “to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and other claims.”
aIII
AMRGUMENT
15. “A defendant may seek too designate a person as a responsible third party by filing
a motion for leave to designate that person as a responsible third party. The motion must be filed
on or before the 60th day before the trial date unless the court finds good cause to allow the
motion to be filed at a later date.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004(a). That occurred
here, with Kassab filing his motion on May 13, 2022, more than 60 days before the October 10,
2022 trial settingc. The current trial setting is December 5, 2022. Thus, the statute required the
Court to “grant leave to designate the named person as a responsible third party unless another
party files an objection to the motion for leave on or before the 15th day after the date the motion
is served.” Id. at § 33.004(f).
16. Pohl filed his objection on May 30, 2022. Still, the Court was required to “grant
leave to designate the person as a responsible third party unless the objecting party establishes …
the defendant did not plead sufficient facts concerning the alleged responsibility of the person to
satisfy the pleading requirement of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure[.]” Id. at § 33.004(f). In
any event, the Court denied the Kassab Defendants’ Motion to Designate Responsible Third
Parties on October 31, 2022, but gave the Kassab Defendants an opportunity to rekplead.
17. A responsible third party is “any person who is alleged tlo have caused or
contributed to causing in any way the harm for which recovery of damagces is sought, whether by
negligent act or omission, by any defective or unreasonably dangerosus product, by other conduct
or activity that violates an applicable legal standard, or by any combination of these.” Id. at §
33.011(6). Pohl claims that his harm is the allegedly “unlawful taking” or “use” of Pohl’s
purported trade secret information.2 Kassab denies Pohl’s allegations. But even assuming they
are true, Kassab’s designation satisfies the minimal notice pleading standard to demonstrate that
the Designated Parties caused or contributeda to causing “in any way” the loss of or eventual
alleged misuse of purported trade secret information. See In re CVR Energy, Inc., 500 S.W.3d
67, 80 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st eDist.] 2016, no pet.) (“The standard for designating a
potentially responsible third partyf is notice pleading under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
18. Kassab allegeys that Walker, Ladner and Seymour are responsible for the harm
alleged to the extent thCey misappropriated Pohl’s trade secrets in the first instance and sold them
to Scott Favre, whoa Pohl alleges then sold them to Kassab to pursue the barratry litigation. In
fact, Pohl himsfelf, swore under oath that Walker, Lander and Seymour, who Pohl identified
collectiveUly as the “PR Consultants,” attempted to sell his “accumulated work product to third
parties”3 and “undertook to convert, misappropriate for themselves and/or market to third parties
2 Pohl RTP Objection, at 2.
3 Exhibit 1, Pohl June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 18.
claimant files and other information and materials that belong to me.”4 Pohl testified that the
purported information stolen by Walker, Ladner and Seymour is the same information that Pohl
claims is his trade secrets here: “original client contingency fee contracts between [Pohl’s]
clients and [Pohl], documentation of contact and personal information, claim iknformation and
supporting materials.”5 Pohl testified that this purportedly trade secret informaltion was delivered
or sold Walker, Ladner and Seymour “without his consent” to Favre.6 Poch t l alleges in this lawsuit
that Favre then sold that same information to Kassab to pursue barrsatry claims against Pohl.7 If
any loss or eventual misuse of Pohl’s purported trade secret information did occur, Walker,
Ladner and Seymour clearly caused or contributed to causing it, as had Walker, Ladner and
Seymour not stolen Pohl’s alleged trade secrets as he alleges, they could not have sold the
alleged trade secrets to Favre and thus, Favre could not have given the alleged trade secrets to
Kassab. a
19. Walker testified under oath that he, Seymour and Ladner, through Precision,
owned all the assets/property, includieng computers and documents that were transferred to Favre.
Walker also testified that he hafd the legal right and authority, through Precision, to sell and
transfer all the subject assyets/property to Favre. Moreover, Walker, Seymour and Ladner
certified that they ownCed all of the subject property/assets and had authority to transfer all of the
subject property/assaets to Favre. If Walker, Seymour and Ladner did not have the legal right to
transfer all of thfe subject assets/property to Favre, then they caused or contributed to causing any
alleged hUarm for which recovery of damages is sought by Pohl by selling the alleged trade
secrets to Favre.
4 Exhibit 1, Pohl June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 28.
5 Exhibit 1, Pohl June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 28.
6 Exhibit 1, Pohl June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶¶ 28-29.
7 Pohl’s First Amended Petition, at ¶ 24.
20. Kassab also sufficiently alleged how Pohl’s counsel in the Mississippi litigation,
Shepherd, caused or contributed to causing the purported loss or misuse of Pohl’s allegedly
confidential information. Specifically, Shepherd negotiated a settlement in thek litigation with
Walker, Ladner and Seymour but failed to protect Pohl by ensuring that all sulbject property was
gathered from all third parties and returned to Pohl or destroyed as pacrt of the any settlement
agreement, if in fact Pohl owned and/or desired to safeguard the subjsect property.
21. Shepherd knew that Walker, Seymour and Ladner had sold Precision to Favre and
knew that Walker, Seymour and Ladner had legally transferred Precision’s assets, including the
subject matter of Pohl’s conversion and theft of trade secrets claims, to Favre. Shepherd further
knew that Favre and/or his counsel had given documents to third parties, including Kassab and
others prior to negotiating a settlement in thae Mississippi Litigation. Thus, Shepherd failed to
protect Pohl’s alleged trade secrets by failing to include a provision in the settlement agreement
forcing all parties to gather the alleeged trade secrets from outside third parties like Kassab so
they could be returned to Pohl, fif in fact he owns them as alleged. This failure by Shepherd
caused and/or contributed toy causing the harm for which recovery of damages is sought by Pohl.
22. ShepherCd’s malfeasance was either negligent or intentional. If Shepherd knew
that the subject asseats/property were a point of contention in the Mississippi Litigation and knew
that the assets/pfroperty could be used by outside third parties to garner clients to sue Pohl, as
Pohl alleUges, Shepherd may have intentionally failed to protect Pohl’s interest so that he could
secure future lucrative employment for himself and his law firm for years to come by continuing
to represent Pohl in litigation to be brought against Pohl after the subject property was used to
garner clients to sue Pohl as Pohl alleges. Thus, Shepherd is a person who caused or contributed
to causing the harm for which recovery of damages is sought by Pohl.
10
23. Finally, Kassab sufficiently alleged how Dona Pohl, Jaimes, Tally and Santana
caused or contributed to causing the purported loss or misuse of Pohl’s alleged trade secret
information. Specifically, Kassab alleges that these persons failed to keep Pohl’s information
confidential because they routinely placed Pohl’s alleged trade secrets and dokcuments in the
public domain, circulating Precision’s marketing lists and other documents alllegedly belonging
to Pohl to numerous third parties rather than safeguard these documents acnd lists.
24. Additionally, if Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaismes, Talley or Santana had
an agreement and/or duty to safeguard any property allegedly owned by Pohl as Pohl alleges,
they are responsible for failing to safeguard the property. Additionally, Walker, Seymour,
Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley and Santana routinely placed Pohl’s alleged trade secrets and
documents in the public domain, circulating Precision’s marketing lists and other documents
allegedly belonging to Pohl to numerous thirda parties rather than safeguard these documents and
lists. 
25. “Under the notice-pleeading standard, fair notice is achieved if the opposing party
can ascertain from the pleading tfhe nature and basic issues of the controversy, and what type of
evidence might be relevant.y” In re CVR Energy, Inc., 500 S.W.3d at 80. “A trial court may not
review the truth of thCe allegations or consider the strength of the defendant's evidence.” Id.
Kassab satisfies thais “low threshold” by alleging that the Designated Parties caused or
contributed to cfausing the alleged theft or misuse of Pohl’s purported trade secret information.
See id. UTherefore, Shepherd, Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley, Santana are
persons who caused or contributed to causing any alleged harm for which recovery of damages is
sought by Pohl. Their conduct caused or contributed to causing in part (if not entirely) the harm
for which recovery of damages is sought by Pohl, and that conduct violated an applicable legal
standard and/or constitutes negligence. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.011(6). Thus, the
11
jury should be permitted to consider apportioning fault in this case to Shepherd, Walker,
Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley, Santana. Their designation as responsible third parties
is factually justified and legally appropriate.8 Accordingly, the Court should overrule Pohl’s
objection and grant leave to designate the requested third parties. See TEX. CIV.k PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 33.004(f) (providing that if pleadings are sufficient, the trial court “s
halll grant” leave).
IV c
PRAYER r
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs, Lance Christopher
Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. D/B/A The Kassab Law Firm ask the Court to
grant the Kassab Defendants’ Amended Motion to Dersignate Responsible Third Parties and
grant all other relief in law or in equity as the Court sees fit and as Defendants, Counter-
Plaintiffs will ever pray. i l
8 It is also of no concern here that the Court might be unable to exert personal jurisdiction over either Walker,
Seymour, Ladner, Talley, Dona, Jaimes or Santana. In its 2003 revision of Chapter 33, the Legislature abolished the
predecessor law, which had defined responsible third parties to be only those over whom the court could exercise
jurisdiction, thus allowing the designation of those “who are not subject to the court’s jurisdiction or who are
immune from liability to the claimant.” See, e.g., In re Unitec Elevator Serv. Co., 178 S.W.3d 53, 58 & n. 5 (Tex.
App.-- Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding); accord Hix-Hernandez v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:20-cv-29-RP,
2021 WL 7632564, at *1 (W.D. Tex. May 6, 2021) (“A defendant may designate a responsible third party despite
the fact that the party has a defense to liability, cannot be joined as a defendant, or both. Even parties who are
outside the court’s jurisdiction or are immune from liability may be designated responsible third parties.”) (internal
citations omitted).
12
Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSABk
Texas State Bar No. 007940r70
lance@kassab.law l
DAVID ERIC KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. c24071351
david@kassab.lawr
NICHOLAS R. PIE s RCE
Texas State BDar No. 24098263
nicholas@kassab.law
1214 Elgisn Street
Houston, Texas 77004
Teleprhone: 713-522-7400
Facsimile: 713-522-7410
ATTORNEYS FOR THE KASSAB DEFENDANTS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true aned correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has
been forwarded to all known parties and/or counsel of record pursuant to the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure on this, the 15th off f November, 2022.
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
C Lance Christopher Kassab
13
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab
Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law r
Envelope ID: 70189306
Status as of 11/15/2022 1:37 PM CST
Case Contacts r i
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldssfrizzell.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldgsfrizzell.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@reynouldsfrizzell.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@yfavrepa.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Lawyer Wade lawayerwade@hotmail.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Andrea Mendez andrea@kassab.law 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Lance Kassab olance@kassab.law 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
David Kassab david@kassab.law 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo f jason@ciofalolaw.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Todd Taylor p ttaylor@jandflaw.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Misty Davis C mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Nicholas Pierce a l nicholas@kassab.law 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrar.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Murray Fogler o mfogler@fbfog.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Andrew JohnsUon ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Vilma Yanes vyanes@thompsoncoe.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10607900 jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo 24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
D Kassab david@kassab.law 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab
Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law r
Envelope ID: 70189306
Status as of 11/15/2022 1:37 PM CST
Case Contacts r i
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
L Kassab lance@kassab.law s 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbgrar.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT
Non-Party Witness Billy Shepherd bshepherd@supcounsel.com 11/15/2022 1:31:33 PM SENT"
43,2022-11-14,OA,Kassab,8th Amended Answer (final),"Kassab Defendants' Eighth Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim (Final Pre-Trial Pleading)","Filed November 14, 2022 in Cause No. 2018-58419, 189th Judicial District, Harris County, Texas. This is Kassab's final amended answer asserting 23 affirmative defenses, responsible third-party designations (8 individuals), and a counterclaim for civil barratry based on assigned claims from 242 claimants. Filed approximately three weeks before the December 5, 2022 trial setting, after all four MSJs were denied on October 31, 2022.",PLEAD-1,N/A,Phase 3,2022-11-14_OA_Kassab-8th-Amended-Answer-CC_FILED.pdf,"That Pohl recover nothing on his claims; that Kassab recover on counterclaims including (i) actual and consequential damages, (ii) statutory damages, (iii) pre- and post-judgment interest, (iv) attorneys' fees and costs, and (v) all other appropriate relief","11/14/2022 3:25 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 70152760
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 11/14/2022 3:25 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIArL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS, LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AtND LANCE
CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAWi FIRM’S EIGHTH
AMENDED ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES ANsD COUNTERCLAIM
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: 
COMES NOW, Defendants, Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher
Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm and files this their Eighth Amended
Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim, and would respectfully show the
Court as follows; a
f  I
RULE 47 STATEMENT
1. The Kassab Deffendants, in their capacity as Counter-Plaintiffs, seek
monetary relief of more than $1,000,000.00.
C II
l PARTIES
2. Plaiintiff, Michael A. Pohl is an individual lawyer residing in Colorado
and is a paroty herein.
3. Plaintiff, Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl is a law firm set up for the
practice of law in various states of the union, including Texas and is a party herein.
4. Defendant, Scott Favre is a nonresident individual residing in
Mississippi and is a party herein.
5. Defendant, Scott M. Favre, PA, LLC is a nonresident limited liability
company located in Mississippi and is a party herein.
6. Defendant, Precision Marketing Group, LLC is a nonresident limited
liability company located in Mississippi and is a party herein. k
7. Defendant, F. Douglas Montague III is a nonresident iCndividual residing
in Mississippi.
8. Defendant, Montague, Pittman & Varnadoi, PA is a nonresident
professional association located in Mississippi.
9. Defendant, Tina Nicholson is an individual residing in Texas and is a
party herein.
10. Defendant, Baker Nicholson, lLLP, d/b/a Baker Nicholson Law Firm is a
limited liability partnership located inM Texas and is a party herein.
11. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab is an
individual residing in Texas anid is a party herein.
12. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The
Kassab Law Firm is ao professional corporation located in Texas and is a party herein.
l III
c i JURISDICTION AND VENUE
13. oThis matter is within the jurisdictional limits of this Court and
Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl
(“Pohl”) and Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs, Lance Christopher Kassab (“LCK”) and
Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab, P.C.”)
(collectively “Kassab”) are subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. Venue is proper in this
county because one or more of the defendants are residents of this county and because
a substantial part of the acts and/or omissions that form the basis of this suit occurred
in this county.
IV k
GENERAL DENIAL e
14. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab generally detnies all allegations
made by Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl ansdt Law Offices of Michael
A. Pohl, and requests the Court to require Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael
A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl to carry their burden of proof regarding
all allegations against Kassab.
AFFIRMATIViE l DEFENSES
15. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab pleads the following affirmative
defenses: 
1. Statute of limitationf is;
2. Justification; y 
3. Estoppel;
4. Waivera;
5. Ratiffication;
6.U Release;
7. Unclean hands;
8. Contribution;
9. Failure to mitigate;
10. Lack of standing;
11. Accord and Satisfaction;
12. Assumption of the Risk;
13. Illegality/Criminal Acts; k
14. First Amendment; C
15. Attorney Immunity;
16. Judicial Immunity; i
17. Immunity under Rule 17.09 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.
18. In Pari Delicto;
19. Res Judicata;
20. Defect of Parties; l
21. Abandonment; M
22. Subject of a Valid Contract; and
23. Preemption pursuanit to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.007(a).
SPECIFIC DENIALS
16. Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs specifically deny that all conditions
precedent regardiing Plaintiffs claims of conversion and theft of trade secrets have
been perforomed or occurred prior to Plaintiffs’ filing of suit against Kassab.
VII
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
17. LCK is a lawyer practicing law with The Kassab Law Firm, a law firm
in Houston, Texas focusing on plaintiffs’ legal malpractice cases. Kassab filed four
lawsuits on behalf of over four hundred clients against Pohl (the “Harris County
Lawsuits”). The main allegations against Pohl are civil barratry and conspiracy to
commit barratry, a third-degree felony in Texas. Pohl conspired with his wife,
Donalda Pohl (“Dona”), his paralegal, Edgar Jaimes (“Jaimes”) and thrkee runners in
Mississippi to illegally solicit clients on behalf of Pohl. Dona ownCs a sham lending
company in Texas called Helping Hands Financing, LLC (“HH Texas”). Jaimes rans
the day-to-day operations of HH Texas. The three ruinners are Scott Walker
(“Walker”), Steve Seymour (“Seymour”) and Kirk Ladner (“Ladner”) (collectively
“Runners”). The three Runners owned and operated two other sham companies called
Helping Hands Group, LLC and Helping Hands Financial, LLC (collectively “HH
Mississippi”). The three runners also olwned Precision Marketing Group, LLC
(“Precision”) which they sold to ScMott Favre and/or his companies (collectively
“Favre”). The runners had several other business entities from which they operated
and concealed their illegal soliicitation conspiracy.
18. With regard to the clients obtained in the BP Litigation, Walker,
Seymour and Ladnero hired other runners to literally go up and down streets in
specific locations klnocking on doors to solicit clients on behalf of Pohl for lawsuits
against Britishi Petroleum. Walker, Seymore and Ladner, through Precision and on
behalf of Pohl, paid these runners as much as $300-$400 for every potential client
they obtained. Pohl paid Precision as much as $1,500 for every client Precision
obtained and referred to Pohl. Walker, Seymore and Ladner paid the other runners
from this amount and pocketed the balance. Pohl also offered and agreed to pay
Walker, Seymour and Ladner a percentage of his legal fees once cases settled. This
percentage was disguised as an hourly rate of $1,500.00 per hour, but the percentage
of the “settlement” payment was never below the agreed percentage. For example,
no matter how much “hourly” time was actually spent on a case, thek agreed upon
percentage was always achieved by simply dividing the percentagCe amount of Pohl’s
legal fees by $1,500.00 to calculate the imaginary number of hours, and then the
Runners would submit an invoice for those imaginary numbier of hours. Whether the
Runners actually spent five (5) or fifty (50) hours on a particular case was not the
measure of the “settlement” fees to be paid to the Runners, it was always the agreed
upon percentage of attorney’s fees earned by Pohl regardless of actual hours spent on
a case. l
19. With regard to auto accidMents, Pohl set up a “Google Alerts” to be notified
whenever there was a horrific rollover or other type of horrific vehicle crash across
the nation. Pohl would then imimediately send the alert to the Runners so they could
arrange to visit hospitals, homes and funerals to contact the families of the injured
in order to solicit theom as clients. The Runners would use their sham companies,
“Helping Hands” tlo act as though they were approaching these victims to genuinely
help them rathier than solicit them. The Runners would falsely tell these victims that
they were there to provide money for burial services, food, clothing, lodging, etc. In
reality however, the Runners’ contacted these families under these false pretenses
with the sole objective of talking advantage of these victims and their families while
they were emotionally distraught and not thinking straight in order to lock them into
contracts which allowed the runners to select a lawyer for the victim. The victims
and the family members were encouraged to hire Pohl and told they could not get the
money unless they agreed to hire Pohl. Pohl would pay the Runners as much as
$7,500 per client they signed up and Pohl also promised the runners ask much as 33%
of Pohl’s legal fees on the back end when the case settled. AdditCionally, HH Texas
would pay HH Mississippi $2,500 for every client referred to HH Texas to “loan”
money to these victims and their family. Pohl used this priocedure as an attempt to
put an additional buffer between him and the actual Runners.
20. Pohl also helped the Runners form another sham entity, the GM
Settlement Verification Team (“GM Team”) after General Motors, Inc. issued a recall
on cars due to faulty ignition switches whiclh effected the safe operation of the airbag
systems on vehicles. Thus, the GM MTeam was designed to look official as if it was
part of General Motors. This conspiracy was to form an official looking entity from
GM as if GM was wanting to ciompensate people who had been harmed when airbags
failed to deploy in relation to the ignition recall. In reality, this was just another
sham company used too solicit and trick potential clients into hiring Pohl. Again, Pohl
would pay Walkerl and Ladner, through their sham entity, the GM Team, a fee for
every potentiail client it referred to Pohl, in addition to a percentage of his attorney’s
fees on the back end.
21. Pohl knew what he was doing was illegal barratry. Accordingly, he
knowingly formed entities that he perceived would insulate him from liability. In
fact, Walker testified that although he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or
“marketing money” it was “clear to [him] it was barratry.” In fact, Walker considered
himself and his company “a pass-through for barratry money.” All total, Walker,
Ladner and Precision received over $5 million in “barratry pass-through money” from
Pohl and other lawyers to solicit potential clients with claims, both kauto-accident
victims and those involved in the BP Deepwater Horizon litigationC.
22. One of the runners hired by Pohl and Walker to illegally solicit clients
on behalf of Pohl was Magdalena Santana (“Santana”). Ini her September 24, 2016
affidavit, Santana testified that Pohl sent her on “dozens and dozens of car wreck
cases all over the country.” Pohl would email Santana the link of news coverage he
obtained through Google Alerts depicting an accident and asked her “to go to the
victim or the victim’s family and try to get lthem to sign up with him.” Santana swore
under oath that Pohl agreed to pay Mher “$5,000 per case that [she] signed, plus a
percentage of his attorney’s fees.” Santana was advised by Pohl to “be persistent even
if the family ... rejected [her]i.” Santana was instructed by Pohl to “approach the
victims and their families while they were vulnerable, in the emergency room, their
hospital rooms or at thoe funerals.” Pohl told Santana that minorities “were especially
vulnerable since tlhey tended not to know that the law prohibited barratry.”
According to Piohl, they “were easier to sign up.”
23. Pohl would give Santana “money to give to the victims or their families”
but would only give the money to the potential client “if they agreed to sign a Pohl
representation contract.” Pohl advised Santana that the money was a “foot in the
door” but instructed Santana not to mention anything about hiring a lawyer “until
after they agreed to take the money.” “If the client agreed to hire Pohl, then [Santana]
was to have the client sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.” Santana would then give
money to the client “from his own Helping Hands company.” When Santana
questioned this, Pohl told Santana that it “was illegal for him to pay [hekr] directly for
cases, and that’s why the money had to go through some company.C”
24. Pohl and/or his co-conspirators had Santana retract this affidavit
through a December 19, 2017 affidavit. This purported rietraction was likely the
result of Pohl paying Santana to retract the first affidavit, which is similar to
something Pohl had done in the past. In fact, Pohl’s own paralegal, Jaimes, testified
that on one occasion Pohl sent him to Florida with a suitcase containing $50,000 in
cash to give to Santana in exchange for lher agreement not to turn Pohl into the
authorities. Jaimes testified that SanMtana would only get the money if she signed a
statement agreeing not to mention Pohl’s illegal activity. Jaimes testified that
Santana signed the statementi and then he gave her the $50,000.
25. Santana’s deposition was even more detailed. Santana testified at her
deposition that the staotement was an agreement for her to keep quiet and not charge
Pohl with any wronlgdoing, criminal or unethical conduct. Santana testified that Pohl
paid her $50,0i00 in cash to sign this statement, which was delivered by Jaimes in
three bags marked “trick or treat.” Very symbolic given that Santana had been
tricked by Pohl into soliciting potential clients for him and was now being treated the
money she claimed was due under their agreement just to stay quiet. Santana
reiterated in her deposition that if she didn’t sign the gag agreement, she would not
have received the money from Pohl. Santana attempted to indicate on the agreement
that she was receiving $50,000 to keep quiet, but Jaimes told her Pohl demanded that
she state she only received nominal consideration, like $100. Santana did not write
the statement but “just signed it” because she felt she was being “forcked to sign” it
while “under duress.” C
26. Notably, nowhere in Santana’s December 19th affidavit does she state
the testimony in her former affidavit is untrue, only that shie does not “agree with” it
and that the affidavit is not “reliable.” Although Santana states in her December 19th
affidavit that her prior affidavit was drafted by a lawyer, Santana testified in her
deposition that the September 24th affidavit was created voluntarily with her own
“testimony.” Santana testified that, unlike lwith Pohl, she was not paid and had never
been promised any money to provideM the testimony in the September 24th affidavit.
Santana reiterated to counsel for Pohl, Billy Shepherd, that she was there for her
deposition to tell the truth andi would not be bullied by his questioning or his efforts
to confuse her.
27. Regardleoss, Santana’s sworn deposition testimony confirmed most, if
not all of the factsl set forth in her initial affidavit and this deposition testimony has
never been retiracted. Therefore, Santana confirmed that she was hired by Pohl to
solicit auto accident cases, the first one being an accident where a woman and her
unborn child lost their lives. Santana was instructed by Walker, who was instructed
by Pohl, to personally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her up to sue the tire
manufacturer and, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000. Following Walker
10
and Pohl’s instructions, Santana visited the funeral of the deceased and got the family
to feel comfortable with her. Although the mother was grieving, Pohl told Santana:
“take no prisoners, this is a cut throat business, you get in there and you do whatever
it takes to get this client.” The solicitation was successful after Pohl gkave Santana
$2,000 to “give to the client to convince her into signing over with Cthe firm.”
28. “Coach” Kenneth Talley (“Talley”) was another runner hired by Pohl
and Walker who solicited over 20 auto accident cases for Pohil. Talley has sworn under
oath that he was first hired in relation to BP claims to find “folks that lost money due
to the oil spill” and “sign them up” and “get a fee for it.” Talley testified that he went
to work “knocking on doors” looking for potential claimants for Pohl and his partner
in the BP litigation. Talley solicited and siglned up more than 800 BP claims for Pohl
and his co-conspirators. Talley was pMaid between $75 and $350 for each BP client he
signed up for Pohl and his partners.
29. Talley eventuallyi switched to illegally soliciting auto accident victims
for Pohl, “calling on folks that had bad accidents.” Talley recalls that the first client
he solicited for Pohl woas in “the hospital in intensive care.” Talley carried with him
up to $1,000 to paly the accident victims to “help them with problems” but paid the
potential clienit only once they “were signed up.” Talley kept a list of all the auto
accident cases he solicited so he could keep track of the cases that he was due a
percentage from Pohl’s attorney’s fees on the back end after the case settled. Talley
also followed a checklist that instructed him to, among other things, bring flowers to
the initial hospital visit (but to spend no more than $50) and to offer the victims
11
money but to “make sure the funding schedule” from HH Texas “is filled out properly
before releasing any cash.” Talley would advise the victims that he had attorneys who
could help them such as Pohl. Talley was paid a fee of $1,400 plus his expenses by
Pohl, through Walker and/or one of his sham business entities for any kauto accident
case he solicited and referred to Pohl. On some cases, Talley was tCo receive a portion
of the fee paid to Helping Hands out of Pohl’s attorney’s fees. Talley discussed with
Pohl the “percentage of settlements” he was to receive from ithe cases he solicited and
referred, and Pohl told Talley that the money was being placed in an “escrow account”
for him. When asked whether Pohl knew he was getting paid to “contact vehicle
accident victims,” Talley responded, “the money was coming from Edgar [Jaimes] who
worked for him.” And, although his paylcheck was from Walker’s company, “the
funding came by way of Edgar [JaimeMs].”
30. Talley testified that personally soliciting clients for Pohl became so
frequent that he began carryinig blank contracts to each solicitation. Talley testified
that he never recommended any lawyers other than Pohl. However, Talley never told
the clients that he waos getting paid to solicit them. Talley would present a contract
to the potential clilent. If the client did not agree to hire Pohl, the clients would not
get the moneyi. Talley testified that Jaimes and Dona (the operators of HH Texas)
would send him the money.
31. Talley further testified that both he and Pohl knew what they were
doing was illegal. In one instance, Talley was “run out of town” while soliciting clients
for Pohl. Talley testified that during the attempted solicitation he was told by a
12
“lawyer or policeman” that “it was against the law what [he] was doing.” Talley
mentioned this to Pohl and Pohl told him “you’ve just got to leave...some people you
can’t help.”
32. Walker was eventually indicted and sent to prison. Beking afraid of
where Walker’s indictment might lead, Pohl and his lawyer partneCrs stopped paying
Walker and the other runners the illegal fees as Pohl had promised. Therefore,
Walker, Seymour, Ladner and Precision filed a lawsuit in Miississippi Federal Court
(“Federal Litigation”) against Pohl and his law partners claiming they were owed
millions of dollars in promised fees.
33. The above facts were compiled during the Federal Litigation.
Thereafter, more than four hundred clientsl who were illegally solicited contacted the
Kassab Law Firm and requested KassMab to represent them in litigation against Pohl
and his partners. Kassab filed lawsuits on behalf of these clients in four different
courts in Harris County. Addiitionally, due to the egregiousness of Pohl’s violation of
the Texas Penal Code and violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct, Kassab was orequired to notify the Texas State Bar pursuant to Rule 8.03 of
the Texas Disciplinlary Rules of Professional Conduct. Due to this mandate, Kassab
filed grievanceis against Pohl pursuant to Rule 8.03. some of Pohl’s clients also
prepared and filed grievances against Pohl arising out of his egregious conduct.
34. Because of these actions in representing clients against Pohl and the
grievances filed against Pohl, Pohl filed this retaliatory lawsuit against Kassab
alleging conversion and theft of trade secrets. Pohl alleges that Kassab and others
13
stole his property and used it to bring lawsuits and grievances against Pohl.
Specifically, Pohl alleges in his petition that, “Kassab is a lawyer who specializes in
suing other lawyers”1 and “Kassab solicited clients/prospective clients [of Pohl’s] to
act as Plaintiffs . . . to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and okther claims.”2
Thus, Pohl has judicially admitted that he has brought his suit agaiCnst Kassab simply
because Kassab contacted illegally solicited clients to notify them of Pohl’s illegal
conduct and to offer to represent them in suits against Pohli.
35. The lawsuit is frivolous and without merit as it is based upon false
pretenses and was brought solely for retaliation and harassment purposes.
Specifically, Kassab did not steal anything from Pohl. Additionally, Kassab did not
purchase any stolen documents belonging tlo Pohl. Nor did Kassab purchase anything
belonging to Pohl. Moreover, Pohl isM not the owner of documents received, if any,
from Precision, Favre, Nicholson, Montague or anyone else. Lastly, none of the
documents and/or informatioin that Kassab may have received from various
individuals or entities are Pohl’s trade secrets as Pohl alleges. Furthermore, Pohl
has failed to complyo with conditions precedent to filing his retaliatory suit for
conversion and thleft of trade secrets. Specifically, Pohl has never requested from
Kassab, the reiturn of his alleged property. Rather, Pohl abandoned all of the alleged
documents he now accuses Kassab of stealing and/or purchasing. Pohl abandoned all
of the documents he alleges were stolen and/or purchased because he knew that the
documents were not his and that he had no ownership interest in the documents. If
1 Pohl Original Petition, p. 6
2 Id. at p. 6-7
14
Pohl actually believed the subject documents were his, he would have safeguarded
the documents rather than abandon them with a convicted felon (Walker) and his
cohorts (Seymore and Ladner). Even as of today, the subject documents sit in a
warehouse, unattended and not safeguarded. k
VIII C
RESPONSIBLE THIRD PARTIES
36. A responsible third party is “any person who isst alleged to have caused
or contributed to causing in any way the harm for which recovery of damages is
sought, whether by negligent act or omission, by any defective or unreasonably
dangerous product, by other conduct or activity that violates an applicable legal
standard, or by any combination of these.” Id. at § 33.011(6). Pohl claims that his
harm is the allegedly “unlawful takinag” or “use” of Pohl’s purported trade secret
information.3 Kassab denies Pohl’sf allegations. But even assuming they are true,
Kassab’s designation satisfies the minimal notice pleading standard to demonstrate
that the Designated PartieOs caused or contributed to causing “in any way” the loss of
or eventual alleged mipsuse of purported trade secret information. See In re CVR
Energy, Inc., 500 S.W.3d 67, 80 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (“The
standard for dceisignating a potentially responsible third party is notice pleading
under the Toexas Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
37. Kassab alleges that Walker, Ladner and Seymour are responsible for
the harm alleged to the extent they misappropriated Pohl’s trade secrets in the first
3 Pohl RTP Objection, at 2.
15
instance and sold them to Scott Favre, who Pohl alleges then sold them to Kassab to
pursue the barratry litigation. In fact, Pohl himself, swore under oath that Walker,
Lander and Seymour, who Pohl identified collectively as the “PR Consultants,”
attempted to sell his “accumulated work product to third parties”4 and k“undertook to
convert, misappropriate for themselves and/or market to third parCties claimant files
and other information and materials that belong to me.”5 Pohl testified that the
purported information stolen by Walker, Ladner and iSeymour is the same
information that Pohl claims is his trade secrets here: “original client contingency fee
contracts between [Pohl’s] clients and [Pohl], documentation of contact and personal
information, claim information and supporting materials.”6 Pohl testified that this
purportedly trade secret information wals delivered or sold Walker, Ladner and
Seymour “without his consent” to FavMre.7 Pohl alleges in this lawsuit that Favre then
sold that same information to Kassab to pursue barratry claims against Pohl.8 If any
loss or eventual misuse of Piohl’s purported trade secret information did occur,
Walker, Ladner and Seymour clearly caused or contributed to causing it, as had
Walker, Ladner and oSeymour not stolen Pohl’s alleged trade secrets as he alleges,
they could not havle sold the alleged trade secrets to Favre and thus, Favre could not
have given thei alleged trade secrets to Kassab.
4 Exhibit 1, Pohl June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 18.
5 Exhibit 1, Pohl June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 28.
6 Exhibit 1, Pohl June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 28.
7 Exhibit 1, Pohl June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶¶ 28-29.
8 Pohl’s First Amended Petition, at ¶ 24.
16
38. Walker testified under oath that he, Seymour and Ladner, through
Precision, owned all the assets/property, including computers and documents that
were transferred to Favre. Walker also testified that he had the legal right and
authority, through Precision, to sell and transfer all the subject assetks/property to
Favre. Moreover, Walker, Seymour and Ladner certified that theCy owned all of the
subject property/assets and had authority to transfer all of the subject property/assets
to Favre. If Walker, Seymour and Ladner did not have thei legal right to transfer all
of the subject assets/property to Favre, then they caused or contributed to causing
any alleged harm for which recovery of damages is sought by Pohl by selling the
alleged trade secrets to Favre.
39. Kassab also sufficiently allegled how Pohl’s counsel in the Mississippi
litigation, Shepherd, caused or contribMuted to causing the purported loss or misuse of
Pohl’s allegedly confidential information. Specifically, Shepherd negotiated a
settlement in the litigation wiith Walker, Ladner and Seymour but failed to protect
Pohl by ensuring that all subject property was gathered from all third parties and
returned to Pohl or deostroyed as part of the any settlement agreement, if in fact Pohl
owned and/or desirled to safeguard the subject property.
40. Sihepherd knew that Walker, Seymour and Ladner had sold Precision to
Favre and knew that Walker, Seymour and Ladner had legally transferred
Precision’s assets, including the subject matter of Pohl’s conversion and theft of trade
secrets claims, to Favre. Shepherd further knew that Favre and/or his counsel had
given documents to third parties, including Kassab and others prior to negotiating a
17
settlement in the Mississippi Litigation. Thus, Shepherd failed to protect Pohl’s
alleged trade secrets by failing to include a provision in the settlement agreement
forcing all parties to gather the alleged trade secrets from outside third parties like
Kassab so they could be returned to Pohl, if in fact he owns them as aklleged. This
failure by Shepherd caused and/or contributed to causing the harmC for which recovery
of damages is sought by Pohl.
40. Shepherd’s malfeasance was either negligient or intentional. If
Shepherd knew that the subject assets/property were a point of contention in the
Mississippi Litigation and knew that the assets/property could be used by outside
third parties to garner clients to sue Pohl, as Pohl alleges, Shepherd may have
intentionally failed to protect Pohl’s interelst so that he could secure future lucrative
employment for himself and his law fiMrm for years to come by continuing to represent
Pohl in litigation to be brought against Pohl after the subject property was used to
garner clients to sue Pohl as Piohl alleges. Thus, Shepherd is a person who caused or
contributed to causing the harm for which recovery of damages is sought by Pohl.
41. Finally, oKassab sufficiently alleged how Dona Pohl, Jaimes, Tally and
Santana caused olr contributed to causing the purported loss or misuse of Pohl’s
alleged trade siecret information. Specifically, Kassab alleges that these persons failed
to keep Pohl’s information confidential because they routinely placed Pohl’s alleged
trade secrets and documents in the public domain, circulating Precision’s marketing
lists and other documents allegedly belonging to Pohl to numerous third parties
rather than safeguard these documents and lists.
18
42. Additionally, if Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley or
Santana had an agreement and/or duty to safeguard any property allegedly owned
by Pohl as Pohl alleges, they are responsible for failing to safeguard the property.
Additionally, Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley and Santkana routinely
placed Pohl’s alleged trade secrets and documents in the public dComain, circulating
Precision’s marketing lists and other documents allegedly belonging to Pohl to
numerous third parties rather than safeguard these documients and lists.
43. “Under the notice-pleading standard, fair notice is achieved if the
opposing party can ascertain from the pleading the nature and basic issues of the
controversy, and what type of evidence might be relevant.” In re CVR Energy, Inc.,
500 S.W.3d at 80. “A trial court may not revliew the truth of the allegations or consider
the strength of the defendant's evidenMce.” Id. Kassab satisfies this “low threshold” by
alleging that the Designated Parties caused or contributed to causing the alleged
theft or misuse of Pohl’s puriported trade secret information. See id. Therefore,
Shepherd, Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley, Santana are persons who
caused or contributedo to causing any alleged harm for which recovery of damages is
sought by Pohl. Thleir conduct caused or contributed to causing in part (if not entirely)
the harm for wihich recovery of damages is sought by Pohl, and that conduct violated
an applicable legal standard and/or constitutes negligence. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 33.011(6). Thus, the jury should be permitted to consider apportioning
fault in this case to Shepherd, Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley,
19
Santana. Their designation as responsible third parties is factually justified and
legally appropriate.9
COUNTERCLAIM FOR CIVIL BARRATRY
44. Within the lawsuits that Kassab has filed against PoChll on behalf of his
former clients and/or potential clients, Pohl has judicially admcitted that a claim for
barratry is not a legal malpractice case. Pohl has also admitted that a because a
claim for barratry is not a claim for “legal malpractice,s” the Discovery Rule does not
apply to a barratry claim. Therefore, based upogn Pohl’s judicial admissions, the
assignment of a barratry claim is permitted unBder Texas law.
45. Thus, based upon express assignments of interest given to Kassab,
Kassab brings counterclaims againstM Pohl and his law firm pursuant to Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code, Sectioon 16.069. Section 16.069 provides:
(a) If a counterclaim or ccross claim arises out of the same transaction or
occurrence that is fthe basis of an action, a party to the action may
file the counterclaim or cross claim even though as a separate action
it would be baryred by limitations on the date the party’s answer is
required.
(b) The counterclaim or cross claim must be filed not later than the 30th
day after the date on which the party’s answer is required.
9 It is also onf no concern here that the Court might be unable to exert personal jurisdiction over
either WaUlker, Seymour, Ladner, Talley, Dona, Jaimes or Santana. In its 2003 revision of Chapter
33, the Legislature abolished the predecessor law, which had defined responsible third parties to be
only those over whom the court could exercise jurisdiction, thus allowing the designation of those
“who are not subject to the court’s jurisdiction or who are immune from liability to the claimant.”
See, e.g., In re Unitec Elevator Serv. Co., 178 S.W.3d 53, 58 & n. 5 (Tex. App.-- Houston [1st Dist.]
2005, orig. proceeding); accord Hix-Hernandez v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:20-cv-29-RP, 2021 WL
7632564, at *1 (W.D. Tex. May 6, 2021) (“A defendant may designate a responsible third party
despite the fact that the party has a defense to liability, cannot be joined as a defendant, or both.
Even parties who are outside the court’s jurisdiction or are immune from liability may be designated
responsible third parties.”) (internal citations omitted).
20
Kassab has been assigned barratry claims on behalf of 242 claimants. These
counterclaims are timely because they were filed within 30 days of the date
Kassab filed his original answer.
X k
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES e
46. Defendants contend that all or some of Plaintiffs’ claims for
misappropriate under TUTSA were made in bad faith, enablitng Defendants to
recover their reasonable attorney’s fees. See TEX. CIV. P RAC. & REM. CODE §
134A.005. e
XI u
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, Defendants, Counter-Pllaintiffs respectfully pray that Plaintiffs
recover nothing on their claims and that the Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs recover
on their claims against the Plaintiffs and/or any Third-Party Defendants as follows:
i) actual and conseqiuential damages;
ii) statutory damages;
iii) pre- and ppost-judgment interest;
iv) attorneys’ fees and costs; and
v) all other relief to which the Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs may be justly
entitled.
21
Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASS k AB
Texas State Bar No. 00e794070
lance@kassab.law C
DAVID ERIC KASSABt 
Texas State Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.latw
1214 Elgin Stireet
Houston, Texas 77004
Telephone: 713.522.7400
Facsimeile: 713.522.7410
ATTOR u NEYS FOR LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB AND THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
lFOGLER, BRAR, O’NEIL AND GRAY, LLP
M /s/ Murray Fogler
 Murray Fogler
State Bar No. 07207300
e mfogler@foglerbrar.com
i 909 Fannin, Suite 1640
f Houston, Texas 77010
Telephone: 713-481-1010
Facsimile: 713-574-3224
ATTORNEY FOR LANCE
a l CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND THE
c i KASSAB LAW FIRM REGARDING
i PLAINTIFFS’ AFFIRMATIVE CLAIMS
22
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
instrument has been forwarded to all parties pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure on this the 14th day of November 2022.
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
Lance Christopher KCassab
23
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab
Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law r
Envelope ID: 70152760
Status as of 11/14/2022 3:36 PM CST
Case Contacts r i
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldssfrizzell.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldgsfrizzell.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@reynouldsfrizzell.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@yfavrepa.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Lawyer Wade lawayerwade@hotmail.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Andrea Mendez andrea@kassab.law 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Lance Kassab olance@kassab.law 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
David Kassab david@kassab.law 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo f jason@ciofalolaw.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Todd Taylor p ttaylor@jandflaw.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Misty Davis C mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Nicholas Pierce a l nicholas@kassab.law 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrar.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Murray Fogler o mfogler@fbfog.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Andrew JohnsUon ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Vilma Yanes vyanes@thompsoncoe.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10607900 jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo 24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
D Kassab david@kassab.law 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab
Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law r
Envelope ID: 70152760
Status as of 11/14/2022 3:36 PM CST
Case Contacts r i
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
L Kassab lance@kassab.law s 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbgrar.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT
Non-Party Witness Billy Shepherd bshepherd@supcounsel.com 11/14/2022 3:25:53 PM SENT"
41,2022-09-21,NTC,Pohl,Filing evidence and request for leave,Pohl Plaintiffs' Notice of Filing of Evidence in Support of Claims of Privilege and Request for Leave,"Notice filed September 21, 2022 pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.4, filing Pohl's declaration to support privilege claims in response to Kassab Defendants' Fifth Set of Written Discovery Requests and their related Motion to Compel. Filed before Judge Scot Dollinger, 189th Judicial District, Harris County, Texas.",MSJ-3,N/A,Phase 3,2022-09-21_NTC_Pohl-Filing-Evidence-and-Request-for-Leave_FILED.pdf,"Leave to file the declaration of Michael A. Pohl in support of privilege claims less than seven days in advance of the September 23, 2022 hearing on Kassab's Motion to Compel","9/21/2022 9:03 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 68499533
By: Ashley Lopez
Filed: 9/21/2022 9:03 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL AND LAW OFFICE OF § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
MICHAEL A. POHL, PLLC, §
Plaintiffs, §
V. § k
§ e
SCOTT FAVRE and SCOTT M. FAVRE PA, § C l
LLC; PRECISION MARKETING GROUP, § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
LLC; LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB and § c
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. d/b/a § r
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM; TINA § s
NICHOLSON and BAKER NICHOLSON, §
LLP d/b/a BAKER NICHOLSON LAW § s
FIRM; and DOUGLAS MONTAGUE III and § s
MONTAGUE PITTMAN & VARNADO, P.A., §
Defendants. § r189TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
THE POHL PLAINTIFFS’ NOTICE OF FILING OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF
CLAIMS OF PRIVILEGE AND REQUEST FOR LEAVE
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE SCOT “DOaLLI” DOLLINGER:
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.4, Plaintiffs Michael A. Pohl and Law
Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC fieles and serves the attached declaration of Michael A. Pohl
which will be used to support thfe claims of privilege made by Pohl in response to the Kassab
Defendants’ Fifth Set of Wriytten Discovery Requests.
This declaratioCn is being filed as a result of the Kassab Defendants’ Motion to Compel
Removal of Pohl’sa Objections and Properly Respond to Discovery, filed Sept. 19, 2022 (the
“Motion”)—whfich was set for hearing on Sept. 23, 2022. Given that the Motion was both filed
and set for hearing less than seven days in advance of the hearing date, Pohl requests leave for the
filing of this declaration less than seven days in advance of the hearing under Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 193.4(a). The Kassab Defendants and the Montague Defendants do not oppose this
request for leave.
Dated: September 21, 2022 Respectfully submitted,
REYNOLDS FRIZZELL LLP
By: /s/ Jean C. Frizzell
Jean C. Frizzell
State Bar No. 07484650 k
1100 Louisiana St., Suite 3500 e
Houston, Texas 77002 C l
Tel. 713.485.7200 
Fax 713.485.7250 c
jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.rcom
Attorney for PlaintifDfs Michael Pohl
and Law Office ofs Michael A. Pohl, PLLC
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
I hereby certify that on September 21, 2022, a lawyer from my office asked counsel for
defendants if they opposed Plaintiffs’ request for lleave to file a declaration less than seven days in
advance of the hearing. Counsel for the Maontague Defendants and counsel for the Kassab
Defendants responded before the filing of tMhis document, and they indicated that those parties are
not opposed to Pohl’s request for leave. Counsel for Pohl did not receive a response from the
Favre Defendants or the Nicholson Defeondants prior to filing.
f /s/ Jean C. Frizzell
Jean C. Frizzell
C CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby ceratify that a true and correct copy of this document was served on all counsel of
record pursuant toc the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this 21st day of September, 2022.
U /s/ Jean C. Frizzell
Jean C. Frizzell
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this
document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below.
The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate
of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Suni Blue on behalf of Jean Frizzell e
Bar No. 7484650 C
sblue@reynoldsfrizzell.com t
Envelope ID: 68499533 r
Status as of 9/22/2022 9:05 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimsestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com r9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Andrew Johnson ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Andrew J. Sarne asarne@krcl.com  9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.com 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Kathryn Laflin KLaflin@KRCL.com l 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrar.coam 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.comM 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Larry Newsom lnewsom@krcl.com 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo jason@ciofaelolaw.com 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@fjandflaw.com 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Lawyer Wade olawyerwade@hotmail.com 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre Cscott@favrepa.com 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Andrea Mendez  andrea@kassab.law 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Lance Kassab lance@kassab.law 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
David Kassab david@kassab.law 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Nicholas Pierce f nicholas@kassab.law 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson n10607900 jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Raul Herman SuazoU24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
L Kassab lance@kassab.law 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Katie Budinsky kbudinsky@krcl.com 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM ERROR
Misty Davis mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
E. MarieJamison jamison@wrightclosebarger.com 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
Jessica Z.Barger barger@wrightclosebarger.com 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT
D Kassab david@kassab.law 9/21/2022 9:03:12 PM SENT"
40,2022-09-19,OBJ,Kassab,Objection to Pohl’s MSJ evidence,"Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Evidence — joint filing by Kassab and Nicholson Defendants challenging admissibility of Pohl's summary judgment evidence including the Pohl Declaration (paragraphs 4, 6, 10-18, 20-32) and numerous exhibits, with additional deposition testimony offered under Rule 107","Evidentiary objections filed September 19, 2022 at 8:16 AM by Kassab and Nicholson defendants jointly, on the morning of the summary judgment hearing. Challenges admissibility of Pohl's September 12, 2022 declaration and exhibits attached to both the traditional and no-evidence MSJ responses. Attaches complete depositions of Ladner, Seymour, and Walker under Rule 107. Addressed to Judge Scot 'Dolli' Dollinger.",MSJ-3,N/A,Phase 3,2022-09-19_OBJ_Kassab-Objection-to-Pohl-MSJ-Evidence_FILED.pdf,"Sustain all objections, strike objectionable portions of Pohl Declaration and exhibits, and grant summary judgment for Kassab and Nicholson defendants","9/19/2022 8:16 AM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 68367189
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 9/19/2022 8:16 AM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIALk DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS TO C
PLAINTIFFS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE SCOT “DOLLI” DOLLINGEtR:
Defendants Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C.
d/b/a/ The Kassab Law Firm (“the Kassab Defendeants”) and Tina Nicholson and
Baker Nicholson, LLP (“Nicholson”) (both sets ouf Defendants collectively referred to
as “Defendants”) file this, their Objections to Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment
Evidence, and would respectfully show athe following.
OBJECTIONS TO POHL’S EVIDENCE IN RESPONSE TO TRADITIONAL MSJ
Plaintiffs Michael A. Pohel and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC (“Pohl”)
attached to his summary judfgment responses as Exhibit A a declaration from Pohl
dated September 12, 2022 with exhibits (“Pohl Declaration”). Defendants object to
the following statements or paragraphs in the Pohl Declaration for the following
reasons: i
Paoragraph/Statement Objection/Basis
¶ 4 – “During the period that I Conclusory. Unsupported by factual or
maintained office space in Mississippi, I legal basis.
shared that space only with contractors
and employees whom I employed full
time and were treated for privilege and
confidentiality purposes as functional
employees of my law firm.
¶ 6 – “I was informed that Maxwell- Hearsay.
Walker had retained Mississippi
attorneys to advise it and confirm that
its agreement with me as well as the
public relations and marketing services
it was anticipated to provide under the
agreement were in compliance with
Mississippi law.” e
¶ 10 – “Precision represented to me that Conclusory. Hearstay. Vague and
their independent attorney or attorneys ambiguous as to whio at “Precision” made
had reviewed and approved each of the alleged represtentations so this
contracts I signed with them. In fact, interested-witneiss testimony is not
Precision and/or their independent “clear, positive and direct” as required by
attorneys prepared or redrafted several Rule 166a(sc).
of the services agreements.” e
¶ 11 – “Precision also represented that, Conclusory. Hearsay. Vague and
in addition to their public relations ambiguous as to who at “Precision” made
services, they were competent to handle alleged representations so this
client liaison services and claims linterested-witness testimony from Pohl
management with respect to clients whao is not “clear, positive and direct” as
retained me and Jimmy WilliamsonM to required by Rule 166a(c).
investigate and potentially prosecute
their BP claims.”
¶ 12 – “I am and was the righitful owner Conclusory. Improper lay or expert
of all the confidential, pOrivileged and opinion on legal issues for which Pohl is
trade secret information and property not properly qualified or designated to
that Kassab, Montagupe and Nicholson provide testimony on. Unsupported by
obtained from Scott Foavre and Precision factual or legal basis. More specifically,
Marketing Group, LLC on which this Pohl’s statements that he is a rightful
lawsuit is baseda. l… as a lawyer, I am owner of the information, that the
also entitled tco imaintain a copy of the information is a “trade secret,” and that
files and havfei a possessory interest in he has a possessory and ownership
them. Moroeover, with respect to the interest in the information are
attorney-client contracts to which I was conclusory without any supporting basis.
a party, as a contracting party I likewise
have an ownership interest in each of
the attorney-client contracts.”
¶ 13 – “while a single client may have Conclusory. Improper lay or expert
the right to request and obtain his/her opinion on legal issues for which Pohl is
file, that client does not have the right to not properly qualified or designated to
possess or even access other client files. provide testimony on. Unsupported by
The compilation of my clients and their factual or legal basis.
contact information, or any subset of my
clients, belongs to me and is in fact a
‘customer list.’ This is equally true if the
materials consist of over 11,000
attorney-client contracts from which one
can ascertain my ‘client’ or ‘customer e
list’.” C
¶ 14 – “I repeatedly stressed to Precision Conclusory. Heairsay. Vague and
and its staff the importance of keeping ambiguous as to wtho at “Precision” made
client information confidential including alleged repreisentations so this
the attorney-client contracts and the interested-witness testimony from Pohl
corresponding files. In turn, Precision is not “clsear, positive and direct” as
represented to me that they would be required eby Rule 166a(c). Improper lay
providing their marketing and client or expert opinion on legal issues for
services exclusively to me and knew and which Pohl is not properly qualified or
understood that their work and designated to provide testimony on.
communications with clients including Unsupported by factual or legal basis.
the underlying information of the clients l
and any of my contracts with the clienats
were confidential and could not Mbe
disclosed without my express consent.
Although Precision was a third-party
provider of legal related services, for
purposes of privileged or cionfidential
information, they were eOffectively the
functional equivalent of employees
working full time for pme out of offices
arranged for and poaid for by me. I
considered them to be a ‘lawyer
representative’ asl that term is used in
the Texas Rules iof Civil Evidence.
¶ 15 – “I likoewise took additional steps to Conclusory. Improper lay or expert
safeguard my confidential and opinion on legal issues for which Pohl is
proprietary information. My offices, not properly qualified or designated to
where my information was kept, were at provide testimony on. Unsupported by
the top floor of a bank building which factual or legal basis.
had 24-hour security. The elevators were
programmed such that after hours a
person could only access a floor or floor
for which that person had authority. The
building itself contained numerous
security cameras. My firm would lock
and secure the offices after office hours,
and my files were therefore kept under
lock and key. I also made sure my
computers were password protected.
With respect to my contracts with my
clients, the contracts were written in a e
way that left no doubt that they were an C
agreement between a lawyer and a client t 
or clients for the rendition of legal
services.” t
¶ 16 – “I did not commit barratry. The Conclusory. Improper lay or expert
assertions made by the Defendants in opinion ons legal issues for which Pohl is
their motions for summary judgment not propeerly qualified or designated to
that I committed barratry and that I provide testimony on. Unsupported by
agreed to pay Precision any percentage factual or legal basis.
of the attorney’s fees I was to receive is
not true.”
¶ 17 – “At all times, I attempted tao Conclusory. Hearsay. Improper lay or
conform to the requirements relatinMg to expert opinion on legal issues for which
practicing in states in which I was not Pohl is not properly qualified or
licensed. I note that the filing process in designated to provide testimony on.
the BP Matter permitted the Unsupported by factual or legal basis.
participation of non-lawyers. iThere was
no requirement of bar Oadmission for
filing claims.” 
¶ 18 – “the assertionso that I ever agreed Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to
to pay any percentage of my attorney's who at “Precision” made alleged
fees to Precisiona lare not true. Instead, representations so this interested-
the May 25, c2i012 and July 15, 2012 witness testimony from Pohl is not
Contracts faiccurately reflect the “clear, positive and direct” as required by
agreement oorally discussed and Rule 166a(c). Unsupported by factual or
understood by all of the parties before legal basis.
their execution. The agreement required
that the Precision ""shall keep accurate
daily time records of all efforts expended
on behalf of LOMAP."" The %-of-
attorney's-fees clause was simply to
impose a ""cap"" on amounts that may be
due under the other terms of the
agreement, not an independent promise
to pay any percentage of the attorney's
fees earned by LOMAP on the subject
claims. This was orally discussed and
understood by the parties before the May
25, 2012 and July 15, 2012 Contracts
were executed.”
¶ 20 – “Further with respect to the terms Conclusory. Vague andC ambiguous as to
of agreement and services to be provided who at “Precisiont ” made alleged
under the May 25, 2012 Contract and representations sio this interested-
the July 15, 2012 Contract, I was witness testimonty from Pohl is not
informed by Precision that they wanted “clear, positive aind direct” as required by
to confer with their attorneys before Rule 166a(c). Unsupported by factual or
finalizing and executing the agreement legal basiss.
documentation. We specifically discussed e
that the inclusion of the agreed
maximum-price provisions was essential
to me in agreeing to either a ""reasonable
rate"" formula or a specified contract
rate. Precision subsequently confirmed l
to me that they had conferred with theiar
Mississippi attorneys, who had advMised
that the terms of the agreement and
anticipated services thereunder were
lawful, and executed the agreement
accordingly.” i
¶ 21 – “Precision and its members Hearsay.
agreed they would orpganize and host
festivals, town hall moeetings and other
gatherings to appropriately educate the
public as part of thleir marketing efforts.”
¶ 22- “On my cbiehalf, Precision and its Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to
members agrfeied they would organize who at “Precision” Pohl is referring to, so
and host foestivals, town hall meetings this interested-witness testimony from
and other gatherings to appropriately Pohl is not “clear, positive and direct” as
educate the public as part of their required by Rule 166a(c). Unsupported
marketing efforts. Precision was also by factual or legal basis.
responsible for training and supervising
their staff to ensure optimal results and
compliance with the rules governing
their marketing activities.”
¶ 22 – “This included Precision sending Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to
me falsified and inflated invoices and who at “Precision” Pohl is referring to, so
expense information. It was also later this interested-witness testimony from
discovered that Precision had Pohl is not “clear, positive and direct” as
systematically overcharged me on all required by Rule 166a(c). Unsupported
amounts I paid them under the public by factual or legal basis.
relations agreement.”
¶ 23 – “Precision admitted that they had Conclusory. Vague andC ambiguous as to
been stealing from me. Thus, from the who at “Precision” otr “PR Consultants”
inception of my relationship with PR Pohl is referring tio, so this interested-
Consultants, they consistently witness testimonty from Pohl is not
overstated to me the amount of the “clear, positive aind direct” as required by
actual costs they charged me for, and Rule 166a(c). Unsupported by factual or
then misappropriated, converted and/or legal basiss.
stole the inflated amounts for their own e
use and benefit.”
¶ 24 – “Precision took my property Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to
including my engagement agreements, who at “Precision” Pohl is referring to, so
client files, contact information, lthis interested-witness testimony from
computers and other informatioan Pohl is not “clear, positive and direct” as
without my permission. These files wMere required by Rule 166a(c). Unsupported
at one time maintained in approximately by factual or legal basis. Hearsay as to
seventeen clear plastic file containers. what Ladner – who is not a party to this
Ladner admitted absconding with those case – stated.
files from my satellite law ioffice and,
without my consent, keptO them at his
residence until they were later delivered,
also without my consenpt, to Scott Favre,
who had purchasedo Precision (from
Walker, Seymour, and Ladner) and
became its managilng member.”
¶ 24 – “Precf iision and Tina Nicholson Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to
refused to roeturn and converted to their who at “Precision” Pohl is referring to, so
own use my computers that I purchased this interested-witness testimony from
for my office and which Precision used Pohl is not “clear, positive and direct” as
while there performing services for me. required by Rule 166a(c). Improper lay
Those computers held software and or expert opinion on legal issues for
stored data that I had paid for, which Pohl is not properly qualified or
specialized legal forms (that had been designated to provide testimony on.
prepared in compliance with various Unsupported by factual or legal basis.
state law after consultation with local
counsel in those jurisdictions),
marketing information and other trade
secrets, my proprietary administrative
client forms, various fee-agreement
forms prepared in accordance with the
laws of various states, internal emails
and other work product relating to the
BP claims and other matters for which e
Precision rendered services in connection C
with our services agreements.” t 
¶ 25 – “This theft and unlawful Conclusory. Heatrsay. Vague and
disclosure was made even more ambiguous as toi who at “Precision” Pohl
egregious by the fact that, from the is referring to, so this interested-witness
outset of their contractual relationship testimony sfrom Pohl is not “clear,
with me, Precision expressed their positive aend direct” as required by Rule
understanding of the confidential nature 166a(c). Pohl’s statement about what
of the information based on their prior “appears” to have occurred is not
experience in providing litigation related competent summary judgment evidence,
services to attorneys, a field in which and his statement about a “barratry
Precision held themselves out to me as lscheme” is conclusory and unsupported
experienced professionals. Neverthelesas, by factual or legal basis. Moreover, not
without my consent, and without lMegal designated to opine on the issue of legal
title to the contracts, documents, title.
computers, passwords or data stored
thereon, Precision sold the contracts,
documents, computer, passwoirds and/or
stored data to Scott FavreO (even after I
had informed Favre that the materials
had been stolen from pme by Precision),
who it appears eventoually sold some or
all of those items and the information
therein to Kaslsab, Montague and
Nicholson for theiir barratry scheme.
¶ 26 – “Aso part of that enforcement of Conclusory and unsupported by factual
the settlement agreement, certain or legal basis.
Defendants were sanctioned.”
¶ 27 – “The materials at issue have Conclusory. Improper lay or expert
independent economic value from not opinion on legal issues for which Pohl is
being generally known to or not properly qualified or designated to
ascertainable through proper means by provide testimony on. Unsupported by
another person who can obtain economic factual or legal basis.
value from them.”
¶ 27 – “I agree with this valuation and Conclusory. Improper lay or expert
believe it constitutes the fair market opinion on legal issues for which Pohl is
price for what an investor would pay for not properly qualified or designated to
such information. However, the provide testimony on. Pohl’s statement
conversion and misappropriation of my about what he “believes” is not
client information has deprived me of competent summary judgement evidence.
this value.” Unsupported by factuaCl or legal basis.
¶ 28 – “I have suffered injury as a result Conclusory. Impropter lay or expert
of the Defendants’ misappropriation of opinion on legal issiues for which Pohl is
my trade secrets and conversion of my not properly quatlified or designated to
property. My injury includes the costs I provide testimDoiny on. Unsupported by
have incurred in legal fees and expenses factual or legal basis. Pohl fails to
that I would never have incurred but for provide susfficient factual support about
the conversion of my property and the fees hee alleges as damages.
misappropriation of my trade secrets. I
have personally incurred hundreds of
thousands of dollars in attorneys’ fees
and expenses in relation to defending
the lawsuits orchestrated by Defendants, l
including the Berry, Brumfielad,
Cheatham, and Gandy lawsuits. I Mwas
also harmed, as I paid a substantial sum
of money as part of a settlement
agreement under which certain
Defendants were required to ireturn my
materials and not fomOent litigation
against me. But I did not receive those
benefits.” p
¶ 29 – “The filing process in the BP Conclusory. Hearsay. Improper lay or
Matter permitteadl the participation of expert opinion on legal issues for which
non-lawyers. Tchiere was no requirement Pohl is not properly qualified or
of bar admissfioin for filing claims.” designated to provide testimony on.
o Unsupported by factual or legal basis.
¶ 30 – “At no time did I knowingly Conclusory. Unsupported by factual or
participate in any illegal solicitation of legal basis.
clients in Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas
or elsewhere. I always instructed
everyone in my employ to abide by the
laws of the state in which they were
acting. I, at all times, attempted to
adhere to the rules of the State Bar of
Texas and other relevant states
regarding the solicitation of clients.
¶ 31 – “Prior to the two year period Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to
leading up to the filing of this case, I was who at “Precision” Pohl is referring to, so
unaware that Scott Favre and Precision, this interested-witness testimony from
with the assistance of Tina Nicholson, Pohl is not “clear, positivee and direct” as
had sold my information to Kassab and required by Rule 166Ca(c). Unsupported
Montague. And, in fact, that sale by factual or legal bast is.
occurred in November of 2016, less than i
two years before this suit was filed. t
¶ 32 – “The grievances involved those Conclusory. 
same allegations.” s
Defendants request the Court to sustain these objections and strike these
objectionable portions of the Pohl Declaration. With those statements struck, Pohl
has no evidence to support his claimls against Kassab, rendering summary
judgment appropriate. M
In addition, Defendants object to several of Pohl’s summary judgment
exhibits on the following grounds.
Exhibit/Description Objection/Basis
Exhibit F - November 15, 2019 letter Hearsay. Irrelevant because outcomes of
from Office of Cohief Disciplinary grievance proceedings are not res
Counsel. judicata in civil matters. See Charles v.
l Diggs, No. 14-19-00725-CV, 2020 Tex.
Exhibit G – Feibruary 24, 2020 letter App. LEXIS 8502, at *5 (Tex. App.—
from Office iof Chief Disciplinary Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 29, 2020, pet.
Counsel. o denied) (client’s claim against lawyer
Exhibit H – May 14, 2020 Letter from was not precluded by dismissal of
Board of Disciplinary Appeals. grievance because “the disciplinary rules
do not set the standard for civil
Exhibit I – January 14, 2020 letter from liability”); TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R.
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel. 17.03 (“Neither the Complainant nor the
Respondent is affected by the doctrines
Exhibit J – April 10, 2020 Letter from of res judicata or estoppel by judgment
Board of Disciplinary Appeals. from any Disciplinary Action.”).
Exhibit K – January 9, 2020 letter from
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel.
Exhibit L – April 10, 2020 Letter from
Board of Disciplinary Appeals.
Exhibit M – January 9, 2020 letter from e
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel. C
Exhibit N – April 10, 2020 Letter from
Board of Disciplinary Appeals. t
Exhibit O – January 9, 2020 letter from 
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel.
Exhibit P – April 10, 2020 Letter from
Board of Disciplinary Appeals.
Exhibit T – January 9, 2020 letter from
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel. l
Exhibit R – October 3, 2017 Letter fMrom Hearsay.
Magdalena Santana 
Exhibit S – Transcription of audiotaped Hearsay as to statements made by
conversation between Lance Kiassab and Magdalena Santana.
Magdalena Santana. O
Exhibit Y – emails and letter from Hearsay
counsel p
Additionalalyl, Pohl attached to his response only portions of the depositions of
Scott Walker f(iExhibit D), Kirk Ladner (Exhibit V), and Steve Seymour (Exhibit W),
taken August 29-31, 2022, after Defendants filed their motions for summary
judgment. For purposes of optional completeness, Defendants attach the entire
depositions of these witnesses as Exhibits 1 (Ladner), 2 (Seymour) and 3 (Walker) to
this pleading and asks the Court to consider those depositions part of the summary
10
judgment record. See TEX. R. EVID. 107 (“If a party introduces part of an act,
declaration, conversation, writing, or recorded statement, an adverse party may …
introduce any other act, declaration, conversation, writing, or recorded statement
that is necessary to explain or allow the trier of fact to fully understkand the part
offered by the opponent.”). This exhibits include, for example, adCditional proof for
Defendants’ summary-judgment arguments, such as Kirk Ladner’s following
testimony: i
• Precision owned the marketing and client lists. Ex. 1 at 44-45.
• Helping hands decided which law firms to refer clients to. Ex. 1 at 55-56, 62-
64
• Ladner did his own research to find lthe motor vehicle accident cases. Ex. 1 at
97, 285-89. M
• Pohl was really splitting attorney’s fees with Precision and his contracts were
a deceptive smokescreein to make the scheme appear legal. Ex. 1 at 77-79,
83-85, 94-95, 269-271, 276, 287-288, 398-416, 443
• Forms and maroketing lists used by Precision belonged to Precision. Ex. 1 at
128-29. l
• Pohl nef iver told Lander to return the documents, which belonged to ladner.
Ex. 1 at 133, 173-74
• The BP claimants were clients of Precision first. Ex. 1 at 214-215.
• Pohl never told Ladner to keep the information confidential. Ex. 1 at 232-35,
264-65, 500-502
11
• Spreadsheets of claimants and pre-questionnaire forms belonged to Precision.
Ex. 1 at 244-245, 262-263.
• Pohl committed barratry. Ex. 1 at 274-280, 285-86
• Helping Hands and GM Verification signed up the claimants as their own
clients. 444 C
Additionally, Steve Seymour testified that Walker creaited claimant lists but
Pohl never said the client lists were confidential. Ex. 2 ati 96-98, 147-149, 221-222.
Walker testified that the marketing lists were Precission’s work product and so was
the initial screening forming Precision had claimants compete. Ex. 3 at 232-33,
237-242.
OBJECTIONS TO POHL’S EVIDENCE INl RESPONSE TO NO-EVIDENCE MSJ
Because the Pohl DefendantsM use the same declaration to support their
Response to the No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants
incorporate by reference all thie above-stated objections and assert them as to Pohl’s
declaration attached to the No-Evidence Response as Exhibit A.
EXHIBIT/DES o CRIPTION EXHIBIT/BASIS
Exhibit BB – Omnibus Transcript Hearsay
Exhibit D – Grcieivance documents Hearsay. Irrelevant because outcomes of
f i grievance proceedings are not res
o judicata in civil matters. See Charles v.
Diggs, No. 14-19-00725-CV, 2020 Tex.
App. LEXIS 8502, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 29, 2020, pet.
denied) (client’s claim against lawyer
was not precluded by dismissal of
grievance because “the disciplinary rules
do not set the standard for civil
liability”); TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R.
12
17.03 (“Neither the Complainant nor the
Respondent is affected by the doctrines
of res judicata or estoppel by judgment
from any Disciplinary Action.”).
Exhibit S – Zavitsanos Report Hearsay, unsworn.
Exhibit T – Pohl Deposition at 115-116 Hearsay regarding what third-parties
allegedly told Nicholson. Also, Pohl’s
testimony was nonresponsive.
Exhibit Y – Pohl Declaration
¶ 4 Conclusory. Improiper lay or expert
opinion on legal sitssues for which Pohl is
not properly Dquialified or designated to
provide testimony on. Unsupported by
factual or slegal basis. More specifically,
Pohl’s statements that he is a rightful
owner of the information, that the
information is a “trade secret,” and that
he has a possessory and ownership
interest in the information are
lconclusory without any supporting basis.
¶¶ 5, 6 Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to
 who at “Precision” Pohl is referring to, so
this interested-witness testimony from
Pohl is not “clear, positive and direct” as
i required by Rule 166a(c). Unsupported
O by factual or legal basis. Hearsay as to
 what Ladner – who is not a party to this
p case – stated.
¶ 7 Conclusory. Hearsay. Vague and
a l ambiguous as to who at “Precision” Pohl
c i is referring to, so this interested-witness
f i testimony from Pohl is not “clear,
o positive and direct” as required by Rule
166a(c). Pohl’s statement about what
“appears” to have occurred is not
competent summary judgment evidence,
and his statement about a barratry
scheme is conclusory and unsupported
by factual or legal basis. Moreover, not
designated to opine on issue of legal
¶ 8 title.
13
¶ 9 Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to
who at “Precision” Pohl is referring to, so
this interested-witness testimony from
Pohl is not “clear, positive and direct” as
required by Rule 166a(c). Unsupported
by factual or legal basis. e
¶¶ 10, 13, 14 Not designated as an expert on damages,
and his damages topines are conclusory,
speculative, unireliable, and lack any
factual support.
¶ 11 Conclusoery
CONCLUSION & PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should sustain these objections to Pohl’s
summary judgment evidence. With the aobjections sustained, the Court should grant
Kassab’s request for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment and order that
Pohl take nothing his claims against Kassab.
O Respectfully submitted,
p THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
/s/ David Eric Kassab
l DAVID ERIC KASSAB
i Texas State Bar No. 24071351
i david@kassab.law
o LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 00794070
lance@kassab.law
NICHOLAS R. PIERCE
Texas State Bar No. 24098263
nicholas@kassab.law
1214 Elgin Street
Houston, Texas 77004
Telephone: 713-522-7400
14
Facsimile: 713-522-7410
E-Service: eserve@kassab.law
ATTORNEYS FOR KASSAB DEFENDANTS
THOMPSON, COE, COUSINS & IRONS, LLP
By: /s/ Andrew L. Johneson
Andrew L. Johnson C
State Bar No.: 24060025
Zandra E. Foley
State Bar No.: 2t4032085
Benjamin S. Riitz
State Bar No.: 24096147
One Riverway, Suite 1400
Houstoen, Texas 77056
(713) 403-8210 – Telephone
(71u3) 403-8299 – Facsimile
ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com
zfoley@thompsoncoe.com
lbritz@thompsoncoe.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS TINA
NICHOLSON AND BAKER
fNICHOLSON, LLP
OCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that onp this date, September 19, 2022, I electronically filed this
document with the Clerk of the Court using the eFile.TXCourts.gov electronic filing
system which will send notification of such filing to all parties or counsel of record.
f /s/ David Eric Kassab
DAVID ERIC KASSAB
15
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this
document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below.
The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate
of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab e
Bar No. 24071351 C
david@kassab.law t
Envelope ID: 68367189 r
Status as of 9/19/2022 8:41 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email sTimestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com r 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Andrew Johnson ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Andrew J. Sarne asarne@krcl.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.conm 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Kathryn Laflin KLaflin@KRCL.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10607900 jefferson@mdjwlarw.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo 24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Larry Newsom lnewsom@fkrcl.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo jason@ciofalolaw.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Todd Taylor titaylor@jandflaw.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Misty Davis fmdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Non-Party Witness Billy Shepherd bshepherd@spcounsel.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Deidre Hicks y GWS_GROUP@spcounsel.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell C jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Todd Taylor  ttaylor@jandflaw.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Lawyer Wade a lawyerwade@hotmail.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Scott M.Favre c scott@favrepa.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Andrea Mendez f i andrea@kassab.law 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Lance Kassab o lance@kassab.law 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
David Kassab david@kassab.law 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Nicholas Pierce nicholas@kassab.law 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Katie Budinsky kbudinsky@krcl.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM ERROR
E. MarieJamison jamison@wrightclosebarger.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT
Jessica Z.Barger barger@wrightclosebarger.com 9/19/2022 8:16:53 AM SENT"
39,2022-09-18,NTC,Pohl,Withdrawal of partial MSJ on aff. def.,Pohl Plaintiffs' Notice of Drawing Down from Hearing Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Defendants' Affirmative Defenses that Seek to Relitigate Failed Barratry Claims and No-Evidence Motion on the Remaining Affirmative Defenses,"Notice submitted September 18, 2022 (filed by clerk September 19, 2022) withdrawing Pohl's own motion for partial summary judgment on affirmative defenses from the September 19, 2022 hearing before Judge Scot 'Dolli' Dollinger, while defendants' MSJs remained pending for the same hearing date. Filed by Jean C. Frizzell of Reynolds Frizzell LLP.",MSJ-3,N/A,Phase 3,2022-09-18_NTC_Pohl-Withdrawal-of-Partial-MSJ-on-Aff-Def_FILED.pdf,"Request that Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Defendants' Affirmative Defenses be drawn down from the September 19, 2022 hearing","9/18/2022 5:42 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 68364897
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 9/19/2022 12:00 AM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL AND LAW OFFICE OF § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
MICHAEL A. POHL, PLLC, §
Plaintiffs, §
V. § k
§ e
SCOTT FAVRE and SCOTT M. FAVRE PA, § C l
LLC; PRECISION MARKETING GROUP, § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
LLC; LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB and § c
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. d/b/a § r
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM; TINA § s
NICHOLSON and BAKER NICHOLSON, §
LLP d/b/a BAKER NICHOLSON LAW § s
FIRM; and DOUGLAS MONTAGUE III and § s
MONTAGUE PITTMAN & VARNADO, P.A., §
Defendants. § r189TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
THE POHL PLAINTIFFS’ NOTICE OF DRAWING DOWN FROM HEARING
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
DEFENDANTS’ AFFIRMATIVE DEFElNSES THAT SEEK TO RELITIGATE
FAILED BARRATRY CLAIMS AGaAINST PLAINTIFFS AND NO-EVIDENCE
MOTION ON THE REMAMINING AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE SCOT “DOLLI” DOLLINGER:
Plaintiffs Michael A. Pohl and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC file this notice to
draw down Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Defendants’ Affirmative
Defenses that Seek to Relitigate Failed Barratry Claims Against Plaintiffs and No-Evidence
Motion on the Remaining Affirmative Defenses, filed on August 29, 2022. This motion is
currently set for hcearing on September 19, 2022, and Plaintiffs request that it be drawn down from
that hearing so that the motion is not heard at that time.
Dated: September 18, 2022 Respectfully submitted,
REYNOLDS FRIZZELL LLP
By: /s/ Jean C. Frizzell
Jean C. Frizzell
State Bar No. 07484650 k
1100 Louisiana St., Suite 3500 e
Houston, Texas 77002 C l
Tel. 713.485.7200 
Fax 713.485.7250 c
jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.rcom
Attorney for PlaintifDfs Michael Pohl
and Law Office ofs Michael A. Pohl, PLLC
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct coply of this document was served on all counsel of
record pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Praocedure on this 18th day of September, 2022.
o /s/ Jean C. Frizzell
e Jean C. Frizzell
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this
document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below.
The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate
of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Suni Blue on behalf of Jean Frizzell e
Bar No. 7484650 C
sblue@reynoldsfrizzell.com t
Envelope ID: 68364897 r
Status as of 9/19/2022 8:35 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email sTimestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com r 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Andrew Johnson ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Andrew J. Sarne asarne@krcl.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.conm 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Kathryn Laflin KLaflin@KRCL.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrrar.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Larry Newsom lnewsom@fkrcl.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo jason@ciofalolaw.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Todd Taylor titaylor@jandflaw.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Harris Wells fhwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Lawyer Wade y lawyerwade@hotmail.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@favrepa.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Andrea Mendez C andrea@kassab.law 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Lance Kassab  lance@kassab.law 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
David Kassab a david@kassab.law 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Nicholas Pierce c nicholas@kassab.law 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson f i 10607900 jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo o 24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
L Kassab lance@kassab.law 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Misty Davis mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Non-Party Witness Billy Shepherd bshepherd@spcounsel.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Deidre Hicks GWS_GROUP@spcounsel.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
E. MarieJamison jamison@wrightclosebarger.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Jessica Z.Barger barger@wrightclosebarger.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
Katie Budinsky kbudinsky@krcl.com 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT
D Kassab david@kassab.law 9/18/2022 5:42:37 PM SENT"
37,2022-09-15,DECL,D. Kassab,David Kassab’s declaration,Declaration of David Eric Kassab in Support of Kassab Defendants' Summary Judgment Motions and Discovery Objections — sworn declaration under penalty of perjury providing factual basis for discovery burden objections and documenting the voluminous materials received from Pohl in the Barratry Litigation,"Evidentiary declaration filed September 15, 2022 in support of Kassab defendants' traditional and no-evidence motions for summary judgment. Provides factual basis for discovery burden objections by documenting the categories and volume of documents received from Pohl in the Barratry Litigation.",MSJ-2,N/A,Phase 3,2022-09-15_DECL_David-Kassab-Declaration_FILED.pdf,,"E
4
H

