filing_id,date,doc_type,party,description,doc_type_detail,procedural_posture,chain,outcome,phase,filename,relief_requested,full_text
15,2018-12-26,RSP,Pohl,Pohl’s response to supp. TCPA motion,"Pohl's combined notice of mandatory stay, response in opposition to motion for leave to file late TCPA motion, and response in opposition to Favre/Precision's TCPA Motion to Dismiss","Filed December 26, 2018 in Cause No. 2018-58419, 189th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas. Filed after Kassab's TCPA motion was denied by operation of law and Kassab noticed an interlocutory appeal on December 18, 2018. Pohl argues a mandatory stay bars consideration of the Favre/Precision TCPA motion. This response addresses both the timeliness of the Favre/Precision motion (filed after the 60-day TCPA deadline) and the merits of the TCPA dismissal arguments.",TCPA-1,N/A,Phase 1,2018-12-26_RSP_Pohl-Response-to-Supp-MTD-TCPA_FILED.pdf,Deny the Motion for Leave to file late TCPA motion; deny the Motion to Dismiss as untimely and on the merits; deny attorney's fees,"12/26/2018 11:52 AM
Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 29957412
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 12/26/2018 11:52 AM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL AND LAW OFFICE OF § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
MICHAEL A. POHL, PLLC, §
Plaintiffs, §
V. § k
§ e
SCOTT FAVRE and SCOTT M. FAVRE PA, § l
LLC; PRECISION MARKETING GROUP, § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
LLC; LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB and § c
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. d/b/a § r
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM; TINA § s
NICHOLSON and BAKER NICHOLSON, § D
LLP d/b/a BAKER NICHOLSON LAW § s 
FIRM; and DOUGLAS MONTAGUE III and § s
MONTAGUE PITTMAN & VARNADO, P.A., §
Defendants. § r189TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PLAINTIFFS MICHAEL POHL AND LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL A. POHL’S
NOTICE OF MANDATORY STAY OF ALL PROCEEDINGS, RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR LEAVEl TO FILE MOTION TO DISMISS, AND
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO aDEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiffs Michael Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl (collectively, “Pohl”) provide
this notice that all proceedings are staeyed, respond in opposition to the Motion for Leave to File a
Motion to Dismiss filed by Defenfdants Scott Favre (“Mr. Favre”), Scott M. Favre Public Adjuster,
LLC (“Favre”), and Precisioyn Marketing Group, LLC (“Precision”) (collectively, “Defendants”),
and respond in oppositCion to the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (the “Motion”).
In light of the filing of an interlocutory appeal, this case is currently subject to a mandatory
stay, precludinfgf the Court’s consideration of the Motion. In addition, the Motion was not timely
filed andU should be denied for that reason. Finally, the Motion purports to find its basis in the
Texas Citizens’ Participation Act, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 27.001 et. seq.
(“TCPA”), but the TCPA does not apply to Pohl’s claims, and even if it did, the Motion would
fail.
THIS CASE IS SUBJECT TO A MANDATORY STAY OF ALL PROCEEDINGS
Defendants Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The
Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab”) moved to dismiss the claims against Kassab by a kmotion filed on
October 24, 2018. That motion was overruled by operation of law, and Kassabl noticed an appeal
of that denial on December 18, 2018. Kassab’s notice of appeal gave risce to a mandatory stay of
“all other proceedings in the trial court pending resolution of that asppeal.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 51.014(b). The stay applies to all of the “trial csourt’s proceedings, including all
discovery.” In re Roser, 14-16-00065-CV, 2016 WL 2605686, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] May 5, 2016, orig. proceeding). The stay precludes this Court’s consideration of the Motion.
See In re Texas Educ. Agency, 441 S.W.3d 747, 750 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, orig. proceeding.)
(“Conducting hearings and signing the challenaged orders denying supersedeas was an abuse of the
district court’s discretion because it violated the automatic stay of ‘all other proceedings in the trial
court’ under section 51.014(b).”). Tehe mandatory stay of section 51.014(b) prevents the Court
from considering the Motion, or ftaking any other action, until the appeal is resolved. See In re
Bliss & Glennon, Inc., 1-13-y00320-CV, 2014 WL 50831, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
Jan. 7, 2014, orig. proCceeding) (finding abuse of discretion and granting mandamus relief after
trial court took action during a mandatory stay under section 51.014(b)).
So longf fas the appeal of the denial of Kassab’s TCPA motion to dismiss remains pending,
this CourUt must stay all proceedings, including a hearing on the Motion. Any action taken in
violation of the stay will be voidable. See Roccaforte v. Jefferson County, 341 S.W.3d 919, 923
(Tex. 2011) (noting that a trial court’s actions taken in violation of section 51.014(b) are “voidable,
not void”).
II.
THE COURT SHOULD DENY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
THEIR MOTION OUT OF TIME
The TCPA supplies a deadline for filing: “A motion to dismiss a legal action under this
section must be filed not later than the 60th day after the date of service of the leegal action.” TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003(b). The 60-day period begins to run upon
service of the original
petition and is not reset by the filing of amended petitions. See Bachararch v. Garcia, 485 S.W.3d
600, 602 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). D
Defendants acknowledge in their Motion for Leave thast they filed their Motion to Dismiss
after the deadline had passed. See Motion for Leave at 1.r While a showing of good cause would
permit this Court to allow an out-of-time filing, Defendants failed to request an extension within
the requisite sixty-day period and have failed to lmake such a showing of good cause. TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003(b) (“court mMay extend the time to file a motion under this section
on a showing of good cause.” (emphasis added)). The term “showing” indicates that “proof” is
involved and that good cause will be “establish[ed] through evidence and argument.” See Bryan
A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “showing”).
Defendants attempt but fail to make any showing of good cause. Defendants provide no
explanation for the failure to file timely and therefore no basis on which to rest a finding of good
cause. Instead, cDefendants ask the Court to find that the late filing could not have been
“intentional” because they “had nothing to gain by filing the Motion after the deadline.” See
Motion for Leave at 3. In fact, Defendants did gain something by filing late; because the Court
conducted the hearing on Kassab’s TCPA Motion to Dismiss on November 5, 2018, Defendants
were able to tailor their Motion in response to the Court’s reaction to Kassab’s Motion.
Additionally, even if Defendants did not “gain” anything by a late filing, this is not
evidence of an absence of intent; it is merely a suggestion of an absence of motive. Defendants
have not provided any support for their position that the delay was for good cause.
Defendants similarly have provided no support for their argument that thek late filing was
not the result of conscious indifference. They argue only that the Court shoulld find that counsel
was not consciously indifferent because the filing was only three days clate. See id. Favre had
sixty days within which to file his motion, and his co-defendant Kasssab filed and served a TCPA
motion to dismiss on the fortieth day of that period.1 Kassab’s fsiling would have alerted a careful
lawyer to the impending deadline for his own filing. Defendants’ failure to make a timely filing
after that reminder actually suggests conscious indifference. See Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d
439, 442 n.1 (Tex. 2005) (characterizing a lawyer’s failure to meet a deadline as an “elementary
mistake” that could warrant a conclusion of inatent or conscious indifference).
Given the absence of any evidence to support their claim for good cause, Defendants’
Motion for Leave should be denied. Peohl respectfully requests that the Court deny the Motion for
Leave and decline to hear the Moftion to Dismiss as untimely.
y III.
RESPCONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS
A. Background
Defendfafnts, with Tina Nicholson and Baker Nicholson, LLP d/b/a Baker Nicholson Law
Firm’s (cUollectively “Nicholson”) assistance, illegally sold Pohl’s stolen property to defendant
Lance Kassab for $250,000. Through this purchase, Kassab obtained the stolen names, addresses,
and in some instances actual confidential client files of Pohl’s former and potential clients so that
1 Favre was served on September 14, and Kassab filed his motion to dismiss on October 24, 2018.
Kassab could solicit those clients to assert barratry claims. To vindicate his rights, Pohl filed suit
on August 28, 2018. Since the initiation of this case, Kassab and Nicholson have already sought
dismissal of the claims against them; now Defendants ask the Court to hold that their actions in
selling and actually providing the stolen materials are protected by the TCPA. k
In an attempt to contort the application of the TCPA and delay this lalwsuit, Defendants
assert that the TCPA applies to Pohl’s causes of action for conversion of cconfidential information,
misappropriation of trade secrets, and conspiracy without sustaining tsheir burden of demonstrating
why. Contrary to Defendants’ arguments, Pohl’s claims do not starget Defendants for the exercise
of any rights of free speech, petition, or association. Pohl brings claims to hold Defendants
responsible for their wrongful conversion of Pohl’s information and misappropriation of trade
secrets, together with their participation in a conspiracy to commit both torts. The claims on their
face do not implicate the TCPA, and the inquiary should end there.
Defendants have the burden of demonstrating the applicability of the TCPA by a
preponderance of the evidence. See LeFMC Enterprises, LLC v. Baker, 546 S.W. 3d 893, 897 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018,f pet. denied). In spite of this requirement, Defendants offer no
evidence of any kind to suppyort their position that the legal action is based on, relates to or is in
response to DefendantsC’ exercise of any protected right. Instead, Defendants, relying entirely on
non-binding precedent, simply argue that the TCPA necessarily applies to any claim for theft of
trade secrets, cfofnversion, and conspiracy, without examining those claims as they are asserted in
this case.U
Even if Defendants had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the TCPA
applies, Defendants’ Motion would nevertheless fail. Pohl’s suit is exempt from the TCPA by
virtue of the commercial exception to that statute. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.010(b).
The communications at issue with Defendants arose out of a transaction involving the types of
goods and services Precision provides. Precision was primarily engaged in the business of
providing goods and services related to marketing lists, including those for potential customers—
like the converted trade secret information at issue here. The intended audikence for those
communications was Kassab and Montague, who eventually purchased the stollen information. In
a similar fashion, through the combined ownership and control interests inc Precision, which places
them in charge of Precision’s business, Mr. Favre and Favre’s condusct also falls squarely into the
commercial speech exception. s 
Although it is clear that the TCPA does not apply to Pohl’s claims, Pohl fully sets forth his
prima facie case for each element of his causes of action. The pleadings and the affidavits Pohl
supplies can leave no question that he has satisfied the second prong of the TCPA analysis.
Defendants argue but fails to conclusively estaablish the affirmative defense of limitations, which
does not bar Pohl’s claims. 
B. Defendant’s Motion Shoulde Be Denied
The Texas Legislature enfacted the TCPA “to encourage and safeguard the constitutional
rights of persons to petition, sypeak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government
to the maximum extenCt permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the rights of a person to
file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.002
(emphasis addefdf). The TCPA is intended to identify and dispose of lawsuits that are “designed to
chill FirstU Amendment Rights, not to dismiss meritorious lawsuits.” In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579,
589 (Tex. 2015).
