filing_id,date,doc_type,party,description,doc_type_detail,procedural_posture,chain,outcome,phase,filename,relief_requested,full_text
13,2018-11-19,MTD,Kassab,Supplemental TCPA Motion to Dismiss,Kassab's Supplement to TCPA Motion to Dismiss incorporating Favre co-defendants' statute of limitations arguments,"Filed November 19, 2018 in Cause No. 2018-58419, 189th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas. Supplemental briefing filed in support of Kassab's original TCPA Motion to Dismiss (filed October 24, 2018). Incorporates arguments from co-defendant Favre's separately filed TCPA motion. Addressed to the Honorable Judge Bill Burke.",TCPA-1,DENIED,Phase 1,2018-11-19_MTD_Kassab-Supp-TCPA_FILED.pdf,"Dismissal of Pohl's claims with prejudice; attorney's fees as previously requested in Kassab's original Motion to Dismiss; sanctions of a minimum of $50,000 against Pohl and his counsel Frizzell to deter future frivolous and retaliatory filings","11/19/2018 10:48 AM
Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 29125236
By: ARIONNE MCNEAL
Filed: 11/19/2018 10:48 AM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIAkL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS, LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND LANCE CHlRISTOPHER
KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAW FIRM’S SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION TO
DISMISS PURSUANT TO THE TEXAS CITIZENS PARTICcIPATION ACT
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE BILL BURKE: s
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab,
P.C. d/b/a/ The Kassab Law Firm (Kassab) files this, their Supplement to Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to the Texas Citizens Participation Act set forth in Chapter 27 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code.
This is a retaliatory lawsuit filed by Plaintiff, Michael A. Pohl and his law firm, Law
Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC (“ePohl”) that is based on, related to, and in response to the
rights to free speech, petition andf association, and should therefore be dismissed pursuant to the
Texas Citizens Participationy Act (the “TCPA”). Additionally, Pohl’s claims must be dismissed
pursuant to Chapter 2C7 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code because, even if Pohl
could establish a parima facie case on each element of each of his causes of action, the TCPA
provides that thfe trial court must still dismiss his claims if, based upon a preponderance of the
evidence,U each essential element of a valid defense is established. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE,
§ 27.005(d).
Kassab files this supplement to Kassab’s Motion to Dismiss simply to incorporate the
arguments and Exhibits outlined in paragraphs 35 through 42 of Scott Favre, Scott M. Favre
Public Adjuster, LLC and Precision Marketing Group, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss. The
arguments and Exhibits clearly show that Pohl’s claims were filed far beyond the statute of
limitations. Thus, not only is there a preponderance of the evidence establishing each essential
element of a statute of limitations defense, there is a plethora of evidence ekstablishing the
defense.1 l
Pohl is a seasoned lawyer who proclaims to be an outstanding cla t wyer.2 Moreover, his
lawyer, Jean Frizzell (Frizzell) holds himself out to the world, amongs other things, as a “Top 100
Super Lawyer” with outstanding credentials.3 It is unfathomable to assume that Pohl and his
“Super Lawyer” Frizzell could be so incompetent as to not know Pohl’s claims were dead on
arrival when filed. Therefore, the only plausible explanation for filing Pohl’s frivolous claims
were for retaliation purposes against Kassab for representing more than 400 clients against Pohl
in four separate lawsuits, as stated in Kassab’as Motion to Dismiss.
Thus, in addition to dismissing Pohl’s claims with prejudice, this Court should sanction
Pohl and Frizzell in an amount sufeficient to deter them from bringing similar actions and/or
filing similar frivolous pleadingsf in the future. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.009(a).
The Court should sanction Pyohl and Frizzell a minimum of fifty-thousand dollars ($50,000.00) in
addition to the attorneCy’s fees and costs requested in Kassab’s Motion to Dismiss so that Pohl
and Frizzell will fually understand that their actions have consequences and that the rule of law
has meaning. Tfo do otherwise, will simply reinforce lawyers like Pohl and Frizzell to continue
to harass,U create delay, increase the cost of litigation and create conflicts with impunity, and send
1 See Favre’s Motion to Dismiss, pp. 13-15 and Kassab’s Motion to Dismiss, pp. 26-28.
2 https://pohlatty.wordpress.com/
3 https://www.reynoldsfrizzell.com/attorneys/jean-frizzell/
a message to lawyers like Pohl and Frizzell that the rule of law does not matter, the practice of
law is simply a game and the truth is meaningless.
CONCLUSION & PRAYER
For the reasons stated herein, in addition to the reasons stated in Kasrsab’s Motion to
Dismiss, Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs Lance Christopher Kassab and The Kassab Law Firm
respectfully request the Court to grant their Motion to Dismiss Pursurant to the Texas Citizens
Participation Act and order that Plaintiffs take nothing in their claDims against Lance Christopher
Kassab and The Kassab Law Firm. In addition, the Courts should award Lance Christopher
Kassab and The Kassab Law Firm attorney’s fees as reqruested and sanction Plaintiffs and their
counsel in an amount sufficient to deter them from bringing similar frivolous and retaliatory
lawsuits in the future. l
o Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
y LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 00794070
C lance@kassab.law
 DAVID ERIC KASSAB
a Texas State Bar No. 24071351
c david@kassab.law
f 1214 Elgin Street
Houston, Texas 77004
U Telephone: 713.522.7400
Facsimile: 713.522.7410
ATTORNEYS FOR LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB AND THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has
been forwarded to all parties pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this the 19th day
of November, 2018.
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassakb
Lance Christopher Kassab r"
12,2018-11-07,OA,Kassab,3rd Amended Answer,"Kassab's Third Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaim, and Designation of Responsible Third Parties","Filed November 7, 2018 in Cause No. 2018-58419, 189th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas. The day after the Second Amended Answer. Third amended responsive pleading, further expanding counterclaims from 235 to 242 assigned barratry claimants. Adds additional detail to the Designation of Responsible Third Parties section regarding Shepherd's knowledge of Favre's document transfers to third parties prior to the Federal Litigation settlement.",PLEAD-1,N/A,Phase 1,2018-11-07_OA_Kassab-3rd-Amended-Answer-CC_FILED.pdf,"Plaintiffs take nothing; Kassab recovers on counterclaims and against third-party defendants including actual and consequential damages, statutory damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, attorneys' fees and costs, and all other just relief","11/7/2018 4:22 PM
Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 28873961
By: ARIONNE MCNEAL
Filed: 11/7/2018 4:22 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIrAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS, LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAW FIRM’S THIRD AMENDED
ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND COUNtTERCLAIM,
AND DESIGNATION OF RESPONSIBLE THIRD PARTIES
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: s
COMES NOW, Defendants, Lance Christopher Kgassab and Lance Christopher Kassab,
P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm and files this thBeir Third Amended Answer, Affirmative
Defenses, and Counterclaim, and Designation of Ryesponsible Third Parties, and would respectfully
show the Court as follows; a
RULfE 47 STATEMENT
The Kassab Defendants, in teheir capacity as Counter-Plaintiffs, seek monetary relief of
more than $1,000,000.00. f
y PARTIES
Plaintiff, Michael A. Pohl is an individual lawyer residing in Colorado.
Plaintiff, Laawl Offices of Michael A. Pohl is a law firm set up for the practice of law in
various states of ithe union, including Texas.
Defnendant, Scott Favre is a nonresident individual residing in Mississippi.
Defendant, Scott M. Favre, PA, LLC is a nonresident limited liability company located in
Mississippi.
Defendant, Precision Marketing Group, LLC is a nonresident limited liability company
located in Mississippi.
Defendant, F. Douglas Montague III is a nonresident individual residing in Mississippi.
Defendant, Montague, Pittman & Varnado, PA is a nonresident professional association
located in Mississippi.
Defendant, Tina Nicholson is an individual residing in Texas. k
Defendant, Baker Nicholson, LLP, d/b/a Baker Nicholson Law Firm ils a limited liability
partnership located in Texas. c
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab is an sindividual residing in Texas.
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm
is a professional corporation located in Texas.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
This matter is within the jurisdictional lnimits of this Court and Plaintiffs, Counter-
Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Officers of Michael A. Pohl (“Pohl”) and Defendants,
Counter-Plaintiffs, Lance Christopher Kassab (“LCK”) and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a
The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab, P.C.”) (collectively “Kassab”) are subject to the Court’s
jurisdiction. Venue is proper in thifs county because one or more of the defendants are residents of
this county and because a substantial part of the acts and/or omissions that form the basis of this
suit occurred in this county.
a l GENERAL DENIAL
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab generally denies all allegations made by Plaintiffs,
Counter-Denfendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl, and requests the Court
to require Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl to
carry their burden of proof regarding all allegations against Kassab.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab pleads the following affirmative defenses:
1. Statute of limitations
2. Justification.
3. Estoppel.
4. Waiver. t
5. Ratification. t
6. Release. 
7. Unclean hands. e
8. Contribution. u
9. Failure to mitigate damages. n
10. Lack of standing. r
11. Accord and Satisfaction.
12. Assumption of the Risk. 
13. Illegality/Criminal Actfs
14. First Amendment. 
15. Attorney Imm
unity.
16. In Pari Daellicto.
17. Res juidicata.
SPECIFIC DENIALS
Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs specifically deny that all conditions precedent regarding
Plaintiffs claims of conversion and theft of trade secrets have been performed or occurred prior to
Plaintiffs filing suit against Kassab.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
LCK is a lawyer practicing law with Kassab, P.C., a law firm in Houston, Texas focusing
solely on plaintiffs’ legal malpractice. Kassab filed four lawsuits on behalf of over four hundred
clients against Pohl (the “Harris County Lawsuits”). The main allegations against Pohl is civil
barratry and conspiracy to commit barratry, a third-degree felony in Texas. Pohl conspired with
his wife, Donalda Pohl (“Dona”), his paralegal, Edgar Jaimes (“Jaimes”t), and three runners in
Mississippi to illegally solicit clients on behalf of Pohl. Dona owns at sham lending company in
Texas called Helping Hands Financing, LLC (“HH Texas”). Jaimes runs the day-to-day operations
of HH Texas. The three runners are Scott Walker (“Walkere”), Steve Seymour (“Seymour”) and
Kirk Ladner (“Ladner”). The three runners own and ouperate two other sham companies called
Helping Hands Group, LLC and Helping Hands Finnancial, LLC (collectively “HH Mississippi”).
The three runners also owned Precision Markerting Group, LLC (“Precision”) which they sold to
Scott Favre and/or his companies (collectively “Favre”).
With regard to the clients obtained in the BP Litigation, Walker, Seymour and Ladner hired
other runners to literally go up anfd down streets knocking on doors to solicit clients on behalf of
Pohl for lawsuits against British Petroleum. Precision paid these runners as much as $300-$400
for every client they obtained. Pohl then paid Precision as much as $1,500 for every client
Precision referred tao lPohl. Pohl also offered and agreed to pay Walker, Seymour and Ladner a
percentage of hisi legal fees once the cases settled. This percentage was disguised as an hourly rate
of $1,500.00 per hour.
With regard to auto accidents, Pohl set up a “Google Alerts” to be notified whenever there
was a horrific rollover crash. Pohl would then send his runners to hospitals, homes and funerals
to contact the families of the injured. The runners would use their sham companies, “Helping
Hands” to act as though they were genuinely there to help these victims. The runners would falsely
tell these victims that they were there to help the victims’ in their time of need in the form of
money for burial services, food, clothing, lodging, etc. In reality, the runners’ contacted these
families under false pretenses with the sole objective to take advantage of these victims and their
families while they were emotionally distraught and not thinking straight in ordker to lock them
into contracts which allowed the runners to select a lawyer for the victim. Tlhe victims and the
family members were encouraged to hire Pohl and told they could not gect the money unless they
agreed to hire Pohl. Pohl would pay the runners as much as $7,5s00 per client and Pohl also
promised the runners as much as 33% of Pohl’s legal fees on the back end when the case settled.
Additionally, HH Texas would pay HH Mississippi $2,500 for every client referred to HH Texas
to “loan” money to these victims and their family. Pohl used this procedure as an attempt to put
an additional layer between him and the actual runners.
Pohl also helped the runners form anaother sham entity, the GM Settlement Verification
Team (“GM Team”) after General Motors, Inc. issued a recall on cars due to faulty ignition
switches which effected the safe opereation of the airbag systems on vehicles. Thus, the GM Team
was designed to look official as iff it was part of General Motors. The conspiracy was to form an
official looking entity as if GyM was contacting people who had been harmed when airbags failed
to deploy in relation toC the ignition recall. In reality, this was just another sham company used to
trick clients into hiaring Pohl. Again, Pohl would pay Walker and Ladner, through their sham
entity, the GM Tfeam, a fee for every client it referred to Pohl, in addition to a percentage of fees
on the baUck end.
Pohl knew what he was doing was illegal barratry. Accordingly, he knowingly formed
entities that he perceived would insulate him from liability. In fact, Walker testified that although
he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or “marketing money” it was “clear to [him] it was
barratry.” In fact, Walker considered himself and his company “a pass-through for barratry
money.” All total, Walker, Ladner and Precision received over $5 million in “barratry pass-through
money” from Pohl and other lawyers to solicit potential clients with claims, both auto-accident
victims and those involved in the BP Deepwater Horizon litigation. k
One of the runners hired by Pohl and Walker to solicit illegally solicit cllients on behalf of
Pohl was Magdalena Santana (“Santana”). In her September 24, 2016 afcfidavit, Santana testified
that Pohl sent her on “dozens and dozens of car wreck cases all ovser the country.” Pohl would
email Santana the link of news coverage he obtained through Google Alerts depicting an accident
and asked her “to go to the victim or the victim’s family and try to get them to sign up with him.”
Santana swore under oath that Pohl agreed to pay her “$5,000 per case that [she] signed, plus a
percentage of his attorney’s fees.” Santana was advised by Pohl to “be persistent even if the family
... rejected [her].” Santana was instructed by Paohl to “approach the victims and their families while
they were vulnerable, in the emergency room, their hospital rooms or at the funerals.” Pohl told
Santana that minorities “were especieally vulnerable since they tended not to know that the law
prohibited barratry.” Accordingf to Pohl, they “were easier to sign up.”
Pohl would give Sanytana “money to give to the victims or their families” but would give
the money to the client C“if they agreed to sign a Pohl representation contract.” Pohl advised Santana
that the money was aa “foot in the door” but instructed Santana not to mention anything about hiring
a lawyer “untilf after they agreed to take the money.” “If the client agreed to hire Pohl, then
[Santana]U was to have the client sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.” Pohl would then give Santana
the money to pay the client “from his own Helping Hands company.” When Santana questioned
this, Pohl told Santana that it “was illegal for him to pay [her] directly for cases, and that’s why
the money had to go through some company.”
Pohl and/or his co-conspirators had Santana retract this affidavit through a December 19,
2017 affidavit. This purported retraction was likely the result of Pohl paying Santana to provide
testimony, which is something he has done in the past. In fact, Pohl’s own paralegal, Jaimes,
testified that on one occasion Pohl sent him to Florida with a suitcase filled with $k50,000 in cash
to give to Santana in exchange for her signing a statement for him. Jaimes tesltified that Santana
would only get the money if she signed the statement for Pohl. Jaimes testcified that Santana signed
the signed the statement and got the money. s
Santana went into more detail about this in her deposition. Santana testified that the
statement was an agreement for her to keep quiet and not charge Pohl with any wrongdoing,
criminal or unethical conduct. Santana testified that Pohl paid her $50,000 in cash to sign this
statement, which was delivered by Jaimes in three bags marked “trick or treat.” Very symbolic
given that Santana had been tricked by Pohla into soliciting clients for him and was now being
treated the money she claimed was due under their agreement just to stay quiet. Santana reiterated
in her deposition that if she didn’t sigen the gag agreement, she would not receive the money from
Pohl. Santana attempted to indicafte on the agreement that she was receiving $50,000 to keep quiet,
but Jaimes told her Pohl deymanded that she state she only received nominal consideration, like
$100. Santana did not wCrite the statement but “just signed it” because she felt she was being “forced
to sign” it while “unader duress.”
Notablyf, nowhere in Santana’s December 19th affidavit does she state the testimony in her
former afUfidavit is untrue, only that she does not “agree with” it and that the affidavit is not
“reliable.” Although Santana states in her December 19th affidavit that her prior affidavit was
drafted by a lawyer, Santana testified in her deposition that the September 24th affidavit was
created voluntarily with her own “testimony.” Santana testified that, unlike with Pohl, she was not
paid and had never been promised any money to provide the testimony in the September 24th
affidavit. Santana reiterated to counsel for Pohl, Billy Shepherd, that she was there in her
deposition to tell the truth and would not be bullied by his questioning or his efforts to confuse
her. k
Regardless, Santana’s sworn deposition testimony confirmed most of tlhe facts set forth in
her initial affidavit and this deposition testimony has never been rectracted. There, Santana
confirmed that she was hired by Pohl to solicit auto accident cases, thse first one being an accident
where a woman and her unborn child lost their lives. Santana was instructed by Walker, who was
instructed by Pohl, to personally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her up to sue the tire
manufacturer and, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000. Santana visited the funeral of the
deceased and got the family to feel comfortable with her. Although the mother was grieving, Pohl
told Santana: “take no prisoners, this is a cut tharoat business, you get in there and you do whatever
it takes to get this client.” The solicitation was successful after Pohl gave Santana $2,000 to “give
to the client to convince her into signeing over with the firm.”
“Coach” Kenneth Talleyf (“Talley”) was another runner hired by Pohl and Walker who
solicited over 20 auto accideynt cases for Pohl. Talley has sworn under oath that he was first hired
in relation to BP claimCs to find “folks that lost money due to the oil spill” and “sign them up” and
“get a fee for it.” Taalley testified that he went to work “knocking on doors” looking for potential
claimants for Pofhl and his partner in the BP litigation. Talley solicited and signed up for Pohl and
his co-coUnspirators more than 800 BP claims. Talley was paid between $75 and $350 for each BP
client he signed up for Pohl and his partners.
Talley eventually switched to soliciting auto accident victims, “calling on folks that had
bad accidents.” Talley recalls that the first client he solicited was in “the hospital in intensive care.”
Talley carried with him up to $1,000 to pay the accident victims to “help them with problems” but
only once they “were signed up.” Talley kept a list of all the auto accident cases he solicited so he
could keep track of the cases that he was due a fee on the back end after the case settled. Talley
also followed a checklist that instructed him to, among other things, bring flowekrs to the initial
hospital visit (but to spend no more than $50) and to offer the victims moneyl but to “make sure
the funding schedule” from HH Texas “is filled out properly before relecasing any cash.” Talley
would advise the victims that he had attorneys who could help them ssuch as Pohl. Talley was paid
a fee of $1,400 plus his expenses by Pohl, through Walker, for any auto accident case he solicited
and referred to Pohl. On some cases, Talley was to receive a portion of the fee paid to Helping
Hands out of Pohl’s attorney’s fees. Talley discussed with Pohl the “percentage of settlements”
he was to receive from the cases he solicited and referred, and Pohl told Talley that the money was
being placed in an “escrow account” for him. aWhen asked whether Pohl knew he was getting paid
to “contact vehicle accident victims,” Talley responded, “the money was coming from Edgar
[Jaimes] who worked for him.” Ande, although his paycheck was from Walker’s company, “the
funding came by way of Edgar [Jfaimes].”
Talley testified that pyersonally soliciting clients for Pohl became so frequent that he began
carrying blank Pohl coCntracts to each solicitation. Talley testified that he never recommended any
lawyers other than Paohl. However, Talley never told the clients that he was getting paid to solicit
them. Talley wofuld present a Pohl contract to the potential client. If the client did not agree to hire
Pohl, the Uclients would not get the money. Talley testified that Jaimes and Dona (the operators of
HH Texas) would send him the money.
Talley further testified that both he and Pohl knew what they were doing was illegal. In
one instance, Talley was “run out of town” while soliciting clients for Pohl. Talley testified that
during the attempted solicitation he was told by a “lawyer or policeman” that “it was against the
law what [he] was doing.” Talley mentioned this to Pohl and Pohl told him “you’ve just got to
leave...some people you can’t help.”
Walker was eventually indicted and sent to prison. Thereafter, Pohl and hisk lawyer partners
refused to pay Walker and the other runners the ill gained fees as Pohl had prolmised. Therefore,
Walker, Seymour, Ladner and Precision filed a lawsuit in Mississippi cFederal Court (“Federal
Litigation”) against Pohl and his law partners claiming they were sowed millions of dollars in
promised fees. 
The above facts were compiled during the Federal Litigation. Thereafter, more than four
hundred clients who were illegally solicited contacted the Kassab Law Firm and requested Kassab
to represent them in litigation against Pohl and his partners. Kassab filed lawsuits on behalf of
these clients in four different courts in Harrisa County. Additionally, due to the egregiousness of
Pohl’s violation of the Texas Penal Code and violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct, Kassab was reequired to notify the Texas State Bar pursuant to Rule 8.03 of
the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Pfrofessional Conduct. Thus, Kassab filed grievances against Pohl
pursuant to Rule 8.03. Pohl’ys clients are also preparing and filing grievances against Pohl arising
out of his blatant barraCtry.
Because of athese actions in representing clients against Pohl and the grievances filed
against Pohl, Pofhl has filed a retaliatory lawsuit against the Kassab alleging conversion and theft
of trade sUecrets. Pohl alleges that Kassab and others stole his property and are using it to bring
lawsuits and grievances against Pohl. Specifically, Pohl alleges in his petition against Kassab that,
“Kassab is a lawyer who specializes in suing other lawyers”1 and “Kassab solicited
1 Pohl Original Petition, p. 6
10
clients/prospective clients [of Pohl’s] to act as Plaintiffs . . . to bring cases against Pohl for alleged
barratry and other claims.”2 Thus, Pohl has judicially admitted that he has brought his suit against
Kassab because Kassab contacted Pohl’s clients and filed suit against Pohl on behalf of these
clients. k
COUNTERCLAIM FOR CIVIL BARRATRY
Within the lawsuits that Kassab has filed against Pohl on behalf oft his former clients and
potential clients, Pohl has judicially admitted that a claim for barratryt is not a legal malpractice
case. Pohl has also admitted that a claim for barratry is not a claim for “legal malpractice,” and
thus, the discovery rule does not apply to a barratry claim. Teherefore, based upon Pohl’s judicial
admissions, the assignment of a barratry claim is permituted under Texas law.
Thus, based upon express assignments onf interest given to Kassab, Kassab brings
counterclaims against Pohl and his law firm purrsuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,
Section 16.069. Section 16.069 provides:
(a) If a counterclaim or cross claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence
that is the basis of an acction, a party to the action may file the counterclaim or
cross claim even thougfh as a separate action it would be barred by limitations
on the date the partyO’s answer is required.
(b) The counterclaipm or cross claim must be filed not later than the 30th day after
the date on which the party’s answer is required.
Kassab has been assaiglned barratry claims on behalf of 242 claimants. These counterclaims
are timely becauise they were filed within 30 days of the date Kassab filed his original
answer.
2 Id. at p. 6-7
11
DESIGNATION OF RESPONSIBLE THIRD PARTIES
A responsible third party is someone who caused or contributed to cause a portion of the
Plaintiff’s alleged damages. Defendant/Counter-Plaintiffs, Kassab, designates George W. (Billy)
Shepherd, Scott Walker, Steve Seymour and Kirk Ladner as responsible third-parties as these
individuals are the sole or proximate cause of any damages alleged by Pohl. Billy Shepherd
(“Shepherd”) represented Pohl in the Federal Litigation filed against Pohtl by Walker, Seymour,
Ladner and Precision. Shepherd knew that Walker, Seymour and Latdner had sold Precision to
Favre and knew that Walker, Seymour and Ladner had legally transferred Precision’s assets and
property to Favre. Shepherd further knew that Favre and/ore his counsel had given documents to
third parties, including Kassab and others prior to negotiauting a settlement in the Federal Litigation.
The documents, assets and all other property that Pnrecision owned that were transferred to Favre
are the subject of Pohl’s lawsuit herein. r
Shepherd negotiated the settlement in the Federal Litigation between Walker, Seymour,
Ladner, Favre and Precision on the one hand and Pohl on the other hand. If Pohl now complains
in this lawsuit that he was entiftled to the return and/or destruction of said assets/property,
Shepherd, as Pohl’s attorney in the Federal Litigation wholly failed to protect Pohl by ensuring
that all subject property was gathered from all third parties and returned to Pohl or destroyed.
Shepherd’s amlalfeasance was either negligent or intentional. Since Shepherd knew that the
subject assets/prioperty were a point of contention in the Federal Litigation and knew that the
assets/property could be used by outside third parties to garner clients as Pohl alleges, Shepherd
may have intentionally failed to protect Pohl’s interest so that he could secure future lucrative
employment for himself and his law firm for years to come by continuing to represent Pohl in the
current state court litigation after the subject property was used to garner clients to sue Pohl as
Pohl alleges. Thus, Shepherd is the sole or proximate cause of Pohl’s alleged damages.
12
Walker, Seymour and Ladner sold Precision to Favre. Walker, Seymour and Ladner also
transferred the subject assets/property of Precision to Favre. Walker testified under oath that he,
Seymour and Ladner, through Precision, owned all the assets/property, including computers and
documents that were transferred to Favre. Walker also testified that he had thek legal right and
authority, through Precision, to sell and transfer all the subject assets/property tol Favre. Moreover,
Walker, Seymour and Ladner certified that they owned all of the subjectc property/assets and had
authority to transfer all of the subject property/assets to Favre. If Wsalker, Seymour and Ladner
did not have the legal right to transfer all the subject assets/property to Favre, then they are the
sole or proximate cause of Pohl’s alleged damages. Therefore, if Pohl has been damaged in any
way as he alleges, Shepherd, Walker, Seymour and Ladner are the sole proximate cause of his
damages.
PRAYERa FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs respectfully pray that Plaintiffs recover nothing
on their claims and that the Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs recover on their claims against the
Plaintiffs and/or any Third-Party Dfefendants as follows:
i) actual and consequential damages;
ii) statutory doamages;
iii) pre- and post-judgment interest;
iv) attoirneys’ fees and costs; and
v) fall other relief to which the Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs may be justly entitled.
13
Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 0079407k0
lance@kassab.law r
DAVID ERIC KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law c
1214 Elgin Street r
Houston, Texas s77004
Telephone: 71D3.522.7400
Facsimile: 713.522.7410
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS,
COUNTErR-PLAINTIFFS LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB AND THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
CERTIFICAaTE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has been
forwarded to all parties pursuant to thoe Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this the 7th day of
November 2018. e
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
Lance Christopher Kassab
14"
11,2018-11-06,OA,Kassab,2nd Amended Answer,"Kassab's Second Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaim, and Designation of Responsible Third Parties","Filed November 6, 2018 in Cause No. 2018-58419, 189th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas. The day after the reply brief on the TCPA motion. This is the second amended responsive pleading, expanding the counterclaims from 150 to 235 assigned barratry claimants and adding a Designation of Responsible Third Parties (Billy Shepherd, Scott Walker, Steve Seymour, Kirk Ladner). Addressed to the Honorable Judge of said Court.",PLEAD-1,N/A,Phase 1,2018-11-06_OA_Kassab-2nd-Amended-Answer-CC_FILED.pdf,"Plaintiffs take nothing; Kassab recovers on counterclaims and against third-party defendants including actual and consequential damages, statutory damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, attorneys' fees and costs, and all other just relief","11/6/2018 2:08 PM
Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 28831260
By: ARIONNE MCNEAL
Filed: 11/6/2018 2:08 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIrAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS, LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAW FIRM’S SECOND AMENDED
ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND COUNtTERCLAIM,
AND DESIGNATION OF RESPONSIBLE THIRD PARTIES
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: s
COMES NOW, Defendants, Lance Christopher Kgassab and Lance Christopher Kassab,
P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm and files this theBir Second Amended Answer, Affirmative
Defenses, and Counterclaim, and Designation of Ryesponsible Third Parties, and would respectfully
show the Court as follows; a
RULfE 47 STATEMENT
The Kassab Defendants, in teheir capacity as Counter-Plaintiffs, seek monetary relief of
more than $1,000,000.00. f
y PARTIES
Plaintiff, Michael A. Pohl is an individual lawyer residing in Colorado.
Plaintiff, Laawl Offices of Michael A. Pohl is a law firm set up for the practice of law in
various states of ithe union, including Texas.
Defendant, Scott Favre is a nonresident individual residing in Mississippi.
Defendant, Scott M. Favre, PA, LLC is a nonresident limited liability company located in
Mississippi.
Defendant, Precision Marketing Group, LLC is a nonresident limited liability company
located in Mississippi.
Defendant, F. Douglas Montague III is a nonresident individual residing in Mississippi.
Defendant, Montague, Pittman & Varnado, PA is a nonresident professional association
located in Mississippi.
Defendant, Tina Nicholson is an individual residing in Texas. k
Defendant, Baker Nicholson, LLP, d/b/a Baker Nicholson Law Firm ils a limited liability
partnership located in Texas. c
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab is an sindividual residing in Texas.
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm
is a professional corporation located in Texas.
JURISDICTION ANDB VENUE
This matter is within the jurisdictional lnimits of this Court and Plaintiffs, Counter-
Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Officers of Michael A. Pohl (“Pohl”) and Defendants,
Counter-Plaintiffs, Lance Christopher Kassab (“LCK”) and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a
The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab, P.C.”) (collectively “Kassab”) are subject to the Court’s
jurisdiction. Venue is proper in thifs county because one or more of the defendants are residents of
this county and because a substantial part of the acts and/or omissions that form the basis of this
suit occurred in this county.
a l GENERAL DENIAL
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab generally denies all allegations made by Plaintiffs,
Counter-Denfendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl, and requests the Court
to require Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl to
carry their burden of proof regarding all allegations against Kassab.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab pleads the following affirmative defenses:
1. Statute of limitations
2. Justification.
3. Estoppel.
4. Waiver. t
5. Ratification. t
6. Release. 
7. Unclean hands. e
8. Contribution. u
9. Failure to mitigate damages. n
10. Lack of standing. r
11. Accord and Satisfaction.
12. Assumption of the Risk. 
13. Illegality/Criminal Actfs.
14. First Amendment. 
15. Attorney Immunity.
16. In Pari Daellicto.
17. Res juidicata.
SPECIFIC DENIALS
Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs specifically deny that all conditions precedent regarding
Plaintiffs claims of conversion and theft of trade secrets have been performed or occurred prior to
Plaintiffs filing suit against Kassab.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
LCK is a lawyer practicing law with Kassab, P.C., a law firm in Houston, Texas focusing
solely on plaintiffs’ legal malpractice. Kassab filed four lawsuits on behalf of over four hundred
clients against Pohl (the “Harris County Lawsuits”). The main allegations against Pohl is civil
barratry and conspiracy to commit barratry, a third-degree felony in Texas. Pohl conspired with
his wife, Donalda Pohl (“Dona”), his paralegal, Edgar Jaimes (“Jaimes”t), and three runners in
Mississippi to illegally solicit clients on behalf of Pohl. Dona owns at sham lending company in
Texas called Helping Hands Financing, LLC (“HH Texas”). Jaimes runs the day-to-day operations
of HH Texas. The three runners are Scott Walker (“Walkere”), Steve Seymour (“Seymour”) and
Kirk Ladner (“Ladner”). The three runners own and ouperate two other sham companies called
Helping Hands Group, LLC and Helping Hands Finnancial, LLC (collectively “HH Mississippi”).
The three runners also owned Precision Markerting Group, LLC (“Precision”) which they sold to
Scott Favre and/or his companies (collectively “Favre”).
With regard to the clients obtained in the BP Litigation, Walker, Seymour and Ladner hired
other runners to literally go up anfd down streets knocking on doors to solicit clients on behalf of
Pohl for lawsuits against British Petroleum. Precision paid these runners as much as $300-$400
for every client they obtained. Pohl then paid Precision as much as $1,500 for every client
Precision referred tao lPohl. Pohl also offered and agreed to pay Walker, Seymour and Ladner a
percentage of hisi legal fees once the cases settled. This percentage was disguised as an hourly rate
of $1,500.00 per hour.
With regard to auto accidents, Pohl set up a “Google Alerts” to be notified whenever there
was a horrific rollover crash. Pohl would then send his runners to hospitals, homes and funerals
to contact the families of the injured. The runners would use their sham companies, “Helping
Hands” to act as though they were genuinely there to help these victims. The runners would falsely
tell these victims that they were there to help the victims’ in their time of need in the form of
money for burial services, food, clothing, lodging, etc. In reality, the runners’ contacted these
families under false pretenses with the sole objective to take advantage of these victims and their
families while they were emotionally distraught and not thinking straight in ordker to lock them
into contracts which allowed the runners to select a lawyer for the victim. Tlhe victims and the
family members were encouraged to hire Pohl and told they could not gect the money unless they
agreed to hire Pohl. Pohl would pay the runners as much as $7,5s00 per client and Pohl also
promised the runners as much as 33% of Pohl’s legal fees on the back end when the case settled.
Additionally, HH Texas would pay HH Mississippi $2,500 for every client referred to HH Texas
to “loan” money to these victims and their family. Pohl used this procedure as an attempt to put
an additional layer between him and the actual runners.
Pohl also helped the runners form anaother sham entity, the GM Settlement Verification
Team (“GM Team”) after General Motors, Inc. issued a recall on cars due to faulty ignition
switches which effected the safe opereation of the airbag systems on vehicles. Thus, the GM Team
was designed to look official as iff it was part of General Motors. The conspiracy was to form an
official looking entity as if GyM was contacting people who had been harmed when airbags failed
to deploy in relation toC the ignition recall. In reality, this was just another sham company used to
trick clients into hiaring Pohl. Again, Pohl would pay Walker and Ladner, through their sham
entity, the GM Tfeam, a fee for every client it referred to Pohl, in addition to a percentage of fees
on the baUck end.
Pohl knew what he was doing was illegal barratry. Accordingly, he knowingly formed
entities that he perceived would insulate him from liability. In fact, Walker testified that although
he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or “marketing money” it was “clear to [him] it was
barratry.” In fact, Walker considered himself and his company “a pass-through for barratry
money.” All total, Walker, Ladner and Precision received over $5 million in “barratry pass-through
money” from Pohl and other lawyers to solicit potential clients with claims, both auto-accident
victims and those involved in the BP Deepwater Horizon litigation. k
One of the runners hired by Pohl and Walker to solicit illegally solicit cllients on behalf of
Pohl was Magdalena Santana (“Santana”). In her September 24, 2016 afcfidavit, Santana testified
that Pohl sent her on “dozens and dozens of car wreck cases all ovser the country.” Pohl would
email Santana the link of news coverage he obtained through Google Alerts depicting an accident
and asked her “to go to the victim or the victim’s family and try to get them to sign up with him.”
Santana swore under oath that Pohl agreed to pay her “$5,000 per case that [she] signed, plus a
percentage of his attorney’s fees.” Santana was advised by Pohl to “be persistent even if the family
... rejected [her].” Santana was instructed by Paohl to “approach the victims and their families while
they were vulnerable, in the emergency room, their hospital rooms or at the funerals.” Pohl told
Santana that minorities “were especieally vulnerable since they tended not to know that the law
prohibited barratry.” Accordingf to Pohl, they “were easier to sign up.”
Pohl would give Sanytana “money to give to the victims or their families” but would give
the money to the client C“if they agreed to sign a Pohl representation contract.” Pohl advised Santana
that the money was aa “foot in the door” but instructed Santana not to mention anything about hiring
a lawyer “untilf after they agreed to take the money.” “If the client agreed to hire Pohl, then
[Santana]U was to have the client sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.” Pohl would then give Santana
the money to pay the client “from his own Helping Hands company.” When Santana questioned
this, Pohl told Santana that it “was illegal for him to pay [her] directly for cases, and that’s why
the money had to go through some company.”
Pohl and/or his co-conspirators had Santana retract this affidavit through a December 19,
2017 affidavit. This purported retraction was likely the result of Pohl paying Santana to provide
testimony, which is something he has done in the past. In fact, Pohl’s own paralegal, Jaimes,
testified that on one occasion Pohl sent him to Florida with a suitcase filled with $k50,000 in cash
to give to Santana in exchange for her signing a statement for him. Jaimes tesltified that Santana
would only get the money if she signed the statement for Pohl. Jaimes testcified that Santana signed
the signed the statement and got the money. s
Santana went into more detail about this in her deposition. Santana testified that the
statement was an agreement for her to keep quiet and not charge Pohl with any wrongdoing,
criminal or unethical conduct. Santana testified that Pohl paid her $50,000 in cash to sign this
statement, which was delivered by Jaimes in three bags marked “trick or treat.” Very symbolic
given that Santana had been tricked by Pohla into soliciting clients for him and was now being
treated the money she claimed was due under their agreement just to stay quiet. Santana reiterated
in her deposition that if she didn’t sigen the gag agreement, she would not receive the money from
Pohl. Santana attempted to indicafte on the agreement that she was receiving $50,000 to keep quiet,
but Jaimes told her Pohl deymanded that she state she only received nominal consideration, like
$100. Santana did not wCrite the statement but “just signed it” because she felt she was being “forced
to sign” it while “unader duress.”
Notablyf, nowhere in Santana’s December 19th affidavit does she state the testimony in her
former afUfidavit is untrue, only that she does not “agree with” it and that the affidavit is not
“reliable.” Although Santana states in her December 19th affidavit that her prior affidavit was
drafted by a lawyer, Santana testified in her deposition that the September 24th affidavit was
created voluntarily with her own “testimony.” Santana testified that, unlike with Pohl, she was not
paid and had never been promised any money to provide the testimony in the September 24th
affidavit. Santana reiterated to counsel for Pohl, Billy Shepherd, that she was there in her
deposition to tell the truth and would not be bullied by his questioning or his efforts to confuse
her. k
Regardless, Santana’s sworn deposition testimony confirmed most of tlhe facts set forth in
her initial affidavit and this deposition testimony has never been rectracted. There, Santana
confirmed that she was hired by Pohl to solicit auto accident cases, thse first one being an accident
where a woman and her unborn child lost their lives. Santana was instructed by Walker, who was
instructed by Pohl, to personally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her up to sue the tire
manufacturer and, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000. Santana visited the funeral of the
deceased and got the family to feel comfortable with her. Although the mother was grieving, Pohl
told Santana: “take no prisoners, this is a cut tharoat business, you get in there and you do whatever
it takes to get this client.” The solicitation was successful after Pohl gave Santana $2,000 to “give
to the client to convince her into signeing over with the firm.”
“Coach” Kenneth Talleyf (“Talley”) was another runner hired by Pohl and Walker who
solicited over 20 auto accideynt cases for Pohl. Talley has sworn under oath that he was first hired
in relation to BP claimCs to find “folks that lost money due to the oil spill” and “sign them up” and
“get a fee for it.” Taalley testified that he went to work “knocking on doors” looking for potential
claimants for Pofhl and his partner in the BP litigation. Talley solicited and signed up for Pohl and
his co-coUnspirators more than 800 BP claims. Talley was paid between $75 and $350 for each BP
client he signed up for Pohl and his partners.
Talley eventually switched to soliciting auto accident victims, “calling on folks that had
bad accidents.” Talley recalls that the first client he solicited was in “the hospital in intensive care.”
Talley carried with him up to $1,000 to pay the accident victims to “help them with problems” but
only once they “were signed up.” Talley kept a list of all the auto accident cases he solicited so he
could keep track of the cases that he was due a fee on the back end after the case settled. Talley
also followed a checklist that instructed him to, among other things, bring flowekrs to the initial
hospital visit (but to spend no more than $50) and to offer the victims moneyl but to “make sure
the funding schedule” from HH Texas “is filled out properly before relecasing any cash.” Talley
would advise the victims that he had attorneys who could help them ssuch as Pohl. Talley was paid
a fee of $1,400 plus his expenses by Pohl, through Walker, for any auto accident case he solicited
and referred to Pohl. On some cases, Talley was to receive a portion of the fee paid to Helping
Hands out of Pohl’s attorney’s fees. Talley discussed with Pohl the “percentage of settlements”
he was to receive from the cases he solicited and referred, and Pohl told Talley that the money was
being placed in an “escrow account” for him. aWhen asked whether Pohl knew he was getting paid
to “contact vehicle accident victims,” Talley responded, “the money was coming from Edgar
[Jaimes] who worked for him.” Ande, although his paycheck was from Walker’s company, “the
funding came by way of Edgar [Jfaimes].”
Talley testified that pyersonally soliciting clients for Pohl became so frequent that he began
carrying blank Pohl coCntracts to each solicitation. Talley testified that he never recommended any
lawyers other than Paohl. However, Talley never told the clients that he was getting paid to solicit
them. Talley wofuld present a Pohl contract to the potential client. If the client did not agree to hire
Pohl, the Uclients would not get the money. Talley testified that Jaimes and Dona (the operators of
HH Texas) would send him the money.
Talley further testified that both he and Pohl knew what they were doing was illegal. In
one instance, Talley was “run out of town” while soliciting clients for Pohl. Talley testified that
during the attempted solicitation he was told by a “lawyer or policeman” that “it was against the
law what [he] was doing.” Talley mentioned this to Pohl and Pohl told him “you’ve just got to
leave...some people you can’t help.”
Walker was eventually indicted and sent to prison. Thereafter, Pohl and hisk lawyer partners
refused to pay Walker and the other runners the ill gained fees as Pohl had prolmised. Therefore,
Walker, Seymour, Ladner and Precision filed a lawsuit in Mississippi cFederal Court (“Federal
Litigation”) against Pohl and his law partners claiming they were sowed millions of dollars in
promised fees. 
The above facts were compiled during the Federal Litigation. Thereafter, more than four
hundred clients who were illegally solicited contacted the Kassab Law Firm and requested Kassab
to represent them in litigation against Pohl and his partners. Kassab filed lawsuits on behalf of
these clients in four different courts in Harrisa County. Additionally, due to the egregiousness of
Pohl’s violation of the Texas Penal Code and violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct, Kassab was reequired to notify the Texas State Bar pursuant to Rule 8.03 of
the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Pfrofessional Conduct. Thus, Kassab filed grievances against Pohl
pursuant to Rule 8.03. Pohl’ys clients are also preparing and filing grievances against Pohl arising
out of his blatant barraCtry.
Because of athese actions in representing clients against Pohl and the grievances filed
against Pohl, Pofhl has filed a retaliatory lawsuit against the Kassab alleging conversion and theft
of trade sUecrets. Pohl alleges that Kassab and others stole his property and are using it to bring
lawsuits and grievances against Pohl. Specifically, Pohl alleges in his petition against Kassab that,
“Kassab is a lawyer who specializes in suing other lawyers”1 and “Kassab solicited
1 Pohl Original Petition, p. 6
10
clients/prospective clients [of Pohl’s] to act as Plaintiffs . . . to bring cases against Pohl for alleged
barratry and other claims.”2 Thus, Pohl has judicially admitted that he has brought his suit against
Kassab because Kassab contacted Pohl’s clients and filed suit against Pohl on behalf of these
clients. k
COUNTERCLAIM FOR CIVIL BARRATRY
Within the lawsuits that Kassab has filed against Pohl on behalf oft his former clients and
potential clients, Pohl has judicially admitted that a claim for barratryt is not a legal malpractice
case. Pohl has also admitted that a claim for barratry is not a claim for “legal malpractice,” and
thus, the discovery rule does not apply to a barratry claim. Teherefore, based upon Pohl’s judicial
admissions, the assignment of a barratry claim is permituted under Texas law.
Thus, based upon express assignments onf interest given to Kassab, Kassab brings
counterclaims against Pohl and his law firm purrsuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,
Section 16.069. Section 16.069 provides:
(a) If a counterclaim or cross claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence
that is the basis of an acction, a party to the action may file the counterclaim or
cross claim even thougfh as a separate action it would be barred by limitations
on the date the partyO’s answer is required.
(b) The counterclaipm or cross claim must be filed not later than the 30th day after
the date on which the party’s answer is required.
Kassab has been assaiglned barratry claims on behalf of 235 claimants. These counterclaims
are timely becauise they were filed within 30 days of the date Kassab filed his original
answer.
2 Id. at p. 6-7
11
DESIGNATION OF RESPONSIBLE THIRD PARTIES
A responsible third party is someone who caused or contributed to cause a portion of the
Plaintiff’s alleged damages. Defendant/Counter-Plaintiffs, Kassab designates George W. (Billy)
Shepherd, Scott Walker, Steve Seymour and Kirk Ladner as responsible third-parties as these
individuals are the sole or proximate cause of any damages alleged by Pohl. Billy Shepherd
(“Shepherd”) represented Pohl in the Federal Litigation filed against Pohtl by Walker, Seymour,
Ladner and Precision. Shepherd knew that Walker, Seymour and Latdner had sold Precision to
Favre and knew that Walker, Seymour and Ladner had legally transferred Precision’s assets and
property to Favre. The assets and property that were transferered to Favre are the subject of Pohl’s
lawsuit herein. u
Shepherd negotiated a settlement in the Fnederal Litigation between Walker, Seymour,
Ladner, Favre and Precision on the one hand anrd Pohl on the other hand. If Pohl now complains
in this lawsuit that he was entitled to the return and/or destruction of said assets/property,
Shepherd, as Pohl’s attorney in the Federal Litigation wholly failed to protect Pohl by ensuring
that all subject property was gathfered from all third parties and returned to Pohl or destroyed.
Shepherd’s malfeasance was either negligent or intentional. Since Shepherd knew that the subject
assets/property were a point of contention in the Federal Litigation and knew that the
assets/property coualdl be used by outside third parties to garner clients as Pohl alleges, Shepherd
may have intentiionally failed to protect Pohl’s interest so that he could secure future lucrative
employment for himself and his law firm for years to come by continuing to represent Pohl in the
current state court litigation after the subject property was used to garner clients to sue Pohl as
Pohl alleges. Thus, Shepherd is the sole or proximate cause of Pohl’s alleged damages.
Walker, Seymour and Ladner sold Precision to Favre. Walker, Seymour and Ladner also
transferred the subject assets/property to Favre. Walker testified under oath that he, Seymour and
12
Ladner, through Precision, owned all the assets/property, including computers and documents that
were transferred to Favre. Walker also testified that he had the legal right, through Precision, to
sell and transfer all the subject assets/property to Favre. Moreover, Walker, Seymour and Ladner
certified that they owned all of the subject property/assets and had authority to traknsfer all of the
subject property/assets to Favre. If Walker, Seymour and Ladner did not havle the legal right to
transfer all the subject assets/property to Favre, then they are the sole or pcroximate cause of Pohl’s
alleged damages. Therefore, if Pohl has been damaged in anyway as hse alleges, Shepherd, Walker,
Seymour and Ladner are the sole proximate cause of his damages.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs respeuctfully pray that Plaintiffs recover nothing
on their claims and that the Defendants, Counter-nPlaintiffs recover on their claims against the
Plaintiffs and/or any Third-Party Defendants asr follows:
i) actual and consequential damages;
ii) statutory damages;
iii) pre- and post-judgment interest;
iv) attorneys’ fees aOnd costs; and
v) all other relief to which the Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs may be justly entitled.
13
Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 0079407k0
lance@kassab.law r
DAVID ERIC KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law c
1214 Elgin Street r
Houston, Texas s77004
Telephone: 71D3.522.7400
Facsimile: 713.522.7410
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS,
COUNTErR-PLAINTIFFS LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSBAB AND THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
CERTIFICAaTE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has been
forwarded to all parties pursuant to thoe Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this the 6th day of
November 2018. e
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
Lance Christopher Kassab
14"
10,2018-11-05,OBJ,Kassab,Objections to Pohl’s TCPA response evidence,Kassab's Objections to Plaintiffs' Response Evidence and Reply in Support of TCPA Motion to Dismiss,"Filed November 5, 2018 as a combined objection and reply brief in further support of Kassab's TCPA Motion to Dismiss. Responds to Pohl's November 1, 2018 opposition, challenging the admissibility of Pohl's evidence and arguing the commercial speech exception does not apply. Filed in Cause No. 2018-58419, 189th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas. Addressed to the Honorable Judge Bill Burke.",TCPA-1,N/A,Phase 1,2018-11-05_OBJ_Kassab-Objections-to-Pohl-Response_FILED.pdf,Grant the TCPA Motion to Dismiss; strike Shepherd affidavit and all attached documents; strike Pohl's declaration paragraphs 3-9; order Plaintiffs take nothing; award reasonable and necessary attorney's fees and costs as required by the statute,"11/5/2018 8:03 AM
Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 28779207
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 11/5/2018 8:03 AM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIAkL DISTRICT
THE KASSAB DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTlIFFS’
RESPONSE AND REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE BILL BURKE: r
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs Lance Christopher Kassab Dand Lance Christopher Kassab,
P.C. d/b/a/ The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab”) file this reply asnd objections in further support of
their Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to the Texas Citizens Parrticipation Act.
OBJECTIONS
A. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A (Affidavait of Billy Shepherd)
Kassab objects to Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A, the alleged affidavit of Billy Shepherd
(“Shepherd”) and all exhibits attacheed thereto. Specifically, Shepherd’s affidavit fails as an
affidavit on its face because itf is not based upon “personal knowledge” or state that the
statements therein are “true yand correct”, thus perjury does not attach, and therefore, the alleged
affidavit is nothing moCre than a statement by Pohl’s “interested” counsel. An affidavit must be
based on the affianta’s personal knowledge and must state that the facts in it are true. Humphreys
v. Caldwell, 88
8f S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex. 1994); see TEX. R. EVID. 602 (evidence must show the
witness hUas personal knowledge); Radio Station KSCS v. Jennings, 750, S.W.2d 760, 761-62
(Tex. 1988). An affidavit must contain direct and unequivocal statements that, if false, would be
grounds for perjury. Burke v. Satterfield, 525 S.W.2d 950, 955 (Tex. 1975); Hall v. Stephenson,
919 S.W.2d 454, 466 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ denied).
Additionally, Shepherd’s statement appears to attempt to prove up business records, but
this attempt fails. To introduce a business record through a witness, a party must prove the
following: (1) the record is a memorandum, report, other compilation of data; (2) the witness is
the custodian or another qualified witness; (3) the record was made from informaktion transmitted
by a person with knowledge of the facts; (4) the record was made at or near thle time of the acts,
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses appearing on it; (5) the recordc was made as part of the
regular practice of that business activity; and (6) the record was kepst in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity. See TEX. R. EVID. 101 (h)(4),
803 (6)(A)-(6)(D); Freeman v.
American Motorists Ins., 53 S.W.3d 710, 715 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001 no pet.).
The alleged affidavit fails in all respects.
The alleged affidavit also fails to conform with Texas Rules of Evidence, 902 (10), and
therefore, fails to establish the exhibits as baus r iness records.1 Specifically, the alleged affidavit
fails to adequately show that Shepherd is the custodian of records or otherwise establish how he
knows what each particular documeent is other than he is a lawyer for Pohl. This does not
establish the requisite “knowledgfe.” See id. Therefore, the documents attached as exhibits are
nothing more than hearsay yupon hearsay. TEX. R. EVID. 902 (10). Moreover, Shepherd has
failed to provide the Crequisite notice of his filing. Id. For these reasons, the “affidavit” of
Shepherd and all doacuments attached must be struck from the record.
B. Pflaintiffs’ Exhibit B (Declaration of Michael A. Pohl).
KUassab objects to Plaintiffs’ Exhibit B, the sworn declaration of Michael A. Pohl,
Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. The statements contained in this declaration are conclusory and
constitute no evidence at all. Conclusory affidavits do not raise fact issues and are incompetent
evidence as a matter of law. Ryland Group, Inc. v. Hood, 924 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. 1996);
1 Response, at Exhibit A.
Stephens v. Precision Drilling Oilfield Servs. Corp., No. 01-11-00326-CV, 2013 Tex. App.
LEXIS 5700, 2013 WL 1928797, at *19 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 9, 2013, no pet.)
(mem. op.). “A conclusory statement is one that does not provide the underlying facts to support
the conclusion.” Dolcefino v. Randolph, 19 S.W.3d 906, 930 (Tex. App. – Houskton [14th Dist.]
2000, pet. denied). Moreover, an affidavit is conclusory when it expresses “la factual inference
without stating the underlying facts on which the inference is based.” E.Ic. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 259 S.W.3d 800, 809 (Tex. App.—Houston [1sts Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
Pohl’s declaration consists of nothing but conclusory statements. Kassab objects to
Paragraph 3, which states: “I was and am the rightful owner of the confidential, privileged and
trade secrete information that Kassab obtained from Scott Favre and Tina Nicholson on which
this suit is based.”2 This statement is conclusory because Pohl fails to describe what the
purported confidential information or trade seacrets are or explain how he is the rightful owner of
this information as opposed to Scott Favre or his entities who have claimed to be the owner of
the marketing lists provided to Kassaeb. Moreover, Pohl fails to explain how the information even
constitutes a trade secret. See Gafme Sys. v. Forbes Hutton Leasing, Inc., No. 02-09-00051-CV,
2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 4098y, at *76 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth, May 26, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(statement that the softCware “constitutes a trade secret” was conclusory and not proper evidence).
Kassab objeacts to Paragraph 4 which states, “I did not provide consent for Kassab to
exercise dominifon and control over the property, and his exercise of that dominion and control is
wrongfulU.”3 Pohl does not provide any factual support for this statement or explain why Kassab’s
exercise and control over lists he obtained rightfully from Favre or his counsel is wrongful. See
2 Response, Exhibit B, ¶ 3.
3 Response, Exhibit B, ¶ 4.
McCollum v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., 481 S.W.3d 352, 362 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no
pet.) (conclusory statements in affidavit that conduct is “allegedly wrongful” is insufficient to
raise fact issue that conduct alleged is in fact wrongful).
Kassab objects to Paragraph 5 which states, “I have incurred damagesk as a result of
Kassab’s conversion of my property, through at the very least, by thel exposure of the
confidential materials and information, which results in a loss of the cintrinsic value to me as
trade secrets and confidential materials.”4 Again, Pohl does not prosvide any factual support for
the conclusion that he had been damaged. Pohl does not state what the alleged trade secrets or
confidential materials are or explain how he is allegedly damaged by Kassab’s alleged
misappropriation of the material. See Celtic Props., L.C. v. Cleveland Reg'l Med. Ctr., L.P., No.
09-13-00464-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 8051, 2015 WL 4600661, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont July 31, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.)a (statement that property was “damaged” as a result
of defendant’s conduct was insufficient as a matter of law); Chapa v. Stonehaven Dev., Inc., No.
13-13-00030-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LeEXIS 10159, at *9 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi, Aug. 15,
2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (statefment “we lost the profits we would have made” is conclusory
because it provides no undeyrlying facts to support the conclusion); see also Fraud-Tech, Inc. v.
Choicepoint, Inc., No.C 02-05-150-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 3181, 2006 WL 1030189, at *5
(Tex. App.—Fort Waorth Apr. 20, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (finding affidavit testimony that
appellants weref damaged because of the alleged conversion conclusory when affiant did “not
supply faUcts underlying its conclusions”).
Kassab objects to Paragraph 6 which states “Before they were stolen, I took substantial
measures to maintain the materials and information that Kassab obtained from Scott Favre and
4 Response, Exhibit B, ¶ 5.
Tina Nicholson as confidential and protected them as valuable trade secrets. I strictly limited
access to them and by maintaining physical copies under lock and key.”5 These statements are
conclusory. Pohl does not describe what “substantial” measures he allegedly took to maintain
information obtained by Kassab, what the information obtained by Kassab even kis, or state how
the information obtained by Kassab is allegedly a “valuable trade secret.” Polhl makes no effort
to describe how he “strictly limited” access to his alleged confidential icnformation given that it
freely ended up in the hands of Favre, who claimed ownerships of the marketing material
provided to Kassab. 
Kassab objects to Paragraph 7 which states, “The stolen materials and information have
independent economic value from not being generally known to, and not readily being
ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the
disclosure or use of the information.”6 This staat r ement is conclusory as Pohl does not provide any
facts to support this statement. Pohl does not describe how any materials were purportedly
stolen, what the materials even are, ehow the materials are not known to the general public, or
how the materials allegedly provifde economic value to Pohl.
Kassab objects to pyaragraph 8 which states “Kassab’s misappropriation of my trade
secrets has caused meC damages in both the form of actual loss of the value of my confidential
materials and of unajust enrichment to Kassab as a result of his wrongful misappropriation.”7 This
statement is confclusory. Pohl provides no facts to explain how Kassab allegedly misappropriated
the tradeU secrets, how the information even constitutes a trade secret, or how the loss of the
5 Response, Exhibit B, ¶ 6.
6 Response, Exhibit B, ¶ 7.
7 Response, Exhibit B, ¶ 8.
information allegedly caused Pohl damages or unjustly enriched Kassab. See Plas-Tex, Inc. v.
Jones, NO. 03-99-00286-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 3188, at *18 (Tex. App. – Austin, May 18,
2000, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“conclusory statements regarding the value of intangible assets
such as unidentified trade secrets” was insufficient to support claim of damages)k. The purported
loss to Pohl of any alleged misappropriation of trade secrets is also speculativel.
Finally, Kassab objects to Paragraph 9 which states “In the sacme ways that Kassab’s
conversion and misappropriation of my confidential information injusred me, I was injured by the
conspiracy to commit those torts.”8 This is a conclusory statement within a conclusory statement.
Pohl does not describe the purported conversion or misappropriation and makes no effort to
provide any facts supporting the alleged conspiracy claims. This statement is insufficient as a
matter of law. See Methodist Hosp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 329 S.W.3d 510, 530 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (caoncluding that affiant’s “bare assertion” that the
conduct of the opposing party was the “causal connection” of its damages was conclusory and
“substantively defective” and nothinge more than affiant’s subjective opinion).
f II
REPLY
A. Any documentation that Kassab obtained from Favre and/or his
counselC, Tina Nicholson come from Precision, not Pohl.
Pohl arguesa that Kassab converted and stole his files. However, the evidence is clear that
any documents fKassab obtained from Favre or Nicholson came into Favre’s possession when he
purchasedU Precision Marketing Group. Precision owned the documents, not Pohl. Even
assuming arguendo that the documents were somehow part of Pohl’s legal files, which Kassab
8 Response, Exhibit B, ¶ 9.
denies, Pohl still would not own the files because those files would belong to the client. Texas
Rule of Professional Conduct, 1.15 (d) specifically provides:
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent
reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable
notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrenkdering
papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding anyr advance
payments of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain paplers relating
to the client to the extent permitted by other law only if such retention will not
prejudice the client in the subject matter of the representation. c
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L. CONDUCT 1.15 (d) (emphasis added).s
The Rule cited above is clear and concise. Moreover, the courts enforcing this Rule are
clear and unambiguous. The Texas Supreme Court has stated, “The attorney is the agent of the
client, and the work product generated by the attorney in representing the client belongs to the
client.” In Re Kenneth George-consolidated with- In Re Epic Holdings, Inc., 28 S.W.3d 511,
516 (Tex. 2000); see also Hebisen v. State, 6a15 r S.W.2d 866, 868 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1981, no writ). Moreover, everything in the entire file having to do with a clients’
representation, i.e. attorney notes, elegal memoranda, etc., etc., etc. belongs to the client.
Resolution Trust Corp. v. H--, Pf.C., 128 FRD 647, (N.D. Tex. 1989) (holding that the attorney
may retain a copy of the filey at the attorney’s expense, however, the original file belongs to the
client); Nolan v. FCoreman, 665 F.2d 738, reh’g denied, 671 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir.
1982). Furthermorea, the contents of a client’s file must be turned over to the client promptly
upon request. Hfebisen, 615 S.W.2d at 868. The failure to do so is willful and malicious, and
constituteUs dishonorable conduct. Smith v. State, 490 S.W.2d 902, 909 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Corpus Christi 1972, writ ref’d, n.r.e.). Retention of documents is only permitted to secure a
debt if and only if such retention will not prejudice the client in the subject matter of the
representation. Smith, 490 S.W.2d at 910; TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L. CONDUCT 1.15 (d).
Therefore, Pohl lacks standing to sue Kassab for conversion or theft of trade secrets because Pohl
never owned any of the subject documents.
B. The commercial exception does not apply.
Pohl argues in his response that the TCPA does not apply to this case bekcause this case
falls under the statutory exemption for commercial speech found in sectioln 27.010(b). This
section states: c
[The TCPA] does not apply to a legal action brought againsst a person primarily
engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or servDices, if the statement or
conduct arises out of the sale or lease of goods, services, or an insurance product,
insurance services, or a commercial transaction in whisch the intended audience is
an actual or potential buyer or customer.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.010(b). “The par
ty asserting the exemption bears the burden
of proving its applicability.” See Castleman v. Internet Money Ltd., 546 S.W.3d 684, 688 (Tex.
2018); Schimmel v. McGregor, 438 S.W.3d 8a47, 857 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet.
denied). 
Pohl contends that that his ceonversion and theft of trade secrets claims fall within this
exemption because (1) Kassab wfas primarily engaged in the business of selling legal services;
(2) the claims against Kassayb arose from Kassab’s conduct in allegedly purchasing Pohl’s list of
clients and former clCients for the purpose of soliciting those clients; (3) Kassab’s conduct
occurred in the coaurse of delivering his legal services; and (4) the intended audience of his
conduct was a pfotential buyer, the clients.9 This is not accurate.
InU determining whether some of Pohl’s claims fall within the commercial-speech
exemption, the Court must examine the evidence, which in this case consists of Pohl’s own
pleadings. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.006. Pohl alleges that Favre and his counsel
9 Response, p. 11.
stole from him information about his clients and prospective clients and “secretly sold Pohl’s
stolen confidential information and property to Kassab” and that Kassab “knew that the
information and property that [he was] purchasing was stolen and not Favre’s and/or [his
counsel’s] to sell.”10 Pohl alleges that “Using the stolen confidential informatiokn and property
that he knowingly purchased, Kassab solicited those clients/prospective clientsl to act as plaintiffs
… to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and other claims.”11 Pco t hl does not allege that
the agreement between Kassab and Favre effectuated a sale of legasl services or that any of the
conduct for which he sues Kassab arises out of the sale of services that Kassab is “primarily
engaged” in.
“The exemption expressly provides that the TCPA does not apply to a legal action
brought against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or
services, but only if the statement or conducat arises out of the sale or lease of goods, services,
or an insurance product, insurance services, or a commercial transaction.” Castleman, 546
S.W.3d at 688 (emphasis added) (inteernal quotations omitted). The Texas Supreme Court opined
in Castleman that the exception fcan only apply when “(1) the defendant was primarily engaged
in the business of selling ory leasing goods, (2) the defendant made the statement or engaged in
the conduct on which Cthe claim is based in the defendant's capacity as a seller or lessor of those
goods or services, a(3) the statement or conduct at issue arose out of a commercial transaction
involving the kifnd of goods or services the defendant provides, and (4) the intended audience of
the statemUent or conduct were actual or potential customers of the defendant for the kind of
goods or services the defendant provides. Id. Pohl has failed to prove establish each of these
elements.
10 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, ¶ 21.
11 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, ¶ 22.
More specifically, even if the alleged conduct at issue (i.e., conduct amounting to
conversion or theft of trade secretes) “arose out of” Kassab’s alleged theft of trade secrets or
conversion of files, as Pohl alleges, Pohl has nevertheless failed to establish that this type of
conduct is a “commercial transaction involving” legal services or any other type kof services that
Kassab is primarily engaged in. See id. In other words, Pohl has not establlished that Kassab
“engaged in the conduct on which the claim is based in the defendant'cs capacity as a seller or
lessor of those goods or services.” Id. Stated another way, Kassab sis not primarily engaged in
purchasing marketing lists and client files, which is the business which Pohl alleges these claims
arise. Similarly, with respect to the fourth element of the commercial exception, Pohl has failed
to demonstrate that the intended audience of Kassab’s alleged conduct (i.e., the conversion and
theft of trade secrets) were actual or potential customers of Kassab for the kind of goods or
services that Kassab is “primarily engaged” ina. See id. Consequently, Pohl has therefore failed to
establish that his conversion and theft of trade secret claims fall within the commercial-speech
exemption. e
f III
CONCLUSION & PRAYER
For the reasons set forth herein and in the initial motion, Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs
Lance Christopher Kassab and The Kassab Law Firm respectfully request the Court to grant this
Motion to Dismiscs Pursuant to the Texas Citizens Participation Act and order that Plaintiffs take
nothing in their claims against Lance Christopher Kassab and The Kassab Law Firm and award
reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs as required by the statute.
10
Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 0079407k0
lance@kassab.law r
DAVID ERIC KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law c
1214 Elgin Street r
Houston, Texas s77004
Telephone: 71D3.522.7400
Facsimile: 713.522.7410
ATTORNEYS FOR LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB rAND THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
CERTIFICAaTE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has
been forwarded to all parties pursuant too the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this the 5th day of
November, 2018. e
f / s / Lance Christopher Kassab
Lance Christopher Kassab
11"
5,2018-10-24,DEPO,Kassab,Pohl deposition filed by Kassab (TCPA exhibit),"Excerpts from the Oral Videotaped Deposition of Michael A. Pohl taken May 15, 2018 in Cheatham v. Pohl (Cause No. 2017-41110), filed as Exhibit 23 in connection with Kassab's TCPA motion in Pohl v. Kassab","Deposition taken in a related case (Cheatham v. Pohl, Cause No. 2017-41110, 55th Judicial District, Harris County) on May 15, 2018, subsequently filed as an exhibit (Exhibit 23) in the Pohl v. Kassab TCPA proceedings. The deposition was taken by Lance Kassab as counsel for the Cheatham plaintiffs, with Pohl represented by Billy Shepherd. Only pages 85-93 and 318-319 are included in this exhibit.",TCPA-1,N/A,Phase 1,2018-10-24_DEPO_Pohl-Deposition_FILED.pdf,,"E
»<
H
I
BIT
23
iA