I

. Zo
: J ,

S ,
S |

CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
§
§
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
ae
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th SUDIGIAL DISTRICT
DECLARATION OF DAVID ERIC KASSAB -

1. My name is David Eric Kassab. My date of birth Oetober 20, 1982.
My business address is 1214 Elgin Street, Houses) Texas 77004. I
declare under penalty of perjury that the statements of fact made
herein are within my personal knowledge and true and correct.

2. Jaman attorney licensed to practice Law the State of Texas. I have
been licensed to practice law by the State of Texas since 2010 and I
am in good standing. &

SS

3. Iam an attorney at Lance Chriesfphier Kassab, PC d/b/a The Kassab
Law Firm (“the Firm”). In thie suit I represent the Firm and its
owner, my uncle and law part , Lance Kassab.

4. J was an attorney for the plaintiff in the following litigation (and any
related appeals): (1) Catige No. 2017-38294, Dezzie Brumfield, et al. v.
Jimmy iiamson ea , in the 189 Judicial District Court of Harris
County, Texas (“th umfield case”) (2) Cause No. 459,062-401, Alice
Marie Gandy, et alyv. Jimmy Williamson, et al., In the Probate Court
No. 2 of taco Texas (“the Gandy case”), (3) Cause No. 2017-
37567, Mae (Bey y, et al. v. Michael Pohl, et al., in the 113 Judicial
District Cour (the “Berry case”). I am also currently counsel for
plaintiffs in” Cause No. 2017-41110, Mark Cheatham, et al. v. Michael
A. Po ee al., in the 55th Judicial District Court, Harris County Texas,
and ignthe related appeal (“the Cheatham case’). I will refer to these
& collectively as “the Barratry Litigation.”

5. The Berry case was filed on or about June 5, 2017, and ultimately
included seven plaintiffs that were alleged to have been solicited by
Precision Marketing Group (“Precision”) to hire Michael A. Pohl and
his firm (“Pohl”) to pursue auto accident claims. The Cheatham case
was filed on June 20, 2017, and ultimately included four plaintiffs who
were alleged to have been solicited by Precision to hire Pohl to pursue

1

auto accident claims. The Brumfield case was filed on June 8, 2017,
and by July 26, 2017, that suit had approximately 272 plaintiffs who
were alleged to have been solicited by Precision to hire Pohl and his
co-counsel Jimmy Williamson to pursue BP claims. The Gandy case
was filed on October 16, 2017, and that suit included approximately
135 plaintiffs who were alleged to have been solicited by Precision to
hire Pohl and Williamson to pursue BP claims. AS

6. In conjunction with representing these clients in the Brupipeld and
Gandy cases, my office requested from Pohl and Willia son the
clients’ original files. In response to that request, in -approximately
February 2018, we received hundreds of client files. Those files
contained contracts of employment and referral a ents between
the Brumfield and Gandy plaintiffs and Pohl an illiamson related
to the BP claims as well as communications ex¢hanged between the
clients and Pohl or Williamson, among other gs. Because Pohl had
previously represented those clients, each e client files that Pohl
or his co-counsel produced to Kassab nec rily contained documents
bearing Pohl’s name, letterhead, or ogo, or “Pohl Information,”
including client contracts and intake forms

7. Inthe Gandy case, Pohl filed an © vi wherein he included copies
of his contracts with the BP cNéts as well as an excel spreadsheet
entitled “Pohl Master List 6¢7Ns3.xlsx”. A true and correct copy of that
affidavit is attached hereto@s’ Exhibit A.

8. We also requested fron Pohl the client files for the plaintiffs in the
Berry and Cheatha A cases. Pohl and his co-counsel in two of the
underlying auto {ecldent cases, Robert Ammons, responded and
provided my offiee, with the client or prospective client files (if the
individuals h ver hired Pohl). Attached hereto as Exhibit A are
true and co copies of correspondence from Pohl’s counsel in the
Cheathamsan Berry cases, Billy Shepherd, providing my office with
that information. Because Pohl had previously represented those
clien seach of the client files necessarily contained documents
bear} Pohl’s name, letterhead, or logo, or “Pohl Information,”
he client contracts or intake forms.

9. In the Berry and Cheatham cases, Pohl produced to my firm in
response to discovery several categories of documents. I personally
reviewed that production, which included, among other things:

a. Attorney-client contracts between Pohl and the auto
accident clients, bearing Pohl’s letterhead.
2

b. Service agreements, operating agreements, “public
relations consulting agreements,” “Public Relations
Amendment” or other contracts or agreements between
Pohl and Scott Walker, Kirk Ladner and Steve Seymour,
or their respective companies, including Precision, related
to the BP claims or auto accident clients. Ne

c. Email communications between Pohl and others, including =
Scott Walker, related to “signing up” or “helping” auto
accident victims. ww

XS

d. Email communications between Pohl and others,siheluding
Walker and Ladner, related to payments to their
companies, including Precision, for BP cl s or auto
accident cases. ®

GP

e. Pohl’s banking records reflecting payments made to

Precision.
eS

f. Invoices from CMV Investigations.addressed to Pohl.

cats)

g. Text message cra a) etween Pohl and Dane
Maxwell and Florian (Ja ntana, many of which relate
to auto accident clients,""

10. Separately, during the Barratry Litigation, Pohl produced to my firm
approximately 6,937, es of information from the Mississippi
Litigation.! A ce oe copy of the production transmittal
letter is attached eto as Exhibit C. I personally reviewed that
production wnicaatyeiuded among other things:

a. Copies excel spreadsheets titled “Claimant logs” or
“Williamson-Pohl Master List” that identify hundreds of
BP -élients (sometimes by name, address, telephone
eee and email) and their estimated claim amount.

be Service agreements, operating agreements, “public

S relations consulting agreements,” “Public Relations
Amendment” or other contracts or agreements between
Pohl and Scott Walker, Kirk Ladner and Steve Seymour,
or their respective companies, including Precision, related
to the BP claims or auto accident cases.
1 This term refers to the Mississippi lawsuit filed against Pohl, Case No. 1:14cv381-KS-JCG.
3

c. Invoices from Precision addressed to Pohl related to the BP
claims or auto accident cases.

d. Emails communications between Pohl and Walker, Ladner
or Seymour related to the BP claims or auto accident cases.

e. Attorney-client contracts between Pohl and BP claimants\\_
or auto accident claimants. EN

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f. Marketing information related to Pohl, such ag, thn
brochures and advertisements, directed towards BP
claimants or auto accident victims. &

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g. Communications and financial informatién) reflecting
payments Pohl made to Walker, Ladner_6g Seymour or
their respective entities, including Precigion.

h. Financial information and exper > ons reflecting
attorney’s fees paid to Pohl and iamson from the BP
litigation. &

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i. Financial information and Rank records from Precision
reflecting payments Precis n made to its workers in
relation to the BP claims auto accident cases.

j. Emails and communieations between Pohl and his clients
or Pohl and thirds Lies concerning or relating to the BP
claims or auto ent cases.

k. “Operating Agreements” or “Distribution Agreements”
between Py¥egision and Magdalena Santana, Florian (Jay)
Santan en Talley related to their work for Precision.
t3 SS ° ” . . . .

l. BP.Settlement Claimant Forms” identifying BP clients

ith potential claims and their contact information, and
racts between BP claimants and the “BP Claim
ssistance Group.”

m. Contracts or agreements relating to “Helping Hands
Group, LLC” or “GM Settlement Verification Team” or
“Helping Hands Financing, LLC” with identifying client
information.

n. Attorney-client contracts for the Liberis Law Firm.

4

11. Inthis lawsuit, Pohl has served Lance Kassab and the Firm (“Kassab”)
with written discovery. The requests for production ask Kassab to
produce “Pohl Information” he has received, regardless of source,
between time periods beginning April 2012 to January 2021.
Interrogatories Nos. 1-3 ask Kassab to identify each contract or
document bearing Pohl’s name, letterhead, or logo, or contain on
Information” that “was or is” in Kassab’s possession and ide a
description of the material, the date it was sequired the date
possession was terminated, and the “identity of each per urrently
having possession or control over each such document.? Interrogatory
No. 9 asks Kassab to identify all “Pohl Information’ that Kassab
“obtained exclusively from or through the public ds involved in
the Mississippi Litigation.” The discovery defi the term “Pohl
Information” to include “information that concerfi{s] and/or identif[ies]
any past or current clients and/or prospective clients of Pohl” as well
as “all documents and information that inated from Pohl and
concern matters related to the British Petipleam Deepwater Horizon
oil spill and to General Motors ignitionS/and rollovers.”

12. Given the information Kassab received related to Pohl in the Barratry
Litigation, the discovery reaueets are over broad and unduly
burdensome. As drafted, the ret ists require Kassab to re-produce to
Pohl the thousands of docu s that Kassab received from Pohl in
the Barratry Litigation, whether in response to discovery in that case
or 1n response to Kassab’grequest for the client files. Additionally, the
requests require Kas produce information that he received from
his clients relating ‘oon Staff at my office have had to hundreds of
pages of documentsfrom hundreds of client files in the Barratry
Litigation and filter confidential or privileged information such as
Kassab’s com {uhications with his clients or co-counsel in that
litigation an@ gttorney work product.

13. Worse, tH@ Riscovery requires Kassab to identify in response to the
inter ories every document bearing Pohl’s name or letterhead,
desc the material, and to state the date it is was acquired. I
estimate that it would take me, as counsel for Kassab, more than 405
hous of time to undertake that task. At a rate of $450 per hour, this
would be a cost of $182,250 worth of time.

14. That estimate is based on my knowledge of the voluminous materials
that were provided to Kassab in the Barratry Litigation as well as the
following. There are more than 400 electronic or hardcopy client files
for the Brumfield and Gandy plaintiffs, each containing information

5

related to Pohl. If I spent 15 minutes reviewing each file and
identifying and transcribing responsive materials, I could complete
four files an hour. It would therefore take me more than 100 hours to
complete that task. In addition to the client files, Kassab received
thousands of pages of document production. For instance, in the
Cheatham case, more than 61,000 pages of documents were produced
in addition to the 6,000 plus pages of documents produced recast to
the Mississippi Litigation. That does not include the production rom
the Berry case, which was also voluminous. Even if I wenable to
review and transcribe responsive information at a rate of 0 pages
an hour, it would take me approximately 305 hours to.¢omplete that
task. &
°@

15. Nonetheless, Kassab has responded to Pohl’s whitten discovery and
has produced to Pohl twelve sets of productionGeginning in October
2021 and continuing into September 2022, containing more than
366,000 pages of responsive documents. A that production is the
actual documents and information conce g Precision’s clients that
the Runners solicited to hire Pohl thatKassab received from Favre.

Executed in Harris County, State of Texas,on the 15th day of September, 2022.
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«David Eric Kassab
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No. 459,062-401
IN RE: THE ESTATE OF § IN PROBATE COURT NO. 2
JIMMY GLENN WILLIAMSON §
(A/K/A JIMMY GLEN §
WILLIAMSON), §
§
DECEASED §
oo NS
§ OF HARRIS CO ,» TEXAS
ALICE MARIE GANDY, ET AL. §
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ESTATE OF JIMMY GLEN § NS
WILLIAMSON, DECEASED, § 2)
ET AL. § &
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es ee.
: AFFIDAVIT OF MICHA EL POHL
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BEFORE ME, the undersigne @Rhority, on this day personally appeared
Michael A. Pohl, who upon being ae orn, deposes and says:

1. My name is Michael Poh?) I am over eighteen years old, and I am fully
competent and able- make this affidavit. I make this affidavit in
connection with thé above-referenced case styled Alice Marie Gandy, et al.
v.. Estate of He) len Williamson, Deceased, et al., No. 459,062-401 in
Probate Court Nor? of Harris County, Texas (hereinafter, the “Lawsuit”), in
which I and Offices of Michael Pohl, PLLC are two of the named
Defendants m able to swear, as I do hereby swear, that all facts and
statemen{s contained in this affidavit are true and correct and within my
personal knowledge. ;

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2. I Qlawyer. I have done business as the Law Office of Michael A. Pohl. I
a e sole and managing member of the Law Office of Michael A. Pohl,

| C, which is a defendant in this lawsuit.

3S Beginning in mid-2012, I began representing persons and businesses with
claims arising from the British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon oil spill (“BP
oil spill claims”). I referred some of my clients and prospective clients with

i
EXHIBIT 2

BP oil spill claims, including certain plaintiffs in this lawsuit, to Jimmy
Wilbamson and/or Jimmy Williamson, P.C.

4. True and correct copies of ten (10) pages of business records from my law
practice and concerning certain of the plaintiffs in this lawsuit are attached
to this affidavit as Exhibit A. Those 10 pages of records are referred to as
the “Pohl/BP Claim Records.” I am the custodian of records for the Pohl/BP
Claim Records. The Pohl/BP Claim Records are memor. , reports,
records, or data compilations of acts, events, or conditions ma or near the

| time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with Inowledge The
Pohl/BP Claim Records are kept in the course of a reg rly conducted
business activity, my practice of law. It was the regdlst practice of that
| business activity to make the PohI/BP Claim Records:
Re)

5. As reflected in the PohY/BP Claim Records, the « date that each of the
following plaintiffs in this lawsuit signed an attorney-client fee agreement
with one or more of the Defendants in the Tgonuit to represent him/her in
connection with BP oil spill claims is n ter than the date contained
parenthetically next to each such Pain name below:

Plaintiff No. 23: Carlean skinner (February 14, 2013);
. Plaintiff No. 26: Charlee oney (February 5, 2013);
Plaintiff No. 30: ar Keys (February 7, 2013);
Plaintiff No. 69: _ Jeffery Shanks (September 19, 2012);
Plaintiff No. 98: Odessa Williams (February 26, 2013):
Plaintiff 00: Pamela Shanks (September 19, 2012); and
Plaintiff No. 130: Willie Keys (February 7, 2013).

6. The numbers ofthe plaintiffs identified in the immediately preceding two
paragraphs affidavit correspond to the numbers that identify them
in their mended petition in this lawsuit.

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* On the 10 pages of business records attached as Exhibit A, information concerning BP oil
spill clients and prospective clients who are not plaintiffs in this lawsuit has been redacted.
2
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FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
Michael Pohl 3 .
Nac
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TOpbefort, me on this \ a°) of Dest
MARY REX Notary P&blic ©)
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STARY 1D 10974013147 Ge
Hy COMMISSION EIRES JANUARY 12, 2019 ©
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POHL/GANDY 001-000105

(99/20/2012 89:52 6817356407 WAVNESRORO Lrprary LOL MACHR saris
O-Yo-t d
CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT
Jimmy Williamson, P.C. NS
Attorney at Law @
4310 Yoakum Boulevard )
Houston, Texas 77006 Ww
(713) 223-3330 oG
www. jimmywilliamson.com eS
Michael A, Pohl &
Attorney at Law
1114 Lashbrook Driyg
, Houston, Texas 77077
(713) 652-0180)
This Agreement is made between one) Shao NS (hereinafter
“Client’) and JIMMY WILLIAMSON, P.C., 4310 Yoakum Boulevard, Houston, Texas,
77008, 713-223-3330, and MICHAEL A. POHL, 1114 Lashbrook Drive, Houston, Texas i
77077, 713-652-0100 (hereinafter “Attomey"") to prosecute a-certain claim held by Cllent |
against: } Or | |
BP, PLC ORITS AFFILIATES OR ANY OTHER RESPONSIBLE PARTY !
{
in connection with the. following ators:
‘Monies due or clab rect connection with the Deepwater Horizon disaster
and oll spill occurrihig on April20, 2010 and the damages resulting therefrom,
inclading any claims available under the MDL 2178 {
onomie Claim Class Action Settlement. :
Attorney Is fully shored ous and prosecute same. No settlement shall be made by ‘
the Attorney a> t the Client's approval. |
Attomey fs hereby granted authority to prepare, sign and file all tegal instruments,
pleadi rafts, authorizations, and. papers as reasonably necessary to prosecute and
conclu is claim. Attorney's representation Is limited to the specific companies named,
and specific matters herein. Other attorneys may be engaged at Attorney's option.
Contract of Employment extends through the trial of this cause and the entry ofa final
| court judgment. Attorney will not have any duty to undertake post-judgment collection .
fforts or appeal unless and until there Is an agreement between Client and ‘the Attorney
to undertake same. Jimmy Williamson, P.C. and Michael A. Pohl are not specialized in,
nor do they. give, tax advice and they would recommend the retention of a Certified Public
Accountant (C:P.A.) or qualified tax lawyer with regard to any questions as to the taxability
of proceeds received pursuant to this agreement.
Pago | of 4
\
POHL/GANDY 001-000145

83/26/2812 69:52 6817356407 WAYNESBORO LIBRARY PAGE 93/18
in payment, Client does hereby assign and convey to Attorney a present and undivided
interest !n Client’s clalms set forth hereln, as a reasonable contingent fee for Attorney's
services. The Attorney's fee will be calculated on the total recovery. All sums are payable
at the office of Jimmy Willlamson, P.C., 4310 Yoakum Boulevard, Houston, Texas 77006.

25 % ofall payments made through fhe Class Action latins Process;
- 33413 %_if collection or settlement Is made outside of ie Class Action
Claims process,
&
COSTS ~S
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Client additionally agrees that Attomey is to be repald and reliqbutsed reasonable out-of-
pocket costs and expenses Attorney incurs in the specific p ution of Client's claim out
of Client’s recovery. If Attorney does not obtain for Gient any recovery, then the
Client will not pay any fees or costs or expenses. ®
| @
COMMON BENEFIT FEES AND EXPENSES
The Court ‘in the Deepwater Horizon MDL 247e gto and consolidated Limitatlon
proceedings may awatd Common Benefit_fees and expenses to Common Benefit
attorneys. If there isa Common Benefit Fe ‘or Cost award by the Court, any such award
to Attorney shal] not increase, or-reduce, Fees and Costs owed under the
Agreement. There is no credit or offset for any Common Benefit fees or costs
awarded. &©
‘or HER CLIENTS
Attorney represents other clignts who also have claims as a result of the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill. Having mdltiple cllents leads to. certain Issues regarding confidentiality.
Common Information, sich a for example, information relevant to what:caused the spill,
or the partlas respon@tly or the splll, or research applicable to an analysis of damages
under the spill, will be sHared with’all cllents. However, client specific information will be
Kept.confidential. fAttomey receives proprietary or secret information regarding a client
{for example, finaricial Information regarding a particular client not publicly available), then
the client has a igh? to insist that Attorney maintalns that confidence. Further, not all fees
are, identical. Other cllents who hired Attorney at a prior date (or who sigh up after this
date) may flave been charged a different percentage, which may be lower, or higher, than
the fees'sé (forth hereIn. Also, when‘a specific client settles thelr clalm, then that specific
client has fhe right to insist that the monetary settlement amount not be shared with other
clle tof e Attorney. BY SIGNING THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT, THE CLIENT
CONSENTS TO THIS PROVISION.
|
S GENERAL
Attorney cannot warrant or guarantee the outcome of the case and Attorney has not
: represented to the Client that the Cllent will recover all or any of the funds desired.
Page 2 of 4
POHL/GANDY 001-000146

93/28/2812 83:52 6017356487 WAYNESBORO LIBRARY PAGE 84/18

This Agreement shall be construed under and In accordance with the laws of the State of

Texas. To the extent this Contract is subject to the laws, rules and/or regulations for a
particular jurisdiction, thls Contract will bo interpreted to comply with the laws, rules and/or
regulations of that jurisdiction.

This Agreement/Contract of Employment constitutes the sole and only agre t of the
patties hereto and supersedes any prior understandings or written or o greement
between the partles. This Agreement shall be binding upon and Inure t eneflt of the
parties hereto and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, legal yepresentative,
successors and assigns, In case any one or more of the Ho Ow toccatie in this
Agreement shail for any reason be. held to be invalid, illegal, or.dinenforceable in any
respect, such invalldity, Uegality, or unenforceabllity shall not Gat any other provision
thereof and this Agreement shail be construed as If such invalidyilegal, or unenforceable
provision had never been contained herein. &

Client is hereby put on notice that the State Batof Texas Investigates and
prosecutes professional misconduct committed b fdxas attorneys. Although not
every complaint against or dispute with a lawyer involves professional misconduct,

the State Bar's Office of General Counsel will previde you with information about

how to file a complaint. Please call 1-80-98 2.1800 toll-free for more Information,

os 5 eS) | |
EXECUTED on this LA _dayot____ Sep , 2012. ;
Ae Snds eo ACCEPTED:
CLIENT SIGNATURE w
By:
Lr EN For Jimmy Willlamson, P.C.
| Client Printed Name @
ERE ETAT 6 WUE ee a)
—_————— By
Social Security NaJOr 1 ax ID # For Michaet A. Poht
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Street Address

CitysState & ZIp
a Numbers

pate of cir:

Page 3 of 4
POHL/GANDY 001-000147

Q9/28/2012 89:52 6817356407 WIAYNESBORO LIBRARY PAGE 95/18
POWER OF ATTORNEY
Cllent grants a Power of Attorney to Jimmy Williamson, P.C. and its attomeys fo act on
Client's behalf in all matters arising out the Deepwater Horizon Incident and to file and
pursue all claims of Client arising therefrom Including through any claims or settlement
process, settlement, mediation, suit, trial and/or appeal; notwithstanding same, Glen alone
determines whether to accept any settlement offer. @
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CLIENT NAME: p amela Shanks &
py: “(Pima Shautea> &
Sig ature °@
TITLE: Kronis radios Le fomela Shedtin , Una ©)
DATE: 4 | 19] 2.0}2 | @
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POHL/GANDY 001-000148

89/28/2812 93:52 6017356487 WIAYNESBORO LIBRARY PAGE 06/18
_ BP SETTLEMENT/ CLAIMANT FORM
ATTORNEYS, JIMMY WILLIAMSON & MICHAEL A, POHL
paTe__DAILS) Joa Ss
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Claim Area Zone: ee © eee . &
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Approx. Amt of Loss: __ Bg5,000 , eS
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Business Name @
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Client Printed Name 6)
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Telephone numbers“ CEL XMQUS INUIMUSLS _
Email: - ee
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So Oli Use Only Below this line:
Initials
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SHEPHERD PREWETT Puc
Billy Shepherd
June 28, 2017
Via Hand-Delivery/RRR NS
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David Eric Kassab ©
The Kassab Law Firm &
1420 Alabama Street S
Houston, Texas 77004 5 eS
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Re: Mark Kentrell Cheatham, Sr. and Luella Miller &
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Dear Mr. Kassab: &

I write in response to your June 21, 2017 Jette addressed to Michael A. Pohl
in care of me. I have enclosed Mr. Pohl’s ee relating to the referenced persons.
Information on certain of the documente\y garding unrelated clients has been
redacted. S

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770 South Post Oak lane Suite 4220 Houston, Texos 77056 T 713.955.4440 F 1.713.766.6542 www.spcounsel.com

SHEPHERD PREWETT pic
Billy Shepherd
June 26, 2017 NG
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or
Via Facimile & Email Ww
David Eric Kassab “GO
The Kassab Law Firm XG
. 1420 Alabama Street 2B)
Houston, Texas 77004 ©)
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Re: Mae Berry, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Johnny Berry
Dear Mr. Kassab: ss
I write in response to your June 21, 20)@Netter addressed to Michael A. Pohl in
care of me. Mr. Pohl did not represent Ma ry, and has no client file concerning
her. However, I have enclosed documents ia Mr, Pohl’s possession, custody, or control
that reference Ms. Berry. LS 7
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770 South Post Oak Lane Suite 420 Houston, Texas 77056 T 713.955.4440 F 1.713.766.6542 www.spcounsel.com

HELPING
The Helping Hands Group, LLC
1 Hancock Plaza * 2510 14” Street Suite. 1200 * Gulfport, Mississippi * ae
‘ (228) 206-1996(p) * (228) 284-1677(f) Ke
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Www.thehelpinchandseroup.org (Website). ©
[hereby retain you to preserve my evidence, conduct a full scene investigation, exanaine the involved products.
for possible defects, and identify and interview witnesses in connection with my motor vehicle accident.
THERE WILL BE NO CHARGE IF THERE IS NO RECOVERS.
In payment of the services to be rendered, I agree to pay you from any recovery I may receive on an hourly fee
of $400 per hour, so long as the total fee does not exceed 32% of th ount rendered for me based on your
efforts. In performance of your services, you may hire such indepen experts or attorneys as you deem.
necessary, so long the total fee does not exceed the maximum ees ated above. If you have a case and suit is
filed on your behalf, the total fee increases to 40%. H)
The Helping Hands Group, LLC will advance funds payin and reasonable expenses of the claims which
shall be repaid out of the Client’s share of tenes he Helping Hands Group’s fee shall be calculated _
before deduction of costs and expenses: w
AGREED: Al § KOA Date: ¥ /2O}/¢
Print Name: Va ? Ne) a Ge ae Vv
7 i © L,
Address: _’ 30 L Ae Li
| (Chey liy el. Mo Bee
©
Phone: cele BG / = & Cay
| Email: ee
Date of Accident: &f A lef
Vehicle: Le wd p Milenll

; HELPING HANDS FINANCING, LLC.
FUNDING AGREEMENT
This Funding Agreement is made on the date below stated between Claimant and Helping
Hands Financing (“Funding Agent”) NS
Claimant and/or Claimants family was involved in'an accident described as? oy
Occurring on: s ind is asserting ale to recovery.
Claimant urgently requires financial assistance and has. no.other lteevative mean to meet
such needs. Funding Agent is taking a high degree of risk and ‘Claimant understands that
Funding Agent expects to make a profit from this funding. &
Funding Agent agrees that it will be repaid only if as nto ena recovery is funded.
| IF THERE IS NO RECOVERY, CLAIMANT HAS NO oBLiaTioN TO REPAY THIS DEBT.
| In consideration of the amount(s) set forth on hoon el together:with the application
- fee for each funding of $50.00 (fifty and SN rs) | hereby agree to repay such amounts
ae ». . frommy share of the proceeds of my case. if 2 Is no recovery, | owe nothing: | realize that if
cee “>. «my recovery is small, the above funding(s). qual or excéed my portion of the recovery.
This agreement must be approved aN ttorney prosecuting the case. Claimant's Attorney
shall be bound to honor the terms on(thi agreement.
Repayment shall be delivered to: Funding Agent at the address stated below unless. changed
with notice to Claimant: BS
{ hereby grant Funding ram) lien on the proceeds of my case to the extend of all funding here
: under, Before | incur a her or further liens on my case, | will, at the option of Funding Agent
pay off the indebted, created hereunder.
if Funding Avent (ao to initiate a collection action against me hereunder, 1 understand that I will
be obligated tp Bey Funding Agent’s fees and expenses of collection,
SS
Funding oe gent ‘shall have no say whatsoever in any court:action which Claimant’s.attorney may
intatn Been.
ein to drop my case and my Attorney believes my case is meritorious and economically
justifiable, then | must repay the indebtedness hereby created.

if any provision of this agreement is'deemed unenforceable, it shall not affect the validity of
any other parts on this. agreement. This agreement and the agreement with my Attorney
constitute the entire agreement of the parties.
Any controversy related hereto that cannot be resolved by mutual agreement shall be
submitted to final and binding arbitration administrated by the American Arbitration
Association in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules and the ore ules for
Emergency Measures of Protection. The Federal Arbitration Act shall be applicable) any such
controversy and no state law shall apply: BW
% ce) .
Thave read this entire agreement. | have been:advised that'l should requ gabe tunding only as
= dast resource and only if absolutely necessary. | have the right to have ts Agreement reviewed
by an Attorney before | sign. 6
The Funding Schedule is made apart hereof forall purposes. &
AGREED AND ager
° — ‘signature .
KC Printed Name
State of AG a — oe
ral Sf s °
County of Veal Hiei LE A
Date: B12 (Uy
Address: ; |
1200 bere, Lert,
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aS eel
Helping Hands Financing, LLC
P.O. Box 1262
Montgomery, TX 77316

HELPING HANOS FINANCING, LLC.
FUNDIKG SCHEDULE :
Claimant/borrower:__X_ 7 VE) aad Z 5 ey Ty @
| ; {Name} SO .
Case Identity: Hele fe theat Bnol{etA_Y LO SUT. SIG why p 7
The Funding Agreement signed by me fs adopted by reference hi < By my signature below |
acknowledge the request for and receipt of the Case funding designated be low.
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On 8/21/14, 3:43 PM, ""Michael Pohl"" <pohlatty@me.com> wrote:
>Thanks. &
>Can family ask for photos of seat belt bruising. The bruising will appear about 24-g8,RoUrs after incident.
>
>Sent from my iPhone 5 &
>> On Aug 21, 2014, at 1:27 PM, Scott Walker <swalker@maxwell-walker.cém> wrote:
- S
>> Edgar, ®
>> oP
>> Attached is the signed Helping Hands Group, LLC contract and the Helping Hands Financing, LLC funding
agreement. S
>>
| >> Coach Ken will be getting the Pohl contract signed this afternoon.
>> ; \
>> We are working to get the accident report now. Unofficially the Deputy Coroner has confirmed that
Johnny Berry was wearing his seatbelt. Ww
>> &
>> | will mail the originals to the ranch. ©
>>
>> Thanks. 9 &
S
, >> -Scott &
>> <8.20.14 Berry Case (MS).pdf> O
IN
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1

From: Scott Walker <swalker@maxwell-walker.com>
Date: Thursday, August 28, 2014 at 3:51 PM NS |

To: Edgar Jaimes <edgarsroom@gmail.com> NZ)

Cc: Mike Pohl <pohlatty@mac.com> ©

Subject: Re: Berry &

| S
Edgar, 5 eS
: S
Attached is what I have in my file on the Berry Case (MS). a
Thanks! . GP .
-Scott.
&
On Thu, Aug 28, 2014 at 2:31 PM, Edgar Jaimes <edescom@smsil.con> wrote:
_ Scott,
| We have to reject this case, but | have not seen a cosSSeor this family, can you send me the contract and

_ the information of that case? Thank you. > =

_ Edgar. ~\

<8.20.14 Berry Case (MS).pdf> ©

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SHEPHERD PREWETT puic
Stephen R. Bailey sbailey@spcounsel.com
April 13, 2018

Mr. David Kassab Via Hand-Delivery/RRR

Kassab Law Firm cS

1214 Elgin Street NZ)

Houston, Texas 77004 ©

XK,

Re: Cause No. 2017-37567, Mae Berry, Individually and a Representative of the
Estate of Johnny Berry, Deceased v. Michael A. Pont et al., in the 113th
Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas SS

Dear Mr. Kassab: &

Per your request of April 6, 2018, enclose please find two CDs with

documents labeled S
1. POHL/BERRY(Butts)—003—00000 {through POHL/BERRY (Butts)—003—

000002; ow
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2. and POHL/BERRY(Speck)-(04-000001 through POHL/BERRY(Speck)—
004—000137. KR
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It appears from the enclosed POHL/BERRY (Butts) documents that Mr. Pohl
did not represent Raymond Bu ts. Information regarding other clients has been
redacted. If you have any questions, please let me know.
. Very truly-yours,
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Stephen R. Bailey sbailey@spcounsel.com
April 13, 2018

Mr. David Kassab Via Hand-Delivery/RRR

Kassab Law Firm Ne

1214 Elgin Street RQ

Houston, Texas 77004 oy

Re: Cause No. 2017-41110; Mark Kenirell Cheatham, Sr., l. v. Michael A.

Pohl, et al., in the 55t Judicial District Court of Harrig.€ nty, Texas

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Dear Mr. Kassab: Q)
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Per your request of April 4, 2018, enclosed plegse find a CD with documents
labeled POHL/CHEATHAM (Reese)—003-—00000 (through POHL/CHEATHAM
(Reese)—003—000234.