“Courts use a ‘two-step procedure to expedite the dismissal of claims brought to intimidate
or to silence a defendant’s exercise of these First Amendment rights.’” Wayne Dolcefino &
Dolcefino Communications, LLC v. Cypress Creek EMS, 540 S.W.3d 194, 198 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (quoting ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman, 512 S.W.3d 895,
898 (Tex. 2017)). The first step of the TCPA analysis requires that the movant establish by “a
preponderance of evidence that the suit he is seeking to dismiss ‘is based on, relkates to, or is in
response to the [movant’s] exercise of: (1) the right of free speech; (2) the righlt to petition; or (3)
the right of association.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting TEX. CIVc. PRAC. & REM. CODE §
27.003). s
If the movant sustains its burden of demonstrating by a psreponderance of the evidence that
the claims asserted in the petition fall within the ambit of the TCPA, and only then, the court turns
to the second step in the process. That step shifts the burden to the non-movant to provide by clear
and specific evidence a prima facie case supporting the elements of its claim. TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 27.005(c). In examining awhether a plaintiff has sustained its burden of
demonstrating a prima facie case, a court is obligated to consider “the pleadings and supporting
and opposing affidavits stating the facets on which the liability or defense is based.” Id. § 27.006(a).
A prima facie case is established wfhen the pleadings and evidence supply the “‘minimum quantum
of evidence necessary to suypport a rational inference that the allegation of fact is true.’” In re
Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d atC 590 (quoting In re E.I DuPont de Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 223
(Tex. 2004)).
As set ffofrth below, neither of the two prongs necessary to dismiss claims under the TCPA
are satisfiUed here, and Defendants’ Motion should be denied.
1. Pohl’s allegations on their face do not implicate the TCPA
To determine whether Defendants have proved to the Court by a preponderance of the
evidence that the TCPA applies to Pohl’s claims, the Court should start with the most recent
petition to determine the alleged conduct that forms the basis of the legal action. See Hersh v.
Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017) (the “basis of a legal action is not determined by the
defendant’s admissions or denials but by the plaintiff’s allegations”). Courts “do not blindly accept
attempts by the [defendants] to characterize [plaintiff’s] claims as implicakting protected
expression.” Sloat v. Rathbun, 513 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex. App.—Austin 2l015, pet. dism’d).
Instead, courts should “favor[] the conclusion that [the plaintiff’s] claimcs are not predicated on
protected expression.” Id. Further, “any activities by the [defendsants] that are not a factual
predicate for [the plaintiff’s] claims are simply not pertinent to tshe inquiry.” Id.
A movant under the TCPA must establish “a connection between the claims in the lawsuit
and the alleged protected conduct.” Wayne Dolcefino, 540 S.W.3d at 201. In conducting this
review, the Court must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Id. at
199. The Court’s inquiry should focus on (1a) what conduct forms the factual bases for Pohl’s
claims, based on the pleadings and evidence viewed in the light most favorable to him, and (2) the
extent to which that conduct is, as ae matter of law, are protected expression within the TCPA’s
definition. Sloat, 513 S.W.3d at f504.
Examining each of Pyohl’s claims against Defendants makes clear that they are not subject
to the TCPA. As PohlC’s First Amended Petition makes clear, Defendants engaged in conversion
through the act and a participation in Precision’s sale of stolen information to Kassab.2 Defendants’
liability for thisf f wrongful conduct is not based on facts related to the exercise of the rights of free
speech, pUetition, or association. Instead, their liability is based on their conduct of facilitating the
sale and the actual selling of the stolen materials.
2 See Amended Petition at ¶¶ 21–23.
Similarly, Pohl’s TUTSA claim is based on Defendants’ conduct in misappropriating trade
secrets through their sale to Kassab. For the same reasons as above, the factual basis of liability
for this claim does not trigger protections under the TCPA.
Pohl’s conspiracy claim involves Defendants’ overt acts in selling and Pohkl’s trade secrets
and other proprietary information.3 Yet again, nothing in the factual basis of lialbility provided for
this claim is based on or targets Defendants for the exercise of their rightsc of free speech, petition,
or association. s
Pohl has also asserted a claim for breach of contract agsainst Defendants. See Amended
Petition ¶ 35. Defendants have failed to seek the dismissal of the breach of contract claim in their
Motion. See generally Motion (containing no reference or discussion of the breach of contract
claim). Accordingly, Pohl’s breach of contract claim cannot be dismissed.
For all four of Pohl’s claims against aDefendants, the theory of liability is predicated on
wrongful acts, not protected speech or conduct. Pohl brought this lawsuit to vindicate his rights,
and not in response to or based upone any TCPA protected conduct. The pleadings and evidence
the Court must use to determine fif the TCPA applies make this clear. The Texas Supreme Court
has held that the petition is thye “best and all-sufficient evidence of the nature of the action.” Hersh
v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d C462, 467 (Tex. 2017) (quoting Stockyards Nat. Bank v. Maples, 95 S.W.2d
1300, 1302 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1936)), and Pohl’s Amended Petition establishes that the nature
of the action dof fes not implicate the TCPA.
2.U Defendants have not sustained their burden of demonstrating the applicability
of the TCPA to Pohl’s claims.
As the movants, Defendants have the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that Pohl’s claims are “based on, relate[] to, or [are] in response to [the Defendants’] exercise of”
3 See Amended Petition ¶ 43. See id. ¶ 38.
some protected speech or act. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(b). As set forth above,
Pohl’s claims on their face do not support Defendants’ invocation of the TCPA, and Defendants
are required to show a “connection between the claims in the lawsuit and the alleged protected
conduct.” Wayne Dolcefino, 540 S.W.3d at 201. Also, the Defendants must demoknstrate that the
protected conduct on which the Defendants rely is connected to the “facts on wlhich the liability or
defense is based.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.006(a). c
Defendants filed no evidentiary support for their Motion. Aslthough five exhibits were
attached to Favre’s Motion, those exhibits are not verified, and thse Court should decline to consider
them. Defendants have failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Pohl’s claims
are based on any act or communication protected under the TCPA. Instead, Defendants make
sweeping generalizations about the case law and rely on recharacterizations of the allegations in
Pohl’s Amended Petition. Courts have explicaitly rejected this very tactic, holding that defendants
cannot rely on their own theories of what may have motivated a claim or what its underlying basis
might be in order to support a motione to dismiss under the TCPA. See Sloat, 513 S.W.3d at 504
(rejecting the defendant’s effort tfo “recast [the Plaintiff’s] petition as complaining principally” of
actions of protest instead of ythe actions on which the petition was based). Although Defendants
make conclusory asserCtions that Pohl’s claims are “based on” or are “in response to” their alleged
protected conduct, the Court may not “blindly accept” those characterizations of Pohl’s
allegations. Infsftead, the Court must keep in mind that there needs to “be a connection between the
claims inU the lawsuit and the alleged protected conduct.” Wayne Dolcefino, 540 S.W.3d at 201.
a. No Showing Was Made that the Right of Association is Implicated by Pohl’s Claims
Defendants make unsupported assertions that Pohl’s trade secret and conspiracy claims
implicate their right of association. See Motion at 4–6. Instead of carrying their burden to show
10
that Pohl’s specific claims implicate their right of association, Defendants’ argument confuses
necessary and sufficient conditions; they mistakenly believe that because the TCPA can apply to
a trade secrets claim that it must apply to theirs. That simply does not follow. Even with the heavy
reliance on non-binding authority to argue for their expansive view of the TCPAk’s applicability,
Defendants are still unable to support this conclusion. l
The Motion cites the same two cases (both non-binding) discussicng the application of the
TCPA to cases involving trade secrets as were discussed in the Nichoslson Motion. See Motion at
4–5; Nicholson Motion at 4–5. Although it is certainly possibles for the TCPA to apply to a trade
secrets case, Defendants fail to provide any support for the notion that in every case, the mere
assertion of a trade secrets claim necessarily implicates the TCPA. To suggest that it does leads
to the absurd conclusion that instead of modifying trade secrets procedure directly, the Texas
Legislature decided to modify the administraation of all trade secrets cases through a statute that
does not even reference or deal with trade secrets.
The Motion does not provide eany evidence or even a quote from the Petition to argue that
Pohl’s trade secrets claims are anfalogous to those at issue in the cases cited. Instead, Defendants
rely on generic assertions thayt the TCPA must apply in this case as well. Defendants are required
to provide more to sCustain their burden of demonstrating the statute’s applicability by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Similarflfy, the Motion fails to carry its burden to show that the TCPA applies to Pohl’s
claim of cUonspiracy. Ignoring the fact that Defendants rely heavily on non-binding authority, there
is yet again a failure by the Defendants to carry their burden. Other than a single citation to the
Original Petition (which merely confirms that a civil conspiracy claim was made), no evidence is
provided to the Court at all—let alone evidence sufficient to support the application of the TCPA
11
to this claim. Defendants yet again relies on the mere existence of a conspiracy claim to trigger
the application of the TCPA. No legal authority is provided to support this idea. And again, it
would lead to ridiculous results for this Court to hold that Defendants can take advantage of the
TCPA merely by pointing out that a conspiracy claim was made, without also esktablishing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the factual basis of the claim implicates thel TCPA.
b. No Showing Was Made that the Right to Free Speech is Implicatecd by Pohl’s Claims
The Motion’s arguments related to free speech focus not on sPohl’s claims, but rather on
the Defendants’ conduct subsequent to engaging in the wrongfusl acts that form the basis of Pohl’s
claims. The problem with this approach should be immediately apparent to this Court. To allow
this to trigger the TCPA would allow Defendants to manufacture TCPA applicability. Defendants
could engage in wrongful conduct and then simply undertake activities afterwards that involve
speech or association to ensure that the TCPAa applies to claims brought against them. This cannot
be the way the TCPA works, and it is not the way it works.
In this case, the Defendanets are not being sued for bringing barratry claims or
communicating about alleged attforney misconduct. Defendants are being sued for selling stolen
trade secrets. This is not a ysituation where a plaintiff is suing defendants regarding defamation
related to their commuCnications and complaints about barratry. Defendants’ conduct subsequent
to their sale of the stolen trade secrets is not the basis of their liability. Defendants cannot carry
their burden tof fshow that Pohl’s claims implicate their free speech rights. Nothing in the four
paragraphUs of Pohl’s Original Petition cited by the Motion show that Pohl’s claims are based on
communications by Defendants that implicate their right to free speech. See Motion at 7–8 (citing
paragraphs 19–23 of Pohl’s Original Petition).