Michael Pohl
5/15/2018
CAUSE NO. 2017-41110

MARK KENTRELL CHEATHAM, ) IN THE DISTRICT COURT
SR., AND LUELLA MILLER, )
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS )
WRONGFUL DEATH ) N=
BENEFICIARIES OF LADONNA ) oe
CHEATHAM, DESTINY CHEATHAM) )
AND MARKUS CHEATHAM, )
DECEASED ) , &

) Ss
vs. ) HARRIS counry,, TEXAS

) ©)
MICHAEL A. POHL, DONALDA ) &
POHL, LAW OFFICE OF ) @
MICHAEL POHL, PLLC, ROBERT) @
AMMONS AND THE AMMONS LAW ) Le)
FIRM, LLP ) STR gMDICIAL DISTRICT

ORAL VIDEOTAPED pebosrz0n OF
MICHAEL BS OHL
May Be 2018
©)

ORAL VIDEOTAPED BRPOSTTION OF MICHAEL A. POHL,
produced as a witedee at the instance of the
Plaintiff and ox sworn, was taken in the
above-styled and numbered cause on May 15, 2018, from
9:26 a.m. to 5:05 p-m., before Laurie Carlisle,
Certified ‘Shorthand Reporter in and for the State of

SS
Texas, Feported by computerized machine shorthand, at
the 6éfices of Shepherd Prewett, 770 South Post Oak
Lane, Suite 420, Houston, Texas, pursuant to the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and the provisions
stated on the record or attached hereto.
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1 malicious act by an unethical lawyer, and I don't
2 think anything should be -- further should be
3 submitted by you.
4 Q. Okay. And you think I'm an unethical ee
a
5 lawyer? G
6 A. Yes. You stole my files. You robed me.
7 You tried to destroy my practice. So I believe
8 you should submit any more materials, popVicularty
9 false affidavits that have been retracted by the
10 witnesses who made them and othe erifiably false
11 accusations. And you've soticiead my clients like
12 Mr. Cheatham, and you've told hin lies to get him to
13 sue me. LV
14 Q. Okay. And you State on the record under
15 oath, subject to pesiey, that I stole your files,
16 | right? O
17 A. You and your co-counsel and your team of
18 thieves. ou
19 OR. L. KASSAB: Objection, nonresponsive.
20 Q. ‘< that a yes to my question?
21 os MR. SHEPHERD: Form.
22 A. That's what I said it was.
23 Q. I just need a yes or no, sir. Is thata
24 yes?
25 MR. SHEPHERD: Form.
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1 A. Read it back.
2 Q. I just want to make a clear record so that
3 I have a clear record, sir. So you stated under oath
4 that I stole your files, correct? AS
XA
5 A. Read back the answer that I gave, and f'11
6 see if I made a mistake. &
7 Q. Sir, I'm asking if that was vou testinony
8 You don't remember whether or not it was”
9 MR. SHEPHERD: Form. &
10 A. If the question is “ge steal my files
11 and rob my office, the answer ist at you and your
12 co-counsel and your crew obi ay office, stole my
13 clients' names, contacted. ily clients and told them
14 lies to initiate suits éRinst me.
15 Q. Okay. How, did I steal your files, sir?
16 Did I break into house?
17 A. You broke into my law office.
18 Q. I did personally?
19 A. You and your crew.
20 Q. Sind when did I do that?
21 ae I don't know the exact date, but I believe
22 it was in 2014 when you robbed me.
23 Q. I robbed you in 2014?
24 A. Yes, sir.
25 Q. And where did I rob you at?
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1 A. Mississippi.