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KR tephen R. Bailey
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JUL 10 2018
SHEPHERD PREWETT puc CEIVED
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July 10, 2018 ~~
Mr. Lance Kassab Via Hand-Delivery/RRR
Mr. David Kassab Gi
Kassab Law Firm j KASSA b
1214 Elgin Street & —
Houston, Texas 77004 &
JO-O+-2618
Re: Brumfield, et al v. Pohl,.et al;
Gandy, et al. v. Pohl, et al; 6)
Cheatham, et al v. Pohl, et al; & RECEIVED
Berry, et al v. Pohl, et al. ~
Dear Lance & David: Ww
In supplementation of disepery in the referenced matters, I have enclosed a
thumb drive containing docu $s Bates-labeled POHL/CHEATHAM-004-000001
through POHL/CHEATHAM- -006937. The documents include depositions and
deposition exhibits from th ississippi federal court case, hearing transcripts and
hearing exhibits from th ississippi federal court case, party affidavits from the
Mississippi federal cour case, and other documents. Note that, in the transcript of
the April 20, 2017 silent conference conducted by the Hon. Keith Starrett, the
settlement amounts a e been redacted. The parties agreed that the settlement
amounts would be\confidential, and Judge Starrett approved the agreement and
settlement, eve] ering that certain subsequent filings concerning the settlement
be filed under gen. ;
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38,2022-09-15,RSP,Pohl,Pohl’s response to MTA,"Plaintiffs' Response to the Kassab Defendants' Motion to Abate Trial Setting — opposes abatement of four-year-old case on eve of preferential trial setting, arguing future damages do not justify abatement and unlawful acts defense has been preempted","Response filed September 15, 2022 by Jean C. Frizzell of Reynolds Frizzell LLP opposing Kassab's motion to abate the trial setting in a four-year-old case with a preferential trial setting. Incorporates by reference Pohl's September 12, 2022 responses to defendants' summary judgment motions.",MTA-1,N/A,Phase 3,2022-09-15_RSP_Pohl-Response-to-Kassab-MTA-Trial_FILED.pdf,Deny Kassab's Motion to Abate Trial Setting and allow the case to proceed to trial during its current preferential trial setting,"9/15/2022 5:08 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 68313271
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 9/15/2022 5:08 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL AND LAW OFFICE § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
OF MICHAEL A. POHL, PLLC, §
Plaintiffs, §
v. § k
§ e
SCOTT FAVRE and SCOTT M. FAVRE PA, § C l
LLC; PRECISION MARKETING GROUP, § 189TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
LLC; LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB and § c
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, § r
P.C. d/b/a THE KASSAB LAW FIRM; TINA §
NICHOLSON and BAKER NICHOLSON, LLP §
d/b/a BAKER NICHOLSON LAW FIRM; and § s
DOUGLAS MONTAGUE III and MONTAGUE §
PITTMAN & VARNADO, P.A., § g
Defendants. § r HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO THE KASSAB DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO ABATEy TRIAL SETTING
Plaintiffs Michael Pohl and Law Officaes of Michael A. Pohl (collectively, “Pohl”) file this
this response to Defendants Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C.’s
(collectively, “Kassab”) Motion to Abeate Trial Setting (the “Motion to Abate”). Pohl requests that
the Court deny Kassab’s Motion fto Abate and allow this four-year-old case to be tried during its
current preferential trial settiyng—a trial setting that Kassab appears to be trying to avoid.
Kassab argues Cthat this case should be abated for two reasons: (1) Pohl is still incurring
damages; and (2) the outcome of a separate lawsuit—the Cheatham case—will impact Kassab’s
illegality (unlafwfful acts doctrine) defense. Neither argument has merit. First, the existence of
future daUmages does not justify abatement. For Pohl to recover future damages, he must satisfy
the ordinary standard of showing to the jury that he will sustain those damages with reasonable
probability. Second, Kassab’s unlawful acts defense has been preempted and does not apply—a
defense Kassab acknowledged in another case is “no longer good law.”
I. BACKGROUND1
Kassab’s campaign of lawsuits and bar grievances against Pohl can only be described as a
failure. Kassab facilitated the filing of seven separate grievances with the Texas State Bar and
four lawsuits—all based on Kassab’s theory that Pohl engaged in alleged barrkatrous conduct.
Every grievance failed, often with a finding that Pohl’s alleged conduct ldid not constitute
professional misconduct or a violation of the Texas Disciplinary Rules ocf Professional Conduct.
Two of the lawsuits resulted in a final judgment on the merits in favosr of Pohl. In a third lawsuit,
Pohl settled the lawsuit—not for the “substantial sum of money” alleged by Kassab—but instead
for an amount less than the cost of defense. It is the fourth case, the Cheatham case, that Kassab’s
Motion to Abate is concerned with.
It is worth noting that although the Cheatham case is pending, the allegations asserted in
that case are without merit. Like Kassab’s recycled barratry allegations in this lawsuit, many of
the allegations of supposed barratry by Pohl in Cheatham were the subject of a grievance that
Kassab helped file. The Office of ethe Chief Disciplinary Counsel for the State Bar of Texas
dismissed the grievance after it hafd “examined the Grievance and determined that the information
alleged does not demonstrayte Professional Misconduct or a Disability.”2 Kassab appealed the
dismissal of the CheathCam grievance, and The Board of Disciplinary Appeals (which is appointed
by the Texas Supreame Court) determined “that the conduct you described in the grievance does
not violate the Tfexas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.”3
WUhen the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel found that allegations involved in the
Cheatham case did not “demonstrate Professional Misconduct,” the Cheatham case was on appeal
1 To avoid duplicative recitations of the factual background of this case, to the extent necessary, Pohl refers the Court
to the factual background included in his September 12, 2022 responses to Defendants’ summary judgment motions.
2 See Feb. 24, 2020 Letter from State Bar of Texas: Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, attached as Exhibit 1.
3 See May 14, 2020 Letter from The Board of Disciplinary Appeals, attached as Exhibit 2.
following a final judgment in favor of Pohl.4 Recently, the court of appeals reversed the trial court,
not because it found that barratry occurred, but because it believed the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment on the basis of limitations and whether the barratry statute was impermissibly
applied extraterritorially. See Cheatham, 2022 WL 3720139, at *9–10. Pohl is coknfident that this
case—which involves “[t]wo sets of wrongful-death claimants” out of the “l10,000 or more of
Pohl’s clients/prospective clients” whose information defendants cmisappropriated—will
ultimately be resolved in Pohl’s favor. Id. at *1; Pohl’s First Amendesd Petition ¶ 21. Regardless,
the outcome of the Cheatham case is not relevant to Pohl’s claimss or entitlement to damages. The
relevance of that case is that the fees and expenses Pohl incurs in defending it are a component of
Pohl’s actual damages in this lawsuit.
II. DISyCUSSION
Kassab presents two justifications for why abatement is necessary. First, he suggests that
the fact that Pohl may continue to suffer damages in connection with defending the Cheatham case
means the Court should wait to resolvee Pohl’s claims. Second, Kassab argues that the Cheatham
case is relevant to his “illegality”f defense. Neither argument has merit. Future damages are an
entirely normal occurrence thyat does not justify abatement of a case. Kassab’s affirmative defenses
are either preempted orC have little relevance. Regardless, they do not justify Kassab’s request for
abatement on the evae of trial.
A. The fpotential existence of future damages does not support abatement.
As the Court is surely familiar with, cases frequently arise and are tried despite the fact that
a party may not have suffered the full extent of the damages they will likely incur. In fact, Texas
4 See Cheatham v. Pohl, No. 01-20-00046-CV, 2022 WL 3720139, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 30,
2022, no pet. h.) (noting the trial court entered a “final and appealable” order in Pohl’s favor); see also Notices of
Appeal filed on Jan. 15 & 17, 2022 in Cause No. 2017-41110, Mark K Cheatham, Sr., et al, v. Michael A. Pohl, et al.,
in the 55th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas, attached as Exhibit 3.
law often requires an injured party to bring their claims even when “all resulting damages have
not yet occurred.” See Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Pasko, 544 S.W.3d 830, 834 (Tex. 2018)
(citation omitted) (discussing accrual of claims in the context of a statute of limitations). If the
fact that a party will continue to suffer damages required abating a case, there wokuld not be trials
in cases involving damages for lost profits, damages for loss of earning capaclity, or damages for
future medical expenses. Those cases go to trial, and the result should bec no different here.
The concept of future, and thus necessarily uncertain, damagess is not novel. In fact, there
is a standard for how a jury can analyze these types of damagess. See, e.g., GTE Mobilnet of S.
Tex. Ltd. P’ship v. Pascouet, 61 S.W.3d 599, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet.
denied) (discussing how a jury has discretion to award future damages that a party “in reasonable
probability will sustain in the future”). Given the existence of this standard, the fact that a case
involves future damages that are uncertain is naot sufficient to show that abatement is proper.
Kassab’s primary case to support his theory that Pohl’s future damages justify an abatement
is In re Tex. Collegiate Baseball Leageue, Ltd., 367 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, no
pet.). See Motion to Abate, at f3–4 (citing Collegiate Baseball League). However, the facts
underlying that case are entiyrely dissimilar to those of this case, and the fact that abatement was
proper in that case doeCs not provide any useful guidance in this case.
Collegiate Baseball League involved a lawyer who was sued by two clients over an alleged
settlement agrefefment. 367 S.W.3d 462, 464 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.). The lawyer
asserted Ua counterclaim for recovery of his legal fees, and his clients subsequently asserted
malpractice claims against him based on three separate lawsuits that were still pending. Id. The
issue before the appellate court was over whether abatement or severance of the malpractice claims
was proper, and whether the attorneys’ fees claim should also be subject to any abatement or
severance. Id. at 465.
To understand the court’s decision in Collegiate Baseball League, it is important to know
that the parties did not dispute that the malpractice claims were premature. k Id. The claim
for fees brought by the lawyer involved fees he charged in connection withl the three pending
cases—the same three cases that were at issue in the clients’ malpractice cclaims against the lawyer.
Id. at 465–66. Given this, the court found that “[s]everance or sepsarate trials are therefore not
appropriate because the fee claim and the malpractice claims insvolve the same facts and issues.”
Id. at 467. The court also found abatement was appropriate, because severing the fees claim could
cause certain parties “to simultaneously take inconsistent litigation positions.” Id. at 467. It is in
this context that the court notes that “the malpractice allegations and damage theories will remain
fluid until the [other] litigations conclude.” Ida.
The issues present in the Collegiate Baseball League case are not analogous to those before
the Court. The Court is not faced wieth a situation where severance or abatement is required, and
it then must decide the scope of thfe severance or abatement. Nor does the Cheatham case and this
lawsuit involve the same facyts and issues. The shared issue is the far more common occurrence
that the full extent of PCohl’s damages has not been incurred at this time. The Court should deny
Kassab’s Motion to Abate, as the existence of future damages does not justify abatement.
B. Kasfsfab’s defense has been preempted and does not entitle him to abatement.
KUassab’s argues that under his “illegality” (unlawful acts doctrine) defense, “[i]f the
Cheatham plaintiffs establish these barratry claims against Pohl, then Pohl cannot be permitted to
recover any damages arising from his unlawful conduct.” Motion to Abate at 4.5 This is not
5 Kassab also mentions his “unclean hands” defense once, without any explanation. Motion to Abate at 2. He simply
states that the outcome of the Cheatham case will establish his “unclean hands” defense and as a result, “Pohl would
correct for multiple reasons.6 First, Kassab’s defense is not valid, as it was preempted years ago
by Texas’s proportionate responsibility statute. Second, even if the unlawful acts doctrine were
available as a defense, Kassab has not shown, or even alleged, how Pohl’s damages or injury in
this lawsuit were proximately caused by Pohl’s alleged unlawful conduct. Regkardless of any
unproven barratrous conduct, Pohl is entitled to recover damages that resultedl from defendants’
conversion and misappropriation of Pohl’s confidential information and fciles.
First, Kassab failed to disclose on-point authority from the Tsexas Supreme Court stating
that Kassab’s defense has been statutorily preempted. The sole scase Kassab cites for his unlawful
acts or illegality defense is Andrew Shebay & Co., P.L.L.C. v. Bishop, 429 S.W.3d 644 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). Kassab’s “illegality” defense is also known as the
“unlawful acts doctrine.”7 However, after the court’s ruling in Bishop, the Texas Supreme Court
ruled that “[t]he plain language of section 33.a003 clearly indicates that the common law unlawful
acts doctrine is no longer a viable defense.” Dugger, 408 S.W.3d at 832.
Kassab—and lead counsel fore the Kassab law firm, David Kassab—should be aware that
Kassab’s asserted defense is no flonger viable, as demonstrated by the following argument they
made in a different case: y
be entitled to no damiages from Kassab.” Id. While the lack of explanation or argument from Kassab makes it
unnecessary to address this issue more fully, it is worth pointing out that “unclean hands” is a defense to equitable
relief that applies fwhen a party engaged in wrongful conduct that harmed the person raising the unclean hands defense.
See In re Nolle, 265 S.W.3d 487, 494 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.). Damages are not equitable
relief, and Kassab has not alleged that Pohl’s alleged conduct in the Cheatham case has harmed him. Thus, Kassab’s
“unclean hands” defense is not applicable and cannot support abatement of this case.
6 Kassab also does not explain how the outcome, as opposed to the facts, of the Cheatham case will impact this case.
It is not clear how any outcome in that case, which involves different parties, could have a preclusive effect in this
lawsuit. Furthermore, Kassab does not explain what further factual development will occur in the Cheatham case that
is necessary or impactful to the issues in this case.
7 Compare Dugger v. Arredondo, 408 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tex. 2013) (stating that “this Court recognized the common
law unlawful acts doctrine as barring a plaintiff from recovering damages if it could be shown that, at the time of
injury, the plaintiff was engaged in an illegal act that contributed to the injury”), with Bishop, 429 S.W.3d at 648–49
(describing the defense, cited by Kassab, as providing that if “at the time of the plaintiff’s injury, the plaintiff was
engaged in an illegal act, and that act contributed to the injury, he may not recover”).
[T]he Texas Supreme Court has reiterated that “the comparative responsibility
scheme under Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code abrogated
the unlawful acts doctrine.” Boerjan v. Rodriguez, 2014 Tex. LEXIS 531 at *7
(Tex. 2014)(citing Dugger v. Arredondo, 408 S.W.3d 825 (Tex. 2013)). Thus, the
illegal acts doctrine may not be used as a ground to support summary judgment
even if it is recast as a public policy argument. Id. (“Applying Dugger to this case,
the unlawful acts doctrine cannot provide the basis for summary judgmentk.”).8
Kassab was correct then. The unlawful acts doctrine is no longer a valid defenlse.
Second, even if Kassab’s use of the unlawful acts doctrine werec not preempted, Kassab
would still have to show that Pohl’s alleged barratry was “a prosximate cause of the injury
complained of in order to bar [Pohl’s] recovery.” See Arredondo v. Dugger, 347 S.W.3d 757,
761–62 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011), aff’d on other grounds, 408 S.W.3d 825 (Tex. 2013). Even if
Pohl had committed barratry, it did not proximately cause Pohl’s injuries giving rise to his claims
here—defendants’ conversion and misappropriation of Pohl’s confidential and proprietary
information. Kassab’s unsupported assertions that the outcome of the Cheatham case matters or
impacts Pohl’s claims in this case should be rejected, and the Court should deny the Motion to
Abate. e
fIII. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs Michael Poyhl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl respectfully request that the
Court deny Kassab’s Motion to Abate for the reasons set forth herein. Regardless of whether Pohl
is likely to incur fuarther damages in connection with the Cheatham case, and regardless of the
outcome of thatf case, Pohl is entitled to a trial on the merits of his claims. Abatement is neither
required nor appropriate in these circumstances.
8 See Plaintiffs’ Objections and Response to Defendants’ Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment, dated Sept.
15, 2014, in Cause No. 2011-75990, William Beatty, et al, v. Jimmy Van Knighton, II, et al., in the 133rd Judicial
District Court of Harris County, Texas (a copy of this briefing is attached as Exhibit 4).
Dated: September 15, 2022 Respectfully submitted,
REYNOLDS FRIZZELL LLP
By: /s/ Jean C. Frizzell
Jean C. Frizzell
State Bar No. 07484650 k
1100 Louisiana St., Suite 3500 e
Houston, Texas 77002 l
Tel. 713.485.7200
Fax 713.485.7250 c
jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.rcom
Attorney for PlaintifDfs Michael Pohl
and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct coply of this document was served on all counsel of
record pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this 15th day of September, 2022.
o /s/ Jean C. Frizzell
e Jean C. Frizzell
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this
document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below.
The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate
of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Suni Blue on behalf of Jean Frizzell e
Bar No. 7484650 C
sblue@reynoldsfrizzell.com t
Envelope ID: 68313271 r
Status as of 9/16/2022 8:04 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimsestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com r9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
Andrew Johnson ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
Andrew J. Sarne asarne@krcl.com  9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.com 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
Kathryn Laflin KLaflin@KRCL.com l 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrar.coam 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.comM 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo jason@ciofalolaw.com 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandeflaw.com 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
Misty Davis mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@freynoldsfrizzell.com 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
Lawyer Wade lawyerwade@hotmail.com 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre oscott@favrepa.com 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
Andrea Mendez Candrea@kassab.law 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
Lance Kassab  lance@kassab.law 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
David Kassab david@kassab.law 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
Nicholas Pierce nicholas@kassab.law 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10f607900 jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo n24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
Kevin Graham CainU24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
D Kassab david@kassab.law 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
L Kassab lance@kassab.law 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 9/15/2022 5:08:42 PM SENT"
33,2022-09-12,DECL,Kassab,Lance Kassab’s declaration,"Declaration of Lance Christopher Kassab in support of Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to Pohl's MSJ — sworn testimony under penalty of perjury establishing Kassab's professional background, the joint venture with Montague and Nicholson, the source of client information from Precision Marketing, the four barratry lawsuits and their outcomes, and assertion of work product and attorney-client privilege over communications","Phase 3 evidentiary filing supporting Kassab's MSJ (Filing #30) and his Response to Pohl's No-Evidence MSJ (Filing #34). This is a sworn declaration under penalty of perjury providing foundational facts for Kassab's immunity and justification defenses. Filed September 12, 2022.",MSJ-2,N/A,Phase 3,2022-09-12_DECL_Lance-Kassab-Declaration_FILED.pdf,,"9/12/2022 3:28:03 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk
Harris County
Envelope No: 68168171
By: LOPEZ, ASHLEY V
Filed: 9/12/2022 3:28:03 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
§
§
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
ae
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th SUDIGIAL DISTRICT
DECLARATION OF LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
1. My name is Lance Christopher Kassab. My date of. ~ is March 12,
1961. My business address is 1214 Elgin Street, H on, Texas 77004.
I am of sound mind and have never been conWicted of a felony or
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude anda erwise competent to
make this declaration. I declare under pe y of perjury that the
statements of fact made herein are within personal knowledge and
true and correct. 6)

2. Iam an attorney licensed to practice:iaie in the State of Texas. I have
been licensed to practice law by theState of Texas since 1995 and I am
in good standing. I graduated a a school with honors and was
editor-in-chief of Law Review also licensed to practice before the
United States Supreme Court, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals and the United States District Court of Texas, Southern,
Eastern and Western Dagens. I was formerly a Briefing Attorney for
the First Judicial Disc ourt of Appeals in Houston, Texas and Iam
a former intern for Texas Supreme Court and the First Judicial District
Court of Appeals.

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3. For more thaw twenty-five (25) years I have been in private practice

handling complex legal malpractice cases. I have been involved in and/or
handled appvoximately 2,300 legal malpractice cases and have been
alee numerous appeals regarding numerous legal malpractice
issues Th e vast majority of these cases have been on the Plaintiff's side.
Ho I have also handled the defense of legal malpractice cases. I
have. andled cases for clients all over Texas and in numerous other
states within the Union such as California, Utah, Nevada, Oregon,
Idaho, Arkansas, Colorado, Virginia, Alabama, Louisiana, Florida and
Mississippi.

4. I am the owner of Lance Christopher Kassab, PC d/b/a The Kassab Law
Firm. I have associated with Hattiesburg attorney F. Douglas Montague

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(“Montague”) in the past. For instance, Montague and I were co-counsel
in lawsuits we brought against John O’Quinn, which we filed on behalf
of more than a thousand of O’Quinn’s former silicosis clients. That
litigation was filed in 2011 and litigated through 2015. Communications
between me or my office on the one hand and Montague and his office
on the other hand concerning or relating to that litigation are privileged
under the attorney-client and work product privileges and confidéntial
under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. @

5. Sometime in the fall of 2014, Montague notified me of litigation filed
against Michael A. Pohl (“Pohl”) in Mississippi, styled Cause No. 1:14-
cv-381-KS-JCG: Scott Walker, et al. v. Jimmy Williamson, et al.; In the
United States District Court for the Southern Dis ib of Mississippi,
Southern Division (the “Mississippi Litigation. The Mississippi
Litigation was filed by Scott Walker, Kirk Ladnefand Steve Seymore,
the then owners of a company named Precision Marketing Group, LLC
(“Precision Marketing”). Walker, Ladner and Symore alleged that Pohl
had hired their marketing company, Precision arketing, to find and
solicit clients to refer to Pohl in excharige for a percentage of Pohl’s
attorney’s fees. Precision Marketing algo. alleged that it would receive,
from Pohl, a sum certain for each client it referred to Pohl. Walker,
Ladner and Seymore alleged that hey acquired thousands of clients
relating to the BP Deepwater Hofigpn Oil Spill and referred those clients
to Pohl. They also alleged ne ey referred numerous auto accident
cases to Pohl. Walker, Ladner, eymore and Precision Marketing sued
Pohl claiming he breached ¢heir agreement by refusing to pay them for
all of the referrals. &

6. Upon learning of thé Mississippi Litigation, I and staff at my office
obtained a large amount of information related to the Mississippi
Litigation from ederal court’s online public access to court records
system, PACHR.;Falso met with Scott Favre (“Favre”), who I understood
became the, owner of Precision Marketing through a_ purchase
agreements be had with the prior owners. Upon reviewing the
informatior obtained from PACER and through my discussions with
Favre oncluded that the clients who were solicited to hire Pohl had
pote claims against him for civil barratry pursuant to Section
82.08 1 of the Texas Government Code.

7. On November 11, 2016, I entered into a joint venture agreement with
Montague and another lawyer named Tina Nicholson (“Nicholson”). A
copy of that agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The purpose of
the joint venture was to pursue causes of action against Pohl and others
for civil barratry.

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8. Thereafter, Favre and his counsel, Nicholson, provided me with
information from Precision Marketing’s files, including the names and
addresses of Pohl’s former clients or prospective clients. This
information was provided to me prior to Favre and Precision Marketing
settlement of the Mississippi Litigation with Pohl. I understood that this
information belonged to and was the property of Precision Markéting,
not Pohl or any other person or entity. The basis of this understanding
is the purchase and sale agreements, where Walker, Letper and
Seymore stated they were the owners of all the assets ,of recision
Marketing, including all of the documents in _ thei)possession,
computers, computer files, client lists, etc. and that alkof those assets
were sold to Favre when her purchased Precision Mpxtsting

9. Pohl has alleged that all of Precision Marketing’sGssets, such as client
lists, marketing information and all other doc nts within Precision
Marketing’s possession was somehow acqui y improper means. I
did not know that the information I we provided by Precision
Marketing had been allegedly acquired from ohl by improper means or
misappropriated by anyone. In fact, Ichad reviewed agreements that
indicated the former owners of Precision Marketing, Scott Walker, Kirk
Ladner and Steve Seymour sediment had sold, conveyed, or
otherwise transferred all of theirGdeuments, lists, marketing materials,
and all other documents and ass s in their possession to Favre and/or
his companies. ©

10. Pursuant to the joint v & with Montague and Nicholson, I used the
information from th “Mississippi Litigation to send advertisement
letters to Precision Mayketine’s clients, informing them that they may
have been a victim-of barratry, that barratry is illegal and unethical in
Texas, and that, fact they were victims of barratry, they would be
entitled to fileciyil claims against Pohl. I sent the advertisement letters
to the Texas. tate Bar and the bars of other states in which the
advertiseménts were distributed for approval. Literally hundreds of
individ esponded, indicating that they had been, in fact, personally
solicit hire Pohl in their auto accident or BP claims.

11. Beginning at least by February 2017, my firm and the law firms of
Montague and Nicholson entered into contracts with more than four
hundred individuals to represent them in their claims against Pohl for
civil barratry. Attached hereto as Exhibit B are the contracts that we
received pertaining to Dezzie Brumfield (signed February 28, 2017),
Alice Marie Gandy (signed August 21, 2017), Mark Cheatham, Sr.
(signed April 20, 2017) and Mae Berry (signed April 14, 2017) who would

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become the lead plaintiffs in the four barratry lawsuits that Montague,
Nicholson and I were hired to pursue against Pohl.
12.Pursuant to the joint venture, I filed the four separate barratry lawsuits
against Pohl (collectively, “the Barratry Litigation”). The Berry case was
filed on June 5, 2017, and ultimately included seven plaintiffs that were
alleged to have been solicited by Pohl to pursue auto accident claims.
The Cheatham case was filed on June 20, 2017, and ultimately gpitided
four plaintiffs who were alleged to have been solicited to hess ohl to
pursue auto accident claims. The Brumfield case was fil June 8,
2017, and by July 26, 2017, that suit had vopronimatoly. 62 plaintiffs
who were alleged to have been solicited to hire Pohl to pursue BP claims.
The Gandy case was filed on October 16, 2017, an that suit included
approximately 135 plaintiffs who were alleged to ve) been solicited to
hire Pohl to pursue BP claims. &
13. Pohl filed this lawsuit against me, Nicholso and Montague on August
28, 2018, while the Barratry Litigation wag Spdoing
6)
14.The Berry case was settled on Decombges0 2019 with Pohl agreeing to
pay the plaintiffs a substantial sumof money. The Cheatham case was
initially dismissed on summary jidement, but the court of appeals
recently reversed, concluding oes ismissal of the case was erroneous.
See Cheatham v. Pohl, No. 01- 046-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 6528
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dit Aug. 30, 2022, no pet. h.). Thus, the
Cheatham case is ongoi he Brumfield and Gandy cases were
dismissed on summary-iidement based on an affirmative defense of
limitations. See Brumfield v. Williamson, 634 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2027, pet. denied); Gandy v. Williamson, 634 S.W.3d
214 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, pet. denied). We represented
the plaintiffs 1 Appeals through the Texas Supreme Court. The
appellate courf affirmed on May 27, 2021, and the Texas Supreme Court
denied review on January 28, 2022. Our representation of the Brumfield
and Gandy @eintifis concluded shortly thereafter.
Sou a.
15.In thi wsuit, Pohl has requested communications and documents
exc ed between me or my firm on the one hand and Nicholson and
ague or their firms on the other hand. Those communications and
documents exchanged are protected by the work product privilege
because I anticipated litigation against Pohl no later than January of
2015. In fact, Montague and I started discussing litigation against Pohl
and others in late 2014 and started circulating a joint venture
agreement by January 15, 2015. Nicholson was brought in because she
was licensed to practice law in many of the gulf states where we
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contemplated filing lawsuits against Pohl. Communications and
documents exchanged between Montague, Nicholson and I after we
anticipated litigation consist of work product.

16. Pohl has also requested communications between me or my firm on the
one hand and my clients in the Barratry Litigation on the other hand.
Those communications are protected by the attorney-client angers
product privileges and are confidential communications under the: exas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. The communicg iis were
made for the purposes of facilitating the rendition of profess} al legal
services to my clients in their pursuit of barratry claims Ggainst Pohl.
Likewise, the internal work product of my firm is eon: idential and
consists of mental impressions, opinions, conclusion eahétes and/or legal
theories concerning the Barratry Litigation. Ke)

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Executed in Harris County, State of Texas, on the 12tday of September, 2022.
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Lance Christopher Kassab
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LAW FIRM )
| November 11, 2016 GO
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| Via Email dmontague@mpviaw.com °@
| F, Douglas Montague, HI Z )
| MONTAGUE, PirrMAN & VARNADO, P_A, ®
| 525 Main Street @
Hattiesburg, MS 39403 SO
Via Email nicholson@ bakernicholson.com
Tina Nicholson s\
BAKER NICHOLSON LAW FIRM &
2402 Dunlavy Street Or
Houston, Texas 77006 ~\S
Re: Joint venture for cause{QF action against Jimmy Williamson, Michael
Pohl and any and all afGiiated entities, for violations of the Texas Barratry
Statute or any act@eVhegligence arising out of the Deep Water Horizon
Oil Disaster, ve accident cases, and any other types of cases solicited
by Willamson\and/or Pohl in violation of the Texas Barratry statute by
these lawyers,
Dear Doug and Tina: ou
Please alloy this letter to reflect our agreement regarding our joint venture for suits.
against Jimmy Vijtiamson (Williamson), Michael Pohl (Pohl) and any other lawyer or law firm
connected wig m responsible for violating of the Texas Barratry Statute arising out of the
Deep iene) tl Disaster, vehicle accident cases, and any other types of cases solicited by them
in Violation the Texas Barratry statute.
~) agreement is made between our respective law firms, The Kassab Law Firm
(Kassab), Montague, Pitman & Varnado, P.A. (Montague} and The Baker Nicholson Law Firm
(Baker). We have agreed to bring lawsuits on behalf of clients who were wrongfully solicited on
behalf of Williamson and/or Pohl. their respective law firms and anyone else that may be fiable
for these actions. Kassab agrees to send out solicitation letters and sign up clients for the
lawsuit. Kassab also agrees to drafi relevant petitions, do the bulk of the work in drafting and
responding to motions and other filed documents. litigate and try the cases. Kassab also agrees
to front fifty percent (50%) of the case expenses. Montague agrees to help manage the clients
and help with strategy and litigation where necessary. Montague also agrees to help try cases as
second chair if necessary, Montague also agrees to front fifty percent (50%) of the case
expenses. Baker agrees to help manage clients, strategize and participate or help in filing suits
1426 Alabanza Street | Houston | Texas | 77004 ~
£.733.929.7400 | f. 713.922.7410
sanane: Poseae) coalthda hives whines fev

F. Douglas Montague
November 11, 2076 ‘ ft
Page 2 of 2 Oy
where necessary, including, but not limited to other states where Baker’s atthendys are licensed.
Baker also agrees to provide previously prepared solicitation letter templates, thai comply with
the ethics rules of each applicable state. We have agreed to split any all attorney's fees
generated trom this joint effort in the following way: fifty perce: 30%) to Kassab, forty
percent (40%) to Montague and ten percent (10%) to Baker. In ea’és’ where Baker makes an
| appearance on the pleadings in States such as Florida and/or Alabina, the parties herein agree to
| the following split of fees regarding those cases only: fifty percept 50%) to Kassab, twenty five
| percent (25%) to Montague and twenty five percent (25%) (Baker. Cases in which Baker
| assumes primary responsibility for litigation as lead coun eli any, shall be negotiated on an
| individual basis. ©
| There may also be cases that arise from the RB Bractice of these lawyers including, but
| not limited to, negligence claims. The Parties her€it agree to the same arrangement outlined
above with regard to the litigation of these CaBRR, dditionally, some of the clients that have
been solicited by these potential defendants ns cancel their contracts and thus, need counsel
regarding their cases. Furthermore, some ts may have malpractice actions arising out of
Pohi/Williamson’s failure to timely file and@ursue their claims. The Parties herein agree to use
their best efforts to either find these cis counsel to handle their cases, in which we agree to
split any and all referral fees as outlin ove or we will handle their cases. In either event, the
Parties hereto agree to the same auogiess fee split as outlined above.
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If this letter accurately owtfines our agreement, please indicate by signing below.
w la p Y
S Sincerely, .
IN THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
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© “~~ Lance Christopher Kassab
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LAW FIRM
1420 Alabama Street | Houston | Texas | 77004
p. 713.522.7400 | f. 713.522.7410
www. TexasLegalMalpractice.com
POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
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Client(s) full legal name: Dz Z2Z14EL Lam onl Lf. turn PIE I. of 3
Client(s) address: —__
Client(s) home phone number:_ ee x number: 2
Cell number: P| ‘lient(s) Email:
Client(s) social security number(s): : ss oe (Confidential)
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This agreement is between the above client(s), hereinafiet referred to as “Client” and LANCE
CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB oda FIRM, MONTAGUE, PITTMAN &
VARNADO, P.A. and the BAKER NICHOLSON LAW ne ereinafter referred to as “Attorneys.”
1. SCOPE OF SERVICES. Attorneys are hereby employed and appointed as Client’s true and
lawzul attorneys to act for Client and to prosgepite Client’s claims or causes of action against:
JIMMY WILLIAMSON, JIMMY WILLIAMSO - AND/OR MICHAEL A. POHL (Defendants) and
all other persons, firms, corporations, or byst ss entities legally responsible for causing Client’s
damages resulting from such acts as follows;
BARRATRY, LEGAL pRacrice AND/OR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
ARISING O THE BP DEEP HORIZON LITIGATION
Client understands that Client’s case may be filed and litigated jointly with other clients
who are similarly situate ient and/or who have similar claims against Defendants. As
such, Client is aware rees that Client’s confidential information may necessarily be
disclosed among otherclients in order to effectuate a settlement. Client further
understands and a s that if a disagreement or dispute arises between any of the
common clients to sharing of the confidential information, the attorney-client privilege
may not be available for assertion by any of them against the other(s) on certain issues.
Finally, if a ca on or aggregate sett:ement is effectuated, Client understands and agrees
that the of demand may require ue consent of all commonly-represented clients and
the failure‘of one or a few members of the group to consent to the settlement may result in
the withdrawal of the settlement or offer.
Client further understands that Attorneys are not specialized in, nor do they give, tax advice,
bankruptcy advice, family law or estate planning advice or any other advice involving other non-
civil or non-personal injury areas of specialized practice of law and they would recommend the
retention of a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) or qualified tax lawyer with regard to any
questions as to the taxability of any proceeds that are received pursuant to this agreement.
Client(s) Initials: D LB Page 1 of 6

2. AUTHORITY. Client authorizes Attorneys to act as Client’s negotiator, to file pleadings
and appear in courts of law in Client’s behalf, to prosecute Client’s claims or causes of action to
settlement or final judgment, and to take any appropriate legal action they deem reasonably
necessary in the preservation of Client’s rights and claims. Client further authorizes attorneys to
do all things that Client might lawfully do in Client’s behalf, and ratifies and confirms all such
lawful acts that Attorneys may do or cause to be done on behalf of Client. Provided, however,
that no settlement shall be made by attorneys without Client’s approval. If C refuses an
offer of settlement against Attorney’s recommendation, then Client agrees to e responsible
for paying all costs and expenses of the case, and must reimburse Attoméy for expenses and
costs already incurred within seven (7) days of a written demand for such reimbursement. If
Client fails to timely reimburse Attorney after receiving such written e, then such failure
constitutes a termination of the representation by the Client. In the pave such termination,
Attorneys are entitled to retain their entire contingency fee meee
3. CONTINGENT FEE. In consideration of the services rémlered and to be rendered by
Attorneys, Client assigns and conveys to Attorneys the followiag present undivided interest in
and to Client’s claims or causes of action: S)
S
33-1/3% of any sum collected betes sui is filed; OR
40% of any sum collected suit is filed and settlement is
made without a ria OR
45% of any sum coll after the day prior to the first day
trial begins a lement is made or judgment is paid
without appéal.
The above percentages shall be calcul On the gross total settlement and/or recovery of cash,
property, reduction of debt or any, oi calculable benefit Client obtains through Attorney’s
representation, whether paid by pace ic payments, lump sum payment, transfer of property (real
or personal) or calculated by the cost of a structured settlement, or any combination
thereof. The contingent fee will be calculated on the gross recovery before the deduction of
costs and expenses. The co ent fee granted to attorneys based on the foregoing percentages
shall be and does hereby constitute a lien upon said claims or causes of action and any proceeds
of settlement or judgment, Client further understands that this Contract of Employment and
Power of Attorney extends through the trial of this cause and the post-trial motions leading to the
entry of a final trial Soot judgment. However, Attorneys will not have any duty to undertake an
appeal under this Co tract of Employment and Power of Attorney unless and until there is an
agreement bet eon Client and the Attorneys to undertake same for an additional fee. If there is
to be an ap cal; of this case and the Client and the Attorneys agree to appeal this case, then
Attorneys! feos for the consummation and handling of that appeal will be negotiated at that time.
4, REFERRAL FEE. Client understands that no one has an interest in this case as a referring
attorney included in the fees to be paid as described above. The referring attorney’s interest is
n/a of the gross attorney’s fees collected by Attorneys.
5. CosTS, EXPENSES AND COMMON EXPENSES. Client understands that Client’s claims may
be litigated together with similarly situated clients. Client therefore understands that Attorney
Client Initials: D Lf Page 2 of 6

may advance sums to.cover reasonable and necessary expenses which in his opinion are
reasonably necessary for the development of the Client’s case including any client-specific
expenses as well as Client’s share of various “common expenses.” Common expenses are
expenses that benefit multiple clients who are involved in the same litigation. Examples of
common expenses include costs associated with expert witnesses, consultants, investigators or
witnesses who will testify on common issues, deposition costs for deposing Defendants and
witnesses (i.e. the main defendants or the staff members of defendants), travel costs associated
with common depositions and with attending hearings at which motions on co issues are
heard, copying charges for copying or scanning documents that pertain to on issues or
clients, court reporter and deposition fees that pertain to common issues of ohents, as well as
miscellaneous costs such as parking costs, certified mail, delivery charges, and postage for
motions and briefings which pertain to common issues or clients. Client “spécific costs” are costs
that will likely be incurred that benefit only the one specific Sent eee would not be
incurred if that particular client did not exist. Examples of speéifié costs include physical
examinations, costs associated with deposition of the particulaf<client, costs associated with
expert witness testimony that will only benefit the specific cliént, copy charges, postage for
motions, letters, correspondence or other briefs which only benéfit the specific client as well as
travel costs to attend hearings, depositions or other legal eheening which only benefit the
specific client. Client understands and agrees that if Attomiey advance any court costs and other
litigation expenses incident to the handling of Clients) aims, including common expenses,
Client will be responsible for reimbursing Attorneys‘out of any recovery made in client’s
lawsuit. Common expense deductions will be called as follows:
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At the time of settlement or resolutio of Clients’ case, Client will be responsible

for its percentage of the common expenses which will be deducted from any

recovery after the deduction of any attorneys’ fees. The percentage will be

calculated by taking the total nuriber of clients and dividing this number by the

total amount of common expenses. As an example, if there are 100 clients and

common expenses amoun 0,000.00, then each client would be required to

pay $100.00 in common pens (100 clients / $10,000.00 = $100). As another

example, if there are 150\cHents and the common expenses amount to $30,000.00,

then each client woul fe required to pay $200.00 in common expenses (150

clients / $30,000.00 < 00).
Client further agrees meat sums advanced by Attorneys to cover such necessary court costs and
other litigation expenses incident to the preparation and prosecution of Client’s claims or causes
of action will beetaid to Attorneys out of any sum collected in addition to any contingent fee
set forth hereii ient agrees that any advancement of costs or expenses by Attorneys shall
also constitut ien on Client’s claims and any proceeds of any settlement or judgment. If
there is n very for Client, Client will not be responsible for any costs and/or expenses
to develop the case.
6. WARRANTIES AND REPRESENTATIONS. Attorneys agree to use the firm’s best efforts in
representing Client. Client understands that Attorneys make no warranties or representations
regarding the successful outcome of Client’s claims or causes of action, the value thereof, or any
expected recovery, and any expression relative thereto is a matter of Attorney's opinion only.
Attorneys do not guarantee any timeframe within which Client’s claims or causes of action will
be resolved.
Client Initials: DL (2 Page 3 of 6

7. CLIENT OBLIGATIONS. Client agrees to tell Attorneys the truth, to cooperate with and
keep Attorneys informed of any developments relative to Client’s claims or causes of action, to
faithfully comply with this agreement, and to keep Attorneys advised of any changes to Client’s
address or telephone number.
8. FICTITIOUS, GROUNDLESS, OR BAD FAITH. Client understands that in the event a suit
filed in Client’s behalf is found to be frivolous, fictitious, groundless, or brought in bad faith,
Client may be liable for defendant's attorney's fees. NZ)
9. SANCTIONS. Client agrees that Client must timely comply with diyeSPory requests from
opposing counsel. Client understands that Client’s failure to comply -with discovery requests
could result in the court imposing sanctions in the form of a fine or 0 penalty. Client agrees
that in the event sanctions are imposed, Client will be solely responsible for paying any and all
sanctions, and Client further agrees that Attorneys will not be onsible or liable for any
sanction award. ®
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10. LIABILITY FOR CourT CosTs. Client understands ht in the event a lawsuit is filed in
Client’s behalf and such lawsuit is not ultimately resolve Client’s favor, court costs could be
assessed against Client. Client understands that aap costs will not be paid by Attorneys
and agrees to pay such court costs should they be impage .
11. IF NO RECOVERY. Client further undeiSiands that if Attorneys are unable to recover
anything either by settlement or trial, Client alfjowe Attorneys nothing as a fee and Client shall
not be obligated to reimburse Attorneys rege advanced on Client’s behalf.
12. | CONSENT TO ASSOCIATE. Clier understands and agrees to the association of Lance
Kassab of The Kassab Law Firm, Ress Montague of the law firm Montague, Pittman &
Varnado, P.A. and Tina Nicholsosef the Baker Nicholson Law Firm to represent Client and
other similarly situated Clients ini gation and/or potential claims. Attorneys have agreed to
split all attorney’s fees in the RN ing manner:
Fifty percent (50%) the Kassab Law Firm:
Forty percent (40%) 0 Montague, Pittman & Varnado, P.A.: and
Ten percent Ce to The Baker Nicholson Law Firm.
of
However, if The a Nicholson Law Firm assumes primary responsibility for litigation as lead
counsel in Cli case, then the Attorney’s have agreed to split all attorney’s fees in the
following m :
Fis cent (50%) to The Kassab Law Firm
Twenty-Five percent (25%) to Montague, Pitman & Varnado, P.A.; and
Twenty-Five percent (25%) to The Baker Nicholson Law Firm.
The lawyers and law firms listed above have agreed to assume joint responsibility for the
representation of Client. Client understands and agrees to the association of these law firms and
the percentages of fees allocated to each law firm as stated above. The division of fees between
Client Initials: | yay, Page 4 of 6

the lawyers and law firms listed above will not increase or change the amount of attorneys’
fees charged to the Client as outlined in Paragraph 3 above.

13. TERMINATION AND WITHDRAWAL. Client understands and agrees that Attorneys may
terminate the attorney-Client relationship created by this agreement and withdraw from Client’s
representation with or without Client’s consent for any reason Attorneys deem necessary.

14. CONTROVERSY AND DISPUTES. Any controversy arising out of or relating to
Attorneys’ representation of Client or this contract or any modificatidg) or extension
thereof, including any claim for breach of contract, tort, for damages, Gr for rescission or
reformation of this contract, or any other claim shall be settled by ‘a_court of law with
competent jurisdiction in Harris County, Texas without a jury. ©

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15. CLIENT REQUESTS. Client understands that if requests by t are not consistent with
the standard of care required of Attorneys, the Texas Disciplinary s of Professional Conduct,
the Texas Supreme Court’s Mandate of Professionalism, or¢ommon courtesies expected
between Attorneys and other lawyers or third parties, Attorneys are entitled to refuse without
breaching this agreement.
)

16. DISCIPLINARY ISSUES. Client understands oa other alternative remedies against
Defendant attorneys may exist. For that reason th ployment of Attorneys are not for the
purpose of prosecuting other alternative remedie she criminal, disciplinary, or other civil
matters. However, Client is hereby specifically a ised in accordance with the Disciplinary
Rules of Texas that the State Bar of Texas i vest gates and prosecutes professional misconduct
committed by Texas attorneys. Although nak ever complaint against or dispute with a lawyer
involves professional misconduct, the St ar's Office of General Counsel will provide you
with information about how to file a complaint. You may call the State Bar's General Counsel
Office toll free at 1-800-932-1900 fo re information. The complaint that may be filed by the
State Bar's General Counsel’s officesot by you as part of a disciplinary proceeding is NOT the
same thing as a legal malpracticg e¢ that may be prosecuted on your behalf by Attorneys.

17. CONTRACT SURVIV TY. This agreement and the powers and authority granted
herein shall survive and cs inate upon Client’s death, mental incapacity, or legal disability.
18. | SINGULAR ANDXPLURAL. When the context requires, singular nouns and pronouns used
herein include the phi:

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19. Savina ann SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this agreement is held void and/or
unenforceabl en such provision will be modified to reflect the parties’ intention. All
remaining gibpisions of this agreement shall remain in full force and effect.

20. | COMPLETE AGREEMENT. This document sets forth the complete agreement between
Attorneys and Client and may be modified only by a written instrument signed by both a legal
representative of LANCE CHRISTOPHER KAssaB, P.C. and Client. It is agreed that there are no
oral representations of any kind.
21. COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING. By signing below and initialing each page, Client
acknowledges he has fully read this agreement, its terms, effects and consequences and that its
Client Initials: | ye Page 5 of 6

terms, effects and consequences have been fully and completely explained to Client by Attorneys
to Client’s full satisfaction.
PLEASE INITIAL EACH PAGE, PRINT NAME, SIGN AND DATE
patep: A~Z28 - _, 2017.
é
E226 Ames | Lv wt EY
CLIENT: (Printed Name)
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CLIENT: (Si re)
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LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A S)
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM, MONTAGUE, PITTMAN & Varna ; P.A.
BAKER NICHOLSON LAW FIRM
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Client Initials: 9) Lts Page 6 of 6

LAW FIRM
1214 Elgin Street | Houston | Texas | 77004
p. 713.522.7400 | f. 713.522.7410
www.TexasLegalMalpractice.com
POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
Client(s) full legal name: Al, cL M avit - 1th. ( Lawn Ws /Seadin Salon
Client(s) home phone number: i work number: ,
Cell number: ED ient(s) Emait:
Client(s) social security number(s): Po (Confidential)
p This agreement is between the above client(s), hereinafter referred to as “Client” and LANCE
Sy, CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAW FIRM, MONTAGUE, PITTMAN &
wo) D VARNADO, P.A. and the BAKER NICHOLSON LAW FIRM hereinafter referred to as “Attorneys.”
“Qe. 1. SCOPE OF SERVICES. Attorneys are hereby employed and appointed as Client’s true and
“(apt attorneys to act for Client and to prosecute Client’s claims or causes of action against:
Asie WILLIAMSON, JIMMY WILLIAMSON, P.C. AND/OR MICHAEL A. POHL (Defendants) and
all ersons, firms, corporations, or business entities legally responsible for causing Client’s
damage sulting from such acts as follows:
Bagh Y, LEGAL MALPRACTICE AND/OR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
CAxisiNc OUT OF THE BP DEEP HORIZON LITIGATION
My
Client understands that t’s case may be filed and litigated jointly with other clients
who are similarly situated fo wR and/or who have similar claims against Defendants. As
such, Client is aware and agr (Chat Client’s confidential information may necessarily be
disclosed among other clients i (Sbrder to effectuate a settlement. Client further
understands and agrees that if a di iafeement or dispute arises between any of the
common clients to the sharing of the co dential information, the attorney-client privilege
may not be available for assertion by any of thea against the other(s) on certain issues.
Finally, if a common or aggregate settlement is ffesuatd, Client understands and agrees
that the offer or demand may require the consent 0 call) commonly-represented clients and
the failure of one or a few members of the group to consent to the settlement may result in
the withdrawal of the settlement or offer. 3 wy
Client further understands that Attorneys are not specialized in, nor y give, tax advice,
bankruptcy advice, family law or estate planning advice or any other advicé j volving other non-
civil or non-personal injury areas of specialized practice of law and they would recommend the
retention of a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) or qualified tax lawyer with regard to any
questions as to the taxability of any proceeds that are received pursuant to this agreement.
Client(s) Initials: fim CG, Page 1 of 6

2. AUTHORITY. Client authorizes Attomeys to act as Client’s negotiator, to file pleadings
and appear in courts of law in Client’s behalf, to prosecute Client’s claims or causes of action to
settlement or final judgment, and to take any appropriate legal action they deem reasonably
necessary in the preservation of Client’s rights and claims. Client further authorizes attorneys to
do all things that Client might lawfully do in Client’s behalf, and ratifies and confirms all such
lawful acts that Attorneys may do or cause to’be done on behalf of Client. Provided, however,
that no settlement shall be made by attorneys without Client’s approval. If Client refuses an
offer of settlement against Attorney’s recommendation, then Client agrees to become responsible
for paying all costs and expenses of the case, and must reimburse Attorney for expenses and
costs already incurred within seven (7) days of a written demand for such reimbursement. If
Client fails to timely reimburse Attorney after receiving such. written notice, then such failure
constitutes a termination of the representation by the Client. In the event of such termination,
Attorneys are entitled to retain their entire contingency fee interest.
3. CONTINGENT FEE. In consideration of the services rendered and to be rendered by
Attorneys, Client assigns and conveys to Attorneys the following present undivided interest in
and to Client’s claims or causes of action:
?.
% 33-1/3% of any sum collected before suit is filed; OR
XD 40% of any sum collected after suit is filed and settlement is
“Qe. made without a trial; OR
o, 45% of any sum collected after the day prior to the first day
Q trial begins and settlement is made or judgment is paid
SS) without appeal.
The above pee ntages shall be calculated on the gross total settlement and/or recovery of cash,
property, retin of debt or any other calculable benefit Client obtains through Attorney’s
representation, W ether aid by periodic payments, lump sum payment, transfer of property (real
or personal) or cli by using the cost of a structured settlement, or any combination
thereof. The continge ill be calculated on the gross recovery before the deduction of
costs and expenses. The c ent fee granted to attorneys based on the foregoing percentages
shall be and does hereby cons tutéalien upon said claims or causes of action and any proceeds
of settlement or judgment. Client t understands that this Contract of Employment and
Power of Attorney extends through tne hay f this cause and the post-trial motions leading to the
entry of a final trial court judgment. Hover Artomey will not have any duty to undertake an
appeal under this Contract of Employment akd’Power of Attorney unless and until there is an
agreement between Client and the Attorneys to wade e same for an additional fee. If there is
to be an appeal of this case and the Client and the eys agree to appeal this case, then
Attorneys’ fees for the consummation and handling of th RY, will be negotiated at that time.
4, REFERRAL FEE. Client understands that no one has an ie in this case as a referring
attorney included in the fees to be paid as described above. The F attorney’s interest is
n/a of the gross attorney’s fees collected by Attorneys. 7)
5. Costs, EXPENSES AND COMMON EXPENSES. Client understands that Client’s claims may
be litigated together with similarly situated clients. Client therefore understands that Attorney
Client Initials: Rife Page 2 of 6

may advance sums to cover reasonable and necessary expenses which in his opinion are
reasonably necessary for the development of the Client’s case including any client-specific
expenses as well as Client’s share of various “common expenses.” Common expenses are
expenses that benefit multiple clients who are involved in the same litigation. Examples of
common expenses include costs associated with expert witnesses, consultants, investigators or
witnesses who will testify on common issues, deposition costs for deposing Defendants and
witnesses (i.e. the main defendants or the staff members of defendants), travel costs associated
with common depositions and with attending hearings at which motions on common issues are
heard, copying charges for copying or scanning documents that pertain to common issues or
clients, court reporter and deposition fees that pertain to common issues or clients, as well as
miscellaneous costs such as parking costs, certified mail, delivery charges, and postage for
motions and briefings which pertain to common issues or clients. Client “specific costs” are costs
that will likely be incurred that benefit only the one specific client and likely would not be
incurred if that particular client did not exist. Examples of specific costs include physical
examinations, costs associated with deposition of the particular client, costs associated with
expert witness testimony that will only benefit the specific client, copy charges, postage for
motions, letters, correspondence or other briefs which only benefit the specific client as well as
travel costs to attend hearings, depositions or other legal proceedings which only benefit the
S) specific client. Client understands and agrees that if Attorneys advance any court costs and other
A) litigation expenses incident to the handling of Client’s claims, including common expenses,
Ae) Client will be responsible for reimbursing Attorneys out of any recovery made in client’s
Kp lawsuit. Common expense deductions will be calculated as follows:
""© At the time of settlement or resolution of Clients’ case, Client will be responsible
Sigfor its percentage of the common expenses which will be deducted from any
@eveyery after the deduction of any attomeys’ fees. The percentage will be
c ed by taking the total number of clients and dividing this number by the
= of common expenses. As an example, if there are 100 clients and
commo ses amount to $10,000.00, then each client would be required to
pay $100.00 ""6 on expenses (100 clients / $10,000.00 = $100). As another
example, if thee 50 clients and the common expenses amount to $30,000.00,
then each client veal required to pay $200.00 in common expenses (150
clients / $30,000.00 =
Client further agrees that all sums advan by Attomeys to cover such necessary court costs and
other litigation expenses incident to the rep and prosecution of Client’s claims or causes
of action will be repaid to Attorneys out 0 uncollected in addition to any contingent fee
set forth herein. Client agrees that any advancéient of costs or expenses by Attorneys shall
also constitute a lien on Client’s claims and any procel of any settlement or judgment. If
there is no recovery for Client, Client will not be response for any costs and/or expenses
to develop the case. Ye
6. WARRANTIES AND REPRESENTATIONS. Attorneys agree toisé the firm’s best efforts in
representing Client. Client understands that Attorneys make no vara or representations
regarding the successful outcome of Client’s claims or causes of action, theWalue thereof, or any
expected recovery, and any expression relative thereto is a matter of Attomey's opinion only.
Attorneys do not guarantee any timeframe within which Client’s claims or causes of action will
be resolved.
Client Initials: By WAG, Page 3 of 6

7. CLIENT OBLIGATIONS. Client agrees to tell Attorneys the truth, to cooperate with and
keep Attorneys informed of any developments relative to Client’s claims or causes of action, to
faithfully comply with this agreement, and to keep Attorneys advised of any changes to Client’s
address or telephone number.
8. FICTITIOUS, GROUNDLESS, OR BAD FAITH. Client understands that in the event a suit
filed in Client’s behalf is found to be frivolous, fictitious, groundless, or brought in bad faith,
Client may be liable for defendant's attorney's fees.
9, SANCTIONS. Client agrees that Client must timely comply with discovery requests from
opposing counsel. Client understands that Client’s failure to comply with discovery requests
could result in the court imposing sanctions in the form of a fine or other penalty. Client agrees
that in the event sanctions are imposed, Client will be solely responsible for paying any and all
sanctions, and Client further agrees that Attorneys will not be responsible or liable for any
sanction award.
10. LIABILITY FOR CourT Costs. Client understands that in the event a lawsuit is filed in
S) Client’s behalf and such lawsuit is not ultimately resolved in Client’s favor, court costs could be
A) assessed against Client. Client understands that such court costs will not be paid by Attorneys
Ae) and agrees to pay such court costs should they be imposed.
Z
“LG. IF NO RECOVERY. Client further understands that if Attorneys are unable to recover
° (apything either by settlement or trial, Client shall owe Attorneys nothing as a fee and Client shall
orb gbligated to reimburse Attorneys for expenses advanced on Client’s behalf.
12. Conse TO ASSOCIATE. Client understands and agrees to the association of Lance
Kassab of rn Law Firm, Doug Montague of the law firm Montague, Pittman &
Varnado, P.A.‘and Tina Nicholson of the Baker Nicholson Law Firm to represent Client and
other similarly situa jents in its litigation and/or potential claims. Attorneys have agreed to
split all attorney’s fees ollowing manner:
Fifty percent (50%) Hea Law Firm:
Forty percent (40%) to Mo gus Pittman & Varnado, P.A.: and
Ten percent (10%) to The Baker Nicholson Law Firm.
However, if The Baker Nicholson Law Firm sstimes primary responsibility for litigation as lead
counsel in Client’s case, then the Attorney’s ha’ (a eed to split all attorney’s fees in the
following manner: 5
Fifty percent (50%) to The Kassab Law Firm A Cy
Twenty-Five percent (25%) to Montague, Pitman & Varnad?.. and
Twenty-Five percent (25%) to The Baker Nicholson Law ©) GY
The lawyers and law firms listed above have agreed to assume joint reéponsibility for the
representation of Client. Client understands and agrees to the association of these law firms and
the percentages of fees allocated to each law firm as stated above. The division of fees between
Client Initials: (\\\G. Page 4 of 6

the lawyers and law firms listed above will not increase or change the amount of attorneys’
fees charged to the Client as outlined in Paragraph 3 above.
13. | TERMINATION AND WITHDRAWAL. Client understands and agrees that Attorneys may
terminate the attorney-Client relationship created by this agreement and withdraw from Client’s
representation with or without Client’s consent for any reason Attorneys deem necessary.
14. | CONTROVERSY AND DISPUTES. Any controversy arising out of or relating to
Attorneys’ representation of Client or this contract or any modification or extension
thereof, including any claim for breach of contract, tort, for damages, or for rescission or
reformation of this contract, or any other claim shall be settled by a court of law with
competent jurisdiction in Harris County, Texas without a jury.
15. | CLIENT REQUESTS. Client understands that if requests by Client are not consistent with
the standard of care required of Attorneys, the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct,
the Texas Supreme Court’s Mandate of Professionalism, or common courtesies expected
between Attorneys and other lawyers or third parties, Attorneys are entitled to refuse without
breaching this agreement.
?.
% 16. DISCIPLINARY ISSUES. Client understands that other alternative remedies against
Wi, Defendant attorneys may exist. For that reason the employment of Attorneys are not for the
Y, purpose of prosecuting other alternative remedies whether criminal, disciplinary, or other civil
° LS matters. However, Client is hereby specifically advised in accordance with the Disciplinary
° Cae of Texas that the State Bar of Texas investigates and prosecutes professional misconduct
ommutted by Texas attorneys. Although not every complaint against or dispute with a lawyer
invol essional misconduct, the State Bar's Office of General Counsel will provide you
with info ion about how to file a complaint. You may call the State Bar's General Counsel
Office toll ee 1-500-932-1900 for more information. The complaint that may be filed by the
State Bar's Ge Cpel's office or by you as part of a disciplinary proceeding is NOT the
same thing as a lega ‘appractice case that may be prosecuted on your behalf by Attorneys.
17. CONTRACT Sunvivainsty, This agreement and the powers and authority granted
herein shall survive and not te unBSS upon Client’s death, mental incapacity, or legal disability.
18. SINGULAR AND PLURAL. When tbe context requires, singular nouns and pronouns used
herein include the plural. &
19. SAVINGS AND SEVERABILITY. If any this i6n of this agreement is held void and/or
unenforceable, then such provision will be modi o reflect the parties' intention. All
remaining provisions of this agreement shall remain in TE effect.
O
20. © COMPLETE AGREEMENT. This document sets forth We plete agreement between
Attorneys and Client and may be modified only by a written insta signed by both a legal
representative of LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. and Client. It is seed that there are no
oral representations of any kind.
21. COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING. By signing below and initialing each page, Client
acknowledges he has fully read this agreement, its terms, effects and consequences and that its
Client Initials: AY \\ (, Page 5 of 6

terms, effects and consequences have been fully and completely explained to Client by Attorneys
to Client’s full satisfaction.
PLEASE INITIAL EACH PAGE, PRINT NAME, SIGN AND DATE
patep: -2\ 2017.
CLIENT: (Printed Name)
CLIENT: (Signature)
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A
S) THE KASSAB LAW FIRM, MONTAGUE, PITTMAN & VARNADO, P.A.
A) BAKER NICHOLSON LAW FIRM
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Client Initials: Qs Page 6 of 6