12
It should not be surprising that Defendants’ Motion does not discuss Pohl’s actual claims
in its arguments—to do so would illustrate that they are not based on Defendants exercising any
free speech rights. Defendants’ wholesale failure to support by a preponderance of the evidence
their position that the TCPA applies is fatal to the Motion. The Court should denyk the Motion on
that basis alone. l
3. Even if the TCPA otherwise applies, the commerciacl exception precludes
dismissal here. r
Even if Defendants had sustained their initial burden to showD the applicability of the TCPA,
the commercial exception to its application applies to Pohl’s cslaims. The TCPA provides:
This chapter does not apply to a legal action brorught against a person primarily
engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, if the statement or
conduct arises out of the sale or lease of goods, services, or an insurance product,
insurance services, or a commercial transaction in which the intended audience is
an actual or potential buyer or customer. l
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.010(bM). The Texas Supreme Court has interpreted this as
requiring the following four-part test:
(1) the defendant was primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods
[or services], (2) the defefndant made the statement or engaged in the conduct on
which the claim is based in the defendant’s capacity as a seller or lessor of those
goods or services, (3y) the statement or conduct at issue arose out of a commercial
transaction involving the kind of goods or services the defendant provides, and (4)
the intended aCudience of the statement or conduct were actual or potential
customers of the defendant for the kind of goods or services the defendant provides.
Castleman v. Intecrnet Money Ltd., 546 S.W.3d 684, 688 (Tex. 2018).
It is notable that the Motion does not even attempt to claim that the commercial speech
exception to the TCPA does not apply to Precision. See Motion at 9–12. The allegations against
Precision are precisely the situation that the commercial speech exception was made for: (1) As a
marketing firm, Precision is primarily engaged in the business of providing goods and services
related to marketing lists, including those for potential customers—like the converted trade secret
13
information at issue here; (2) Precisions’ conversion and sale of Pohl’s trade secrets was done in
its capacity as a seller of its marketing goods and services; (3) the conversion and sale of Pohl’s
trade secrets was a commercial transaction involving the marketing goods and services Precision
provides; and (4) Precision’s intended audience for that conduct was its actual cukstomer, Kassab
as the purchaser of the converted trade secrets. All four elements of Castlemanl are clearly met.
In a similar fashion, through the combined ownership and controlc of Precision, Mr. Favre
and Favre’s conduct also fall squarely into the commercial speech esxception. See Castleman v.
Internet Money Ltd., 546 S.W.3d 684, 689 (Tex. 2018) (discusssing how the “capacity” of the
person is relevant to whether the person was primarily engaged in selling goods or services). The
basis of Mr. Favre and Favre’s liability in this case stems from their actions taken in their capacity
as owners and managers of Precision.
The Motion attempts to shift away froma the commercial speech exception by distinguishing
between other activities undertaken by Mr. Favre and Favre (such as public adjusting) and the
marketing activities of Precision. Seee Motion at 10–12. However, Castleman makes clear that it
is possible to for both Mr. Favref and Favre to have multiple capacities, including ones that are
primarily engaged in selling ygoods or services.
4. There iCs clear and specific evidence demonstrating a prima facie case.
Defendants’ failure to demonstrate the applicability of the TCPA relieves Pohl of any
burden of demfofnstrating a prima facie case of his claims. Furthermore, Pohl has established the
applicabiUlity of the commercial exception to the TCPA, which likewise obviates the need to show
a prima facie case. Pohl nevertheless sets forth below the clear and specific evidence found in his
14
Amended Petition and the attached affidavits for each element of the claims he has asserted against
Defendants.4
In examining whether a plaintiff has sustained its burden of demonstrating a prima facie
case, the Court is obligated to consider “the pleadings and supporting and oppkosing affidavits
stating the facts on which the liability or defense is based.” TEX. CIV. PRCAlC. & REM. CODE §
27.006(a). Where a plaintiff provides enough detail in his pleading to “schow the factual basis for
its claim,” such a pleading “is sufficient to resist a TCPA motion tos dismiss.” In re Lipsky, 460
S.W.3d 579, 591 (Tex. 2015). A prima facie case is establisheds when the pleadings and evidence
supply the “‘minimum quantum of evidence necessary to support a rational inference that the
allegation of fact is true.’” Id. at 590 (quoting from In re E.I DuPont de Nemours & Co., 136
S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex. 2004)).
The nonmovant’s evidence of a primaa facie case must be “clear and specific” in order to
avoid dismissal, id. § 27.005(c), although the statute does not define “clear and specific.” The
Texas Supreme Court, in Lipsky, refeerenced “clear” as meaning “‘unambiguous,’ ‘sure,’ or ‘free
from doubt,’” and “specific” as “f‘explicit’ or ‘relating to a particular named thing.’” Lipsky, 460
S.W.3d at 590; see also S &y S Emergency Training Sols., Inc. v. Elliott, ---S.W.3d---, 17-0628,
2018 WL 6711322, at C*3 (Tex. Dec. 21, 2018). The Court has also held that “direct evidence of
damages is not required, but the evidence must be sufficient to allow a rational inference that some
damages naturaf flly flowed from the defendant’s conduct. See Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d. at 591, 592.
InU his Amended Petition, Pohl asserts four causes of action against Defendants: (1) breach
of contract; (2) conversion; (3) violations of the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Texas Civil
Practices and Remedies Code Chapter 134A (“TUTSA”); and (4) conspiracy to commit conversion
4 In support of this Response, Pohl has attached two sworn documents, the affidavit of Billy Shepherd, Exhibit A, and
the declaration of Michael Pohl, Exhibit B.
15
and to violate TUTSA. Pohl sets forth in detail below the clear and specific evidence
demonstrating a prima facie case of each of these claims.
Because Defendants have not moved to dismiss Pohl’s breach of contract claim, Pohl is
not required to provide a prima facie case of that claim. Pohl can nevertheless ekstablish such a
prima facie case by demonstrating the existence of the Settlement Agreement land release, Pohl’s
performance under that agreement, Defendants’ failure to perform under thcat Agreement by selling
Pohl’s confidential materials to Kassab; and Pohl’s damages resultisng from that sale. See, e.g.,
Prime Products, Inc. v. S.S.I. Plastics, Inc., 97 S.W.3d 631, 636s (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2002, pet. denied) (setting forth elements of a breach of contract claim).
The elements of the conversion claim are that (a) Pohl owned and owns certain property
and information; and (b) Defendants wrongfully exercised dominion and control over Pohl’s
property in contravention of Pohl’s rights aby participating in the sale of the property and
information to Kassab for $250,000. The elements of a violation of TUTSA against Defendants
are that Defendants, without Pohl’s econsent knowingly participated in the sale of Pohl’s trade
secrets to Kassab for $250,000. f Finally, the conspiracy claim alleges that Defendants acted in
combination with other defyendants and committed overt acts toward unlawful conversion and
misappropriation. C
Pohl’s pleading—the First Amended Petition—sets forth in abundant detail each element
of each cause foff action. Pohl alleges that he hired defendant Precision Marketing Group, LLC
(“PrecisioUn”) to assist him in gathering and preserving evidence and liaise with Pohl’s clients.5
Precision thereby gained access to Pohl’s confidential and proprietary information relating to his
client’s identity and their detailed contact information.6 The information and property also included
5 Amended Petition ¶¶ 19–20.
6 Id. ¶ 20.
16
actual attorney-client fee agreements with clients/prospective clients, compilations of clients, other
confidential communications between the clients/prospective clients and Pohl, specialized legal forms
that had been prepared in compliance with various state laws after consultation with local counsel in
those jurisdictions, Pohl’s proprietary administrative client forms, fee-agreement fokrms prepared in
accordance with the laws of various states, internal emails, propriety marketing inlformation and other
trade secrets, and other work product relating claims of Pohl’s clients cand prospective clients.7
Despite Defendants’ claims to the contrary, these materials belonged tos Pohl, not Precision.
After a dispute arose between Pohl and Defendants concesrning the Defendants’ provision of
services, Pohl, Precision and Mr. Favre entered into a binding Settlement Agreement dated late April
and early May 2017.8 The Settlement Agreement expressly provides that Mr. Favre and Precision
will return to Pohl all originals and all copies of documents in their and their counsel’s possession,
custody, or control that concern or identify all apast or current clients or prospective clients of Pohl,
and that Mr. Favre and Precision will delete all such electronically stored information.9 The
Settlement Agreement also providede that Mr. Favre and Precision would not cause any claim,
complain, or legal action to be filefd f or made against Pohl.10 Defendants breached each aspect of the
Settlement Agreement by failying to return or delete the materials as promised and by causing claims,
complaints and legal acCtions—not their own—to be filed and prosecuted against Pohl.11 The very
existence of the cases that Kassab, Montague, and Nicholson are pursuing against Pohl is a breach of
the Settlement Af fgreement.12
7 Id.
8 Id. ¶¶ 30, 31.
9 Id. ¶ 31.
10 Id. ¶ 32.
11 Id. ¶ 32.
12 Id. ¶ 32.
17
Defendants, with the assistance of Nicholson who helped broker the transaction and
actually provided Pohl’s stolen information and property to Kassab, secretly entered into an
agreement with Kassab and defendants F. Douglas Montague III and Montague Pittman &
Varnado, P.A. (collectively, “Montague”) to sell Pohl’s stolen confidential inkformation and
property.13 Defendants, with the assistance of Nicholson, struck a rich balrgain; Kassab and
Montague paid Favre $250,000.00 in cash together with substantial bonuses.c14 Kassab and Montague
knew that the information and property that they were purchasing was sstolen and not Favre’s and/or
Nicholson’s to sell.15 Defendants and Nicholson likewise knews that the information and property
that they were selling or helping to sell was stolen and belonged to Pohl.16
The sale and unlawful disclosure of Pohl’s proprietary, confidential and trade secret
information was made even more egregious by the fact that from the outset of the relationship between
Pohl and Precision, Pohl made clear to Precisioan and its representatives the confidential nature of the
above listed information.17 Precision and its representatives expressed their understanding of the
confidential and proprietary nature of ethe information and that the information belonged to Pohl.18
In addition, as described afbove and in conjunction with the sale of Pohl’s information and
property to Kassab and Montaygue, all Defendants converted Pohl’s confidential information/property
by knowingly and uCnlawfully assuming and exercising dominion and control over that
information/property in a way that was inconsistent with Pohl’s ownership. Each of the Defendants,
individually andf f in combination with each other, misappropriated Pohl’s trade secrets in violation of
the TUTUSA by unlawfully obtaining and using Pohl’s confidential and trade secret
13 Id. ¶ 22–23.
14 Id. ¶ 23 & Exhibit B.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.¶ 25.
18 Id.
18
information/property in the sale of such information/property to Kassab and Montague and continuing
to use Pohl’s information and property to solicit cases against Pohl.19
These specific, detailed allegations of each element of breach of contract, conversion, theft
of trade secrets, and conspiracy are by themselves sufficient to set forth a prima fackie case meeting
the requirements of the TCPA. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(a); se
e allso Hicks v. Group
& Pension Administrators, Inc., 473 S.W.3d 518, 526 (Tex. App.—Corpucs Christi 2015, no pet.).
Although Pohl’s Amended Petition establishes a prima facie csase without the necessity for
further inquiry, Pohl provides additional evidence to supposrt his prima facie case against
Nicholson in the form of the attached affidavit of Billy Shepherd and the exhibits thereto, as well
as the declaration of Michael Pohl.