2 Q. And what location did I rob you at?

3 A. Our Gulfport, Mississippi office at the

4 time. I do not remember the street address where I

5 had my office. )

6 Q. So I broke into your office and etoile your

7 stuff in 2014 at your Gulfport, Wissiecipet office,

8 right? &

9 A. You and your crew. &
10 Q. Well, let's just talk seat me right now.
11 A. No, I can't talk aborts Poo without your
12 co-counsel and your crew peciins you're one and the
13 same. LV
14 Q. Well, I want @ talk about me, sir.
15 A. You ask ta siatione, I'll give you the
16 truthful answers. ()
17 Q. That's\ what I just said. So you're telling
18 all the folks in this room that I stole -- that I
19 broke into.(your office and I stole your files,
20 correct {And you're stating that under oath, right?
21 a I'm saying that you, your co-counsel and
22 your crew robbed me, hacked my computers, stole my
23 client names and then solicited my clients with
24 material omissions to get them to sue me which, as a
25 consequence, caused them to suffer damages in their

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1 own case and not get the money they were entitled to.

2 MR. L. KASSAB: Objection, nonresponsive.

3 Q. The question was that you're telling all

4 the folks in this room that I broke into your office

5 and stole your files, correct? )

6 A. I believe that was the question you asked

7 previously, to which I answered. S&

8 Q. Is that a yes?

9 MR. SHEPHERD: Form. &
10 A. I believe that was the quastion you asked
11 previously, to which I gave rowel full and complete
12 answer. SS
13 Q. Sir, I need to gat a clear record on this
14 so there's no gray area (later when -- okay, that's
15 | why I'm asking. SF
16 A. Sure. chive no problem answering.
17 Q. I just heed to know -- I just want to make
18 sure that I daderstand what you're saying. You're
19 telling everybody in this room that I personally
20 broke iS your Gulfport office in Mississippi
21 someting in 2014 and stole your files, right?
22 A. I didn't say you as a person. I said you
23 and your crew, and I made that clear in each answer.
24 And your co-counsel, by the way.
25 Q. So I'm asking about me. Is it your

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1 testimony that I personally broke into your office?
2 A. I wasn't there, and I didn't see who
3 actually broke in and I didn't see who hacked my
4 computer. So I'm not a witness to it. I just know
5 the event occurred. ©
6 Q. Okay. Did you file a police report?
SS
7 A. No. °@
8 Q. Did you file a grievance witty the State Bar
. @
9/ against me? @
©
10 A. I have not yet done woo
11 Q. Have you contacted the a's office?
12 A. I did speak to a District Attorney.
©)
13 Q. Which one? LV
14 A. It happened tebe a retired District
15 Attorney in Oklaho (and I spoke to him about the
16 | feasibility of riiyy charges.
17 Q. Okay. My question is a little different.
18 Have you talked to the Harris County District
19 Attorney regarding the fact that you claim I stole
AS)
20 your files?
©
21 AS I claim that you and your co-counsel and
22 your crew robbed my office, hacked my computers,
23 solicited my clients and, to be clear, and I have not
24 talked to the Harris County District Attorney.
25 MR. L. KASSAB: Objection, nonresponsive
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1 to everything other than ""I have not talked to the
2 Harris County District Attorney.""
3 Q. Have you talked to the Attorney General's
4 office in Texas regarding your allegation and &
5 testimony, sworn testimony today that I have stole
6 your files, broke into your office in cultpoxe,
7 Mississippi in 2014 and stole your files2©
8 MR. AKERS: Objection, rome”
9 MR. SHEPHERD: Form. &
10 Q. And everything else roped I did.
11 MR. SHEPHERD: roms”
12 MR. COLLMER: objdction, form.
13 Q. Have you done nat?
14 A. I have not tarda to the Attorney General
15 about the fact that yon, your co-counsel and your
16 crew robbed me, née my computers, solicited my
17 clients to turn them against me, and done various
18 things associated with the theft of my client files.
19 OR. L. KASSAB: Objection, nonresponsive
20 other eneer 1 have not talked to the Attorney
21 Genexd.
22 Q. Okay. So this happened approximately four
23 years ago, correct?
24 A. I don't know the date it happened because
25 nobody told me we're about to go into your office and
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1 steal your files.
2 Q. Well, did you go into your office and find
3 out that your office had been ransacked?
4 A. No, I did not because we closed the office,
5 and it was in connection with the closing of the)
6 office that the thefts occurred. And they ait didn't
7 occur at once. Some of them continued into as late
8 as probably 2016, maybe '15. I don't a) because
9 they did not communicate to me that sey were robbing
10 me. ©
11 MR. L. KASSAB: Obj Vion, nonresponsive.
12 Q. And who is the cxoi Ghat you're talking
13 about? Give me specific nines, please.
14 A. Well, it would Be you, it would be Tina
15} Nicholson. It wong. Doug Montague. It would be
16|} June Allison. It (would be Kirk Ladner and Scott
17 Walker. At least that group of thieves.
18 Q. oKdy I got me, Tina Nicholson, June
19 Allison, scott Walker, Doug Montague and who else?
20 Is that ie?
21 ac I believe I mentioned Kirk Ladner and Scott
22 Walker.
23 Q. I got Scott Walker.
24 A. Oh, I'm sorry. Scott Favre, who paid --
25 who paid Scott Walker and Kirk Ladner, from what I
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1 found in some of their private documents that I got,
2 $85,000 to rob my office and then possibly some more
3 money to actually hack my computers and sell to you
4 or your co-counsel my passwords so you could rob
5 of my electronic information as well. )
6 Q. So this happened approximately rout years
7 ago, and it's your testimony that you cia ot contact
8 the police department to file a report an
9 Mississippi, correct? Cn
10 MR. SHEPHERD: Form. ©
11 A. It happened esmnaneiing Sout four years ago
12 and continuing onward, and ye correct, I did not
13 contact the Mississippi police.
14 Q. Right. And y&SYhaven't filed a police
15 report anywhere, rigge
16 A. I have filed a police report.
17 Q. Why not?
18 A. I don't know. I haven't thought about it.
19 I prayed about it and hoped that, you know, a just
20 result Goi ensue. But I did not go to the police.
21 oe You just decided you'd take matters in your
22 own hands?
23 MR. SHEPHERD: Form.
24 A. I have not taken matters in my own hands.
25 I wanted to spend time to reflect on it before taking
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1 action because I didn't want to do anything that was

2 precipitous.

3 Q. And why haven't you gone to the State Bar

4 to report my theft activities? NS

a

5 A. I simply haven't. ©

6 Q. And why haven't you talked to the Mazris

7 County DA's office about the fact that Lina thief,

8 as you state?

9 A. Well, these events didn't secur in Texas,
10 so they would have nothing to do it anyway. So
11 why would I go talk to them? K
12 Q. Why didn't you go an to the DA -- the
13 County DA's office in Gulgport to report my thievery?
14 A. I would have, Gat I was preoccupied because
15 the criminals involyed in this were extorting money .
16 from me and they wanting millions of dollars for
17 the return of my stolen goods and I was so upset and
18 so preoccupiéd,- that I neglected to do that.

19 Q. ‘And what evidence do you have -- please
20 tell the Judge, jury, State Bar, DA's office and
21 overstody else out there that you have regarding your
22 testimony under oath today that somebody sold me your
23 passwords so that I could hack into your computers?
24 MR. SHEPHERD: Form.
25 A. I haven't marshaled all the evidence and,

Omni Litigation

713-864-4443

Michael Pohl
5/15/2018
318
1 CAUSE NO. 2017-41110
2 MARK KENTRELL CHEATHAM, ) IN THE DISTRICT COURT
SR., AND LUELLA MILLER, )
3 INDIVIDUALLY AND AS )
WRONGFUL DEATH ) N=
4 BENEFICIARIES OF LADONNA ) oe
CHEATHAM, DESTINY CHEATHAM) )
5 AND MARKUS CHEATHAM, )
DECEASED ) ey
é ) S
7/ vs. ) HARRIS COUNTY) TEXAS
)
8 MICHAEL A. POHL, DONALDA ) &
POHL, LAW OFFICE OF ) @
9 MICHAEL POHL, PLLC, ROBERT) Ke)
AMMONS AND the AMMONS LAW ) es
10 FIRM, LLP ) S57H JUDICIAL DISTRICT
11 6
S
12 REPORTER ' 6sr IF ICATE
ORAL VIDEOTAPED DEPOSTSTON OF MICHAEL A. POHL
13 May 15, 2018
14 @
»>O
15 I, Laurie capers Certified Shorthand Reporter
16 in and for the ss e of Texas, hereby certify:
17 That the witness, MICHAEL A. POHL, was duly
18 sworn and that the transcript of the deposition is a
na)
19 true record of the testimony given by the witness;
20 That the deposition transcript was duly
21 submitted on —t—“‘C‘éECO «CME ~WiittNl@SSSS OF tO thee
22 attorney for the witness for examination, signature,
23 and return to me by .
24 That pursuant to information given to the
25 deposition officer at the time said testimony was
Omni Litigation
713-864-4443

Michael Pohl
5/15/2018
319
1 taken, the following includes all parties of record
2 and the amount of time used by each party at the time
3 of the deposition:
4 Mr. Lance Kassab (5h59m) NS
Attorney for Plaintiff NZ)
5 Mr. Billy Shepherd (0hOm) ©
Attorney for Defendant Michael Poh}.
6 Mr. Brock Akers (0h0m) cS
Attorney for Defendants Robert Aginons and
7 The Ammons Law Firm NS
Mr. Mark Collmer (h0m) ©)
8 Attorney for Defendant Donalda’ Pohl
9 I further certify that I am neither counsel for,
10 related to, nor employed by any of the parties in the
11 action in which this pare taken, and
12 further that I am not financial y or otherwise
©)
13 interested in the outcome this action.
14 Further certification requirements pursuant to
15} Rule 203 of the - an of Civil Procedure will be
16 | complied with aftér) ey have occurred.
17 Certified to by me on this day of
18 lau , 2018.
19 , ~S
OS
20 &S
21 & Laurie Carlisle, CSR
S Texas CSR 2205
22 Firm No. CRF 10402
Expiration: 12/31/19
23 Omni Litigation
832 Tulane Street
24 Houston, Texas 77007
25
Omni Litigation
713-864-4443"
6,2018-10-24,EX,Kassab,Exhibit: bar grievance pleadings against Pohl,"State Bar of Texas Grievance filed by Lance Christopher Kassab against Michael Pohl (File No. 201801825), including grievance form, detailed Exhibit 'A' statement of facts and violations, and two supplemental letters to the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel dated July 3 and July 20, 2018","Bar grievance filed by Kassab against Pohl with the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the State Bar of Texas, pursuant to Rule 8.03(a) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. Filed on behalf of approximately 10,000 alleged victims. Companion grievance No. 201801826 filed against Cyndi Rusnak. Subsequently filed as Exhibit 21 in the Pohl v. Kassab TCPA proceedings.",TCPA-1,N/A,Phase 1,2018-10-24_EX_Grievance-Pleadings-Against-Pohl_FILED.pdf,Disciplinary action against Michael Pohl by the State Bar of Texas for violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct and Texas Penal Code barratry and commercial bribery statutes,"EXHIBIT 21 .
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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL
STATE BAR OF TEXAS
GRIEVANCE FORM
I. GENERAL INFORMATION
Before you fill out this paperwork, there may be a faster way to resolve the isgue-you are
currently having with an attorney.
@
If you are considering filing a grievance against a Texas attorney for any ofthe following
reasons: 5 G
S
~ You believe your attorney is neglecting your case. XZ)
~ Your attorney does not return phone calls or keep you informed <a the status of your case.
~ You have fired your attorney but are having problems getting you ile back from the attorney.
You may want to consider contacting the Client-Attorne Aséistance Program (CAAP) at
1-800-932-1900. &
CAAP was established by the State Bar of Texas to help people resolve these kinds of issues
with attorneys quickly, without the filing of a formal-griévance. CAAP can resolve many
problems without a grievance being filed by prov information, by suggesting various self-
help options for dealing with the situation, or byeon cting the attorney either by telephone or
letter. >
I have Ihave not X __ wc Client-Attorney Assistance Program.
II. INFORMATION ABOUT YOu -- Praase KEEP CURRENT
wS
COMPLAINANT # 1: &
1. Name and address: ©)
Lance Christophe Kassab, pursuant to Rule 8.03 (a) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
rrofessional Co ct and on behalf of approximately 10,000 victims surrounding the
Gulf Coast. &
Re,
Lance topher Kassab
THE AB LAW FIRM
1 abama
ton, Texas 77004
2. Employer and address:
The Kassab Law Firm
1420 Alabama
Houston, TX 77004

3. Telephone number: Residence: | Work: 713-522-7400
4. Drivers License # NA Date of Birth: NA
5. Name, address, and telephone number of person who can always reach you. Ne
EN
Lance Christopher Kassab NZ)
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM ©
1420 Alabama, Houston, Texas 77004 Re
Telephone: 713-522-7400 “GO
Facsimile: 713-522-7410 XG
6 @
6. Do you understand and write in the English language? Yes ©)
. ®
If no, what is your primary language? GP
Who helped you prepare this form? ©
Lance Christopher Kassab
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM &
1420 Alabama S\
Houston, Texas 77004 es
Telephone: 713-522-7400 ~\
Will they be available to translate future @S}respondence during this process? N/A
7. Are you a Judge? No 5 S
If yes, please provide Court, oes City, State: N/A
ILL. INFORMATION anour ATtonvey
Note: Grievances are Hot accepted against law firms. You must specifically name the attorney
against whom you omplaining. A separate grievance form must be completed for each
attorney against you are complaining.
wS
1. Attorney nae and address:
©)
Michael Pohl
2254 Stratton Forest Heights
Colorado Springs, CO 80906
2. Telephone number: Work: (713) 652-0100 Home: Unknown Other: Unknown
3. Have you or a member of your family filed a grievance about this attorney previously?

Yes__ No_X_If “yes”, please state its approximate date and outcome.
4. Please check one of the following:
This attorney was hired to represent me.
This attorney was appointed to represent me.
_X__ This attorney was hired to represent someone else. NS
Please give the date the attorney was hired or appointed and what the tomes hired or
appointed to do: O)
See Exhibit “A” attached hereto. eS
5. What was your fee arrangement with the attorney? S
See Exhibit “A” attached hereto. &
If you signed a contract and have a copy, please atach,
See Exhibit “A” attached hereto,
If you have copies of checks and/or receipts, please attach
IN
N/A es
6. If you did not hire the attorney, what 1h camnection with the attorney? Explain briefly:
©
See Exhibit “A” attached hereto,
2>O
7. Are you currently represented byan attorney?
See Exhibit “A” sche,
If yes, please provide sain about your current attorney:
Lance Christopher Kassab
THE Kass AW FIRM
1420 a, Houston, Texas 77004
Telep : 713-522-7400
Facsimile: 713-522-7410
8. Do yo. Bam the attorney has an impairment such as depression or a substance use disorder?
If yes, please provide specifics (your personal observations of the attorney such as slurred
speech, odor of alcohol, ingestion of alcohol or drugs in your presence etc., including the date
you observed this, the time of day, and location).

No
9. Did the attorney ever make any statements or admissions to you or in your presence that
would indicate that the attorney may be experiencing an impairment such as depression or a
substance use disorder? If so, please provide details.
x we
@
IV. INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR GRIEVANCE ©
1. Where did the activity you are complaining about occur? ©
Harris County, Texas. However, activity also occurred in thrighout the Gulf Coast
including Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and F lotida, See Exhibit “A” attached
hereto. &
Z)
2. If your grievance is about a lawsuit, answer the following, @knovm:
a. Name of court:
See Exhibit “A” attached hereto for oe
b. Title of the suit: WS
©
See Exhibit “A” attached hereto rte explanation.
c. Case number and date suit was me ©
See Exhibit “A” attached Heres for further explanation.
d. If you are not a party to this () what is your connection with it?
See Exhibit “A” wie hereto for further explanation.
If you have copies of gourt documents, please attach.
2
See Exhibit “A” attached hereto and all documents attached thereto.
©
3. Explain if detail why you think this attomey has done something improper or has failed to do
somethi hich should have been done. Attach additional sheets of paper if necessary.
If you have copies of letters or other documents you believe are relevant to your grievance,
please attach. Do not send originals.
See Exhibit “A” attached hereto and all documents attached thereto.

In a nutshell, Michael Pohl, Cyndi Rusnak and Jimmy Williamson (deceased) entered a
joint venture and conspiracy to commit barratry by violating the Texas Penal Code, Section
38.12, Rule 7.03 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct and various other
rules of professional conduct. This was Accomplished by paying, giving and/or offering
to pay or give money to numerous runners not licensed to practice law for soliciting
prospective clients and/or referring clients or prospective clients to the Nor pecuniary
gain. Please see Exhibit “A” and all other documents attached ert for further
explanation and documentary proof. ©
Include the names, addresses, and telephone number of all persons who Know something
about your grievance. SS
6 @
Lance Christopher Kassab ©)
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM ©
1420 Alabama ®
Houston, Texas 77004 ®
713-522-7400 Ke)
The documents attached to Exhibit “A” list ménypersons with knowledge of relevant
facts. However, I will provide a ENS list during your investigation.
Also, please be advised that a copy of your griginice will be forwarded to the attorney
named in your grievance. VW
V. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE Warver
I hereby expressly waive any attorneylient privilege as to the attorney to the extent it is, the
subject of this grievance, and aut such attorney to reveal any information in the
professional relationship to the e of Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the State Bar of Texas
regarding same.
I understand that DisilnyProcetings are strictly confidential.
Signature: 5 © Date:
e©)
TO ENSURE PROMPT ATTENTION, THE GRIEVANCE SHOULD BE MAILED TO:
©
The Office 6f Chief Disciplinary Counsel
P.O. Bow 13466
Austin, Texas 78761

STATEMENT OF THE GRIEVANCE

Attorney, Michael Pohl violated Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, 1.04
(f), (1) & (2), & (g); 1.15 (a)(1) & (d); 5.04 (a); 7.01(a); 7.03 (b) & (d); 7.06 (a) & (b); 8.04
(a)(1)(2)(3)(4)(9) & (12), & (b). Specifically, Michael Pohl conspired with CyniiRusnak and
Jimmy Williamson to improperly solicit approximately ten thousand prospec} ents and refer
these prospective clients to their joint venture solely for pecuniary sins This was accomplished
by hiring and paying runners to organize crews which would illegall sGanetbicaly and improperly
“knock on doors” and otherwise canvas the entire Gulf Coast KS) obtain and refer potential
clients who had potential claims against British Petroleum sist defendants arising out of the
Deep-Water Horizon Explosion. Se

Additionally, Michael Pohl on the one hand and Rusnak and Williamson on the other hand
were lawyers practicing law in two distinct wt en law firms, entered into a joint venture to
pay the runners for their illegal tan ad aed to split fees in complete degredation of Rule

1.04 by intentionally failing to oe. (Hient consents in writing outlining the terms of their
attorney’s fee split prior to the tim ofthe association between Michael Pohl on the one hand and
Rusnak and Williamson on theotiler hand.

Furthermore, both a and Rusnak offered, promised and agreed to pay non-lawyers (the
Runners) a portion of the atomey' fees generated from the representation arising from the illegal
gathering of potent lents

| ani a —

This uct, violating the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct and other
rules of ta) Sbsolutely occurred and is painstakingly outlined in detail in Exhibit “A” along with
sworn statements from the Runners themselves, all attached thereto. The conduct outlined in this
grievance is the very conduct that the State Bar and the Texas Legislature has attempted to curb
through recent legislation. Although it appears that there is an unwritten rule at the State Bar to

take no action against lawyers when a civil case has been filed against lawyers arising out of the

same conduct,! this conduct and these violations should not be condoned by the State Bar, any

other agency or anyone else. Action must be taken, otherwise the erosion of the nobility in the

practice of law will continue to occur, the perception that lawyers are above the awl continue

to grow and lawyers will be emboldened by the fact that the State Bar will a6 nothing in light of

clear violations of its Rules. ©

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'T have Ss law exclusively in the field of legal malpractice for more than 20 years and in every civil malpractice
case I have been involved with there have been the conduct alleged also violated the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct. However, I have filed and/or helped file (on behalf of clients) only a small number of
grievances (compared to civil cases), only to have them summarily dismissed. In each one of these grievances, there
were clear violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, yet the State Bar dismissed the vast majority of them.
When I finally inquired as to why the State Bar would summarily dismiss cases with clear violations, I was told that
there was an unwritten rule to dismiss cases when there was a civil case filed arising out of the same conduct. Out of
all the grievances I have been involved with, only a handful have not been summarily dismissed by the State Bar.

EXHIBIT “A”
I
Facts
After the tragic Deepwater Horizon oil tig explosion occurred in the Gulf of Mexico on
April 20, 2010 (the “Oil Spill”), the National Pollution Fund Center (“NPFC”) ofthe United States
Coast Guard issued a letter of designation to BP Exploration and Paton Inc. (“BP”)
designating it as a responsible party under the Oil Pollution Act COPa"") and advising BP to
advertise for and receive claims as a result of the Oil Spill. BP scepied this designation in writing
and established the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“GCCF”) for the purpose of administering,
processing and settling claims by individuals and busing had been impacted by the Oil
Spill. Ss
Seizing upon the opportunity to line his pockets Michael Pohl (“Pohl”) orchestrated a
conspiracy and barratry scheme with J omy Yann (Williamson) (now deceased) and Cyndi
Rusnak (Rusnak) to hire and pay runners tO organize crews which would illegally, unethically and
improperly “knock on doors” and otherwise canvas the Gulf Coast area to obtain and refer potential
clients who had potential clei British Petroleum and other defendants arising out of the
Deep-Water Horizon Explosion,
Williamson engkeol in a joint venture and/or partnership with Rusnak of Cindi Rusnak,
PLLC, practicing ne inde the trade name “Williamson & Rusnak” to illegally solicit and
represent clients the BP Deepwater Horizon litigation.! Williamson and Rusnak also engaged
another Texas lawyer, Michael A. Pohl (“Pohl”) of the Law Office of Michael Pohl, PLLC to aid
in what would ultimately be unethical and illegal barratry violations relating to thousands of
i aba 1 — Deposition of Jimmy Williamson, 23:14-23; Exhibit 2 ~ Walker Memorandum Opinion (Doc. No.
»p.5.
1

potential clients.” Pohl, Williamson and Rusnak agreed that they would split the profits from any
fruits of the barratry joint venture with 40% of any attorney’s fees derived from the BP litigation
going to Pohl and 60% going to Williamson and Rusnak.3 Williamson and Rusnak agreed to split
their 60% of the fees according to the amount of resources each put into the cases
Beginning approximately in April of 2012, Pohl, in furtherance ote joint venture,
arranged a meeting with Scott Walker (“Walker”), a consultant who was-well connected with
several companies in Pascagoula, Mississippi.> Pohl indicated hath Williamson wanted to
hire Walker to use his contacts to obtain potential BP clients.° Witiamson met with Walker and
Pohl and confirmed the barratry venture, telling Walker thatBP had structured the settlement to
include the whole state of Mississippi and thus there ws Peaty thousands of businesses and
individuals who could be targeted for solicitation slits Pohl and Williamson wanted to hire
another person with government contacts to view Walker who could solicit governmental
entities as part of the barratry conspiry® Walker introduced Pohl and Williamson to Steve
Seymour (“Seymour”) of Diamond Consulting who, at the time, was a public official in Hancock
County, Mississippi.? Pohl ns en advised Seymour that they “were trying to get clients
&
2 Exhibit 1 — Deposition oc Fly Williamson, 58:6-25, 59:1-11,
3 Exhibit 3 — Affidavit 8 Son Walker, ¥ 2.
4 Exhibit 1 -Deveion of Jimmy Williamson, p. 32:6-20.
5 Exhibit 3 <i of Scott Walker, 2.
6 Exhibit 3 — Affidavit of Scott Walker, ff 4, 5.
7 Exhibit 3 — Affidavit of Scott Walker, { 4.
* Exhibit 3 — Affidavit of Scott Walker, 5.
° Exhibit 3 — Affidavit of Scott Walker, { 5; Exhibit 4 — Affidavit of Steve Seymour, § 2.
2

with BP oil spill claims in Mississippi” and convinced him that Williamson was the “absolute best
lawyer in the field for handling BP oil spill claims.””!°
To aid in the barratry conspiracy, Williamson and Pohl provided Walker and Seymour with
“Advertisements” promoting the legal services of Williamson, Rusnak and Pohl & Lawyers).!!
Williamson instructed Walker and Seymour to use the advertisements in thei Stes pitches to
potential clients in an effort to sell them on hiring the Lawyers. ! Willian and Pohl instructed
Walker and Seymour to call all of their friends and sequntances toby to get them to hire the
Lawyers on their BP claims, and to make cold calls on people ond sins they didn’t know.?
Williamson told Walker and Seymour that he also had a po@se point presentation to be used to
“seal the deal” on potential clients that were hesitant.!4 wie con provided Walker and Seymour
with Williamson & Rusnak’s attorney-client sonatas used for signing up potential clients. !5
Williamson instructed Walker and Seymour to ib ta clients sign the blank contracts and
to email the signed contracts to Wiliams
The parties agreed that Williamson was to decide which groups of claimants should be
targeted; direct the joint venture marketing efforts; provide marketing materials to use in
soliciting potential clients; od with and market himself, his firm, and his partner Rusnak,
Q
©
10 Exhibit 4 — a Seymour, ] 3.
1 Exhibit 3- arate Walker, {| 6; Exhibit 4 — Affidavit of Steve Seymour, §f 6, 7; Exhibit 5 —
Williamson and P on P Advertisements.
12 Exhibit 3 <li of Scott Walker, J 6; Petition Exhibit 4 — Affidavit of Steve Seymour, J 7.
13 Exhibit 3 — Affidavit of Scott Walker, {J 6, 7; Exhibit 4 — Affidavit of Steve Seymour, { 7.
4 Exhibit 3 — Affidavit of Scott Walker, {{] 6, 7; Exhibit 4 — Affidavit of Steve Seymour, ] 7.
'S Exhibit 3 — Affidavit of Scott Walker, {J 6, 7; Exhibit 4 — Affidavit of Steve Seymour, q 7.
'© Exhibit 3 — Affidavit of Scott Walker, f] 6, 7; Exhibit 4 — Affidavit of Steve Seymour, 7.
3

to claimants with larger claims.'’ Williamson stated that he would “handle the overhead
expenses” including “intake” and “staffing.”'® The parties agreed that Pohl would handle
Walker’s and Seymour’s compensation.!? Rusnak’s contribution to the barratry conspiracy was to
assist with the intake of the claims, review the claims, reject any unsuitable claims, ane to generally
handle the processing of the claims throughout the BP Settlement Claim rose his included
supervising a large staff.”° In addition, Rusnak directed the barratry conspipacy, instructing Walker
to “go after the claims that would produce the highest legal fees” and ibacted Walker to “market
NS

to clients in certain geographic locations.”””!

In early May 2012, Walker introduced Pohl and Williamson to Dane Maxwell
(“Maxwell”).”” Maxwell provided lawyers with svesidged services via his company called
CMV Investigations (“CMV”).”> Pohl and Winsor erste Maxwell and CMV to obtain
potential BP clients.24 Maxwell assembled a en of contract workers to make cold calls on

O,
potential clients on behalf of the Lawyen 2 he Lawyers agreed to pay Maxwell a flat fee of
$1,000 for each BP client that he or his team working for CMV obtained for the Lawyers, plus
&
©
7 ima nana toageli. 116; Exhibit 4 — Affidavit of Steve Seymour, 10.
'8 Exhibit 3 — Affidavit oF Se Was {| 6; Exhibit 4 — Affidavit of Steve Seymour, 10.
19 Exhibit 3 — AfidavifScou Walker, {| 6; Exhibit 4 ~ Affidavit of Steve Seymour, q 10.
20 Exhibit 6 — May 20 16 Affidavit of Scott Walker, 99 5, 6, 7.
21 Exhibit 6 <M 3, 2016 Affidavit of Scott Walker, q 5.
*? Exhibit 7 — Deposition of Michael Pohl, pp. 51-52.
*3 Exhibit 7 — Deposition of Michael Pohl, pp. 51-52, 70.
*4 Exhibit 8 - Maxwell Amended Verified Complaint.
* Exhibit 8 — Maxwell Amended Verified Complaint, § 18.
4

expenses.*° The Lawyers paid Maxwell and CMV as much as $2.47 million for the illegal
barratry.?7
On or about May 25, 2012, the Lawyers, Walker and Seymour reduced their agreement to
commit barratry in writing.”® The agreement included another runner, Terry Robingen of Robinson
Holdings, LLC (“Robinson”).”° Per the agreement, Pohl, on behalf of the fin Ger agreed to
pay Walker, Seymour and Robinson (and/or their respective companies) 30% of the 40% interest
in attorney’s fees he was to receive from his agreement with Wilaio in the BP litigation.*°
Walker, Seymour and Robinson (collectively the “Solicitation Group"") all non-lawyers, agreed to
split the 30% attorney’s fees as follows: 12% to Walker (Maxwell & Walker Consulting Group,
LLC); 12% to Seymour (Diamond Consulting); and cosb Pinon (Robinson Holdings, LLC).
This written agreement was, of course, completely sock and illegal. See TEx. DISCIPLINARY
RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.04(a)(“A lawyer sw firm shall not share or promise to share legal
fees with a non-lawyer”). Over the next month, Walks Seymour and Robinson “hit the ground
running” and “distributed information abou Williamson to hundreds of Mississippians.”?!
Williamson, on behalf of the conspiracy later recruited another individual, Kirk Ladner
(“Ladner”) to join the tat dou” Ladner had been in the seafood industry his entire life.23
f
26 Exhibit 9 — Deposition af Soot Walker, p. 200.
27 Exhibit 9 — Deposition oF Seo Walker, p. 73-74.
28 Exhibit 3 — Aft Scott Walker, at Exhibits 1 & 2 (Operating Agreements).
29 Exhibit 3 <n of Scott Walker, at Exhibits 1 & 2 (Operating Agreements).
3° Exhibit 3 — Affidavit of Scott Walker, at Exhibits 1 &2 (Operating Agreements).
*! Exhibit 4 — Affidavit of Steve Seymour, ¥ 13.
° Exhibit 4 — Affidavit of Steve Seymour, 4 15; Exhibit 10 — Affidavit of Kirk Ladner, {ff 8-9.
33 Exhibit 10 — Affidavit of Kirk Ladner, ff 8-9.
5

Williamson and Pohl convinced Ladner to join their barratry organization, telling him that he,
along with Seymour and Walker, would all be “multi-millionaires.”*4 Thus, on July 15,2012, Pohl,
on behalf of the joint venture, signed a new unethical and illegal partnership agreement with
Ladner, Walker and Seymour.*’ In this new agreement, Ladner, Walker and Seymour agreed to
accept a 22.5 % interest in the attorney’s fees Pohl was to obtain from BF representation
agreement between Williamson and Pohl.*° One of the reasons for this pew agreement was that
Williamson wanted to end the relationship with Robinson.27 , &

The Lawyers paid roughly $5 million in “barratry pass ou money” to Walker, Ladner
and Seymour to solicit and accumulate potential clients.** Althotgh the money was labeled on the
books as “marketing money” for “marketing services,” wie candidly admitted that it is “clear
to [him] it was barratry.”3? Walker, Ladner and see wed this money to solicit BP clients on
behalf of the Lawyers’ joint venture.”° RS

The barratry money distributed oar, Walker, Seymour and CMV would be used to
pay case runners who worked below then in what can only be described as a barratry pyramid
scheme. While CMV would rece $1,000 per potential client, the mid-level runners would
receive $100-$250 of this sit per potential client. The mid-level runners would also recruit

runners to work below ogre pay the low-level runners $20-$30 per potential client while
34 Exhibit 4 — sn teve Seymour, {ff 16-19; Exhibit 10 ~ Affidavit of Kirk Ladner, $f 10-16.
35 Exhibit 4 — aside of Steve Seymour, at Exhibit 2 Operating Agreement.
36 Exhibit 4 Ala of Steve Seymour, at Exhibit 2 Operating Agreement.
37 Exhibit 3 — Affidavit of Scott Walker, ¥ 14.
38 Exhibit 9 — Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 73-76.
* Exhibit 9 — Deposition of Scott Walker, p. 149.
40 Exhibit 9 — Deposition of Scott Walker, p. 200.
6

working under their umbrella. Thus, while the lowest level runners would receive a mere $20 from
the Williamson-Pohl-Rusnak conspiracy, the mid-level runners would receive $100-$250 per
potential client and CMV would receive the remainder of the $1,000.
One of the low level runners was Jacqueline Taylor (“Taylor”) PR State Line,
eS
Mississippi.*' Taylor was recruited to solicit clients for the lawyers through EMV by another
runner, Karen Boykin (“Boykin”).*” Taylor owned a beauty salon and wag Sontacted in person by
S
Boykin who was targeting small business owners on behalf of the Layiyers.® Boykin told Taylor
NS
that she had a claim against BP and convinced her to hire the Lane to file the claim.“ Taylor
agreed and completed the blank Williamson & Rusnak contract fiat Boykin had brought with her.
Boykin then told Taylor about all the money she was vst to solicit clients and gave her the
business card of another lady working for CMV, Mons Chaney:**
a
pune Se es
Monica Chaney - g
Cell: 228-219-988 ~\
fama e ee KR
CVi/ Cell: 601-470-2331 ©
mr BP Claims Conguitat
, ones mneranseh
Fax, 228-87 2-i
rota rie |)
D'bervite, MS '
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3
4! Exhibit 11 — Sw tatement of Jaqueline Taylor, p. 5.
2 Exhibit 1 1 Sgn Statement of Jaqueline Taylor, pp. 5-6.
“3 Exhibit 11 — Swom Statement of Jaqueline Taylor, pp. 6-7.
“ Exhibit 11 — Sworn Statement of Jaqueline Taylor, pp. 7-8.
** Exhibit 11 — Sworn Statement of Jaqueline Taylor, pp. 7-8.
“© Exhibit 11 — Sworn Statement of Jaqueline Taylor, p. 6, and at Taylor Exhibit 1.
7