LAW FIRM
1420 Alabama Street | Houston | Texas | 77004
p. 713.522.7400 | f. 713.522.7410
www.TexasLegalMalpractice.com
POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
@
Client(s) full legal name:
Client(s) address: _
Client(s) home phone number TE ork number; -_
Cell number: Client(s) Email:
Client(s) social security number(s): ____ (Confidential)
@
This agreement is between the above client(s), herein > ered to as “Client” and LANCE
CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASS FIRM, MONTAGUE, PITTMAN &
VARNADO, P.A. and the BAKER NICHOLSON LAW ereinafter referred to as “Attorneys.”
1. SCOPE OF SERVICES. Attorneys are perdy npoyed and appointed as Client’s true and
lawful attorneys to act for Client and to pr égute Client’s claims or causes of action against:
MICHAEL A. POHL (Defendant) and all other persons, firms, corporations, or business entities
legally responsible for causing Client’s damages resulting from such acts as follows:
BARRATRY, LEGAL MAL TICE AND/OR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
ARISING F A ROLLOVER CASE INCIDENT
Client understands that Cli ®) case may be filed and litigated jointly with other clients
who are similarly situated lient and/or who have similar claims against Defendants. As
such, Client is aware an rees that Client’s confidential information may necessarily be
disclosed among other) clients in order to effectuate a settlement. Client further
understands and agrees that if a disagreement or dispute arises between any of the
common clients to sharing of the confidentiai information, the attorney-client privilege .
may not be av ale e for assertion by any of them against the other(s) on certain issues.
inally,if-a corn on or-ageregate settlemen effectuated,-Client-understands-and-agrees———
that the off or oF demand may require the consent of all commonly-represented clients and
the failu ¢ of one or a few members of the group to consent to the settlement may result in
the withdrawal of the settlement or offer.
Client further understands that Attorneys are not specialized in, nor do they give, tax advice,
bankruptcy advice, family law or estate planning advice or any other advice involving other non-
civil or non-personal injury areas of specialized practice of law and they would recommend the
retention of a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) or qualified tax lawyer with regard to any
questions as to the taxability of any proceeds that are received pursuant to this agreement.
Client(s) Initials: MN C Page 1 of 6

2. AUTHORITY. Client authorizes Attorneys to act as Client’s negotiator, to file pleadings
and appear in courts of law in Client’s behalf, to prosecute Client’s claims or causes of action to
settlement or final judgment, and to take any appropriate legal action they deem reasonably
necessary in the preservation of Client’s rights and claims. Client further authorizes attorneys to
do all things that Client might lawfully do in Client’s behalf, and ratifies and confirms all such
lawful acts that Attorneys may do or cause to be done on behalf of Client. Provided, however,
that no settlement shall be made by attorneys without Client’s approval. If Client refuses an
offer of settlement against Attorney’s recommendation, then Client agrees to becaite responsible
for paying all costs and expenses of the case, and must reimburse Actornes expenses and
costs already incurred within seven (7) days of a written demand for sucheimbursement. If
Client fails to timely reimburse Attorney after receiving such written n , then such failure
constitutes a termination of the representation by the Client. In the event of such termination,
Attomeys are entitled to retain their entire contingency fee interest. . &
3. | CONTINGENT FEE. In consideration of the services renteved and to be rendered by
Attorneys, Client assigns and conveys to Attorneys the following present undivided interest in
and to Client’s claims or causes of action: &
33-1/3% of any sum collected before shit is filed; OR
40% of any sum collected afiereuit is filed and settlement is
made without a na ge
45% of any sum collected er the day prior to the first day
trial begins an ement is made or judgment is paid
without app nae
The above percentages shall be caleulaedn the gross total settlement and/or recovery of cash,
property, reduction of debt or any other calculable benefit Client obtains through Attorney’s
representation, whether paid by peri payments, lump sum payment, transfer of property (real
or personal) or calculated > cost of a structured settlement, or any combination
thereof. The contingent fee e calculated on the gross recovery before the deduction of
costs and expenses. The contingent fee granted to attorneys based on the foregoing percentages
shall be and does hereby constitute a lien upon said claims or causes of action and any proceeds
of settlement or jud ~” Client further understands that this Contract of Employment and
Power of Attorney exis through the trial of this cause and the post-trial motions leading to the
entry of a final trial ¢oyirt judgment. However, Attorneys will not have any duty to undertake an
appeal under thi Contract of Employment and Power of Attorney unless and until there is an
agreement betwss Client and the Attorneys to undertake same for an additional fee. If there is
to be an appe4lof this case and the Client and the Attorneys agree to appeal this case, then
Attomeys fees for the consummation and handling of that appeal will be negotiated at that time.
4. REFERRAL FEE. Client understands that no one has an interest in this case as a referring
attorney included in the fees to be paid as described above. The referring attorney’s interest is
n/a of the gross attorney’s fees collected by Attorneys.
5. Costs, EXPENSES AND COMMON EXPENSES. Client understands that Client’s claims may
be litigated together with similarly situated clients. Client therefore understands that Attorney
may advance sums to cover reasonable and necessary expenses which in his opinion are
Client Initials: me _ Page 2 of 6

reasonably necessary for the development of the Client’s case including any client-specific
expenses as well as Client’s share of various “common expenses.” Common expenses are
expenses that benefit multiple clients who are involved in the same litigation. Examples of
common expenses include costs associated with expert witnesses, consultants, investigators or
witnesses who will testify on common issues, deposition costs for deposing Defendants and
witnesses (i.e. the main defendants or the staff members of defendants), travel costs associated
with common depositions and with attending hearings at which motions on common issues are
heard, copying charges for copying or scanning documents that pertain to contin issues or
clients, court reporter and deposition fees that pertain to common issues or clients, as well as
miscellaneous costs such as parking costs, certified mail, delivery charges,))and postage for
motions and briefings which pertain to common issues or clients. Client “specific costs” are costs
that will likely be incurred that benefit only the one specific client i tikes would not be
incurred if that particular client did not exist. Examples of specificocosts include physical
examinations, costs associated with deposition of the particul tent, costs associated with
expert witness testimony that will only benefit the specific client/ copy charges, postage for
motions, letters, correspondence or other briefs which only be the specific client as well as
travel costs to attend hearings, depositions or other legal edings which only benefit the
specific client. Client understands and agrees that if Atto advance any court costs and other
litigation expenses incident to the handling of Client’s¢ aims, including common expenses,
Client will be responsible for reimbursing Attomne¥s_jout of any recovery made in client’s
lawsuit. Common expense deductions will be “— as follows:

At the time of settlement or resolution Clients case, Client will be responsible

for its percentage of the common expense which will be deducted from any

recovery after the deduction of attorneys’ fees. The percentage will be

calculated by taking the total number of clients and dividing this number by the

total amount of common expenses. As an example, if there are 100 clients and

common expenses amount tet 0,000.00, then each client would be required to

pay $100.00 in common expenses (100 clients / $10,000.00 = $100). As another

example, if there are 15G gents and the common expenses amount to $30,000.00,

then each client would be required to pay $200.00 in common expenses (150

clients / $0 000.00= $20
Client further agrees nit.all sums advanced by Attorneys to cover such necessary court costs and
other litigation expe incident to the preparation and prosecution of Client’s claims or causes
of action will be repaid to Attorneys out of any sum collected in addition to any contingent fee
set forth herein. ient agrees that any advancement of costs or expenses by Attorneys shall
also constitute@ ‘lien on Client’s claims and any proceeds of any settlement or judgment. If
there is n very for Client, Client will not be responsible for any costs and/or expenses
to re Ha ne feeover:
6. WARRANTIES AND REPRESENTATIONS. Attorneys agree to use the firm’s best efforts in
representing Client. Client understands that Attorneys make no warranties or representations
regarding the successful outcome of Client’s claims or causes of action, the value thereof, or any
expected recovery, and any expression relative thereto is a matter of Attorney's opinion only.
Attorneys do not guarantee any timeframe within which Client’s claims or causes of action will
be resolved.
Client Initials: Nn Page 3 of 6

7. CLIENT OBLIGATIONS. Client agrees to tell Attorneys the truth, to cooperate with and
keep Attorneys informed of any developments relative to Client’s claims or causes of action, to
faithfully comply with this agreement, and to keep Attorneys advised of any changes to Client’s
address or telephone number.
8. FICTITIOUS, GROUNDLESS, OR BAD FAITH. Client understands that in the event a suit
filed in Client’s behalf is found to be frivolous, fictitious, groundless, or broughtin bad faith,
Client may be liable for defendant's attorney's fees. RQ
@
9. SANCTIONS. Client agrees that Client must timely comply with discovery requests from
opposing counsel. Client understands that Client’s failure to comply | discovery requests
could result in the court imposing sanctions in the form of a fine or ot enalty. Client agrees
that in the event sanctions are imposed, Client will be solely responsible for paying any and all
sanctions, and Client further agrees that Attorneys will not be gesponsible or liable for any
sanction award.
&

10. LIABILITY FOR COURT Costs. Client understands thatin the event a lawsuit is filed in
Client’s behalf and such lawsuit is not ultimately sven Ce favor, court costs could be
assessed against Client. Client understands that such costs will not be paid by Attorneys
and agrees to pay such court costs should they be imposed.
11. IF NO RECOVERY. Client further indent that if Attorneys are unable to recover
anything either by settlement or trial, Client sh owe Attorneys nothing as a fee and Client shall
not be obligated to reimburse Attorneys for ¢ ses advanced on Client’s behalf.
12. CONSENT TO ASSOCIATE. Clieat understands and agrees to the association of Lance
Kassab of The Kassab Law Firm, Doug Montague of the law firm Montague, Pittman &
Vamado, P.A. and Tina Nicholso rhe Baker Nicholson Law Firm to represent Client and
other similarly situated Clients ins litigation and/or potential claims. Attorneys have agreed to
split all attorney’s fees in the following manner:

Fifty percent (50% The Kassab Law Firm:

Forty percent (4 0 Montague, Pittman & Varnado, P.A.: and

Ten percent a The Baker Nicholson Law Firm.
However, if The Baker Nicholson Law Firm assumes primary responsibility for litigation as lead
counsel in Client's case, then the Attorney’s have agreed to split all attorney’s fees in the
following mee

Pitty percent (50%) to The Kassab Law Firm

Twenty-Five percent (25%) to Montague, Pitman & Varnado, P.A.; and

Twenty-Five percent (25%) to The Baker Nicholson Law Firm.
The lawyers and law firms listed above have agreed to assume joint responsibility for the
representation of Client. Client understands and agrees to the association of these law firms and
the percentages of fees allocated to each law firm as stated above. The division of fees between
the lawyers and law firms listed above will not increase or change the amount of attorneys’
fees charged to the Client as outlined in Paragraph 3 above.
Client Initials: | hf Page 4 of 6

13. TERMINATION AND WITHDRAWAL. Client understands and agrees that Attorneys may
terminate the attorney-Client relationship created by this agreement and withdraw from Client’s
representation with or without Client’s consent for any reason Attorneys deem necessary.
14. CONTROVERSY AND DISPUTES. Any controversy arising out of or relating to
Attorneys’ representation of Client or this contract or any modification Ns extension
thereof, including any claim for breach of contract, tort, for damages, or fora scission or
reformation of this contract, or any other claim shall be settled by a colt of law with
competent jurisdiction in Harris County, Texas without a jury. GS
XS

15. CLIENT REQUESTS. Client understands that if requests by Clie not consistent with
the standard of care required of Attorneys, the Texas Disciplinary Rul Professional Conduct,
the Texas Supreme Court’s Mandate of Professionalism, or on courtesies expected
between Attorneys and other lawyers or third parties, Attorneys entitled to refuse without
breaching this agreement. &

16. DISCIPLINARY ISSUES. Client understands that ther alternative remedies against
Defendant attorneys may exist. For that reason the empJoyment of Attorneys are not for the
purpose of prosecuting other alternative remedies whether criminal, disciplinary, or other civil
matters. However, Client is hereby specifically advised in accordance with the Disciplinary
Rules of Texas that the State Bar of Texas investigates and prosecutes professional misconduct
committed by Texas attorneys. Although not complaint against or dispute with a lawyer
involves professional misconduct, the State s Office of General Counsel will provide you
with information about how to file a co t. You may call the State Bar's General Counsel
Office toll free at 1-800-932-1900 for moresinformation, The complaint that may be filed by the
State Bar's General Counsel’s office ox,by you as part of a disciplinary proceeding is NOT the
same thing as a legal malpractice ner may be prosecuted on your behalf by Attorneys.

17. CONTRACT SURVIVABILITY. This agreement and the powers and authority granted
herein shall survive and not tefquinate upon Clients death, mental incapacity, or legal disability.
18. SINGULAR AND Pian When the context requires, singular nouns and pronouns used
herein include the plugat

19. SaviNcs, 4) SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this agreement is held void and/or
unenforceable, (then such provision will be modified to reflect the parties’ intention. All
remaining Peon of this agreement shall remain in full force and effect.

20. COmDLETE AGREEMENT. This document sets forth the complete agreement between
Attorneys and Client and may be modified only by a written instrument signed by both a legal
representative of LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. and Client. It is agreed that there are no
oral representations of any kind.

21. COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING. By signing below and initialing each page, Client
acknowledges he has fully read this agreement, its terms, effects and consequences and that its
terms, effects and consequences have been fully and completely explained to Client by Attorneys
to Client’s full satisfaction.

Client Initials: / Zi Page 5 of 6

PLEASE INITIAL EACH PAGE, PRINT NAME, SIGN AND DATE
DATED: Agvil) ZO, , 2017.
CLIENT: (Printed Name) <o
~~
CLIENT: (Signature)>
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A Z)
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM, MONTAGUE, PITTMAN & VARNADQ; PA.
BAKER NICHOLSON LAW FIRM
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LAW FIRM
1420 Alabama Street | Houston | Texas | 77004
p. 713.522.7400 | f. 713.522.7410
www.TexasLegalMalpractice.com
POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
Client(s) full legal name: MEP a Fi OAAS o WO -

(s) = —e- a
Client(s) home phone number: work number: XG a —
Cel! number a i ©
Client(s) social security number(s): cr (Confidential)

. ° : bd @ it . 39

This agreement is between the above client(s), hereinaft ferred to as “Client” and LANCE

CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB RM, MONTAGUE, PITTMAN &
VARNADO, P.A. and the BAKER NICHOLSON LAW FI ereinafter referred to as “Attorneys.”
1, SCOPE OF SERVICES. Attorneys are here Snployed and appointed as Client’s true and
lawful attorneys to act for Client and to prose lient’s claims or causes of action against:
MICHAEL A. POHL (Defendant) and all ot rsons, firms, corporations, or business entities
legally responsible for causing Client’s d: e s resulting from such acts as follows:

BARRATRY, LEGAL MALPR¢ on AND/OR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
ARISING Our oF A ROLLOVER CASE INCIDENT
ca

Client understands that re ase may be filed and litigated jointly with other clients
who are similarly situated to.Client and/or who have similar claims against Defendants. As
such, Client is aware and es that Client’s confidential information may necessarily be
disclosed among other nts in order to effectuate a settlement. Client further
understands and agrées) that if a disagreement or dispute arises between any of the
common clients to the sharing of the confidential information, the attorney-client privilege
may not be available for assertion by any of them against the other(s) on certain issues.
Finally, if a co NRG i or aggregate settlement is effectuated, Client understands and agrees
that the offer ore lemand may require the consent of all commonly-represented clients and
the failure of on e or a few members of the group to consent to the settlement may result in
the withdraw al of the settlement or offer.

Client further understands that Attorneys are not specialized in, nor do they give, tax advice,
bankruptcy advice, family law or estate planning advice or any other advice involving other non-
civil or non-personal injury areas of specialized practice of law and they would recommend the
retention of a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) or qualified tax lawyer with regard to any
questions as to the taxability of any proceeds that are received pursuant to this agreement.
Client(s) Initials: WS Page 1 of 6

2. AUTHORITY. Client authorizes Attorneys to act as Client’s negotiator, to file pleadings
and appear in courts of law in Client’s behalf, to prosecute Client’s claims or causes of action to
settlement or final judgment, and to take any appropriate legal action they deem reasonably
necessary in the preservation of Client’s rights and claims. Client further authorizes attorneys to
do all things that Client might lawfully do in Client’s behalf, and ratifies and confirms all such
lawful acts that Attorneys may do or cause to be done on behalf of Client. Provided, however,
that no settlement shall be made by attorneys without Client’s approval. If Client refuses an
offer of settlement against Attorney’s recommendation, then Client agrees to becothe responsible
for paying all costs and expenses of the case, and must reimburse Attorne expenses and
costs already incurred within seven (7) days of a written demand for ok nen If
Client fails to timely reimburse Attorney after receiving such written notive/ then such failure
constitutes a termination of the representation by the Client. In the overt of such termination,
Attomeys are entitled to retain their entire contingency fee interest. eS
3. CONTINGENT FEE. In consideration of the services wa and to be rendered by
Attomeys, Client assigns and conveys to Attorneys the followjag resent undivided interest in
and to Client’s claims or causes of action: SF
33-1/3% of any sum collected before suitis filed; OR
40% of any sum collected ate suit is filed and settlement is
made without a trial; Re
45% of any sum collected:after the day prior to the first day
trial begins and settlement is made or judgment is paid
without oe
The above percentages shall be calculated.o the gross total settlement and/or recovery of cash,
property, reduction of debt or any oth& calculable benefit Client obtains through Attorney’s
representation, whether paid by periodié)payments, lump sum payment, transfer of property (real
or personal) or calculated by usi e cost of a structured settlement, or any combination
thereof. The contingent fee wi calculated on the gross recovery before the deduction of
costs and expenses. The conti t fee granted to attorneys based on the foregoing percentages
shall be and does hereby constignte a lien upon said claims or causes of action and any proceeds
of settlement or judgmen ke ient further understands that this Contract of Employment and
Power of Attorney ete hh the trial of this cause and the post-trial motions leading to the
entry of a final trial cour udgment. However, Attorneys will not have any duty to undertake an
appeal under this Coftiract of Employment and Power of Attomey unless and until there is an
agreement betw: ient and the Attorneys to undertake same for an additional fee. If there is
to be an appea' this case and the Client and the Attorneys agree to appeal this case, then
Attorneys' fep@r the consummation and handling of that appeal will be negotiated at that time.
4. Rikebean FEE. Client understands that no one has an interest in this case as a referring
attorney included in the fees to be paid as described above. The referring attorney’s interest is
n/a of the gross attorney’s fees collected by Attorneys.
5. COSTS, EXPENSES AND COMMON EXPENSES. Client understands that Client’s claims may
be litigated together with similarly situated clients. Client therefore understands that Attorney
may advance sums to cover reasonable and necessary expenses which in his opinion are
Client Initials: INS Page 2 of 6

reasonably necessary for the development of the Client’s case including any client-specific
expenses as well as Client’s share of various “common expenses.” Common expenses are
expenses that benefit multiple clients who are involved in the same litigation. Examples of
common expenses include costs associated with expert witnesses, consultants, investigators or
witnesses who will testify on common issues, deposition costs for deposing Defendants and
witnesses (i.e. the main defendants or the staff members of defendants), travel costs associated
with common depositions and with attending hearings at which motions on common issues are
heard, copying charges for copying or scanning documents that pertain to oo issues or
clients, court reporter and deposition fees that pertain to common issues or RO Ss, as well as
miscellaneous costs such as parking costs, certified mail, delivery char. d postage for
motions and briefings which pertain to common issues or clients. Client “s cific costs” are costs
that will likely be incurred that benefit only the one specific client and likely would not be
incurred if that particular client did not exist. Examples of specifig. cost include physical
examinations, costs associated with deposition of the particular Ko , costs associated with
expert witness testimony that will only benefit the specific cliget) opy charges, postage for
motions, letters, correspondence or other briefs which only benefit the specific client as well as
travel costs to attend hearings, depositions or other legal wedtsadings which only benefit the
specific client. Client understands and agrees that if Attorn dvance any court costs and other
litigation expenses incident to the handling of Client’s s, including common expenses,
Client will be responsible for reimbursing Attorne cout of any recovery made in client’s
lawsuit. Common expense deductions will be sels follows:

At the time of settlement or resolution of Clients case, Client will be responsible

for its percentage of the common expenses which will be deducted from an

P ge Mi

recovery after the deduction of ee fees. The percentage will be

calculated by taking the total nume of clients and dividing this number by the

total amount of common expensé§;’As an example, if there are 100 clients and

common expenses amount to $10,000.00, then each client would be required to

pay $100.00 in common e es (100 clients / $10,000.00 = $100). As another

example, if there are 3 do and the common expenses amount to $30,000.00,

then each client would\be required to pay $200.00 in common expenses (150

clients / $30,000.00 78200).
Client further agrees ht advanced by Attorneys to cover such necessary court costs and
other litigation expensessincident to the preparation and prosecution of Client’s claims or causes
of action will be r iF t0 Attorneys out of any sum collected in addition to any contingent fee
set forth herein, Client agrees that any advancement of costs or expenses by Attorneys shall
also constitute a lien on Client’s claims and any proceeds of any settlement or judgment. If
there is no reéovery for Client, Client will not be responsible for any costs and/or expenses
to develop the case.
6. WARRANTIES AND REPRESENTATIONS. Attorneys agree to use the firm’s best efforts in
representing Client. Client understands that Attorneys make no warranties or representations
regarding the successful outcome of Client’s claims or causes of action, the value thereof, or any
expected recovery, and any expression relative thereto is a matter of Attorney's opinion only.
Attorneys do not guarantee any timeframe within which Client’s claims or causes of action will
be resolved.
Client Initials: TY “ Page 3 of 6

7. CLIENT OBLIGATIONS. Client agrees to tell Attorneys the truth, to cooperate with and
keep Attorneys informed of any developments relative to Client’s claims or causes of action, to
faithfully comply with this agreement, and to keep Attorneys advised of any changes to Client’s
address or telephone number.
8. FICTITIOUS, GROUNDLESS, OR BAD FAITH. Client understands that in the event a suit
filed in Client’s behalf is found to be frivolous, fictitious, groundless, or brought in bad faith,
Client may be liable for defendant's attorney's fees. AS
9. SANCTIONS. Client agrees that Client must timely comply with disso requests from
opposing counsel. Client understands that Client’s failure to comply withsdiscovery requests
could result in the court imposing sanctions in the form of a fine or other penal Client agrees
that in the event sanctions are imposed, Client will be solely responsi or paying any and all
sanctions, and Client further agrees that Attorneys will not be responsible or liable for any
sanction award. &y
10. ‘LIABILITY FOR Court Costs. Client understands that ja the event a lawsuit is filed in
Client’s behalf and such lawsuit is not ultimately resolved inClient’s favor, court costs could be
assessed against Client. Client understands that such couthabsts will not be paid by Attorneys
and agrees to pay such court costs should they be imps
11. IF NO RECOVERY. Client further underst that if Attorneys are unable to recover
anything either by settlement or trial, Client sha Attorneys nothing as a fee and Client shall
not be obligated to reimburse Attorneys for expenses advanced on Client’s behalf.
12. CONSENT TO ASSOCIATE. Clint ndesands and agrees to the association of Lance
Kassab of The Kassab Law Firm, Dotg”’ Montague of the law firm Montague, Pittman &
Varnado, P.A. and Tina Nicholson ofthe Baker Nicholson Law Firm to represent Client and
other similarly situated Clients in its litigation and/or potential claims. Attorneys have agreed to
split all attorney’s fees in the owing manner:

Fifty percent (50%) tothe Kassab Law Firm:

Forty percent Orgs ontague, Pittman & Varnado, P.A.: and

Ten percent (0); e Baker Nicholson Law Firm.
However, if The Baker Nicholson Law Firm assumes primary responsibility for litigation as lead
counsel in Client’ sease, then the Attorney’s have agreed to split all attorney’s fees in the
following manrier:,""

©

Fifty percent (50%) to The Kassab Law Firm

T y-Five percent (25%) to Montague, Pitman & Varnado, P.A.; and

Twenty-Five percent (25%) to The Baker Nicholson Law Firm.
The lawyers and law firms listed above have agreed to assume joint responsibility for the
representation of Client. Client understands and agrees to the association of these law firms and
the percentages of fees allocated to each law firm as stated above. The division of fees between
the lawyers and law firms listed above will not increase or change the amount of attorneys’
fees charged to the Client as outlined in Paragraph 3 above.
Client Initials: TIt4 Page 4 of 6

13. TERMINATION AND WITHDRAWAL. Client understands and agrees that Attorneys may
terminate the attorney-Client relationship created by this agreement and withdraw from Client’s
representation with or without Client’s consent for any reason Attorneys deem necessary.

14, CONTROVERSY AND DISPUTES. Any controversy arising out of or relating to
Attorneys’ representation of Client or this contract or any modification or extension
thereof, including any claim for breach of contract, tort, for damages, or foxirescission or
reformation of this contract, or any other claim shall be settled by a cout of law with
competent jurisdiction in Harris County, Texas without a jury. )

15, CLIENT REQUESTS. Client understands that if requests by Clien not consistent with
the standard of care required of Attorneys, the Texas Disciplinary Rul rofessional Conduct,
the Texas Supreme Court’s Mandate of Professionalism, or co n courtesies expected
between Attorneys and other lawyers or third parties, Attomeys(are entitled to refuse without
breaching this agreement. S

16. DISCIPLINARY ISSUES. Client understands that oo alternative remedies against
Defendant attorneys may exist. For that reason the em ent of Attorneys are not for the
purpose of prosecuting other alternative remedies whee rime disciplinary, or other civil
matters. However, Client is hereby specifically advised in accordance with the Disciplinary
Rules of Texas that the State Bar of Texas investigates and prosecutes professional misconduct
committed by Texas attorneys. Although not ope opin against or dispute with a lawyer
involves professional misconduct, the State ‘s’ Office of General Counsel will provide you
with information about how to file a complaint’ You may call the State Bar's General Counsel
Office toll free at 1-800-932-1900 for m ormation. The complaint that may be filed by the
State Bar's General Counsel’s office or epyou as part of a disciplinary proceeding is NOT the
same thing as a legal malpractice case that may be prosecuted on your behalf by Attorneys.

17. CONTRACT sunvivanases This agreement and the powers and authority granted
herein shall survive and not tertninlate upon Client’s death, mental incapacity, or legal disability.
18. SINGULAR AND Pua When the context requires, singular nouns and pronouns used
herein include the plural‘

19. SAVINGS AND) SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this agreement is held void and/or
unenforceable, thenysuch provision will be modified to reflect the parties’ intention. All
remaining provisions of this agreement shall remain in full force and effect.

20. Contry AGREEMENT. This document sets forth the complete agreement between
Attorneys Client and may be modified only by a written instrument signed by both a legal
representative of LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. and Client. It is agreed that there are no
oral representations of any kind.

21. COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING. By signing below and initialing each page, Client
acknowledges he has fully read this agreement, its terms, effects and consequences and that its
terms, effects and consequences have been fully and completely explained to Client by Attorneys
to Client’s full satisfaction.