As quoted above, Kassab supplied an affidavit in which he admitted that he obtained from
Defendants and Nicholson information that iancluded the names and addresses of Pohl’s former
clients and prospective clients.20 
The admissions of both Kasesab and Nicholson make clear that it is not disputed that
Montague and Kassab bought inffo f rmation relating to Pohl’s client lists from Defendants.21 Most
elements of Pohl’s prima faycie case are therefore uncontroverted. The only controverted fact
involves ownership of Cthe materials, as Defendants claim that the materials belong to them, while
Pohl contends that the materials were his. This disputed fact is one as to which Pohl has provided
prima facie profoff.22
TUhe attached affidavits provide prima facie evidence of the following facts. Favre, the
Kassab Law Firm and Montague, Pittman and Varnado, P.A., represented by Nicholson, entered
19 Id. ¶ 33.
20 See page 2 of the Declaration of Lance Christopher Kassab.
21 Id.
22 Amended Petition ¶ 20; Declaration of Michael Pohl ¶¶ 4–6, attached as Exhibit B hereto.
19
into an Agreement, dated November 10, 2016, executed by Lance Kassab (the “Favre–Kassab
Agreement”).23 The Favre–Kassab Agreement contains many relevant provisions, including:
• That Kassab and Montague will pay Favre an hourly rate of $250, a large per-case fee,
and an “upfront advance pay retainer to Favre forin [sic] the amount of k$250,000 to be
credited against first fees earned by Favre. This retainer is fully eCarlned at the time of
payment and is not refundable. Subsequent hourly fees are not toc be credited against the
retainer.”24 s
• That Kassab and Montague “shall indemnify and hold hsarmless Favre for from [sic] any
and all costs he incurs in defending claims relatingg to an/or arising from the disclosure of
any client information where such claims areB asserted by . . . Michael Pohl. . . . Favre
certifies that he is not aware of any contractual or legal provision that prohibits him from
making such disclosure to [Kassab anad Montague].”25
• That the parties “agree that this Af greement is confidential and shall remain confidential
for all times.”26 e
On its face, the Favre–Kassab Afgreement proves that Kassab agreed to pay Favre an enormous
upfront payment of $250,000, together with substantial sums over time. The amount of the
payment alone is primaC facie evidence that Defendants knew that the confidential information and
material they were selling was not publicly known and that it belonged to Pohl.
The Favfre–Kassab Agreement also obligates Kassab to indemnify Favre from claims that
Pohl migUht bring—making clear that Nicholson and Favre contemplated that Pohl might assert
23 A copy of the Favre–Kassab Agreement is attached as Exhibit 3 to the Shepherd Affidavit, attached hereto as Exhibit
A, and also to the Amended Petition as Exhibit D.
24 See Favre-Kassab Agreement, Exhibit 3 to the Shepherd Affidavit, Exhibit A hereto, Exhibit D to the Amended
Petition, p. 1.
25 Id. p. 3.
26 Id.
20
such claims at the time he executed the agreement. What possible reason could there be for
Nicholson to require Kassab to indemnify if Defendants owned the materials and information that
was the subject of the Favre–Kassab Agreement? Why would indemnity be necessary if the
information and materials were publicly known? Again, these facts support Pohkl’s prima facie
case of misappropriation. l
Similarly, the requirement in the Favre–Kassab Agreement thcat the parties keep the
agreement confidential suggests that the parties understood that disclsosure of the existence of the
agreement and its terms might raise substantial issues. If thes materials and information were
publicly known and belonged to Defendants, what was the necessity for confidentiality? Each of
these facts supports Pohl’s allegation that the materials and information were trade secrets and that
Kassab knew that the confidential information and material he purchased from Favre was stolen.
Mr. Favre’s testimony regarding the paarties’ performance of the Favre–Kassab Agreement
provides additional support for Pohl’s contentions. In a hearing conducted on October 25, 2017
in Cause No. 1:14-cv-381-KS-JCG, Secott Walker, et al. v. Jimmy Williamson, et al., in the United
States District Court for the Sofuthern District of Mississippi, Southern Division (“Walker v.
Williamson Litigation”),27 Myr. Favre confirmed that Kassab, Montague or their firms had in fact
paid the $250,000 to FCavre.28 Mr. Favre testified that he did not sell attorney/client fee contracts
to Kassab and Mon a tague but instead gave them away to Nicholson.29 Mr. Favre acknowledged
that an email, fdfated December 7, 2016 and sent from Montague to Kassab and others, reflected
that Mr. FUavre had called to check that Kassab’s office had been receiving Dropbox deliveries of
27 A copy of the relevant portions of the October 25, 2017 hearing transcript in the Walker v. Williamson Litigation is
attached hereto and to the Amended Petition as Exhibit 2 to the Shepherd Affidavit.
28 Walker v. Williamson Litigation transcript, Exhibit 2 to Shepherd Affidavit at 63.
29 Id. at 92–93.
21
contracts over the last several days.30 Mr. Favre testified that between the time he received the
payment of $250,000 and April 2017, he had received no fees, provided no work and exchanged
no documents under the Favre–Kassab Agreement.31
Nicholson’s testimony contradicts Mr. Favre’s testimony in at least onke enlightening
way.32 Nicholson testified that Mr. Favre did not give her the Pohl fee conltracts; instead, she
believes he gave them to “one of her co-counsel in the Texas cases agcainst Mr. Pohl.”33 Mr.
Favre’s and Nicholson’s testimony and the emails about which they tsestify further support Pohl’s
prima facie case of intentional misappropriation, conversion sand conspiracy. The emails and
testimony confirm that Scott M. Favre, P.A. was in fact paid $250,000, and that Kassab and
Montague understood that they were to receive Dropbox deliveries of contracts. The large amount
of the payment to Favre, in advance of the delivery of contracts to the Dropbox and the absence of
any further work by Favre, supports a strong ainference that the payment was in fact in exchange
for the contracts and not for any future services. Mr. Favre’s testimony that he had given the
attorney/client fee contracts to Nichoelson and Nicholson’s disavowal of that testimony strongly
suggests that each witness hopesf to distance him or herself from the ultimate transfer to Kassab.
This contradiction supports Pyohl’s allegation that all parties to the Favre–Kassab Agreement knew
that the files and informCation being transferred had been converted or misappropriated.
As lawyers, Nicholson, Kassab, and Montague knew that the materials that were being
bought and soflfd included confidential information protected by the attorney–client privilege,
30 Id. at 95; see also email dated December 7, 2016, attached as Exhibit C to the Amended Petition.
31 Walker v. Williamson Litigation transcript, Exhibit 2 to Shepherd Affidavit at 121–27.
32 See Deposition of Tina Nicholson, dated November 27, 2017, attached as exhibit 5 to the Shepherd Affidavit at
65:11–66:10.
33 Id. at 66:7–9.
22
including actual attorney–client fee agreements.34 Mr. Favre has confirmed under oath that he
maintained the materials as confidential and protected them as valuable trade secrets.35
In sum, Pohl’s prima facie evidence in the form of both pleadings and affidavits
demonstrates each element of each of Pohl’s causes of action as set forth below: k
BREACH OF CONTRACT l
• Favre, Precision and Pohl entered into a binding agreemenct.36
• Pohl timely and fully performed that agreement.37 s
• Favre and Precision breached that agreement.38 s
• Pohl suffered damages.39 g
CONVERSION B
• The information and materials Deyfendants sold to Kassab was personal property
subject to conversion.40 a
• Pohl owned the informatiofn and materials Defendants sold.41
• Defendants wrongfully exercised dominion and control over the property.42
• Pohl has incurOred actual damages caused by Defendants’ conversion by at a
minimum hpis loss of the intrinsic value of the materials.43
34 Amended Petition ¶ 20.
35 See Affidavit off f Scott Favre, filed in Cause No. 1:14-cv-381-KS-JCG, Scott Walker, et al. v. Jimmy Williamson, et
al., in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Southern Division, and attached as
Exhibit 7 to the Affidavit of Billy Shepherd.
36 Amended Petition ¶¶ 30, 31.
37 Amended Petition ¶ 35.
38 Amended Petition ¶¶ 32, 35.
39 Amended Petition ¶ 32, 35.
40 Amended Petition ¶¶ 20–21, 27; Favre-Kassab Agreement, Exhibit 3 to the Shepherd Affidavit; Email, Exhibit 4 to
the Shepherd Affidavit.
41 Amended Petition ¶¶ 20–21, 27, 38; Declaration of Michael Pohl ¶¶ 4–5.
42 Amended Petition ¶¶ 20, 21, 27; Declaration of Michael Pohl¶¶ 4–8.
43 Amended Petition ¶ 38; Favre Kassab Agreement, Exhibit 3 to Shepherd Affidavit (demonstrating that Kassab
placed a value on the materials of at least $250,000); Affidavit of Michael Pohl ¶¶ 5–7, 10, 12.
23
MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS
• Pohl owned trade secrets.44
• Pohl maintained that information as a secret, taking substantial measures to
maintain its confidentiality.45 k
• The information has independent economic value from not beCin l g generally known
to, and not readily being ascertainable through proper mceans by, another person
who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or s use of the information.46
• Defendants misappropriated the trade secrets bsy participating in their sale with
knowledge that they had been acquired throgugh improper means—i.e., by theft.47
• The misappropriation damaged Pohl iBn the form of both actual loss and unjust
enrichment.48 y
• Defendants’ misappropriation a was willful and malicious.49
CONSPIRACY f
• Defendants were members of a combination of two or more persons.50
• The agreed objeOct of the combination was to accomplish the unlawful purposes of
conversion pand misappropriation of trade secrets.51
• Defendants and the other conspirators committed tortious overt acts to further the
objeict of the conspiracy.52
44 Amended Petition ¶¶ 20–21, 39; Declaration of Michael Pohl ¶¶ 4–5.
45 Amended Petition ¶ 39; Declaration of Michael Pohl ¶ 11.
46 Amended Petition ¶ 39; Declaration of Michael Pohl ¶ 12.
47 Amended Petition ¶¶ 40–41; Declaration of Michael Pohl ¶ 7.
48 Declaration of Michael Pohl ¶ 13.
49 Amended Petition ¶ 41; Declaration of Michael Pohl ¶¶ 5–8.
50 Amended Petition ¶¶ 33, 43.
51 Id. ¶ 43.
52 Id. ¶¶ 23, 27, 38, 43.
24
• Pohl suffered injury as a result.53
Pohl denies that Defendants have demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that
Pohl has asserted a legal action based on related to or in response to Defendants’ exercise of rights
to free speech, petition, or association. To the extent that the Court disagrees, Pokhl has provided
clear and specific evidence to support his petition, and the Court should denyC Dlefendants’ Motion.
5. Defendants cannot conclusively establish the defense ocf limitations.
Defendants argue that, even though Pohl may be able to establish a prima facie case, they
are still entitled to dismissal because they can establish by a prseponderance of the evidence each
essential element of the affirmative defense of limitations. This defense is not available, and
Defendants have not established it—let alone by a preponderance of the evidence.