Taylor called Chaney who hired her to solicit clients.47 Chaney told Taylor that Williamson and
Pohl employed CMV to solicit clients.*® Taylor was given blank Williamson & Rusnak and Pohl
contracts”? and was trained on how to obtain potential clients on behalf of the Lawyers and what
to say.©” Taylor was trained to target business owners and then, when those claimsyan out, farmers
and land owners.*’ Taylor was provided a map and told to focus on pri Taylor was
paid $20-$30 per potential client®? while Chaney was paid $100-$1 50 foreach potential client
brought in by Taylor.*4 Taylor would send the clients information Bane each week and was
paid through a cash card from Wal-Mart. Taylor was ribet fo any expenses associated
with the solicitation. All total, Taylor was paid to solicit overine hundred potential clients.5”
Another runner under the Lawyer’ barratry schenéive Magdalena Santana (“Santana”).°8
Santana was approached by Seymour in July of sores recruited by Williamson and Pohl for a
“marketing position” which required her to “9 Brat clients and sign them up for legal
w
EN
©
“7 Exhibit 11 — Sworn Statement of Jaqucling Payor, pp. 9-10.
“8 Exhibit 11 — Sworn Statement of agen Taylor, pp. 11-13.
Exhibit 11 — Sworn Statement of Zagieline Taylor, pp. 9-10.
°° Exhibit 11 — Sworn Statement of Jaqueline Taylor, pp. 17-19.
5! Exhibit 11 — Sworn Sateen Jaqueline Taylor, p. 20.
* Exhibit 11 — Sworn Satnen of Jaqueline Taylor, p. 31-32.
3 Exhibit 11 — Swit Sitemen of Jaqueline Taylor, p. 13.
* Exhibit 1 1 Sein Statement of Jaqueline Taylor, p. 23, 50.
°° Exhibit 11 — Sworn Statement of Jaqueline Taylor, p. 13-14.
°° Exhibit 11 — Sworn Statement of Jaqueline Taylor, p. 26-27.
*7 Exhibit 11 — Sworn Statement of Jaqueline Taylor, p. 16.
°8 Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit.
8

representation.”°° Santana testified that the job required her to “make cold calls on business owners
and managers trying to get them to sign blank legal representation contracts with Pohl and
Williamson.”® Santana “would be paid $250 for each claim [she] signed up.”*! Santana was
instructed by Pohl to target “businesses in the high-paying settlement zones” une “beachfront
properties, hotels, taxi companies, commercial fisherman, nightlubs, a other tourism
businesses.” Williamson likewise instructed Santana to “go business to,bpsiness, door to door”
GS
asking people “if they had losses from the oil spill.” Separate from Pati, Williamson instructed
Santana to “target businesses in high paying zones and in tourign Zones since they were getting
higher payouts.” Santana was provided a map showing he high-paying settlement zones.®
Santana was told to target churches because they were “sy as they “didn’t have to provide tax
9966
returns. <
ON
Like other runners, Santana was provided a binder with blank Williams-Pohl-Rusnak
O,
contracts and advertisements (similar to hese above) with Williamson’s name on them to
distribute to potential clients, Santana Was also emailed blank Williamson-Pohl contracts.
&
— 8
*° Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit, ] x
6° Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit 4
6! Exhibit 12 — Santana asian 14.
© Exhibit 12 — Santana Afidavit, 5.
wS
© Exhibit 12 — Sa sans Afi 13.
“ Exhibit 12 Sania Affidavit, ] 13.
6 Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit, ] 6, see also Santana Exhibit B.
° Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit, q{5.
*’ Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit, {] 6, see also Santana Exhibit A.
68 Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit, J 8, see also Santana Exhibit C. .
9

Santana was told that if she had trouble soliciting a “big fish” client, Williamson and Pohl would
visit them personally.® Santana solicited seventy-seven (77) claims her first week on the job.”
Santana was paid bonuses personally by Williamson for obtaining the “big fish” clients. 7!
Williamson told Santana that they “were all going to make lots of money.”” Santana testified how
cS
“Williamson and Pohl both knew that [she] was cold-calling businesses to sep BK claims.” “Both
Williamson and Pohl gave [her] specific instructions to knock on doors to-drum up clients for
SS
them.””4 5 ss
NS
All total, Santana obtained approximately 1,500 cases for Wiliamson, Rusnak and Pohl.”
None of them were friends, family or colleagues.” After sein would solicit the clients, Pohl
would meet Santana at restaurants to sign the contracts ao illegally and unethically obtained.””
Santana was not paid by Pohl and Williamson pas but through a company called Precision
Marketing Group, LLC (“Precision”).’8 This xe a company formed by Walker, Ladner and
O,
Seymour to serve as the “center of operons for the solicitation.”” The lease, furnishings and
©
@
GS
© Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit, 7. &
” Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit, J EN
” Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit 92.
? Exhibit 12 — Santana asia q 13.
73 Exhibit 12 — Santana Advi 138.
SS
4 Exhibit 12 — Sa ans Affidavit, 7 38.
® Exhibit 12 Sanians Affidavit, 38.
7 Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit, J 38.
” Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit, J 22.
” Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit, | 23.
” Exhibit 3 — Affidavit of Scott Walker, § 32.
10

staff of this company was paid for by the Lawyers.®° When Santana asked Pohl why she was not
paid by him directly, Pohl stated “that it was illegal for him to pay [her] directly, and that’s why
the money had to go through some company.”®! Santana and Taylor were just two of the many
runners. Eventually the Lawyers’ joint venture had illegally solicited appeeemately 9,800
potential or actual BP clients.®2 oy
On October 18, 2014, Walker, Ladner, Seymour and their related entities, including
Precision, filed suit against Pohl and Williamson, alleging they “inal ogther in a joint venture
or partnership in order to represent Mississippi clients in their lis against [BP] in connection
with the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill” and “contracted vith [them] to provide public relations
services for this joint venture.”®? The runners alleged nde lawyers breached their agreement,
engaged in bad faith, breached their duties of soog and fair dealing and became unjustly
enriched after they refused to pay them fees fc whiting the clients on the lawyers’ behalf.°4
Rusnak was eventually added to this last under the claim that she too was part of the joint
venture or partnership.®* Walker, Seymour and Ladner later assigned their right in the action to
Precision®® and Precision was purchased by an individual named Scott F avre (“Favre”).87
©
ry
80 Exhibit 3 — Affidavit of Scout alker, J 32.
8! Exhibit 12 — Santana doit, 23.
® Exhibit 1 — Depoftion of Jimmy Williamson, 186:6-22.
83 Exhibit 2 we Memorandum Opinion (Doc. No. 475), p. 2; Exhibit 13 — Walker First Amended Complaint.
84 See Exhibit 13 — Walker First Amended Complaint.
* Exhibit 2 ~ Walker Memorandum Opinion (Doc. No. 475), p. 2.
*° Exhibit 2— Walker Memorandum Opinion (Doc. No. 475), p. 2.
*” Exhibit 14 — Affidavit of Scott Farve.
11

The Lawyers attempted to dismiss that litigation, arguing that they were not partners or in
a joint venture with one another or the runners and that the agreements between them and the
runners were illegal and unenforceable.** The federal court rejected these contentions, finding
prima facia evidence that Pohl, Williamson and Rusnak to be in a partnership or j cugt venture with
each other and also concluding that the agreements to solicit clients would ae a violation of
Texas law and the Texas disciplinary rules, which did not apply to Walker, Seymour and Ladner.®?
Having failed to obtain summary dismissal, the Lawyers settled the pation with Precision and

NS

Favre, hoping to forever conceal their barratry conspiracy.”

In addition to illegally soliciting unsuspecting people for the BP oil spill, Pohl also illegally
solicited victims of rollover accidents. Specifically, rent er Santana, her brother Jay Santana,
Ladner, Seymour and Walker to solicit families whenever were killed or severely injured in
rollover accidents. Incredibly, and with cin dls Pohl helped set up companies like “The
Helping Hands Group”! and the “GM stoma Verification Team”** in order to make people
believe these companies and their employees (the Runners) were there to actually help rollover
accident victims. &

Pohl would direct be Runes to specific accidents as soon as they happened and
typically pay these Ranmes 2.5% of his attorney’s fees from each case they signed up on his
88 Exhibit 2— Wa emorandum Opinion (Doc. No. 475); Exhibit 15 — Williamson Memorandum (Doc. No.

178); Exhibit 1 hl Memorandum (Doc. No. 175).
89 Exhibit 2SWulker Memorandum Opinion (Doc. No. 475); Exhibit 17 — Walker Order on Pohl and Williamson
Motions to Dismiss (Doc. No. 252); Exhibit 18 — Walker Order on Rusnak Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 273).
* Exhibit 19 — Walker Judgment (Doc. No. 499).
°! Exhibits 25, 28 and 29.
2 Exhibit 40.
12

behalf.”? As an example, on September 29, 2012, Michael Pohl sent Walker an article about a
death in a rollover accident that occurred two days earlier.°* Walker immediately sent the article
to his Runners about two hours later stating, “See below article. We need to try and sign the family
of the deceased mentioned in the article. If you think you can make this happen, cajlme and I will
cN
send you a contract from Michael. We need to move fast on this.” That sine aflemoon, Pohl
forwarded a contract to Walker who forwarded it to the field Runners.** Asan extra incentive to
SS
motivate the Runners, Walker told Jay Santana to go to Pohl’s wobte to see “the cases that
NS
Michael has won.”®” The list of rollover cases on the website shows that Pohl has settled or
obtained judgments on rollover cases in excess of 43 ming gie
Another example is a rollover case in Towa Ko where eleven people were injured
on April 14, 2013. By April 19, 2013, MagdalenaSantana had been sent to Kansas and signed
‘ 100 : AS) . cc . .
up the entire group. By April 29, 2013 “ee ael Pohl signed a “Retention of Services
O,
Agreement” with Ladner, Walker and Seow agreeing to pay them a fee of $1,500 an hour, not
to exceed 22.5% of Pohl’s attorney’s fe. On the same day, Ladner, Walker and Seymour signed
an “Operating Agreement with Mafiatene Santana and Florian Santana agreeing to pay them 25%
3 Exhibits 20, 41 & 42. SS
4 Exhibit 20. ©
5 Td. Note, Pohl was on the email.
eO)
6 Exhibit 21. Po os $ copied on this email as well.
97 Exhibit 2205S""
8 Id.
°° Exhibit 41.
100 7g,
101 Td.
13

each from the 22.5% of Pohl’s attorney’s fees.'°? The Operating Agreement does not provide for
an hourly rate, it simply states that, “The parties hereto agree that the fees paid under this Operating
Agreement shall not exceed twenty-two and one-half percent (22.5%) of LOMAP’s 40% interest
in the representation agreement of the above mentioned victims.”!™ x
Another example involved a rollover in Muskogee, Oklahoma on 2, 2014 where

Cynthia Shannon was ejected from the vehicle and killed.! Within sins of the accident,
Helping Hands visited the mourning family and convinced the fay to sign an agreement
allowing for them to “hire independent experts or attorneys” as otping Hands deems necessary
and charge the family up to 40% of any recovery the storey sbi for them.'° By June 20,

2014, Michael Pohl signs the “Retention of Services Agreement with Walker and Ladner of the

“Claim Verification Team (an affiliate of The oe cae Group, LLC)” wherein Pohl agrees

to pay the “Claims Verification Team” up to 28% of his attorney’s fees for soliciting and referring
the case to Pohl.!% &

Michael Pohl’s barratry scheme Was choreographed to a science. The Runners were told
precisely what to do when a rllov€é necured, such as “go to the wreck as early as you can to find
blown tires,” “take pictures” in personal items (cell phone, iPods, eye wear, anything
personal) to take to teh al when you meet the families.”'®’ They were instructed to “meet

&
a
102 Td. &
108 Id,
104 Exhibit \
105 Td,
106 Tq.
107 Exhibit 23 (emphasis added).

14

with the family of the deceased and have them sign the contract” and to “[g]et all the other
members that were in the case to sign additional contracts because they will receive funds also
from the settlement.”’”* The Runners were also instructed “to inquire if the deceased’s family may
need help from HELPING HANDS for the burial.”! le

Helping Hands is an organization run by none other than Donalda rn ish Pohl’s
spouse. The Runners were instructed to offer funds from Helping Hands ¥f they would sign a
contract with Helping Hands. The contract with Helping Hands oid Helping Hands to hire
attorneys for the family’s rollover case and earn a percentage of any settlement recovery. Of
course, the attorney chosen by Helping Hands was always Michael Pohl.

One example of this relates to Mark Cheatham Tragically, on February 15, 2014,
Mark Cheatham’s ex-wife, LaDonna, whom Mark kad reunited with and Mark’s three children
(one biological) were involved in a rollover oii"" Mark’s biological son, Markus was the only
one to survive. One of Pohl’s Runners, Keine Talley (Talley) arrived in Louisiana on February
18, 2014 to solicit Mark and his grieving family just three days after he lost the majority of his
family.!’° On February 19, 2014, alley stopped at My Rouses to pick up flowers on his way to
Mark’s home.!!! Talley’s vis uninvited and unsolicited by Mark. However, after gaining
Mark’s confidence vile a was dealing with the tragic loss of LaDonna and his two daughters,
and dealing with his, son’s serious injuries, Talley convinced Mark to sign an agreement with

SO
iS
&
eS ee
108 Td.
109 7d (emphasis in original)
HO Exhibit 24
11 Iq.
15

Helping Hands,'""” sign a limited power of attorney! and sign the crashed vehicle over to Talley
for $2,000.00.'* Remarkably, the $2,000.00 for the purchase of the vehicle came from Helping
Hands which charged Mark 18% per annum for the very funds Talley paid to Mark for the
vehicle.'!° Talley also had Mark sign an “Attorney Acknowledgment” form for Helping Hands.!!6
cS
The form provides that, “{i]n the event of a dispute, my attorney shall be epi to his fee and
expenses.”''7 And that if Mark wanted to change his attorney, the “Funding Agent [Helping
SS
Hands] may declare the subject debt due and payable.”!!® Of course attorney being referred
to was Michael Pohl, Donalda Pohl’s (owner of Helping Hands) sand This is known because
the attorney signature line on the form is signed with the igQear for Michael A. Pohl.!!? This
barratry conspiracy between husband and wife is und by the fact that Helping Hands has
a form that protects the attorney’s interests. In furtherance of the conspiracy is the Helping Hands
“Funding Agreement.”!?° This agreement rv tt the “Funding Agent agrees that it will be
O,
repaid only if as and when Chimant’s over is funded.” And that, IF THERE IS NO
@
RECOVERY, CLAIMANT HAS NO.OBLIGATION TO REPAY THIS DEBT.!2! However,
&
112 Exhibit 25, <\
113 Exhibit 26. S
114 Exhibit 27. ©
&
115 Exhibit 28. >
wS
N6 Exhibit 29. ES
©
118 7g. ,
119 Td.
120 Exhibit 30.
'21 Td. (emphasis in original).
16

in small-unemboldened script, the document states, “If I decide to drop my case and my Attorney
[Michael Pohl] believes my case is meritorious and economically justifiable, then I must repay the
indebtedness hereby created.”'”? Thus, the document obligates the client (Mark Cheatham in this
instance) to pay Helping Hands up to 40% of any recovery regarding the accident pursuant to the
Helping Hands agreement attached hereto as Exhibit 25.!3 In fact, the sing agreement
marked as Exhibit 25 also allows Helping Hands to hire experts and attorneys’ as Helping Hands
deems necessary.'** Michael Pohl signed an attorney/client cont ith Mark on February 21,
2014, just six (6) days after the tragic accident and two days afer Talley showed up at Mark’s
home uninvited.’?> Notably, Tally brought a notary from Kini On-Site-Notary with him.!*6
The Runners of course were not to be left wit bing their percentage of fees
recovered from these lucrative rollover cases. Mid Pohl signed a “Retention of Services
Agreement” (Retention Agreement) with san Wa and Kirk Ladner of Precision Marking
Group (Precision) with regard to Mark Chatham's case.'?” In the Retention Agreement, Pohl
agreed to pay Precision $1,500 an hous. up to 30% of Pohl’s 40% contingency fee.'""8 However,
Pohl and Precision both knew tha the fee for soliciting and referring cases would not be based
upon an hourly rate, but her apr of attorney’s fees recovered. This is so, because the
Retention Agreement sae tt “any and all such fees shall be apportioned by and between the
—
122 Td. 5 &
123 Exhibit 25, @
©
124 Tq Sy
125 Exhibit 32.
126 Td.
27 Exhibit 31.
128 7.
17

parties hereto as follows: Ladner (15%) and Walker (15%).”!?° If the parties to the agreement
actually thought Precision’s fee was based upon an hourly rate the split between Ladner and
Walker would be 50/50 and not listed a 15% for each. Kenneth Talley was to be rewarded as well.
He was to receive $10,000.00 for every one-million recovered for Cheatham and his family.!*°
This is not based upon any hourly rate. oe
Underscoring the fact that Precision was to be paid a percentage of the attorney’s fees
recovered as opposed to an actual hourly rate is the numerous cherie when Pohl paid Ladner
and Walker for there solicitation and referral of rollover cases. Unie the Cheatham case, most
agreements for referring cases to Pohl outlined a fee to Precisigir of 22.5% instead of 30%.'3! On
November 28, 2014, Pohl sent an email to Walker won “Diaz/Curran” case stating the
case settled for $875,000.00.!32 Pohl disclosed the@mount of settlement so that Walker could
manufacture his hours to fit 22.5% of Pohl’s £2 om can clearly see the calculation of legal
fees from the $875,000 to be $306,250. Then that number was multiplied by 22.5% to come up
with $68,906.25 and then divided by $1,500 per hour to come up the number of hours (45.93
hours).!°> Of course, Walker rounds up to an even 46 hours.'*° If Pohl actually believed that he
was paying Precision by be oi he would not have disclosed the amount of the recovery; he
&
Id. | ~S
130 Exhibit 33. NS
©
131 Exhibit 34, &
132 Exhibit rs
133 Tq.
134 Tq.
135 Tq.
136 Td.
18

would have simply requested a detailed account of the hours spent by Precision. If Precision’s
time actually surpassed 22.5% of the attorney’s fee, Pohl could have simply reduced the amount
to no more than 22.5%.

The same thing was done with the “Sanchez” case. On J anuary 1, 2015, Pall sent an email
to Walker informing him that the Sanchez case had settled for $680,000.37 Poi ats “In order
to compute the ceiling on your hourly fees and expenses, the attorney feesnet of local counsel
charges was $250,129.90.”!38 Pohl provides this figure without knowin that Precision’s hours
would even reach the 22.5% threshold. This is because everyone knew that the real fee to Precision
was 22.5% of Pohl’s net attorney’s fee. Of course, 22.5% of 250,129.90 is 56,279.90.!5° After
deducting the $5,000 owed to Pohl for personal loans, wine divides the remainder to calculate
Precision’s hours instead of providing a setaledenccty billing. '*° In fact, the “Operating
Agreement” Pohl signed with Precision, viv the Sanchez case, does not mention an
hourly “rate,” it simply states that, “The pais here agree that the fees paid under this Operating
Agreement shall not exceed twenty-two and one-half percent (22.5%) of LOMAP’S [Law Offices
of Michael A. Pohl] representatioi agreement with victims in cases where Precision Marketing
Group, LLC is retained.” Th Agreement clearly contemplates that Ladner, Walker and
Seymour, of Precision wax receive 7.5% for a total of 22.5%.'"" The “Operating Agreement”
137 Exhibit 36. ©
138 1a, Sy
139 Tq.

140 Td.
141 Exhibit 34,
142 Td.
19

between Precision and the Runners who actually signed up the Sanchez case shows that Precision
is to receive 50% percent of the 22.5% and Florian Santana and Magdalena Santana were to each
receive 25% of the 22.5%.'*? These documents prove, without doubt, that Pohl agreed share his
fees with non-lawyers for soliciting and referring rollover cases. Ne

In October of 2014, Pohl was caught attempting to steal a rollover asm a lawyer in
Mississippi. On October 15, 2014, Richard Shenkan of the Shenkan Law Fitm sent a letter to Pohl
stating, “On September 16, 2014, your salesman, Kirk Ladner, came wide home of Michael Lucas
under the disguise of a member of the GM Settlement Verification Fea, LLC, offering to ‘inform’
the resident about a potential legal claim.”!44 Mr. Shenkan alsy states, “Remarkably, Mr. Ladner
explained that he typically earns $25,000 for every ce for you [Pohl] which involves
a catastrophic injury potentially involving the GM rte defect claims.”!*5 Attached hereto is
the contract between Pohl and Michael Lucas wi was the subject of Mr. Shenkan’s letter.!*

Pohl’s remarkable unconsciousness undscore by the creation of the “GM Settlement
Verification Team” as referred to in Ms, Shenkan’s letter.47 As stated by Mr. Shenkan, Pohl’s
runner acted as if he was part oO Genera Motors and was simply contacting people to “inform”

ee
&
©
143 Exhibit BS
144 Exhibit 38.
145 Tq.
146 Exhibit 39.
47 Td.
20

them about potential legal claims.'** Another example of this pertains to the Hart family."" This
tactic was used by Pohl and his Runners on numerous occasions. !%°
The history of what is known as “barratry” in Texas is long. Although it has recently
become the subject of civil statutes, barratry has been considered a crime in Texgs since 1876.
EN
Reynolds v. State, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 11059, *1-2.; Katherine A. Laroe, gosilent Much Ado
About Barratry: State Regulation of Attorneys’ Targeted Direct-Mail Solicitation, 25 St. Mary's L.J.
S
1514, 1519-20 n.28 (1994)(also tracing historical basis of offense throigh pre-colonial times). As
NS
far back as 1917, Texas outlawed a distinct form of barratry oF third party (a ""runner"") to
solicit clients on behalf of a lawyer. Jd. at 1524 n.30; Remote 17 Tex. App. LEXIS 11059, *1-
2. In a different form, that prohibition exists today ope PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.12(d)(West
2016) which criminalizes a lawyer knowingly — a third party to improperly solicit on the
lawyer's behalf employment from a victim witha iyo days of an accident. Under the text
O,
of the statute, a lawyer commits an fens hen he or she:
(d)(2) with the intent to obtai “Gro fessional employment for the person or for
another, provides or knowi iy permit to be provided to an individual who has not
sought the person's employment, legal representation, advice, or care a written
communication or a solicitation, including a solicitation in person or by telephone,
that: \
(A) concerns an Goivtor personal injury or wrongful death or otherwise relates
to an accident of disaster involving the person to whom the communication or
solicitation isprovided or a relative of that person and that was provided before
the 31st day-atter the date on which the accident or disaster occurred.
gS
<
M48 Td.
149 Exhibit 40.
‘50 There are numerous documents supporting this fact that have not been attached hereto, but are available upon
request.
21

Stated otherwise: (1) a lawyer, (2) cannot with intent to obtain professional employment,
(3) provide or knowingly permit to be provided to someone who hasn't sought the lawyer's services,
(4) a written communication or a solicitation (in person or by phone), (5) in the first thirty days
following some accident or disaster. Jd. ve

“The ordinary meaning of barratry is vexatious incitement to tigation especially by
soliciting potential legal clients.” Neese v. Lyon, 479 S.W.3d 368, 376 (Te -App—Dallas 2015,
no pet.) (citations omitted). In an effort to curtail this crime, the Least, in 1989, enacted §
82.065 of the Texas Government Code, which allowed clients to seid contingent fee contract “if
it is procured as a result of conduct violating the laws of this ie or the Disciplinary Rules of the
State Bar of Texas regarding barratry by attorneys or ti ys Neese, 479 S.W.3d at 376-
77. The 1989 version of section 82.065 provided: &

A contingent fee contract for legal servi SY vant by the client if it is procured

as a result of conduct violating the 1 f this state or the Disciplinary Rules of

the State Bar of Texas regarding rd attorneys or other persons.

See id.; Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 866, givett Sept. 1, 1989 (amended 2011).

In 2011, the Legislature pésed Senate Bill 1716 which amended § 82.065 and enacted
section 82.0651 to create eo “liability arising from conduct constituting barratry and
provid[ing] a civil peng? Se JUDICIARY & CIVIL JURISPRUDENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, 8.B.
1716, Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 94 (S.B. 1716), § 3(a), eff. Sept. 1, 2011 (“S.B. 1716 Analysis”)
(emphasis added Nees 479 §.W.3d at 377. The purpose of S.B. 1716 was to create a civil
cforement pa statutes and disciplinary rules prohibiting barratry, the “vexatious incitement
to litigation, especially by soliciting potential legal clients.” See S.B. 1716 Analysis.'>* The bill
'S! Exhibit 44 — A true and correct copy of S.B. 1716 Analysis.

192 Td.
22

itself specifically stated that it was intended to provide “liability arising from conduct constituting
barratry; providing a civil penalty.” See S.B. 1716, Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 94 (S.B. 1716), §
3(a), eff. Sept. 1, 2011 (“S.B. 1716”), #53
The legislative intent and “purpose” of S.B. 1716 was set forth in ne Gepon of the
Judiciary & Civil Jurisprudence Committee to “add a civil enforcement opfon to “help curtail”
the practice of barratry: 5 &
&s
Barratry is commonly known as vexatious incitement to litigation, typically by
soliciting potential legal clients. Many refer to the pract®oy a “case running.”
Under Section 38.12, Penal Code, “barratry” is genery. efined as the illegal
solicitation of professional employment. The Texas; isciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct of the State Bar of Texas prohibit\these solicitations as well.
Adding a civil enforcement option would help cua is practice.
S.B. 1716 adds a cause of action for a client Wo has been unlawfully solicited to
void the contract and recover any actual d s and any fees and expenses paid.
The bill allows a potential client to rec civil penalty of $10,000 from any
person who committed barratry but not succeed in getting the potential
client to sign a contract. Actual d. Ss and attorney's fees are also recoverable
by a potential client. we
See S.B. 1716 Analysis (emphasis added): House Bill 1890, the companion and preceding bill
2 O
to 8.B. 1716, also provided that ‘the purpose of the legislation was to create “[c]ivil action for
conduct constituting barratry “ee HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION BILL ANALYSIS OF HB
1890, April 20, 2011 coe 890 Analysis”) (emphasis added).'°° Under the enacted statute,
“(victims of barratry w ho did not enter a contract could recover $1 0,000 penalty, actual damages,
NS
and attorney’s fees” See id. (emphasis added).!%
<
‘93 Exhibit 45 — A true and correct copy of S.B. 1716
154 See Exhibit 44 — A true and correct copy of S.B. 1716 Analysis.
‘SS Exhibit 46 — A true and correct copy of H.B. 1890 Analysis.
156 See Id.
23

Texas Government Code section 82.0651, the enacted section to create the civil
enforcement, is specifically titled “Civil Liability for Prohibited Barratry.” See TEx. Gov’T CODE
§ 82.0651(c) and (€) (eff. Sept. 1, 2011 to Aug. 31, 2013) (emphasis added).!57 Section 82.0651
enacted in 2011 provided:

BS

(c) A person who was solicited by conduct violating the laws of tips or the

Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bay of Texas

regarding barratry by attorneys or other persons, but who did Cipenter into a

contract as a result of that conduct, may file a civil action againet y person who

committed barratry. A

NS
(d) A person who prevails in an action under Subsection (sal recover from each
person who engaged in barratry: G
@

(1) a penalty in the amount of $10,000; Ke)

(2) actual damages caused by the prohibited obriduct; and

(3) reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees

&s

See id. (emphasis added). To promote its Purpose to deter barratry and to create a civil liability, §
82.065 1(e) expressly provided that the section was to “liberally construed.” Id. at § 82.0651(e)
(emphasis added). 5 S

In 2013, the Legisatan( pie House Bill 1711, which the bill described as “relating to
barratry,” to amend sections 82.068 and 82.0651. See Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., ch. 315, H.B. 1711,

©
§ 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2013, CHB, 1711”).'°8 The reason for the amendment was stated in the
“background and pitpose” of H.B. 1711:
SS

Recent eisatin established civil liability for prohibited barratry and provided

for ility of a client to void any contract for legal services that was procured

t such prohibited conduct. Concern has been raised over reports that some

attorneys have found a loophole in the law to avoid one of the civil penalties for

barratry by releasing their client after a case is “run” and a contract for legal
‘57 Exhibit 47 — A true and correct copy of TEX. Gov’T CODE § 82.065 (eff. Sept. 1, 2011 to Aug. 31, 2013).
188 Exhibit 48 — A true and correct copy of H.B. 1711.

24

services is signed. Interested parties note that the $10,000 penalty currently
assessed applies only when a person is illegally solicited but no legal services
contract is signed as a result of that conduct and that there is no such penalty if a
legal services contract is signed as a result of that illegal solicitation. In an effort
to close this loophole and hold attorneys who commit barratry accountable for
their actions, C.S.H.B. 1711 authorizes a client who enters into a legal services
contract to recover certain damages and amounts from a person who cempmits
barratry. KN
a @
See HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION BILL ANALYSIS OF HB 171 1, Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., ch. 315,
H.B. 1711, § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2013 (“H.B. 1711 Analysis).!° HB. 114 also amended Section
eZ)
82.0651 from “conduct violating the laws of this state or the Disciplinary Rules of the State Bar
of Texas” to “conduct violating Section 38.12(a) or (b), Penab’Cdde, or Rule 7.03 of the Texas
@
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar6ey exas.” See H.B. 1711; TEX. Gov’T
Cope § 82.0651 (eff. Sept. 1, 2013).!
H.B. 1711 was codified into Section S065) and became effective Sept. 1, 2013. The
Ss
Statute is again titled “Civil Liability for Paiva Barratry” the relevant portion of which
provides: S
(c) A person who was solicited by conduct violating Section 38.12(a) or (b), Penal
Code, or Rule 7.03 of thé Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct of
the State Bar of Texas, tegarding barratry by attorneys or other persons, but who
did not enter into a coiract as a result of that conduct, may file a civil action
against any person why ommitted barratry.
©
(d) A person whbphevails in an action under Subsection (c) shall recover from each
person who engaged in barratry:
NS
(Dhapenalty in the amount of $10,000;
Xe actual damages caused by the prohibited conduct; and.
(3) reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees.
'®? Exhibit 49 — A true and correct copy of H.B. 1711 Analysis.
'©0 Exhibit 50 — A true and correct copy of TEX. Gov’T CODE § 82.0651 (eff. Sept. 1, 2013).
25

See id. (emphasis added). Even as amended, § 85.0651 was to be “liberally construed” to
promote its underlying purpose of deterring barratry. Jd. at § 82.0651 (e). This section has not been
repealed or amended since 2013. See Id.

Unfortunately, however, as shown herein, Michael Pohl believes he is abaye the clear and
unequivocal laws of Texas which are outlined in the Texas Penal Code and beta Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct. This is a textbook case for the violations ofthese laws and rules,
and the evidence is overwhelming. , Ss

i)
II
VIOLATIONS &

The evidence cited to above and attached hereto ceil shows that Michal A. Pohl violated
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, Ss (1) & (2), & (g), 1.15 (a)(1), 5.04 (a)
& (d)(1), 7.03 (b) & (d), 7.05 (a) & (c), 7.06 @eo, 8.04 (a)(1)(2)(3)(9) & (12), & (b). Pohl
and his wife, Donalda also violated the Tea en Code, Sections 38.12(a)(4), 38.12(b)(1), (2)
& (3) which are third-degree felonies in Texas and considered “serious crimes” pursuant to the
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, 8.04(b). Pohl also violated Section 32.43(b) of
the Texas Penal Code. Moreové ti evidence attached outlines an egregious conspiracy between
Michael Pohl and his wife Donald Pohl to take advantage of grieving individuals in despicable
fashion. ou

N
A. TEXAS Discs INARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT VIOLATIONS:
1. Rule L040, (1) & (2), & (g) provides:
a division or agreement for division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the
same firm may be made only if:
(1) the division is:
(i) in proportion to the professional services performed by each lawyer; or
26

(ii) made between lawyers who assume joint responsibility for the

representation; and
(2) The client consents in writing to the terms of the arrangement prior to the time of the
association or referral proposed, including

(i) The identity of all lawyers or law firms who will particips in the fee-
sharing arrangement; and

@

(ii) | Whether fees will be divided based on the proportio Sfservices performed
or by lawyers agreeing to assume joint responsibility fo the representation;
and SS

(iii) | The share of the fee that each lawyer. or firm will receive, or if the
division is based on the proportion of services performed, the basis on which
the division is based on the proportion ab services performed, the basis on
which the division will be made; . . .

(g) Every agreement that allows a lawyer or to associate other counsel in the
representation of a person, or to refett e person to other counsel for such
representation, and that results in suclran association with or referral to a different
law firm or a lawyer in such a diffeeeat firm, shall be confirmed by an arrangement
conforming to paragraph (f). Consent by a client or a prospective client without
knowledge of the informatio ified in subparagraph (f)(2) does not constitute
a confirmation within the g of this rule. No attorney shall collect or seek to
collect fees or expenses connection with any such agreement that is not
confirmed in that way, io t for:

(1) the reasonable value ofteal services provided to that person; and

(2) the reasonable and recdssary expenses actually incurred on behalf of that person.
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. Prom’ Conpuct 1.04(f), (1) & (2), & (g).

©

As shown, Pohl Williamson and Rusnak agreed to share fees arising out of their joint

representation of cen in the BP litigation. The contracts attached hereto as Exhibit 43 are
SS

completely devoid of the language mandated by Rule 1.04, and therefore, prove that Pohl,
Williamson and Rusnak knowing failed to comply with Rule 1.04(f), (1) & (2), & (g).'®!