Client Initials: “7 f, “3 Page 5 of 6

PLEASE INITIAL EACH PAGE, PRINT NAME, SIGN AND DATE
J. /
DATED: “/ LE f -_, 2017.
Wise ~ faerry
CLIENT: (Printed Name) _<C (
CLIENT: (Signature) /
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LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A Q
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM, MONTAGUE, PITTMAN & VARNADO PA.
BAKER NICHOLSON LAW FIRM
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34,2022-09-12,RSP,Kassab,Kassab’s response to Pohl no-evid MSJ,"Kassab's Response to Pohl's Motion for Partial Traditional and No-Evidence Summary Judgment on Affirmative Defenses — opposes Pohl's attempt to eliminate Kassab's affirmative defenses of justification, unclean hands, illegality, unlawful acts, criminal acts, and in pari delicto, and challenges Pohl's global no-evidence motion as procedurally defective under Timpte Industries v. Gish","Phase 3 response brief filed September 12, 2022 (same day as Kassab's declaration, Filing #33). Responds to Pohl's motion seeking to eliminate Kassab's key affirmative defenses before trial. Incorporates by reference Kassab's own MSJs (June 8, 2021 and August 29, 2022, i.e. Filing #30), the Nicholson MSJ (August 19, 2022), and Nicholson's response to Pohl's motion (September 12, 2022). Addressed to Judge Scot 'Dolli' Dollinger.",MSJ-3,N/A,Phase 3,2022-09-12_RSP_Kassab-Response-to-Pohl-No-Evid-MSJ_FILED.pdf,"Deny Pohl's Motion for Partial Traditional and No-Evidence Summary Judgment on Affirmative Defenses; alternatively, grant continuance under Rule 166a(g) to allow completion of discovery on illegality defense; grant summary judgment against Plaintiffs ordering they take nothing on their claims against Kassab","9/12/2022 6:16 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 68179652
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 9/12/2022 6:16 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIALk DISTRICT
THE KASSAB DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFSC’ MOTION FOR
PARTIAL TRADITIONAL AND NO-EVIDENCE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE SCOT “DOLLI” DOLLINGEtR:
Defendants, Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C.
d/b/a/ The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab”) file this, theeir Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Partial Traditional and No-Evidence Suummary Judgment on Affirmative
Defenses,1 and would respectfully show the following.
INTRaODUCTION
Pohl2 committed illegal and unethical barratry and he wants Kassab, who
brought the barratry litigation aend grievances against Pohl on behalf of more than
four hundred (400) of Pohl’fs illegally solicited clients, to pay for Pohl’s barratry
defense costs. But Pohl’s claims are barred for several reasons, including based on
several affirmative defenses. Pohl has filed the instant Motion, seeking partial
traditional summiary judgment on the affirmative defenses of justification, unclean
hands, illegoality, and unlawful acts. However, Pohl has not negated those defenses
as a matter of law. As to the other defenses, Pohl attempts to dispose of them
through a global and conclusory no-evidence challenge, which is insufficient.
1 The self-serving title of the pleading is “Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses that Seek to Relitigate Failed Barratry Claims Against Plaintiffs
and No-Evidence Motion on the Remaining Affirmative Defenses.”
2 This refers collectively to Plaintiffs Michael A. Pohl and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC.
Regardless, Kassab can demonstrate, either here or in incorporated summary
judgment briefing, that each of the defenses applicable to him apply, and that
evidence supports each of them. Accordingly, the Motion should be in all things
denied. k
GENERAL OBJECTION C
Pohl inappropriately suggests that all barratry suits were resolved on the
merits. That is incorrect. One of the lawsuits – the Berry caise – was settled,3 which
suggests that the case had merit. Another lawsuit – the Cheatham case – was
initially dismissed on summary judgment but recently reversed because fact issues
existed on whether Pohl and his co-counsel committed barratry. See Cheatham v.
Pohl, No. 01-20-00046-CV, 2022 Tex. Appl. LEXIS 6528 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Aug. 30, 2022, no pet. h.). TheM other two lawsuits – Brumfield and Gandy –
were dismissed, not on the merits, but on the affirmative defense of limitations. See
Brumfield v. Williamson, 634 iS.W.3d 170, 177 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021,
pet. denied) and Gandy v. Williamson, 634 S.W.3d 214 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2021, pet. denoied). “An affirmative defense presents a situation where a
plaintiff cannot relcover even if his claims are true because of some other fact that
the defendant ihas pled as a bar.” Man Engines & Components, Inc. v. Shows, 434
S.W.3d 132, 137 (Tex. 2014), In other words, none of the barratry suits have
been adjudicated on the merits, and neither has the issue of whether Pohl
committed barratry.
3 Exhibit 1, September 12, 2022 Declaration of Lance Kassab at ¶ 14.
Kassab incorporates and adopts by reference all evidence and argument in
his Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment filed on August 29, 2022. See TEX. R.
CIV. P. 58. Kassab also incorporate all evidence and argument in the Traditional
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Tina Nicholson and Baker Nikcholson, LLP
(“Nicholson”) on August 19, 2022, as well as Nicholson’s responsCe to Pohl’s Motion
filed September 12, 2022, to the extent that response is applicable to Kassab. The
combined evidence and argument of all those documents diemonstrate conclusively
that Pohl committed barratry and unauthorized practice of law, which bars him
from recovery in this retaliatory lawsuit.
RESPONSE TO TRADITIONAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Justification is a valid laffirmative defense to Pohl’s
claims. a
Kassab has asserted the affirmative defense of justification.4 Pohl contends
that justification “is not a defenese to any of Pohl’s claims.”5 Of course, Pohl fails to
support this statement with fany authority. Rather, he contends that justification “is
an affirmative defense to a claim of tortious interference with contract.”6 But just
because the defense is commonly applied to one type of claim does not mean, as Pohl
contends, that iti is “not a recognized defense” to other types of claims, such as theft
of trade secorets, conversion or conspiracy.7 In fact, the defense of justification has
been applied outside the context of tortious interference to anti-trust claims. See
Money Masters, Inc. v. TRW, Inc., No. 05-98-02017-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 622,
4 See Kassab’s Sixth Amended Answer, at ¶ 15(2).
5 Mot. at 2.
6 Mot. at 3.
7 Mot. at 3.
at *17 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 23, 2003, pet. denied) (mem. op.). And, Texas courts
have considered the defense in relation to theft of trade secrets. See Lamont v.
Vaquillas Energy Lopeno, Ltd., 421 S.W.3d 198, 220 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013,
pet. denied) (determining whether evidence supported defense of jukstification to
claim that seismic map of a gas prospect constituted a tradCe secret and was
acquired through improper means). Accordingly, Pohl has failed to demonstrate
that the defense of justification is inapplicable as a matter iof law.
Pohl argues that even if the defense applies, Kassab and Nicholson cannot
show that “Pohl took any action against them or that involved them before they
committed the torts that form the basis of Pohl’s claim.”8 But Pohl misunderstands
the nature of the justification defense, andl the factual basis giving rise to it.
Justification can be based on Mthe exercise of either (1) the party’s own legal
rights or (2) the party’s good faith claim to a colorable right, even though the claim
ultimately proves to be mistakien. Tex. Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203, 211
(Tex. 1996). When the party conclusively establishes it had a legal right to engage
in the complained-of oconduct, the party's motive for engaging in that conduct is
irrelevant. Id. l
Here, Kiassab was justified in obtaining the information that Pohl contends is
his purported trade secrets. The information was obtained by Kassab as part of his
investigation and ultimate pursuit of barratry claims against Pohl on behalf of
hundreds of clients.9 Kassab concluded, based on discussions he had with and
8 Mot. at 3.
9 Exhibit 1, September 12, 2022 Declaration of Lance Kassab at ¶¶ 5-8.
documents obtained from Scott Favre, the owner of Precision Marketing, that the
information was owned by Precision Marketing, and not Pohl.10 In fact, Favre
testified that Precision Marketing owned the information, including client lists and
files the company acquired while soliciting clients,11 and shared wkith Kassab a
purchase agreement demonstrating that Favre was the owner oCf that information
through his purchase of Precision Marketing.12
Kassab had a legal right to acquire evidence to supiport the barratry claims
that would be made against Pohl on behalf of his clients without making himself
liable. See Taylor v. Tolbert, 644 S.W.3d 637, 647 (Tex. 2022) (“lawyers must be able
to pursue legal rights they deem necessary and proper for their clients without the
menace of civil liability looming over theml and influencing their actions.”). And in
carrying out that lawyerly duty, KasMsab had the right and obligation to investigate
the potential claims against Pohl or risk sanctions for not investigating the claims.
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 13. Kassaib was also justified in obtaining the information to
report Pohl to the State B
ar of Texas, which he did.13 See TEX. DISC. R. PROF’L COND.
8.03 (“a lawyer havinog knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of
applicable rules ofl professional conduct that raises a substantial question as to that
lawyer's honesity, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall
inform the appropriate disciplinary authority.”); TEX. R. DISC. PROC. 17.09 (“No
lawsuit may be instituted against any Complainant or witness predicated upon the
10 Exhibit 1, September 12, 2022 Declaration of Lance Kassab at ¶¶ 8.
11 Exhibit 2, Affidavit of Scott Favre.
12 Exhibit 3, Purchase Agreement.
13 Exhibit 4, October 2018 Declaration of Lance Kassab, at p. 2; Exhibit 5, Grievance Complaint.
filing of a Grievance or participation in the attorney disciplinary and disability
system.”).
Under these circumstances, there are genuine issues of material fact as to
whether Kassab was justified in the actions that he took. k
B. Kassab may assert unclean hands as a defensCe because
Pohl seeks equitable relief. 
Kassab asserts unclean hands as a defense becauset Pohl seeks injunctive
relief and attorney’s fees as damages under the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(“TUTSA”). To the extent Pohl is permitted to seeke attorney’s fees as damages, his
unclean hands bar him from recovering under suuch an equitable exception.
Pohl’s summary judgment is based on the false premise that he “does not
seek equitable relief.”14 That contentioan is rebutted by Pohl’s own pleadings. Pohl
has pursued claims under TUTSA, which requires a person claiming ownership of a
trade secret to demonstrate “legeal, or equitable” title to the information. See TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§f 134A.002(3-a) (emphasis added). Additionally, “Pohl
seeks injunctive relief”15 and it is well-established that “[i]njunctive relief is an
equitable remedy.” Fetter v. Wells Fargo Bank Tex., N.A., 110 S.W.3d 683, 688
(Tex. App.—Houiston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (emphasis added). Moreover, Pohl’s
conclusion roequests “other and further or alternative relief (legal and equitable) to
which Pohl may be entitled,”16 for all of his causes of action. Because Pohl is seeking
equitable relief, he “must come into court with clean hands.” Fetter, 110 S.W.3d at
14 Mot. at 4.
15 See Pohl’s First Amended Petition, at ¶ 45.
16 Pohl’s First Amended Petition, at ¶ 50 (emphasis added).
688. Pohl’s contention that unclean hands is not a valid affirmative defense fails as
a matter of law.
C. Illegality.
1. Objection to Pohl’s lack of supporting evidencke.
Kassab objects to Pohl’s lack of evidence supporting his traCditional summary
judgment motion as to illegality. Pohl asserts that illegality does not apply because
it “is not part of a document,” and he “engaged in ‘illegal aicts” long before” Kassab
allegedly wronged Pohl.17 Pohl then incorrectly implies that his acts of barratry
“[have] largely been adjudicated” on the merits.18 That is untrue, as demonstrated
above. Pohl also asserts that his “claims do not seek to enforce any illegal contract
or other illegal action.”19 But Pohl prlovides no evidence in support of his
statements, and “motions and argumMents of counsel are not evidence.” Johnson v.
Scott, 113 S.W.3d 366, 373 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003, pet. denied). It is telling
that Pohl is unwilling to sweair to any of these facts in an affidavit. Kassab objects
to Pohl’s lack of summary judgment evidence.
2. Poohl has not negated the illegality defense.
Pohl arguesl that the illegality defense “is not a defense” to his claims, “and
even if it werei, it would not be available here.”20 Of course, Pohl does not cite any
case precluding the use of the illegality defense in claims arising from barratry.
This is because the defense has commonly been applied to bar claims stemming
17 Mot., at 4.
18 Mot., at 4-5.
19 Mot., at 5.
20 Mot., at 4.
from barratry. See Luong v. McAllister, No. 01-17-00198-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS
5998, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 2, 2018, pet. denied) (contract
between law firm and non-lawyer to solicit clients in exchange for share of
attorney’s fees was void due to illegality); Plumlee v. Paddock, 832 S.Wk.2d 757, 760
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1992, writ denied) (refusing equitable relCief where owner of
ambulance company had no basis to recover under fee-sharing agreement with
attorney without reliance on unlawful barratry agreemenit). And Pohl’s lawyers
are well aware of this doctrine. They recently used the illegality defense to
obtain summary judgment on a legal malpractice claim brought by an investor who
gave an attorney money in exchange for a share of attorneys’ fees from the BP
litigation. See Duncan Litig. Invs., LLC vl. Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell &
Berkowitz, No. 4:19-CV-3094, 2022 UM.S. Dist. LEXIS 147005, at *24-30 (S.D. Tex.
2022). Moreover, as demonstrated in the summary judgment briefing on file with
the Court, Pohl and his lawyeirs in the Mississippi Litigation also used the illegality
defense to Precisions Marketing’s claims against Pohl for failing to pay Precision
Marketing for referrinog thousands of BP cases.
The illegalitly defense applies here. To sustain his claims, Pohl must establish
a right to thei property he claims was misappropriated. The first element of a
TUTSA claim violation is that the plaintiff owned a trade secret. TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE §§ 134A.002(1), (3), (6), 134A.004(a). The statute defines “owner” to
mean “the person or entity in whom or in which rightful, legal, or equitable title to”
the trade secret. Id. at § § 134A.002(3-a). Because Pohl obtained the alleged trade
secret information illegally, through barratry and the unauthorized practice of law,
he necessarily does not have “rightful, legal, or equitable title” to the information.
Accordingly, Pohl’s illegal conduct necessarily negates his TUTSA claim.
Likewise, although common-law claims for conversion and conkspiracy are
preempted by TUTSA, Pohl would have to establish that hCe owned or had
possession of the property or entitlement to possession. See Freezia v. IS Storage
Venture, LLC, 474 S.W.3d 379, 386-87 (Tex. App.—Houstion [14th Dist.] 2015, no
pet.). Because Pohl’s claims rest on information acquired through illegal contracts,
Kassab can sustain an affirmative defense of illegality against Pohl.
Pohl provides a string cite of unrelated authority to improperly suggest that
illegality cannot be a defense in this casel. But none of the cases cited by Pohl are
relevant to the facts of this case or dMiscuss the interaction of the illegality defense
and the unlawful acts doctrine. See Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. White, 490 S.W.3d 468,
483 (Tex. 2016) (in unrelated ilandlord tenant case); Lewkowicz v. El Paso Apparel
Corp., 625 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex.1981) (holding that illegal actions concerning
leather production anod improper jailing in Mexico violate the public policy of Texas);
Niles v. Harris Colunty Fresh Water Supply Dist., 339 S.W.2d 562, 563 (Tex. Civ.
App.—Waco 19i60, writ ref’d) (affirming pleading of illegality was unnecessary over
water supply where the contract was illegal on its face); Reid v. Associated
Employers Lloyds, 164 S.W.2d 584, 585–586 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1942, writ
ref’d) (whether illegality must be affirmatively asserted as a defense to worker’s
compensation claim originating from unlading a keg of beer); Montgomery Ward &
Co. v. Lusk, 52 S.W.2d 1110 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1932, writ ref’d) (whether
contract requiring work for more than 9 hours a day violated a statute); Texas & P.
Coal Co. v. Lawson, 89 Tex. 394, 34 S.W. 919, 921 (1896) (concerning the legality of
a contract for the sale of liquor). k
Accordingly, this Court should deny Pohl’s traditional moCtion for summary
judgment on illegality as unsupported by law or fact.
D. Unlawful acts, criminal acts, and in pari dielicto.
1. Objection to Pohl’s lack of supporting evidence.
Kassab again objects to Pohl’s lack of evidence supporting his traditional
motion for summary judgment as to unlawful acts, criminal acts or in pari delicto.
Pohl asserts that “criminal acts,” “unlawlful acts,” and “in pari delicto” does not
apply because “(1) Pohl’s actions hMave been largely adjudicated and were not
‘admittedly’ criminal or unlawful; and (2) even if a fact issue remained regarding
the legality of Pohl’s acts, anyi wrongful act is not sufficiently tied to Pohl’s claims
here to give rise to a defense.”21 But Pohl’s barratry and unauthorized practice of
law in other states hoave not been disposed of on the merits. Instead, Pohl’s sole
evidence supportilng his motion is that “Pohl can certainly demonstrate the
elements of eaich of his claims without being required to prove any illegal act.”22 And
then he doesn’t—he provides no evidence whatsoever. Pohl is not even willing to
swear under oath that he did not commit barratry. Accordingly, Kassab objects to
Pohl’s lack of summary judgment evidence.
21 Mot., at 5.
22 Mot., at 6.
10
2. Kassab established that Pohl’s unlawful acts,
criminal acts and the doctrine of in pari delicto
preclude Pohl’s claims in prior summary judgment
briefing, which is incorporated herein.
In his Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment filed on August 29, 2022,
Kassab demonstrated that Pohl’s unlawful acts, criminal acts and thee in pari delicto
doctrines preclude Pohl’s claims as a matter of law. Kassab incorporates that
argument and evidence as if set forth verbatim herein. Kassatb also incorporates the
argument and evidence relating to the unlawful acts doctrine (including illegal or
criminal acts or in pari delicto) set forth on pages e9-14 of Nicholson’s Response to
Plaintiffs’ Traditional and No-Evidence Motionu for Summary Judgment, filed on
September 12, 2022.
In short, the Unlawful Acts ruale provides that “[i]f, at the time of the
plaintiff’s injury, the plaintiff was engaged in an illegal act, and that act contributed
to the injury, he may not recoveer.” Andrew Shebay & Co., P.L.L.C. v. Bishop, 429
S.W.3d 644, 648–49 (Tex. fApp.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). The
summary judgment evidence on file with the Court demonstrates that Pohl violated
Texas rules and laws governing lawyers by illegally soliciting clients, splitting fees
with a non-lawiyer, and failing to protect confidential client information. Pohl’s
former clienots then sued him for his barratry, and Pohl now seeks to recover fees
from defending his barratry.23 In sum, if Pohl had not been violating the law and
disciplinary rules by procuring the purported trade secret information through
23 In addition, Kassab attaches the expert reports from Lillian Hardwick (Exhibit 6), Benjamin
Cooper (Exhibit 7), and Joseph F. Cleveland, Jr. (Exhibit 8), which detail and explain why the
evidence in the summary judgment record establishes that Pohl committed barratry and other
unlawful acts which preclude his claims.
11
illegal and unethical means, he would not have been sued for barratry. The very
purpose of the doctrine is to make sure “that [Pohl] should not even entertain the
hope of indemnity for the offense committed.” Houston Ice & Brewing Co. v. Sneed,
63 Tex. Civ. App. 17, 21, 132 S.W. 386, 388 (1910, writ dism’d) (holdinkg that one of
two parties involved in the illegal sale of alcohol could not Csue the other for
misrepresentation).
Moreover, the First Court of Appeals has opined thait Pohl’s acts, if true—and
they are true—are illegal and preclude summary judgment. In the Cheatham case,
the court of appeals concluded that the same Walker deposition testimony as here
on the same allegations24 are “some evidence” that “Pohl and [his co-counsel]
coordinated the barratry scheme” and “thlat Pohl directly funded, and his wife and
her company further funded, the solMicitation of prospective clients” and that “Pohl
directed case runners to contact and solicit potential clients on his behalf, including
offering money from Pohl’s fiirm and his wife’s company.” Cheatham, 2022 WL
3720139, at *8. This evidence defeated the summary judgment filed by Pohl’s co-
counsel in the Cheathoam case, and is certainly enough to defeat it here.
Accordinglyl, this court can apply these doctrines to deny recovery to Pohl for
his illegal actis, even if the court holds that one or more defendants have also
committed an unlawful act. See Dover v. Baker, Brown, Sharman & Parker, 859
S.W.2d 441, 443, 450-51 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (denying
recovery to plaintiff who sued his attorney for malpractice claiming he signed a
24 Kassab attached Walker’s testimony as exhibits in his prior summary judgment motion, which is
incorporated by reference herein.
12
false affidavit on the advice of his attorney who knew the affidavit was unlawful).
This doctrine is not an “excuse” but a bar to Pohl bringing any claims that stem
from his own illegal and wrongful actions.
For these reasons, and those stated in the summary judgment bkriefing before
the Court, summary judgment on the affirmative defenses of unlawCful acts, criminal
acts and the in pari delicto should be denied.
RESPONSE TO NO-EVIDENCE SUMMARY J DUiDGMENT
A. Pohl’s global and conclusory no-evidence challenge is
defective and should not be consideered.
The no-evidence summary judgment rule uexplicitly requires Pohl to “state the
elements as to which there is no evidence.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i) (emphasis
added). “The motion must be specific ina challenging the evidentiary support for an
element of a claim or defense; paragraph (i) does not authorize conclusory
motions or general no-evideence challenges to an opponent’s case.” Timpte
Indus. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 30f6, 310 (Tex. 2009) (emphasis added).
Pohl’s no-evidence challenge violates this rule. His entire no-evidence
argument is as follows:
In additioin to the affirmative defenses set forth above, Defendants
assert tihe following affirmative defenses, some of which were already
consiodered and rejected by this Court and the court of appeals during
consideration of the Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss under the Texas
Citizens Participation Act: 1) Statute of limitations; 2) Estoppel; 3)
Waiver; 4) Ratification; 5) Release; 6) Contribution; 7) Failure to
mitigate; 8) Lack of standing; 9) Accord and Satisfaction; 10).
Assumption of the Risk; 11) First Amendment; 12) Attorney Immunity;
13) Res Judicata; 14) Defect of Parties; 15) Abandonment; 16) Subject
of a Valid Contract. Pohl is entitled to summary judgment pursuant to
Rule 166a(i) because after an adequate time for discovery, the
13
Defendants have no evidence to support any of these affirmative
defenses.
This conclusory no-evidence challenge is insufficient as a matter of law. See Dean v.
Aurora Bank, F.S.B., No. 01-15-00827-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 13472, at *9 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 20, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (e“A no-evidence
summary judgment is insufficient as a matter of law if the motion is conclusory or
fails to challenge a specific essential element of a cause of acttion for which the non-
movant would have the burden of proof at trial.”).
When a no-evidence motion for summary ejudgment, as here, does not
challenge specific elements, it must be treatued as a traditional motion under
166a(c), which imposes the burden on the movant. Weaver v. Highlands Ins. Co., 4
S.W.3d 826, 829 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houstaon [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). As he provides
no facts or law in support of his argument, Pohl has not met his burden to prove
“there is no genuine issue as to aeny material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of la
wf.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Hillis v. McCall, 602 S.W.3d
436, 439-40 (Tex. 2020). With Pohl not having met his burden, “the burden does not
shift and [Kassab] need not respond or present any evidence.” Chavez v. Kansas
City S. Ry. Co., 5i20 S.W.3d 898, 900 (Tex. 2017). Accordingly, the Court should deny
Pohl’s purpoorted “no-evidence” motion.
B. The court should deny Pohl’s “no-evidence” motion
because Kassab can provide sufficient evidence and law
to support his affirmative defenses.
In his Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment filed June 8, 2021, Kassab
established, as a matter of law, the defenses of limitations, res judicata, and
14
attorney immunity. Kassab incorporates that motion and the evidence attached
thereto for all purposes herein. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 58. In the Traditional Motion for
Summary Judgment filed on August 29, 2022, Kassab established, as a matter of
law, the defenses of immunity pursuant to Texas Rule of Disciplinakry Procedure
17.09, the judicial proceedings privilege, attorney immunity, limCitations, and that
Pohl’s claims are barred by illegal and unlawful acts. In that motion, Kassab also
demonstrated that the alleged trade secret information is niot owned by Pohl, but by
Precision Marketing or Pohl’s former clients, which demonstrates the lack of
standing and defect of parties affirmative defenses. Kassab also incorporates that
motion and the evidence attached thereto. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 58.
In addition, Kassab incorporates bly reference and adopts the response to
Pohl’s no-evidence motion for sumMmary judgment filed by the Nicholson on
September 12, 2022 as to those defenses which apply equally to Kassab, including
attorney immunity, limitationis, waiver, ratification and failure to mitigate. See TEX.
R. CIV. P. 58.
In addition, aos to the affirmative defense of standing or capacity and
ownership of the lpurportedly confidential information, the recent depositions of
Ladner and Wialker demonstrate that the information was Precision Marketing’s
work product and owned by Precision Marketing, not Pohl. Ladner testified that
“client information” was owned by Precision Marketing.25 Likewise, Walker testified
that his company owned the client list and documents containing information about
25 Exhibit 9, August 29, 2022 Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at 44-45.
15
clients with potential cases.26 Walker agreed that the client information was
Precision Marketing’s “work product.”27 Thus, Pohl does not have standing or
capacity to sue Kassab, and there is a defect of parties to this litigation.
As to the defense of assumption of the risk, Pohl assumed thek risk that his
purported trade secret information would be stolen when he placCed it in the hands
of Walker, a known convicted felon. Specifically, Walker pled guilty to “one count of
federal program fraud and one count of conspiracy to icommit federal program
fraud” because he “fraudulently diverted and misused both federal grants and
money belonging to the State of Mississippi.”28 Pohl knew that Walker was a
convicted felon.29 Yet, Pohl trusted Walker with his purported trade secrets, without
requiring Walker to sign a confidentiality lagreement or non disclosure agreement.30
Pohl did not require these agreemeMnts because the alleged trade secrets are not
trade secrets at all and Pohl has no ownership in the documents that are the subject
of this lawsuit. Thus, Pohl aissumed the risk that Walker, a convicted felon who
“diverted and misused” property belonging to the others, would divert and misuse
Pohl’s purportedly coonfidential information, if in fact the alleged confidential
information were hlis.
The remiaining contract-related affirmative defenses of release, accord and
satisfaction, estoppel do not apply to Kassab. But to the extent that they do, Kassab
26 Exhibit 10, August 31, 2022 Deposition of Scott Walker, at 250-251.
27 Exhibit 10, August 31, 2022 Deposition of Scott Walker, at 251.
28 https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/jackson/press-releases/2014/ocean-springs-businessman-pleads-
guilty-to-federal-program-fraud. The Court is requested to take judicial notice of this official press
release from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
29 Exhibit 11, December 10, 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 104-105, 159-160.
30 Exhibit 11, December 10, 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 22-23, 159-161.
16
incorporates the argument and evidence set forth by Nicholson in her September 12,
2022 response to Pohl’s purported no-evidence challenge.
ALTERNATIVE REQUEST FOR CONTINUANCE
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(g) allows a continuance of kthe summary
judgment hearing “to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositiCons to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.” T iEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(g).
To the extent the evidence is insufficient to raise a fact iissue on the affirmative
defense of illegality, Kassab objects and requests a continuance on the no-evidence
motion because Pohl has unreasonably resisted Kassab’s request for discovery
relating to that defense.
Pohl’s resistance prompted Kassab lto file his Motion to Compel Removal of
Pohl’s Objections and Properly RespMond to Discovery on August 25, 2022. Kassab
incorporates that motion as if set forth verbatim herein and asks the Court to take
judicial notice of it. See TEX. Ri. CIV. P. 58. As set forth in the motion to compel, Pohl
has refused to answer relevant and material discovery relating to his involvement
in the illegal barratroy scheme, which is discovery going to the heart of Kassab’s
illegality defense. lSpecifically, that discovery will aid in establishing that all of
Pohl’s purportiedly trade secret information was derived through illegal or unethical
conduct, such as barratry and the unauthorized practice of law.
Kassab used diligence in attempting to obtain this relevant discovery. Kassab
served the discovery requests beginning in May of 2021.31 Pohl amended his
31 See Motion to Compel, at Exhibit 1.
17
discovery responses through October 2021.32 Kassab attempted to seek additional
information and clarify or elaborate on certain discovery requests in later sets of
discovery, served September 2021 and December 2021.33 Pohl responded to that
discovery into January 2022.34 Over the course of the following moknths, Kassab
reviewed the discovery requests and then attempted to confer wiCth Pohl about the
discovery deficiencies. But Pohl refused to amend his discovery and produce
responsive information,35 thus necessitating the motion to ciompel.
Pohl cannot simultaneously withhold relevant discovery concerning his
illegal acts while, at the same time, move for summary judgment on illegality. See
Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. Fuqua, 29 S.W.3d 140, 145 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th
Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (“A party should nlot be able to abuse the discovery process,
withhold key evidence from their oppMonents, and then use that lack of evidence to
win a judgment.”). Accordingly, a continuance of the summary judgment hearing
(and trial) should be granted iuntil after the motion to compel is heard and Pohl is
compelled to produce the improperly withheld information. See McInnis v. Mallia,
261 S.W.3d 197, 204 o(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (the fact that
movant “withheldl information in discovery” is a factor that weighed “in favor of”
permitting addiitional time for discovery); Tempay, Inc. v. TNT Concrete & Constr.,
Inc., 37 S.W.3d 517, 522-23 (Tex. App. – Austin 2001, pet. denied) (holding that the
trial court abused its discretion in determining that adequate time for discovery had
32 See Motion to Compel, at Exhibit 2 and 3.
33 See Motion to Compel, at Exhibit 4 and 5.
34 See Motion to Compel, at Exhibit 7.
35 See Motion to Compel, at Exhibit 9.
18
passed because movant successfully resisted nonmovant's attempts to obtain
discovery).
CONCLUSION & PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Plaintiffs’ Motikon for Partial
Traditional and No-Evidence Summary Judgment on AffirmatCive Defenses and
grant summary judgment against Plaintiffs, ordering that they take nothing on
their claims against Lance Christopher Kassab and The Kaissab Law Firm.
Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
__________________________
lDAVID ERIC KASSAB
a Texas State Bar No. 24071351
M david@kassab.law
 LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 00794070
e lance@kassab.law
i NICHOLAS R. PIERCE
f Texas State Bar No. 24098263
nicholas@kassab.law
1214 Elgin Street
o Houston, Texas 77004
Telephone: 713-522-7400
l Facsimile: 713-522-7410
i E-Service: eserve@kassab.law
o ATTORNEYS FOR KASSAB DEFENDANTS
19
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date, September 12, 2022, I electronically filed this
document with the Clerk of the Court using the eFile.TXCourts.gov electronic filing
system which will send notification of such filing to all parties or counsel of record.
___________________C____
DAVID ERIC KASSAtB 
20
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this
document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below.
The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate
of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab e
Bar No. 24071351 C
david@kassab.law t
Envelope ID: 68179652 r
Status as of 9/13/2022 8:03 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email sTimestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com r 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Andrew Johnson ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Andrew J. Sarne asarne@krcl.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.conm 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Kathryn Laflin KLaflin@KRCL.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrrar.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Larry Newsom lnewsom@fkrcl.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo jason@ciofalolaw.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Todd Taylor titaylor@jandflaw.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Harris Wells fhwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Lawyer Wade y lawyerwade@hotmail.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@favrepa.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Andrea Mendez C andrea@kassab.law 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Lance Kassab  lance@kassab.law 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
David Kassab a david@kassab.law 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Nicholas Pierce c nicholas@kassab.law 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson f i 10607900 jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo o 24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
L Kassab lance@kassab.law 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Misty Davis mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Non-Party Witness Billy Shepherd bshepherd@spcounsel.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Deidre Hicks GWS_GROUP@spcounsel.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
E. MarieJamison jamison@wrightclosebarger.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Jessica Z.Barger barger@wrightclosebarger.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT
Katie Budinsky kbudinsky@krcl.com 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM ERROR
D Kassab david@kassab.law 9/12/2022 6:16:47 PM SENT"
35,2022-09-12,RSP,Pohl,Pohl’s response to Kassab no-evid MSJ,"Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment Filed by Kassab and Nicholson Defendants — Pohl presents extensive evidence supporting all three claims (conspiracy, conversion, TUTSA) and rebuts defendants' challenges to ownership, protection, misappropriation, and damages elements","Response to no-evidence MSJs filed by Kassab and Nicholson defendants on August 29, 2022, in the third phase of litigation. Filed September 12, 2022 at 11:26 PM. Pohl incorporates by reference the discussion and evidence from his companion Response in Opposition to the Traditional Motions filed the same day. Filed by Jean C. Frizzell of Reynolds Frizzell LLP. Addressed to the 189th Judicial District Court of Harris County.",MSJ-2,N/A,Phase 3,2022-09-12_RSP_Pohl-Response-to-Kassab-No-Evid-MSJ_FILED.pdf,Deny the no-evidence motions for summary judgment filed by Kassab and Nicholson and allow all issues to be tried by a jury,"9/12/2022 11:26 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 68182775
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 9/12/2022 11:26 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL AND LAW OFFICE OF § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
MICHAEL A. POHL, PLLC, §
Plaintiffs, §
V. § k
§ e
SCOTT FAVRE and SCOTT M. FAVRE PA, § C l
LLC; PRECISION MARKETING GROUP, § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
LLC; LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB and § c
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. d/b/a § r
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM; TINA § s
NICHOLSON and BAKER NICHOLSON, §
LLP d/b/a BAKER NICHOLSON LAW § s
FIRM; and DOUGLAS MONTAGUE III and § s
MONTAGUE PITTMAN & VARNADO, P.A., §
Defendants. § r189TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO THE
NO EVIDENCE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FILED BY THE KASSAB DEFENDANTSl AND THE NICHOLSON DEFENDANTS
Plaintiffs Michael Pohl and Law OfMfice of Michael A. Pohl (collectively “Pohl”) respond
in opposition to the No Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Lance
Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C., d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm (collectively
“Kassab”) and Tina Nicholson and Baker Nicholson, LLP d/b/a Baker Nicholson Law Firm
(collectively, “Nicholson”).
Given the overlapping issues in the multiple summary judgment motions before the Court,
Pohl also incorpcorates by reference the discussion and evidence included in his Response in
Opposition to the Traditional Motions for Summary Judgment Filed by the Kassab Defendants and
the Nicholson Defendants that is filed on the same day as this Response.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Pohl represented various persons and entities in claims arising from motor vehicle
accidents and the British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon oil spill.1 Pohl engaged Precision
Marketing Group, LLC (“Precision”) to provide public relations services, to gathker and preserve
evidence, and to screen and liaise with Pohl’s clients and prospective clients.2 l While working for
Pohl, Precision necessarily gained access to Pohl’s confidential and propcrietary information and
property, including trade secret materials.3 Scott Favre, individuaslly and/or through Scott M.
Favre PA, LLC (collectively “Favre”) is the managing member osf Precision.4 Favre took physical
copies of Pohl’s information, and possession of Pohl’s stolen computers and misappropriated
electronic data.5
In November 2016, Defendants Douglas Montague III, his law firm Montague Pittman &
Varnado, P.A. (collectively, “Montague”), Naicholson and Kassab arranged to purchase Pohl’s
stolen confidential information and property from Favre for $250,000, plus bonuses,6 taking
possession of at least some of the infoermation and property in December 2016.7 Kassab, Nicholson
and Montague highly valued Pofhl’s stolen and misappropriated confidential information and
property because, after purchyasing it, they intended to and did use it to contact and solicit Pohl’s
clients and prospectivCe clients.8 Defendants’ actions constitute conversion, violations of the
uniform trade secrets act (“TUTSA”), and conspiracy.
1 Sworn Declaration of Michael A. Pohl (the “Pohl Declaration”), ¶ 2, attached as Exhibit A.
2 Id. ¶ 9.
3 Id.
4 Id. ¶ 24.
5 Id. ¶¶ 24–25.
6 November 10, 2016 Agreement, attached as Exhibit 1 to the Pohl Declaration (Exhibit A).
7 December 7, 2016 Email, attached as Exhibit 2 to the Pohl Declaration (Exhibit A).
8 Kassab has admitted using Pohl’s client files (while erroneously claiming that they belonged to Precision Marketing)
to contact Pohl’s clients and former clients to solicit them to file claims against Pohl. See Declaration of Lance
Christopher Kassab, attached as Exhibit 1 to Kassab’s Motion to Dismiss, filed October 24, 2018, attached as Exhibit
Favre’s participation in the conspiracy to misappropriate and steal Pohl’s confidential
information and client communications violated the terms of a settlement agreement. That
confidential settlement agreement, executed in late April or early May 2017 (the “Settlement
Agreement”), resolved a lawsuit in federal court in Mississippi, styled No. 1:14-ckv-381-KS-JCG,
Scott Walker, et al. v. Jimmy Williamson, et al., In The United States Distrlict Court For The
Southern District of Mississippi, Southern Division (the “Federal Court Ccase”).9
Defendants’ efforts to monetize Pohl’s trade secrets through sassertions of barratry claims
has been nearly a complete failure. Defendants brought barratsry claims on behalf of more than
400 plaintiffs,10 and the claims of all but four plaintiffs have been finally resolved in Pohl’s favor.11
As to those four remaining plaintiffs, the viability of their claims remains in dispute.12 Kassab
asserted multiple grievances with the Texas State Bar,13 all of which have been rejected, many
with the finding that “the Board has determinaed that the conduct you described in the grievance
does not violate the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.”14 Notwithstanding this
lack of success, Defendants continuee to make allegations regarding Pohl and seek to relitigate
irrelevant questions regarding Pohfl’s alleged conduct. The Court should reject Defendants’ efforts
to justify their theft of Pohl’sy trade secrets by reasserting their failed claims of barratry.
9 Pohl Declaration ¶ 26i, Ex. A.
10 See Petitions in four cases, attached as Exhs. 28-30; 32 to the Nicholson’s Traditional Motion for Summary
Judgment, attachefd as Exhibit C.
11 See Cause No. 2017–38294, Dezzie Brumfield d/b/a LAD Enterprises, et al v. Michael A. Pohl, et al, in the 189th
Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas; No. 459,062-401, Alice Marie Gandy, et al v. Michael A. Pohl, et al.,
in the Probate Court No. 2 of Harris County, Texas; Cause No. 2017–37567, Mae Berry et al v. Michael A. Pohl, et
al, in the 113th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas; (showing the Brumfield, Gandy, and Berry cases are
final); see also Cheatham v. Pohl, No. 01-20-00046-CV, 2022 WL 3720139, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
Aug. 30, 2022, no pet. h.) (showing that claims of four plaintiffs remain live). Pohl requests that the Court take judicial
notice of these publicly available facts.
12 Cheatham v. Pohl, No. 01-20-00046-CV, 2022 WL 3720139, at *15 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 30,
2022, no pet. h.) (noting that “As to the barratry claim, we have concluded only that a fact issue continues to exist.
We take no position on the validity of the barratry claim against any of these parties.”).
13 See State Bar and Board of Disciplinary Appeals letters dismissing claims, attached as Exhibit D.
14 Id.
At core, Defendants’ challenges to the evidentiary basis for Pohl’s claims turn on two
fallacies that they have argued from the start. First, Defendants insist that Pohl did not own the
materials—including his own client agreements and client files—that they misappropriated. This
is clearly wrong and has been rejected by numerous courts in different jurisdictkions. See, e.g.,
Fred Siegel Co., L.P.A. v. Arter & Hadden, 1999-Ohio-260, 85 Ohio St. 3d 17l1, 182, 707 N.E.2d
853, 862 (discussing how law firm’s client list could constitute a trade seccret); Reeves v. Hanlon,
95 P.3d 513, 522 (Cal. 2004) (dealing with client data that constituteds trade secrets). Even giving
the argument that Pohl had no ownership interest in his client lsists, client agreements, and client
files the benefit of the doubt, at most the argument raises a disputed fact issue that cannot be
determined on a motion for summary judgment. Second, Defendants erroneously believe that
Pohl’s claims provide them an opportunity to reassert barratry claims that have failed in every
other forum. Those claims have no place herea and should be rejected.
II. ARGUMENT
Pohl has overwhelming prooef of each of the elements of his claims—far more than enough
to respond to Defendants’ no-evidfence challenges, as fully set forth below.
A. Pohl has ample evidyence of each element of conspiracy.
Pohl can readCily prove that Defendants, in combination with each other, sought to
accomplish the goals of conversion of Pohl’s property and misappropriation of Pohl’s trade secrets,
that they reachfefd a meeting of the minds, engaged in one or more unlawful overt acts, and that he
suffered dUamages as a result.
1. Pohl can prove that Defendants (a combination of two or more persons) acted in
combination to accomplish their goals of conversion and misappropriation,
reaching a meeting of the minds.
The evidentiary record of Defendants’ conspiracy is replete with emails establishing their
agreement to combine to acquire Pohl’s property and to use it for their own gaink in violation of
Pohl’s rights. Starting no later than September 2016, Kassab, Nicholson and lMontague engaged
in discussions with Scott Favre relating to a possible deal to bring barratcry claims against Pohl.15
The discussions between Montague and Kassab resulted in what Kasssab agreed could probably be
called a joint venture between the two of them.16 The purpose osf Montague’s joint venture was to
bring barratry claims against Pohl, a Texas lawyer, in Texas courts under the Texas barratry
statute.17
Kassab, Nicholson, and Montague also entered into a co-counsel agreement, the purpose
of which was to bring barratry claims in Texasa against Pohl.18 Kassab testified that this co-counsel
agreement was made in writing, but it has not yet been produced.19 However, Kassab has produced
contracts that he signed with Pohl’s feormer clients that show the co-counsel relationship between
Nicholson, Kassab, and Montagufe.20
Montague admits thyat he actually sent the information and materials that form the basis of
Pohl’s claims against thCem to Kassab in Texas.21 Montague states in his affidavit that he ‘informed
Kassab about this matter and sent him the PMG [Precision] documents owned by Favre that I
15 See Kassab Deposition at 27:4-13; 28:22-25, attached as Exhibit E; Montague Deposition at 72:4-15, attached as
Exhibit F; September 9, 2016 email from Montague, attached as Exhibit G (originally Ex. 2 to the Kassab Deposition);
see also Montague Deposition at 71:18-72:15 (stating that the email in Kassab Deposition Exhibit 2 “appears to be
something that I sent,” and not disputing its authenticity), Exhibit F.
16 See Kassab Deposition at 36:18-22, Ex. E.
17 See Montague Affidavit ¶ 7, Ex. H; Kassab Deposition at 53:13-15, Ex. E.
18 See Ex. F, Montague Deposition at 46:6-16; 49:1-15; Ex. I, Nicholson Deposition at 111:11-112:22.
19 See Ex. E, Kassab Deposition at 86:14-87:10.
20 See Ex. L.
21 See Montague Affidavit ¶ 7, Ex. H; Montague Deposition at 50:14-24, 53:19-54:6, Ex. F.
received.”22 Montague himself defines the “PMG [Precision] documents” in this context as
including “attorney-client contracts, communications, and lists of clients.”23 Nicholson herself
had an active role in attempting to ensure that the team received all of the client contracts.24
Montague took the lead in obtaining Pohl’s documents, including engagemkent agreements
between Pohl and his clients, which Montague helped facilitate the transfelr of to Kassab in
Texas:25 c
It is clear that Kassab and Montafgue were not satisfied with receiving Pohl’s engagement
agreements. They wanted to obtainc the names and the contact information for Pohl’s clients or
potential clients so that they coOuld solicit them to bring barratry claims against Mr. Pohl:26
22 Montague Affidavit ¶ 7, Ex. H (emphasis added).
23 Id. ¶ 6.
24 See Ex. M, Email dated November 22, 2016 from Nicholson to Kassab.
25 See Exhibit N, Dec. 7, 2016 email from Montague (originally used as Exhibit 11 to the Nicholson Deposition); see
also Exhibit O, Nov. 14, 2016 email from Montague (originally used as Exhibit 9 to the Nicholson Deposition)
(showing Montague instructed Favre to send documents to Kassab, a Texas lawyer); Exhibit F, Montague Deposition
at 89:1-10 (stating he recognized Nicholson Exhibit 9 and saying it was “what it appears to be, a request for [wiring]
instructions from Scott Favre.”); Exhibit E, Kassab Deposition at 138:5-9 (acknowledging that Nicholson Exhibit 11
appears to be an email from Montague to Kassab and other defendants and not disputing its authenticity).
26 See Exhibit P, Dec. 8, 2016 email from Montague (originally used as Exhibit 12 to the Nicholson Deposition); see
also Exhibit I, Nicholson Deposition at 162:5-164:15 (acknowledging that the email chain shown in Nicholson Exhibit
12 “was CC’ed to me” and not disputing its authenticity).
Kassab, Nicholson, and Montague were all active participants itn obtaining and processing
additional information to solicit Pohl’s clients or potential clients to bring additional claims in
Texas courts:27 e
When Montague realizeod that additional information was needed, Montague reached out to
Nicholson to obtain that additional converted and stolen information.28 Kassab was at all times
critical to the conspiracy, as he and his firm were the experts on claims of barratry in Texas.
27 See Exhibit Q, Dec. 8, 2016 email from Montague (originally used as Exhibit 13 to the Nicholson Deposition); see
also Exhibit F, Montague Deposition at 103:5-14 (acknowledging the email chain shown in Nicholson Exhibit 13
showed an email that appeared to be sent by Montague and not disputing its authenticity).
28 See Exhibit R, Feb. 15, 2017 email from Montague (originally used as Exhibit 14 to the Nicholson Deposition); see
also Exhibit F, Montague Deposition at 116:1-8 (acknowledging the email chain shown in Nicholson Exhibit 14 and
not disputing its authenticity).
Montague recognized Kassab’s experience and knowledge of civil barratry claims,29 and, as
Kassab points out on his website, a civil claim for barratry is “unique to Texas.”30
2. Pohl can prove that Defendants engaged in one or more overt unlawful acts in
furtherance of their conspiracy.
Defendants engaged in overt acts constituting both conversion and miseappropriation, and
Pohl’s evidence of each of those acts is set forth in the sections addressing them below.
3. Pohl can prove that he suffered damages as a result. r
Pohl has testified, as has his expert witnesses, about the eDxtensive damages arising from
the underlying torts—Defendants’ theft of trade secrets and csonversion.31 Those damages arose
directly from the actions of Defendants in converting anrd misappropriating Pohl’s trade secrets
and then attempting to monetize those secrets by contacting Pohl’s clients and former clients and
fomenting litigation against him. Pohl was alsol damaged by the loss of his property, and he is
entitled to recover the market value ofM the converted and misappropriated property and
information. There are multiple sources of evidence regarding the value of some or all of the
converted or misappropriated infor c mation.32 As these damages are derivative of the damages
suffered for the underlying torts, the evidence cited here supports damages in relation to those
torts, and Pohl incorporates his discussion and evidence in relation to those claims here. See infra
Parts II(B)(4) & II(C)(3).
29 See Exhibit G, Ex. 2 to the Kassab Deposition; Exhibit H, Montague Affidavit ¶ 7; Exhibit F, Montague Deposition
at 44:14-19.
30 See Barratry and Solicitation, Kassab Law Firm, https://texaslegalmalpractice.com/legal-malpractice/barratry-and-
solicitation/ (last visited Aug 7, 2022); see also Exhibit F, Montague Deposition at 49:9-18 (confirming that Montague
is not aware of any state, other than Texas, in which a civil claim for barratry exists).
31 See Report of John Zavitsanos on Fees, attached as Exhibit S; Pohl Declaration ¶¶ 27-28, Ex. A.
32 See Deposition of Scott Walker, at 328:10-16 (testifying about how he had heard Pohl’s client list was worth $6
million), attached as Exhibit V; Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at 314:10–315:18, 343:7-344:17 (recalling that he was
told that the boxes containing Pohl’s information were worth $6 million), attached as Exhibit W; Pohl Declaration ¶
28, Ex. A; see also 2016.11.10 Agreement Between Kassab, Montague, and Favre, attached as Exhibit EE; Montague
Deposition, at 79:11-82:21, Exhibit F (indicating that Kassab and Montague paid $250,000, plus agreed to pay
additional incentives, for access to Pohl’s information).
B. Pohl has ample evidence of each element of conversion
Conversion is the “unauthorized and wrongful assumption and exercise of dominion and
control over the personal property of another, to the exclusion of or inconsistent with the owner's
rights.” Waisath v. Lack's Stores, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Tex. 1971). The elekments are: “(1)
the plaintiff owned, had legal possession of, or was entitled to possession of thle property; (2) the
defendant assumed and exercised dominion and control over the propcerty in an unlawful and
unauthorized manner, to the exclusion of and inconsistent with the splaintiff's rights; and (3) the
defendant refused the plaintiff’s demand for return of the propserty.” Akin v. Santa Clara Land
Co., Ltd., 34 S.W.3d 334, 344 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. denied); see also Hunt v.
Baldwin, 68 S.W.3d 117, 131 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
1. Pohl’s evidence that he owned, had legal possession of, or was entitled to
possession of the property is more thaln sufficient.
Pohl testified that he owns his compMuters, property, attorney-client contracts, forms created
for his practice, data, photographs, client files, attorney work product and financial information
that was stolen from his office.33 It c is not disputed that the materials at issue included Pohl’s client
lists, client files, and thousands of contracts between Pohl and his clients.34 In addition to Pohl’s
own testimony, the persons to whom Defendants now trace their purported ownership have
testified that the client contracts and/or client lists belong to Pohl.35 In fact, Pohl’s client lists were
valuable to Defencdants because they belonged to Pohl, and Defendants believed they had value as
a means for convincing Pohl’s clients and former clients to bring barratry claims against Pohl.36
33 See Deposition of Michael A. Pohl, at 5:22-7:23, attached as Exhibit T.
34 See Deposition of Scott M. Favre, at 119:2-13, Exhibit U; Deposition of Lance Kassab, at 59:5-60:15, Exhibit E;
Affidavit of Douglas Montague III ¶¶ 6, 7, Exhibit H.
35 See Deposition of Scott Walker, at 283:17-21, 316:5-319:14, 327:14-329:23, attached as Exhibit V; Deposition of
Kirk Ladner, at 126:17–128:20, 161:19–163:20, 340:22–342:17, 350:1–351:21, 356:23–358:10, attached as Exhibit
W; Deposition of Steve Seymour, at 193:13-195:9, attached as Exhibit X.
36 See, e.g., Affidavit of Douglas Montague III ¶¶ 6-8, Ex. H.
The argument that Pohl did not own his own client list ignores completely the undisputed
fact that the list was a list of Pohl’s clients. Defendants’ insistence that Pohl did not own these
materials is simply an argument; their factual challenges to Pohl’s ownership are irrelevant and
should not be considered in disposing of the no-evidence motions for summary kjudgment. See
King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. 2003) (no-evidencel motion requires a
court to disregard all contrary evidence and inferences).37 But even cif it were relevant, the
immense amount of testimony declaring that Pohl does own his clienst list and contracts provides
far more than a scintilla of evidence in support of Pohl’s ownersship.38
2. Pohl’s evidence that Defendants assumed and exercised dominion and control over
the property in an unlawful and unauthorizedr manner, to the exclusion of and
inconsistent with Pohl’s rights is more than sufficient.
There is no dispute that Defendants obtained Pohl’s attorney-client contracts,
communications and client lists, nor is there aany dispute that they did so without obtaining Pohl’s
permission.39 Defendants expected to and did use that material and information to file suits and
grievances against Pohl.40 There is,e in fact, no evidence that Defendant’s actions were lawful,
authorized or consistent with Pohfl’s rights or frankly the right of Pohl’s clients.
3. Pohl’s evidence tyhat Defendants refused his demand for return of the property, if
necessary, is more than sufficient.
As a legal matter, Pohl contends that there was no requirement for Pohl to lodge a formal
demand for the creturn of his property, as Defendants wrongfully obtained possession of the
37 Furthermore, defendants’ argument ignores that a claim for conversion requires that a plaintiff have a right to
possession, not necessarily ownership, of the alleged converted property. See French v. Moore, 169 S.W.3d 1, 13
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). Even if defendants were correct that Pohl did not have legal title to
some of the converted information, the evidence Pohl cites to demonstrate his ownership would at the very least raise
a fact question about his superior right of possession against all third parties, such as against defendants.
38 See supra notes 33 & 35.
39 See Deposition of Tina Nicholson, at 70:7-15, attached as Exhibit I; Kassab Deposition, at 60:25-62:6, Exhibit E;
Pohl Declaration filed in response to TCPA Motion ¶ 8, Exhibit Y.
40 Kassab Deposition, at 70:4-20, Exhibit E.
10
converted property and their actions were a clear repudiation of Pohl’s rights to his property.41 As
a factual matter, Pohl and his counsel did repeatedly demand the return of Pohl’s property.42 To
the extent that there is any doubt that defendants wrongfully obtained possession of the materials,
this issue is a fact question.43 However, given that the individuals who tookk the materials
acknowledge that they believed it belonged to Pohl44 and did not have permislsion to take it, that
should remove any doubt. Additionally, there is enough evidence that Decfendants’ actions were a
repudiation of Pohl’s rights, as they used his converted materials to ssolicit clients to sue him and
disregarded his instructions to Precision to maintain the confidesntiality of the materials.45
Even if demand and refusal were necessary elements of Pohl’s claim, there is ample
evidence that Pohl sought the return of his files and other property from Precision, Nicholson, and
Kassab as well as from other defendants. Pohl’s counsel from another lawsuit made multiple
demands to Nicholson (then acting as the lawyaer for both Favre and Precision) for the return of his
property.46 Both Nicholson and Kassab testified in their depositions that they had entered a joint
venture to pursue barratry claims agaienst Pohl, and it is not disputed that, together with Montague,
they acted together.47 It is likewfise not disputed that Pohl struggled to obtain the return of his
41 See Guillory v. Dietrich, 598 S.W.3d 284, 294 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. denied) (“demand and refusal are not
required if the defendanat wlrongfully acquired possession”); French v. Moore, 169 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2004, no peit.) (“A plaintiff is required to demand return of the property if the defendant legally obtained
possession.”); El Paso Prod. Co. v. Valence Operating Co., 112 S.W.3d 616, 625 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2003, pet. denied)f (stating that a demand for return of the property is not required if the “possessor’s acts manifest a
clear repudiation of the plaintiff’s rights”).
42 See Collection of Letters from Billy Shepherd, attached as Exhibit Z; see also Exhibit 12 to the Nicholson Motion.
43 See supra notes 39-40.
44 See Deposition of Scott Walker, at 283:17-21, 316:5-319:14, 327:14-329:23, attached as Exhibit V; Deposition of
Kirk Ladner, at 126:17–128:20, 161:19–163:20, 340:22–342:17, 350:1–351:21, 356:23–358:10, attached as Exhibit
W; Deposition of Steve Seymour, at 193:13-195:9, attached as Exhibit X.
45 See Ex. B, Declaration of Lance Christopher Kassab, attached as Exhibit 1 to Kassab’s Motion to Dismiss, filed
October 24, 2018; Ex. E, Kassab Deposition 130:3-21 (admitting that Kassab attached Pohl’s fee agreements with
Pohl’s clients that he obtained from Precision to solicitation letters that Kassab sent to Pohl’s clients).
46 See Collection of Letters from Billy Shepherd, attached as Exhibit Z.
47 Nicholson Deposition, at 109:5-15, Ex, I; Kassab Deposition, at 37:2-7, Exhibit E; Exhibit AA (originally used as
Exhibit 8 to Kassab Deposition).
11
property, including by seeking sanctions from a federal court for failure to return everything to
him.48 Nicholson admits in her traditional motion for summary judgment that: “As part of the
settlement, the Parties entered into a confidential Settlement Agreement, and in the agreement Pohl
requested the return of the same trade secrets alleged here.” See Nicholson’s Amenkded Traditional
Motion for Summary Judgment, at 21, filed August 29, 2022. The evidence of dlemand and refusal
to return Pohl’s property is clear. c
4. Pohl’s evidence of damages resulting from the conversiosn of his property is more
than sufficient. D
Nicholson challenges Pohl’s evidence of damages asrising from the conversion of his
property. In so doing, she ignores established Texas law trhat provides:
An owner is competent to testify regarding the value of converted property and, in
the absence of controverting evidence, such testimony will sustain a verdict.
Wiese v. Pro Am Services, Inc., 317 S.W.3d 857, 862 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no
pet.) (citing Burns v. Rochon, 190 S.W.3d 263, 270–71 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no
pet.); see also Burlington N. R.R. ve. Gen. Projection Sys., No. 05–97–00425–CV, 2000 WL
1100874, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dalflas Aug. 8, 2000, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g) (not designated for
publication) (concluding tesytimony by plaintiff’s CFO concerning converted property’s rental
value was legally and Cfactually sufficient to support an award for loss of use damages). Pohl is
entirely competent ato testify regarding the value of the converted property.49
In additifon, there are multiple additional sources of evidence of the value of the converted
materialsU, including the amount Favre paid to acquire Precision Marketing and files in its
possession,50 Favre’s affidavit testimony regarding the value of the materials,51 and Defendants’
48 See Transcript of hearing on October 25, 2017, attached as Exhibit BB; Pohl Declaration ¶ 26, Ex. A.
49 Pohl Declaration ¶ 27, Ex. A.
50 The amount was $1.5 million; see Exhibit CC; see also Exhibit 10 to the Nicholson Motion.
51 See Favre Affidavit, Ex. DD.
12
payment of $250,000 plus bonuses for access to the materials.52 Finally, there is evidence that
Pohl suffered actual damages in the form of attorneys’ fees and expenses that he incurred
defending litigation that arose due to Defendants’ conversion of his property.53
C. Pohl has ample evidence of each element of TUTSA. k
Pohl has evidence to support each of the elements of his TUTSA claiml, as he can prove:
(1) that he owned trade secrets; (2) that Defendants knowingly acquired thcem by improper means,
and (3) that the misappropriation caused Pohl damages. See TEX. sCIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §
134A.002. Texas law provides that a trade secret s 
may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
used in one’s business, and which gives him an oprportunity to obtain an advantage
over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical
compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern
for a machine or other device, or a list of customers.
Trilogy Software, Inc. v. Callidus Software, Inc., 143 S.W.3d 452, 463 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004,
pet. denied). 
Mr. Pohl has sworn that he eowns the materials and that the materials at issue have
independent economic value fromf not being generally known to or ascertainable through proper
means by another person wyho can obtain economic value from them.54 He has sworn that he
protected the trade secrCet information by strictly limiting access and maintaining them under lock
and key and by ensauring that those who had access to the information understood its confidential
nature.55 This fwas confirmed by the Precision witnesses.56 He has sworn that he has suffered
52 See 2016.11.10 Agreement Between Kassab, Montague, and Favre, attached as Exhibit EE; Montague Deposition,
at 79:11-82:21, Ex. F.
53 Pohl Declaration ¶ 28, Ex. A.
54 Pohl Declaration ¶ 27, Ex. A.
55 Id. ¶¶ 14-15.
56 See, e.g., Deposition of Michael A. Pohl, attached as Exhibit T, at 5:22-7:23; Deposition of Scott M. Favre at 119:2-
13, Exhibit U; Deposition of Lance Kassab at 59:5-60:15, Exhibit E; Deposition of Scott Walker, at 283:17-21, 316:5-
319:14, 327:14-329:23, Exhibit V; Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at 126:17–128:20, 161:19–163:20, 340:22–342:17,
350:1–351:21, 356:23–358:10, Exhibit W; Deposition of Steve Seymour, at 193:13-195:9, Exhibit X.
13
injury as a result of Defendants’ misappropriation of those trade secrets.57 This evidence is
sufficient to overcome the challenges of the no-evidence motions. As set forth in greater detail
below, Pohl has substantial evidence of each element of his claims under TUTSA.
1. Pohl’s evidence that he owned the trade secrets is sufficient. k
TUTSA provides a statutory definition of the term “owner.” l
“Owner” means, with respect to a trade secret, the person or enticty in whom or in which
rightful, legal, or equitable title to, or the right to enforce rigrhts in, the trade secret is
reposed. s
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.002(3-a). Once agasin, Defendants challenge Pohl’s
evidence demonstrating his ownership of the materials, claiming both that he did not own it and
that his acquisition of the trade secrets was wrongful. Pohl’s evidence of ownership, as fully set
forth above is substantial;58 it is Defendants’ position that Pohl did not own the materials that is
unsupported by any evidence. Defendants’ caontention that Pohl has no legal or equitable title to
his attorney-client agreements, his confidential client lists, and his attorney work product because
he obtained those materials by impropeer means is just another reiteration of their failed arguments
regarding barratry. Defendants’ cfontention that Pohl obtained the client lists through illegal action
has been fought and lost, andy their efforts to reurge every failed argument should be rejected.
2. Pohl’s evideCnce that he protected the trade secrets is sufficient.
Mr. Pohl has sworn that he strictly limited access to the trade secrets, and he ensured that
those who had fafccess to that information fully understood as part of their professional obligations
the confiUdential character of that information. Defendants apparently believe that because they
57 Pohl Declaration ¶ 28, Ex. A.
58 See, e.g., Deposition of Michael A. Pohl, attached as Exhibit T, at 5:22-7:23; Deposition of Scott M. Favre at 119:2-
13, Exhibit U; Deposition of Lance Kassab at 59:5-60:15, Exhibit E; Deposition of Scott Walker, at 283:17-21, 316:5-
319:14, 327:14-329:23, Exhibit V; Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at 126:17–128:20, 161:19–163:20, 340:22–342:17,
350:1–351:21, 356:23–358:10, Exhibit W; Deposition of Steve Seymour, at 193:13-195:9, Exhibit X.
14
were able to unlawfully obtain the information, Pohl cannot demonstrate that he protected that
information. If that argument succeeded, then in every claim of misappropriation, the
misappropriation itself would prove a failure to protect the information.
Defendants suggest that Pohl failed to protect the information at issue becaukse Pohl did not
include a specific confidentiality provision in his contract with Precision. Bult whether Pohl did
or did not take one of many potential steps to protect trade secrets does ncot support a no-evidence
motion for summary judgment. Pohl has more than a scintilla osf evidence of the statutory
requirement—that he take “reasonable measures under tshe circumstances” to preserve
confidentiality. Pohl testified that “numerous times throughout the relationship,” he emphasized
to Precision and its employees the importance of confidentiality.59 The testimony of individuals
associated with Precision shows that not only were they aware of the confidential nature of the
information, but they took reasonable steps ato protect the confidentiality of that information.60
These steps include (and are corroborated by Precision representatives):
• Pohl informed Preciseion and all of the staff of the confidential and privileged
nature of the inforfmation and instructed them to treat them accordingly.61
• Pohl maintai y ned his office at the top of Hancock Bank – “the most secure location
on the cCoast.”62
• The building had 24 hour/round the clock security.63
59 Deposition of Michael Pohl at 23:5-21, Exhibit T.
60 Deposition of Scott Walker, at 283:17-284:22, 321:5-324:7, Exhibit V; Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at 355:18–
358:10, 372:7–374:24, 377:4–23, 501:3–502:18, Exhibit W; Deposition of Steve Seymour, at 96:16-24, 223:1-20,
Exhibit X.
61 See Deposition of Scott Walker, at 283:17-284:22, Exhibit V; Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at 372:7–374:24, Exhibit
62 See Deposition of Scott Walker, at 283:17-284:22, Exhibit V; Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at 372:7–374:24, Exhibit
63 See Deposition of Scott Walker, at 283:17-284:22, Exhibit W.
15
• The elevators were coded such that one could only get to one’s own floors.64
• There were security cameras at every floor.65
• The documents and computers were kept under “lock and seal.”66
• The engagement agreements were clearly labeled to identify the k m as contracts
between lawyers and clients.67 C l
Defendants’ focus on the absence of a written confidentiality provision is a distraction from the
evidence (which defeats a no evidence summary judgment) of Pohl’s efforts to protect
confidentiality. s
2. Pohl’s evidence that Defendants knowingly mgisappropriated the trade secrets is
sufficient. r
The statutory definition of “misappropriation” includes “acquisition” of a trade secret by
improper means and “use” of a trade secret by a iperson if the person knows or has reason to know
that the person’s knowledge of the trade secret was derived from or through a person who used
improper means to acquire the trade sec
ret. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.002(3). Kassab
and Nicholson misappropriated Poihl’s trade secrets by participating in a scheme to acquire stolen
trade secrets and they then “used” Pohl’s trade secrets by contacting Pohl’s clients to solicit their
participation in barratry souits.
Through theirl training and experience as lawyers, Kassab and Nicholson knew or should
have known that it was improper to obtain an attorneys’ client contracts and list from a third party
without thant lawyer’s or the client’s authorization.68 Furthermore, the agreement that Kassab
(Nicholson’s co-counsel) signed to obtain Pohl’s trade secrets contains an indemnity provision for
64 See Deposition of Scott Walker, at 322:9-23, Exhibit V.
65 Id.
66 See Deposition of Scott Walker, at 283:17-284:22, Exhibit V.
67 Pohl Declaration ¶ 15, Ex. A.
68 See Pohl Deposition at 115:5-116:1, Exhibit T.
16
Favre in which Kassab agreed to indemnify and hold harmless Favre in defending claims relating
to and/or arising from the disclosure of client information where such claims are asserted by Pohl
and certain others.69 Nicholson also was responsible for sending threatening letters to get Walker
and others to turn over Pohl’s information to Nicholson, Precision, and Favre.70 k
In addition, certain Defendants’ “uses” of the trade secrets occurred aftelr May 1, 2017, the
date of the Settlement Agreement that Nicholson discusses in her traditiocnal motion for summary
judgment.71 There can be no doubt that by the time Kassab and Nicholsson used Pohl’s trade secrets
to contact and solicit Pohl’s clients and former clients, they knsew that the materials belonged to
Pohl and their use violated his rights of ownership.