The parties entered the Settlement Agreement in April and May 2017. Limitations for
breach of contract is four years. TEX. CIV. PaRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.051; Stine v. Stewart, 80
S.W.3d 586, 592 (Tex. 2002). The breach of contract claim is not time-barred.
As to the remainder of the claiems against Defendants, Kassab purchased the stolen material
from the Defendants by virtue of tfhe Favre–Kassab Agreement, which was executed on November
10, 2016, well under two yeayrs prior to the filing of this suit. Pohl’s claims against Defendants are
based on that purchase,C and no claim has a limitations period of less than two years. See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a) (two-year limitation period for conversion); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 1f6.010(a) (three-year limitation period for TUTSA violations); Mayes v. Stewart,
316 S.W.U3d 715, 719 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
Defendants contend that limitations bars this action because they engaged in wrongful
conduct more than four years ago. See Motion at 13–15. But, the Amended Petition makes clear
53 Amended Petition ¶ 43; Declaration of Michael Pohl ¶ 14.
25
that the wrongful conduct to which they refer is not the basis of this lawsuit. Furthermore, Pohl
was not aware of the claims in this case in the two year period prior to the filing of this case.
Declaration of Michael Pohl ¶ 9. Defendant has not established the defense of limitations and their
Motion to dismiss cannot be granted on that ground. k
C. Defendants Are Not Entitled to Attorney’s Fees l
Defendants are not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees becausec their Motion should be
overruled. Furthermore, Defendants fail entirely to support their cslaim for fees. Defendants’
Motion mentions attorney’s fees precisely once. In the final ssentence, Defendants requests an
award of fees. Defendants provides no argument, and more to the point no evidentiary support for
an award of attorneys’ fees. Without an affidavit or other evidence proving the expenditure of fees
and the amount, the Court should decline to award fees in any amount. See Sullivan v. Abraham,
488 S.W.3d 294, 299–300 (Tex. 2016) (movaant has the burden of proof on fees, “‘includ[ing], at
a minimum, documentation of the services performed, who performed them and at what hourly
rate, when they were performed, ande how much time the work required.’” (citation omitted)). In
the absence of such proof, the Cofurt is not empowered to award fees.
y CONCLUSION
For the foregoiCng reasons, Plaintiffs Michael Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl
respectfully request that the Motion be in all respects denied.
26
Dated: December 26, 2018 Respectfully submitted,
REYNOLDS FRIZZELL LLP
By: /s/ Jean C. Frizzell
Jean C. Frizzell
State Bar No. 07484650 k
1100 Louisiana St., Suite 3500 e
Houston, Texas 77002 l
Tel. 713.485.7200
Fax 713.485.7250 c
jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.rcom
Attorneys for PlaintiDffs Michael Pohl
and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC
CERTIFICATE OF SERrVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document was served on all counsel of
record pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this 26th day of December, 2018.
M /s/ Jean C. Frizzell
 Jean C. Frizzell
27"
14,2018-11-30,AP,Pohl,Pohl’s 1st Amended Petition,"Pohl's First Amended Petition asserting four causes of action (breach of contract, conversion, TUTSA violations, civil conspiracy) against all defendants","Filed November 30, 2018 in Cause No. 2018-58419, 189th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas. Amended pleading filed approximately three months after the original petition (August 28, 2018). Filed during the pendency of Kassab's TCPA motion to dismiss. Adds detail to factual allegations and refines causes of action. This is the operative petition in Phase 1. Jury trial demanded.",PLEAD-1,N/A,Phase 1,2018-11-30_AP_Pohl-1st-Amended-Petition_FILED.pdf,Judgment against all defendants; actual damages within jurisdictional limits; injunctive relief under § 134A.003; exemplary damages under §§ 41.001 et seq. and 134A.004(b); attorney's fees under §§ 38.001 et seq. and 134A.005; pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; trial by jury,"11/30/2018 9:45 PM
Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 29415016
By: ARIONNE MCNEAL
Filed: 11/30/2018 9:45 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL AND LAW OFFICE OF § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
MICHAEL A. POHL, PLLC, §
Plaintiffs, §
V. § k
§ e
SCOTT FAVRE and SCOTT M. FAVRE PA, § C l
LLC; PRECISION MARKETING GROUP, § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
LLC; LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB and § c
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. d/b/a § r
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM; TINA § s
NICHOLSON and BAKER NICHOLSON, §
LLP d/b/a BAKER NICHOLSON LAW § s
FIRM; and DOUGLAS MONTAGUE III and § s
MONTAGUE PITTMAN & VARNADO, P.A., §
Defendants. § r189TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PLAINTIFFS MICHAEL POHL AND LAW OyFFICE OF MICHAEL A. POHL, PLLC’S
FIRST AMENDiED PETITION
fSUMMARY
1. Plaintiffs Michael Pcohl and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC (sometimes
collectively “Pohl”) sue DefendOants Scott Favre and Scott M. Favre PA, LLC (collectively “Favre”);
Precision Marketing Groupp, LLC (“Precision”); Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher
Kassab, P.C. D/B/A The Kassab Law Firm (collectively “Kassab”); Tina Nicholson and Baker
Nicholson, LLP Di/B/A Baker Nicholson Law Firm (collectively “Nicholson”); and F. Douglas
Montague III oand Montague Pittman & Varnado, P.A. (collectively “Montague”). Favre, Precision,
Kassab, Nicholson, and Montague are collectively called “Defendants.”
2. Defendants engaged in a scheme pursuant to which they illegally obtained,
maintained, and used trade secrets and other confidential information and property belonging to
Pohl. Favre and Precision’s actions are in breach of a settlement agreement to which Pohl, Favre,
and Precision are parties, and all Defendants’ actions constitute the torts of conversion and
violations of the uniform trade secrets act, as well as conspiracy.
3. More specifically, Favre and Precision executed a settlement agreement with Pohl
pursuant to which they agreed to return to Pohl certain information in their andk their counsel’s
possession, custody, or control; to permanently delete such electronically-storeld information; and
not to cause any claim to be made or filed against Pohl. Favre and Precicsion also warranted that
they had not caused any suit or action to be filed against Pohl. Psohl fully complied with his
obligations under the agreement. Favre and Precision breachsed and continue to breach their
obligations under the agreement by causing claims to be made or filed against Pohl.
4. Defendants knowingly and illegally obtained and/or used confidential information
and property that belongs to Pohl, and exercised dominion and control over the information and
property in a manner inconsistent with Pohla’s rights of ownership—each of which constitutes
actionable conversion. 
5. The actions of each ofe the Defendants relative to the confidential information and
property that they obtained, mafintained, and used constitute misappropriation and violate the
Texas Uniform Trade Secretys Act. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code, § 134A.001, et seq. (“TUTSA”).
6. DefendaCnts entered into a combination with the object of unlawfully
misappropriating Pohl’s trade secrets and, in so doing, they engaged in one or more unlawful overt
acts, includinf fg stealing Pohl’s confidential information/property and using the
informatiUon/property for their own gain. Pohl has suffered damages as a proximate result of
Defendants’ conduct.
7. Pohl brings this action to recover damages and other relief for Defendants’ breach of
contract, conversion, violations of TUTSA, and conspiracy. Pohl seeks monetary relief in an amount
-2-
over $1,000,000.00. All conditions precedent to Pohl maintaining this action and recovering from
Defendants have been performed or have occurred.
DEFENDANTS
8. Scott Favre is a nonresident individual who is a licensed public adjuskter in Texas and
who engages in business in Texas. He does not maintain a regular place of busliness in Texas or a
designated agent for service of process in Texas. Mr. Favre may be servced with citation and this
petition: (a) at his office address at 7044 Stennis Airport Road, Kiln, Misssissippi 39556; or (b) through
the Texas Secretary of State under Texas Civil Practice and Remsedies Code Sections 17.044(a)(1)
and (b).
9. Scott M. Favre PA, LLC is a nonresident limited liability company that engages in
business in Texas. It does not maintain a regular place of business in Texas or a designated agent for
service of process in Texas. Scott M. Favre PAa, may be served with citation and this petition: (a) by
serving Scott Favre, the person in charge of Scott M. Favre PA, LLC’s business, at the address of the
business, 7044 Stennis Airport Road, eKiln, Mississippi 39556; or (b) through the Texas Secretary of
State under Texas Civil Practice anfd Remedies Code Sections 17.044(a)(1) or (b).
10. Precision is a ynonresident limited liability company that engages in business in Texas.
It does not maintain a rCegular place of business in Texas or a designated agent for service of process
in Texas. Precision may be served with citation and this petition: (a) by serving Scott Favre, the
person in chargfef of Precision’s business, at 7044 Stennis Airport Road, Kiln, Mississippi 39556; or
(b) througUh the Texas Secretary of State under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Sections
17.044(a)(1) or (b).
-3-
11. Lance Christopher Kassab is an individual and resident of Texas. He is an attorney
who specializes in legal malpractice claims. He may be served with citation and this petition: (a)
at 1214 Elgin Street, Houston, Texas 77004; or (b) at 5314 Navarro Street, Houston, Texas 77056.
12. Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. D/B/A The Kassab Law Firm is a Tekxas professional
corporation. It may be served with citation and this petition by serving its regilstered agent, Lance
Christopher Kassab: (a) at 1214 Elgin Street, Houston, Texas 77004; or (bc) at 5314 Navarro Street,
Houston, Texas 77056. s
13. Tina Nicholson is an individual and a resident ofs Texas. She is an attorney. Tina
Nicholson may be served with citation and this petition: (a) at 4306 Yoakum Blvd., Suite 400,
Houston, Texas 77006; or (b) at 1607 Dove Ridge Drive, Katy, Texas 77493.
14. Baker Nicholson, LLP D/B/A Baker Nicholson Law Firm is a Texas limited liability
partnership. It may be served with citation and athis petition: (a) by serving its partner, Allison Baker,
at 4306 Yoakum Blvd., Suite 400, Houston, Texas 77006; or (b) by serving its partner, Tina
Nicholson, at 4306 Yoakum Blvd., Sueite 400, Houston, Texas 77006.
15. F. Douglas Montagfue III is a nonresident individual who engages in business in Texas.
He does not maintain a regulayr place of business in Texas or a designated agent for service of process
in Texas. Mr. MontaguCe may be served with citation and this petition: (a) at his office address at 525
Main Street, Hattiesburg, Mississippi 39401; or (b) through the Texas Secretary of State under Texas
Civil Practice afnfd Remedies Code Sections 17.044(a)(1) or (b).
16U. Montague Pittman & Varnado, P.A. is a non-resident professional association that
engages in business in Texas. It does not maintain a regular place of business in Texas or a designated
agent for service of process in Texas. Montague Pittman & Varnado, P.A. may be served with citation
and this petition: (a) by serving F. Douglas Montague III, its registered agent for services of process
-4-
and the person in charge of its business, at 525 Main Street, Hattiesburg, Mississippi 39401; or (b)
through the Texas Secretary of State under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Sections
17.044(a) (1) or (b).