2. Rule 1.15 (a)(1) provides:

(a) A lawyer shall decline to represent a client or, where representation has commenced,

shall withdraw, except as stated in paragraph (c), from the representation of a client, if:
161 Exhibit 43,
27

(1) the representation will result in violation of Rule 3.08, other applicable rules of
professional conduct or other law; .. .
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.15(a) (1).

The Lawyers rejected many of the potential clients illegally obtained eae was
convicted of a felony and sent to prison in Mississippi in an attempt to estan themselves from
him. However, Pohl, Williamson and Rusnak kept many of the ill-gotten clients, failing to
withdraw as mandated by and in violation of Rule 1.15. 5 &

Rule 5.04 (a) provides:

(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share or promise tire legal fees with a nonlawyer, .
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 5.04(a). ss

As shown above, Pohl agreed to share fees we share fees regarding his rollover cases
with Walker, Ladner, Seymour, Santana, Talley and numerous others, all of which are non-
lawyers.'© Also shown above, Pohl, Witians and Rusnak shared fees with these individuals
regarding their BP litigation! o

3. Rule 7.03 (b) & (d) i es:

(b) A lawyer shall not pay, give, or offer to pay or give anything of value to a person not
licensed to pace la for soliciting prospective clients for, or referring clients or
prospective om o, any lawyer or firm, . . .

(d) A focal not enter into an agreement for, charge for, or collect a fee for
profess} employment obtained in violation of Rule 7.03(a), (b), or (c).

TEX. Dwscrunyey R. PROF’L CONDUCT 7.03(b) & (4).
Sy
1© See Exhibits 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38,41 & 42.
163 See Exhibits 3, 4, 6, 8 & 9.
28

Clearly, the evidence provided herein demonstrates that Pohl violated this Rule by paying,
giving and offering to pay money to Ladner, Walker, Seymour, Santana, Talley and others.! The
agreements attached hereto also prove that Pohl entered into agreements for, charged for and
collected a fee for professional employment obtained in violation of Rule 7.03 PEL!

4. Rule 7.06 (a) & (b) provides: oy

(a) A lawyer shall not accept or continue employment in a matter When that employment
was procured by conduct prohibited by any of Rules 7.01 gh 7.05, 8.04(a))2), or
8.04(a)(9), engaged in by that lawyer personally or by, other person whom the
lawyer ordered, encouraged, or knowingly permitted tocenzage in such conduct.

(b) A lawyer shall not accept or continue employment in matter when the lawyer knows
or reasonably should know that employment w ocured by conduct prohibited by
any of Rules 7.01 through 7.05, 8.04(a)(2), or SS a)(9), engaged in by any person or
entity that is a shareholder, partner, or me ex , an associate in, or of counsel to that
lawyer’s firm; or by any other person wh y of the foregoing persons or entities
ordered, encouraged, or knowingly pee to engage in such conduct.

IN

TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 7 06(3) & (b).

The evidence above makes it sonal clear that Pohl, Williamson and Rusnak illegally
obtained clients through runners. Only.fter Walker was convicted of a felony and sent to prison

2 O
did these Lawyers attempt to “ee themselves from the runners and some of the ill-obtained
cases. However, Pohl, walgqson and Rusnak kept many of these clients in violation of Rule
7.06(a) & (b). In fact, Po conned to use the same runners with regard to the rollover accident
cases he was receiving nd then failed to withdraw in violation of the Rule.!®
NS
&
<
164 See Exhibits 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41 & 42
165 dd.
166 Td.
29

5. Rule 8.04 (a)(1)(2)(3)(9) & (12), & (b) provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not:

(1) Violate these rules, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through
the acts of another, whether or not such violation occurred in the course of a client-
lawyer relationship;

FS

(2) Commit a serious crime, or commit any other criminal act that fefec adversely
on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;

(3) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit orinisrepresentation, ..

(9) engage in conduct that constitutes barratry as defined by the law of this state; . . .

(12) violate any other laws of this state relating to théprofessional conduct of lawyers
and to the practice of law. GP

(b) As used in subsection (a)(2) of this Rule, “seri @erime” means barratry; any felony
involving moral turpitude, any misdem involving theft, embezzlement, or
fraudulent misappropriation of money or o property, or any attempt, conspiracy, or
solicitation of another to commit any <i crimes.

TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 7.066940, ),(3),(9) & (12), & (b).
O,
The overwhelming evidence provided erin, proves that Pohl, Williamson and Rusnak
violated each of these Rules. o
B. TEXAS PENAL CODE ViouAtio NS
1. Section 38.1204)
As shown above, Poht violated Section 38.12(a)(4) of the Texas Penal Code. This section
is violated if a ""ean intent to obtain an economic benefit...pays or gives or offers to pay
oS
or give a persggefebney or anything of value to solicit employment.” TEX. PENAL CODE §
38.12(a)(4). As demonstrated herein, Pohl paid runners, Ladner, Walker, Seymour, Santana, Talley
and others Wlions of dollars to solicit and gather clients for Pohl and his cohorts, not only for the
30

BP litigation, but also with regard to rollover cases.!§7 Pohl did so with the intent to obtain the
economic benefit of attorney’s fees. Thus, Pohl violated Section 38. 12(a)(4).
2. Sections 38.12(b)(1), (2) & (3):
Pohl violated Section 38.12(b)(1), (2) & (3) as well. These sections are viglated when one
(1) knowingly finances the commission of an offense under Subsection (a) oF Sesion 38.12, (2)
invests funds the person knows or believes are intended to further the commission of an offense
under Subsection (a) of Section 38.12 or (3) is a professional who kneel accepts employment
within the scope of the person’s license, registration, or crifation that results from the
solicitation of employment in violation of Subsection (a) of Seétion 38.12. TEX. PENAL CODE §
38.12(b). Clearly, the evidence provided herein sonst Pohl violated this section of the
Texas Penal Code as well.!® KR
3. Section 32.43(b): RS
Pohl further violated Section 22.43 th Texas Penal Code (commercial bribery). Section
32.43(b) of the Texas Penal Code prohibits fiduciary — such as a lawyer — from “intentionally or
knowingly” soliciting, accepting “or agrecing to accept any benefit from another person on
agreement or understanding bart benefit will influence the conduct of the fiduciary in relation
to the affairs of his bea TEX. PENAL CODE § 32.43(b). Pohl intentionally or knowingly
solicited, accepted, or agreed to accept a benefit from the Runners (the ability to represent Plaintiffs
in the rollover sete cases and to obtain the subsequent attorney’s fees therefrom) on the
serene’ oF ndestanding that the benefit received would influence the conduct of Pohl in
relation to the representation of clients in that Pohl breached duties to his clients as outlined above
by engaging in the deceptive barratry scheme.
167 See Exhibits 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41 & 42.
168 Tq.
31

it
CONCLUSION

Although many believe the contrary, no lawyer is above the law. And, although many look
the other way when it comes to case running, the violations outlined in this grievance cannot be
ignored. To do so, would make a mockery of the profession we call the pate fie It would
also serve as a shining example that Texas lawyers are incapable of slyegulaton and that the
State of Texas is incapable of preventing our lawyers from not only ting advantage of those in
need of legal services in Texas, but in other states as these Lawyef have.

The conduct outlined above is some of the most egregious conduct I have seen in more
than twenty-years of practicing legal malpractice. If en of these Lawyers is condoned,
the State Bar and the Texas Supreme Court should fepeal all of the Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct and issue an opinion ning all Texas lawyers that this type of conduct
is the standard for how lawyers may obtain a ie cases in Texas. Additionally, the statutes
regarding barratry will have no meaning and thus, the legislature should simply abolish those
statutes as well. 5 &

&
=) Respectfully submitted,
S&
&S a
, > Lance Christopher Kassab
iS
S$
32

Ih
LAW FIRM
July 3, 2018
ae
VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL (timothy.baldwin@texasbar. com) oy
Timothy J. Baldwin Be
Administrative Attorney “GO
The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel XG
4801 Woodway Drive, Suite 315-W °@
Houston, TX 7705661 ©)
: ®
Re: File No. 201801826: Grievance Concerning di Rusnak
File No. 201801825: Grievance Concerning ichael Pohl
Dear Mr. Baldwin:

Sent with this letter is a copy of the Re ito Ms. Rusnak’s response to the grievance.
Attached to the Reply as Exhibit “A” is a copy of M gdalena Santana’s deposition with all of the
exhibits.’ The deposition is more than 350 ges long and confirms everything in Ms. Santana’s
first affidavit. Of course, Rusnak and Poh-wil undoubted claim that Ms. Santana was coached
to say everything she said in her depositién, Owever, Common sense dictates that that would be
an impossibility due to the length, breadth and detail within of the deposition.

i)

Attached to this letter are bits “A,” “B,” “C,” “D,” “EB,” “EF” & “G”. Exhibit “A” is a
copy of a transcribed conversati etween Lance Kassab and Magdalena Santana wherein she
confirms that she was hired by—Precision Marketing to run cases for Pohl and Williamson2
Santana also confirms that Walker, Kirk Ladner and Steve Seymour were hired by Pohl
and Williamson.’ Jd. Eve himself has testified in an affidavit that Walker, Ladner and
Seymore were his représefitatives.4 The affidavit is attached hereto as Exhibit “B.” In his
affidavit, Pohl states, Ch addition to performing permissible public relations services for me,
Walker, Seymour, Ladner, and Robinson (and/or their companies) were my representatives for
purposes of perforthing client liaison services, client screening services, and evidence gathering
services in co on with BP oil spill claims and/or motor vehicle accident claims.” All this
corroborates x Santana has said in her first affidavit which Rusnak and Pohl now argue the
Bar should fe} consider.

1 Exhibit “A”
* Rusnak has been determined to be Williamson’s partner and a partner in the joint venture to obtain BP cases. See
Order from the Mississippi Federal Court attached to grievance.
3 Exhibit “A,” pp. 2, 4
* Exhibit “B,” par. 7
1214 Elgin Street | Houston | Texas | 77004 | p. 713.522.7400 f. 713.522.7410 | www.TexasLegalMalpractice.com

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 3, 2018
Page 2 of 3

Attached as Exhibit “C,” is the affidavit of Andrew Paul Mozingo who is an expert in
computer forensics. Mr. Mozingo pulled the text messages from Scott Walker’s cell phone. The
text messages between Walker and Pohl and Walker and Pohl’s paralegal, Edgar Jaimes also
corroborates Santana’s testimony from her first affidavit and deposition and shows how these
folks would visit hospitals, funerals and homes to sign up clients.

Exhibit “D” attached hereto is a spreadsheet showing the prentgs nP and his
joint ventures, Williamson and Rusnak paid to non-lawyers. As the Spreads indicates, these
runners were always paid their contract percentages of either 30% of the f or 22.5% of the
fees.° “GS

&

Exhibits “E”* and “F”” are documents which show that Pohl, Gniacted clients within days
of tragic accidents which claimed the lives of loved ones. These @optacts are clear violations of
the Texas Penal Code, Section 38.12(d)(2)(A). This section-de nes one act of barratry as
follows: oP

(d) A person commits an offense if the persone)

(1) Is an attorney, .. .

(2) With the intent to obtain Sonal employment for the person or for
another, provides or knowi permist to be provided to an individual who
has not sought the perso ployment, leg! representation, advice, or care a
written communication, 0 a solicitation, including a solicitation in person or
by telephone, that: ©
(A) Concerns Gon for personal injury or wrongful death or otherwise

relates to Ge rocident or disaster involving the person to whom the
communication or solicitation is provided or a relative of that person and
that vad provided before the 31% day after the date on which the accident
or ion occurred;

Clearly, Poh Violated the penal code in this manner® and thus, violated Texas
Disciplinary Rule of Pofesional Conduct, Rule 8.04 and then violated Rule 7.06 by continuing
employment. Po cepted employment of these two clients and continued employment with
these two clien ark Cheatham, Sr. and Lacy Reese). Moreover, Pohl violated Rule 1.03 by
failing to eee this material information to these two clients.
> Exhibit “D”
® Exhibit “E” (Email regarding contacting Lacy Reese within days of losing her husband in a rollover accident)

7 Exhibit “F” (Declaration of Mark Cheatham, Sr. wherein he states that he was contacted within a couple of days of
the tragic accident that claimed the lives of his loved ones, by people who he later found out were sent there by
Michael Pohl)

8 See Exhibits “E” & “F.” See also Pohl deposition (Exhibit “G,” pp. 80-83; 271-273 and 275). Thus, Pohl
contacted Mark Cheatham, Sr. and Lacy Reese within days from the tragic accidents that took the lives of their
loved ones in violation of the Texas Penal Code.

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 3, 2018
Page 3 of 3

Exhibit “G” is the deposition of Michael Pohl that was recently taken with all exhibits.
The deposition is telling in that he conveniently could not recall numerous pertinent fact, refused
to answer certain questions, and was generally combative throughout the deposition. Mr. Pohl
also accused Kassab of personally breaking into his office in Gulfport Mississippi and stole his
files and computers.” Here, Mr. Pohl admits that he was running a law office Mississippi”
Mr. Pohl also admits that he has an office in Tennessee.!! However, he i t licensed to
practice law in Tennessee. Mr. Pohl is also not licensed to practice law i Mississippi 2 By
operating a law firm in Tennessee and Mississippi without a license to practic law in those
states appears to violate Rules 5.05 and 7.01. XG)

&

Additionally, during Mr. Pohl’s deposition he came over to where my client, my nephew,
David Kassab and my client were talking and told my client that pe ever wanted to settle his
case to give him a call without his lawyers present.!? This appe S to be a violation of Texas
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 4.02. G

@

- Santana’s affidavit and the corroborating testimony-of Michael Pohl’s paralegal, Edgar
Jaimes, prove that Pohl paid Santana $50,000.00 in c rt her agreement not to testify against
him.'* This is not only a criminal act, it is a violationof Rules 3.04 and 8.04.

RY
es Sincerely,
S THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
© o FZ
ES “
O Lance Christopher Kassab

Cec: Billy Shepherd (bs So spcounsel.com)

Steve Bailey (sbailey(@spcounsel.com)

Gregg Weinberg gweinberg(@rmwbhlaw.com)

John Zavitsae ey (jzavitsanos(@azalaw.com)

Patrick “we ough (pyarborough@azalaw.com)

©

LCK/sg Sy
9 Exhibit “G,” pp. 87-93.
10 Td.
1] Exhibit “G,” pp. 44-46 (Pohl likely did have his Tennessee website approved by any state bar as well.)
12 Exhibit “G,” pp. 17-18.
13 Exhibit “G,” pp. 226-229,
'4 Edgar Jaimes’ deposition transcript will be forwarded next week after it has been transcribed.
15 See Chapter 36 of the Texas Penal Code.

LAW FIRM
July 20, 2018
ewe
ViA ELECTRONIC MAIL (timothy.baldwin@texasbar.com) oy
Timothy J. Baldwin 5 &
Administrative Attorney eS
The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel °F
4801 Woodway Drive, Suite 315-W &
Houston, TX 7705661
®

Re: File No. 201801825: Grievance Concerning Michael Pohl
Dear Mr. Baldwin: ©

[am in receipt of Michael Pohl’s Reply sted ly 17, 2018. Again, rather than address
the actual merits of the alleged rule violating Pod and his counsel throw more disparaging
remarks against me. In fact, essentially all 22 pages of the reply act out against me personally
rather than addressing the merits. So

)

Of course, there are too MG iicutons remarks to address in a short time, nonetheless,
there are several that should bé mentioned. First of all, they criticize me for asking for additional
time to address all of te disparaging remarks against me personally in addition to
supplementing the gribwanc and then they also criticize me for not addressing the disparaging
remarks. As you inay remember, on July 2, 2018, I requested an additional 30 days to respond,

wS
however, shesy thereafter you told me that I could not be granted 30 days. Therefore, I
attempted tp cobble together additional documents that I thought would be pertinent for your
review in a short amount of time. With not much time to respond, I thought the documents
pertaining to the grievance were more important than addressing Pohl’s personal attacks.
Obviously, Pohl and his counsel disagree.
1214 Elgin Street | Houston | Texas | 77004 |p. 713.522.7400 f. 713.522.7410 | www.TexasLegalMalpractice.com

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 2 of 17
Additionally, Pohl and his lawyers state that I have “blatantly” mischaracterized Pohl’s
50,000.00 payment to Magdalena Santana (“Santana”). Unbelievably, Pohl and his lawyers state
that the $50,000.00 cash payment was for what they attempt to describe as ajo release”
that “included a standard non-disparagement clause. . . .”! Notably, nownefe.in the “agreement”
are the words, “non-disparagement.” What is also notable is that Senin crossed out the words
“in order to clear my conscience and set the record straight.” She also crossed out the words,
“These charges [(referring to the previous claims and ategsion she made against Pohl and
others concerning barratry)] were made by me when Sra in dire need of money and not
thinking clearly.”? The only inference that can be nade Santana crossing out these statements
was that she was thinking with a clear mind win se made the allegations against Pohl and
others, that she wanted to set the record seat and that she was not in dire need of money.

Not only are my characterizations of the $50,000.00 cash payment accurate, Pohl and his
lawyers are hypocrites in that they blatantly” mischaracterize my agreement with an expert
witness. Pohl and his lawyers éapanery lie to you by stating over and over and over again that
I “knowingly purchased cident records stolen from Pohl and improperly solicited Pohl’s
clients based on that itGopiation.” Any examination of the agreement that these lawyers cite to
as their proof i assertion contradicts this statement. These lawyers cannot cite to or
provide any poo! of their claim. Yet, they contort the truth to disparage me in a feeble ad
hominem aitempt to direct the focus away from Pohl. This is truly shameful.

1 Pohl’s Reply, p. 14.
? Exhibit 16 to Pohl’s Reply.
3 Pohl’s Reply, p. 1.

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 3 of 17
In any event, in order to make their statement that I have “blatantly” mischaracterized the
$50,000.00 cash payment to Santana, these lawyers state, “Rather, the agreement sought to
prevent Santana from further ‘publishing’ or relating to third parties her allegations of wrongful
eS
conduct.” Actually, the agreement that Santana was forced to sign before Reon get paid
states: ES
nS)
FOR THE SUM OF $100 AND OTHER CONSIDERATIO $50,000.00 IN
CASH] RECEIVED I AGREE TO TODAY AND FROM EFORTH NOT
TO PUBLISH IN WRITING OR BY ELECTRONIC ANY CHARGES
OF WRONGDOING, CRIMNAL CONDUCT, ILLEGAL CONDUCT OR
UNETHICAL CONDUCT AND SHALL NOT RELATE SUCH CHARGES TO
ANYONE VERBALLY .* S
Agreeing “not publish in writing or by cect mail any charges of wrongdoing,
criminal conduct, illegal conduct or unethical uct” against Pohl, and agreeing “not to
INN
relate such charges [regarding Pohl] to anyovie verbally” is an agreement not to testify against
Pohl. Who are these guys kidding? What does this mean? Yet, incredibly, these same
lawyers argue to you that a retainer agreement with an expert witness means I “knowingly
purchased confidential records sdien from Pohl and improperly solicited Pohl’s clients based on
that information.” Their ey remarkable.
Another cul tendency to skew the truth may be found on page four of Pohl’s
Reply. There, they Eapsesent to you and this forum that: .
of
NS
It is also(uncontroverted that Walker and his partners in the alleged “barratry
conspiracy,” Steve Seymour (Seymour”) and Kirk Ladner (“Ladner”), held
the es out as having expertise in marketing/public relations services,
repre nted to Pohl that they operated under the guidance of experienced
issippi attorneys to ensure the propriety of their marketing activities, and
did, in fact, obtain review and approval of their marketing activities from
several Mississippi lawyers.°
* Exhibit 16 to Pohl’s Reply (emphasis added).
> Page 4 of Pohl’s Reply (emphasis added).

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 4 of 17
First, these lawyers cite you to page 194-195 of Mr. Walker’s deposition as support for
this representation. They make this representation to you as though Mr. Walker testified that he,
Ladner and Seymour “operated under the guidance of experienced Mississippi. ‘attorneys to
‘ . . . age . NS
ensure the propriety of their marketing activities, and did, in fact, obtain review and approval of
their marketing activities from several Mississippi lawyers.” Yet, Mr. Walker says nothing of
the sort. In fact, Mr. Walker states the complete opposite. He sate
They—when you say approved by many attorneys, that~Qhat’s the contracts, the
May 25"" and July 15"" contracts that have been wri by -- that were written
by Pohl and looked at by five or six attorneys. T, are the contracts. Now,
the inner workings of $5 million of barratry mate that came through, that’s
not attorneys approving that. I mean, this — ) re approving the little generic
one-page contracts that I know now today, not’on June 17"" of ’13 but today, I
know were written just to protect Mr. Pohl abd Mr Williamson.°
| WS
In fact, Mr. Walker continues to state under oath"" We were training the field workers of Jimmy
Williamson and Michael Pohl to go agen solicit contracts.”’ Of course, Pohl and his
lawyers fail to direct you to this portion, of the testimony. These lawyers must believe that you
eO)
will simply take their word fae is written in the Reply and not care to read the actual
testimony. Additionally, they would rather criticize and disparage me for bringing this conduct to
the State Bar’s tention ae the State Bar the truth.
Pohl and his Nawyers go on to state that I concealed from Pohl and this forum my
of
NS
possession of atelephone recording of Ms. Santana that “contradicts the factual premise” of the
grievance. These lawyers then cherry pick a portion of the transcript they believe contradicts the
factual wee of the grievance (which it does not). Again, of course, these lawyers fail to cite
the portion of the transcript that fully supports the “premise of the grievance.” Moreover, they
6 Exhibit 3 to Pohl’s Reply, (excerpt of Walker’s depo, p. 195, In. 16 through p. 196, In. 3) (emphasis added).
7 Exhibit 3 to Pohl’s Reply, (excerpt of Walker’s depo, p. 196, Ins. 23-26) (emphasis added).

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 5 of 17
fail to cite to you another transcribed recording of Ms. Santana that further supports the “premise
of the grievance.”
Regarding the statements made in the first Santana transcript that these layers conceal
EN
from you, the conversation is this: oy
Ms. Santana: Is there any way that I can sue them at all? &
S
Mr. Kassab: Sue Pohl and those guys? ES
°@
Ms. Santana: Pohl and the guys that actually started the Scheme. Scott Walker, Steve
Seymore, Kirk Latner (sic). &
Mr. Kassab: And Williamson and all those guys? &
S
Ms. Santana: Yes®
ah
Mr. Kassab: Yeah, my understandin from talking to you and to other people, was
that Pohl and Willia are the ones who came up with it and they just
hired Walker and thes olks.
Ms. Santana: The marketing?
SE)
Mr. Kassab: Yeah, the marketing company.
Ms. Santana: Chain ef mma I guess.
Mr. Kassab: Yost and hired people like you to go out and actually do it. But the
iat eting company, my understanding is the marking (sic) guys, were
hired by Pohl and Williamson to do all this. They didn’t know how to do
Ort. I mean, it wasn’t their idea. Isn’t that your understanding?
ge
Ms. Santana Yeah.
©
Mi Kassab: But isn’t that your understanding?
Ms. Santana: it makes sense now. I guess it went through a chain of command.’
® Exhibit 13 to Pohl’s Reply, p. 2-3.
° Exhibit 13 to Pohl’s Reply, pp. 4-5.

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 6 of 17
There was no “coax” of Santana. She made these statements of her own free will. In
fact, as can be seen in the transcript, the question is asked, “Isn’t that your understanding?”
Santana was free to say “no” but she didn’t. Santana confirmed that it was through a chain of
command with Pohl and Williamson at the top. Of course, Pohl himself confined this point
when he finally admitted in his own affidavit that Walker, Ladner Sr were his
representatives.'° In his affidavit, Pohl stated under oath that, “Sk addition to performing
permissible public relations services for me, Walker, Seymour, {adner, and Robinson (and/or
their companies) were my representatives for purposes of verfoming client liaison services,
client screening services, and evidence gathering services connection with BP oil spill claims
and/or motor vehicle accident claims.” This admicton confirms what Santana stated in the
transcript. Interestingly, although Pohl sie tt hired to Walker, Seymour, Ladner and
Robinson to perform “permissible” public ton services for him, Pohl fails to state that he
hired these folks to perform “permissible"" “client liaison services, client screening services, and
evidence gathering services in conneetion with BP oil spill claims and/or motor vehicle accident
claims.” Most likely because knew that the services these folks were providing was not
“permissible.” ©)
Additionally, Pht and his lawyer’s statement that I “concealed” this transcript from the
OCDC is preposten@: The transcript supports the grievance, thus, there would be no reason to
conceal it. re a so many documents that support the grievance and only so much time to
prepare a Btievance, It is surprising that Pohl and his lawyers do not cite some of the thousands
of other documents that did not make it into the grievance and state that I “concealed” those as
well in their attempt to shine the focus away from Pohl.
'° Exhibit “B,” par. 7 attached to July 3, 2018 letter to Mr. Baldwin.

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 7 of 17
The second conversation with Santana also supports the “premise of the grievance.”
Since Pohl and his lawyers failed to provide you a copy of this conversation, I guess they
“concealed” it from you as well. It makes sense that they would intentional} conceal this
because it is not only devastating to their position, it shows that one of the awe zo her to sign
the second affidavit"" that Pohl and his lawyers attempt to use as evidence that the first affidavit
SS
is false. In the transcript, Santana infers that I should pay her for het help and pay her for the
; SS
documents she is in possession of. Of course, I decline. Noneties it is obvious from the full
conversation t that she was paid by one of the lawyers to sign the second affidavit. Pohl and his
lawyers know this, yet have done nothing to bring this tote tight Rather, they have suppressed
this information and even concealed this conversation om you even though they had a copy of
the recording when they filed their Reply on sly 7,201 8.1?

In any event, I have transcribed the seording and it is attached hereto as Exhibit “1.” In
the conversation, Santana states that there aire numerous lawyers in Texas that have approached
her to do what she was doing ee She states, “I can name ten lawyers right now that do
the same thing in Texas. The thing.”'* Ms. Santana also states, “Michael Pohl was not the
only attorney that spproacied me."" Santana also states that after researching that I handle
malpractice claims agdinst lawyers and what that means in the law industry, she said to herself,

IN
o
I Exhibit 1, per
2 A copy Sao oduced to them on July 9, 2018.
'3 Exhibit 1, pp. 7-8
4 Id. p.7.
15 Td.

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 8 of 17
“oh, my God, these guys then should be punished. .. ””!* She goes on to state that, “After [Pohl]
taught me the ropes, then I would run into other attorneys doing his dirty work. I — other
attorneys approached me, you know.”!” She stated that “They’ve even got diplomates involved,
embassy. Consulate lawyers and diplomats. It’s a big scheme.”!® Santana sii and states,
“Yeah. Well, this is a nationwide scheme, and they’re all over the place. Chey're in New York,
they’re in Washington, they’re in Florida. They’re in Texas. Oktaidm, They’re in Mexico
over the border, the Paisano brothers, those brothers, these other snore. It’s unreal.””!9
To further support the “premise of the grievance fei Pohl, and to assist you in
combing through this evidence, I will cite to you speciforton of the testimony and evidence
already provided. If it is not something previously prove it is being provided in the email or a
by way of a link referenced therein. If I have invertenty omitted any of the items that I cite,
please let me know and I will provide it. LV
Walker testified that although he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or “marketing
money” it was “clear to [him] it, was barratry? In fact, Walker considered himself and his
iS
company “a pass-through fot barratry money.””! All total, Walker, Ladner and Precision
Marketing received over $5 lion in “barratry pass-through money” from Pohl and other
lawyers to solicit acciept victims and potential clients with claims, both auto-accident victims
©
16 Td, p. 6. &S
7 Td, pp. 18.0
18 Id. p. SS
19 Id, p. 10.
© Deposition of Scott Walker, p. 149.
""1 Deposition of Scott Walker, p. 197:6-7.

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 9 of 17
and those involved in the BP Deepwater Horizon litigation.” They would use this money to pay
contract workers to solicit clients.”> They would locate and instruct contract workers on how to
accomplish the solicitation. They trained “40 or 50 people” on how to “go gen solicit
contracts,” oy
One of these workers was Magdalena Santana (“Santana”). In her September 24, 2016
; Ss
affidavit, Santana testified that Pohl sent her on dozens and dozens ofe r wreck cases all over
the country.”* Pohl would email Santana the link of news covedSp depicting the accident and
ask her “to go to the victim or the victim’s family and try Ke them to sign up with him.”27
Pohl offered to give Santana “$5,000 per case that [a Sane plus a percentage of his
attorney’s fees.”** Santana was advised by Pohl to be peste even if the family ... rejected
[her].”’° Santana was instructed by Pohl to “apse the victims and their families while they
were vulnerable, in the emergency room the hospital rooms or at the funerals.”2° Pohl told
Santana that minorities “were especially vilnerable since they tended not to know that the law
prohibited barratry.”>! Aco Fo they “were easier to sign up.”22
©
*2 Deposition of Scott Walker, reas 74:1-25; 75-1-15,
3 Deposition of Scott vate
4 Deposition of Scott vale p. 77-78.
25 Deposition of Set Water p. 196-197,
26 Santana atid 17.
cal Santana Aiigavi 417.
*8 Santana Affidavit, J 18.
?° Santana Affidavit, { 19.
%° Santana Affidavit, 7 19.
*! Santana Affidavit, {| 19 (emphasis added).

Timothy J. Baldwin

July 20, 2018

Page 10 of 17

Pohl would give Santana “money to give to the victims or their families” but “only if they

agreed to sign a Pohl representation contract.”33 Pohl advised Santana that the money was a “foot
in the door” but instructed Santana not to mention that she was there on behalf or erver “until
after they agreed to take the money.”*4 “If the client agreed to hire Pohl, the [Stang was to
have the client sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.”°5 Pohl would then give Santana the money to
pay the client “from his own Helping Hands company.” When Saplina questioned this, Pohl
told Santana that it “was illegal for him to pay [her] directly for ce) and that’s why the money
had to go through some company.”37 &

Defendants may take the position that Santa rate this affidavit through a
December 19, 2017 affidavit produced in this case. Thi purported retraction is likely the result
of Pohl paying Santana to provide testimony, wich is something he has done in the past.3? In
fact, Pohl’s own paralegal, Edgar Jaimes Caimes, testified that on one occasion Pohl sent him
to Florida with a suit case filled with $50,000 cash to give to Santana in exchange for her signing
an affidavit for him.*° Jaimes ian Santana would only get the money if she signed the

©

2 Santana Affidavit, 19. S

33 Santana Affidavit, J 17. ©

34 Santana Affidavit, so

5 Santana Aerial 24

36 Santana ‘ee 424.

*7 Santana Affidavit, § 23.

*8 December 19, 2017 Santana Affidavit.

39 Exhibit 2 - Deposition of Edgar Jaimes, pp. 371-373.
* Exhibit 2 - Deposition of Edgar Jaimes, pp. 371-373,

Timothy J. Baldwin

July 20, 2018

Page 11 of 17

statement for Pohl.*’ Jaimes testified that Santana signed the signed the statement and got the
money.”

Santana went into more detail about this in her deposition. Santana teste at that the
statement was an agreement for her to keep quiet and not charge Pohl with ny srongdoing or
criminal or unethical conduct.*? Santana testified that Pohl paid her $50,000 cash to sign this
statement, which was delivered by Jaimes in three bags marked “tick reat."" Very symbolic
given that Santana had been tricked by Pohl into soliciting aliens him and was now being
treated the money she claimed was due just to stay quite. Sen iterated that if she didn’t sign
the gag agreement, she wouldn’t get the money from Pohl Santana attempted to indicate on the
agreement that she was receiving $50,000 to keep quik Jaimes told her Pohl demanded that
she state she only received nominal consideain, like $100.%° Santana did not write the
statement but “just signed it’4” because ob ta she was “forced to sign” it*® while “under
duress.””? Santana’s December 19, 2017 affidavit produced by Pohl in this case is likely the

result of similar duress and pacino

©

“| Exhibit 2 — Deposition of Eager Jaitnes, pp. 373-374.
“ Exhibit 2 — Deposition of Bdgar Jaimes, pp. 373-374,
4 Exhibit 3 — Sentane XSi, Vol. I, p. 153.

“4 Exhibit 3 — seis Deposition, Vol. I, p. 122-127.

4° Exhibit 3 ~ Sento Deposition, Vol. I, p. 131.

7 echt Sdcotan Deposition, Vol. II, p. 346.
47 Exhibit 3 — Santana Deposition, Vol. I, p. 153.
“8 Exhibit 3 — Santana Deposition, Vol. I, p. 155.
“? Exhibit 4 — Santana Deposition, Vol. II, p. 309.

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 12 of 17
Notably, nowhere in Santana’s December 19"" affidavit does she state the testimony in
her former affidavit is untrue, only that she does not “agree with” it and that the affidavit is not
“reliable.”°? Although Santana states in her December 19"" affidavit that her priox affidavit was
drafted by a lawyer, Santana testified in her deposition that the Stone 2 affidavit was
created voluntarily with her own “testimony.”>' Santana testified that, unbike- with Pohl, she was
not paid and had never been promised any money to provide the testing in the September 24
affidavit.** Santana reiterated to counsel for Pohl, Billy sheph& that she was there in her
deposition to tell the truth and would not be bullied by his aeftioing or his efforts to confuse
her. ©
Regardless, Santana confirmed most of the fa set forth in her initial affidavit in her
deposition™ and this deposition testimony was na etracted. There, Santana confirmed that she
was hired by Pohl to solicit auto accident the first one being an accident where a woman
and her unborn child lost their lives.° Senfana was instructed by Walker, who was instructed by
Pohl, to go to personally visit thec mother of the deceased and sign her up to sue the tire
manufacturer — if she suits fo would pay her $5,000.°’ Santana visited the funeral of the
s\
a
°° December 19, 2017 Sant ffidavit,
> Exhibit 4 — Santana 2G Ston, Vol. II, p. 270-271.
52 Exhibit 4 — Sane Deposition Vol. II, p. 276-278.
3 Exhibit 3 — Sontans Deposition, Vol. I, p. 176.
4 Exhibit SQ vane Deposition, Vol. I; Exhibit 4 — Santana Deposition, Vol. II.
55 See December 19, 2017 Santana Affidavit.
°° Exhibit 3 — Santana Deposition, Vol, I, p. 37.
°” Exhibit 3 — Santana Deposition, Vol, I, p. 37-38.