3. Pohl’s evidence that he incurred actual damages is sufficient.
Pohl has testified relating to his extensive damages arising from Defendants’ theft of trade
secrets.72 Those damages arose directly from athe actions of Defendants in misappropriating Pohl’s
trade secrets and attempting to monetize those secrets by contacting Pohl’s clients and former
clients and fomenting litigation againest him. Additionally, Pohl has provided evidence of damages
in the form of the market value fof his trade secrets that constitute unjust enrichment/reasonable
royalty damages for Defendaynts’ theft of those trade secrets.73
69 2016.11.10 Agreement Between Kassab, Montague, and Favre, Ex. EE.
70 See Letters from Nicholson (originally used as Exhibits 70 and 71 in the Walker Deposition), attached as Exhibit
FF; Deposition of Scott Walker, at 391, 394:11-395:9 (discussing Exhibits 70 and 71 and showing that they were
produced by Nicholson’s attorney in the deposition), Ex. V.
71 See Petitions in four cases, attached as Exhs. 28-30; 32 to the Nicholson’s Traditional Motion for Summary
Judgment, each filed after May 1, 2017, Exhibit C. These filings were in direct violation of the Settlement Agreement,
which requires that parties and their affiliates (defined to include their attorneys) will not file or cause to be filed any
complaint, claim or legal action against Pohl and others.
71 Cf. Nicholson’s Amended Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment, at 21, filed August 29, 2022
72 See Pohl Declaration ¶¶ 27-28, Ex. A.
73 See id. ¶ 27.
17
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Michael Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl
respectfully request that the No Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment filedk by Kassab and
Nicholson be in all respects denied and that the issues raised in Plaintiffs’ Peltition be tried by a
jury. c
Dated: September 12, 2022 Respectfully submitted,s
REYNOLDS FRIZZEsLL LLP
By: /s/ Jean C. Frizzell
Jean rC. Frizzell
State Bar No. 07484650
1100 Louisiana St., Suite 3500
Houston, Texas 77002
Tel.l 713.485.7200
Faax 713.485.7250
Mjfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com
oAttorney for Plaintiffs Michael Pohl
e and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document was served on all counsel of
record pursuant to the TCexas Rules of Civil Procedure on this the 12th day of September, 2022.
c /s/ Jean C. Frizzell
f Jean C. Frizzell
18
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this
document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below.
The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate
of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Suni Blue on behalf of Jean Frizzell e
Bar No. 7484650 C
sblue@reynoldsfrizzell.com t
Envelope ID: 68182775 r
Status as of 9/13/2022 8:05 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email sTimestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com r 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Andrew Johnson ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Andrew J. Sarne asarne@krcl.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.conm 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Kathryn Laflin KLaflin@KRCL.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrrar.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Larry Newsom lnewsom@fkrcl.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo jason@ciofalolaw.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Todd Taylor titaylor@jandflaw.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Harris Wells fhwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Lawyer Wade y lawyerwade@hotmail.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@favrepa.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Andrea Mendez C andrea@kassab.law 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Lance Kassab  lance@kassab.law 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
David Kassab a david@kassab.law 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Nicholas Pierce c nicholas@kassab.law 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson f i 10607900 jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo o 24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
L Kassab lance@kassab.law 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Misty Davis mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Non-Party Witness Billy Shepherd bshepherd@spcounsel.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Deidre Hicks GWS_GROUP@spcounsel.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
E. MarieJamison jamison@wrightclosebarger.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Jessica Z.Barger barger@wrightclosebarger.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT
Katie Budinsky kbudinsky@krcl.com 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM ERROR
D Kassab david@kassab.law 9/12/2022 11:26:05 PM SENT"
36,2022-09-12,RSP,Pohl,Pohl’s response to Kassab trad MSJ,"Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Traditional Motions for Summary Judgment Filed by Kassab and Nicholson Defendants — comprehensive 38-page response opposing limitations, unlawful acts doctrine, attorney immunity, judicial proceedings privilege, release, TUTSA protection, ownership, and damages defenses","Response to traditional MSJs filed by Kassab (Aug. 29, 2022) and Nicholson (Amended, Aug. 29, 2022), four years into litigation. Filed September 12, 2022 at 11:55 PM. Incorporates arguments and evidence from companion no-evidence MSJ response filed same day. Filed by Jean C. Frizzell of Reynolds Frizzell LLP. Notes Court previously denied Kassab's first MSJ (limitations, res judicata, attorney immunity) on August 3, 2021.",MSJ-2,N/A,Phase 3,2022-09-12_RSP_Pohl-Response-to-Kassab-Trad-MSJ_FILED.pdf,Deny the traditional motions for summary judgment filed by Kassab and Nicholson in all respects,"9/12/2022 11:55 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 68182991
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 9/12/2022 11:55 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL AND LAW OFFICE OF § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
MICHAEL A. POHL, PLLC, §
Plaintiffs, §
V. § k
§ e
SCOTT FAVRE and SCOTT M. FAVRE PA, § C l
LLC; PRECISION MARKETING GROUP, § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
LLC; LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB and § c
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. d/b/a § r
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM; TINA § s
NICHOLSON and BAKER NICHOLSON, §
LLP d/b/a BAKER NICHOLSON LAW § s
FIRM; and DOUGLAS MONTAGUE III and § s
MONTAGUE PITTMAN & VARNADO, P.A., §
Defendants. § r189TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO THE
TRADITIONAL MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FILED BY THE KASSAB DEFENDANTSl AND THE NICHOLSON DEFENDANTS
Plaintiffs Michael Pohl and Law OfMfice of Michael A. Pohl (collectively “Pohl”) respond
in opposition to the Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Lance
Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C., d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm (collectively
“Kassab”) and the Amended Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Tina Nicholson
and Baker Nicholson, LLP d/b/a Baker Nicholson Law Firm (collectively, “Nicholson,” and
together with Kassab, the “Moving Defendants”).
c I. INTRODUCTION
On June 8, 2021, Kassab moved for traditional summary judgment on the grounds of
limitations, res judicata, and attorney immunity. By order dated August 3, 2021, the Court denied
Kassab’s motion. Although nothing has changed relative to the facts relating to the defenses of
limitations and attorney immunity, Kassab reargues those issues to the Court. Nicholson likewise
asserts limitations and immunity defenses. For the same reasons the Court rejected those defenses
in Kassab’s original motions, the Court should reject those defenses again here.
The Moving Defendants’ assertion of an “illegal acts” defense fails as both a matter of fact
and a matter of law. Both Nicholson and Kassab expend countless breathless pakges and submit
dozens of exhibits in an effort to prove what they have been unable to demolnstrate in multiple
prior lawsuits and in Texas State Bar Grievances. The claim that Pohl engcaged in acts that violated
the Texas Rules governing lawyers has been examined and rejected bsy the State Bar of Texas, and
the enormous evidentiary record does not alter that determinatiosn. Instead, it merely exposes once
again the Moving Defendants’ overall strategy of muddying the record with extraneous allegations
against Pohl, in spite of the Court’s dismissal of all the counterclaims previously asserted against
him.
The “illegal acts” defense does noat apply because (1) it is preempted by Texas’s
proportionate responsibility statute; (2) Pohl’s actions have been adjudicated and were not
“admittedly” criminal or unlawful; aned (3) even if a fact issue remained regarding the legality of
Pohl’s acts, any wrongful act is fnot sufficiently tied to and is not a proximate cause of Pohl’s
claims here to give rise to a dyefense.
Nicholson contCends that any torts they committed against Pohl were released as a result of
the a confidential settlement agreement, executed in late April and early May 2017 (the
“Settlement Agf freement”), that resolved a lawsuit in federal court in Mississippi, styled No. 1:14-
cv-381-KUS-JCG, Scott Walker, et al. v. Jimmy Williamson, et al., In The United States District
Court For The Southern District of Mississippi, Southern Division (the “Federal Court Case”), in
which Tina Nicholson represented Precision, then owned by Favre. Given that Nicholson has
flagrantly and repeatedly violated obligations arising from that Settlement Agreement, including
by fomenting litigation against Pohl and by failing to return all originals and all copies of materials
stolen from Pohl, it is surprising that Nicholson would invoke that agreement here. In any event,
the release on which Nicholson relies does not extend to the acts committed here.
The Moving Defendants also contend that various forms of immunity proktect them from
this suit, but their arguments fail as a matter of law. The attorney immunityl doctrine does not
protect lawyers from claims of conversion and theft of trade secrets comcmitted when they were
not representing any client. Similarly, the “judicial proceedings privislege” does not apply to those
torts in that context. s 
The final two defenses that the Moving Defendants assert in their traditional motions for
summary judgment are Pohl’s alleged failure to protect his trade secrets by requiring a
confidentiality agreement, and an argument that the damages Pohl seeks are not available as
recompense for misappropriation of trade secarets and conversion. Both defenses fail as a matter
of law and as a matter of fact. 
I. FeACTUAL BACKGROUND1
Pohl represented variousf persons and entities in claims arising from motor vehicle
accidents and the British Peytroleum Deepwater Horizon oil spill (“BP Matter”).2 Pohl engaged
Precision Marketing GCroup, LLC (“Precision”) to provide public relations services, to gather and
preserve evidence, a and to screen and liaise with Pohl’s clients and prospective clients.3 While
working for Pfofhl, Precision naturally gained access to Pohl’s confidential and proprietary
informatiUon and property, including trade secret materials.4 Scott Favre, individually and/or
1 Pohl incorporates by reference both the arguments and evidence contained in his Response to the No-Evidence
Motions for Summary Judgment that is filed on the same day as this Response.
2 Sworn Declaration of Michael A. Pohl (the “Pohl Declaration”) ¶ 2, attached as Exhibit A.
3 Id. ¶ 9.
4 Id.
through Scott M. Favre PA, LLC (collectively “Favre”) is the managing member of Precision.5
Favre took physical copies of Pohl’s information, and took possession of Pohl’s stolen computers
and misappropriated electronic data.6
In November 2016, facilitated by Nicholson, Kassab and Douglas Mokntague III and
Montague, Pittman & Varanado, P.A. purchased Pohl’s stolen confidentiall information and
property from Favre for a whopping $250,000, plus bonuses,7 taking poscsession of at least some
of the information and property in December 2016.8 The Moving Defsendants highly valued Pohl’s
stolen and misappropriated confidential information and propertys because, after purchasing it, they
intended to and did contact and solicit Pohl’s clients and prospective clients.9 These actions
constitute conversion, violations of the uniform trade secrets act (“TUTSA”), and conspiracy. Pohl
timely brought this lawsuit alleging those torts on August 28, 2018.10
The Barraatry Allegations
Although any attempt to relitigate the failed barratry allegations should not be permitted
(and will be the subject of appropriaete motions in limine and evidentiary objections), and Pohl
hesitates to give the allegations unfnecessary attention, Pohl will address those claims briefly below
out of an abundance of cautiyon and to not leave the inaccurate, and often purposefully misleading,
allegations unrebuttedC. While the problems and misstatements contained in Kassab’s and
5 Id. ¶ 24.
6 Id. ¶¶ 24–25.
7 November 10, 2016 Agreement, attached as Exhibit 1 to the Pohl Declaration (Exhibit A).
8 December 7, 2016 Email, attached as Exhibit 2 to the Pohl Declaration (Exhibit A).
9 The defendants have admitted using Pohl’s client files (while erroneously claiming that they belonged to Precision
Marketing) to contact Pohl’s clients and former clients to solicit them to file claims against Pohl. See Declaration of
Lance Christopher Kassab, attached as Exhibit 1 to Kassab’s Motion to Dismiss, filed October 24, 2018, Exhibit B;
Kassab Deposition 130:3-21 (admitting that Kassab attached Pohl’s fee agreements with Pohl’s clients that he obtained
from Precision to solicitation letters that Kassab sent to Pohl’s clients), Exhibit C.
10 See generally Pohl’s Original Petition, filed August 28, 2018.
Nicholson’s motions could result in an 80-page response, Pohl will address a few key issues and
rely upon his declaration to further rebut the allegations.
Precision, before the sale to the Favre parties, was owned and run by Kirk Ladner, Steve
Seymour, and Scott Walker.11 At the time that Pohl retained Precision, Preckision made the
following representations to Pohl: l
• That Precision had considerable experience in working wcith many law firms and
could provide marketing and public relations services, gather and preserve
evidence and act as a liaison with Pohl’s
clientss;12
• That Precision operated under the guidancge of experienced Mississippi attorneys
to ensure the propriety of their marketBing activities;13
• That Precision would organize anyd host festivals, town hall meetings and other
gatherings to appropriately edaucate the public as part of their marketing efforts;14
• That Precision would traifn  and supervise the Precision staff so as to ensure optimal
results and complian e ce with the rules governing their marketing activities.15
Mr. Pohl and Mr. WilOliafmson relied on these representations in moving forward with
Precision’s principals and entered into services agreements that provided for an hourly rate for
services that was cappCed at a percentage of Pohl’s fees.16 Precision worked out of an office
11 Pohl Declaration ¶¶ 5-8, 24, Exhibit A.
12 Pohl Declaration ¶¶ 5, 9, 25.
13 Pohl Declaration ¶¶ 10, 20.
The evidence still supports this representation. As Walker testified less than two weeks ago: “We ran [the
contracts between Precision and Pohl] past multiple law firms and they all approved those.” Deposition of Scott
Walker, at 209:25-211:9, attached as Exhibit D.
14 Pohl Declaration ¶ 21.
15 Pohl Declaration ¶ 21.
16 Pohl Declaration ¶ 18; see also Exhibit 2 to the Kassab Motion (attaching a later example of such an agreement).
supplied by Pohl and Precision’s owners and staff were Pohl’s agents facilitating the rendition of
Pohl’s and Williamson’s legal service.17
Precision did not live up to expectations. Precision committed the following misconduct:
• Referred certain clients to other lawyers when they were supposed kto be providing
services full time to Pohl and Williamson; C l
• Fabricated expenses to overcharge Pohl for fraudulent expcense reimbursements;
• Systematically overcharged Pohl in violation of the services agreements;
• Failed to keep time records as both required sby the services agreements and
repeatedly requested by Pohl. g
• Brought suit in Mississippi Federal CBourt claiming Precision was underpaid for
their marketing and public relatioyns services. Precision initially (and correctly)
argued that they were paid by a hourly fee.18 When their lack of supporting time
records became a problemf and when Nicholson became involved in the litigation,
their position changed to that they were guaranteed a percentage of the fee.19 As
will be addressOed below, it was Nicholson who raised the issue of barratry,
provided the Precision witnesses scripts to follow to assert barratry allegation,
and threatened witnesses unless they delivered the scripted testimony concocted
by hier.
• o fPrecision then stole Pohl’s client files, information and computers so that they
could sell them ostensibly as part of a sale of Precision to Favre with Favre then
17 Pohl Declaration ¶ 14 (discussing how Precision’s principals acted as the functional equivalent of employees).
18 See Original Complaint in MS Lawsuit, at 5-6, attached as Exhibit 4 to the Nicholson Motion (discussing how
Precision was entitled to “hourly fees”).
19 See Amended Complaint in MS Lawsuit filed March 17, 2016, at 12-13, attached as Exhibit E (including different
allegations that Precision was entitled to a percentage of fees, not an “hourly rate”).
acting as managing member of Precision to move forward with a concerted
scheme to bring barratry claims against Pohl, Williamson and a third lawyer Rob
Ammons.
After the sale of Precision to Favre, Nicholson represented Favre, Precisiokn and the three
individuals (Ladner, Seymour and Walker) and actively suborned perjury. It lis against this back
drop that Kassab and Nicholson have selectively pulled testimony capparently scripted by
Nicholson and designed to further Precision’s claims in the Mississisppi suit and provide support
for the barratry lawsuit scheme—now largely recanted—to suppsort their assertion of barratry.
The Multiple Grievances
As a starting point, it is important to note that all of the allegedly illegal acts argued by
Kassab and Nicholson were the subject of a grievance brought by Kassab against Pohl individually,
as well as multiple grievances brought by Kasasab as counsel for former clients of Pohl that Kassab
had solicited after purchasing Pohl’s files. Kassab, in a manner very similar to the course chosen
by Kassab and Nicholson for their Meotion for Summary Judgment, submitted over 60 pages of
argument for his individual grievfance and over 2,300 pages of exhibits. However, once Pohl had
an opportunity to respond ywith the actual facts and by pointing out the misstatements and
fabrications in Kassab’Cs submissions, Pohl was cleared of any wrongdoing:
The Kassab a Grievance: State Bar of Texas: Summarily Dismissed.20
The Chf f eatham Grievance:
U• State Bar of Texas: “This office has examined the Grievance and determined that
the information alleged does not demonstrate Professional Misconduct or a
Disability.21
20 See Nov. 15, 2019 Letter from State Bar of Texas: Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Ex. F, at 12.
21 See Feb. 24, 2020 Letter from State Bar of Texas: Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Ex. G, at 11.
• The Board of Disciplinary Appeals: “After reviewing your grievance as you
originally filed it and no other information, the Board has determined that the
conduct you described in the grievance does not violate the Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct.”22 k
The Bikumbu Grievance: C l
• State Bar of Texas: dismissed on limitations grounds:23 c
• The Board of Disciplinary Appeals: “After reviewing your grievance as you
originally filed it and no other information, thse Board has determined that the
conduct you described in the grievance doges not violate the Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct.”24 B
The Speck Grievance: y
• State Bar of Texas: dismissed oan limitations grounds:25
• The Board of Disciplinafry Appeals: “After reviewing your grievance as you
originally filed it and no other information, the Board has determined that the
conduct you deOscribed in the grievance does not violate the Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct.”26
The Berry Grievance:
• Statie Bar of Texas: dismissed on limitations grounds:27
• o f The Board of Disciplinary Appeals: “After reviewing your grievance as you
originally filed it and no other information, the Board has determined that the
22 See May 14, 2020 Letter from The Board of Disciplinary Appeals, Ex. H, at 5.
23 See Jan. 14, 2020 Letter from State Bar of Texas: Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Ex. I, at 10.
24 See April 10, 2020 Letter from The Board of Disciplinary Appeals, Ex. J, at 4.
25 See Jan. 9, 2020 Letter from State Bar of Texas: Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Ex. K, at 8.
26 See April 10, 2020 Letter from The Board of Disciplinary Appeals, Ex. L, at 1.
27 See Jan. 9, 2020 Letter from State Bar of Texas: Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Ex. M, at 7.
conduct you described in the grievance does not violate the Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct.”28
The Miller Grievance:
• State Bar of Texas: “This office has examined the Grievance and kdetermined that
the information alleged does not demonstrate ProfessionCall Misconduct or a
Disability.”29 c
• The Board of Disciplinary Appeals: “After reviewing your grievance as you
originally filed it and no other information, thse Board has determined that the
conduct you described in the grievance doges not violate the Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct.”30 B
Undeterred, Kassab and Nicholson rely yheavily for their allegations of barratry upon
portions of testimony from Scott Walker takaen from his 2016 deposition in the Mississippi suit
when: a) he was trying to obtain funds from Pohl and Williamson; b) he was represented by
Nicholson; and c) he was directed by Nicholson on what he should and should not say including
the instruction to pepper his testimfony with barratry allegations.31
Q. (Kassab) Now, I hear what you said. You said that Tina Nicholson prepared
you for the deposoition. Is that what I heard?
A. (Walker) Yes
Q. And idid Ms. Nicholson tell you to lie?
A. She just told us things, buzz words to say. I had never heard the word
“barratry” before, “cold calling.” Those were the things Ms. Nicholson wanted us
to say throughout the deposition as much as we could.”
Q. Do you recall my question?
28 See April 10, 2020 Letter from The Board of Disciplinary Appeals, Ex. N, at 2.
29 See Jan. 9, 2020 Letter from State Bar of Texas: Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Ex. O, at 9.
30 See April 10, 2020 Letter from The Board of Disciplinary Appeals, Ex. P, at 3.
31 See Deposition of Scott Walker, at 198:19-199:19, 203:15-204:23, Exhibit D.
A. What was it?
Q. I asked you if Ms. Nicholson instructed you or told you to lie in the deposition.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And is it your testimony today that you, in fact, perjured yourself in the
deposition by lying?
A. No. r
Q. Well, did you lie in the deposition? C
A. I listened and did what my attorney said to do.32 t
This is a stunning admission given that Walker is an ex-felon.t He went on to testify that
he did not knowingly intend to lie but relied upon the advice of Nicholson to give the testimony
he gave.33 e
Kassab and Nicholson also rely heavily on a uSeptember 24, 2016 affidavit and some
testimony by Magdelena Santana. While Kassab annd Nicholson do mention that she swore out an
additional affidavit, they do not describe it accur irately. Nor do they mention Ms. Santana’s letter
sent to Judge Starett in Mississippi (among other recipients) and the taped conversation that
occurred solely between Ms. Santana and Kassab.
Ms. Santana’s letter statedf ais follows:34
32 See Deposition of Scott Walker, at 203:15-204:23 (emphasis added), Exhibit D.
33 See Deposition of Scott Walker at 205:1-14, Exhibit D; see also Deposition Instructions to Walker, attached as
Exhibit Q (used as Walker Ex. 69 in the deposition); Deposition of Scott Walker at 347:20-350:7, Exhibit D
(authenticating Walker Ex. 69).
34 See October 3, 2017 letter from Magdalena Santana copying Judge Starett, attached as Exhibit R.
10
The private call between Kassab and Santana, secretly recorded by Kassab on August 15th,
2017 confirms her letter to Judge Starret and reflects the pressure brought to bear by Nicholson
and Favre against Ms. Santana:
…I’m still going through emotional distress. Recently I just finished that
subpoena, going to be a year in November, with the whole scenario that they
promised cthat I would – the firm, Tina Nicholson and Scott [Favre], they signed the
documefnft that said that if I testified – actually they were calling my mom’s house,
calling me, saying that if I didn’t come and testify, that I was going to be in
trUouble, that they were going to go send – subpoena my brother. I don’t know. It’s
been super-stressful. It’s been super stressful. They’ve been calling and telling me
all kinds of stuff. And I agreed to go and testify just to avoid any type of problems
to come to my family, to my mother’s house and my brother’s house in the fact –
and due to the fact that they were going to pay me what was owed, they got settled
money and then they just kicked me to the curb.35
35 See Audio Transcription dated August 15, 2017, at pp. 6-7, attached as Exhibit S.
11
And although Kassab sought to coax Santana into supporting the claim that Pohl and
Williamson were involved in an alleged barratry scheme, Santana rejected that contention as well:
MR. KASSAB: My understanding is Williamson Pohl set up the scheme. I thought
that’s what you told me.
MS. SANTANA: The marketing firm is the one that hired me. I didn’t eeven go out
and meet Pohl and Williamson during the course of that whole thing…l.36
Kassab and Nicholson also assert that Pohl paid Santana $50,00c0 and imply that it was
payment to retract her September 14, 2016 affidavit and to sign her Dsecember 19, 2017 affidavit.
This is not only false but is clearly designed to mislead the Cousrt.
The actual facts surrounding the disturbing story of Ms. Santana are as follows. Ms.
Santana wrote/signed the relevant agreements, correspondence and affidavits on the following
dates:
May 21, 2014: Santana/Walker eat al./Pohl release and non-disparagement
agreement a/k/a “sworn statement” M(Santana is paid $50,000 as consideration).
September 24, 2016: Santana’s “ffirst affidavit” (prepared by Tina Nicholson)
October 3, 2017: Santana’s eletter to Favre/Nicholson/Judge Starrett (stating she
was coerced into signing thec “first affidavit”)
December 19, 2017: SOantana’s “second affidavit” (retracting the “first affidavit”).
The Moving Defendants’ reliance on testimony from a retracted affidavit demonstrates that their
Motions are not to be tCaken seriously.
II. ARGUMENT
A. The Efvidence Cited by the Moving Defendants Is Not Competent Summary
Jundgment Evidence and Pohl Objects to Consideration of It.
As a threshold matter, the Moving Defendants rely on numerous inadmissible deposition
transcripts taken in other lawsuits, many of which involve persons who are not parties to this
lawsuit. Additionally, the exhibits attached to Kassab’s Motion are not properly authenticated as
36 Id. at 3-4.
12
evidence, as the attached declaration incorrectly claims that everything attached to Kassab’s
Motion are business records of Kassab’s firm. The lack of seriousness with which the Moving
Defendants approach summary judgment evidence is not surprising, given that the motions also
rely on controverted evidence, which cannot support a traditional motion for summkary judgment.
The Moving Parties cite to numerous deposition transcripts from plrior lawsuits that
constitute inadmissible hearsay that the Court should disregard. The Tcexas Rules of Evidence
provide an exclusion from the hearsay rule for testimony from a desposition “taken in the same
proceeding.” TEX. R. EVID. 801(3). However, deposition testims ony from a different proceeding
is inadmissible unless it falls within an exclusion to the hearsay rule. See Taylor v. Baylor Scott
& White Med. Ctr.-Frisco, No. 05-20-00352-CV, 2022 WL 405896, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Feb. 10, 2022, no pet.) (“Because the record establishes that Dr. Carmody’s deposition testimony
is not from the same proceeding, and the deposaition did not fall within any exclusion to the hearsay
rule, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence.”).
Kassab cites to eight differenet inadmissible deposition transcripts from prior lawsuits.37
These are not tangential to Kassfab’s Motion, as he cites to these inadmissible depositions well
over a hundred times. See gyenerally Kassab’s Motion. Nicholson’s Motion fares a little better.
She cites to four diffeCrent inadmissible deposition transcripts from prior lawsuits38 well over a
dozen times. See generally Nicholson’s Motion. Furthermore, Kassab incorporated Nicholson’s
briefing and evfifdence. See Kassab’s Motion, at 2. Pohl objects to these exhibits, and the Court
should exUclude all of this inadmissible evidence and deny the Motions as insufficient on this
ground alone.
37 See Kassab Ex. 3-A; Kassab Ex. 3-B; Kassab Ex. 4; Kassab Ex. 7; Kassab Ex. 8; Kassab Ex. 15; Kassab Ex. 25;
Kassab Ex. 39.
38 See Nicholson Ex. 18; Nicholson Ex. 19; Nicholson Ex. 25; Nicholson Ex. 26.
13
Pohl also objects on the grounds that Kassab’s Motion improperly attempts to authenticate
evidence as business records without proper support. Despite attaching 60 exhibits, which include
items like contracts to which Kassab is not a party39 and correspondence between third parties,40
Kassab attempts to authenticate all of the exhibits by stating: k
Attached to the Motion are true and correct copies of documents whichl were either
exchanged in discovery in the Barratry Litigation, including document production
and depositions, or used in the Barratry Litigation, like declacrations from my
clients. These documents are considered business records of the Frirm and have been
kept in the regular course of business. The records attached tos the Motion are exact
duplicates.41 D
First, this does not satisfy the requirements of a business recsords affidavit. See TEX. R. EVID.
902(10). Furthermore, much of the evidence cannot satisfry the requirements of a business record,
as there is no way for David Kassab to be familiar with the creation of items that were produced
in discovery by other parties and whether “the relcord was made at or near the time by—or from
information transmitted by—someone withM knowledge.” See TEX. R. EVID. 803(6)(A).
Because they are not properly aouthenticated as evidence, the Court should not consider
Kassab Exhibits 2-5, 7-8, 10-15, 17c, 20-21, 23-28, 30-34, 36-38, 40, & 51.
B. Pohl’s Claims are Not Barred by Limitations.
Pohl’s claims against the Moving Defendants accrued no earlier than November 2016
because they arise from the November 2016 purchase—and subsequent use—of information and
property stolen frcom Pohl. As no claim has a limitations period of less than two years, and Pohl
brought this lawsuit in August 2018, Pohl’s claims are not barred.
39See, e.g., Kassab Exhibits 26 & 31.
40 See, e.g., Kassab Exhibit 38.
41 See Declaration of David Kassab ¶ 5, attached as Exhibit 1 to the Kassab Motion.
14
1. The summary judgment standard for the affirmative defense of limitations.
Defendants seeking summary judgment on limitations bear the burden of proof and must
conclusively prove when each of the alleged causes of action accrued. See Regency Field Services,
LLC v. Swift Energy Operating, LLC, 622 S.W.3d 807, 818 (Tex. 2021) (“a defkendant seeking
summary judgment based on limitations must conclusively establish that thel limitations period
expired before the claimant filed suit”). “Generally, a claim accruecs when the defendant’s
wrongful conduct causes the claimant to suffer a legal injury, which gsives the claimant the right to
seek a judicial remedy.” Id. Texas courts apply specific tests to determine the accrual of certain
claims, including the three claims at issue here.
A claim for conversion generally accrues at the time of the defendant’s “unlawful taking”
of the plaintiff’s property. See Burns v. Rochon, 190 S.W.3d 263, 271 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2006, no pet.). When property is alleged to have been converted and then transferred to
another party, “each possession is a new conversion.” Pemex Exploracion y Produccion v. BASF
Corp., CIV.A. H-10-1997, 2013 WLe 5514944, at *31 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2013) (citation omitted)
(applying Texas law). There is a ftwo-year limitations period for conversion. See TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE § 16.003(a). y
“A cause of acCtion for trade-secret misappropriation accrues when the trade secret is
actually used. Use aof the trade secret means commercial use by which the offending party seeks
to profit from thfe use of the secret.” Sw. Energy Prod. Co. v. Berry-Helfand, 491 S.W.3d 699,
721–22 (UTex. 2016) (cleaned up). There is a three-year limitations period for TUTSA violations.
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.010(a). The civil conspiracy claim is derivative of the
underlying torts, and it accrues “as to each alleged underlying tort when that tort occurs.” Agar
Corp., Inc. v. Electro Circuits Int’l, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136, 145 (Tex. 2019).
15
2. Pohl’s claims accrued within two years of the initiation of this suit.
Pohl brought suit on August 28, 2018.42 Because Pohl’s conversion claim accrued after
August 28, 2016 and Pohl’s TUTSA claim accrued after August 28, 2015, the affirmative defense
of limitations fails. k
Pohl’s conversion claim arises from Defendants’ purchase and slubsequent use of
information and property that they knew had been stolen from Pohl. Seec Amended Complaint ¶¶
36–38.43 The evidence shows that Defendants made this purchasse through a contract dated
November 10, 2016.44 The Defendants took possession of at least some of Pohl’s information and
property no earlier than that date and mostly beginning in De e cember 2016.45
Pohl’s conversion claim accrued when the Defendants obtained Pohl’s property. See Burns
v. Rochon, 190 S.W.3d 263, 271 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Contrary to the
Defendants’ arguments, a prior claim for conversion against other individuals or entities is entirely
irrelevant, as “each possession is a new conversion.” Pemex Exploracion y Produccion v. BASF
Corp., CIV.A. H-10-1997, 2013 WLe 5514944, at *31 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2013) (emphasis added)
(applying Texas law). Defendafnts’ liability did not accrue when other people and entities
committed wrongs against Pyohl; that liability accrues when Defendants themselves committed the
tortious acts. BecauseC the contract to purchase the property is dated in November 2016,46 and
Kassab was still acaquiring possession of the stolen property in December 2016,47 Pohl’s claim
against Kassab ffor conversion accrued, no earlier than November 2016—well within the two-year
period. U
42 See generally Pohl’s Original Petition, filed August 28, 2018.
43 See also November 10, 2016 Agreement, attached as Exhibit 1 to the Pohl Declaration.
44 Id.
45 December 7, 2016 Email, attached as Exhibit 2 to the Pohl Declaration.
46 November 10, 2016 Agreement, attached as Exhibit 1 to the Pohl Declaration.
47 December 7, 2016 Email, attached as Exhibit 2 to the Pohl Declaration.
16
Pohl’s TUTSA claim is based on Defendants’ knowing purchase and subsequent use of
stolen trade secrets. See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 39–42. Pohl’s TUTSA claim accrued upon the
Defendants’ use of Pohl’s stolen trade secrets. See Sw. Energy Prod. Co. v. Berry-Helfand, 491
S.W.3d 699, 721–22 (Tex. 2016). For Defendants to obtain summary judgmentk on limitations,
they must conclusively show that Pohl’s TUTSA claim against accrued prior tlo August 28, 2015.
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.010(a) (providing a three-year limcitations period). Pohl’s
claims accrued no earlier than November 10, 2016, as that is the date osf the contract through which
Defendants purchased Pohl’s trade secrets.48 Given that Defensdants had not collected all of the
materials by December 7, 2015,49 their use of Pohl’s trade secrets—and the accrual of Pohl’s
TUTSA claim—occurred after November 10, 2016.
3. The arguments and evidence about the actions of others are irrelevant to the Moving
Defendants’ limitations defense. l
Kassab and Nicholson focus on wrMongful conduct by others—conduct that does not give
rise to Pohl’s claims in this lawsuit—too argue that limitations bars Pohl’s claims. See Nicholson
Defendants’ Motion at 36-40; Kascsab Defendants’ Motion at 45-51. However, in determining
when claims accrued against a defendant, it is that defendant’s alleged wrongful conduct that is
relevant, not the conduct of others. Defendants’ participation in the sale and purchase of Pohl’s
information, through a contract dated in November 2016, and their subsequent use of that
information is thec conduct that gives rise to Pohl’s claims. See Amended Petition ¶¶ 21–23, 26–
29, 33.50 D o efendants’ arguments suggest a sort of reverse discovery rule—i.e., they hope to
convince the Court that because Pohl allegedly knew that others may have stolen and otherwise
48 November 10, 2016 Agreement, attached as Exhibit 1 to the Pohl Declaration.
49 December 7, 2016 Email, attached as Exhibit 2 to the Pohl Declaration.
50 See November 10, 2016 Agreement, attached as Exhibit 1 to the Pohl Declaration; Declaration of Lance Christopher
Kassab, attached as Exhibit 1 to Kassab’s Motion to Dismiss, filed October 24, 2018, attached as Exhibit B.
17
mistreated certain of his trade secrets and other property belonging to him, his causes of action for
separate torts by these Defendants accrued before any Defendants had even committed the torts
for which Pohl seeks to recover. The discovery rule does not operate to shorten the statutory
limitations period to cause a claim to accrue before the defendant commits a tort. k
Even if the wrongful conduct of others (that did not give rise to Polhl’s claims) were
somehow relevant to a limitations defense—and it is not—the Movincg Defendants have not
factually established that Pohl “knew or in the exercise of reasonable dsiligence should have known
of the wrongful act and resulting injury” more than three years psrior to this lawsuit for his TUTSA
claim and more than two years prior for the conversion claim. See Regency Field Services, LLC
v. Swift Energy Operating, LLC, 622 S.W.3d 807, 817 (Tex. 2021).
Nicholson argues that Pohl knew or should have known that Precision stole the trade
secrets in 2014 or that Favre claimed ownaership of the trade secret documents and Pohl’s
computers by no later than May 2015. She does not explain, however, how that knowledge can
possibly trigger limitations on sepaerate torts committed by Nicholson. She cites case law
indicating that trade secrets claimfs are not continuing offences and that “the wrong occurs at the
time of the improper acquisiytion.” Nicholson Defendants’ Motion at 42. Pohl agrees—the wrong
occurred no earlier thaCn the time of the improper acquisition of the trade secrets, no earlier than
November or December 2016. How could Pohl have known about that in May 2015 when it had
not even happef fned yet?
SiUmilarly, Kassab argues that “at least of May 2015, Pohl knew that Walker and Ladner
had transferred the alleged trade secrets to Favre.” Such knowledge, even if established, does not
address a claim of conversion or theft of trade secrets committed by Kassab. Kassab also purports
to negate the application of the discovery rule through Pohl’s testimony. The evidence Kassab
18
cites suggests only that Pohl may have had knowledge of some wrongful conduct by some
individual or individuals that occurred in 2014.51 It does not address when Pohl knew of Kassab’s
own wrongful conduct.52 Again, the discovery rule does not cause limitations to commence before
the defendant has even committed the wrongful act for which the plaintiff sues. k
As much as they struggle to establish their limitations defense as a maltter of law, Kassab
and Nicholson have at most raised a question of fact regarding the acccrual date of the asserted
causes of action. Indeed, the evidence is undisputed that as to Kassabs and Nicholson, the dates of
their torts are well within the statutory limitations period. Thse Court should deny the Moving
Defendants’ Motions to the extent that they are based on limitations.
C. The Unlawful Acts Doctrine53 is not legally available or factually established.
The Moving Defendants expend pages and pages and submit volumes of exhibits—
including exhibits that are not competent evidaence—attempting to establish their contention that
Pohl committed various violations of the Texas Rules. See Nicholson Defendants’ Motion at 3-
25; Kassab Defendants’ Motion at 3-3e2. Apparently disappointed in their inability to successfully
present this collection of materifals in their failed efforts to obtain a judgment against Pohl—
through separate failed lawsuyits—they are attempting to salvage some value out of it by submitting
to the Court in this caseC. This “evidence” has no place here. It is irrelevant, it establishes nothing
as a matter of law, and it is simply an attempt to distract from the Moving Defendants’ patently
51 See Exhibit 58 to Kassab’s Motion (discussing Pohl’s knowledge and contentions made in May 2018).
52 See generally id.
What Pohl’s prior testimony shows is that he was contending that, at that time, he believed Kassab had
conspired with individuals who had previously wronged Pohl. As a co-conspirator, Kassab would thus be responsible
for their acts. A past belief about conspirator liability does not change the fact that Kassab’s wrongful conduct took
place within the limitations period.
53 The Moving Defendants variously characterize this defense as the “illegal acts rule,” the “unlawful acts doctrine,”
“in pari delicto” and “equity.” This section of Pohl’s response covers each of those defenses, as they are treated as
interchangeable by the Moving Defendants.
19
tortious acts. Furthermore, to the extent that the doctrine could have applied, it is preempted by
Texas’s proportionate responsibility statute.
1. The Unlawful Acts Doctrine is preempted.
To the extent that the unlawful acts doctrine could have any relevance tok this case, it is
preempted by Texas’s proportionate responsibility statute. In Dugger v. Arrledondo, the Texas
Supreme Court explicitly considered “whether the common law unlawful cacts doctrine is available
as an affirmative defense under the proportionate responsibility framsework.” 408 S.W.3d 825,
831–32 (Tex. 2013). The Court found that ""it is not,” and thast “[t]he plain language of section
33.003 clearly indicates that the common law unlawful acts doctrine is no longer a viable defense.”
Id. at 832.
The claims alleged against the Moving Defendants, conversion, theft of trade secrets, and
conspiracy, are torts that are subject to the praoportionate liability statute. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 33.002. Kassab clearly thinks this statute applies as well, as he filed a flawed motion
to designate responsible third partiees under this statute. See generally Kassab’s Motion to
Designate Responsible Third Parfties, filed May 13, 2022. While Kassab is incorrect that people
other than defendants in this ylawsuit are responsible for the damages Pohl seeks, he cannot dispute
that the unlawful acts dCoctrine is not a valid defense in this lawsuit.
2. Even if not preempted, the Unlawful Acts Doctrine does not apply in this case.
Under Tf fexas law, the concepts of “unlawful acts,” “illegal acts rule,” or “in pari delicto”
provide tUhat “no action may be predicated upon an admittedly unlawful act of the party asserting
it.” Denson v. Dallas Cnty. Credit Union, 262 S.W.3d 846, 855 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.)
(emphasis added). Courts have interpreted this defense to mean that if the illegal act is inextricably
intertwined with the claim and the alleged damages would not have occurred but for the illegal act,
20
the plaintiff is not entitled to recover as a matter of law.” See Sharpe v. Turley, 191 S.W.3d 362,
366 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied).
An examination of the caselaw—including the caselaw cited by the Moving Defendants—
shows that courts apply the doctrine when “at the time of the plaintiff’s injury, tkhe plaintiff was
engaged in an illegal act, and that act contributed to the injury.” Andrew Sheblay & Co., P.L.L.C.
v. Bishop, 429 S.W.3d 644, 648–49 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 20c13, pet. denied); Kassab
Defendants’ Motion at 62 (citing Bishop). It is not enough to plausibsly connect a claim to illegal
conduct, courts look at whether the plaintiff’s claim is prediscated on and must be proven in
connection with an illegal act. See Carcamo-Lopez v. Does 1 through 20, 865 F. Supp. 2d 736,
767 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (“But when the illegal conduct arises in a defense and not in the plaintiff’s
case, the unlawful acts rule will not bar a plaintiff’s claims.”).
As an initial matter, there is no “admitatedly unlawful act” that would allow the application
of the doctrine. See Macias v. Moreno, 30 S.W.3d 25, 29 (Tex. App.—El Paso El Paso 2000, pet.
denied). In addition, any alleged unlaewful act was not inextricably intertwined with Pohl’s causes
of action. To determine whether tfhe illegal act is “inextricably intertwined” courts look to whether
“whether the person seekingy to enforce [his claim] requires any aid from the illegal transaction to
establish his case.” SeCe Marathon Oil Co. v. Hadley, 107 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935)
(quotation omitted).
No recof fvery can be had if it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove, as part of his
cause of action, his own illegal contract or other illegal transaction. But the plaintiff
mUay recover if he can show a complete cause of action without being obliged to
prove his own illegal act, although such act may incidentally appear, and may be
explanatory even of other facts in the case, it being sufficient if his cause of action
is not essentially founded upon something which is illegal.
Id. See also Macias, 30 S.W.3d at 29 (“However, if a party can show a complete cause of action
without being obliged to prove their own illegal act, although the illegal act may appear
21
incidentally and may be important in explanation of other facts in the case, they may recover.”).
Pohl can certainly demonstrate the elements of each of his claims without being required to prove
any illegal act.54 Nothing about Pohl’s claims requires him to show that his client contracts are
enforceable or are free from any alleged barratrous activity. He owns his own kclient contracts
regardless of how he procured them. l
Another impediment to the application of the unlawful acts thec Texas Supreme Court
clarified long ago that the illegal act must have been a proximate casuse of the plaintiff’s injury.
Pyeatt v. Anderson, 269 S.W. 429, 430 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1s925); Arredondo v. Dugger, 347
S.W.3d 757, 761–62 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011), aff’d 408 S.W.3d 825 (Tex. 2013); Petta v. Rivera,
985 S.W.2d 199, 204 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1998), rev’d on other grounds sub
nom. Texas Dep’t of Public Safety v. Petta, 44 S.W.3d 575 (Tex. 2001). Even crediting the Moving
Defendants’ arguments, any illegal act by Paohl is not the proximate cause of Pohl’s injuries.
Instead, the cause of his injuries were the tortious acts of the Moving Defendants.
The illegal acts doctrine is noet applicable to Pohl’s claims as a matter of law. Whether
Pohl committed any of the acts thef Moving Defendants allege (and he did not) is in no way relevant
to Pohl’s claims against themy. It is nothing more than a side-show. And, as set forth below, the
Moving Defendants haCve wholly failed to establish their defense as a matter of fact.
3. Kassab’s use of caselaw on the unlawful acts doctrine is misleading.
Kassabf fcontends that “Texas courts have applied the Unlawful Acts Rule to preclude
claims arUising from barratry.” Kassab’s Motion, at 64 (emphasis removed). They cite to Truyen
Luong v. McAllister, No. 01-17-00198-CV, 2018 WL 3651103 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
54 As addressed more fully below, the Moving Defendants’ strident contentions that Pohl obtained the client lists and
other property and materials through “illegal acts” are false, as evidenced by the failure of both the grievance procedure
and their barratry suits.
22
Aug. 2, 2018, pet. denied). Id. But Kassab’s discussion of McAllister has no bearing on this
lawsuit. McAllister dealt with a non-lawyer suing to recover compensation under an agreement
where all parties admitted the compensation was a percentage of a lawyer’s fees. McAllister, 2018
WL 3651103, at *2. The court held that “the contract was void due to illegality.” k Id. at *4. Pohl
is not attempting to enforce any client agreement or agreement with anyone whlo worked for him.
The fact that a court refused to enforce a contract that was admittedly illecgal is not surprising, and
it provides no guidance in this case. s
4. The Moving Defendants have not and cannot establissh that Pohl committed illegal acts.
The Moving Defendants allege that their torts are excused because Pohl allegedly violated
the Texas Rules governing lawyers in four ways: (1) practicing law in other jurisdictions without
a license; (2) sharing an office with non-lawyers; (3) illegally soliciting clients; and (4) failing to
protect confidential client information. Saee Nicholson Defendants’ Motion at 1; Kassab
Defendants’ Motion at 2. Although the Moving Defendants go to some length in their effort to
establish these allegations as a mattere of law, they have wholly failed to do so. At most, they have
raised a fact issue regarding wholfly irrelevant allegations.
Before addressing tyhe individual allegations relating to Pohl’s actions, it deserves
repeating: these allegCed actions were brought to the attention of the relevant authorities
through grievance a s filed with the State Bar of Texas, which dismissed the grievances.55 For
those grievancfefs that were appealed to the Board of Disciplinary Appeals, that Board rendered
findings tUhat “the Board has determined that the conduct you described in the grievance does
not violate the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional and affirms the dismissal.” The
contention that Pohl violated the Texas Rules governing lawyers has been determined, and the
55 See Grievance dismissal letters, attached as Exhibit T.
23
claim has failed. This Court should decline to rehear these allegations, as they have been resolved.
Furthermore, as set forth below, they are false.
a. Pohl did not engage in unauthorized practice of law.
The State Bar of Texas appropriately dismissed claims against Pohl krelating to the
unauthorized practice of law because Pohl at all times attempted to conform tlo the requirements
relating to practicing in states in which he was not licensed.56 Moreovcer, the process for filing
claims relating to the BP Matter did not even require that a licensesd attorney participate in the
filing.57
The materials that the Moving Defendants have submitted do not conclusively establish
that Pohl engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Instead, to the extent that the question can
even be considered by this Court, given that the State Bar of Texas has finally resolved the issue,
there is substantial controverting evidence. Aaccordingly, the allegation does not provide a basis
on which to enter summary judgment in the Moving Defendants’ favor.
b. Pohl shared office space weith contractors and secretaries who worked for him full time.
The Moving Defendants afttack Pohl for sharing office space with non-lawyers. Here again,
the State Bar of Texas propeyrly dismissed the claim because Pohl employed everyone with whom
he shared an office, Cor they were a functional equivalent of an employee or a lawyer’s
representative.58 a
The maf fterials that the Moving Defendants have submitted do not support much less
conclusivUely establish that Pohl wrongfully shared office space with non-lawyers. Instead, to the
extent that the question can even be considered by this Court given that the State Bar of Texas has
56 Pohl Declaration, ¶ 17.
57 Id. ¶ 29.
58 Id. ¶ 14.
24
finally resolved the issue, there is substantial controverting evidence. Accordingly, the allegation
does not provide a basis on which to enter summary judgment in the Moving Defendants’ favor.
c. Pohl legally solicited his clients.
Pohl instructed all of those working for him as subcontractors never to illegkally solicit any
potential client.59 Pohl himself never intentionally directly or illegally solilcited any client or
clients.60 Pohl at all times attempted to adhere to the rules of the Statec Bar of Texas and other
relevant states regarding the solicitation of clients.61 s
The materials that the Moving Defendants have submitsted do not conclusively establish
that Pohl illegally solicited clients. Instead, to the extent that the question can even be considered
by this Court given that the State Bar of Texas has finally resolved the issue, there is substantial
controverting evidence. Accordingly, the allegation does not provide a basis on which to enter
summary judgment in the Moving Defendantsa’ favor.
d. Pohl reasonably protected client information.
Pohl testified in his depositioen regarding the reasonable steps he took to protect the client
information, confidential informaftion, and trade secrets that are the subject matter of this suit.62
At all times, Pohl strictly limyited access to the trade secrets, and he ensured that those who had
access to that informatiCon fully understood as part of their professional obligations the confidential
character of that a information.63 Pohl also testified that “numerous times throughout the
relationship,” hfef emphasized to Precision and its employees the importance of confidentiality.64
59 Id. ¶ 30.
60 Id. ¶
61 Id. ¶
62 Pohl Deposition, at 15:21-16:18, attached as Exhibit U.
63 Pohl Declaration ¶¶ 14-15, Exhibit A; see also Deposition of Scott Walker, at 283:17-284:22, 321:5-324:7, Exhibit
D; Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at 355:18–358:10, 372:7–374:24, 377:4–23, 501:3–502:18, Exhibit V; Deposition of
Steve Seymour, at 96:16-24, 223:1-20, Exhibit W.
64 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 23:5-21, Ex. U.
25
The materials that the Moving Defendants have submitted do not conclusively establish
that Pohl failed to protect client information. Instead, to the extent that the question can even be
considered by this Court given that the State Bar of Texas has finally resolved the issue, there is
substantial controverting evidence. Accordingly, the allegation does not provide ak basis on which
to enter summary judgment in the Moving Defendants’ favor. l
e. Pohl legally obtained the materials at issue. c
The Moving Defendants also assert that Pohl cannot recover fosr their violations of TUTSA
because the materials at issue did not legally belong to him. Tshis allegation depends entirely on
the Moving Defendants’ failed arguments relating to the unauthorized practice of law and illegal
solicitation of clients. For the same reasons that those arguments fail, this challenge to Pohl’s
ownership of the materials at issue fails and does not provide a basis on which to enter summary
judgment in the Moving Defendants’ favor. a
Additionally, the Moving Defendants seem to suggest that Pohl cannot own his client
contracts if they are illegal. Howeveer, TEX. GOV’T CODE § 82.0651(a) indicates that an attorney-
client contract is voidable, not vfoid. There is no evidence that any of Pohl’s contracts were
declared void, as provided foyr in the barratry statute. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 82.0651(a). Thus, even
if the Moving DefendaCnts were correct factually on the barratry issue—and they are not—Pohl’s
contracts were still effective and worthy of protection. The Moving Defendants failed to establish
as a matter of lfafw that Pohl does not own the materials at issue.
InU any event, Pohl does not have to demonstrate how he acquired his engagement
agreements with his clients or his client files to pursue his claims. The agreements are clear on
their face. While Kassab claims to have relied upon the non-lawyers Walker and Ladner, and
Favre relied on Nicholson for the idea that Precision somehow owned Pohl’s files, the evidence
26
(and an ounce of common sense) does not support it. Walker repeatedly admitted that he knew
the attorney-client contracts, the computers containing Pohl’s files and any list of clients belonged
to Pohl.65 Mr. Ladner indicated that he believed those materials belonged to Pohl, questioned
Favre about it and was told to consult Nicholson. Nicholson told him that Pohl’ks contracts and
files did not belong to Pohl.66 However, in reality, Ladner had to concede thalt the contracts and
case files were all “Pohl’s stuff.”67 c
D. None of the Asserted Immunity Doctrines Apply. s
The Moving Defendants hope to cloak their tortious actsions in one variety or another of
immunity, variously asserting attorney immunity, judicial proceeding privilege, and immunity for
filing a grievance. None of these doctrines supplies the shield that the Moving Defendants hope
to hide behind.
Pohl sued the Moving Defendants for coanverting his property and misappropriating his trade
secrets. They argue that they are entitled to immunity because after they engaged in this wrongful
acquisition of property and informateion, they sought to profit from their torts by suing Pohl for
barratry and other claims. Texas fdoes not recognize any form of immunity for the tortious actions
of lawyers taken outside they attorney-client relationship and outside of the judicial process. As
hard as the Moving DCefendants may try to characterize their actions as being part of “judicial
proceedings” or as being part of their work as attorneys, that effort fails.
1. The aftftorney immunity doctrine does not apply.
TUhe common-law attorney-immunity defense applies to lawyerly work in “all adversarial
contexts in which an attorney has a duty to zealously and loyally represent a client” but only when
65 Deposition of Scott Walker, at 316-319; 327-329, Ex. D.
66 Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at 119:21-120:15, 127:5-25, 340:10-342:17, Exhibit V.
67 Id. at 350:11-351:21, 356:11-359:12.
27
the claim against the attorney is based on “the kind of conduct” attorneys undertake while
discharging their professional duties to a client. Taylor v. Tolbert, 644 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex.
2022). Where, as here, an attorney engages in conduct that is not “lawyerly work” or is “entirely
foreign to the duties of a lawyer” or falls outside the scope of client representatiokn, the attorney-
immunity defense is inapplicable. Id.; see also Haynes & Boone, LLP v. NFTDl, LLC, 631 S.W.3d
65, 67 (Tex. 2021); Landry’s, Inc. v. Animal Legal Defense Fund, 63c1 S.W.3d 40, 47 (Tex.
2021); Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. 201s5).
Attorney immunity does not protect conduct s 
simply because attorneys often engage in that activity or because an attorney
performed the activity on a client’s behalf. Ratherr, the conduct must involve the
uniquely lawyerly capacity and the attorney’s skills as an attorney. For example, a
lawyer who makes publicity statements to the press and on social media on a client’s
behalf does not partake of the office, professional training, skill, and authority of an
attorney because anyone—including presls agents, spokespersons, or someone with
no particular training or authority at aall—can publicize a client’s allegations to the
media. Immunity attaches only if theM attorney is discharging “lawyerly” duties to his
or her client. 
Tolbert, 644 S.W.3d at 646 (footnotees omitted) (cleaned up).
The Texas Supreme Courft has held that two inquiries are relevant to an attorney-immunity
defense: “the type of conduyct at issue and the existence of an attorney–client relationship at the
time.” Youngkin v. HCines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 683 (Tex. 2018). The claims against the Moving
Defendants do not fall within the attorney-immunity doctrine because the conduct at issue does
not qualify as “f fthe kind of conduct in which an attorney engages when discharging his duties to
his clientU.” Canty Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. 2015). The Moving
Defendants have not and cannot establish the existence of an attorney–client relationship at the
time of their wrongful conduct.
28
The Moving Defendants’ knowing purchase of stolen property before representation of a
client is neither within the scope of the client representation nor is it an activity undertaken in a
“uniquely lawyerly capacity.” See Landry’s, 631 S.W.3d at 47. The use of the information by the
Moving Defendants to solicit and advertise to obtain clients is not within the kscope of client
representation, because this conduct necessarily precedes the “meeting of thel minds” between a
potential client and attorney necessary to form an attorney–client relationcship. See Tanox, Inc. v.
Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 105 S.W.3d 244, 254–55s (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). s 
The Moving Defendants attempt to address this issue by arguing the non-relevant point
that attorney immunity can apply prior to any litigation. While the doctrine can in certain
circumstances apply prior to litigation, that fact is not relevant here. Pohl asserts claims for
conduct, not just before litigation, but before thae Moving Defendants had a single client with whom
they could have the requisite attorney–client relationship. Tanox, Inc. v. Akin, Gump, Strauss,
Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 105 S.W.3d e244, 254–55 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet.
denied) (noting that attorney–clifent relationship cannot be formed prior to a “meeting of the
minds”). y
In sum, the MoCving Defendants cannot show that their wrongful actions were “within the
scope of client representation” and were “not foreign to the duties of a lawyer.” Youngkin, 546
S.W.3d at 682f. f Immunity arises only if a lawyer can establish as a matter of law that when he
engaged Uin his alleged wrongful acts, he was acting not only within the scope of client
representation, but that there was something “particular to ‘the office, professional training, skill,
and authority of an attorney’ about” his alleged wrongful conduct. See Landry’s, 631 S.W.3d at
47.
29
Because the Moving Defendants did not and cannot provide evidence of the existence of
an attorney–client relationship at the time of their wrongful actions and evidence that those actions
were within the scope of their representation, their request for summary judgment on the attorney-
immunity doctrine must be denied. The fact that their wrongful conduct of pukrchasing stolen
information was not the type of conduct undertaken in a “uniquely lawyerly caplacity” only further
supports this conclusion. c
2. The judicial proceedings privilege does not apply. s
The judicial proceedings privilege applies only to commsunications “in the due course of a
judicial proceeding” and the privilege protects against a claim for libel or slander. Landry’s, 631
S.W.3d at 46. Given that the basis of Pohl’s claim is not a communication made in the due course
of a judicial proceeding and given that Pohl has not sued for libel or slander, the judicial
proceedings privilege does not apply as a matater of law.
Kassab argues that even though Pohl’s claims do not assert claims for libel or slander, the
judicial proceedings privilege shoueld apply because Pohl’s claims arise somehow out of
communications. Pohl’s claims dfo not however, arise out of communications. They arise out of
theft. Misappropriation of ytrade secrets is not a form of communication, nor is conversion.
Kassab’s arguments faCil.
3. The judicial proceedings privilege does not apply. Section 17.09 of the Texas
Disciplicnary Rules does not apply
Although Kassab contends baldly that “it is undisputed that Pohl’s allegations of
wrongdoing are predicated on Kassab’s filing of grievances against Pohl,” Kassab Defendants’
Motion at 35, that is untrue. Instead, Pohl’s suit is predicated on the Defendants’ conversion of
his property and misappropriation of his trade secrets. The fact that Kassab subsequently used
those trade secrets and that property to file grievances does not trigger the protections of TEX. R.
30
DISC. P. 17.09. In short, that section does not apply to the claims asserted here, as they are based
on conversion and theft.
E. Pohl’s Claims Have Not Been Released
Nicholson erroneously contends that the Settlement Agreement that she repkeatedly ignored
and flagrantly breached released her from the claims that Pohl now asserts. Thlis argument fails.
As an initial matter, Nicholson has provided the Court with no adcmissible evidence of the
terms of the Settlement Agreement on which they rely. Althougsh the Amended Motion for
Traditional Summary Judgment purports to quote the termss of the confidential agreement,
Nicholson has not attached or verified the agreement itself. Without the Settlement Agreement as
evidence, the Court cannot enter summary judgment on the argument that it contains release
language that would effectively release the claims asserted here.
In addition, contrary to Nicholson’s ianterpretation of the language of the releases in the
Settlement Agreement, that language does not provide a release for future torts not yet committed
by the released parties at the time of tehe Settlement Agreement.
More importantly, howefver, the Settlement Agreement requires specific actions (in
addition to the return of docyuments) that Nicholson quite plainly violated. That is, Paragraph 27
of the Settlement AgreCement provides that “Claimants and Affiliates of Claimants promise and
agree not to make or cause to be made any claim, not to file or cause to be filed any complaint
(administrativef for otherwise), and not to file or cause to be filed any legal action against any of the
Lawyer RUeleasees [which includes Pohl].” Nicholson’s blatant violation of this provision
invalidates any contention that the Settlement Agreement Releases her from the claims Pohl asserts
here.
31
F. Pohl’s TUTSA Claim is not “Conclusively Negated”
Nicholson contends that Pohl’s TUTSA claim is “conclusively negated” because of the
absence of a confidentiality provision in Pohl’s agreement with Precision. This is not a
requirement of TUTSA, which simply requires “reasonable measures under the cirkcumstances” to
preserve confidentiality. This also ignores the “circumstance” of the special natlure of the attorney-
client relationship and the ability and often need for a lawyer to share mcaterials with employees,
consultants, and vendors who qualify as “lawyer representatives” usnder Rule 503 of the Texas
Rules of Evidence. s 
Moreover, Pohl has sworn that he took steps to protect and limit access to the trade secrets,
and he ensured that those who had access to that information fully understood as part of their
professional obligations the confidential character of that information.68
These steps include (and are corroboraated by Precision representatives):
• Pohl informed Precision and all of the staff of the confidential and privileged
nature of the informateion and instructed them to treat them accordingly.69
• Pohl maintained hfis office at the top of Hancock Bank – “the most secure location
on the coast. y ”70
• The buCilding had 24 hour/round the clock security.71
• The elevators were coded such that one could only get to one’s own floors.72
• fThere were security cameras at every floor.73
68 Pohl Declaration ¶¶ 14-15, Exhibit A.
69 Id.; Deposition of Scott Walker, at 283:17-284:22, Exhibit D; Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at 372:7–374:24, Exhibit
70 See Deposition of Scott Walker, at 283:17-284:22, Exhibit D; Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at 372:7–374:24, Exhibit
71 See Deposition of Scott Walker, at 283:17-284:22, Exhibit D.
72 See Deposition of Scott Walker, at 322:9-23, Exhibit D.
73 Id.
32
• The documents and computers were kept under “lock and seal.”74
• The engagement agreements were clearly labeled to identify them as contracts
between lawyers and clients.75
While Nicholson claims that the lists at issue here have been previously usekd as exhibits in
various depositions and hearings, she ignore the facts surrounding the limiteCd plroduction.
First, Pohl and Williamson were both lawyers who owed duties tco their clients and had a
proprietary interest in their own files. All of the defendants were “lawyer representatives” and had
a continuing responsibility to protect the confidential informatsion of both Pohl and Williamson
and the underlying clients. g
Second, all of the parties to the Mississippi laBwsuit already had the either possession (by
virtue of stealing Pohl’s files) or a proprietary iynterest in and in some cases possession of the
documents (Pohl and Williamson). Any limaited production simply went from one party who
already had the information to another party who had the information and did not expand
disclosure of privileged and confidential information beyond those that already had it.
Unsurprisingly, Defendanfts have offered no authority to support the assertion that merely
producing information from one party with continuing duties to protect it to another party who
already has the informaCtion and a continuing duty to protect it somehow waives confidentiality.
Equally important, and surprisingly absent from Kassab’s and Nicholson’s motion, are two
separate ordersf f issued in the Mississippi suit. On October 14th, 2016, Magistrate Judge John C.
Gargiulo Udenied Precision’s Motion for Protective Order where they sought to prevent discovery
of any of the “marketing lists” in their possession. In denying the motion, Judge Garguilo orders
the production of information but with very strict confidentiality protections, limiting who can
74 See Deposition of Scott Walker, at 283:17-284:22, Exhibit D.
75 Pohl Declaration ¶ 15, Ex. A.
33
even have access to the client-based information.76 This was followed up by a letter from Pohl’s
counsel Mr. Bailey.77
On March 22, 2017, Judge Garguilo issued a protective order that was sought by all parties
and approved as to form by all counsel. In that order, the Court defined “Confidentikal Information”
as including the names, addresses and telephone numbers of the Pohl and/orl Williamson along
with amount of gross recovery and fees received and placed strict protectiocns on that information.78
While the Order indicated that it did not apply to previously produceds documents or to Exhibit 70
(which had been previously publicly filed and merely contasined information about totals of
categories of clients and did not identify individual clients), it specifically held that it did apply to
the underlying data to Exhibit 70 (the individual client information) and to any supplements of
Exhibit 70 and to the underlying data to the supplements.79 Accordingly, to the extent even needed
given the continuing duties of the parties and athe fact that all parties already had the information,
the Court reinforced the confidentiality of all the underlying client data by specifically holding it
fell within the scope of the Confidenteiality Order.
Finally, even ignoring allf of the above, Defendants have no summary judgment evidence
that the client lists and client ycontact information is the same or even overlaps. Instead, they simply
erroneously assert that Cclient lists were submitted without the protection of a protective order. Far
from conclusively establishing anything at all, Nicholson has at most raised a potential fact issue
relative to somfef of the materials that are the subject of the suit.
76 See October 14, 2016 Order from Mississippi Court, attached as Exhibit X.
77 See October 27, 2016 email and letter from Counsel to Pohl, attached as Exhibit Y.
78 See Exhibit 21 to the Nicholson Motion, at 1-2.
79 Exhibit 70 is attached hereto as Exhibit Z.
34
G. Pohl’s ownership has not been disproven.
Kassab’s allegations regarding the ownership of Pohl’s trade secrets and information are
self-defeating. Kassab states:
The claimant must also demonstrate that it is “the person or entity in whokm or in
which rightful, legal, or equitable title to, or the right to enforce rights ine, the trade
secret is reposed.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.002(3-a)l. Similarly,
“[a] plaintiff who has not shown title or some other right to possession of the
property allegedly converted may not maintain a suit in convercsion.” Catania v.
Garage de Le Paix, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Tex. Civ. App.—rTyler 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). s
Kassab Motion at 58. However, Kassab’s entire theory regarding why these requirements are not
met is because he alleges that Pohl’s trade secrets and other information constitute part of the client
file, which they contend belongs to the client, and must be turned over to the client upon the client’s
demand. See Kassab’s Motion, at 58-59. But even if that were the entire story, that would not
mean that Pohl did not have a right to possession of the client file up until his clients demanded he
turn over the contents of their client file to them. There is no evidence of any such demand that
would limit Pohl’s possessory rights.e However, as laid out in more detail in Pohl’s Response to
the No-Evidence Motions for Sumfmary Judgment, there is evidence demonstrating that Pohl is the
rightful owner of misappropyriated and converted files and information.80