JURISDICTION/VENUE k
17. The damages that Pohl seeks in this case are within the jurisdicltional limits of this
Court. The Court has jurisdiction over Defendants because they have cthe necessary minimum
contacts with Texas, which include engaging in business in Texas, comsmitting torts in Texas and, as
to some of them, residing in Texas. Further, Favre and Precission contracted with Pohl, a Texas
resident at the time, for Pohl to perform the contract at issue in whole or in part in Texas. This case
arises out of business done in Texas by Defendants.
18. Venue is proper in Harris County under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
Sections 15.002 and 15.062. a
BACKGROUND
19. Pohl is a lawyer who reepresented various persons and entities in claims arising from
motor vehicle accidents and the Bfritish Petroleum Deepwater Horizon oil spill. (See the attached
Declaration of Michael Pohl, yExhibit A, ¶ 3). Scott Favre, individually and/or through Scott M. Favre
PA, LLC, is the managiCng member of Precision, a public relations and marketing firm. Nicholson is
a lawyer who represented Favre and Precision, including for purposes of the settlement agreement
mentioned abovf fe as well as in facilitating the sale of Pohl’s confidential and proprietary information
and propeUrty to Kassab and Montague. At the time the settlement agreement was entered into and
still today, Nicholson was also Kassab and Montague’s co-counsel in connection with claims that
they are prosecuting against Pohl.
-5-
20. Pohl engaged Precision for a period of time to provide public relations services, to
gather and preserve evidence, and to screen and liaise with Pohl’s clients/prospective clients. While
working for Pohl, Precision gained access to Pohl’s confidential and proprietary information and
property, including trade secret materials, that included the identities of Pohl’s clikents/prospective
clients, as well as their detailed contact information. The information and prolperty also included
actual attorney–client fee agreements with clients/prospective clients, comcpilations of clients, other
confidential communications between the clients/prospective clients ands Pohl, specialized legal forms
that had been prepared in compliance with various state laws aftesr consultation with local counsel in
those jurisdictions, Pohl’s proprietary administrative client forms, fee-agreement forms prepared in
accordance with the laws of various states, internal emails, propriety marketing information and other
trade secrets, and other work product relating to claims of Pohl’s clients and prospective clients.
Despite Favre and Precision’s claims to the conatrary, these materials belonged to Pohl, not Precision.
Favre and Nicholson also ultimately gained access to the information.
21. Favre and Precision iellegally misappropriated Pohl’s proprietary and confidential
information and property describedf above, which included information about and/or communications
with as many as 10,000 or ymore of Pohl’s clients/prospective clients. Favre and Precision stole
physical copies of certaCin of the information, stole Pohl’s computers, and misappropriated electronic
data to which they had access through Precision’s work for Pohl. Favre, with Nicholson or with
Nicholson’s acftfive and knowing and intentional assistance, then secretly sold Pohl’s stolen
confidentUial information and property to Kassab and Montague.
22. As Kassab himself indicated in a sworn affidavit: “Favre and his counsel, Tina
Nicholson (‘Nicholson’), provided me with information from Precision Marketing’s files, including
the names and addresses of Pohl’s former clients or prospective clients.” This information, which
-6-
included compilations of former, current and prospective clients—as well as actual engagement
agreements—did not belong to Precision, however. As with any law firm, information such as
compilations of former, current and prospective clients, belong to the law firm itself. Thus,
Nicholson’s active, knowing and intentional assistance included brokering the illegakl sale of Pohl’s
information and property as well as actually providing such information and proplerty to Kassab.
23. Favre and Precision, with the assistance of Nicholson, strucck a rich bargain; Kassab
and Montague paid Favre $250,000.00 in cash together with substsantial bonuses. Kassab and
Montague knew that the information and property that they were psurchasing was stolen and not Favre
and/or Nicholson’s to sell. (A true and correct copy of the agreement to sell Pohl’s information is
attached hereto as Exhibit B). Favre, Precision, and Nicholson likewise knew that the information
and property that they were selling or helping to sell was stolen and belonged to Pohl.
24. Like Favre and Precision, Nichoalson was also motivated to participate in and facilitate
the illegal transaction with Kassab and Montague described above in furtherance of her own business.
As a direct result of the transaction aned Nicholson’s role in the transaction, Kassab and Nicholson
have apparently successfully solicfited clients for whom Nicholson is now co-counsel with Kassab.
Nicholson is a lawyer primaryily in the business of obtaining legal work and providing legal services.
Nicholson obtains legaCl work either through directly obtaining clients or entering into co-counsel
relationships with other counsel. Her participation in the illegal transaction described above and the
conduct for whfifch she is being sued was done for the purpose of and resulted in her obtaining a co-
counsel reUlationship with Kassab and thereby gaining the opportunity to provide legal services.
25. The theft, sale and unlawful disclosure of Pohl’s proprietary, confidential and trade
secret information was made even more egregious by the fact that from the outset of the relationship
between Pohl and Precision, Pohl made clear to Precision and its representatives the confidential
-7-
nature of the above listed information. Precision and its representatives expressed their understanding
of the confidential and proprietary nature of the information and that the information belonged to
Pohl.
26. Kassab is a lawyer who specializes in suing other lawyers and who, ukpon information
and belief, has worked with Montague in this connection in the past. Kassab sawl the value of Pohl’s
stolen and misappropriated confidential information and property because ict provided him the ability
to contact and solicit Pohl’s clients/prospective clients. As noted prevsiously, included in the stolen
information purchased by Kassab and Montague were actual engsagement agreements between Pohl
and his clients. (Attached as Exhibit C hereto is an email between Montague and Kassab and copying
Nicholson dated December 7, 2016 reflecting the transfer of actual engagement agreements to
Kassab).
27. Kassab and Montague had to knaow that the information and property they purchased
for a non-refundable $250,000.00 along with promises of future payments was stolen. Nicholson
likewise had to know that the informaetion and property that she assisted in selling was stolen. Any
attorney, and especially an attornefy specializing in legal malpractice, would know not to purchase or
sell another law firm’s engagyement agreements, client compilations and other materials from a third-
party. C
28. The fact that Kassab, Montague and Nicholson all knew that the information and
property involvfefd in the sale was stolen is further evidenced by terms of the purchase agreement itself.
That agreUement obligates Kassab and Montague to indemnify Favre from claims that Pohl might
bring—making clear that everyone understood that Pohl might assert a claim. Indemnity would be
unnecessary if Favre owned the materials or if they were publicly known.
-8-
29. Using the stolen confidential information and property that he knowingly purchased,
Kassab solicited those clients/prospective clients to act as plaintiffs and, joined by Nicholson and
Montague, to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and other claims.
30. The actions of Favre and Precision, in addition to being tortious andk in violation of
Texas law, were in direct violation and breach of the settlement agreement, lwhich is a binding
contract. More specifically, a dispute arose resulting in a lawsuit in federal ccourt in Mississippi, styled
No. 1:14-cv-381-KS-JCG, Scott Walker, et al. v. Jimmy Williamson,s et al., In The United States
District Court For The Southern District of Mississippi, Soutshern Division. That lawsuit was
resolved pursuant to a Confidential Settlement Agreement, executed in late April/early May 2017 (the
“Settlement Agreement”). Nicholson represented Favre and Precision in connection with the
Settlement Agreement, including its execution, while at the same time serving as co-counsel with
Kassab and Montague for the claims now beinga asserted against Pohl.
31. The Settlement Agreement was executed by Favre, as managing member of Precision
and on behalf of Scott M. Favre PA, LLeC, and by Pohl. The Settlement Agreement expressly provides
that Favre and Precision will returnf to Pohl all originals and all copies of documents in their and their
counsel’s possession, custodyy, or control that concern and/or identify all past or current clients and/or
prospective clients of PCohl, and that Favre and Precision will delete all such electronically-stored
information. At the time, Nicholson was not only Favre and Precision’s agent and counsel in
connection witfhf the Settlement Agreement; she was also Kassab and Montague’s co-counsel in
connectioUn with the claims now being made against Pohl in various cases.
32. The Settlement Agreement also provided that Favre and Precision would not cause
any claim, complaint, or legal action to be filed or made against Pohl. Favre and Precision further
warranted and represented that they had not caused any suit or action to be filed against Pohl. Favre
-9-
and Precision breached these provisions of the Settlement Agreement by, inter alia, causing claims,
complaints, and legal actions—not their own—to be filed and/or prosecuted against Pohl. The very
existence of the cases that Kassab, Montague, and/or Nicholson are prosecuting against Pohl is a
breach of the Settlement Agreement. k
33. In addition, as described above and in conjunction with the sale ofl Pohl’s information
and property to Kassab and Montague, all Defendants convertced Pohl’s confidential
information/property by knowingly and unlawfully assuming and exesrcising dominion and control
over that information/property in a way that was inconsistent wisth Pohl’s ownership. Each of the
Defendants, individually and in combination with each other, misappropriated Pohl’s trade secrets in
violation of the TUTSA by unlawfully obtaining and using Pohl’s confidential and trade secret
information/property in the sale of such information/property to Kassab and Montague and continuing
to use Pohl’s information and property to soliciat cases against Pohl.
34. Paragraphs 1 through 7 and 19 through 33 are incorporated into all following
paragraphs of this petition. In additione, attached hereto as Exhibit D is the affidavit of Billy Shepherd
and certain information confirminfg and further explaining the claims asserted herein.
y CAUSES OF ACTION
CounCt One: Breach of Contract (Against Favre and Precision)
35. Favre and Precision are bound by the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Pohl timely
and fully perfofrmed the Settlement Agreement. Favre and Precision breached the Settlement
AgreemenUt by assisting and continuing to assist in the manufacture and prosecution of claims against
Pohl. Their breaches include causing claims to be made against Pohl; causing complaints and legal
actions to be filed against Pohl; and Favre’s assisting Kassab and his co-counsel, Montague and
-10-
Nicholson, in pursuing claims, complaints, and actions against Pohl. Favre and Precision’s breaches
resulted in damages to Pohl.
Count Two: Conversion (Against All Defendants)
36. In selling Pohl’s proprietary and confidential information, Favre,k Precision, and
Nicholson have wrongfully assumed and exercised dominion and control ovCer Pohl’s property in
contravention of Pohl’s rights as owner of that property. c
37. In knowingly purchasing the stolen information, Kassab and Montague have
wrongfully exercised dominion and control over Pohl’s property sin contravention of Pohl’s rights as
owner of that property. g
38. In knowingly maintaining and using the Bstolen information and property since the sale
of said information and property to Kassab and Moyntague, all Defendants have wrongfully exercised
dominion and control over Pohl’s property in coantravention of Pohl’s rights as owner of that property.
Pohl owned and owns the information/prof perty, and Favre and Precision (with Nicholson or with
Nicholson’s active and knowing and intentional assistance as described above) disclosed the
information/property and sold it fto Kassab and Montague. Kassab and Montague knowingly
purchased the stolen information/property. Pohl has been damaged thereby in an amount in excess
of $250,000 which is thCe price that Kassab and Montague paid for Pohl’s information and property.