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 13 of 17
deceased and got the family to feel comfortable with her.°® At first the mother was grieving, but
Pohl told Santana: “take no prisoners, this is a cut throat business, you get in there and you do
whatever it takes to get this client.”°° The solicitation was successful after Pohl gave Santana
$2,000 for her to “give to the client to convince her into signing over with he
After that, Santana attempted to solicit about “forty to fifty” auto accident cases for Pohl
from Texas to Florida.®' About fifteen to eighteen cases were sul signed up. Pohl would
send Santana a web link with information about the accident and dre the potential client may
be found and she would hit the ground running.® Santana sid clients for Pohl in “hospitals,
funeral homes, you name it.” Pohl instructed Santana tng minorities because they are
“unrecognized to the law” and “they don’t know he In an effort to circumvent the law,
Santana was instructed to have the client call Polis that it would look like the client made the
initial contact with the lawyer. Santana wold oer the clients money to sign with Pohl but had
explicit instructions from Pohl: “If they don't sign they don't get no money.”®” In short, “no
ee
*8 Exhibit 3 — Santana Deposition, @) p. 37-38.
°° Exhibit 3 — Santana a.) I, p. 39.
% Exhibit 3 — Santana Dep4eitidn, Vol. I, p. 40.
5! Exhibit 3 — Santana So, Vol. I, p. 43.
6 Exhibit 3 — Sane Depstn Vol. I, p. 46-47
© Exhibit 3 — Sine Deposition, Vol. I, p. 54.
84 er ee Deposition, Vol. I, p. 52.
°° Exhibit 3 — Santana Deposition, Vol. I, p. 52.
°° Exhibit 3 — Santana Deposition, Vol. I, p. 60.
§7 Exhibit 3 — Santana Deposition, Vol. I, p, 42.

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 14 of 17
signature, no money.”® Santana testified in her deposition that was paid $2,500 for every client
she signed up and was “promised a percentage in the back end” by Pohl and Walker.© Pohl told
Santana that the money would have to go through Walker’s company Precisiqn, Marketing
because it “was illegal for him to give [her] the money directly.””° oe
Another of Pohl’s solicitors was Kenneth Talley (“Talley”), who Solicited over 20 auto
accident cases for Pohl.’ Talley testified that he was first hired by! Walker in relation to BP
claims to find “folks that lost money due to the oil spill” and «si hem up” and “get a fee for
it.””? Talley went to work “knocking on doors” looking for Sn claimants for Pohl and his
partner, Jimmy Williamson (“Williamson”).” Talley sélcted and signed up for Pohl and
Williamson more than 800 BP claims.” Talley wa between $75 and $350 for each BP
client he signed up.” ~
Talley eventually switched to soliciting aut accident victims and “calling on folks that
had bad accidents” with the first being @ Victim that was in “the hospital in intensive care.”
Talley carried with him up to get pay the accident victims to “help them with problems”
©
68 Exhibit 3 — Santana Deposit, Vol I, p. 66.
© Exhibit 3 — Santana Depbsition, Vol. I, p. 47.
7 Exhibit 3 — Santana Depion Vol. I, p. 72.
7 Exhibit 5 — Dep of Kenneth Talley, p. 87.
” Exhibit 5 — Depebition of Kenneth Talley, p. 10.
73 Exhibit SS Merosition of Kenneth Talley, p. 10-11.
™ Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 11.
® Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 19.
7 Exhibit 5 ~ Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 37.

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 15 of 17
once they “were signed up.””’ Talley kept a list of all the auto accident cases he solicited.78
Talley followed a checklist that instructed him to, among other things, bring flowers to the initial
hospital visit (but to spend no more than $50) and to offer the victims money butte “make sure
the funding schedule” from Helping Hands Financing — Donalda Pohl’s cose managed by
Pohl’s paralegal Jaimes — “is filled out properly before releasing any cash” Talley would
S
advise the victims that he had attorneys who could help them, and that ne of those attorneys was
NS
Pohl.*° Talley was paid a fee of $1,400 plus his expenses by Poh{thtough Walker, for any auto
accident case he solicited.*! On some cases, including the Chesifiam case, Talley was to receive a
portion of the fee paid to Helping Hands Group out of Poh atomey’ fees.* Talley discussed
with Pohl the “percentage of settlements” he was to ser from the cases he solicited and Pohl
told Talley that the money was being placed iin “escrow account” for him.®? When asked
whether Pohl knew he was getting paid to “ntact vehicle accident victims,” Talley responded,
“the money was coming from Edgar [laintes] who worked for him.”** Although his paycheck
was from Walker’s company, “tates came by way of Edgar [Jaimes].”®
77 Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kenifedt alley, p. 38.
Or
78 Exhibit 5 — Deposition ofKehneth Talley, p. 43-44; Exhibit 6— Talley Exhibit 165.
7 ~~
9 Exhibit 7 — Talley Exhibit 168.
8 Exhibit 5 — Destin of Kenneth Talley, p. 47.
8! Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 47-48.
82 Exhibit 3 Serosition of Kenneth Talley, p. 97-98; 102.
* Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 99.
%4 Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 100.
* Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 100.

Timothy J. Baldwin

July 20, 2018

Page 16 of 17

Personally soliciting clients for Pohl became so frequent that Talley began carrying with

him blank Pohl contracts to each solicitation.® Talley would refer the potential clients to
“attorneys out of Houston that were the best at handling these types of soared would
offer to give the potential clients “money up front.”®” Talley would only rcopinii Pohl and no
other lawyer.** Talley would have no “reason not to mention Mr. Pohl’s fame.” Talley would
not tell the clients that he was getting paid to solicit them.” Talley weil present a Pohl contract
to the potential client.”' If the client did not sign up, the clients wid ot get the money.” Talley
testified that Edgar and Donalda would send him the money 3?

Both Talley and Pohl knew that what they were ding a illegal. In one instance, Talley
was “run out of town” while soliciting clients for Poh Talley testified during the attempted
solicitation he was told by a “lawyer or police that “it was against the law what [he] was
doing.”** Talley mentioned this to Pohl and Pod tol him “‘you’ve just got to leave...some people
you can’t help.” S

Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kenneth Tate, p. 49.

87 Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kennet ‘oy p. 54.

88 Exhibit 5 — Deposition of coh p. 59.

% Exhibit 5 — Deposition ofKehneth Talley, p. 108.
5° Exhibit 5 — Deposit Kenneth Talley, p. 58; 109.
5! Exhibit 5 — Destin of Kenneth Talley, p. 89.

92 Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 58-59.
3 Exhibit 3S position of Kenneth Talley, p. 86.

* Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 84.

°5 Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 84.
*6 Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 85.

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 17 of 17
Mr. Baldwin, this is just a fraction of the evidence that I have mounted against Pohl and
his conspirators through my efforts to bring my clients justice. I continue to gather evidence as
my cases proceed, but I believe the information that has been submitted already. provides more
eS
than just cause to discipline Pohl and keep him from engaging in these peedtory barratry
practices. We are supposed to be a self-regulating profession. I am taking fixe out of my practice
eS
and my life with my family to inform the State Bar of the unethical coe that I have witnessed
WS
as I have an obligation to do under the disciplinary rules. I do this Sveh though I get ridiculed and
Z)
threatened by opposing counsel. I do this because I am hopefuf that the State Bar will protect the
public from lawyers like Pohl. ©
sheet
<a KASSAB LAW FIRM
&
© r
© oo
@ Lance Christopher Kassab
&
Cc: Billy Shepherd (shedaspcounselcom
Steve Bailey “ee spcounsel.com)
aN
O
LCK/dek &
&

a
1) <assab
LAW FIRM
October 19, 2018
vs
VIA ELECTRONIC MAU. (timothy.baldwin ‘@texasbar.com) oy
Timothy J. Baldwin . &
Administrative Attorney ~S
The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel 5 eS
4801 Woodway Drive, Suite 315-W &
Houston, TX 7705661 a
Re: File No. 201801826: Grievance Concernin: di Rusnak
File No. 201801825: Grievance Concerni ichael Pohl
Dear Mr. Baldwin:

J am in receipt of your letters dated October 15, 2018, notifying me that the complaints I
filed against Cyndi Rusnak and Michael Pohl een placed on a Summary Disposition Panel
docket. My understanding of what this is that the Chief Disciplinary Counsel has
recommended that the grievances be summatily dismissed.

I have informed you and the Seis Bar that I have a plethora of documents and swom
testimony from witnesses and even the actual Tunners who were hired and paid by these lawyers
to conduct their illegal and im Oper solicitation of clients and invited you to peruse this
evidence as part of your investi mn because it was too much to simply put in the complaint.
However, I have never been acted by anyone to come view this evidence, Therefore, no
effort to review evidence and/or conduct a meaningful investigation has occurred. Obviously,

there truly are good reasongy, our State Bar gets a D minus compared to other State Bars.
©

I have brought these grievances as I am required to do pursuant to Rule 8.03. However,
instead of a thorough vestigation, I have been subjected to insults, criticisms, lies and outright
slander as to my°’edrduct and integrity in attempting to uphold the rule of law, the rules of

professional duct and the barratry statutes created by the Texas Legislature. It appears to me
that the oppo side only needs to state that I have filed these grievances to “gain an advantage
in litigation?and the State Bar then summarily dismisses the grievances. Lawyers like me, who
handle | alpractice cases, are the ones that see the violations of the rules, yet when we file
grievances-we are immediately accused of attempting to gain an advantage in litigation. I can
assure you there is never an advantage to filing a grievance while civil litigation is pending. In
fact, in my experience, it is a detriment. A while back a lawyer from the State Bar actually
admitted to me that there is an unwritten rule at the State Bar to summarily dismiss bar violations
when civil litigation is pending. Apparently, this is the case here as well.