H. Pohl’s AllegeCd Damages are Recoverable
In their finaal effort to prevent Pohl’s claims from being presented to a jury, the Moving
Defendants relyf on inapplicable case law to argue that Pohl is not entitled to recover for the injuries
that theyU inflicted. Relying on standard case law relating to the availability of attorney’s fees
arising during the pursuit of the case at issue, the Moving Defendants argue that Pohl cannot claim
80 Pohl incorporates by reference both the arguments and evidence on the ownership of the information contained in
his Response to the No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment that is filed on the same day as this Response.
35
as damages the harm he suffered in being forced to defend himself from the Moving Defendants’
failed barratry actions.
As the Moving Defendants point out, a plaintiff in a TUTSA action is entitled to “the value of
the plaintiff’s lost profits, the defendant’s actual profits from the use of the seckret, the value a
reasonably prudent investor would have paid for the trade secret, the developmentl costs the defendant
avoided by the misappropriation, and a reasonable royalty.” Sw. Energy Prodt. Co. v. Berry-Helfand,
491 S.W.3d 699, 710–11 (Tex. 2016). In this case, the fees and expensses incurred by Pohl to defend
against the scurrilous actions brought by the Moving Defendants fall squarely within the category of
actual loss damages that are expressly recoverable under the eterms of TUTSA explicitly authorizes
recovery of. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.004(au) (providing that TUTSA damages include
“the actual loss caused by misappropriation”).81 
Furthermore, the only case the Moving Defiendants cite relating to the availability of attorneys’
fees from a prior case as damages has been directly questioned on that point by the Texas Supreme
Court. See Martin-Simon v. Womack, 68 S.W.3d 793 ,797-98 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001,
pet. denied), declined to extend by Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. National Development
and Research Corp., 299 S.W.3d 106, 120 (Tex. 2009). The Moving Defendants’ citation of the case
for the broad proposition that attorneys’ fees in a prior case are not available as damages misstates the
governing precedent. Furthermore, subsequent caselaw has confirmed that attorneys’ fees from prior
litigation may be rceciovered as actual damages in a subsequent suit in certain circumstances. See Dixon
Fin. Services,o Ltd. v. Chang, 325 S.W.3d 668, 678 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied).
Finally, Defendants fail to even address the other damages sought by Pohl. One component of
damages is the value a reasonably prudent investor would have paid for the trade secret. Here, the
evidence demonstrates that Defendants believed Pohl’s protected information was worth $6 million.
81 Pohl also seeks other types of damages in relation to his TUTSA claim.
36
Both Mr. Walker and Mr. Ladner testified hearing Favre and Nicholson discuss on multiple occasions
that Pohl’s files, and specifically the identity of Pohl’s clients, were worth $6mm.82 Pohl as owner of
the assets confirms this value.83 Mr. Favre confirmed that Pohl’s information had independent value
and was one of Precisions “most valuable asset” such that the value of the entire company would be
substantially reduced if they were disclosed.84
III. CONCLUSION t
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Michael Pohl and Law Otffices of Michael A. Pohl
respectfully request that the Kassab Defendants’ Motion for Traditional Summary Judgment and
the Nicholson Defendants’ Amended Motion for Traditional eSummary Judgment be in all respects
denied. u
82 See Deposition of Scott Walker, at 328:10-16 (testifying about how he had heard Pohl’s client list was worth $6
million), attached as Exhibit D; Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at 314:10–315:18, 343:7-344:17 (recalling that he was
told that the boxes containing Pohl’s information were worth $6 million), attached as Exhibit V.
83 Pohl Declaration ¶ 27, Ex. A.
84 See Exhibit 50 to the Kassab Motion.
37
Dated: September 12, 2022 Respectfully submitted,
REYNOLDS FRIZZELL LLP
By: /s/ Jean C. Frizzell
Jean C. Frizzell
State Bar No. 07484650 k
1100 Louisiana St., Suite 3500 e
Houston, Texas 77002 l
Tel. 713.485.7200
Fax 713.485.7250 c
jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.rcom
Attorney for PlaintifDfs Michael Pohl
and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC
CERTIFICATE OF SERrVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document was served on all counsel of
record pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this 12th day of September, 2022.
M /s/ Jean C. Frizzell
 Jean C. Frizzell
38
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this
document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below.
The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate
of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Suni Blue on behalf of Jean Frizzell e
Bar No. 7484650 C
sblue@reynoldsfrizzell.com t
Envelope ID: 68182991 r
Status as of 9/13/2022 8:05 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email sTimestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com r 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Andrew Johnson ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Andrew J. Sarne asarne@krcl.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.conm 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Kathryn Laflin KLaflin@KRCL.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrrar.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Larry Newsom lnewsom@fkrcl.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo jason@ciofalolaw.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Todd Taylor titaylor@jandflaw.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Harris Wells fhwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Lawyer Wade y lawyerwade@hotmail.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@favrepa.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Andrea Mendez C andrea@kassab.law 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Lance Kassab  lance@kassab.law 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
David Kassab a david@kassab.law 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Nicholas Pierce c nicholas@kassab.law 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson f i 10607900 jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo o 24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
L Kassab lance@kassab.law 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Misty Davis mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Non-Party Witness Billy Shepherd bshepherd@spcounsel.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Deidre Hicks GWS_GROUP@spcounsel.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
E. MarieJamison jamison@wrightclosebarger.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Jessica Z.Barger barger@wrightclosebarger.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT
Katie Budinsky kbudinsky@krcl.com 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM ERROR
D Kassab david@kassab.law 9/12/2022 11:55:09 PM SENT"
32,2022-09-06,MTA,Kassab,Motion to Abate Trial,"Kassab's Motion to Abate Trial Setting pending resolution of the related Cheatham v. Pohl barratry case, which was reversed on appeal August 30, 2022 and remanded for further proceedings","Phase 3 procedural motion filed one week after the Traditional MSJ and Seventh Amended Answer. Kassab argues trial should be abated because the still-pending Cheatham case will determine the full extent of Pohl's alleged damages and may establish Pohl's barratry, which would bar his claims entirely. Addressed to Judge Scot 'Dolli' Dollinger. Counsel for Plaintiffs (Jean Frizzell) opposed.",MTA-1,N/A,Phase 3,2022-09-06_MTA_Kassab-Mtn-to-Abate-Trial_FILED.pdf,Abate the trial setting in this case pending the resolution of the Cheatham v. Pohl barratry case,"9/6/2022 8:41 AM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 67958716
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 9/6/2022 8:41 AM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIALk DISTRICT
THE KASSAB DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO ABATE TRIACL SETTING
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE SCOT “DOLLI” DOLLINGER:
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs Lance Christopheir Kassab and Lance
Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a/ The Kassab Law Firm files this, Motion to Abate
Trial Setting, and would respectfully show the following.
BACKGROUND
Lance Kassab and his firm were hlired by more than 400 of Michael Pohl’s
former clients to sue Pohl and othersM for barratry – the illegal solicitation of clients.
Kassab v. Pohl, 612 S.W.3d 571, 575 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet.
denied). Kassab field four sieparate lawsuits against Pohl, two of which Pohl
successfully dismissed on limitations. See Brumfield v. Williamson, 634 S.W.3d 170,
177 (Tex. App.—Houoston [1st Dist.] 2021, pet. denied) and Gandy v. Williamson,
634 S.W.3d 214 (Tlex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, pet. denied). Another of the
cases settled, iwith Pohl paying a substantial sum of money to Kassab and his
clients. The fourth case – the Cheatham case – was dismissed by the trial court but
recently reversed by the Houston Court of Appeals and remanded for further
proceedings. See Cheatham v. Pohl, No. 01-20-00046-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS
6528, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 30, 2022, no pet. h.).
In retaliation, Pohl filed this litigation against Kassab and others, alleging
specious claims for conversion and misappropriation of trade secrets.1 Specifically,
Pohl alleges that the runners he hired to commit the barratry “gained access to
[Pohl’s] confidential and proprietary information and property, inckluding trade
secret materials” and “work product” and “illegally misapCpropriated” that
information and then allegedly “secretly sold [it] to Kassab”2 who then “solicited
clients/prospective clients [of Pohl’s] to act as [p]laintiffs . i. . to bring cases against
Pohl for alleged barratry and other claims.”3 Pohl seeks as damages “costs and
expenses of serial litigations” that Kassab filed against Pohl, including “[a]ny fees
[and] any expenses [Pohl] had, hotel rooms, long-distance phone calls, copy costs” –
“[Pohl] intend[s] to sue Mr. Kassab for all olf it.”4
RGUMENT
Pohl has no basis to obtain attorney’s fees and expenses incurred by Pohl in
the underlying barratry litigaition when Pohl never requested and was not entitled
to recover those fees. But since Pohl asserts that he can, then the extent of Pohl’s
alleged damages are onot yet known because the Cheatham case is still ongoing. In
fact, the outcome olf Cheatham could result in a judgment against Pohl for barratry,
which will deifinitively establish Kassab’s illegality, unclean hands and other
affirmative defenses. In that case, Pohl would be entitled to no damages from
Kassab. Rather, Kassab would be entitled to attorney’s fees from Pohl in addition to
1 See Pohl’s First Amended Petition (on file with the Court) (“Petition”),
2 Petition, at ¶¶ 20-21.
3 Petition, at ¶ 29.
4 Exhibit 1, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 121.
the disgorgement of Pohl’s fees and expenses in the underlying cases. Thus, for the
reasons stated below, the Court should exercise its discretion and abate the trial of
this case until the Cheatham case is finally resolved. See Kallinen v. City of Hous.,
462 S.W.3d 25, 28 (Tex. 2015) (a court may decide, exercising sound kdiscretion, to
abate proceedings to await a relevant ruling from another proceedCing).
The case In re Tex. Collegiate Baseball League, Ltd., 367 S.W.3d 462 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.) demonstrates why abatemient is required. There, a
client sued its attorney to enforce a settlement agreement concerning legal fees that
the attorney claimed he was owed. Id. at 464. The attorney counterclaimed for
attorney’s fees. Id. The client amended its pleadings to assert malpractice against
the attorney and then sought to abate lthe case pending the resolution of the
underlying litigation from which the Mmalpractice and fee claims arose. Id. The trial
court denied the motion to abate, and the client filed a petition for writ of
mandamus. Id. The court of aippeals agreed, and conditionally granted mandamus
relief. It agreed that if the malpractice and fee claims were not abated, the parties
would be required too pursue claims “for which their alleged damages are not yet
known.” Id. at 46l5. The court of appeals reasoned that the “damage theories will
remain fluid uintil the [underlying] litigations conclude.” Id. at 468. The court of
appeals believed it made “little sense” for the parties to “prepare for trial concerning
the fee claim” when the underlying litigation giving rise to the fee claim was still
pending. Id.
Here too it makes “little sense” for the parties to prepare for and proceed to
trial without knowing the full extent of Pohl’s alleged damages, if any, stemming
from the still-pending Cheatham case. Just as in Tex. Collegiate Baseball, the extent
of Pohl’s alleged damages are not yet known and remain fluid unktil the final
resolution of the Cheatham case. Accordingly, the Court would aCbuse its discretion
by declining to abate the trial of this matter until after the Cheatham case is
resolved. See Tex. Collegiate Baseball, 367 S.W.3d at 468-69i.
Moreover, the Cheatham case will have a substantial impact on whether Pohl
can recover anything because of his illegal and other conduct. In Cheatham, two
groups of clients sued Pohl and his co-counsel Robert Ammons for barratry after the
clients were illegally and unethically soliclited. 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 6528, at *2-3.
The trial court granted no-evidence aMnd traditional summary judgment in favor of
Pohl and Ammons. Id. at *4-5. But the court of appeals reversed, concluding that
the clients “presented more thian a scintilla of evidence to support their allegations”
of barratry, rendering summary judgment improper. Id. at *17 n. 7. That evidence
included proof that “Poohl and Ammons coordinated the barratry scheme” and “that
Pohl directly fundled, and his wife and her company further funded, the solicitation
of prospective iclients” and that “Pohl directed case runners to contact and solicit
potential clients on his behalf, including offering money from Pohl’s firm and his
wife's company.” Id. at *17. If the Cheatham plaintiffs establish these barratry
claims against Pohl, then Pohl cannot be permitted to recover any damages arising
from his unlawful conduct. See Andrew Shebay & Co., P.P.L.C. v. Bishop, 429
S.W.3d 644, 648 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (“Texas public
policy prohibits a plaintiff from recovering damages from his own illegal acts.”).
Accordingly, the outcome of the Cheatham case will have a direct impact on
Kassab’s illegality and other defenses, and Pohl’s ability to recover in kthis case. For
this reason too, abatement of the trial is required. See Tex. CollegCiate Baseball, 367
S.W.3d at 467 (abating case because defense to fee claim was “unripe” while
underlying litigation was pending); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Miillard, 847 S.W.2d 668,
673 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding) (requiring abatement of
bad faith claims when they could be rendered moot by outcome of underlying
contract proceedings).
CONCLUSIONl & PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, the MCourt should grant this motion and abate the
trial setting in this case pending the resolution of the Cheatham case.
i Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
__________________________
l LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
i Texas State Bar No. 00794070
i lance@kassab.law
o DAVID ERIC KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law
NICHOLAS R. PIERCE
Texas State Bar No. 24098263
nicholas@kassab.law
1214 Elgin Street
Houston, Texas 77004
Telephone: 713-522-7400
Facsimile: 713-522-7410
E-Service: eserve@kassab.law
ATTORNEYS FOR KASSAB PARTIES
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE k
I certify that I conferred with Jean Frizzell, counsel for PlCaintiffs, and he is
opposed to the relief requested in this motion. 
_____________i__________
DAVID ERIC KASSAB
CERTIFICATE OF SE u RVICE
I certify that on this date, September 6, 2022, I electronically filed this
document with the Clerk of the Court usinlg the eFile.TXCourts.gov electronic filing
system which will send notification of suach filing to all parties or counsel of record.
_______________________
e DAVID ERIC KASSAB
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this
document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below.
The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate
of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab e
Bar No. 24071351 C
david@kassab.law t
Envelope ID: 67958716 r
Status as of 9/6/2022 8:47 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimsestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com r9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com  9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@favrepa.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Lawyer Wade lawyerwade@hotmail.coml 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Lance Kassab eserve@kassab.law a 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbraMr.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Larry Newsom lnewsom@krcl.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo jason@ciofaelolaw.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Jessica Z.Barger barger@wrightclosebarger.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappafs@krcl.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Misty Davis mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Andrew Johnson oajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Andrew J. Sarne Casarne@krcl.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Kathryn Laflin  KLaflin@KRCL.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10f607900 jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo n24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Kevin Graham CainU24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
D Kassab david@kassab.law 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
L Kassab lance@kassab.law 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT
Katie Budinsky kbudinsky@krcl.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM ERROR
E. MarieJamison jamison@wrightclosebarger.com 9/6/2022 8:41:44 AM SENT"
31,2022-08-29,OA,Kassab,7th Amended Answer,"Kassab's Seventh Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim — adds Judicial Immunity (#16) and Immunity under Rule 17.09 (#17) as new affirmative defenses, expands Illegality to include 'Unlawful Acts Rule' (#13), bringing total to 23 defenses. Filed same day as Traditional MSJ.","Phase 3 amended pleading superseding the Sixth Amended Answer, filed the same day as the Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing #30). Expands affirmative defenses from 21 to 23, adding Judicial Immunity (#16), Rule 17.09 disciplinary immunity (#17), and expanding #13 to include the Unlawful Acts Rule. This becomes the live answer going into the MSJ hearing.",PLEAD-1,N/A,Phase 3,2022-08-29_OA_Kassab-7th-Amended-Answer-CC_FILED.pdf,"That Pohl recover nothing; that Kassab recover (i) actual and consequential damages, (ii) statutory damages, (iii) pre- and post-judgment interest, (iv) attorneys' fees and costs, and (v) all other just relief","8/29/2022 4:43 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 67770941
By: Ashley Lopez
Filed: 8/29/2022 4:43 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIArL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS, LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AtND LANCE
CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAWi FIRM’S SEVENTH
AMENDED ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES ANsD COUNTERCLAIM
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: 
COMES NOW, Defendants, Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher
Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm and files this their Seventh Amended
Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim, and would respectfully show the
Court as follows; a
f  I
RULE 47 STATEMENT
1. The Kassab Deffendants, in their capacity as Counter-Plaintiffs, seek
monetary relief of more than $1,000,000.00.
C II
l PARTIES
2. Plaiintiff, Michael A. Pohl is an individual lawyer residing in Colorado
and is a paroty herein.
3. Plaintiff, Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl is a law firm set up for the
practice of law in various states of the union, including Texas and is a party herein.
4. Defendant, Scott Favre is a nonresident individual residing in
Mississippi and is a party herein.
5. Defendant, Scott M. Favre, PA, LLC is a nonresident limited liability
company located in Mississippi and is a party herein.
6. Defendant, Precision Marketing Group, LLC is a nonresident limited
liability company located in Mississippi and is a party herein. k
7. Defendant, F. Douglas Montague III is a nonresident iCndividual residing
in Mississippi.
8. Defendant, Montague, Pittman & Varnadoi, PA is a nonresident
professional association located in Mississippi.
9. Defendant, Tina Nicholson is an individual residing in Texas and is a
party herein.
10. Defendant, Baker Nicholson, lLLP, d/b/a Baker Nicholson Law Firm is a
limited liability partnership located inM Texas and is a party herein.
11. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab is an
individual residing in Texas anid is a party herein.
12. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The
Kassab Law Firm is ao professional corporation located in Texas and is a party herein.
l III
c i JURISDICTION AND VENUE
13. oThis matter is within the jurisdictional limits of this Court and
Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl
(“Pohl”) and Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs, Lance Christopher Kassab (“LCK”) and
Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab, P.C.”)
(collectively “Kassab”) are subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. Venue is proper in this
county because one or more of the defendants are residents of this county and because
a substantial part of the acts and/or omissions that form the basis of this suit occurred
in this county.
IV k
GENERAL DENIAL e
14. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab generally detnies all allegations
made by Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl ansdt Law Offices of Michael
A. Pohl, and requests the Court to require Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael
A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl to carry their burden of proof regarding
all allegations against Kassab.
AFFIRMATIViE l DEFENSES
15. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab pleads the following affirmative
defenses: 
1. Statute of limitationf is;
2. Justification; y 
3. Estoppel;
4. Waivera;
5. Ratiffication;
6.U Release;
7. Unclean hands;
8. Contribution;
9. Failure to mitigate;
10. Lack of standing;
11. Accord and Satisfaction;
12. Assumption of the Risk;
13. Illegality/Criminal Acts/Unlawful Acts Rule; k
14. First Amendment; C
15. Attorney Immunity;
16. Judicial Immunity; i
17. Immunity under Rule 17.09 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.
18. In Pari Delicto;
19. Res Judicata;
20. Defect of Parties; l
21. Abandonment; M
22. Subject of a Valid Contract; and
23. Preemption pursuanit to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.007(a).
SPECIFIC DENIALS
16. Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs specifically deny that all conditions
precedent regardiing Plaintiffs claims of conversion and theft of trade secrets have
been perforomed or occurred prior to Plaintiffs’ filing of suit against Kassab.
VII
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
17. LCK is a lawyer practicing law with The Kassab Law Firm, a law firm
in Houston, Texas focusing on plaintiffs’ legal malpractice cases. Kassab filed four
lawsuits on behalf of over four hundred clients against Pohl (the “Harris County
Lawsuits”). The main allegations against Pohl are civil barratry and conspiracy to
commit barratry, a third-degree felony in Texas. Pohl conspired with his wife,
Donalda Pohl (“Dona”), his paralegal, Edgar Jaimes (“Jaimes”) and thrkee runners in
Mississippi to illegally solicit clients on behalf of Pohl. Dona ownCs a sham lending
company in Texas called Helping Hands Financing, LLC (“HH Texas”). Jaimes rans
the day-to-day operations of HH Texas. The three ruinners are Scott Walker
(“Walker”), Steve Seymour (“Seymour”) and Kirk Ladner (“Ladner”) (collectively
“Runners”). The three Runners owned and operated two other sham companies called
Helping Hands Group, LLC and Helping Hands Financial, LLC (collectively “HH
Mississippi”). The three runners also olwned Precision Marketing Group, LLC
(“Precision”) which they sold to ScMott Favre and/or his companies (collectively
“Favre”). The runners had several other business entities from which they operated
and concealed their illegal soliicitation conspiracy.
18. With regard to the clients obtained in the BP Litigation, Walker,
Seymour and Ladnero hired other runners to literally go up and down streets in
specific locations klnocking on doors to solicit clients on behalf of Pohl for lawsuits
against Britishi Petroleum. Walker, Seymore and Ladner, through Precision and on
behalf of Pohl, paid these runners as much as $300-$400 for every potential client
they obtained. Pohl paid Precision as much as $1,500 for every client Precision
obtained and referred to Pohl. Walker, Seymore and Ladner paid the other runners
from this amount and pocketed the balance. Pohl also offered and agreed to pay
Walker, Seymour and Ladner a percentage of his legal fees once cases settled. This
percentage was disguised as an hourly rate of $1,500.00 per hour, but the percentage
of the “settlement” payment was never below the agreed percentage. For example,
no matter how much “hourly” time was actually spent on a case, thek agreed upon
percentage was always achieved by simply dividing the percentagCe amount of Pohl’s
legal fees by $1,500.00 to calculate the imaginary number of hours, and then the
Runners would submit an invoice for those imaginary numbier of hours. Whether the
Runners actually spent five (5) or fifty (50) hours on a particular case was not the
measure of the “settlement” fees to be paid to the Runners, it was always the agreed
upon percentage of attorney’s fees earned by Pohl regardless of actual hours spent on
a case. l
19. With regard to auto accidMents, Pohl set up a “Google Alerts” to be notified
whenever there was a horrific rollover or other type of horrific vehicle crash across
the nation. Pohl would then imimediately send the alert to the Runners so they could
arrange to visit hospitals, homes and funerals to contact the families of the injured
in order to solicit theom as clients. The Runners would use their sham companies,
“Helping Hands” tlo act as though they were approaching these victims to genuinely
help them rathier than solicit them. The Runners would falsely tell these victims that
they were there to provide money for burial services, food, clothing, lodging, etc. In
reality however, the Runners’ contacted these families under these false pretenses
with the sole objective of talking advantage of these victims and their families while
they were emotionally distraught and not thinking straight in order to lock them into
contracts which allowed the runners to select a lawyer for the victim. The victims
and the family members were encouraged to hire Pohl and told they could not get the
money unless they agreed to hire Pohl. Pohl would pay the Runners as much as
$7,500 per client they signed up and Pohl also promised the runners ask much as 33%
of Pohl’s legal fees on the back end when the case settled. AdditCionally, HH Texas
would pay HH Mississippi $2,500 for every client referred to HH Texas to “loan”
money to these victims and their family. Pohl used this priocedure as an attempt to
put an additional buffer between him and the actual Runners.
20. Pohl also helped the Runners form another sham entity, the GM
Settlement Verification Team (“GM Team”) after General Motors, Inc. issued a recall
on cars due to faulty ignition switches whiclh effected the safe operation of the airbag
systems on vehicles. Thus, the GM MTeam was designed to look official as if it was
part of General Motors. This conspiracy was to form an official looking entity from
GM as if GM was wanting to ciompensate people who had been harmed when airbags
failed to deploy in relation to the ignition recall. In reality, this was just another
sham company used too solicit and trick potential clients into hiring Pohl. Again, Pohl
would pay Walkerl and Ladner, through their sham entity, the GM Team, a fee for
every potentiail client it referred to Pohl, in addition to a percentage of his attorney’s
fees on the back end.
21. Pohl knew what he was doing was illegal barratry. Accordingly, he
knowingly formed entities that he perceived would insulate him from liability. In
fact, Walker testified that although he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or
“marketing money” it was “clear to [him] it was barratry.” In fact, Walker considered
himself and his company “a pass-through for barratry money.” All total, Walker,
Ladner and Precision received over $5 million in “barratry pass-through money” from
Pohl and other lawyers to solicit potential clients with claims, both kauto-accident
victims and those involved in the BP Deepwater Horizon litigationC.
22. One of the runners hired by Pohl and Walker to illegally solicit clients
on behalf of Pohl was Magdalena Santana (“Santana”). Ini her September 24, 2016
affidavit, Santana testified that Pohl sent her on “dozens and dozens of car wreck
cases all over the country.” Pohl would email Santana the link of news coverage he
obtained through Google Alerts depicting an accident and asked her “to go to the
victim or the victim’s family and try to get lthem to sign up with him.” Santana swore
under oath that Pohl agreed to pay Mher “$5,000 per case that [she] signed, plus a
percentage of his attorney’s fees.” Santana was advised by Pohl to “be persistent even
if the family ... rejected [her]i.” Santana was instructed by Pohl to “approach the
victims and their families while they were vulnerable, in the emergency room, their
hospital rooms or at thoe funerals.” Pohl told Santana that minorities “were especially
vulnerable since tlhey tended not to know that the law prohibited barratry.”
According to Piohl, they “were easier to sign up.”
23. Pohl would give Santana “money to give to the victims or their families”
but would only give the money to the potential client “if they agreed to sign a Pohl
representation contract.” Pohl advised Santana that the money was a “foot in the
door” but instructed Santana not to mention anything about hiring a lawyer “until
after they agreed to take the money.” “If the client agreed to hire Pohl, then [Santana]
was to have the client sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.” Santana would then give
money to the client “from his own Helping Hands company.” When Santana
questioned this, Pohl told Santana that it “was illegal for him to pay [hekr] directly for
cases, and that’s why the money had to go through some companyC.”
24. Pohl and/or his co-conspirators had Santana retract this affidavit
through a December 19, 2017 affidavit. This purported rietraction was likely the
result of Pohl paying Santana to retract the first affidavit, which is similar to
something Pohl had done in the past. In fact, Pohl’s own paralegal, Jaimes, testified
that on one occasion Pohl sent him to Florida with a suitcase containing $50,000 in
cash to give to Santana in exchange for lher agreement not to turn Pohl into the
authorities. Jaimes testified that SanMtana would only get the money if she signed a
statement agreeing not to mention Pohl’s illegal activity. Jaimes testified that
Santana signed the statementi and then he gave her the $50,000.
25. Santana’s deposition was even more detailed. Santana testified at her
deposition that the staotement was an agreement for her to keep quiet and not charge
Pohl with any wronlgdoing, criminal or unethical conduct. Santana testified that Pohl
paid her $50,0i00 in cash to sign this statement, which was delivered by Jaimes in
three bags marked “trick or treat.” Very symbolic given that Santana had been
tricked by Pohl into soliciting potential clients for him and was now being treated the
money she claimed was due under their agreement just to stay quiet. Santana
reiterated in her deposition that if she didn’t sign the gag agreement, she would not
have received the money from Pohl. Santana attempted to indicate on the agreement
that she was receiving $50,000 to keep quiet, but Jaimes told her Pohl demanded that
she state she only received nominal consideration, like $100. Santana did not write
the statement but “just signed it” because she felt she was being “forcked to sign” it
while “under duress.” C
26. Notably, nowhere in Santana’s December 19th affidavit does she state
the testimony in her former affidavit is untrue, only that shie does not “agree with” it
and that the affidavit is not “reliable.” Although Santana states in her December 19th
affidavit that her prior affidavit was drafted by a lawyer, Santana testified in her
deposition that the September 24th affidavit was created voluntarily with her own
“testimony.” Santana testified that, unlike lwith Pohl, she was not paid and had never
been promised any money to provideM the testimony in the September 24th affidavit.
Santana reiterated to counsel for Pohl, Billy Shepherd, that she was there for her
deposition to tell the truth andi would not be bullied by his questioning or his efforts
to confuse her.
27. Regardleoss, Santana’s sworn deposition testimony confirmed most, if
not all of the factsl set forth in her initial affidavit and this deposition testimony has
never been retiracted. Therefore, Santana confirmed that she was hired by Pohl to
solicit auto accident cases, the first one being an accident where a woman and her
unborn child lost their lives. Santana was instructed by Walker, who was instructed
by Pohl, to personally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her up to sue the tire
manufacturer and, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000. Following Walker
10
and Pohl’s instructions, Santana visited the funeral of the deceased and got the family
to feel comfortable with her. Although the mother was grieving, Pohl told Santana:
“take no prisoners, this is a cut throat business, you get in there and you do whatever
it takes to get this client.” The solicitation was successful after Pohl gkave Santana
$2,000 to “give to the client to convince her into signing over with Cthe firm.”
28. “Coach” Kenneth Talley (“Talley”) was another runner hired by Pohl
and Walker who solicited over 20 auto accident cases for Pohil. Talley has sworn under
oath that he was first hired in relation to BP claims to find “folks that lost money due
to the oil spill” and “sign them up” and “get a fee for it.” Talley testified that he went
to work “knocking on doors” looking for potential claimants for Pohl and his partner
in the BP litigation. Talley solicited and siglned up more than 800 BP claims for Pohl
and his co-conspirators. Talley was pMaid between $75 and $350 for each BP client he
signed up for Pohl and his partners.
29. Talley eventuallyi switched to illegally soliciting auto accident victims
for Pohl, “calling on folks that had bad accidents.” Talley recalls that the first client
he solicited for Pohl woas in “the hospital in intensive care.” Talley carried with him
up to $1,000 to paly the accident victims to “help them with problems” but paid the
potential clienit only once they “were signed up.” Talley kept a list of all the auto
accident cases he solicited so he could keep track of the cases that he was due a
percentage from Pohl’s attorney’s fees on the back end after the case settled. Talley
also followed a checklist that instructed him to, among other things, bring flowers to
the initial hospital visit (but to spend no more than $50) and to offer the victims
11
money but to “make sure the funding schedule” from HH Texas “is filled out properly
before releasing any cash.” Talley would advise the victims that he had attorneys who
could help them such as Pohl. Talley was paid a fee of $1,400 plus his expenses by
Pohl, through Walker and/or one of his sham business entities for any kauto accident
case he solicited and referred to Pohl. On some cases, Talley was tCo receive a portion
of the fee paid to Helping Hands out of Pohl’s attorney’s fees. Talley discussed with
Pohl the “percentage of settlements” he was to receive from ithe cases he solicited and
referred, and Pohl told Talley that the money was being placed in an “escrow account”
for him. When asked whether Pohl knew he was getting paid to “contact vehicle
accident victims,” Talley responded, “the money was coming from Edgar [Jaimes] who
worked for him.” And, although his paylcheck was from Walker’s company, “the
funding came by way of Edgar [JaimeMs].”
30. Talley testified that personally soliciting clients for Pohl became so
frequent that he began carryinig blank contracts to each solicitation. Talley testified
that he never recommended any lawyers other than Pohl. However, Talley never told
the clients that he waos getting paid to solicit them. Talley would present a contract
to the potential clilent. If the client did not agree to hire Pohl, the clients would not
get the moneyi. Talley testified that Jaimes and Dona (the operators of HH Texas)
would send him the money.
31. Talley further testified that both he and Pohl knew what they were
doing was illegal. In one instance, Talley was “run out of town” while soliciting clients
for Pohl. Talley testified that during the attempted solicitation he was told by a
12
“lawyer or policeman” that “it was against the law what [he] was doing.” Talley
mentioned this to Pohl and Pohl told him “you’ve just got to leave...some people you
can’t help.”
32. Walker was eventually indicted and sent to prison. Beking afraid of
where Walker’s indictment might lead, Pohl and his lawyer partneCrs stopped paying
Walker and the other runners the illegal fees as Pohl had promised. Therefore,
Walker, Seymour, Ladner and Precision filed a lawsuit in Miississippi Federal Court
(“Federal Litigation”) against Pohl and his law partners claiming they were owed
millions of dollars in promised fees.
33. The above facts were compiled during the Federal Litigation.
Thereafter, more than four hundred clientsl who were illegally solicited contacted the
Kassab Law Firm and requested KassMab to represent them in litigation against Pohl
and his partners. Kassab filed lawsuits on behalf of these clients in four different
courts in Harris County. Addiitionally, due to the egregiousness of Pohl’s violation of
the Texas Penal Code and violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct, Kassab was orequired to notify the Texas State Bar pursuant to Rule 8.03 of
the Texas Disciplinlary Rules of Professional Conduct. Due to this mandate, Kassab
filed grievanceis against Pohl pursuant to Rule 8.03. some of Pohl’s clients also
prepared and filed grievances against Pohl arising out of his egregious conduct.
34. Because of these actions in representing clients against Pohl and the
grievances filed against Pohl, Pohl filed this retaliatory lawsuit against Kassab
alleging conversion and theft of trade secrets. Pohl alleges that Kassab and others
13
stole his property and used it to bring lawsuits and grievances against Pohl.
Specifically, Pohl alleges in his petition that, “Kassab is a lawyer who specializes in
suing other lawyers”1 and “Kassab solicited clients/prospective clients [of Pohl’s] to
act as Plaintiffs . . . to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and okther claims.”2
Thus, Pohl has judicially admitted that he has brought his suit agaiCnst Kassab simply
because Kassab contacted illegally solicited clients to notify them of Pohl’s illegal
conduct and to offer to represent them in suits against Pohli.
35. The lawsuit is frivolous and without merit as it is based upon false
pretenses and was brought solely for retaliation and harassment purposes.
Specifically, Kassab did not steal anything from Pohl. Additionally, Kassab did not
purchase any stolen documents belonging tlo Pohl. Nor did Kassab purchase anything
belonging to Pohl. Moreover, Pohl isM not the owner of documents received, if any,
from Precision, Favre, Nicholson, Montague or anyone else. Lastly, none of the
documents and/or informatioin that Kassab may have received from various
individuals or entities are Pohl’s trade secrets as Pohl alleges. Furthermore, Pohl
has failed to complyo with conditions precedent to filing his retaliatory suit for
conversion and thleft of trade secrets. Specifically, Pohl has never requested from
Kassab, the reiturn of his alleged property. Rather, Pohl abandoned all of the alleged
documents he now accuses Kassab of stealing and/or purchasing. Pohl abandoned all
of the documents he alleges were stolen and/or purchased because he knew that the
documents were not his and that he had no ownership interest in the documents. If
1 Pohl Original Petition, p. 6
2 Id. at p. 6-7
14
Pohl actually believed the subject documents were his, he would have safeguarded
the documents rather than abandon them with a convicted felon (Walker) and his
cohorts (Seymore and Ladner). Even as of today, the subject documents sit in a
warehouse, unattended and not safeguarded. k
VIII C
COUNTERCLAIM FOR CIVIL BARRATRY
36. Within the lawsuits that Kassab has filed agaisntst Pohl on behalf of his
former clients and/or potential clients, Pohl has judicially admitted that a claim for
barratry is not a legal malpractice case. Pohl has also admitted that a because a
claim for barratry is not a claim for “legal malpractice,” the Discovery Rule does not
apply to a barratry claim. Therefore, based upon Pohl’s judicial admissions, the
assignment of a barratry claim is permiatted under Texas law.
37. Thus, based upon expfress assignments of interest given to Kassab,
Kassab brings counterclaims against Pohl and his law firm pursuant to Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies CodOe, Section 16.069. Section 16.069 provides:
(a) If a counterclpaim or cross claim arises out of the same transaction or
occurrence tohat is the basis of an action, a party to the action may
file the counterclaim or cross claim even though as a separate action
it woulad lbe barred by limitations on the date the party’s answer is
requicreid.
(b) Tohe counterclaim or cross claim must be filed not later than the 30th
day after the date on which the party’s answer is required.
Kassab has been assigned barratry claims on behalf of 242 claimants. These
counterclaims are timely because they were filed within 30 days of the date
Kassab filed his original answer.
15
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
38. Defendants contend that all or some of Plaintiffs’ claims for
misappropriate under TUTSA were made in bad faith, enabling Defendants to
recover their reasonable attorney’s fees. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM e. CODE §
134A.005. 
X t
PRAYER FOR RELIEF D i
Wherefore, Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs resspectfully pray that Plaintiffs
recover nothing on their claims and that the Deferndants, Counter-Plaintiffs recover
on their claims against the Plaintiffs and/or any Third-Party Defendants as follows:
i) actual and consequential damlages;
ii) statutory damages; M
iii) pre- and post-judgmentf interest;
iv) attorneys’ fees and costs; and
v) all other relief tof f which the Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs may be justly
entitled.
p Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
c / s / David Eric Kassab
f LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 00794070
U lance@kassab.law
DAVID ERIC KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law
1214 Elgin Street
Houston, Texas 77004
Telephone: 713.522.7400
Facsimile: 713.522.7410
16
ATTORNEYS FOR LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB AND THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
FOGLER, BRAR, O’NEIL AND GRAY, LLP
/s/ Murray Fogler k
Murray Fogler e
State Bar No. 072073C00
mfogler@foglerbrar.com
909 Fannin, Suite 1640
Houston, Texast 77010
Telephone: 71i3-481-1010
Facsimile: 713-574-3224
ATTORNEY e FOR LANCE
CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND THE
KASSA u B LAW FIRM REGARDING
PLAINTIFFS’ AFFIRMATIVE CLAIMS
CERTIFICAaTE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
instrument has been forwarded to all parties pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure on this the 29th day ofe August 2022.
 / s / Lance Christopher Kassab
p Lance Christopher Kassab
17
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this
document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below.
The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate
of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab e
Bar No. 24071351 C
david@kassab.law t
Envelope ID: 67770941 r
Status as of 8/30/2022 8:18 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimsestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com r8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com  8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@favrepa.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Lawyer Wade lawyerwade@hotmail.coml 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Lance Kassab eserve@kassab.law a 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Lance Kassab lance@kassab.lawM 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
David Kassab david@kassab.law 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Larry Newsom lnewsom@krcl.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo jason@ciofaelolaw.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Jessica Z.Barger barger@wrightclosebarger.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Nicholas Pierce nicholafs@kassab.law 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrar.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Andrew Johnson oajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Andrew J. Sarne Casarne@krcl.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Kathryn Laflin  KLaflin@KRCL.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10f607900 jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo n24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Kevin Graham CainU24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
D Kassab david@kassab.law 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
L Kassab lance@kassab.law 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Katie Budinsky kbudinsky@krcl.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
Misty Davis mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT
E. MarieJamison jamison@wrightclosebarger.com 8/29/2022 4:43:08 PM SENT"
29,2022-08-02,OA,Kassab,6th Amended Answer,"Kassab's Sixth Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim — adds 21st affirmative defense (TUTSA preemption under § 134A.007(a)) and attorney's fees claim for bad faith TUTSA prosecution under § 134A.005; otherwise substantively identical to the Fifth Amended Answer","Phase 3 amended pleading superseding the Fifth Amended Answer. Key additions over Filing #27: (1) new affirmative defense #21 for preemption under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 134A.007(a), and (2) new section claiming attorney's fees under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 134A.005 for bad faith TUTSA claims by Pohl. All prior content maintained including 20 affirmative defenses, factual background, and barratry counterclaim.",PLEAD-1,N/A,Phase 3,2022-08-02_OA_Kassab-6th-Amended-Answer-CC_FILED.pdf,"That Pohl recover nothing; that Kassab recover (i) actual and consequential damages, (ii) statutory damages, (iii) pre- and post-judgment interest, (iv) attorneys' fees and costs, and (v) all other just relief","8/2/2022 4:00 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 66899970
By: Ashley Lopez
Filed: 8/2/2022 4:00 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIrAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS, LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAW FIRM’S SIXTH AMENDED
ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND COUNtTERCLAIM
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
COMES NOW, Defendants, Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab,
P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm and files this their Sixth Armended Answer, Affirmative Defenses,
and Counterclaim, and would respectfully show the Court as follows;
iIl
RULE 47a STATEMENT
1. The Kassab Defendantso, in their capacity as Counter-Plaintiffs, seek monetary
relief of more than $1,000,000.00.
y PARTIES
2. Plaintiff, Michael A. Pohl is an individual lawyer residing in Colorado and is a
party herein. c i
3. oPlaintiff, Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl is a law firm set up for the practice of
law in various states of the union, including Texas and is a party herein.
4. Defendant, Scott Favre is a nonresident individual residing in Mississippi and is a
party herein.
5. Defendant, Scott M. Favre, PA, LLC is a nonresident limited liability company
located in Mississippi and is a party herein.
6. Defendant, Precision Marketing Group, LLC is a nonresident limited liability
company located in Mississippi and is a party herein. k
7. Defendant, F. Douglas Montague III is a nonresident indilvidual residing in
Mississippi. c
8. Defendant, Montague, Pittman & Varnado, PA is sa nonresident professional
association located in Mississippi. 
9. Defendant, Tina Nicholson is an individual residing in Texas and is a party herein.
10. Defendant, Baker Nicholson, LLP, d/b/a Baker Nicholson Law Firm is a limited
liability partnership located in Texas and is a party herein.
11. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Laance Christopher Kassab is an individual residing
in Texas and is a party herein. 
12. Defendant, Counter-Pelaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The Kassab
Law Firm is a professional corpofration located in Texas and is a party herein.
y III
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
13. Thisa matter is within the jurisdictional limits of this Court and Plaintiffs, Counter-
Defendants, Mifcihael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl (“Pohl”) and Defendants,
Counter-Plaintiffs, Lance Christopher Kassab (“LCK”) and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a
The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab, P.C.”) (collectively “Kassab”) are subject to the Court’s
jurisdiction. Venue is proper in this county because one or more of the defendants are residents of
this county and because a substantial part of the acts and/or omissions that form the basis of this
suit occurred in this county.
GENERAL DENIAL
14. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab generally denies all allegations made by
Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl, and requests
the Court to require Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Oeffices of Michael
A. Pohl to carry their burden of proof regarding all allegations against Kassab.
V r
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
15. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab pleads the fsollowing affirmative defenses:
1. Statute of limitations; g
2. Justification; B
3. Estoppel; y
4. Waiver;
5. Ratification; f
6. Release;
7. Unclean hands; O
8. Contribution;
9. Failure to mitigate;
10. Lack ofi standing;
11. Accford and Satisfaction;
12. Assumption of the Risk;
13. Illegality/Criminal Acts;
14. First Amendment;
15. Attorney Immunity;
16. In Pari Delicto;
17. Res Judicata;
18. Defect of Parties;
19. Abandonment; k
20. Subject of a Valid Contract; and l
21. Preemption pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134Ac.007(a).
VI s
SPECIFIC DENIALS D
16. Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs specifically dseny that all conditions precedent
regarding Plaintiffs claims of conversion and theft of rtrade secrets have been performed or
occurred prior to Plaintiffs’ filing of suit against Kassab.
VIlI
FACTUAL BACKGROUNDa AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
17. LCK is a lawyer practicinog law with The Kassab Law Firm, a law firm in Houston,
Texas focusing on plaintiffs’ legal mcalpractice cases. Kassab filed four lawsuits on behalf of over
four hundred clients against Pohl (the “Harris County Lawsuits”). The main allegations against
Pohl are civil barratry andp conspiracy to commit barratry, a third-degree felony in Texas. Pohl
conspired with his wife, Donalda Pohl (“Dona”), his paralegal, Edgar Jaimes (“Jaimes”) and three
runners in Missiscsiippi to illegally solicit clients on behalf of Pohl. Dona owns a sham lending
company in Toexas called Helping Hands Financing, LLC (“HH Texas”). Jaimes rans the day-to-
day operations of HH Texas. The three runners are Scott Walker (“Walker”), Steve Seymour
(“Seymour”) and Kirk Ladner (“Ladner”) (collectively “Runners”). The three Runners owned and
operated two other sham companies called Helping Hands Group, LLC and Helping Hands
Financial, LLC (collectively “HH Mississippi”). The three runners also owned Precision
Marketing Group, LLC (“Precision”) which they sold to Scott Favre and/or his companies
(collectively “Favre”). The runners had several other business entities from which they operated
and concealed their illegal solicitation conspiracy.
18. With regard to the clients obtained in the BP Litigation, Walkerk, Seymour and
Ladner hired other runners to literally go up and down streets in specific localtions knocking on
doors to solicit clients on behalf of Pohl for lawsuits against British Petrolceum. Walker, Seymore
and Ladner, through Precision and on behalf of Pohl, paid these runnesrs as much as $300-$400 for
every potential client they obtained. Pohl paid Precision as much as $1,500 for every client
Precision obtained and referred to Pohl. Walker, Seymore and Ladner paid the other runners from
this amount and pocketed the balance. Pohl also offered and agreed to pay Walker, Seymour and
Ladner a percentage of his legal fees once cases settled. This percentage was disguised as an
hourly rate of $1,500.00 per hour, but the percaentage of the “settlement” payment was never below
the agreed percentage. For example, no matter how much “hourly” time was actually spent on a
case, the agreed upon percentage wase always achieved by simply dividing the percentage amount
of Pohl’s legal fees by $1,500.00 fto calculate the imaginary number of hours, and then the Runners
would submit an invoice for tyhose imaginary number of hours. Whether the Runners actually spent
five (5) or fifty (50) hoCurs on a particular case was not the measure of the “settlement” fees to be
paid to the Runnersa, it was always the agreed upon percentage of attorney’s fees earned by Pohl
regardless of acftual hours spent on a case.
19U. With regard to auto accidents, Pohl set up a “Google Alerts” to be notified
whenever there was a horrific rollover or other type of horrific vehicle crash across the nation.
Pohl would then immediately send the alert to the Runners so they could arrange to visit hospitals,
homes and funerals to contact the families of the injured in order to solicit them as clients. The
Runners would use their sham companies, “Helping Hands” to act as though they were
approaching these victims to genuinely help them rather than solicit them. The Runners would
falsely tell these victims that they were there to provide money for burial services, food, clothing,
lodging, etc. In reality however, the Runners’ contacted these families under thesek false pretenses
with the sole objective of talking advantage of these victims and their famililes while they were
emotionally distraught and not thinking straight in order to lock them intoc contracts which allowed
the runners to select a lawyer for the victim. The victims and the familsy members were encouraged
to hire Pohl and told they could not get the money unless they agreed to hire Pohl. Pohl would pay
the Runners as much as $7,500 per client they signed up and Pohl also promised the runners as
much as 33% of Pohl’s legal fees on the back end when the case settled. Additionally, HH Texas
would pay HH Mississippi $2,500 for every client referred to HH Texas to “loan” money to these
victims and their family. Pohl used this procedaure as an attempt to put an additional buffer between
him and the actual Runners. 
20. Pohl also helped thee Runners form another sham entity, the GM Settlement
Verification Team (“GM Team”)f after General Motors, Inc. issued a recall on cars due to faulty
ignition switches which effeycted the safe operation of the airbag systems on vehicles. Thus, the
GM Team was designeCd to look official as if it was part of General Motors. This conspiracy was
to form an official laooking entity from GM as if GM was wanting to compensate people who had
been harmed wfhen airbags failed to deploy in relation to the ignition recall. In reality, this was
just anothUer sham company used to solicit and trick potential clients into hiring Pohl. Again, Pohl
would pay Walker and Ladner, through their sham entity, the GM Team, a fee for every potential
client it referred to Pohl, in addition to a percentage of his attorney’s fees on the back end.
21. Pohl knew what he was doing was illegal barratry. Accordingly, he knowingly
formed entities that he perceived would insulate him from liability. In fact, Walker testified that
although he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or “marketing money” it was “clear to [him]
it was barratry.” In fact, Walker considered himself and his company “a pass-throkugh for barratry
money.” All total, Walker, Ladner and Precision received over $5 million in “balrratry pass-through
money” from Pohl and other lawyers to solicit potential clients with clacims, both auto-accident
victims and those involved in the BP Deepwater Horizon litigation. s
22. One of the runners hired by Pohl and Walker to illegally solicit clients on behalf of
Pohl was Magdalena Santana (“Santana”). In her September 24, 2016 affidavit, Santana testified
that Pohl sent her on “dozens and dozens of car wreck cases all over the country.” Pohl would
email Santana the link of news coverage he obtained through Google Alerts depicting an accident
and asked her “to go to the victim or the victima’s family and try to get them to sign up with him.”
Santana swore under oath that Pohl agreed to pay her “$5,000 per case that [she] signed, plus a
percentage of his attorney’s fees.” Sanetana was advised by Pohl to “be persistent even if the family
... rejected [her].” Santana was insftructed by Pohl to “approach the victims and their families while
they were vulnerable, in they emergency room, their hospital rooms or at the funerals.” Pohl told
Santana that minoritiesC “were especially vulnerable since they tended not to know that the law
prohibited barratray.” According to Pohl, they “were easier to sign up.”
23. Pfohl would give Santana “money to give to the victims or their families” but would
only giveU the money to the potential client “if they agreed to sign a Pohl representation contract.”
Pohl advised Santana that the money was a “foot in the door” but instructed Santana not to mention
anything about hiring a lawyer “until after they agreed to take the money.” “If the client agreed to
hire Pohl, then [Santana] was to have the client sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.” Santana would
then give money to the client “from his own Helping Hands company.” When Santana questioned
this, Pohl told Santana that it “was illegal for him to pay [her] directly for cases, and that’s why
the money had to go through some company.”
24. Pohl and/or his co-conspirators had Santana retract this affidkavit through a
December 19, 2017 affidavit. This purported retraction was likely the result of Plohl paying Santana
to retract the first affidavit, which is similar to something Pohl had done icn the past. In fact, Pohl’s
own paralegal, Jaimes, testified that on one occasion Pohl sent hims to Florida with a suitcase
containing $50,000 in cash to give to Santana in exchange for her agreement not to turn Pohl into
the authorities. Jaimes testified that Santana would only get the money if she signed a statement
agreeing not to mention Pohl’s illegal activity. Jaimes testified that Santana signed the statement
and then he gave her the $50,000.
25. Santana’s deposition was evena more detailed. Santana testified at her deposition
that the statement was an agreement for her to keep quiet and not charge Pohl with any
wrongdoing, criminal or unethical coenduct. Santana testified that Pohl paid her $50,000 in cash to
sign this statement, which was dfelivered by Jaimes in three bags marked “trick or treat.” Very
symbolic given that Santanay had been tricked by Pohl into soliciting potential clients for him and
was now being treatedC the money she claimed was due under their agreement just to stay quiet.
Santana reiterated ian her deposition that if she didn’t sign the gag agreement, she would not have
received the mfoney from Pohl. Santana attempted to indicate on the agreement that she was
receivingU $50,000 to keep quiet, but Jaimes told her Pohl demanded that she state she only received
nominal consideration, like $100. Santana did not write the statement but “just signed it” because
she felt she was being “forced to sign” it while “under duress.”
26. Notably, nowhere in Santana’s December 19th affidavit does she state the testimony
in her former affidavit is untrue, only that she does not “agree with” it and that the affidavit is not
“reliable.” Although Santana states in her December 19th affidavit that her prior affidavit was
drafted by a lawyer, Santana testified in her deposition that the September 24kth affidavit was
created voluntarily with her own “testimony.” Santana testified that, unlike witlh Pohl, she was not
paid and had never been promised any money to provide the testimoncy t in the September 24th
affidavit. Santana reiterated to counsel for Pohl, Billy Shepherd, sthat she was there for her
deposition to tell the truth and would not be bullied by his questioning or his efforts to confuse
her.
27. Regardless, Santana’s sworn deposition testimony confirmed most, if not all of the
facts set forth in her initial affidavit and this deposition testimony has never been retracted.
Therefore, Santana confirmed that she was haired by Pohl to solicit auto accident cases, the first
one being an accident where a woman and her unborn child lost their lives. Santana was instructed
by Walker, who was instructed by Poehl, to personally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her
up to sue the tire manufacturer fand, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000. Following
Walker and Pohl’s instructioyns, Santana visited the funeral of the deceased and got the family to
feel comfortable withC her. Although the mother was grieving, Pohl told Santana: “take no
prisoners, this is a acut throat business, you get in there and you do whatever it takes to get this
client.” The solficitation was successful after Pohl gave Santana $2,000 to “give to the client to
convinceU her into signing over with the firm.”
28. “Coach” Kenneth Talley (“Talley”) was another runner hired by Pohl and Walker
who solicited over 20 auto accident cases for Pohl. Talley has sworn under oath that he was first
hired in relation to BP claims to find “folks that lost money due to the oil spill” and “sign them
up” and “get a fee for it.” Talley testified that he went to work “knocking on doors” looking for
potential claimants for Pohl and his partner in the BP litigation. Talley solicited and signed up
more than 800 BP claims for Pohl and his co-conspirators. Talley was paid between $75 and $350
for each BP client he signed up for Pohl and his partners. k
29. Talley eventually switched to illegally soliciting auto accidenlt victims for Pohl,
“calling on folks that had bad accidents.” Talley recalls that the first clicent he solicited for Pohl
was in “the hospital in intensive care.” Talley carried with him up tos $1,000 to pay the accident
victims to “help them with problems” but paid the potential client only once they “were signed
up.” Talley kept a list of all the auto accident cases he solicited so he could keep track of the cases
that he was due a percentage from Pohl’s attorney’s fees on the back end after the case settled.
Talley also followed a checklist that instructed him to, among other things, bring flowers to the
initial hospital visit (but to spend no more thaan $50) and to offer the victims money but to “make
sure the funding schedule” from HH Texas “is filled out properly before releasing any cash.”
Talley would advise the victims thate he had attorneys who could help them such as Pohl. Talley
was paid a fee of $1,400 plus his efxpenses by Pohl, through Walker and/or one of his sham business
entities for any auto accidenyt case he solicited and referred to Pohl. On some cases, Talley was to
receive a portion of theC fee paid to Helping Hands out of Pohl’s attorney’s fees. Talley discussed
with Pohl the “peracentage of settlements” he was to receive from the cases he solicited and
referred, and Pofhl told Talley that the money was being placed in an “escrow account” for him.
When askUed whether Pohl knew he was getting paid to “contact vehicle accident victims,” Talley
responded, “the money was coming from Edgar [Jaimes] who worked for him.” And, although
his paycheck was from Walker’s company, “the funding came by way of Edgar [Jaimes].”
10
30. Talley testified that personally soliciting clients for Pohl became so frequent that
he began carrying blank contracts to each solicitation. Talley testified that he never recommended
any lawyers other than Pohl. However, Talley never told the clients that he was getting paid to
solicit them. Talley would present a contract to the potential client. If the client dkid not agree to
hire Pohl, the clients would not get the money. Talley testified that Jaimes and Dlona (the operators
of HH Texas) would send him the money. c
31. Talley further testified that both he and Pohl knew whast they were doing was illegal.
In one instance, Talley was “run out of town” while soliciting clients for Pohl. Talley testified that
during the attempted solicitation he was told by a “lawyer or policeman” that “it was against the
law what [he] was doing.” Talley mentioned this to Pohl and Pohl told him “you’ve just got to
leave...some people you can’t help.”
32. Walker was eventually indicteda and sent to prison. Being afraid of where Walker’s
indictment might lead, Pohl and his lawyer partners stopped paying Walker and the other runners
the illegal fees as Pohl had promisede. Therefore, Walker, Seymour, Ladner and Precision filed a
lawsuit in Mississippi Federal Cfourt (“Federal Litigation”) against Pohl and his law partners
claiming they were owed miyllions of dollars in promised fees.
33. The aboCve facts were compiled during the Federal Litigation. Thereafter, more
than four hundred aclients who were illegally solicited contacted the Kassab Law Firm and
requested Kassfab to represent them in litigation against Pohl and his partners. Kassab filed
lawsuits oUn behalf of these clients in four different courts in Harris County. Additionally, due to
the egregiousness of Pohl’s violation of the Texas Penal Code and violations of the Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, Kassab was required to notify the Texas State Bar
pursuant to Rule 8.03 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. Due to this
11
mandate, Kassab filed grievances against Pohl pursuant to Rule 8.03. some of Pohl’s clients also
prepared and filed grievances against Pohl arising out of his egregious conduct.
34. Because of these actions in representing clients against Pohl and the grievances
filed against Pohl, Pohl filed this retaliatory lawsuit against Kassab alleging convkersion and theft
of trade secrets. Pohl alleges that Kassab and others stole his property and usedl it to bring lawsuits
and grievances against Pohl. Specifically, Pohl alleges in his petition thcat, “Kassab is a lawyer
who specializes in suing other lawyers”1 and “Kassab solicited clsients/prospective clients [of
Pohl’s] to act as Plaintiffs . . . to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and other claims.”2
Thus, Pohl has judicially admitted that he has brought his suit against Kassab simply because
Kassab contacted illegally solicited clients to notify them of Pohl’s illegal conduct and to offer to
represent them in suits against Pohl.
35. The lawsuit is frivolous and waithout merit as it is based upon false pretenses and
was brought solely for retaliation and harassment purposes. Specifically, Kassab did not steal
anything from Pohl. Additionally, Keassab did not purchase any stolen documents belonging to
Pohl. Nor did Kassab purchase afnything belonging to Pohl. Moreover, Pohl is not the owner of
documents received, if any, yfrom Precision, Favre, Nicholson, Montague or anyone else. Lastly,
none of the documents Cand/or information that Kassab may have received from various individuals
or entities are Pohl’as trade secrets as Pohl alleges. Furthermore, Pohl has failed to comply with
conditions precfedent to filing his retaliatory suit for conversion and theft of trade secrets.
SpecificaUlly, Pohl has never requested from Kassab, the return of his alleged property. Rather,
Pohl abandoned all of the alleged documents he now accuses Kassab of stealing and/or purchasing.
Pohl abandoned all of the documents he alleges were stolen and/or purchased because he knew
1 Pohl Original Petition, p. 6
2 Id. at p. 6-7
12
that the documents were not his and that he had no ownership interest in the documents. If Pohl
actually believed the subject documents were his, he would have safeguarded the documents rather
than abandon them with a convicted felon (Walker) and his cohorts (Seymore and Ladner). Even
as of today, the subject documents sit in a warehouse, unattended and not safeguarkded.
VIII l
COUNTERCLAIM FOR CIVIL BARRATRY
36. Within the lawsuits that Kassab has filed against Pohl on brehalf of his former clients
and/or potential clients, Pohl has judicially admitted that a claim for barratry is not a legal
malpractice case. Pohl has also admitted that a because a claim for barratry is not a claim for
“legal malpractice,” the Discovery Rule does not apply to ra barratry claim. Therefore, based upon
Pohl’s judicial admissions, the assignment of a barratry claim is permitted under Texas law.
37. Thus, based upon express assignmlents of interest given to Kassab, Kassab brings
counterclaims against Pohl and his law firm pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,
Section 16.069. Section 16.069 provides:
(a) If a counterclaim or cross claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence
that is the basis of an faction, a party to the action may file the counterclaim or
cross claim even though as a separate action it would be barred by limitations
on the date the party’s answer is required.
(b) The counteCrclaim or cross claim must be filed not later than the 30th day after
the date on which the party’s answer is required.
Kassab has been assigned barratry claims on behalf of 242 claimants. These counterclaims
are timely because they were filed within 30 days of the date Kassab filed his original
answer.
13
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
38. Defendants contend that all or some of Plaintiffs’ claims for misappropriate
under TUTSA were made in bad faith, enabling Defendants to recover their reasonable
attorney’s fees. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.005.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF c
Wherefore, Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs respectfully pray that Plaintiffs recover nothing
on their claims and that the Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs rescover on their claims against the
Plaintiffs and/or any Third-Party Defendants as follows:
i) actual and consequential damages; B
ii) statutory damages; n
iii) pre- and post-judgment interest; i
iv) attorneys’ fees and costs; anMd
v) all other relief to which tohe Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs may be justly entitled.
O Respectfully submitted,
p THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
l LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
i Texas State Bar No. 00794070
i lance@kassab.law
o f DAVID ERIC KASSAB
n Texas State Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law
1214 Elgin Street
Houston, Texas 77004
Telephone: 713.522.7400
Facsimile: 713.522.7410
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS,
14
COUNTER-PLAINTIFFS LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB AND THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
/s/ Murray Fogler
Murray Fogler k
State Bar No. 07207300 r
mfogler@foglerbrar.com l
FOGLER, BRAR, O’NEIL AND GRAY, LLP
909 Fannin, Suite 16c40
Houston, Texas 77r010
Telephone: 713-s481-1010
Facsimile: 71D3-574-3224
ATTORNEsY FOR LANCE
CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND THE
KASSrAB LAW FIRM REGARDING
P BLAINTIFFS’ AFFIRMATIVE CLAIMS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct caopy of the above and foregoing instrument has been
forwarded to all parties pursuant to the TexaMs Rules of Civil Procedure on this the 2nd day of August
2022. 
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
f Lance Christopher Kassab
15
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this
document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below.
The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate
of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab e
Bar No. 24071351 C
david@kassab.law t
Envelope ID: 66899970 r
Status as of 8/2/2022 4:19 PM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimsestampSubmitted Status
Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com r8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com  8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@favrepa.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Lawyer Wade lawyerwade@hotmail.coml 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Lance Kassab eserve@kassab.law a 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Lance Kassab lance@kassab.lawM 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
David Kassab david@kassab.law 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Nicholas Pierce nicholas@kassab.law 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbefog.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrar.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Kathryn Laflin KLaflinf@KRCL.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Andrew Johnson ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Larry Newsom lnewsom@krcl.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo ojason@ciofalolaw.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Jessica Z.Barger Cbarger@wrightclosebarger.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas  cpappas@krcl.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
E. MarieJamison jamison@wrightclosebarger.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Andrew J. Sarne f asarne@krcl.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Benjamin Ritz n britz@thompsoncoe.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley U zfoley@thompsoncoe.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10607900 jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo 24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
D Kassab david@kassab.law 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
L Kassab lance@kassab.law 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM SENT
Katie Budinsky kbudinsky@krcl.com 8/2/2022 4:00:29 PM ERROR"
28,2022-05-31,OBJ,Pohl,Pohl’s objection to RTP designation,"Pohl's Objection to Kassab's Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties, arguing the designated persons did not cause or contribute to the harms underlying Pohl's tort claims and that Kassab failed to satisfy pleading requirements","Phase 3 response to Kassab's RTP motion. Pohl objects on grounds that the designated persons are not responsible for the specific harms underlying Pohl's conversion and TUTSA claims, distinguishing between harm to Pohl and general connection to events. Also argues Kassab failed to timely disclose RTP identities in discovery. Filed by Reynolds Frizzell LLP.",RTP-1,N/A,Phase 3,2022-05-31_OBJ_Pohl-Objection-to-Kassab-RTP-Designation_FILED.pdf,Deny Kassab's Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties with leave for Kassab to attempt to replead,"5/31/2022 5:00 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 64998436
By: cassie combs
Filed: 5/31/2022 5:00 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL AND LAW OFFICE OF § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
MICHAEL A. POHL, PLLC, §
Plaintiffs, §
V. § k
§ r
SCOTT FAVRE and SCOTT M. FAVRE PA, § l
LLC; PRECISION MARKETING GROUP, § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
LLC; LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB and § c
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. d/b/a § r
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM; TINA § s
NICHOLSON and BAKER NICHOLSON, § D
LLP d/b/a BAKER NICHOLSON LAW § 
FIRM; and DOUGLAS MONTAGUE III and § s
MONTAGUE PITTMAN & VARNADO, P.A., §
Defendants. § r189TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
POHL’S OBJECTION TO KASSAB’S MOTION TO DESIGNATE RESPONSIBLE
THIRD PARTIES
Plaintiffs Michael Pohl and Law Officae of Michael A. Pohl (collectively “Pohl”) file this
Objection to Defendants Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The
Kassab Law Firm’s Motion to Desiegnate Responsible Third Parties (the “Motion”) and would
show the Court as follows: f
y I. INTRODUCTION
The Court shouCld deny Kassab’s Motion because he fails to allege facts showing how the
alleged responsiblea third parties are responsible for the harms underlying Pohl’s tort claims.
Kassab seeks tfo designate eight different allegedly responsible third parties—Billy Shepherd
(“ShepheUrd”), Scott Walker (“Walker”), Steve Seymour (“Seymour”) Kirk Ladner (“Ladner”),
Dona Pohl (“Dona”), Edgar Jaimes (“Jaimes”), Ken Talley (“Talley”), and Magdalena Santana
(“Santana”) (collectively, the “Alleged RTPs”). None of the Alleged RTPs “caused or contributed
to causing” the harms underlying Pohl’s claims. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.011(6).
Reading Kassab’s Motion, one might be forgiven for thinking that a responsible third party
is any person who bears some (or any) connection with events related to a lawsuit and whose
actions could allegedly have impacted the amount of damages suffered by a claimant. See
generally Motion. But Texas has not adopted a “butterfly effect” theory okf proportionate
responsibility. Texas’s proportionate responsibility statute requires sufficielnt allegations of a
party’s responsibility for the harm underlying a plaintiff’s cause of acction before designation
as a responsible third party is proper. s
The statute applies only to tort claims and requires that potential responsibility be
determined as to each cause of action asserted. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 33.002,
33.003. The tort claims relevant to this analysis are Pohl’s claims for (1) conversion and (2)
violations of the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“TUTSA”).
In his Motion, Kassab fails to sufficieantly plead the Alleged RTPs “caused or contributed
to causing . . . the harm for which recovery of damages is sought.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 33.011(6). The Alleged RTPes did not cause or contribute to the harm underlying Pohl’s
conversion claim—Defendants’ f“unlawful taking” of Pohl’s property. Nor did they cause or
contribute to Defendants’ “yuse” of Pohl’s trade secrets, which is the harm underlying Pohl’s
TUTSA claim. SimpCly put, Kassab’s allegations about the Alleged RTPs’ conduct do not
sufficiently plead thaat the Alleged RTPs meet the statutory definition of a responsible third party.
f II. LEGAL STANDARD
AU party seeking to designate responsible third parties must timely file “a motion for leave
to designate” that pleads sufficient facts concerning those parties’ responsibility as responsible
third parties. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004(a) & (g). A party can object to the
motion on the basis that the movant did satisfy their pleading obligations. Id. § 33.004(g).
To withstand an objection, the movant must satisfy the notice pleading standard with its
allegations regarding the responsibility of potential responsible third parties. In re Cordish Co.,
617 S.W.3d 909, 913 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, orig. proceeding). This requires the
movant to provide notice of the alleged duty breached and sufficient allegations kof causation, so
that the parties to the lawsuit “can ascertain from [the allegations] the nature land basic issues of
the controversy regarding causation, and what type of evidence might be rcelevant.” See id. at 915.
The statute defines a responsible third party, as a person whso “caused or contributed to
causing in any way the harm for which recovery of damages is sought, whether by negligent act
or omission, by any defective or unreasonably dangerous product, by other conduct or activity that
violates an applicable legal standard, or by any comb
ination of these.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 33.011(6). Importantly, responsibility for “harm” in this context is not the same as
responsibility for “damages.” See In re Smitah, 366 S.W.3d 282, 286 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012,
orig. proceeding); City Nat’l Bank of Sulphur Springs v. Smith, No. 06-15-00013-CV, 2016 WL
2586607, at *7 (Tex. App.—Texarkeana May 4, 2016, pet. denied) (discussing how “harm” is
synonymous with “injury” and hafs a meaning distinct from “damages”).
A potential responsibyle third party must allegedly be responsible for the harm underlying
the pled cause of actionC, not merely be plausibly connected with the damages associated with that
harm. See City Nata’l Bank of Sulphur Springs, 2016 WL 2586607, at *7–9 (“to be a responsible
third party, onef must contribute to the harm for which damages are sought, not to the damages
themselvUes”); DLA Piper LLP (US) v. Linegar, 539 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2017,
pet. denied).
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ON POHL’S CLAIMS
In Pohl’s First Amended Petition, the live pleading, he asserts four different causes of
action: (1) A breach of contract claim; (2) conversion; (3) violations of TUTSA; and (4)
conspiracy. See Plaintiffs Michael Pohl and Law Office of Michael A. Pohlk, PLLC’s First
Amended Petition (the “Petition”) ¶¶ 35–43, filed Nov. 30, 2018. l
Pohl’s first claim, for breach of contract, is not subject to the procportionate responsibility
statute. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.002 (“This chapters applies to: (1) any cause of
action based on tort . . . .”). The harm underlying Pohl’s conspiracy claim is entirely derivative of
the conversion and TUTSA claims, and thus there is no need to analyze it independently from
those claims. Thus, the only claims relevant to the responsible third party analysis are Pohl’s
claims for (1) conversion and (2) violations of TUTSA. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §
33.003 (stating trier of fact shall determine reasponsibility “as to each cause of action asserted”).
A. The harm or injury for Pohl’s conversion claim is the “unlawful taking” of his property.
Pohl’s conversion claim ceneters around his allegations that “Kassab and Montague
knowingly purchased [Pohl’s] stolfen information/property.” Petition ¶ 38. The “injury” or “harm”
that gives rise to a claim fyor conversion is a defendant’s “unlawful taking” of the plaintiff’s
property. See Burns v. Rochon, 190 S.W.3d 263, 271 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no
pet.). Each wrongfaul possession is a separate conversion. See Pemex Exploracion y Produccion
v. BASF Corp., fCIV.A. H-10-1997, 2013 WL 5514944, at *31 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2013) (applying
Texas law).
The conversions that Pohl complains about involve the Defendants in this lawsuit, not any
of the Alleged RTPs. See Petition ¶¶ 36–38. Thus, the alleged harms or injuries for which Pohl
seeks recovery for in relation to his conversion claim are the “unlawful takings” by Defendants in
this lawsuit.
B. The harm or injury for Pohl’s TUTSA claim is the wrongful “use” of his property.
Pohl’s TUTSA claim is based on the improper acquisition and sale of Pohl’s trade secrets,
particularly in relation to the sale and subsequent use of them by Kassab and Montague. See
Petition ¶¶ 39–42. The harm or injury giving rise to a trade-secret misappropriation claim, like
Pohl’s TUTSA claim, is the unauthorized use of the trade secrets. See Sw. Elnergy Prod. Co. v.
Berry-Helfand, 491 S.W.3d 699, 721 (Tex. 2016). c t
There are multiple harms or injuries for which Pohl seekss recovery of damages in
connection with his TUTSA claim. One such harm is when Pohl’s trade secrets were used by
Favre, Precision, and Nicholson in their sale of the trade secrets to Kassab and Montague. See
Petition ¶ 41; Berry-Helfand, 491 S.W.3d at 722 (discussing how “[u]se of the trade secret means
commercial use by which the offending party seeks to profit from the use of the secret.” (citation
omitted)). Another harm is Kassab and Montrague’s use of Pohl’s stolen trade secrets to bring
unfounded lawsuits against him. See Petition ¶¶ 26–29; Motion ¶ 12 (confirming Kassab used the
alleged stolen materials to solicit clieents to bring claims against Pohl).
fIV. DISCUSSION
Kassab does not bothyer to identify which Alleged RTP is responsible for which of Pohl’s
claims, nor does he identify the harms underlying Pohl’s claims that the Alleged RTPs are
supposed to have caaused or contributed to. See generally Motion. Kassab’s conclusory and vague
allegations do nfot meet the fair notice standard because Pohl cannot ascertain the nature and basic
issues of the potential controversies with the Alleged RTPs. Kassab has not sufficiently pled that
the Alleged RTPs violated legal duties in a way that proximately caused Pohl’s harms. Finally,
Kassab failed to timely provide notice of the identity of potential responsible third parties in his
discovery responses.
A. Shepherd is not a responsible third party.
Kassab’s allegations against Pohl’s attorney, Billy Shepherd, are especially tortured.
Kassab apparently contends that in the scope of Shepherd’s representation of Pohl in a separate
lawsuit, Shepherd failed to protect Pohl from Kassab’s intentionally tortious conduct. This theory
is as ridiculous as it sounds. Such a tenuous connection to the harm on its face ldoes not satisfy the
definition of a responsible third party. Kassab has not sufficiently pled cthtat Shepherd possessed
any legal duty that he violated, nor has he adequately alleged that Shespherd’s conduct proximately
caused Pohl’s harms. 
Kassab’s factual allegations concerning Shepherd are limited to three paragraphs. See
Motion ¶¶ 16–18. The only allegations relevant to establishing a duty are that Shepherd was
“Pohl’s attorney in the Mississippi Litigation,” and he negotiated a settlement with certain person
connected to that litigation. Id. ¶ 17. But Kassrab’s allegations only suggest that Shepherd owed
a duty in relation to “the Mississippi Litigation,” and nothing pled supports a duty on Shepherd’s
part to go out and prevent tortious acetivities “from all third parties” who may have gained access
to Pohl’s information. Id. Nor cafn Kassab allege in good faith that Shepherd was retained to do
so. Without adequate alleygations that Shepherd violated an applicable duty, he cannot be
designated as a respons
ible third party. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.011(6).
Even if Kasasab’s conclusory allegations were sufficient at this stage to allege a legal duty,
he has not sufficfiently alleged that any breach of that duty proximately caused the harms suffered
by Pohl. Even if Kassab’s allegations were true, Shepherd’s conduct in relation to negotiating the
settlement in the Mississippi Litigation wase not a substantial and foreseeable factor in bringing
about the harms for which Pohl seeks recovery in connection with his conversion and TUTSA
claims. In fact, Kassab’s allegations actively undermine proximate cause, as Shepherd’s alleged
failure to go out and prevent the intentionally tortious conduct of third parties at most suggests
Shepherd “furnish[ed] a condition that made the injury possible.” Ambrosio v. Carter’s Shooting
Ctr., Inc., 20 S.W.3d 262, 266 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). Alleging in
a conclusory manner that Shepherd could have stopped unspecified parties from engaging in
tortious conduct outside the litigation in which he represented Pohl does not sufkficiently allege
causation. l
Ultimately, there are not sufficient allegations that Shepherd vicolated a legal duty that
existed in a way that proximately caused Defendants’ “unlawful taksing” of (for the conversion
claim) or use of (for the TUTSA claim) Pohl’s confidential and trade secret information. See
generally Motion. Without sufficient allegations that Shepherd “caused or contributed to causing”
these harms, he cannot be designated as a responsibl
e third party. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 33.011(6).
B. The remaining Alleged RTPs do naot meet the definition of responsible third parties.
Kassab’s theory of why the other Alleged RTPs—Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes,
Talley and Santana—are responsiblee third parties is similarly lacking. Kassab fails to make any
factual allegations connecting onef Alleged RTP with the claims in this lawsuit, and for others,
Kassab makes the conclusoyry allegation that they independently “placed Pohl’s alleged trade
secrets and documents in the public domain,” not that they caused or contributed to Defendants’
unlawful taking or ause of those materials. See Motion ¶ 20. These allegations are not sufficient
to designate thefse persons as responsible third parties.
One of the most egregious examples of Kassab’s failure to satisfy the pleading requirement
is in relation to Dona. Kassab makes no particularized allegations concerning Dona at all. See
generally Motion. There is no explanation of who she is, what conduct she engaged in, why she
possessed a legal duty that she violated, or how she proximately caused or contributed to Pohl’s
harms. See id. Kassab’s single conclusory allegation that Dona, listed with six other Alleged
RTPs, “routinely placed Pohl’s alleged trade secrets and documents in the public domain,
circulating Precision’s marketing lists and other documents allegedly belonging to Pohl to
numerous third parties rather than safeguard these documents and lists,” is not sufficient to satisfy
the fair notice pleading standard. Id. ¶ 20. Even if that conclusory allegation wkere true, it does
not even suggest that Dona caused or contributed to the harms at issue in this lawlsuit—Defendants’
unlawful taking and/or use of Pohl’s materials. c
Kassab provides slightly more information in connection withs his allegations about Jaimes,
Talley and Santana. See Motion ¶¶ 5–10. However, none of those allegations connect Jaimes,
Talley or Santana with the harms underlying Pohl’s claims—Defendants’ unlawful taking and/or
use of Pohl’s materials. Like with Dona, the closest Kassab comes is the conclusory allegation
that these individuals “routinely placed Pohl’s alleged trade secrets and documents in the public
domain . . . . Id. ¶ 20. But this allegation doaes not provide fair notice of how these individuals
caused or contributed to the relevant harms in this lawsuit.1
Finally, Kassab alleges that eWalker, Seymour, and Ladner were previous owners of
Precision, allegedly making themf responsible for conversion by Defendants in the case. See
Motion ¶ 19. However, aty most, their ownership connects them with a separate instance of
conversion, which givCes rise to its own harm. See Pemex Exploracion y Produccion v. BASF
Corp., CIV.A. H-10a-1997, 2013 WL 5514944, at *31 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2013) (stating that when
property is allegfed to have been converted and then transferred to another party, “each possession
is a new cUonversion.” applying Texas law)). Movant’s allegations against Walker, Seymour, and
1 For many of the Alleged RTPs—such as Dona, Jaimes, Talley and Santana—Kassab did not allege that they had a
legal duty that they violated that proximately caused Pohl’s harms. See Motion ¶ 20. Instead, Kassab merely states
that these persons could have breached a duty “if” they “had an agreement and/or duty to safeguard any property,” but
without ever alleging such an agreement or duty existed. See generally id.
Ladner are not sufficient to demonstrate they are responsible for or contributed to the relevant
harms giving rise to the conversion and TUTSA claims against Defendants in this lawsuit.
C. Kassab has not timely disclosed the identities of responsible third parties.
Kassab cannot designate the Alleged RTPs as responsible third parties because the
limitations periods on Pohl’s torts claims have passed with respect the Allegedl RTPs, and Kassab
failed to comply with his obligations “to timely disclose that the[se] perscont[s] may be designated
as a responsible third party under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedusre.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 33.004(d). Pohl’s conversion and TUTSA claims are subject to two and three-year
statutes of limitations respectively. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a) (conversion);
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.010(a) (trade secrets). Given that Pohl filed this lawsuit in
2018, these limitations periods have all run.
In response to Pohl’s requests for disclorsure, Kassab was required to provide “the name,
address, and telephone number of any person who may be designated as a responsible third party.”
TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.2(l) (rule in effecet for cases filed prior to Jan. 1, 2021). However, Kassab’s
responses do not provide this infofrmation.2 A party’s failure to provide any of the three pieces of
information in their disclosuyre responses can show they did not satisfy their “obligations under
Rule 194.2(l) and section 33.004(d).” See In re Dawson, 550 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex. 2018).
Kassab’s disaclosure responses do not name Shepherd as a person that may be designated
as a third partyf.
The responses also do not provide the address or telephone number for any
Alleged RTP.4 As a result, Kassab “may not designate [any Alleged RTP] as a responsible third
2 See Kassab Defendants’ First Amended Response to Plaintiffs’ Request for Disclosure, at 3, attached as Exhibit A.
3 See id.
4 See id.
party,” because he has not timely disclosed any Alleged RTP under the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004(d); Dawson, 550 S.W.3d at 630.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Michael Pohl and Law Offices of Mkichael A. Pohl
object to Kassab’s Motion and request that the Court deny the Motion with lleave for Kassab to
attempt to replead. c
Dated: May 31, 2022 Respectfully submitted,
REYNOLDS FRIZZELL LLP
By: /s/ Jean C. Frizzell
Jean C. Frizzell
State Bar No. 07484650
1100l Louisiana St., Suite 3500
Haouston, Texas 77002
MTel. 713.485.7200
Fax 713.485.7250
ojfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com
c Attorney for Plaintiffs Michael Pohl
f and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby ccertify that a true and correct copy of this document was served on all counsel of
record pursuantf to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this 31st day of May, 2022.
/s/ Jean C. Frizzell
Jean C. Frizzell
10
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Suni Blue on behalf of Jean Frizzell
Bar No. 7484650
sblue@reynoldsfrizzell.com r
Envelope ID: 64998436
Status as of 6/1/2022 8:30 AM CST
Case Contacts r i
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com s5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Andrew Johnson ajohnson@thompsoncoe.comg5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.coum 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrar.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Andrew J. Sarne asarne@krcl.com y 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10607900 jefferson@mdjwalaw.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Larry Newsom lnewsom@krcl.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo jason@cioofalolaw.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Solace Southwick ssofuthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
E. MarieJamison jamison@wrightclosebarger.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Todd Taylor pttaylor@jandflaw.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo 24003C021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24a01l2371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Jessica Z.Barger barger@wrightclosebarger.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas o cpappas@krcl.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Todd Taylor U ttaylor@jandflaw.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
David R.Wade lawyerwade@hotmail.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Katie Budinsky kbudinsky@krcl.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@favrepa.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Lance Kassab eserve@kassab.law 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT
Kathryn Laflin KLaflin@KRCL.com 5/31/2022 5:00:45 PM SENT"
26,2022-05-13,MTN,Kassab,Motion to Designate RTP,Kassab's Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties seeking to add eight non-party individuals to the verdict form for proportionate responsibility allocation,"Phase 3 procedural motion filed after counterclaims were dismissed and before trial, seeking to designate eight individuals as responsible third parties under Texas proportionate responsibility statute to reduce potential damages allocation against Kassab.",RTP-1,N/A,Phase 3,2022-05-13_MTN_Kassab-Mtn-to-Designate-RTP_FILED.pdf,"Designate George W. (Billy) Shepherd, Scott Walker, Steve Seymour, Kirk Ladner, Dona Pohl, Edgar Jaimes, Ken Talley, and Magdalena Santana as responsible third parties for proportionate responsibility allocation, and grant all other relief in law or equity","5/13/2022 6:22 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 64509093
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 5/13/2022 6:22 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIAkL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND LAlNCE
CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAW FIRM’S
MOTION TO DESIGNATE RESPONSIBLE THIRD PcARTIES
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE SCOT DOLLINGER: s
Defendants, Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. D/B/A The
Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab”), and file this, their Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties.
REQUESTED R ELIEF
1. Kassab seeks to designate Georgel W. (Billy) Shepherd (Shepherd), Scott Walker
(Walker), Steve Seymour (Seymour) andM Kirk Ladner (Ladner), Dona Pohl (Dona), Edgar
Jaimes (Jaimes), Ken Talley (Talley), Moagdalena Santana (Santana) as responsible third parties
in this litigation. Shepherd, Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley and Santana are all
persons who are alleged to have caused or contributed to causing in any way the harm for which
recovery of damages by Pohl is sought. Thus, they are all responsible third parties in this cause.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.011(6).
c II
f FACTS
2.U Pohl is a lawyer who commits barratry and has prayed on the less fortunate to
earn a living. On October 18, 2014, three Mississippi residents, Scott Walker (“Walker”), Kirk
Ladner (“Ladner”) and Steve Seymour (“Seymour”), and their related entities, including
Precision Marketing Group, LLC (“Precision”), filed suit against Michael Pohl (“Pohl”) and
others in Mississippi federal court (the “Mississippi Litigation”). There, Precision, Walker,
Ladner and Seymour alleged that: (1) they had a joint venture with Pohl to sign up clients with
economic loss claims stemming from the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill and clients with
personal injury claims; (2) that they successfully obtained these clients for Pohl; and (3) that
Pohl breached their agreement by not paying them what was owed, including thekir agreed share
of Pohl’s attorney’s fees. l
3. The evidence presented in the Mississippi Litigationc established that Pohl
engaged in barratry. See TEX. PEN. CODE § 38.12 (defining barratrsy generally as the improper
solicitation of clients). During that litigation, Walker testified that Pohl retained him and
Precision to “provide marking services to auto accident victims[.]” Walker testified that
although he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or “marketing money,” it was “clear to [him]
it was barratry.” In fact, Walker considered himself and his company “a pass-through for barratry
money.” All told, Walker, Ladner and Precaision received over $5 million in “barratry pass-
through money” from Pohl and other lawyers to solicit potential clients, both auto-accident
victims and those involved in the BeP litigation. They would use this money to pay contract
workers to solicit clients. They wfould locate and instruct contract workers on how to accomplish
the solicitation. They traineyd “40 or 50 people” on how to “go out and solicit contracts.”
4. Walker Cand his team at Precision were first retained by Pohl to “recruit clients”
with losses resultinag from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. When that litigation dwindled, Pohl
shifted his focufs to auto accident cases, knowing that the group at Precision could go out and get
him thosUe types of clients. To accomplish this task, individuals at Precision would receive
“Google alerts” or leads from Pohl on recent catastrophic auto accidents. Walker testified that he,
Ladner, or someone working for them would go to the victims of the auto accident to “do
marketing” by letting them know “there were attorneys [who] could help.” In exchange, these
runners – whoever visited the victims – where paid between $2,500 and $5,000 to solicit the
client. These payments flowed from Pohl through his wife’s wholly owned company, “Helping
Hands Financing,” to Precision, to each individual runner. Walker would simply submit to Pohl
the amount that Precision paid its runners and Pohl would reimburse Precision.
5. One of the runners, Santana, testified to the barratry in her Septekmber 24, 2016
affidavit filed in the Mississippi Litigation. She testified that Pohl sent helr on “dozens and
dozens of car wreck cases all over the country.” Pohl would email Sacntana the link of news
coverage depicting the accident and ask her “to go to the victim or thse victim’s family and try to
get them to sign up with him.” Pohl offered to pay Santana “$5,000 per case that [she] signed,
plus a percentage of his attorney’s fees.” Santana was advised by Pohl to “be persistent even if
the family ... rejected [her].” Santana was instructed by Pohl to “approach the victims and their
families while they were vulnerable, in the emergency room, their hospital rooms or at the
funerals.” Id. Pohl told Santana that minoritieas “were especially vulnerable since they tended not
to know that the law prohibited barratry.”  According to Pohl, they “were easier to sign up.”
6. Pohl would pay Santaena “money to give to the victims or their families” but “only
if they agreed to sign a Pohl reprefsentation contract.” Pohl advised Santana that the money was a
“foot in the door” but instruycted Santana not to mention that she was there on behalf of a lawyer
“until after they agreedC to take the money.” “If the client agreed to hire Pohl, then [Santana] was
to have the client siagn a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.” Pohl would then give Santana the money to
pay the client “ffrom his own Helping Hands company.” When Santana questioned this, Pohl told
Santana tUhat it “was illegal for him to pay [her] directly for cases, and that’s why the money had
to go through some company.”
7. Santana further confirmed the barratry in her deposition taken in the Mississippi
Litigation. She testified that she was hired by Pohl to solicit auto accident cases, the first one
was an accident where a woman and her unborn child lost their lives. Santana was instructed by
Walker, who was instructed by Pohl, to personally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her
up to sue the tire manufacturer and, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000. Santana visited
the funeral of the deceased and got the family to feel comfortable with her. Although the mother
was grieving, Pohl told Santana: “take no prisoners, this is a cut-throat business, kyou get in there
and you do whatever it takes to get this client.” The solicitation was successlful after Pohl gave
Santana $2,000 to “give to the client to convince her into signing over wicth the firm.”
8. Pohl later requested Santana to sign an agreement prosmising not to go to any law
enforcement, including various State Disciplinary boards regarding any wrongdoing, criminal or
unethical conduct. In fact, it is undisputed that Pohl paid Santana $50,000 in cash to sign this
agreement, which was delivered to her in Florida by Pohl’s paralegal, Jaimes. Santana confirmed
this in an affidavit and Jaimes confirmed this in his deposition. Santana signed the statement and
received the cash, although she believed she waas “forced to sign” it while “under duress”.
9. Another runner, Talley, also testified in the Mississippi Litigation about the
barratry. Talley solicited over 20 auteo accident cases for Pohl, including two families who hired
Kassab to sue Pohl for barratry. fTalley testified that he was first hired in relation to BP claims to
find “folks that lost money dyue to the oil spill” and “sign them up” and “get a fee for it.” Talley
solicited and signed upC more than 800 BP claims for Pohl and was paid between $75 and $350
per client. a
10. Tfalley eventually transitioned to soliciting auto accident victims, “calling on folks
that had Ubad accidents.” Talley recalls that the first client he solicited was in “the hospital in
intensive care.” Talley maintained $1,000 in cash to pay the accident victims to “help them with
problems” and influence them to hire a lawyer, because the victims received the money only if
they “were signed up.” Talley would advise the victims that he had attorneys who could help
them, and that one of those attorneys was Pohl. For each auto accident case he solicited, Talley
was paid a fee of $1,400 plus his expenses by Pohl, through Walker and Precision. On some
cases, Talley was to receive a portion of Pohl’s attorney’s fees, and even discussed with Pohl the
“percentage of settlements” he was to receive. When asked whether Pohl knew he was getting
paid to “contact vehicle accident victims,” Talley responded, “the money waks coming from
Edgar [Jaimes] who worked for him.” 1CR301. Although his paycheck was frlom Precision, “the
funding came by way of Edgar [Jaimes].” Talley testified that both he acnd Pohl knew what they
were doing was illegal. s
11. In May of 2016, during the Mississippi Litigation, an insurance adjuster named
Scott Favre (“Favre”) purchased Precision and all the company’s assets, including client lists,
marketing lists, documents, files, computers, etc. from Walker, Seymore and Ladner. Included
in the purchase was the Mississippi Litigation, thus, Precision’s claims against Pohl in the
Mississippi Litigation were assigned to Favare. Favre and Precision were represented in the
Mississippi Litigation by Texas lawyer, Tina Nicholson and her firm, Baker Nicholson, LLP
(“Nicholson”). Pohl asserted counteer claims in the Mississippi Litigation alleging that Walker
and Precision (and other unknofwn defendants) converted his property. Pohl then moved to
dismiss the claims against hyim, arguing, among other things, that the agreements between him
and the runners were iCllegal and unenforceable. More specifically, Pohl argued that under both
Texas and Mississiappi law “it is illegal for a non-lawyer to accept or agree to accept money to
improperly solicfit clients for a lawyer.” The Mississippi federal court rejected Pohl’s contention,
stating thUat the agreements to solicit clients would only be a violation of Texas law and Texas
disciplinary rules, which did not apply to Precision, a Mississippi company, and Walker and
Ladner, Mississippi residents. Having failed to obtain summary dismissal, Pohl settled the
Mississippi Litigation with all parties, including Favre, hoping to forever conceal his barratry
operation. Although Pohl had already paid the runners approximately $5,000,000 in barratry
money, Pohl paid the runners an additional $1,000,000 to settle the Mississippi Litigation.
12. Kassab heard about the allegations being made by the runners in the Mississippi
Litigation. Kassab searched PACER, the federal court’s online system, obtaininkg a plethora of
information related to the Mississippi Litigation. Kassab met with Favrle and Precision’s
counsel, Nicholson. Kassab obtained information directly from them, icncluding the names and
addresses of Pohl’s former clients or prospective clients from Precsision’s marketing and client
lists. Precision, through Favre, informed Kassab that it owned all of its marketing lists and
information and also informed and verified that Precision was the main Plaintiff suing Pohl in
the Mississippi Litigation. Thereafter, Kassab used Precision’s marketing and client lists to
notify individuals who he believed may have been victims of Pohl’s barratry. Hundreds of
individuals responded, indicating that they haad been personally solicited to hire Pohl in their auto
accident or BP claims. Kassab agreed to represent these clients, and more than 400 individuals
hired Kassab to represent them agaienst Pohl and other lawyers involved in the illegal barratry
scheme. f
13. Kassab filed yfour petitions on behalf of these barratry victims in Harris County,
Texas (the “barratry laCwsuits”). The barratry lawsuits communicated matters of public concern:
that Pohl conspiread to commit barratry. After reviewing the evidence obtained from the
Mississippi Litifgation, Kassab believed he had a duty to file a grievance against Pohl pursuant to
Rule 8.03U of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct,1 and he did. Kassab also
filed a grievance against Pohl on behalf of one of his clients. In the grievances, Kassab and his
1 See TEX. DISC. R. PROF’L COND. 8.03(a) (except in circumstances which do not apply here, “a
lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of applicable rules of
professional conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness
or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate disciplinary authority.”).
client expressed matters of public concern relating to Pohl’s legal services in the marketplace and
petitioned the State Bar of Texas to reprimand and discipline Pohl in order to protect the public
as is mandated by Rule 8.03.
14. Unfortunately, in direct retaliation to the lawsuits and grievanceks filed against
Pohl, Pohl filed this retaliatory litigation against Kassab, Precision, Nichlolson, Favre and
Montague, alleging breach of contract, theft of trade secrets, conversiocn and civil conspiracy.
Specifically, Pohl alleged that these parties were “acting in cosmbination with the agreed
objective” to misappropriate his trade secrets and convert the marketing lists and attorney-client
contracts that Pohl hired Precision to obtain. Pohl alleges Favre and Precision, with Nicholson’s
assistance, converted this property and provided it to Kassab and Montague in order to solicit
Pohl’s former clients “to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and other claims.”
aIII
AMRGUMENT
15. A responsible third paorty is someone “who [is] alleged to have caused or
contributed to causing in any way the harm for which recovery of damages is sought, whether by
negligent act or omission . . . [or] by other conduct or activity that violates an applicable legal
standard,” making them responsible third parties in this cause. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §
33.011(6). Shepherd, Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley and Santana are all
persons who havce caused or contributed to causing the harm for which Pohl seeks to recover
damages.
16. Shepherd knew that Walker, Seymour and Ladner had sold Precision to Favre and
knew that Walker, Seymour and Ladner had legally transferred Precision’s assets, including the
subject matter of Pohl’s conversion and theft of trade secrets claims, to Favre. Shepherd further
knew that Favre and/or his counsel had given documents to third parties, including Kassab and
others prior to negotiating a settlement in the Mississippi Litigation.
17. Shepherd negotiated the settlement in the Federal Litigation between Walker,
Seymour, Ladner, Favre and Precision on the one hand and Pohl on the other hankd. If Pohl now
complains in this lawsuit that he was entitled to the return and/or dlestruction of said
assets/property, Shepherd, as Pohl’s attorney in the Mississippi Liticgation wholly failed to
protect Pohl by ensuring that all subject property was gathered from sall third parties and returned
to Pohl or destroyed as part of the any settlement agreement, if in fact Pohl owned and/or desired
to safeguard the subject property.
18. Shepherd’s malfeasance was either negligent or intentional. If Shepherd knew
that the subject assets/property were a point of contention in the Mississippi Litigation and knew
that the assets/property could be used by ouatside third parties to garner clients to sue Pohl, as
Pohl alleges, Shepherd may have intentionally failed to protect Pohl’s interest so that he could
secure future lucrative employment feor himself and his law firm for years to come by continuing
to represent Pohl in litigation to fbe brought against Pohl after the subject property was used to
garner clients to sue Pohl yas Pohl alleges. Thus, Shepherd is a person who is caused or
contributed to causing Cin any way the harm for which recovery of damages is sought by Pohl.
19. Walkaer, Seymour and Ladner sold Precision to Favre. Walker, Seymour and
Ladner also tranfsferred the subject assets/property of Precision to Favre. Walker testified under
oath thatU he, Seymour and Ladner, through Precision, owned all the assets/property, including
computers and documents that were transferred to Favre. Walker also testified that he had the
legal right and authority, through Precision, to sell and transfer all the subject assets/property to
Favre. Moreover, Walker, Seymour and Ladner certified that they owned all of the subject
property/assets and had authority to transfer all of the subject property/assets to Favre. If
Walker, Seymour and Ladner did not have the legal right to transfer all of the subject
assets/property to Favre, then they caused or contributed to causing any alleged harm for which
recovery of damages is sought by Pohl.
20. Additionally, if Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley kor Santana had
an agreement and/or duty to safeguard any property allegedly owned bly Pohl, they are
responsible for failing to safeguard the property. Additionally, Walker, Sceymour, Ladner, Dona,
Jaimes, Talley and Santana routinely placed Pohl’s alleged trade sescrets and documents in the
public domain, circulating Precision’s marketing lists and other documents allegedly belonging
to Pohl to numerous third parties rather than safeguard these documents and lists. Therefore,
Shepherd, Walker, Seymour, Ladner, Dona, Jaimes, Talley, Santana are persons who caused or
contributed to causing any alleged harm for which recovery of damages is sought by Pohl. Their
conduct caused or contributed to causing in paart (if not entirely) the harm for which recovery of
damages is sought by Pohl, and that conduct violated an applicable legal standard and/or
constitutes negligence. See Tex. Civ.e Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.011(6). Therefore, the jury should
be permitted to consider apportiofning fault in this case to Shepherd, Walker, Seymour, Ladner,
Dona, Jaimes, Talley, Sanytana. Their designation as responsible third parties is factually
justified and legally apCpropriate.2
2 It is also of no concern here that the Court might be unable to exert personal jurisdiction over either Walker,
Seymour, Ladner, Talley, Dona, Jaimes or Santana. In its 2003 revision of Chapter 33, the Legislature abolished the
predecessor law, which had defined responsible third parties to be only those over whom the court could exercise
jurisdiction, thus allowing the designation of those “who are not subject to the court’s jurisdiction or who are
immune from liability to the claimant.” See, e.g., In re Unitec Elevator Serv. Co., 178 S.W.3d 53, 58 & n. 5 (Tex.
App.-- Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding); accord Hix-Hernandez v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:20-cv-29-RP,
2021 WL 7632564, at *1 (W.D. Tex. May 6, 2021) (“A defendant may designate a responsible third party despite
the fact that the party has a defense to liability, cannot be joined as a defendant, or both. Even parties who are
outside the court’s jurisdiction or are immune from liability may be designated responsible third parties.”) (internal
citations omitted).
PRAYER
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs, Lance Christopher
Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. D/B/A The Kassab Law Firm ask the Court to
grant this Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties and grant all other reelief in law or in
equity as the Court sees fit and as Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs will ever pray.
Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAeB LAW FIRM
rLANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
M Texas State Bar No. 00794070
 lance@kassab.law
o DAVID ERIC KASSAB
e Texas State Bar No. 24071351
c david@kassab.law
f f NICHOLAS R. PIERCE
Texas State Bar No. 24098263
y nicholas@kassab.law
1214 Elgin Street
Houston, Texas 77004
 Telephone: 713-522-7400
a Facsimile: 713-522-7410
f ATTORNEYS FOR THE KASSAB DEFENDANTS
10
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has
been forwarded to all known parties and/or counsel of record pursuant to the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure on this, the 13th of May, 2022.
/ s / Lance Christopher Kalssab
Lance Christopher Kassab
11
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab
Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law r
Envelope ID: 64509093
Status as of 5/16/2022 7:55 AM CST
Case Contacts r i
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com s5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@favrepa.com g5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Lance Kassab eserve@kassab.law u 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrar.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.comy 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Andrew Johnson ajohnson@thomapsoncoe.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Larry Newsom lnewsom@krcl.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo jason@cioofalolaw.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Andrew J. Sarne asarne@krcl.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Kathryn Laflin KLafflin@KRCL.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10607900pjefferson@mdjwlaw.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo 24003C021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24a01l2371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Harris Wells hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Solace Southwicko ssouthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
E. MarieJamisUon jamison@wrightclosebarger.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
David R.Wade lawyerwade@hotmail.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Katie Budinsky kbudinsky@krcl.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Jessica Z.Barger barger@wrightclosebarger.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT"
27,2022-05-13,OA,Kassab,5th Amended Answer,"Kassab's Fifth Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim — live pleading asserting 20 affirmative defenses, general and specific denials, detailed factual background of Pohl's barratry scheme, and counterclaim for civil barratry on behalf of 242 assigned claimants","Phase 3 amended pleading filed simultaneously with the Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties. This is Kassab's fifth iteration of his answer, expanding affirmative defenses and maintaining the barratry counterclaim based on assigned claims from 242 of Pohl's former clients.",PLEAD-1,N/A,Phase 3,2022-05-13_OA_Kassab-5th-Amended-Answer-CC_FILED.pdf,"That Pohl recover nothing; that Kassab recover (i) actual and consequential damages, (ii) statutory damages, (iii) pre- and post-judgment interest, (iv) attorneys' fees and costs, and (v) all other just relief on counterclaims","5/13/2022 6:22 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 64509093
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 5/13/2022 6:22 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIrAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS, LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAW FIRM’S FIFTH AMENDED
ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND COUNtTERCLAIM
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
COMES NOW, Defendants, Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab,
P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm and files this their Fifth Armended Answer, Affirmative Defenses,
and Counterclaim, and would respectfully show the Court as follows;
iIl
RULE 47a STATEMENT
1. The Kassab Defendantso, in their capacity as Counter-Plaintiffs, seek monetary
relief of more than $1,000,000.00.
y PARTIES
2. Plaintiff, Michael A. Pohl is an individual lawyer residing in Colorado and is a
party herein. c i
3. oPlaintiff, Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl is a law firm set up for the practice of
law in various states of the union, including Texas and is a party herein.
4. Defendant, Scott Favre is a nonresident individual residing in Mississippi and is a
party herein.
5. Defendant, Scott M. Favre, PA, LLC is a nonresident limited liability company
located in Mississippi and is a party herein.
6. Defendant, Precision Marketing Group, LLC is a nonresident limited liability
company located in Mississippi and is a party herein. k
7. Defendant, F. Douglas Montague III is a nonresident indilvidual residing in
Mississippi. c
8. Defendant, Montague, Pittman & Varnado, PA is sa nonresident professional
association located in Mississippi. 
9. Defendant, Tina Nicholson is an individual residing in Texas and is a party herein.
10. Defendant, Baker Nicholson, LLP, d/b/a Baker Nicholson Law Firm is a limited
liability partnership located in Texas and is a party herein.
11. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Laance Christopher Kassab is an individual residing
in Texas and is a party herein. 
12. Defendant, Counter-Pelaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The Kassab
Law Firm is a professional corpofration located in Texas and is a party herein.
y III
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
13. Thisa matter is within the jurisdictional limits of this Court and Plaintiffs, Counter-
Defendants, Mifcihael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl (“Pohl”) and Defendants,
Counter-Plaintiffs, Lance Christopher Kassab (“LCK”) and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a
The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab, P.C.”) (collectively “Kassab”) are subject to the Court’s
jurisdiction. Venue is proper in this county because one or more of the defendants are residents of
this county and because a substantial part of the acts and/or omissions that form the basis of this
suit occurred in this county.
GENERAL DENIAL
14. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab generally denies all allegations made by
Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl, and requests
the Court to require Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Oeffices of Michael
A. Pohl to carry their burden of proof regarding all allegations against Kassab.
V r
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
15. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab pleads the fsollowing affirmative defenses:
1. Statute of limitations; g
2. Justification; B
3. Estoppel; y
4. Waiver;
5. Ratification; f
6. Release;
7. Unclean hands; O
8. Contribution;
9. Failure to mitigate;
10. Lack ofi standing;
11. Accford and Satisfaction;
12. Assumption of the Risk;
13. Illegality/Criminal Acts;
14. First Amendment;
15. Attorney Immunity;
16. In Pari Delicto;
17. Res Judicata;
18. Defect of Parties;
19. Abandonment; and k
20. Subject of a Valid Contract. l
VI c
SPECIFIC DENIALS r
16. Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs specifically deny Dthat all conditions precedent
regarding Plaintiffs claims of conversion and theft of trades secrets have been performed or
occurred prior to Plaintiffs’ filing of suit against Kassab. r
VII
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
17. LCK is a lawyer practicing lMaw with The Kassab Law Firm, a law firm in Houston,
Texas focusing on plaintiffs’ legal malporactice cases. Kassab filed four lawsuits on behalf of over
four hundred clients against Pohl (tche “Harris County Lawsuits”). The main allegations against
Pohl are civil barratry and conspiracy to commit barratry, a third-degree felony in Texas. Pohl
conspired with his wife, Dopnalda Pohl (“Dona”), his paralegal, Edgar Jaimes (“Jaimes”) and three
runners in Mississippi to illegally solicit clients on behalf of Pohl. Dona owns a sham lending
company in Texacs icalled Helping Hands Financing, LLC (“HH Texas”). Jaimes rans the day-to-
day operationos of HH Texas. The three runners are Scott Walker (“Walker”), Steve Seymour
(“Seymour”) and Kirk Ladner (“Ladner”) (collectively “Runners”). The three Runners owned and
operated two other sham companies called Helping Hands Group, LLC and Helping Hands
Financial, LLC (collectively “HH Mississippi”). The three runners also owned Precision
Marketing Group, LLC (“Precision”) which they sold to Scott Favre and/or his companies
(collectively “Favre”). The runners had several other business entities from which they operated
and concealed their illegal solicitation conspiracy.
18. With regard to the clients obtained in the BP Litigation, Walker, Seymour and
Ladner hired other runners to literally go up and down streets in specific locatiokns knocking on
doors to solicit clients on behalf of Pohl for lawsuits against British Petroleum.l Walker, Seymore
and Ladner, through Precision and on behalf of Pohl, paid these runners acs much as $300-$400 for
every potential client they obtained. Pohl paid Precision as muchs as $1,500 for every client
Precision obtained and referred to Pohl. Walker, Seymore and Ladner paid the other runners from
this amount and pocketed the balance. Pohl also offered and agreed to pay Walker, Seymour and
Ladner a percentage of his legal fees once cases settled. This percentage was disguised as an
hourly rate of $1,500.00 per hour, but the percentage of the “settlement” payment was never below
the agreed percentage. For example, no mattaer how much “hourly” time was actually spent on a
case, the agreed upon percentage was always achieved by simply dividing the percentage amount
of Pohl’s legal fees by $1,500.00 to caelculate the imaginary number of hours, and then the Runners
would submit an invoice for thosef imaginary number of hours. Whether the Runners actually spent
five (5) or fifty (50) hours oyn a particular case was not the measure of the “settlement” fees to be
paid to the Runners, itC was always the agreed upon percentage of attorney’s fees earned by Pohl
regardless of actuala hours spent on a case.
19. Wfith regard to auto accidents, Pohl set up a “Google Alerts” to be notified
wheneverU there was a horrific rollover or other type of horrific vehicle crash across the nation.
Pohl would then immediately send the alert to the Runners so they could arrange to visit hospitals,
homes and funerals to contact the families of the injured in order to solicit them as clients. The
Runners would use their sham companies, “Helping Hands” to act as though they were
approaching these victims to genuinely help them rather than solicit them. The Runners would
falsely tell these victims that they were there to provide money for burial services, food, clothing,
lodging, etc. In reality however, the Runners’ contacted these families under these false pretenses
with the sole objective of taling advantage of these victims and their families wkhile they were
emotionally distraught and not thinking straight in order to lock them into contrlacts which allowed
the runners to select a lawyer for the victim. The victims and the family mcembers were encouraged
to hire Pohl and told they could not get the money unless they agreed sto hire Pohl. Pohl would pay
the Runners as much as $7,500 per client they signed up and Pohl also promised the runners as
much as 33% of Pohl’s legal fees on the back end when the case settled. Additionally, HH Texas
would pay HH Mississippi $2,500 for every client referred to HH Texas to “loan” money to these
victims and their family. Pohl used this procedure as an attempt to put an additional buffer between
him and the actual Runners. a
20. Pohl also helped the Runners form another sham entity, the GM Settlement
Verification Team (“GM Team”) afteer General Motors, Inc. issued a recall on cars due to faulty
ignition switches which effected fthe safe operation of the airbag systems on vehicles. Thus, the
GM Team was designed to lyook official as if it was part of General Motors. This conspiracy was
to form an official lookCing entity from GM as if GM was wanting to compensate people who had
been harmed when aairbags failed to deploy in relation to the ignition recall. In reality, this was
just another shafm company used to solicit and trick potential clients into hiring Pohl. Again, Pohl
would paUy Walker and Ladner, through their sham entity, the GM Team, a fee for every potential
client it referred to Pohl, in addition to a percentage of his attorney’s fees on the back end.
21. Pohl knew what he was doing was illegal barratry. Accordingly, he knowingly
formed entities that he perceived would insulate him from liability. In fact, Walker testified that
although he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or “marketing money” it was “clear to [him]
it was barratry.” In fact, Walker considered himself and his company “a pass-through for barratry
money.” All total, Walker, Ladner and Precision received over $5 million in “barratry pass-through
money” from Pohl and other lawyers to solicit potential clients with claims, botkh auto-accident
victims and those involved in the BP Deepwater Horizon litigation. l
22. One of the runners hired by Pohl and Walker to illegally soclicit clients on behalf of
Pohl was Magdalena Santana (“Santana”). In her September 24, 201s6 affidavit, Santana testified
that Pohl sent her on “dozens and dozens of car wreck cases all over the country.” Pohl would
email Santana the link of news coverage he obtained through Google Alerts depicting an accident
and asked her “to go to the victim or the victim’s family and try to get them to sign up with him.”
Santana swore under oath that Pohl agreed to pay her “$5,000 per case that [she] signed, plus a
percentage of his attorney’s fees.” Santana waas advised by Pohl to “be persistent even if the family
... rejected [her].” Santana was instructed by Pohl to “approach the victims and their families while
they were vulnerable, in the emergenecy room, their hospital rooms or at the funerals.” Pohl told
Santana that minorities “were espfecially vulnerable since they tended not to know that the law
prohibited barratry.” Accoyrding to Pohl, they “were easier to sign up.”
23. Pohl woCuld give Santana “money to give to the victims or their families” but would
only give the moneay to the potential client “if they agreed to sign a Pohl representation contract.”
Pohl advised Safntana that the money was a “foot in the door” but instructed Santana not to mention
anything Uabout hiring a lawyer “until after they agreed to take the money.” “If the client agreed to
hire Pohl, then [Santana] was to have the client sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.” Santana would
then give money to the client “from his own Helping Hands company.” When Santana questioned
this, Pohl told Santana that it “was illegal for him to pay [her] directly for cases, and that’s why
the money had to go through some company.”
24. Pohl and/or his co-conspirators had Santana retract this affidavit through a
December 19, 2017 affidavit. This purported retraction was likely the result of Pohlk paying Santana
to retract the first affidavit, which is similar to something Pohl had done in the lpast. In fact, Pohl’s
own paralegal, Jaimes, testified that on one occasion Pohl sent him toc Florida with a suitcase
containing $50,000 in cash to give to Santana in exchange for her agrseement not to turn Pohl into
the authorities. Jaimes testified that Santana would only get the money if she signed a statement
agreeing not to mention Pohl’s illegal activity. Jaimes testified that Santana signed the statement
and then he gave her the $50,000.
25. Santana’s deposition was even more detailed. Santana testified at her deposition
that the statement was an agreement for haer to keep quiet and not charge Pohl with any
wrongdoing, criminal or unethical conduct. Santana testified that Pohl paid her $50,000 in cash to
sign this statement, which was deliveered by Jaimes in three bags marked “trick or treat.” Very
symbolic given that Santana had fbeen tricked by Pohl into soliciting potential clients for him and
was now being treated the myoney she claimed was due under their agreement just to stay quiet.
Santana reiterated in hCer deposition that if she didn’t sign the gag agreement, she would not have
received the moneya from Pohl. Santana attempted to indicate on the agreement that she was
receiving $50,00f0 to keep quiet, but Jaimes told her Pohl demanded that she state she only received
nominal cUonsideration, like $100. Santana did not write the statement but “just signed it” because
she felt she was being “forced to sign” it while “under duress.”
26. Notably, nowhere in Santana’s December 19th affidavit does she state the testimony
in her former affidavit is untrue, only that she does not “agree with” it and that the affidavit is not
“reliable.” Although Santana states in her December 19th affidavit that her prior affidavit was
drafted by a lawyer, Santana testified in her deposition that the September 24th affidavit was
created voluntarily with her own “testimony.” Santana testified that, unlike with Pohl, she was not
paid and had never been promised any money to provide the testimony in the kSeptember 24th
affidavit. Santana reiterated to counsel for Pohl, Billy Shepherd, that she lwas there for her
deposition to tell the truth and would not be bullied by his questioning cor his efforts to confuse
her. s
27. Regardless, Santana’s sworn deposition testimony confirmed most, if not all of the
facts set forth in her initial affidavit and this deposition testimony has never been retracted.
Therefore, Santana confirmed that she was hired by Pohl to solicit auto accident cases, the first
one being an accident where a woman and her unborn child lost their lives. Santana was instructed
by Walker, who was instructed by Pohl, to perasonally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her
up to sue the tire manufacturer and, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000. Following
Walker and Pohl’s instructions, Santeana visited the funeral of the deceased and got the family to
feel comfortable with her. Althfough the mother was grieving, Pohl told Santana: “take no
prisoners, this is a cut throayt business, you get in there and you do whatever it takes to get this
client.” The solicitatioCn was successful after Pohl gave Santana $2,000 to “give to the client to
convince her into siagning over with the firm.”
28. f“Coach” Kenneth Talley (“Talley”) was another runner hired by Pohl and Walker
who solicUited over 20 auto accident cases for Pohl. Talley has sworn under oath that he was first
hired in relation to BP claims to find “folks that lost money due to the oil spill” and “sign them
up” and “get a fee for it.” Talley testified that he went to work “knocking on doors” looking for
potential claimants for Pohl and his partner in the BP litigation. Talley solicited and signed up
more than 800 BP claims for Pohl and his co-conspirators. Talley was paid between $75 and $350
for each BP client he signed up for Pohl and his partners.
29. Talley eventually switched to illegally soliciting auto accident victims for Pohl,
“calling on folks that had bad accidents.” Talley recalls that the first client he soklicited for Pohl
was in “the hospital in intensive care.” Talley carried with him up to $1,000 lto pay the accident
victims to “help them with problems” but paid the potential client only conce they “were signed
up.” Talley kept a list of all the auto accident cases he solicited so he scould keep track of the cases
that he was due a percentage from Pohl’s attorney’s fees on the back end after the case settled.
Talley also followed a checklist that instructed him to, among other things, bring flowers to the
initial hospital visit (but to spend no more than $50) and to offer the victims money but to “make
sure the funding schedule” from HH Texas “is filled out properly before releasing any cash.”
Talley would advise the victims that he had aattorneys who could help them such as Pohl. Talley
was paid a fee of $1,400 plus his expenses by Pohl, through Walker and/or one of his sham business
entities for any auto accident case he esolicited and referred to Pohl. On some cases, Talley was to
receive a portion of the fee paid tfo Helping Hands out of Pohl’s attorney’s fees. Talley discussed
with Pohl the “percentage yof settlements” he was to receive from the cases he solicited and
referred, and Pohl toldC Talley that the money was being placed in an “escrow account” for him.
When asked whethear Pohl knew he was getting paid to “contact vehicle accident victims,” Talley
responded, “thef money was coming from Edgar [Jaimes] who worked for him.” And, although
his paychUeck was from Walker’s company, “the funding came by way of Edgar [Jaimes].”
30. Talley testified that personally soliciting clients for Pohl became so frequent that
he began carrying blank contracts to each solicitation. Talley testified that he never recommended
any lawyers other than Pohl. However, Talley never told the clients that he was getting paid to
10
solicit them. Talley would present a contract to the potential client. If the client did not agree to
hire Pohl, the clients would not get the money. Talley testified that Jaimes and Dona (the operators
of HH Texas) would send him the money.
31. Talley further testified that both he and Pohl knew what they were doking was illegal.
In one instance, Talley was “run out of town” while soliciting clients for Pohl. Tlalley testified that
during the attempted solicitation he was told by a “lawyer or policeman”c that “it was against the
law what [he] was doing.” Talley mentioned this to Pohl and Pohl stold him “you’ve just got to
leave...some people you can’t help.” 
32. Walker was eventually indicted and sent to prison. Being afraid of where Walker’s
indictment might lead, Pohl and his lawyer partners stopped paying Walker and the other runners
the illegal fees as Pohl had promised. Therefore, Walker, Seymour, Ladner and Precision filed a
lawsuit in Mississippi Federal Court (“Fedearal Litigation”) against Pohl and his law partners
claiming they were owed millions of dollars in promised fees.
33. The above facts weree compiled during the Federal Litigation. Thereafter, more
than four hundred clients who fwere illegally solicited contacted the Kassab Law Firm and
requested Kassab to represeynt them in litigation against Pohl and his partners. Kassab filed
lawsuits on behalf of thCese clients in four different courts in Harris County. Additionally, due to
the egregiousness aof Pohl’s violation of the Texas Penal Code and violations of the Texas
Disciplinary Rufles of Professional Conduct, Kassab was required to notify the Texas State Bar
pursuant Uto Rule 8.03 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. Due to this
mandate, Kassab filed grievances against Pohl pursuant to Rule 8.03. some of Pohl’s clients also
prepared and filed grievances against Pohl arising out of his egregious conduct.
11
34. Because of these actions in representing clients against Pohl and the grievances
filed against Pohl, Pohl filed this retaliatory lawsuit against Kassab alleging conversion and theft
of trade secrets. Pohl alleges that Kassab and others stole his property and used it to bring lawsuits
and grievances against Pohl. Specifically, Pohl alleges in his petition that, “Kasksab is a lawyer
who specializes in suing other lawyers”1 and “Kassab solicited clients/proslpective clients [of
Pohl’s] to act as Plaintiffs . . . to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barcra t try and other claims.”2
Thus, Pohl has judicially admitted that he has brought his suit agasinst Kassab simply because
Kassab contacted illegally solicited clients to notify them of Pohl’s illegal conduct and to offer to
represent them in suits against Pohl.
35. The lawsuit is frivolous and without merit as it is based upon false pretenses and
was brought solely for retaliation and harassment purposes. Specifically, Kassab did not steal
anything from Pohl. Additionally, Kassab daid not purchase any stolen documents belonging to
Pohl. Nor did Kassab purchase anything belonging to Pohl. Moreover, Pohl is not the owner of
documents received, if any, from Preecision, Favre, Nicholson, Montague or anyone else. Lastly,
none of the documents and/or infofrmation that Kassab may have received from various individuals
or entities are Pohl’s trade syecrets as Pohl alleges. Furthermore, Pohl has failed to comply with
conditions precedent Cto filing his retaliatory suit for conversion and theft of trade secrets.
Specifically, Pohl haas never requested from Kassab, the return of his alleged property. Rather,
Pohl abandonedf all of the alleged documents he now accuses Kassab of stealing and/or purchasing.
Pohl abanUdoned all of the documents he alleges were stolen and/or purchased because he knew
that the documents were not his and that he had no ownership interest in the documents. If Pohl
actually believed the subject documents were his, he would have safeguarded the documents rather
1 Pohl Original Petition, p. 6
2 Id. at p. 6-7
12
than abandon them with a convicted felon (Walker) and his cohorts (Seymore and Ladner). Even
as of today, the subject documents sit in a warehouse, unattended and not safeguarded.
VIII
COUNTERCLAIM FOR CIVIL BARRATRY
36. Within the lawsuits that Kassab has filed against Pohl on behalf of his former clients
and/or potential clients, Pohl has judicially admitted that a claim for btarratry is not a legal
malpractice case. Pohl has also admitted that a because a claim fosr barratry is not a claim for
“legal malpractice,” the Discovery Rule does not apply to a barratry claim. Therefore, based upon
Pohl’s judicial admissions, the assignment of a barratry claime is permitted under Texas law.
37. Thus, based upon express assignments ouf interest given to Kassab, Kassab brings
counterclaims against Pohl and his law firm pursuannt to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,
Section 16.069. Section 16.069 provides: r
(a) If a counterclaim or cross claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence
that is the basis of an action,o a party to the action may file the counterclaim or
cross claim even though as a separate action it would be barred by limitations
on the date the party’s ancswer is required.
(b) The counterclaim o O r cross claim must be filed not later than the 30th day after
the date on whichy the party’s answer is required.
Kassab has been assigned barratry claims on behalf of 242 claimants. These counterclaims
are timely because athey were filed within 30 days of the date Kassab filed his original
answer. f i
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs respectfully pray that Plaintiffs recover nothing
on their claims and that the Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs recover on their claims against the
Plaintiffs and/or any Third-Party Defendants as follows:
13
i) actual and consequential damages;
ii) statutory damages;
iii) pre- and post-judgment interest;
iv) attorneys’ fees and costs; and
v) all other relief to which the Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs may ber justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW
FIRM
/ s / Lance sChristopher Kassab
LANCE C eHRISTOPHER KASSAB
Texasg State Bar No. 00794070
lancer@kassab.law
DBAVID ERIC KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 24071351
ydavid@kassab.law
i l1214 Elgin Street
a Houston, Texas 77004
Telephone: 713.522.7400
f Facsimile: 713.522.7410
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS,
i COUNTER-PLAINTIFFS LANCE CHRISTOPHER
O f KASSAB AND THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
C /s/ Murray Fogler
l  Murray Fogler
State Bar No. 07207300
mfogler@foglerbrar.com
f FOGLER, BRAR, O’NEIL AND GRAY, LLP
n 909 Fannin, Suite 1640
U Houston, Texas 77010
Telephone: 713-481-1010
Facsimile: 713-574-3224
ATTORNEY FOR THE KASSAB LAW
FIRM REGARDING PLAINTIFFS’
AFFIRMATIVE CLAIMS
14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has been
forwarded to all parties pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this the 13th day of May
2022.
/ s / Lance Christopher Kasesab
Lance Christopher KassCabl
15
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
David Kassab
Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law r
Envelope ID: 64509093
Status as of 5/16/2022 7:55 AM CST
Case Contacts r i
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com s5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com g5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Scott M.Favre scott@favrepa.com u 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Lance Kassab eserve@kassab.law  5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrar.cyom 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.caom 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Larry Newsom lnewsom@krcl.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Andrew Johnson ajohnson@othompsoncoe.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Andrew J. Sarne asarne@krcl.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Kathryn Laflin KLafflin@KRCL.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Dale Jefferson 10607900pjefferson@mdjwlaw.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Raul Herman Suazo 24003C021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Kevin Graham Cain 24a01l2371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Jason M.Ciofalo jason@ciofalolaw.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Harris Wells o hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Solace SouthwUick ssouthwick@reynoldsfrizzell.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
E. MarieJamison jamison@wrightclosebarger.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Jessica Z.Barger barger@wrightclosebarger.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
David R.Wade lawyerwade@hotmail.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT
Katie Budinsky kbudinsky@krcl.com 5/13/2022 6:22:10 PM SENT"