Count Three: Violation of TUTSA (Against All Defendants)
39. Pfohl maintained information regarding his clients/prospective clients and their contact
information and related data including compilations of former, current and prospective clients, as well
as other information concerning his practice of law, as confidential trade secret information. Pohl
took substantial measures to maintain the confidentiality of that information and obtained assurances
from Precision that Precision would maintain the confidentiality of Pohl’s information. That
information has independent economic value from not being generally known to, and not readily
-11-
being ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can obtain economic value from
the disclosure or use of the information. The value of the information exceeds $250,000, which is the
price Kassab and Montague paid to obtain Pohl’s information.
40. Favre, Precision, and Nicholson willfully and maliciously misapprkopriated Pohl’s
trade secrets by acquiring them through improper means—specifically, by theft. l See Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code § 134A.002(2), (3)(A). c
41. Favre, Precision, and Nicholson willfully and maliciosusly misappropriated Pohl’s
trade secrets by disclosing them via sale to Kassab and Montaguse (who purchased the trade secret
information knowing that it had been stolen) without the express or complied consent of Pohl. See
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 134A.002(3)(B).
42. All Defendants willfully and maliciously misappropriated Pohl’s trade secrets by
using them without the express or implied coansent of Pohl. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §
134A.002(3)(B). 
Count Four: Civeil Conspiracy (Against All Defendants)
43. Acting in combination with the agreed object of misappropriating Pohl’s trade secrets
and converting Pohl’s property, each of the Defendants committed overt acts toward the unlawful
misappropriation of Pohl’s trade secrets, which were unlawful and which proximately caused
damages to Pohl. c
DAMAGES
44. Pohl seeks actual damages within the jurisdictional limits of this Court.
45. Pohl seeks injunctive relief pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
Section 134A.003.
-12-
46. Pohl seeks exemplary damages pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
Sections 41.001, et seq, and 134A.004(b).
47. Pohl seeks attorney’s fees pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
Sections 38.001, et seq, and 134A.005. k
48. Pohl seeks pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. l
TRIAL BY JURY c
49. Pohl requests trial by jury and has submitted the appropsriate jury fee.
CONCLUSION s
50. Pohl requests that judgment be entered in Pohl’s favor and against Defendants on the
counts and as requested above, and for such other and further or alternative relief (legal and equitable)
to which Pohl may be entitled.
Dated: November 30, 2018 M
Respectfully submitted,
REYNOLDS FRIZZELL LLP
By: /s/ Jean C. Frizzell
y Jean C. Frizzell
State Bar No. 07484650
 1100 Louisiana St., Suite 3500
Houston, Texas 77002
c Tel. 713.485.7200
f f Fax 713.485.7250
jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Michael Pohl
and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC
-13-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document was served on all counsel of
record pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this 30th day of November, 2018.
/s/ Jean C. Frizzell k
Jean C. Frizzell e
-14-"
13,2018-11-19,MTD,Kassab,Supplemental TCPA Motion to Dismiss,Kassab's Supplement to TCPA Motion to Dismiss incorporating Favre co-defendants' statute of limitations arguments,"Filed November 19, 2018 in Cause No. 2018-58419, 189th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas. Supplemental briefing filed in support of Kassab's original TCPA Motion to Dismiss (filed October 24, 2018). Incorporates arguments from co-defendant Favre's separately filed TCPA motion. Addressed to the Honorable Judge Bill Burke.",TCPA-1,DENIED,Phase 1,2018-11-19_MTD_Kassab-Supp-TCPA_FILED.pdf,"Dismissal of Pohl's claims with prejudice; attorney's fees as previously requested in Kassab's original Motion to Dismiss; sanctions of a minimum of $50,000 against Pohl and his counsel Frizzell to deter future frivolous and retaliatory filings","11/19/2018 10:48 AM
Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 29125236
By: ARIONNE MCNEAL
Filed: 11/19/2018 10:48 AM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIAkL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS, LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND LANCE CHlRISTOPHER
KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAW FIRM’S SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION TO
DISMISS PURSUANT TO THE TEXAS CITIZENS PARTICcIPATION ACT
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE BILL BURKE: s
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab,
P.C. d/b/a/ The Kassab Law Firm (Kassab) files this, their Supplement to Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to the Texas Citizens Participation Act set forth in Chapter 27 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code.
This is a retaliatory lawsuit filed by Plaintiff, Michael A. Pohl and his law firm, Law
Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC (“ePohl”) that is based on, related to, and in response to the
rights to free speech, petition andf association, and should therefore be dismissed pursuant to the
Texas Citizens Participationy Act (the “TCPA”). Additionally, Pohl’s claims must be dismissed
pursuant to Chapter 2C7 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code because, even if Pohl
could establish a parima facie case on each element of each of his causes of action, the TCPA
provides that thfe trial court must still dismiss his claims if, based upon a preponderance of the
evidence,U each essential element of a valid defense is established. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE,
§ 27.005(d).
Kassab files this supplement to Kassab’s Motion to Dismiss simply to incorporate the
arguments and Exhibits outlined in paragraphs 35 through 42 of Scott Favre, Scott M. Favre
Public Adjuster, LLC and Precision Marketing Group, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss. The
arguments and Exhibits clearly show that Pohl’s claims were filed far beyond the statute of
limitations. Thus, not only is there a preponderance of the evidence establishing each essential
element of a statute of limitations defense, there is a plethora of evidence ekstablishing the
defense.1 l
Pohl is a seasoned lawyer who proclaims to be an outstanding cla t wyer.2 Moreover, his
lawyer, Jean Frizzell (Frizzell) holds himself out to the world, amongs other things, as a “Top 100
Super Lawyer” with outstanding credentials.3 It is unfathomable to assume that Pohl and his
“Super Lawyer” Frizzell could be so incompetent as to not know Pohl’s claims were dead on
arrival when filed. Therefore, the only plausible explanation for filing Pohl’s frivolous claims
were for retaliation purposes against Kassab for representing more than 400 clients against Pohl
in four separate lawsuits, as stated in Kassab’as Motion to Dismiss.
Thus, in addition to dismissing Pohl’s claims with prejudice, this Court should sanction
Pohl and Frizzell in an amount sufeficient to deter them from bringing similar actions and/or
filing similar frivolous pleadingsf in the future. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.009(a).
The Court should sanction Pyohl and Frizzell a minimum of fifty-thousand dollars ($50,000.00) in
addition to the attorneCy’s fees and costs requested in Kassab’s Motion to Dismiss so that Pohl
and Frizzell will fually understand that their actions have consequences and that the rule of law
has meaning. Tfo do otherwise, will simply reinforce lawyers like Pohl and Frizzell to continue
to harass,U create delay, increase the cost of litigation and create conflicts with impunity, and send
1 See Favre’s Motion to Dismiss, pp. 13-15 and Kassab’s Motion to Dismiss, pp. 26-28.
2 https://pohlatty.wordpress.com/
3 https://www.reynoldsfrizzell.com/attorneys/jean-frizzell/
a message to lawyers like Pohl and Frizzell that the rule of law does not matter, the practice of
law is simply a game and the truth is meaningless.
CONCLUSION & PRAYER
For the reasons stated herein, in addition to the reasons stated in Kasrsab’s Motion to
Dismiss, Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs Lance Christopher Kassab and The Kassab Law Firm
respectfully request the Court to grant their Motion to Dismiss Pursurant to the Texas Citizens
Participation Act and order that Plaintiffs take nothing in their claDims against Lance Christopher
Kassab and The Kassab Law Firm. In addition, the Courts should award Lance Christopher
Kassab and The Kassab Law Firm attorney’s fees as reqruested and sanction Plaintiffs and their
counsel in an amount sufficient to deter them from bringing similar frivolous and retaliatory
lawsuits in the future. l
o Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
y LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 00794070
C lance@kassab.law
 DAVID ERIC KASSAB
a Texas State Bar No. 24071351
c david@kassab.law
f 1214 Elgin Street
Houston, Texas 77004
U Telephone: 713.522.7400
Facsimile: 713.522.7410
ATTORNEYS FOR LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB AND THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has
been forwarded to all parties pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this the 19th day
of November, 2018.
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassakb
Lance Christopher Kassab r"
12,2018-11-07,OA,Kassab,3rd Amended Answer,"Kassab's Third Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaim, and Designation of Responsible Third Parties","Filed November 7, 2018 in Cause No. 2018-58419, 189th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas. The day after the Second Amended Answer. Third amended responsive pleading, further expanding counterclaims from 235 to 242 assigned barratry claimants. Adds additional detail to the Designation of Responsible Third Parties section regarding Shepherd's knowledge of Favre's document transfers to third parties prior to the Federal Litigation settlement.",PLEAD-1,N/A,Phase 1,2018-11-07_OA_Kassab-3rd-Amended-Answer-CC_FILED.pdf,"Plaintiffs take nothing; Kassab recovers on counterclaims and against third-party defendants including actual and consequential damages, statutory damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, attorneys' fees and costs, and all other just relief","11/7/2018 4:22 PM
Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 28873961
By: ARIONNE MCNEAL
Filed: 11/7/2018 4:22 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIrAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS, LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAW FIRM’S THIRD AMENDED
ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND COUNtTERCLAIM,
AND DESIGNATION OF RESPONSIBLE THIRD PARTIES
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: s
COMES NOW, Defendants, Lance Christopher Kgassab and Lance Christopher Kassab,
P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm and files this thBeir Third Amended Answer, Affirmative
Defenses, and Counterclaim, and Designation of Ryesponsible Third Parties, and would respectfully
show the Court as follows; a
RULfE 47 STATEMENT
The Kassab Defendants, in teheir capacity as Counter-Plaintiffs, seek monetary relief of
more than $1,000,000.00. f
y PARTIES
Plaintiff, Michael A. Pohl is an individual lawyer residing in Colorado.
Plaintiff, Laawl Offices of Michael A. Pohl is a law firm set up for the practice of law in
various states of ithe union, including Texas.
Defnendant, Scott Favre is a nonresident individual residing in Mississippi.
Defendant, Scott M. Favre, PA, LLC is a nonresident limited liability company located in
Mississippi.
Defendant, Precision Marketing Group, LLC is a nonresident limited liability company
located in Mississippi.
Defendant, F. Douglas Montague III is a nonresident individual residing in Mississippi.
Defendant, Montague, Pittman & Varnado, PA is a nonresident professional association
located in Mississippi.
Defendant, Tina Nicholson is an individual residing in Texas. k
Defendant, Baker Nicholson, LLP, d/b/a Baker Nicholson Law Firm ils a limited liability
partnership located in Texas. c
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab is an sindividual residing in Texas.