1214 Elgin Street | Houston | Texas | 77004 | p. 713.522.7400 £7 13.522.7410 | www.TexasLegalMalpractice.com

Timothy J. Baldwin
October 19, 2018
Page 2 of 2
The State Bar should abolish Rule 8.03 if it has no meaning. Why follow Rule 8.03 or
have the Rule if the State Bar is set on summarily dismissing grievances filed under that Rule
without any investigation? Why file ethics complaints at all if there is pending civil litigation if
litigation nullifies ethics rules in the eyes of the State Bar? Why bring blatant S violations to
the State Bar’s attention if the State Bar refuses to even look at the evid Why have the
State Bar “enforce” disciplinary rules when it refuses to any more than wea district attorney’s
office can do already, as with theft of client property? AG)
SS
You can go ahead and file a grievance against me and sanctips me right now because I
will no longer follow Rule 8.03. [ will no longer waste my tig pid effort trying to help the
State Bar keep unscrupulous lawyers in check by filing ethics plaints when I see corrupt
behavior. Instead, I will work harder on exposing lawyers t public at large so, hopefully,
Texans will not be harmed by unscrupulous lawyers since tate Bar refuses to do the job it
has been given. And, I will work harder on exposing the Texas State Bar’s failings until the day”
the State Bar actually tries to protect Texans. Apparently, this is the only way lawyers can
actually self-regulate to help the public at large.
sh
s Sincerely,
< THE KASSAB LAW FirM
© PP
& ~~ Lance Christopher Kassab
S
Cc: — Randy Sorrels ©
aN
3
&
<
LeK/amS"
7,2018-10-24,MTD,Kassab,TCPA Motion to Dismiss,"Kassab's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to the Texas Citizens Participation Act (Anti-SLAPP), filed October 24, 2018","Filed simultaneously with Kassab's First Amended Answer on October 24, 2018, before Judge Bill Burke, 189th Judicial District. This is an early dispositive motion seeking dismissal of all of Pohl's claims under the TCPA's anti-SLAPP framework. The motion was ultimately denied.",TCPA-1,DENIED,Phase 1,2018-10-24_MTD_Kassab-TCPA_FILED.pdf,"Dismiss all of Pohl's claims under the TCPA; award Kassab $36,750 in attorney's fees ($31,500 for Kassab at $450/hr for 70 hours, $5,250 for associate at $350/hr for 15 hours); conditional appellate fees totaling $90,000; and sanctions of at least $50,000 against Pohl and his counsel Reynolds Frizzell","10/24/2018 2:11 PM
Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 28523758
By: ARIONNE MCNEAL
Filed: 10/24/2018 2:11 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIAkL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND LANCE CHlRISTOPHER
KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAW FIRM’S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT
TO THE TEXAS CITIZENS PARTICIPATION AcCT
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE BILL BURKE: s
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab,
P.C. d/b/a/ The Kassab Law Firm files this, their Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to the Texas
Citizens Participation Act set forth in Chapter 27 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
SUMMlARY
This is a retaliatory lawsuit filed bMy Plaintiff, Michael A. Pohl and his law firm, Law
Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC (“Poohl”) that is based on, related to, and in response to the
rights to free speech, petition and association, and should therefore be dismissed pursuant to the
Texas Citizens Participation Act (the “TCPA”). Defendants, Lance Christopher Kassab and
Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a/ The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab”) represent more than
400 clients who were illegally and unethically personally solicited to hire Pohl for representation
of them in claimcs stemming from catastrophic auto accidents or the BP Deepwater Horizon
litigation. Kassab filed four separate lawsuits against Pohl on behalf of these clients alleging
claims for civil barratry. In addition, Kassab filed and initiated several grievance proceedings on
behalf of these clients, causing the State Bar of Texas to investigate the alleged barratry, which is
prohibited by the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct and the Texas Penal Code.
In response, Pohl filed this lawsuit against Kassab, alleging claims of conversion, theft of trade
secrets and civil conspiracy, claiming Kassab conspired with others to steal Pohl’s property and
solicit his former clients or prospective clients to sue him for barratry.1 Because this lawsuit is
related to Kassab’s right to free speech, right to associate with his own clients, and right to
petition, it must be dismissed pursuant to the TCPA and attorney’s fees must be awkarded.
II l
EVIDENCE
A motion to dismiss pursuant to the TCPA may be supported bry evidence. See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(b). Attached hereto and incorporateDd by reference for all purposes
herein is the following evidence: s
Exhibit 1 – Declaration of Lance Christopher Kasrsab.
Exhibit 2 – Second Amended Petition filed in Walker v. Pohl.
Exhibit 3 – Affidavit of Scott Walker datled April 29, 2017.
Exhibit 4 – Scott Walker DepositioMn Excerpts (August 24, 2016).
Exhibit 5 – Scott Walker Deposoition Excerpts (September 2018).
Exhibit 6 – Affidavit of Magdalena Santana dated September 24, 2016.
Exhibit 7 – Edgar Jaimes Deposition Excerpts (June 26, 2018).
Exhibit 8 – Magdalena Santana Deposition Excerpts, Vol 1 (November 8, 2016).
Exhibit 9 – Magdalena Santana Deposition Excerpts, Vol 1I (November 8, 2016).
Exhibit 1c0 – Affidavit of Magdalena Santana dated December 19, 2017.
Exhibit 11 – Kenneth Talley Deposition Excerpts (November 16, 2016).
Exhibit 12 – Walker Memorandum Opinion (Doc. No. 475)
Exhibit 13 – Walker Pohl Memorandum (Doc. No. 175)
Exhibit 14 – Walker Order on Pohl Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 252)
1 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, ¶¶ 19-28.
Exhibit 15 – Walker Judgment (Doc. No. 499).
Exhibit 16 – State Bar Approvals.
Exhibit 17 – Brumfield Third Amended Petition.
Exhibit 18 – Gandy Third Amended Petition. r
Exhibit 19 – Berry Fifth Amended Petition.
Exhibit 20 – Cheatham Fourth Amended Petition. r
Exhibit 21 – Grievance Pleadings Filed Against Pohl. D
Exhibit 22 – August 10, 2016 Affidavit of Scott Favres.
Exhibit 23 – May 15, 2018 Deposition of Michaerl A. Pohl.
Exhibit 24 – June 19, 2018 Affidavit of Michael Pohl.
Exhibit 25 – August 30, 2016 Depositionl of Michael Pohl.
Exhibit 26 – Pohl Amended ComplMaint in Mississippi Litigation.
Exhibit 27 – Gauthia Motion foor Sanctions.
Exhibit 28 – Gauthia Response to Motion for Sanctions.
Exhibit 29 – June 28, 2018 Order Denying Sanction.
Exhibit 30 – August 24, 2018 Order Denying Counter-Sanctions.
Exhibit 31 – Pohl’s Third Party Petition filed in Cheatham.
Exhibit 3c2 – June 23, 2018 Order Denying Motion to File Third Party Petition.
U III
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Kassab is a licensed Texas attorney who has been practicing law for more than twenty
years.2 Kassab graduated from law school with honors and was editor-in-chief of law review.3
2 Exhibit 1 (Declaration of Lance Christopher Kassab), p.
Kassab was formerly a Briefing Attorney for the First Judicial District Court of Appeals in
Houston, Texas and is a former intern for the First Judicial District Court of Appeals and the
Texas Supreme Court.4 For the past twenty years, Kassab’s practice has focused primarily on
representing victims of legal malpractice and publicly exposing attorney miscondukct.5
A. Michael Pohl is sued by Mississippi runners who expose lthe illegal
and unethical barratry scheme.
On October 18, 2014, three Mississippi residents, Scott Walkerr (“Walker”), Kirk Ladner
(“Ladner”) and Steve Seymour (“Seymour”), and their relatedD entities, including Precision
Marketing Group, LLC (“Precision Marketing”), filed suit agasinst Pohl and others in Mississippi
federal court, styled Cause No. 14-cv-381-KS-JCG; Scortt Walker, et al. v. Michael A. Pohl, et
al.; In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Southern Division
(the “Mississippi Litigation”).6 There, Walker, lLadner and Seymour alleged they had a joint
venture with Pohl to sign up clients with ecMonomic loss claims stemming from the BP Deepwater
Horizon oil spill.7 They also alleged othat they had “conducted marketing efforts to obtain
personal injury clients” for Pohl8 c and that Pohl received attorney’s fees from the cases they
signed up, but that “Pohl did not pay any of the agreed share of his fees to Walker [and]
Ladner.”9
3 Exhibit 1, p. 1.
4 Exhibit 1, p. 1.
5 Exhibit 1, p. 1.
6 Exhibit 2 (Walker Second Amended Petition).
7 Exhibit 2.
8 Exhibit 2, ¶ 118.
9 Exhibit 2, ¶ 136.
During the course of the Mississippi Litigation, Walker testified that Pohl retained him
and Precision Marketing to “provide marking services to auto accident victims[.]”10 Walker
testified that although he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or “marketing money” it was
“clear to [him] it was barratry.”11 In fact, Walker considered himself and his cokmpany “a pass-
through for barratry money.”12 All total, Walker, Ladner and Precision Markelting received over
$5 million in “barratry pass-through money” from Pohl and other lawcyers to solicit potential
clients with claims, both auto-accident victims and those involved sin the BP litigation.13 They
would use this money to pay contract workers to solicit clients.14 They would locate and instruct
contract workers on how to accomplish the solicitation.15 They trained “40 or 50 people” on how
to “go out and solicit contracts.”16
Walker later testified that he and his team at Precision Marketing were first retained by
Pohl to “recruit clients” with losses resultinga f r rom the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.17 When the
work concerning that litigation dwindled down, Pohl and Walker shifted their focus to auto
accident cases, knowing that the grouep at Precision Marketing “could go out and get those types
of cases” for Pohl.18 To accomplfis f h this task, the folks at Precision Marketing would get Google
10 Exhibit 3 (April 29, 2016C Affidavit of Scott Walker), ¶ 3.
11 Exhibit 4 (August 24a, 2l016 Deposition of Scott Walker), p. 149.
12 Exhibit 4, p. 197:6-7.
13 Exhibit 4, p. 73:21-25; 74:1-25; 75-1-15.
14 Exhibit 4, p. 199.
15 Exhibit 4, p. 77-78.
16 Exhibit 4, p. 196-197.
17 Exhibit 5 (September 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker), p. 19.
18 Exhibit 5, p. 148.
alerts or leads from Pohl on auto accidents.19 Walker testified that he or Ladner would go to the
victims of the auto accident themselves or send someone working for them like Magdalena
Santana (“Santana”) to “do marketing” and “let them know that there was help available.”20
More specifically, that “there were attorneys that could – that could help.”21 Variokus case runners
were used aside from Magdalena, including her brother Florian Santana (“Jlay”) and Kenneth
Talley (“Talley”).22 In exchange, these runners – who ever visited thce t victims – where paid
between $2,500 and $5,000 to solicit the client.23 Walker testified sthat these runners were sent
out on behalf of Pohl.24 These payments flowed from Pohl through his wife’s sham company,
Helping Hands Financing, to Precision Marketing to each individual runner.25 Walker would
simply submit to Pohl the amount that Precision Marketing paid its runners and Pohl would pay
it.26
Santana supported these barratry allegaat r ions in her September 24, 2016 affidavit.27 There,
Santana testified that Pohl sent her on “dozens and dozens of car wreck cases all over the
country.”28 Pohl would email Santanea the link of news coverage depicting the accident and ask
19 Exhibit 5, p. 142-147.
20 Exhibit 5, p. 143. C
21 Exhibit 5, p. 143. a l
22 Exhibit 5, p. 149-150.
23 Exhibit 5, p. 151-152.
24 Exhibit 5, p. 152.
25 Exhibit 5, p. 153-160.
26 Exhibit 5, p. 161.
27 Exhibit 6 (Santana September 24, 2016 Affidavit).
28 Exhibit 6, ¶ 17.
her “to go to the victim or the victim’s family and try to get them to sign up with him.”29 Pohl
offered to give Santana “$5,000 per case that [she] signed, plus a percentage of his attorney’s
fees.”30 Santana was advised by Pohl to “be persistent even if the family ... rejected [her].”31
Santana was instructed by Pohl to “approach the victims and their families wkhile they were
vulnerable, in the emergency room, their hospital rooms or at the funerals.”32l Pohl told Santana
that minorities “were especially vulnerable since they tended not to knowc that the law prohibited
barratry.”33 According to Pohl, they “were easier to sign up.”34 s
Pohl would give Santana “money to give to the victims or their families” but “only if they
agreed to sign a Pohl representation contract.”35 Pohl advised Santana that the money was a “foot
in the door” but instructed Santana not to mention that she was there on behalf of a lawyer “until
after they agreed to take the money.”36 “If the client agreed to hire Pohl, then [Santana] was to
have the client sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contraac r t.”37 Pohl would then give Santana the money to
pay the client “from his own Helping Hands company.”38 When Santana questioned this, Pohl
29 Exhibit 6, ¶ 17.
30 Exhibit 6, ¶ 18. C
31 Exhibit 6, ¶ 19. a l
32 Exhibit 6, ¶ 19.
33 Exhibit 6, ¶ 19.
34 Exhibit 6, ¶ 19.
35 Exhibit 6, ¶ 17.
36 Exhibit 6, ¶ 24.
37 Exhibit 6, ¶ 24.
38 Exhibit 6, ¶ 24.
told Santana that it “was illegal for him to pay [her] directly for cases, and that’s why the money
had to go through some company.”39
Pohl had Santana retract this affidavit through a December 19, 2017 affidavit. This
purported retraction is likely the result of Pohl paying Santana to provide testimkony, which is
something he has done in the past.40 In fact, Pohl’s own paralegal, Edgar lJaimes (“Jaimes”),
testified that on one occasion Pohl sent him to Florida with a case fillecd with $50,000 cash to
give to Santana in exchange for her signing an statement for him.41 sJaimes testified that Santana
would only get the money if she signed the statement for Pohl.42 Jaimes testified that Santana
signed the signed the statement and got the money.43
Santana went into more detail about this in her deposition. Santana testified that the
statement was an agreement for her to keep quiet and not charge Pohl with any wrongdoing or
criminal or unethical conduct.44 Santana testaif r ied that Pohl paid her $50,000 cash to sign this
statement, which was delivered by Jaimes in three bags marked “trick or treat.”45 Very symbolic
given that Santana had been trickede by Pohl into soliciting clients for him and was now being
treated the money she claimed wafs due just to stay quite. Santana reiterated that if she didn’t sign
the gag agreement, she woulydn’t get the money from Pohl.46 Santana attempted to indicate on the
39 Exhibit 6, ¶ 23. a l
40 Exhibit 7 (June 26, 2018 Deposition of Edgar Jaimes), pp. 371-373.
41 Exhibit 7, pp. 371-373.
42 Exhibit 7, pp. 373-374.
43 Exhibit 7, pp. 373-374.
44 Exhibit 8 (Deposition of Santana, Vol. I), p. 153.
45 Exhibit 8, p. 122-127.
46 Exhibit 8, p. 131.
agreement that she was receiving $50,000 to keep quiet, but Jaimes told her Pohl demanded that
she state she only received nominal consideration, like $100.47 Santana did not write the
statement but “just signed it”48 because she felt she was “forced to sign” it49 while “under
duress.”50 k
Notably, nowhere in Santana’s December 19th affidavit does she statle the testimony in
her former affidavit is untrue, only that she does not “agree with” it andc that the affidavit is not
“reliable.”51 Although Santana states in her December 19th affidavits that her prior affidavit was
drafted by a lawyer, Santana testified in her deposition that the September 24th affidavit was
created voluntarily with her own “testimony.”52 Santana testified that, unlike with Pohl, she was
not paid and had never been promised any money to provide the testimony in the September 24th
affidavit.53 Santana reiterated to counsel for Pohl, Billy Shepherd, that she was there in her
deposition to tell the truth and would not be abullied by his questioning or his efforts to confuse
her.54 
Regardless, Santana confirmeed most of the facts set forth in her initial affidavit in her
deposition55 and this deposition tfe f stimony was not retracted.56 There, Santana confirmed that she
47 Exhibit 9 (Deposition of Santana, Vol. II), p. 346.
48 Exhibit 8, p. 153.
49 Exhibit 8, p. 155. i
50 Exhibit 9, p. 30f9 f .
51 Exhibit 10 (December 19, 2017 Santana Affidavit).
52 Exhibit 9, p. 270-271.
53 Exhibit 9, p. 276-278.
54 Exhibit 8, p. 176.
55 See generally Exhibit 8 and Exhibit 9.
56 See Exhibit 10.
was hired by Pohl to solicit auto accident cases, the first one being an accident where a woman
and her unborn child lost their lives.57 Santana was instructed by Walker, who was instructed by
Pohl, to personally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her up to sue the tire manufacturer
and, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000.58 Santana visited the funeral kof the deceased
and got the family to feel comfortable with her.59 Although the mother was lgrieving, Pohl told
Santana: “take no prisoners, this is a cut throat business, you get in therec and you do whatever it
takes to get this client.”60 The solicitation was successful after Pohl gsave Santana $2,000 to “give
to the client to convince her into signing over with the firm.”61 
“Coach” Kenneth Talley (“Talley”) was another runner hired by Pohl and Walker who
solicited over 20 auto accident cases for Pohl,62 including two families who hired Kassab to sue
Pohl.63 Talley testified that he was first hired in relation to BP claims to find “folks that lost
money due to the oil spill” and “sign them au r p” and “get a fee for it.”64 Talley went to work
“knocking on doors” looking for potential claimants for Pohl and his partner in the BP
litigation.65 Talley solicited and signeed up for Pohl and his partner more than 800 BP claims.66
Talley was paid between $75 andf f $350 for each BP client he signed up.67
57 Exhibit 8, p. 37.
58 Exhibit 8, p. 37-38.
59 Exhibit 8, p. 37-38. i
60 Exhibit 8, p. 39f. f
61 Exhibit 8, p. 40.
62 Exhibit 11 (Deposition of Kenneth Talley), p. 87.
63 Specifically, Mae Berry and Arthur Speck.
64 Exhibit 11, p. 10.
65 Exhibit 11, p. 10-11.
66 Exhibit 11, p. 11.
10
Talley eventually switched to soliciting auto accident victims, “calling on folks that had
bad accidents.” 68 Talley recalls that the first client he solicited was in “the hospital in intensive
care.”69 Talley carried with him up to $1,000 to pay the accident victims to “help them with
problems” but only once they “were signed up.”70 Talley would advise the victikms that he had
attorneys who could help them, and that one of those attorneys was Pohl.71 Tallley was paid a fee
of $1,400 plus his expenses by Pohl, through Walker, for any auto accicd t ent case he solicited.72
On some cases, Talley was to receive a portion of the fee paid to Hselping Hands out of Pohl’s
attorney’s fees.73 Talley discussed with Pohl the “percentage of settlements” he was to receive
from the cases he solicited and Pohl told Talley that the money was being placed in an “escrow
account” for him.74 When asked whether Pohl knew he was getting paid to “contact vehicle
accident victims,” Talley responded, “the money was coming from Edgar [Jaimes] who worked
for him.”75 Although his paycheck was froma W r alker’s company, “the funding came by way of
Edgar [Jaimes].”76 
67 Exhibit 11, p. 19.
68 Exhibit 11, p. 37. C
69 Exhibit 11, p. 37. a l
70 Exhibit 11, p. 38.
71 Exhibit 11, p. 47.
72 Exhibit 11, p. 47-48.
73 Exhibit 11, p. 97-98; 102.
74 Exhibit 11, p. 99.
75 Exhibit 11, p. 100.
76 Exhibit 11, p. 100.
11
Talley testified that personally soliciting clients for Pohl became so frequent that he
began carrying with him blank Pohl contracts to each solicitation.77 Talley would refer the
potential clients to “attorneys out of Houston that were the best at handling these types of
accidents” and would offer to give the potential clients “money up front.”78 Talkley would have
no “reason not to mention Mr. Pohl’s name” during the solicitation.79 Tlalley would never
recommend any lawyers other than Pohl.80 Talley would not tell the clice t nts that he was getting
paid to solicit them.81 Talley would present a Pohl contract to the psotential client.82 If the client
did not agree to hire Pohl, the clients would not get the money.83 Talley testified that Jaimes –
Pohl’s paralegal – would send him the money.84
Talley further testified that both he and Pohl knew what they were doing was illegal. In
one instance, Talley was “run out of town” while soliciting clients for Pohl.85 Talley testified
during the attempted solicitation he was told aby a “lawyer or policeman” that “it was against the
law what [he] was doing.”86 Talley mentioned this to Pohl and Pohl told him “you’ve just got to
leave...some people you can’t help.”8e7
77 Exhibit 11, p. 49. 
78 Exhibit 11, p. 54.
79 Exhibit 11, p. 108.
80 Exhibit 11, p. 59. i
81 Exhibit 11, p. 5f8 f ; 109.
82 Exhibit 11, p. 89.
83 Exhibit 11, p. 58-59.
84 Exhibit 11, p. 86.
85 Exhibit 11, p. 84.
86 Exhibit 11, p. 84.
87 Exhibit 11, p. 85.
12
Pohl attempted to dismiss the Mississippi Litigation, arguing the agreements between he
and the runners were illegal and unenforceable.88 More specifically, Pohl argued that under both
Texas and Mississippi law “it is illegal for a non-lawyer to accept or agree to accept money to
improperly solicit clients for a lawyer.”89 The Mississippi federal court denied Pkohl’s motion to
dismiss and concluded that he was in a partnership with Walker and Lladner and further
concluded that the agreements to solicit clients would only be a cviolation of the Texas
disciplinary rules and Texas law, which did not apply to Walker ansd Ladner.90 Having failed to
obtain summary dismissal, Pohl settled the Mississippi Litigation, hoping to forever conceal the
barratry operation.91
B. The victims of Michael Pohl’s barratry hire Lance Kassab to bring
claims and file grievances against Michael Pohl.
Kassab was tipped off to the Mississippli Litigation by an associate of his F. Douglas
Montague of Hattiesburg, Mississippi.92 KMassab obtained a large amount of information related
to the Mississippi Litigation from the ofederal court’s online public access to Court records.93
Kassab also obtained information directly from Precision Marketing and its counsel, including
the names and addresses of Pohl’s former clients or prospective clients.94 Kassab used this
information to send advertisement letters to these individuals, informing them that they may have
88 Exhibit 12 (Walker Miemorandum Opinion (Doc. No. 475)); Exhibit 13 (Walker Pohl Memorandum (Doc. No.
175)).
89 Exhibit 13, at ¶ 18.
90 Exhibit 12; Exhibit 14 (Walker Order on Pohl Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 252)).
91 Exhibit 15 (Walker Judgment (Doc. No. 499)).
92 Exhibit 1, pp. 1-2.
93 Exhibit 1, p. 2.
94 Exhibit 1, p. 2.
13
been a victim of barratry, that barratry is illegal and unethical in Texas, and that, if in fact
victims of barratry, they would be entitled to file civil claims against Pohl.95 Kassab sent the
advertisement letters to the Texas State Bar and the bars of other states in which the
advertisements were distributed for approval.96 Hundreds of individuals responkded, indicating
that they had been in fact personally solicited to hire Pohl in their auto accidelnt or BP claims.97
Kassab then entered into contracts with more than four hundred individucals to represent them in
their claims against Pohl for civil barratry.98 s
Kassab associated with and consulted his clients and eventually filed four separate
lawsuits on behalf of these barratry victims in Harris County, Texas (the “Barratry Lawsuits”).99
The Barratry Lawsuits communicated matters of public concern, namely that Pohl and others
conspired to commit and did in fact commit barratry, which can carry a third-degree felony
charge in Texas.100 See TEX. PEN. CODE § 3a8 r .12(h). Additionally, due to the egregiousness of
Pohl’s violation of the Texas Penal Code and violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct, Kassab was reequired to notify the Texas State Bar pursuant to disciplinary
rule 8.03.101 Thus, Kassab filed f f grievances against Pohl pursuant to this rule, and also at the
request of some of Pohl’s foyrmer clients.102 In the grievances, Kassab, individually and on behalf
95 Exhibit 1, p. 2. a l
96 Exhibit 1, p. 2; Exhibit 16 (Sample Letters and State Bar Approvals).
97 Exhibit 1, p. 2.
98 Exhibit 1, p. 2.
99 Exhibit 17 (Brumfield Third Amended Petition), Exhibit 18 (Gandy Second Amended Petition), Exhibit 19 (Berry
Fifth Amended Petition), Exhibit 20 (Cheatham Fourth Amended Petition) (without exhibits).
100 Exhibit 1, p. 1.
101 Exhibit 1, p. 1.
102 Rule 8.03 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct provides: “. . . a lawyer having knowledge
that another lawyer has committed a violation of applicable rules of professional conduct that raises a substantial
14
of his clients, petitioned the State Bar of Texas to reprimand and discipline Pohl in order to
protect the public.103
In direct retaliation to the Barratry Lawsuits and the grievance proceedings, Pohl filed
this litigation alleging that Kassab and others stole his property and are using it tok bring lawsuits
and grievances against him.104 Specifically, Pohl alleges in his petition aglainst Kassab that,
“Kassab is a lawyer who specializes in suing other lawyers”105 ca t nd “Kassab solicited
clients/prospective clients [of Pohl’s] to act as Plaintiffs . . . to bsring cases against Pohl for
alleged barratry and other claims.”106 Thus, Pohl has judicially admitted that he has brought his
suit against Kassab solely because Kassab legally and ethically contacted Pohl’s former clients
or prospective clients107 and filed suit against Pohl on behalf of these individuals.
e IV
ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES
The purpose of the Anti-SLAPP108 statute “is to encourage and safeguard the
constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise
participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect
question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the
appropriate discipflinary authority.”
103 Exhibit 1, p. 2; Exhibit 21 (grievance pleadings filed against Pohl).
104 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition.
105 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, p. 6.
106 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, at p. 6-7
107 Exhibit 16.
108 This is an acronym for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation.
15
the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 27.002. To effectuate the purpose of the TCPA, the Legislature included an
expedited manner of dismissing claims brought to intimidate or to silence a defendant’s exercise
of an enumerated First Amendment right. See id. at § 27.003; see also ExxonMobkil Pipeline Co.
v. Coleman, 512 S.W.3d 895, 898 (Tex. 2017). l
The first step of a TCPA analysis is to determine whether the defecndant has demonstrated
by a preponderance of the evidence that the TCPA applies to the plasintiff's claims. See Adams v.
Starside Custom Builders, LLC, 547 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tex. 2018). The Texas supreme court has
made clear that trial courts should be mindful that the statute “casts a wide net,” and that
“[a]lmost any imaginable form of communication, in any medium, is covered.” Id. (citing §
27.001(1)). In order for the TCPA to be applicable, a defendant moving to dismiss must show by
a preponderance of the evidence that the palaintiff’s claims are based on, relate to, or are in
response to the defendant’s exercise of: (1) the right of free speech, (2) the right to petition, or
(3) the right of association. TEX. CIVe. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(b). In considering whether
the TCPA is applicable, the trial fcourt is statutorily required to consider all pleadings, as well as
supporting and opposing affyidavits stating the facts on which a claim of liability is based. Id. at §
27.006; see also BedCford v. Spassoff, 520 S.W.3d 901, 904 (Tex. 2017). If the record
demonstrates that thae plaintiff's claim implicates one of these rights, then the statute is applicable
as to that claim,f and the trial court must proceed to the second step.
AUt the second step of a TCPA analysis, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish by
“clear and specific evidence” a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in
question. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(c). Dismissal of the claim is mandatory if the
plaintiff fails to satisfy this burden. Id. § 27.005(b). Even if the plaintiff succeeds by establishing
16
a prima facie case, the trial court must still dismiss the claim if the defendant further establishes
by a preponderance of the evidence each essential element of a valid defense. Id. § 27.005(d).
And, if the court dismisses a legal action pursuant to the TCPA, the Court must award the
moving party “court costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, and other expenses incurrekd in defending
against the legal action” as well as sanctions “sufficient to deter the party whlo brought the legal
action from bringing similar actions[.]” Id. at § 27.009(a). c
A. Step one – This lawsuit is based on, relates to and sis in response to the
exercise of protected activities. D
The TCPA applies if Pohl’s suit is “based on, relatess to, or is in response to” Kassab’s
exercise of the right of free speech. Id. at § 27.001(3). Thre exercise of the right of free speech is
defined as a “communication made in connection with a matter of public concern.” Id. at §
27.001(3). A “communication” is defined as lthe “making or submitting of a statement or
document in any form or medium includinMg oral, visual, written, audiovisual, or electronic.” Id.
at § 27.001(1); Deaver v. Desai, 483 So.W.3d 668, 672 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015,
no pet.). The definition encompasses both public and private communications. See Lippincott v.
Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 509 (Tex. 2015). A “matter of public concern” includes an issue
related to “health or safety, environmental, economic, or community well-being, the government,
a public official or public figure, or a good, product, or service in the marketplace.” Id. §
27.001(7)(A). Thce provision of legal services by a legal service professional constitute
matters of public concern. See Deaver, 483 S.W.3d at 673 (holding statements relating to legal
services offered by attorney in the marketplace addressed matters of public concern); see also
Avila v. Larrea, 394 S.W.3d 646 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (statement relating to
legal services was “a matter of public concern” because attorney’s services constituted a “service
in the marketplace.”). The lawsuits and grievances that Kassab filed against Pohl on behalf of
17
these former clients discussed or related to the legal services provided by Pohl – namely the
alleged illegal and unethical barratry committed by Pohl.109
The TCPA also applies if Pohl’s suit is “based on, relates to, or is in response to”
Kassab’s right to petition. Id. at § 27.001(4). Communications made in or abkout a judicial,
legislative, executive or other governmental proceeding are protected by the rlight to petition. Id.
There is no requirement that the subject matter of the proceeding must cconcern the government
or a public interest for the protection to apply. See Watson v. Harsdman, 497 SW3d 601, 606
(Tex. App. – Dallas 2016, no pet.). Moreover, “the remedies provided by the TCPA extend to
attorneys who are acting as agents for their clients when they communicate information about
others during the course of judicial proceedings.” Johnson-Todd v. Morgan, 480 S.W.3d 605,
611 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2015, pet. denied). Accordingly, the filing of the Barratry Lawsuits
by Kassab on behalf of his clients constitute athe “exercise of the right to petition” as defined by
the TCPA. See Beving v. Beadles, No. 02-17-00223-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 8540, at *12
(Tex. App. – Fort Worth, Oct. 18, 20e18, no pet.) (concluding deposition and affidavit testimony
provided in the underlying lawsufit constituted a communication made in a judicial proceeding
and was an exercise of the riyght to petition).
Finally, the TCCPA also applies if Pohl’s suit is “based on, relates to, or is in response to”
Kassab’s right of asasociation. Id. at § 27.001(2). A right to association protects communications
“between indivfiduals who join together to collectively express, promote, pursue, or defend
common Uinterests.” Id. The right to associate protects communications which do not relate to a
public purpose and even those communications which are alleged to be wrongful, such as the
sharing of purportedly confidential information for an improper purpose. See Elite Auto Body
109 Exhibit 1, p. 2; Exhibit 17, 18, 19, and 20 (petitions filed in the Barratry Litigation); Exhibit 21 (grievance
pleadings filed against Pohl).
18
LLC v. Autocraft Bodywerks, Inc., 520 S.W.3d 191, 206 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. dism'd)
(holding the right of association protection applied to claims that a company’s employees
improperly shared confidential information with their new employer for purposes of the new
employer obtaining an unfair advantage in the marketplace). k
This lawsuit is based on, related to or in response to these protected lactivities. Pohl has
filed this retaliatory lawsuit against Kassab for conversion and theft of ctrade secrets, seeking in
excess of $1,000,000.00 in purported actual damages.110 Pohl allegses that Kassab obtained the
names and addresses of Pohl’s former clients/prospective clients, solicited them and brought
“cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and other claims.”111 In other words, Pohl’s lawsuit
against Kassab would not have arisen but for the fact that Kassab exercised his right to free
speech and right to petition on behalf of his injured clients and filed suits and grievances against
Pohl for civil barratry. Because Pohl’s convearsion-related claims arise out of Kassab’s right to
petition and associate, this lawsuit must be dismissed. See James v. Calkins, 446 S.W.3d 135,
147-48 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Diest.] 2014, pet. denied) (claims for fraud against attorney and
client arising out of prior litigatifon were protected as the exercise of the right to freely speak,
freely associate, and to petitiyon).
The recent caseC Collins v. Collins, No. 01-17-00817-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1932,
2018 WL 1320841a (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 15, 2018, pet. filed) (mem. op.) is
instructive. In fCollins, the ex-wife of the deceased, Corinna, sued the deceased’s surviving
spouse anUd administrator of the estate, Kelly, for fraud and conversion based on part on the
deceased’s alleged misrepresentation or nondisclosure of assets during their divorce. Id. at *1.
Kelly filed a motion to dismiss under the TCPA “based on exercise of the right to petition,
110 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, p. 3.
111 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, p. 6-7
19
because Corinna’s claims were based on communications made during a judicial proceeding.” Id.
The probate court denied the motion to dismiss and Kelly appealed. Id. at *1-2. The First Court
of Appeals reversed, concluding that the deceased “was exercising his right to petition when he
served the affidavit and inventory in the divorce” and because Corinna’s claimsk for conversion
and fraud were based on matters relating to this divorce, they were subject to dlismissal under the
TCPA. Id. at *12-13. c
The recent case Reeves v. Harbor Am. Cent., Inc., 552 S.W.3sd 389 (Tex. App. – Houston
[14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) is also instructive. In that case, an employer sued a former employee
for breach of contract, conversion and theft of trade secrets alleging the employee stole
confidential information and solicited customers away from the employee in violation of their
agreement. Id. at 392. The employee, Reeves, filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to the TCPA
alleging the claims were “based on, relate toa, or are in response to [his] right to associate with
others” to “promote and pursue their common interest in developing a competing business.” Id.
The trial court denied the motion, staeting the TCPA “as a matter of law does not allow a party to
avoid contractual obligations sufch as the ones at issue here.” Id. Reeves appealed, and the
Fourteenth Court of Appeayls reversed, stating “[w]hether the TCPA allows a party to avoid
contractual obligationsC is not the proper inquiry.” Id. at 395. Rather, “when a TCPA motion has
been filed, the TCPaA requires trial courts to determine whether a legal action is ‘based on, relates
to, or is in respofnse to a party's exercise of’ the right of free speech, right to petition, or right of
associatioUn and must be dismissed.” Id.
Like the claims at issue in Collins and Reeves, the purported conversion and theft of trade
secrete claims brought by Pohl arise out of and relate to Kassab’s right to petition and associate
with his clients to promote and carry out their common interest in developing and pursing the
20
claims and grievances against Pohl. The allegations in the petitions and the grievances relate to
matters of public concern. This is a retaliatory lawsuit designed to chill the rights of Kassab and
his clients and silence them from speaking out against Pohl and other lawyers in legal
malpractice cases. This is the very type of retaliatory lawsuit the TCPA was inteknded to protect
against. See Reeves, 552 S.W.3d at 393 (“The TCPA protects citizens from rletaliatory lawsuits
that seek to silence or intimidate them on matters of public concern.”). Acccordingly, this lawsuit
must be dismissed. See Collins, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1932, ats *15 (trial court abused its
discretion by denying TCPA motion relating to conversion claims arising out of divorce
proceeding).
B. Step two – Pohl cannot establish by clear and specific evidence a
prima facia case against Kassab.
Because the claims alleged by Pohl falll within the purview of the TCPA, this lawsuit
must be dismissed unless Pohl “establishesM by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for
each essential element of the claim in quoestion.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(c). This
Pohl cannot do. But, even if he can, the Court must still dismiss Pohl’s claims because Kassab
has established the defenses of limitations, attorney immunity and res judicata as a matter of law.
Id. § 27.005(d).
1. Pohl cannot establish his claims for civil conspiracy,
aconversion or theft of trade secrets as a matter of law.
Pohl adfmits that he engaged Precision Marketing, although he claims that it was to
provide “Upublic relations services” to “screen and liaise with Pohl’s clients/prospective clients”
rather than to straight up personally solicit the clients to hire Pohl.112 Pohl claims that Precision
Marketing “gained access to Pohl’s confidential and proprietary information and property,
112 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, ¶ 20.
21
including trade secret materials, that included the identities of Pohl’s clients/prospective clients,
as well as their detailed contact information.”113 Pohl claims that Favre then sold this information
to Kassab who used this information – the names and addresses of the clients/prospective clients
– “to contact and solicit Pohl’s clients/prospective clients” to “act as plaintiffs andk … bring cases
against Pohl for alleged barratry and other claims.”114 Pohl claims that this conlduct is a breach of
the settlement agreement he entered with Favre and Precision Markecting in the Mississippi
Litigation and constitutes conversion and violation of the Texas sUniform Trade Secrets Act
(“TUTSA”).115 As a matter of law, these claims fail. 
First, Kassab obtained the names and addresses of the victims of Pohl’s barratry from
Precision Marketing (and/or its counsel), who was the owner of this property, not Pohl.116 Favre,
the owner of Precision Marketing, testified that Precision Marketing “solicited many of the
marketing contacts (individuals and businesase r s) on these lists for representation” by Pohl.117
Favre testified that the “marketing lists contain the names of thousands of persons who
eventually became [Pohl’s] former celients, and/or whom [Pohl] solicited for representation.”118
Favre made clear that the very infformation that Pohl claims are the trade secretes converted by
Kassab “were and are solelyy the work product and property of Precision [Marketing], developed
during the normal couCrse of its marketing business.”119 In other words, Pohl does not own the
113 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, ¶ 20.
114 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, ¶ 22.
115 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, ¶¶ 23-27.
116 Exhibit 1, p. 2.
117 Exhibit 22 (August 10, 2016 Affidavit of Scott Favre), ¶ 15.
118 Exhibit 22, ¶ 15.
119 Exhibit 22, ¶ 12.
22
information or trade secrets he claims was converted by Kassab and thus, these claims fail as a
matter of law. See FCLT Loans, L.P. v. Estate of Bracher, 93 S.W.3d 469, 482 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (“To bring a conversion claim, the aggrieved party must have
either ownership, possession, or the right to immediate possession of the propertky.”); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.002(3-a) (defining owner as “the person or e
nltity in whom or in
which rightful, legal, or equitable title to, or the right to enforce rightcs in, the trade secret is
reposed.”). s
Pohl’s claims for theft of trade secrets fails for different reasons, namely that the client
lists and information were not trade secrets and were not wrongfully misappropriated. Under the
TUTSA, information is not a trade secret if it is gene
rally known to the public. TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE § 134A.002(6)(A). The names and addresses of the barratry victims who were
solicited to hire Pohl are not confidential anda are certainly known to the public. Moreover, the
TUTSA requires Pohl to show that, at the time Kassab allegedly disclosed the trade secrets,
Kassab “knew or had reason to knowe” that the trade secret was acquired by improper means. Id.
§ 134A.002(3). Here, the evidenfce establishes, as a matter of law, that Precision Marketing and
not Pohl owned the purporteyd trade secrets.120 At minimum, the evidence establishes that Kassab
believed, based on FCavre’s testimony and his discussions with Favre or his counsel, that
Precision Marketinga was the owner of the client lists, and therefore Kassab did not know or have
reason to knowf that they had been acquired from Pohl by improper means.121 Therefore, this
claim failUs as a matter of law.
Because the conversion and statutory theft of trade secret claims fail, Pohl’s claim for
civil conspiracy also fails. See Trammel Crow Co. No. 60 v. Harkinson, 944 S.W.2d 631, 635
120 Exhibit 22.
121 Exhibit 1, p. 2.
23
(Tex. 1997) (to prevail on a civil conspiracy claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
was liable for some underlying tort). Accordingly, Pohl cannot establish all elements of his
claims against Kassab by clear and convincing evidence, and this lawsuit must be dismissed as to
Kassab. See Collins, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1932, at *15. k
2. Pohl’s claims are barred as a matter of law by thle attorney
immunity doctrine.
Even if Pohl can establish a prima facie case on each element orf each cause of action by
clear and convincing evidence, his claims must still be dismissedD because they are barred by the
attorney immunity doctrine. The Texas supreme court hass recognized that “attorneys are
authorized to practice their profession, to advise theirr clients and interpose any defense or
supposed defense, without making themselves liable for damages.” See Cantey Hanger, LLP v.
Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. 2015) (internall quotations omitted). “This attorney-immunity
defense is intended to ensure loyal, faithfulM, and aggressive representation by attorneys employed
as advocates.” Id. (internal quotations oomitted). Thus, “attorneys are immune from civil liability
to non-clients for actions taken in connection with representing a client in litigation.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted). “Merely labeling an attorney’s conduct ‘fraudulent’ does not and should not
remove it from the scope of client representation or render it ‘foreign to the duties of an
attorney.’” Id. at 483. Rather, in determining immunity, the inquiry “focuses on the kind of
conduct at issue crather than the alleged wrongfulness of said conduct.” Youngkin v. Hines, 546
S.W.3d 675, at *11 (Tex. 2018) (emphasis in original). An attorney is not liable to third
parties when the complained of actions relate to the filing of lawsuits. See Cantey Hanger,
467 S.W.3d at 483 (“an attorney's conduct may be wrongful but still fall within the scope of
client representation”); see also Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398, 408
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (holding that a claim against an attorney for
24
conspiracy to defraud was not actionable where “the complained-of actions involve the filing of
lawsuits” were “made to facilitate the rendition of legal services to [the client]”).
The recent case Highland Capital Mgmt., LP v. Looper Reed & McGraw, P.C., No. 05-
15-00055-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 442, 2016 WL 164528 (Tex. App.—Dallaks Jan. 14, 2016,
pet. denied) (mem. op.) is instructive. In Highland Capital, the plaintiff attlempted to sue the
lawyer for the defendant alleging the lawyer obtained stolen propertcy of the defendant and
threatened to disclose this confidential information to extort a sesttlement. Highland Capital,
2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 442, 2016 WL 164528, at *2. The plaintiff, Highland, argued that the
lawyer, Looper Reed, engaged in “malicious conduct with respect to its illegal acquisition,
retention, use, and threatened disclosure of Highland’s proprietary and confidential information”
including “reviewing, copying, and analyzing information it knew to be stolen and proprietary in
furtherance of its scheme to extort, slander, aand disparage Highland, threatening Highland that it
would disclose proprietary information and disparage Highland if a monetary sum was not paid,
and refusing to return and cease use oef Highland’s proprietary information after receiving written
notice of the proprietary and conffidential nature of these documents and Highland's demand that
the stolen materials be returyned.” Id. at *10-*11. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s
dismissal of these claiCms on the pleadings122 based on attorney immunity because the alleged
conduct fell “squaraely within the scope of Looper Reed’s representation” in the lawsuit. Id. at
*16. f
TUhe entire basis for Pohl’s lawsuit against Kassab is that he allegedly purchased the
purportedly stolen information and “solicited [Pohl’s] clients/prospective clients to act as
122 The dismissal was via Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a.
25
plaintiffs … to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and other claims.”123 Pohl’s
characterization of this conduct as wrongful is immaterial. See id. (“That [a party] characterized
the firm’s conduct as fraudulent or otherwise wrongful was immaterial to [the court’s] evaluation
of the immunity defense.”). Mischaracterizations aside, the essence of Pohl’s kclaims against
Kassab are that he used information he obtained from Favre, the owner of Prlecision Marketing,
to determine which clients had been illegally solicited by Precision Macrketing to hire Pohl and
then proceeded to bring such barratry claims against Pohl on behaslf of these clients.124 These
claims fall squarely within attorney immunity. See Highland Capital, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS
442, at *16. This is true regardless of whether the conduct occurred prior to the actual litigation
of these claims. See Cantey Hanger, 467 S.W.3d at 485 (attorney was immune from conduct that
occurred after litigation had ended because it was related to the representation).
3. Pohl’s claimse are barred as a matter of law by the statute of
limitations.
The statute of limitations for conversion is two years from the date the property is
allegedly taken. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a); Burns v. Rochon, 190 S.W.3d 263,
271 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). The statute of limitations for civil conspiracy
is also two yearsc. Mayes v. Stewart, 316 S.W.3d 715, 719 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2010, no pet.). The statute of limitations for misappropriation of trade secrets is three years from
the date the misappropriation was discovered. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.010(a).
123 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, ¶ 22.
124 See Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, ¶¶ 21-27.
26
Pohl testified in his deposition that the basis of his alleged claims against Kassab
occurred in 2014 when Pohl alleges that Kassab and his “crew” allegedly broke into Pohl’s
office in Gulf Port, Mississippi, hacked his computers, stole his clients’ names and then solicited
his clients.125 Pohl testified that although he knew the conduct occurred in 2014, hke did not file a
civil or criminal case against Kassab or his “crew” because he “wanted to splend time to reflect
on it before taking action [and] didn’t want to do anything that was cpr t ecipitous.”126 In other
words, Pohl sat idly by while the statute of limitations clock ticked sand did nothing to preserve
his purported claims. 
Further, Pohl signed an affidavit admitting he learned of the basis of his purported claims
during discovery in the Mississippi Litigation, which began in October of 2014.127 Specifically,
Pohl testified that he learned through discovery that Walker and Ladner allegedly
“misappropriated the services [he] had contraacted and paid for as well as [his] client contracts
and existing and/or expected contractual relationships (including actual executed client contracts
as well as my contract forms and reelated work product)” and “hundreds of claimants” were
allegedly “surreptitiously referrefd f ” by Precision Marketing.128 Pohl alleged in this affidavit that
he discovered in the Mississyippi Litigation that the owners of Precision Marketing “undertook to
convert, misappropriatCe for themselves and/or market to third parties claimant files and other
information and maaterials” from his office in Gulfport, Mississippi.129 Importantly, Pohl testified
at a August 30,f 2016 deposition in the Mississippi Litigation that he found out from a Precision
MarketinUg secretary in 2014 that his clients were being diverted to other lawyers and/or non-
125 Exhibit 23 (May 15, 2018 Deposition of Michael Pohl), pp. 85-93.
126 Exhibit 23, p. 93.
127 Exhibit 24 (June 19, 2018 Affidavit of Michael Pohl).
128 Exhibit 24, ¶ 27.
129 Exhibit 24, ¶ 28.
27
lawyers.130 Pohl also testified that he closed his Gulfport office in February of 2014.131
Accordingly, Pohl would have known of his potential claims against Kassab at that time (2014)
that his purportedly confidential information had been stolen when he moved out of his Gulfport
office and the computers and boxes containing this information were missing. k
“The statute of limitations begins to run when a party has actuall knowledge of a
wrongful injury.” Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3dc 194, 207 (Tex. 2011).
“Once a claimant learns of a wrongful injury, the statute of limitatiosns begins to run even if the
claimant does not yet know the specific cause of the injury; the party responsible for it; the full
extent of it; or the chances of avoiding it.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
Pohl knew or should have known of his potential claims against Kassab (and the other
defendants in this lawsuit) in 2014 when he moved from his office in Gulfport, Mississippi and
learned from a secretary of Precision Markeating that his clients were being diverted to other
lawyers and/or non-lawyers. Pohl filed this lawsuit against Kassab on August 28, 2018.132
Accordingly, Pohl’s claims, filed moere than three years later, are barred by limitations. See TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.00f3; Id. at § 16.010.
4. Pohl’ys claims are barred as a matter of law by res judicata.
“Res judicata, oCr claims preclusion, prevents the relitigation of a claim or cause of action
that has been finallya adjudicated, as well as related matters that, with the use of diligence, should
have been litigafted in the prior suit.” Barr v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex.
1992). PUohl sued Precision Marketing and other “potential” defendants in the Mississippi
130 Exhibit 25 (August 30, 2016 Deposition of Michael Pohl), p. 21.
131 Exhibit 24, ¶ 31.
132 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition.
28
Litigation for conversion, fraud and unjust enrichment alleging, among other things, that
Precision Marketing misappropriated, converted or stole property from Pohl by means of
misrepresentation, deception, or failure to disclose.133 Pohl voluntarily settled and the parties
dismissed the claims against each other with prejudice on April 21, 2017.134k Pohl’s claims
against Kassab are the same that he filed in the Mississippi Litigation and alrise from the same
alleged transactions and are against the same alleged co-conspirators.135 cT t herefore, Pohl’s claims
are barred by res judicata. See Lemon v. Spann, 633 S.W.2d 568, 570s-71 (Tex. App. – Texarkana
1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (“The judgment in the first suit precludes a second action by parties and
their privies not only on matters actually litigated but also on causes of action or defenses which
arise out of the same subject matter and which might have been litigated in the first suit.”).
C. The Court must award attorneys fees and sanctions.
After the Court dismisses Poehl’s claims against Kassab, the Court “must” award Kassab
“court costs, reasonable attorneyf’s fees, and other expenses incurred in defending against the
legal action” and issue “sanyctions against the party who brought the legal action as the court
determines sufficient Cto deter the party who brought the legal action from bringing similar
actions described ina this chapter.” Id. § 27.009(a). Kassab has spent approximately sixty (60)
hours reviewingf Pohl’s petition, drafting an answer, reviewing the TCPA, and researching and
drafting tUhis motion to dismiss. Kassab will undoubtedly expend another ten (10) hours reading
133 Exhibit 26 (Pohl Amended Complaint in Mississippi Litigation), ¶ 6.
134 Exhibit 15.
135 See Plaintiffs’ Original Petition.
29
Pohl’s responses, drafting and filing a reply, and preparing for and attending a hearing regarding
this motion. Therefore, Kassab will have incurred (or will likely incur) approximately seventy
(70) hours defending against Pohl’s legal action, or $31,500 in legal fees.136 In addition,
Kassab’s associate has spent approximately fifteen (15) hours reviewing Pkohl’s petition,
researching and editing this motion to dismiss, researching relevant case lawl and authority and
providing edits, equating to $5,250 in legal fees.137 c t
Moreover, Kassab is entitled to conditional appellate fees. s“If trial attorney’s fees are
mandatory under [the statute], then appellate attorney’s fees are also mandatory when proof of
reasonable fees is presented.” Ventling v. Johnson, 466 S.W.3d 143, 154 (Tex. 2015). Because
the TCPA mandates an award of reasonable attorney’s fees, the trial court does not have
discretion to disallow an award when proof of reasonable appellate attorney’s fees is presented.
See Urquhart v. Calkins, No. 01-17-00256-CaV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 5145, at *11-12 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 10, 2018, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Kassab testifies that a
reasonable attorney’s fee for a futuree appeal to the court of appeals is $45,000; a reasonable fee
for responding to and/or briefingf regarding a motion for rehearing at the intermediate court of
appeals, if such is necessaryy, is $5,000; a reasonable fee for filing a petition or response in the
Texas Supreme CourtC is $10,000; if the Texas Supreme Court requests briefing, a reasonable
attorney’s fee is $2a5,000; and a reasonable attorney’s fee for responding to and/or briefing a
motion for rehefaring at the Texas Supreme Court, if such is necessary, is $5,000.00.138 These
conditionUal appellate fees should be awarded. See id.
136 Exhibit 1, p. 3.
137 Exhibit 1, p. 3.
138 Exhibit 1, p. 3.
30
Finally, this Court should sanction Pohl and his counsel for the egregiousness of his
conduct, including the filing of this retaliatory lawsuit. Pohl believes he is above the rules of law
and that the rules of professional conduct do not apply to him. This is demonstrated by the fact
that he intentionally and shamelessly paid runners millions of dollars to illegallky run cases for
him and has paid off and bribed potential witnesses with tens of thousands olf dollars, including
$50,000.00 to Santana. Pohl’s counsel likely agreed to represent Pohl cbecause they have their
own bone to pick with Kassab. The law firm representing Pohl, Reynsolds Frizzell, has attempted
to sanction Kassab personally in another matter after Kassab sued Reynolds Frizzell’s client,
Arnold & Itkin, alleging claims of barratry.139 Kassab responded by filing a counter-motion for
sanctions not only against Arnold & Itkin, but lawyers at Reynolds Frizzell, requesting a the
lawyers to show cause as to why they should not be sanctioned for filing a groundless
pleading.140 Judge Baker denied the motiona r for sanctions against Kassab filed by Reynolds
Frizzell and ordered the lawyers at Reynolds Frizzell to show cause as to why they should not be
sanctioned.141 Although Judge Bakeer ultimately denied Kassab’s counter-motion for sanctions,
she made clear to point out thef inaccuracies alleged by Reynolds Frizzell in its motion for
sanctions and admonished Ryeynolds Frizzell regarding its inaccuracies.142 This lawsuit against
Kassab is not only retaCliatory for Pohl, it is seemingly retaliatory for his counsel.
The ill motaive of Pohl and his counsel is further evidenced by their conduct in the
Barratry Lawsufits. Pohl’s counsel, Jean Frizzell (“Frizzell”), previously attempted to file this
lawsuit inU the 55th Judicial District solely to create a conflict of interest between Kassab and his
139 Exhibit 27 (Motion for Sanctions in Gauthia).
140 Exhibit 28 (Response to Motion for Sanctions in Gauthia).
141 Exhibit 29 (June 28, 2018 Order Denying Sanctions).
142 Exhibit 30 (August 24, 2018 Order Denying Counter-Sanctions).
31
clients who had sued Pohl.143 Judge Shadwick recognized the gamesmanship of Pohl and Frizzell
in their attempt to create a conflict of interest and outright denied their frivolous motion to file a
third-party petition against Kassab.144 Frizzell knew this by colluding with Pohl’s other counsel,
Billy Shepherd, and having access to all of the discovery taken in the Barratry Lkawsuits and the
Mississippi Litigation by virtue of his representation. Therefore, Frizzell had alccess to and knew,
without a doubt, all the facts and sworn testimony cited to in this moticon, and thus, knew how
frivolous and retaliatory this lawsuit is against Kassab when he filed sthe lawsuit.
This Court should not take kindly to lawyers and their lawyer-clients fabricating lawsuits
simply to create conflicts, harass, create delay, increase the cost of litigation and as a retaliatory
tool against lawyers, like Kassab, who attempt to help victims of illegal conduct perpetrated by
lawyers by enforcing the statutes created by the Texas Legislature. Therefore, this Court should
sanction Pohl and Frizzell in an amount sufaficient to deter them from bringing similar actions
and/or filing similar frivolous pleadings in the future. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §
27.009(a). The Court should sanctioen Pohl and Frizzell a minimum of fifty thousand dollars
($50,000.00) in addition to the afttorney’s fees and costs listed above so that Pohl and Frizzell
will fully understand that thyeir actions have consequences and that the rule of law has meaning.
To do otherwise, will sCimply reinforce lawyers like Pohl and Frizzell to continue to harass, create
delay, increase the acost of litigation and create conflicts with impunity, and send a message to
lawyers like Pofhl and Frizzell that the rule of law does not matter, the practice of law is simply a
game andU the truth is meaningless.
CONCLUSION & PRAYER
143 Exhibit 31 (Pohl’s Third Party Petition filed in Cheatham).
144 Exhibit 32 (July 23, 2018 Order Denying Pohl’s Motion for Leave to File Third Party Petition).
32
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs Lance Christopher Kassab and
The Kassab Law Firm respectfully request the Court to grant this Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
the Texas Citizens Participation Act and order that Plaintiffs take nothing in their claims against
Lance Christopher Kassab and The Kassab Law Firm. In addition, the Court shoukld award Lance
Christopher Kassab and The Kassab Law Firm attorney’s fees as requelsted and sanction
Plaintiffs and/or their counsel in an amount sufficient to deter themc from bringing similar
frivolous and retaliatory lawsuits in the future. s
Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
L ANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 00794070
llance@kassab.law
a DAVID ERIC KASSAB
M Texas State Bar No. 24071351
 david@kassab.law
o 1214 Elgin Street
e Houston, Texas 77004
Telephone: 713.522.7400
f Facsimile: 713.522.7410
y ATTORNEYS FOR LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB AND THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
a CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I herebyf certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has
been forwarded to all parties pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this the 24th day
of OctobeUr, 2018.
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
Lance Christopher Kassab
33"
8,2018-10-24,OA,Kassab,1st Amended Answer with Counterclaims,"Kassab's First Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim for Civil Barratry, filed October 24, 2018 simultaneously with TCPA Motion to Dismiss","Filed October 24, 2018 simultaneously with the TCPA Motion to Dismiss. This amends Kassab's original answer (Filing #2) by adding res judicata as a 17th affirmative defense. Maintains general denial, 17 affirmative defenses, specific denials regarding conditions precedent, and counterclaims for civil barratry on behalf of 150 assigned claimants.","PLEAD-1, CC-1",N/A,Phase 1,2018-10-24_OA_Kassab-1st-Amended-Answer-CC_FILED.pdf,"Plaintiffs take nothing on their claims; Kassab recovers on counterclaims including actual and consequential damages, statutory damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, attorneys' fees and costs, and all other just relief","10/24/2018 2:33 PM
Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 28526297
By: ARIONNE MCNEAL
Filed: 10/24/2018 2:33 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIrAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS, LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAW FIRM’S FIRST AMENDED
ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND COUNtTERCLAIM
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
COMES NOW, Defendants, Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab,
P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm and files this their First Armended Answer, Affirmative Defenses,
and Counterclaim, and would respectfully show the Court as follows;
RULE 47 SiT l ATEMENT
The Kassab Defendants, in their caMpacity as Counter-Plaintiffs, seek monetary relief of
more than $1,000,000.00. o
PARTIES
Plaintiff, Michael A. PoOhl is an individual lawyer residing in Colorado.
Plaintiff, Law Offipces of Michael A. Pohl is a law firm set up for the practice of law in
various states of the union, including Texas.
Defendant, iScott Favre is a nonresident individual residing in Mississippi.
Defenodant, Scott M. Favre, PA, LLC is a nonresident limited liability company located in
Mississippi.
Defendant, Precision Marketing Group, LLC is a nonresident limited liability company
located in Mississippi.
Defendant, F. Douglas Montague III is a nonresident individual residing in Mississippi.
Defendant, Montague, Pittman & Varnado, PA is a nonresident professional association
located in Mississippi.
Defendant, Tina Nicholson is an individual residing in Texas.
Defendant, Baker Nicholson, LLP, d/b/a Baker Nicholson Law Firm is a klimited liability
partnership located in Texas. l
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab is an indicvidual residing in Texas.
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C.s d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm
is a professional corporation located in Texas. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
This matter is within the jurisdictional limitsu of this Court and Plaintiffs, Counter-
Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices onf Michael A. Pohl (“Pohl”) and Defendants,
Counter-Plaintiffs, Lance Christopher Kassab (“rLCK”) and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a
The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab, P.C.”) (collectively “Kassab”) are subject to the Court’s
jurisdiction. Venue is proper in this county because one or more of the defendants are residents of
this county and because a substanftial part of the acts and/or omissions that form the basis of this
suit occurred in this county. 
GENERAL DENIAL
Defendant, Clounter-Plaintiff Kassab generally denies all allegations made by Plaintiffs,
Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl, and requests the Court
to require Pnlaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl to
carry their burden of proof regarding all allegations against Kassab.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab pleads the following affirmative defenses:
1. Statute of limitations
2. Justification.
3. Estoppel.
4. Waiver. t
5. Ratification. t
6. Release. 
7. Unclean hands. e
8. Contribution. u
9. Failure to mitigate damages. n
10. Lack of standing. r
11. Accord and Satisfaction.
12. Assumption of the Risk. 
13. Illegality/Criminal Actfs.
14. First Amendment. 
15. Attorney Immunity.
16. In Pari Daellicto.
17. Res juidicata.
SPECIFIC DENIALS
Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs specifically deny that all conditions precedent regarding
Plaintiffs claims of conversion and theft of trade secrets have been performed or occurred prior to
Plaintiffs filing suit against Kassab.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
LCK is a lawyer practicing law with Kassab, P.C., a law firm in Houston, Texas focusing
solely on plaintiffs’ legal malpractice. Kassab filed four lawsuits on behalf of over four hundred
clients against Pohl (the “Harris County Lawsuits”). The main allegations against Pohl is civil
barratry and conspiracy to commit barratry, a third-degree felony in Texas. Pohl conspired with
his wife, Donalda Pohl (“Dona”), his paralegal, Edgar Jaimes (“Jaimes”t), and three runners in
Mississippi to illegally solicit clients on behalf of Pohl. Dona owns at sham lending company in
Texas called Helping Hands Financing, LLC (“HH Texas”). Jaimes runs the day-to-day operations
of HH Texas. The three runners are Scott Walker (“Walkere”), Steve Seymour (“Seymour”) and
Kirk Ladner (“Ladner”). The three runners own and ouperate two other sham companies called
Helping Hands Group, LLC and Helping Hands Finnancial, LLC (collectively “HH Mississippi”).
The three runners also owned Precision Markerting Group, LLC (“Precision”) which they sold to
Scott Favre and/or his companies (collectively “Favre”).
With regard to the clients obtained in the BP Litigation, Walker, Seymour and Ladner hired
other runners to literally go up anfd down streets knocking on doors to solicit clients on behalf of
Pohl for lawsuits against British Petroleum. Precision paid these runners as much as $300-$400
for every client they obtained. Pohl then paid Precision as much as $1,500 for every client
Precision referred tao lPohl. Pohl also offered and agreed to pay Walker, Seymour and Ladner a
percentage of hisi legal fees once the cases settled. This percentage was disguised as an hourly rate
of $1,500.00 per hour.
With regard to auto accidents, Pohl set up a “Google Alerts” to be notified whenever there
was a horrific rollover crash. Pohl would then send his runners to hospitals, homes and funerals
to contact the families of the injured. The runners would use their sham companies, “Helping
Hands” to act as though they were genuinely there to help these victims. The runners would falsely
tell these victims that they were there to help the victims’ in their time of need in the form of
money for burial services, food, clothing, lodging, etc. In reality, the runners’ contacted these
families under false pretenses with the sole objective to take advantage of these victims and their
families while they were emotionally distraught and not thinking straight in ordker to lock them
into contracts which allowed the runners to select a lawyer for the victim. Tlhe victims and the
family members were encouraged to hire Pohl and told they could not gect the money unless they
agreed to hire Pohl. Pohl would pay the runners as much as $7,5s00 per client and Pohl also
promised the runners as much as 33% of Pohl’s legal fees on the back end when the case settled.
Additionally, HH Texas would pay HH Mississippi $2,500 for every client referred to HH Texas
to “loan” money to these victims and their family. Pohl used this procedure as an attempt to put
an additional layer between him and the actual runners.
Pohl also helped the runners form anaother sham entity, the GM Settlement Verification
Team (“GM Team”) after General Motors, Inc. issued a recall on cars due to faulty ignition
switches which effected the safe opereation of the airbag systems on vehicles. Thus, the GM Team
was designed to look official as iff it was part of General Motors. The conspiracy was to form an
official looking entity as if GyM was contacting people who had been harmed when airbags failed
to deploy in relation toC the ignition recall. In reality, this was just another sham company used to
trick clients into hiaring Pohl. Again, Pohl would pay Walker and Ladner, through their sham
entity, the GM Tfeam, a fee for every client it referred to Pohl, in addition to a percentage of fees
on the baUck end.
Pohl knew what he was doing was illegal barratry. Accordingly, he knowingly formed
entities that he perceived would insulate him from liability. In fact, Walker testified that although
he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or “marketing money” it was “clear to [him] it was
barratry.” In fact, Walker considered himself and his company “a pass-through for barratry
money.” All total, Walker, Ladner and Precision received over $5 million in “barratry pass-through
money” from Pohl and other lawyers to solicit potential clients with claims, both auto-accident
victims and those involved in the BP Deepwater Horizon litigation. k
One of the runners hired by Pohl and Walker to solicit illegally solicit cllients on behalf of
Pohl was Magdalena Santana (“Santana”). In her September 24, 2016 afcfidavit, Santana testified
that Pohl sent her on “dozens and dozens of car wreck cases all ovser the country.” Pohl would
email Santana the link of news coverage he obtained through Google Alerts depicting an accident
and asked her “to go to the victim or the victim’s family and try to get them to sign up with him.”
Santana swore under oath that Pohl agreed to pay her “$5,000 per case that [she] signed, plus a
percentage of his attorney’s fees.” Santana was advised by Pohl to “be persistent even if the family
... rejected [her].” Santana was instructed by Paohl to “approach the victims and their families while
they were vulnerable, in the emergency room, their hospital rooms or at the funerals.” Pohl told
Santana that minorities “were especieally vulnerable since they tended not to know that the law
prohibited barratry.” Accordingf to Pohl, they “were easier to sign up.”
Pohl would give Sanytana “money to give to the victims or their families” but would give
the money to the client C“if they agreed to sign a Pohl representation contract.” Pohl advised Santana
that the money was aa “foot in the door” but instructed Santana not to mention anything about hiring
a lawyer “untilf after they agreed to take the money.” “If the client agreed to hire Pohl, then
[Santana]U was to have the client sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.” Pohl would then give Santana
the money to pay the client “from his own Helping Hands company.” When Santana questioned
this, Pohl told Santana that it “was illegal for him to pay [her] directly for cases, and that’s why
the money had to go through some company.”
Pohl and/or his co-conspirators had Santana retract this affidavit through a December 19,
2017 affidavit. This purported retraction was likely the result of Pohl paying Santana to provide
testimony, which is something he has done in the past. In fact, Pohl’s own paralegal, Jaimes,
testified that on one occasion Pohl sent him to Florida with a suitcase filled with $k50,000 in cash
to give to Santana in exchange for her signing a statement for him. Jaimes tesltified that Santana
would only get the money if she signed the statement for Pohl. Jaimes testcified that Santana signed
the signed the statement and got the money. s
Santana went into more detail about this in her deposition. Santana testified that the
statement was an agreement for her to keep quiet and not charge Pohl with any wrongdoing,
criminal or unethical conduct. Santana testified that Pohl paid her $50,000 in cash to sign this
statement, which was delivered by Jaimes in three bags marked “trick or treat.” Very symbolic
given that Santana had been tricked by Pohla into soliciting clients for him and was now being
treated the money she claimed was due under their agreement just to stay quite. Santana reiterated
in her deposition that if she didn’t sigen the gag agreement, she would not receive the money from
Pohl. Santana attempted to indicafte on the agreement that she was receiving $50,000 to keep quiet,
but Jaimes told her Pohl deymanded that she state she only received nominal consideration, like
$100. Santana did not wCrite the statement but “just signed it” because she felt she was being “forced
to sign” it while “unader duress.”
Notablyf, nowhere in Santana’s December 19th affidavit does she state the testimony in her
former afUfidavit is untrue, only that she does not “agree with” it and that the affidavit is not
“reliable.” Although Santana states in her December 19th affidavit that her prior affidavit was
drafted by a lawyer, Santana testified in her deposition that the September 24th affidavit was
created voluntarily with her own “testimony.” Santana testified that, unlike with Pohl, she was not
paid and had never been promised any money to provide the testimony in the September 24th
affidavit. Santana reiterated to counsel for Pohl, Billy Shepherd, that she was there in her
deposition to tell the truth and would not be bullied by his questioning or his efforts to confuse
her. k
Regardless, Santana’s sworn deposition testimony confirmed most of tlhe facts set forth in
her initial affidavit and this deposition testimony has never been rectracted. There, Santana
confirmed that she was hired by Pohl to solicit auto accident cases, thse first one being an accident
where a woman and her unborn child lost their lives. Santana was instructed by Walker, who was
instructed by Pohl, to personally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her up to sue the tire
manufacturer and, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000. Santana visited the funeral of the
deceased and got the family to feel comfortable with her. Although the mother was grieving, Pohl
told Santana: “take no prisoners, this is a cut tharoat business, you get in there and you do whatever
it takes to get this client.” The solicitation was successful after Pohl gave Santana $2,000 to “give
to the client to convince her into signeing over with the firm.”
“Coach” Kenneth Talleyf (“Talley”) was another runner hired by Pohl and Walker who
solicited over 20 auto accideynt cases for Pohl. Talley has sworn under oath that he was first hired
in relation to BP claimCs to find “folks that lost money due to the oil spill” and “sign them up” and
“get a fee for it.” Taalley testified that he went to work “knocking on doors” looking for potential
claimants for Pofhl and his partner in the BP litigation. Talley solicited and signed up for Pohl and
his co-coUnspirators more than 800 BP claims. Talley was paid between $75 and $350 for each BP
client he signed up for Pohl and his partners.
Talley eventually switched to soliciting auto accident victims, “calling on folks that had
bad accidents.” Talley recalls that the first client he solicited was in “the hospital in intensive care.”
Talley carried with him up to $1,000 to pay the accident victims to “help them with problems” but
only once they “were signed up.” Talley kept a list of all the auto accident cases he solicited so he
could keep track of the cases that he was due a fee on the back end after the case settled. Talley
also followed a checklist that instructed him to, among other things, bring flowekrs to the initial
hospital visit (but to spend no more than $50) and to offer the victims moneyl but to “make sure
the funding schedule” from HH Texas “is filled out properly before relecasing any cash.” Talley
would advise the victims that he had attorneys who could help them ssuch as Pohl. Talley was paid
a fee of $1,400 plus his expenses by Pohl, through Walker, for any auto accident case he solicited
and referred to Pohl. On some cases, Talley was to receive a portion of the fee paid to Helping
Hands out of Pohl’s attorney’s fees. Talley discussed with Pohl the “percentage of settlements”
he was to receive from the cases he solicited and referred, and Pohl told Talley that the money was
being placed in an “escrow account” for him. aWhen asked whether Pohl knew he was getting paid
to “contact vehicle accident victims,” Talley responded, “the money was coming from Edgar
[Jaimes] who worked for him.” Ande, although his paycheck was from Walker’s company, “the
funding came by way of Edgar [Jfaimes].”
Talley testified that pyersonally soliciting clients for Pohl became so frequent that he began
carrying blank Pohl coCntracts to each solicitation. Talley testified that he never recommended any
lawyers other than Paohl. However, Talley never told the clients that he was getting paid to solicit
them. Talley wofuld present a Pohl contract to the potential client. If the client did not agree to hire
Pohl, the Uclients would not get the money. Talley testified that Jaimes and Dona (the operators of
HH Texas) would send him the money.
Talley further testified that both he and Pohl knew what they were doing was illegal. In
one instance, Talley was “run out of town” while soliciting clients for Pohl. Talley testified that
during the attempted solicitation he was told by a “lawyer or policeman” that “it was against the
law what [he] was doing.” Talley mentioned this to Pohl and Pohl told him “you’ve just got to
leave...some people you can’t help.”
Walker was eventually indicted and sent to prison. Thereafter, Pohl and hisk lawyer partners
refused to pay Walker and the other runners the ill gained fees as Pohl had prolmised. Therefore,
Walker, Seymour, Ladner and Precision filed a lawsuit in Mississippi cFederal Court (“Federal
Litigation”) against Pohl and his law partners claiming they were sowed millions of dollars in
promised fees. 
The above facts were compiled during the Federal Litigation. Thereafter, more than four
hundred clients who were illegally solicited contacted the Kassab Law Firm and requested Kassab
to represent them in litigation against Pohl and his partners. Kassab filed lawsuits on behalf of
these clients in four different courts in Harrisa County. Additionally, due to the egregiousness of
Pohl’s violation of the Texas Penal Code and violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct, Kassab was reequired to notify the Texas State Bar pursuant to Rule 8.03 of
the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Pfrofessional Conduct. Thus, Kassab filed grievances against Pohl
pursuant to Rule 8.03. Pohl’ys clients are also preparing and filing grievances against Pohl arising
out of his blatant barraCtry.
Because of athese actions in representing clients against Pohl and the grievances filed
against Pohl, Pofhl has filed a retaliatory lawsuit against the Kassab alleging conversion and theft
of trade sUecrets. Pohl alleges that Kassab and others stole his property and are using it to bring
lawsuits and grievances against Pohl. Specifically, Pohl alleges in his petition against Kassab that,
“Kassab is a lawyer who specializes in suing other lawyers”1 and “Kassab solicited
1 Pohl Original Petition, p. 6
10
clients/prospective clients [of Pohl’s] to act as Plaintiffs . . . to bring cases against Pohl for alleged
barratry and other claims.”2 Thus, Pohl has judicially admitted that he has brought his suit against
Kassab because Kassab contacted Pohl’s clients and filed suit against Pohl on behalf of these
clients. k
COUNTERCLAIM FOR CIVIL BARRATRY
Within the lawsuits that Kassab has filed against Pohl on behalf oft his former clients and
potential clients, Pohl has judicially admitted that a claim for barratryt is not a legal malpractice
case. Pohl has also admitted that a claim for barratry is not a claim for “legal malpractice,” and
thus, the discovery rule does not apply to a barratry claim. Teherefore, based upon Pohl’s judicial
admissions, the assignment of a barratry claim is permituted under Texas law.
Therefore, based upon express assignmentns of interest given to Kassab, Kassab brings
counterclaims against Pohl and his law firm purrsuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,
Section 16.069. Section 16.069 provides:
(a) If a counterclaim or cross claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence
that is the basis of an acction, a party to the action may file the counterclaim or
cross claim even thougfh as a separate action it would be barred by limitations
on the date the partyO’s answer is required.
(b) The counterclaipm or cross claim must be filed not later than the 30th day after
the date on which the party’s answer is required.
Kassab has been asasilgned 150 barratry claims as of this date. These counterclaims are
being filed conteimporaneously with the Kassab’s answer and are therefore timely. The
remaining barratry counterclaims will be filed by November 7, 2018, within thirty (30)
days from the date Kassab’s answer is filed.
2 Id. at p. 6-7
11
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs respectfully pray that Plaintiffs recover nothing
on their claims and that the Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs recover on their claims against the
Plaintiffs as follows:
i) actual and consequential damages;
ii) statutory damages; 
iii) pre- and post-judgment interest; r
iv) attorneys’ fees and costs; and i
v) all other relief to which the Defendants, Counters-Plaintiffs may be justly entitled.
Respecutfully submitted,
THnE KASSAB LAW FIRM
r i/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 00794070
f lance@kassab.law
 DAVID ERIC KASSAB
c Texas State Bar No. 24071351
f i david@kassab.law
O 1214 Elgin Street
 Houston, Texas 77004
p Telephone: 713.522.7400
o Facsimile: 713.522.7410
a l ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS,
i COUNTER-PLAINTIFFS LANCE CHRISTOPHER
f i KASSAB AND THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has been
forwarded to all parties pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this the 24th day of
October 2018.
/ s / Lance Christopher Kasesab
Lance Christopher KassCabl
13"
2,2018-10-08,OA,Kassab,Kassab’s initial answer with counterclaims,"Kassab Defendants' Original Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim for Civil Barratry, including general denial, 16 affirmative defenses, specific denials, and counterclaims based on assigned barratry claims","Kassab's initial responsive pleading to Pohl's Original Petition, filed October 8, 2018, approximately six weeks after suit was commenced. Includes both defensive pleading (general denial, 16 affirmative defenses, specific denials) and offensive counterclaims for civil barratry based on assigned claims from Pohl's former clients.","PLEAD-1, CC-1",N/A,Phase 1,2018-10-08_OA_Kassab-Answer-and-CC_FILED.pdf,That Plaintiffs recover nothing on their claims; actual and consequential damages on counterclaims; statutory damages; pre- and post-judgment interest; attorneys' fees and costs; and all other relief to which Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs may be justly entitled,"10/8/2018 1:34 PM
Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 28104847
By: Brianna Denmon
Filed: 10/8/2018 1:34 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIrAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS, LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAW FIRM’S ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES AND COUNTERCLAIM t
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
COMES NOW, Defendants, Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab,
P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm and files this their Origirnal Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and
Counterclaim, and would respectfully show the Court as follows;
RULE 47 SiT l ATEMENT
The Kassab Defendants, in their caMpacity as Counter-Plaintiffs, seek monetary relief of
more than $1,000,000.00. o
PARTIES
Plaintiff, Michael A. PoOhl is an individual lawyer residing in Colorado.
Plaintiff, Law Offipces of Michael A. Pohl is a law firm set up for the practice of law in
various states of the union, including Texas.
Defendant, iScott Favre is a nonresident individual residing in Mississippi.
Defenodant, Scott M. Favre, PA, LLC is a nonresident limited liability company located in
Mississippi.
Defendant, Precision Marketing Group, LLC is a nonresident limited liability company
located in Mississippi.
Defendant, F. Douglas Montague III is a nonresident individual residing in Mississippi.
Defendant, Montague, Pittman & Varnado, PA is a nonresident professional association
located in Mississippi.
Defendant, Tina Nicholson is an individual residing in Texas.
Defendant, Baker Nicholson, LLP, d/b/a Baker Nicholson Law Firm is a klimited liability
partnership located in Texas. l
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab is an indicvidual residing in Texas.
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C.s d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm
is a professional corporation located in Texas. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
This matter is within the jurisdictional limitsu of this Court and Plaintiffs, Counter-
Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices onf Michael A. Pohl (“Pohl”) and Defendants,
Counter-Plaintiffs, Lance Christopher Kassab (“rLCK”) and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a
The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab, P.C.”) (collectively “Kassab”) are subject to the Court’s
jurisdiction. Venue is proper in this county because one or more of the defendants are residents of
this county and because a substanftial part of the acts and/or omissions that form the basis of this
suit occurred in this county. 
GENERAL DENIAL
Defendant, Clounter-Plaintiff Kassab generally denies all allegations made by Plaintiffs,
Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl, and requests the Court
to require Pnlaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl to
carry their burden of proof regarding all allegations against Kassab.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab pleads the following affirmative defenses:
1. Statute of limitations
2. Justification.
3. Estoppel.
4. Waiver. t
5. Ratification. t
6. Release. 
7. Unclean hands. e
8. Contribution. u
9. Failure to mitigate damages. n
10. Lack of standing. r
11. Accord and Satisfaction.
12. Assumption of the Risk. 
13. Illegality/Criminal Actfs.
14. First Amendment. 
15. Attorney Immunity.
16. In Pari Daellicto.
i SPECIFIC DENIALS
Defnendants, Counter-Plaintiffs specifically deny that all conditions precedent regarding
Plaintiffs claims of conversion and theft of trade secrets have been performed or occurred prior to
Plaintiffs filing suit against Kassab.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
LCK is a lawyer practicing law with Kassab, P.C., a law firm in Houston, Texas focusing
solely on plaintiffs’ legal malpractice. Kassab filed four lawsuits on behalf of over four hundred
clients against Pohl (the “Harris County Lawsuits”). The main allegations against Pohl is civil
barratry and conspiracy to commit barratry, a third-degree felony in Texas. Pohl conspired with
his wife, Donalda Pohl (“Dona”), his paralegal, Edgar Jaimes (“Jaimes”t), and three runners in
Mississippi to illegally solicit clients on behalf of Pohl. Dona owns at sham lending company in
Texas called Helping Hands Financing, LLC (“HH Texas”). Jaimes runs the day-to-day operations
of HH Texas. The three runners are Scott Walker (“Walkere”), Steve Seymour (“Seymour”) and
Kirk Ladner (“Ladner”). The three runners own and ouperate two other sham companies called
Helping Hands Group, LLC and Helping Hands Finnancial, LLC (collectively “HH Mississippi”).
The three runners also owned Precision Markerting Group, LLC (“Precision”) which they sold to
Scott Favre and/or his companies (collectively “Favre”).
With regard to the clients obtained in the BP Litigation, Walker, Seymour and Ladner hired
other runners to literally go up anfd down streets knocking on doors to solicit clients on behalf of
Pohl for lawsuits against British Petroleum. Precision paid these runners as much as $300-$400
for every client they obtained. Pohl then paid Precision as much as $1,500 for every client
Precision referred tao lPohl. Pohl also offered and agreed to pay Walker, Seymour and Ladner a
percentage of hisi legal fees once the cases settled. This percentage was disguised as an hourly rate
of $1,500.00 per hour.
With regard to auto accidents, Pohl set up a “Google Alerts” to be notified whenever there
was a horrific rollover crash. Pohl would then send his runners to hospitals, homes and funerals
to contact the families of the injured. The runners would use their sham companies, “Helping
Hands” to act as though they were genuinely there to help these victims. The runners would falsely
tell these victims that they were there to help the victims’ in their time of need in the form of
money for burial services, food, clothing, lodging, etc. In reality, the runners’ contacted these
families under false pretenses with the sole objective to take advantage of these victims and their
families while they were emotionally distraught and not thinking straight in ordker to lock them
into contracts which allowed the runners to select a lawyer for the victim. Tlhe victims and the
family members were encouraged to hire Pohl and told they could not gect the money unless they
agreed to hire Pohl. Pohl would pay the runners as much as $7,5s00 per client and Pohl also
promised the runners as much as 33% of Pohl’s legal fees on the back end when the case settled.
Additionally, HH Texas would pay HH Mississippi $2,500 for every client referred to HH Texas
to “loan” money to these victims and their family. Pohl used this procedure as an attempt to put
an additional layer between him and the actual runners.
Pohl also helped the runners form anaother sham entity, the GM Settlement Verification
Team (“GM Team”) after General Motors, Inc. issued a recall on cars due to faulty ignition
switches which effected the safe opereation of the airbag systems on vehicles. Thus, the GM Team
was designed to look official as iff it was part of General Motors. The conspiracy was to form an
official looking entity as if GyM was contacting people who had been harmed when airbags failed
to deploy in relation toC the ignition recall. In reality, this was just another sham company used to
trick clients into hiaring Pohl. Again, Pohl would pay Walker and Ladner, through their sham
entity, the GM Tfeam, a fee for every client it referred to Pohl, in addition to a percentage of fees
on the baUck end.
Pohl knew what he was doing was illegal barratry. Accordingly, he knowingly formed
entities that he perceived would insulate him from liability. In fact, Walker testified that although
he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or “marketing money” it was “clear to [him] it was
barratry.” In fact, Walker considered himself and his company “a pass-through for barratry
money.” All total, Walker, Ladner and Precision received over $5 million in “barratry pass-through
money” from Pohl and other lawyers to solicit potential clients with claims, both auto-accident
victims and those involved in the BP Deepwater Horizon litigation. k
One of the runners hired by Pohl and Walker to solicit illegally solicit cllients on behalf of
Pohl was Magdalena Santana (“Santana”). In her September 24, 2016 afcfidavit, Santana testified
that Pohl sent her on “dozens and dozens of car wreck cases all ovser the country.” Pohl would
email Santana the link of news coverage he obtained through Google Alerts depicting an accident
and asked her “to go to the victim or the victim’s family and try to get them to sign up with him.”
Santana swore under oath that Pohl agreed to pay her “$5,000 per case that [she] signed, plus a
percentage of his attorney’s fees.” Santana was advised by Pohl to “be persistent even if the family
... rejected [her].” Santana was instructed by Paohl to “approach the victims and their families while
they were vulnerable, in the emergency room, their hospital rooms or at the funerals.” Pohl told
Santana that minorities “were especieally vulnerable since they tended not to know that the law
prohibited barratry.” Accordingf to Pohl, they “were easier to sign up.”
Pohl would give Sanytana “money to give to the victims or their families” but would give
the money to the client C“if they agreed to sign a Pohl representation contract.” Pohl advised Santana
that the money was aa “foot in the door” but instructed Santana not to mention anything about hiring
a lawyer “untilf after they agreed to take the money.” “If the client agreed to hire Pohl, then
[Santana]U was to have the client sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.” Pohl would then give Santana
the money to pay the client “from his own Helping Hands company.” When Santana questioned
this, Pohl told Santana that it “was illegal for him to pay [her] directly for cases, and that’s why
the money had to go through some company.”
Pohl and/or his co-conspirators had Santana retract this affidavit through a December 19,
2017 affidavit. This purported retraction was likely the result of Pohl paying Santana to provide
testimony, which is something he has done in the past. In fact, Pohl’s own paralegal, Jaimes,
testified that on one occasion Pohl sent him to Florida with a suitcase filled with $k50,000 in cash
to give to Santana in exchange for her signing a statement for him. Jaimes tesltified that Santana
would only get the money if she signed the statement for Pohl. Jaimes testcified that Santana signed
the signed the statement and got the money. s
Santana went into more detail about this in her deposition. Santana testified that the
statement was an agreement for her to keep quiet and not charge Pohl with any wrongdoing,
criminal or unethical conduct. Santana testified that Pohl paid her $50,000 in cash to sign this
statement, which was delivered by Jaimes in three bags marked “trick or treat.” Very symbolic
given that Santana had been tricked by Pohla into soliciting clients for him and was now being
treated the money she claimed was due under their agreement just to stay quite. Santana reiterated
in her deposition that if she didn’t sigen the gag agreement, she would not receive the money from
Pohl. Santana attempted to indicafte on the agreement that she was receiving $50,000 to keep quiet,
but Jaimes told her Pohl deymanded that she state she only received nominal consideration, like
$100. Santana did not wCrite the statement but “just signed it” because she felt she was being “forced
to sign” it while “unader duress.”
Notablyf, nowhere in Santana’s December 19th affidavit does she state the testimony in her
former afUfidavit is untrue, only that she does not “agree with” it and that the affidavit is not
“reliable.” Although Santana states in her December 19th affidavit that her prior affidavit was
drafted by a lawyer, Santana testified in her deposition that the September 24th affidavit was
created voluntarily with her own “testimony.” Santana testified that, unlike with Pohl, she was not
paid and had never been promised any money to provide the testimony in the September 24th
affidavit. Santana reiterated to counsel for Pohl, Billy Shepherd, that she was there in her
deposition to tell the truth and would not be bullied by his questioning or his efforts to confuse
her. k
Regardless, Santana’s sworn deposition testimony confirmed most of tlhe facts set forth in
her initial affidavit and this deposition testimony has never been rectracted. There, Santana
confirmed that she was hired by Pohl to solicit auto accident cases, thse first one being an accident
where a woman and her unborn child lost their lives. Santana was instructed by Walker, who was
instructed by Pohl, to personally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her up to sue the tire
manufacturer and, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000. Santana visited the funeral of the
deceased and got the family to feel comfortable with her. Although the mother was grieving, Pohl
told Santana: “take no prisoners, this is a cut tharoat business, you get in there and you do whatever
it takes to get this client.” The solicitation was successful after Pohl gave Santana $2,000 to “give
to the client to convince her into signeing over with the firm.”
“Coach” Kenneth Talleyf (“Talley”) was another runner hired by Pohl and Walker who
solicited over 20 auto accideynt cases for Pohl. Talley has sworn under oath that he was first hired
in relation to BP claimCs to find “folks that lost money due to the oil spill” and “sign them up” and
“get a fee for it.” Taalley testified that he went to work “knocking on doors” looking for potential
claimants for Pofhl and his partner in the BP litigation. Talley solicited and signed up for Pohl and
his co-coUnspirators more than 800 BP claims. Talley was paid between $75 and $350 for each BP
client he signed up for Pohl and his partners.
Talley eventually switched to soliciting auto accident victims, “calling on folks that had
bad accidents.” Talley recalls that the first client he solicited was in “the hospital in intensive care.”
Talley carried with him up to $1,000 to pay the accident victims to “help them with problems” but
only once they “were signed up.” Talley kept a list of all the auto accident cases he solicited so he
could keep track of the cases that he was due a fee on the back end after the case settled. Talley
also followed a checklist that instructed him to, among other things, bring flowekrs to the initial
hospital visit (but to spend no more than $50) and to offer the victims moneyl but to “make sure
the funding schedule” from HH Texas “is filled out properly before relecasing any cash.” Talley
would advise the victims that he had attorneys who could help them ssuch as Pohl. Talley was paid
a fee of $1,400 plus his expenses by Pohl, through Walker, for any auto accident case he solicited
and referred to Pohl. On some cases, Talley was to receive a portion of the fee paid to Helping
Hands out of Pohl’s attorney’s fees. Talley discussed with Pohl the “percentage of settlements”
he was to receive from the cases he solicited and referred, and Pohl told Talley that the money was
being placed in an “escrow account” for him. aWhen asked whether Pohl knew he was getting paid
to “contact vehicle accident victims,” Talley responded, “the money was coming from Edgar
[Jaimes] who worked for him.” Ande, although his paycheck was from Walker’s company, “the
funding came by way of Edgar [Jfaimes].”
Talley testified that pyersonally soliciting clients for Pohl became so frequent that he began
carrying blank Pohl coCntracts to each solicitation. Talley testified that he never recommended any
lawyers other than Paohl. However, Talley never told the clients that he was getting paid to solicit
them. Talley wofuld present a Pohl contract to the potential client. If the client did not agree to hire
Pohl, the Uclients would not get the money. Talley testified that Jaimes and Dona (the operators of
HH Texas) would send him the money.
Talley further testified that both he and Pohl knew what they were doing was illegal. In
one instance, Talley was “run out of town” while soliciting clients for Pohl. Talley testified that
during the attempted solicitation he was told by a “lawyer or policeman” that “it was against the
law what [he] was doing.” Talley mentioned this to Pohl and Pohl told him “you’ve just got to
leave...some people you can’t help.”
Walker was eventually indicted and sent to prison. Thereafter, Pohl and hisk lawyer partners
refused to pay Walker and the other runners the ill gained fees as Pohl had prolmised. Therefore,
Walker, Seymour, Ladner and Precision filed a lawsuit in Mississippi cFederal Court (“Federal
Litigation”) against Pohl and his law partners claiming they were sowed millions of dollars in
promised fees. 
The above facts were compiled during the Federal Litigation. Thereafter, more than four
hundred clients who were illegally solicited contacted the Kassab Law Firm and requested Kassab
to represent them in litigation against Pohl and his partners. Kassab filed lawsuits on behalf of
these clients in four different courts in Harrisa County. Additionally, due to the egregiousness of
Pohl’s violation of the Texas Penal Code and violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct, Kassab was reequired to notify the Texas State Bar pursuant to Rule 8.03 of
the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Pfrofessional Conduct. Thus, Kassab filed grievances against Pohl
pursuant to Rule 8.03. Pohl’ys clients are also preparing and filing grievances against Pohl arising
out of his blatant barraCtry.
Because of athese actions in representing clients against Pohl and the grievances filed
against Pohl, Pofhl has filed a retaliatory lawsuit against the Kassab alleging conversion and theft
of trade sUecrets. Pohl alleges that Kassab and others stole his property and are using it to bring
lawsuits and grievances against Pohl. Specifically, Pohl alleges in his petition against Kassab that,
“Kassab is a lawyer who specializes in suing other lawyers”1 and “Kassab solicited
1 Pohl Original Petition, p. 6
10
clients/prospective clients [of Pohl’s] to act as Plaintiffs . . . to bring cases against Pohl for alleged
barratry and other claims.”2 Thus, Pohl has judicially admitted that he has brought his suit against
Kassab because Kassab contacted Pohl’s clients and filed suit against Pohl on behalf of these
clients. k
COUNTERCLAIM FOR CIVIL BARRATRY
Within the lawsuits that Kassab has filed against Pohl on behalf oft his former clients and
potential clients, Pohl has judicially admitted that a claim for barratryt is not a legal malpractice
case. Pohl has also admitted that a claim for barratry is not a claim for “legal malpractice,” and
thus, the discovery rule does not apply to a barratry claim. Teherefore, based upon Pohl’s judicial
admissions, the assignment of a barratry claim is permituted under Texas law.
Therefore, based upon express assignmentns of interest given to Kassab, Kassab brings
counterclaims against Pohl and his law firm purrsuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,
Section 16.069. Section 16.069 provides:
(a) If a counterclaim or cross claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence
that is the basis of an acction, a party to the action may file the counterclaim or
cross claim even thougfh as a separate action it would be barred by limitations
on the date the partyO’s answer is required.
(b) The counterclaipm or cross claim must be filed not later than the 30th day after
the date on which the party’s answer is required.
Kassab has been asasilgned 150 barratry claims as of this date. These counterclaims are
being filed conteimporaneously with the Kassab’s answer and are therefore timely. The
remaining barratry counterclaims will be filed by November 7, 2018, within thirty (30)
days from the date Kassab’s answer is filed.
2 Id. at p. 6-7
11
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs respectfully pray that Plaintiffs recover nothing
on their claims and that the Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs recover on their claims against the
Plaintiffs as follows:
i) actual and consequential damages;
ii) statutory damages; 
iii) pre- and post-judgment interest; r
iv) attorneys’ fees and costs; and i
v) all other relief to which the Defendants, Counters-Plaintiffs may be justly entitled.
Respecutfully submitted,
THnE KASSAB LAW FIRM
r i/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 00794070
f lance@kassab.law
 DAVID ERIC KASSAB
c Texas State Bar No. 24071351
f i david@kassab.law
O 1214 Elgin Street
 Houston, Texas 77004
p Telephone: 713.522.7400
o Facsimile: 713.522.7410
a l ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS,
i COUNTER-PLAINTIFFS LANCE CHRISTOPHER
f i KASSAB AND THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has been
forwarded to all parties pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this the 8th day of
October 2018.
/ s / Lance Christopher Kasesab
Lance Christopher KassCabl
13"