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm
is a professional corporation located in Texas.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
This matter is within the jurisdictional lnimits of this Court and Plaintiffs, Counter-
Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Officers of Michael A. Pohl (“Pohl”) and Defendants,
Counter-Plaintiffs, Lance Christopher Kassab (“LCK”) and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a
The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab, P.C.”) (collectively “Kassab”) are subject to the Court’s
jurisdiction. Venue is proper in thifs county because one or more of the defendants are residents of
this county and because a substantial part of the acts and/or omissions that form the basis of this
suit occurred in this county.
a l GENERAL DENIAL
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab generally denies all allegations made by Plaintiffs,
Counter-Denfendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl, and requests the Court
to require Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl to
carry their burden of proof regarding all allegations against Kassab.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab pleads the following affirmative defenses:
1. Statute of limitations
2. Justification.
3. Estoppel.
4. Waiver. t
5. Ratification. t
6. Release. 
7. Unclean hands. e
8. Contribution. u
9. Failure to mitigate damages. n
10. Lack of standing. r
11. Accord and Satisfaction.
12. Assumption of the Risk. 
13. Illegality/Criminal Actfs
14. First Amendment. 
15. Attorney Imm
unity.
16. In Pari Daellicto.
17. Res juidicata.
SPECIFIC DENIALS
Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs specifically deny that all conditions precedent regarding
Plaintiffs claims of conversion and theft of trade secrets have been performed or occurred prior to
Plaintiffs filing suit against Kassab.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
LCK is a lawyer practicing law with Kassab, P.C., a law firm in Houston, Texas focusing
solely on plaintiffs’ legal malpractice. Kassab filed four lawsuits on behalf of over four hundred
clients against Pohl (the “Harris County Lawsuits”). The main allegations against Pohl is civil
barratry and conspiracy to commit barratry, a third-degree felony in Texas. Pohl conspired with
his wife, Donalda Pohl (“Dona”), his paralegal, Edgar Jaimes (“Jaimes”t), and three runners in
Mississippi to illegally solicit clients on behalf of Pohl. Dona owns at sham lending company in
Texas called Helping Hands Financing, LLC (“HH Texas”). Jaimes runs the day-to-day operations
of HH Texas. The three runners are Scott Walker (“Walkere”), Steve Seymour (“Seymour”) and
Kirk Ladner (“Ladner”). The three runners own and ouperate two other sham companies called
Helping Hands Group, LLC and Helping Hands Finnancial, LLC (collectively “HH Mississippi”).
The three runners also owned Precision Markerting Group, LLC (“Precision”) which they sold to
Scott Favre and/or his companies (collectively “Favre”).
With regard to the clients obtained in the BP Litigation, Walker, Seymour and Ladner hired
other runners to literally go up anfd down streets knocking on doors to solicit clients on behalf of
Pohl for lawsuits against British Petroleum. Precision paid these runners as much as $300-$400
for every client they obtained. Pohl then paid Precision as much as $1,500 for every client
Precision referred tao lPohl. Pohl also offered and agreed to pay Walker, Seymour and Ladner a
percentage of hisi legal fees once the cases settled. This percentage was disguised as an hourly rate
of $1,500.00 per hour.
With regard to auto accidents, Pohl set up a “Google Alerts” to be notified whenever there
was a horrific rollover crash. Pohl would then send his runners to hospitals, homes and funerals
to contact the families of the injured. The runners would use their sham companies, “Helping
Hands” to act as though they were genuinely there to help these victims. The runners would falsely
tell these victims that they were there to help the victims’ in their time of need in the form of
money for burial services, food, clothing, lodging, etc. In reality, the runners’ contacted these
families under false pretenses with the sole objective to take advantage of these victims and their
families while they were emotionally distraught and not thinking straight in ordker to lock them
into contracts which allowed the runners to select a lawyer for the victim. Tlhe victims and the
family members were encouraged to hire Pohl and told they could not gect the money unless they
agreed to hire Pohl. Pohl would pay the runners as much as $7,5s00 per client and Pohl also
promised the runners as much as 33% of Pohl’s legal fees on the back end when the case settled.
Additionally, HH Texas would pay HH Mississippi $2,500 for every client referred to HH Texas
to “loan” money to these victims and their family. Pohl used this procedure as an attempt to put
an additional layer between him and the actual runners.
Pohl also helped the runners form anaother sham entity, the GM Settlement Verification
Team (“GM Team”) after General Motors, Inc. issued a recall on cars due to faulty ignition
switches which effected the safe opereation of the airbag systems on vehicles. Thus, the GM Team
was designed to look official as iff it was part of General Motors. The conspiracy was to form an
official looking entity as if GyM was contacting people who had been harmed when airbags failed
to deploy in relation toC the ignition recall. In reality, this was just another sham company used to
trick clients into hiaring Pohl. Again, Pohl would pay Walker and Ladner, through their sham
entity, the GM Tfeam, a fee for every client it referred to Pohl, in addition to a percentage of fees
on the baUck end.
Pohl knew what he was doing was illegal barratry. Accordingly, he knowingly formed
entities that he perceived would insulate him from liability. In fact, Walker testified that although
he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or “marketing money” it was “clear to [him] it was
barratry.” In fact, Walker considered himself and his company “a pass-through for barratry
money.” All total, Walker, Ladner and Precision received over $5 million in “barratry pass-through
money” from Pohl and other lawyers to solicit potential clients with claims, both auto-accident
victims and those involved in the BP Deepwater Horizon litigation. k
One of the runners hired by Pohl and Walker to solicit illegally solicit cllients on behalf of
Pohl was Magdalena Santana (“Santana”). In her September 24, 2016 afcfidavit, Santana testified
that Pohl sent her on “dozens and dozens of car wreck cases all ovser the country.” Pohl would
email Santana the link of news coverage he obtained through Google Alerts depicting an accident
and asked her “to go to the victim or the victim’s family and try to get them to sign up with him.”
Santana swore under oath that Pohl agreed to pay her “$5,000 per case that [she] signed, plus a
percentage of his attorney’s fees.” Santana was advised by Pohl to “be persistent even if the family
... rejected [her].” Santana was instructed by Paohl to “approach the victims and their families while
they were vulnerable, in the emergency room, their hospital rooms or at the funerals.” Pohl told
Santana that minorities “were especieally vulnerable since they tended not to know that the law
prohibited barratry.” Accordingf to Pohl, they “were easier to sign up.”
Pohl would give Sanytana “money to give to the victims or their families” but would give
the money to the client C“if they agreed to sign a Pohl representation contract.” Pohl advised Santana
that the money was aa “foot in the door” but instructed Santana not to mention anything about hiring
a lawyer “untilf after they agreed to take the money.” “If the client agreed to hire Pohl, then
[Santana]U was to have the client sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.” Pohl would then give Santana
the money to pay the client “from his own Helping Hands company.” When Santana questioned
this, Pohl told Santana that it “was illegal for him to pay [her] directly for cases, and that’s why
the money had to go through some company.”
Pohl and/or his co-conspirators had Santana retract this affidavit through a December 19,
2017 affidavit. This purported retraction was likely the result of Pohl paying Santana to provide
testimony, which is something he has done in the past. In fact, Pohl’s own paralegal, Jaimes,
testified that on one occasion Pohl sent him to Florida with a suitcase filled with $k50,000 in cash
to give to Santana in exchange for her signing a statement for him. Jaimes tesltified that Santana
would only get the money if she signed the statement for Pohl. Jaimes testcified that Santana signed
the signed the statement and got the money. s
Santana went into more detail about this in her deposition. Santana testified that the
statement was an agreement for her to keep quiet and not charge Pohl with any wrongdoing,
criminal or unethical conduct. Santana testified that Pohl paid her $50,000 in cash to sign this
statement, which was delivered by Jaimes in three bags marked “trick or treat.” Very symbolic
given that Santana had been tricked by Pohla into soliciting clients for him and was now being
treated the money she claimed was due under their agreement just to stay quiet. Santana reiterated
in her deposition that if she didn’t sigen the gag agreement, she would not receive the money from
Pohl. Santana attempted to indicafte on the agreement that she was receiving $50,000 to keep quiet,
but Jaimes told her Pohl deymanded that she state she only received nominal consideration, like
$100. Santana did not wCrite the statement but “just signed it” because she felt she was being “forced
to sign” it while “unader duress.”
Notablyf, nowhere in Santana’s December 19th affidavit does she state the testimony in her
former afUfidavit is untrue, only that she does not “agree with” it and that the affidavit is not
“reliable.” Although Santana states in her December 19th affidavit that her prior affidavit was
drafted by a lawyer, Santana testified in her deposition that the September 24th affidavit was
created voluntarily with her own “testimony.” Santana testified that, unlike with Pohl, she was not
paid and had never been promised any money to provide the testimony in the September 24th
affidavit. Santana reiterated to counsel for Pohl, Billy Shepherd, that she was there in her
deposition to tell the truth and would not be bullied by his questioning or his efforts to confuse
her. k
Regardless, Santana’s sworn deposition testimony confirmed most of tlhe facts set forth in
her initial affidavit and this deposition testimony has never been rectracted. There, Santana
confirmed that she was hired by Pohl to solicit auto accident cases, thse first one being an accident
where a woman and her unborn child lost their lives. Santana was instructed by Walker, who was
instructed by Pohl, to personally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her up to sue the tire
manufacturer and, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000. Santana visited the funeral of the
deceased and got the family to feel comfortable with her. Although the mother was grieving, Pohl
told Santana: “take no prisoners, this is a cut tharoat business, you get in there and you do whatever
it takes to get this client.” The solicitation was successful after Pohl gave Santana $2,000 to “give
to the client to convince her into signeing over with the firm.”
“Coach” Kenneth Talleyf (“Talley”) was another runner hired by Pohl and Walker who
solicited over 20 auto accideynt cases for Pohl. Talley has sworn under oath that he was first hired
in relation to BP claimCs to find “folks that lost money due to the oil spill” and “sign them up” and
“get a fee for it.” Taalley testified that he went to work “knocking on doors” looking for potential
claimants for Pofhl and his partner in the BP litigation. Talley solicited and signed up for Pohl and
his co-coUnspirators more than 800 BP claims. Talley was paid between $75 and $350 for each BP
client he signed up for Pohl and his partners.
Talley eventually switched to soliciting auto accident victims, “calling on folks that had
bad accidents.” Talley recalls that the first client he solicited was in “the hospital in intensive care.”
Talley carried with him up to $1,000 to pay the accident victims to “help them with problems” but
only once they “were signed up.” Talley kept a list of all the auto accident cases he solicited so he
could keep track of the cases that he was due a fee on the back end after the case settled. Talley
also followed a checklist that instructed him to, among other things, bring flowekrs to the initial
hospital visit (but to spend no more than $50) and to offer the victims moneyl but to “make sure
the funding schedule” from HH Texas “is filled out properly before relecasing any cash.” Talley
would advise the victims that he had attorneys who could help them ssuch as Pohl. Talley was paid
a fee of $1,400 plus his expenses by Pohl, through Walker, for any auto accident case he solicited
and referred to Pohl. On some cases, Talley was to receive a portion of the fee paid to Helping
Hands out of Pohl’s attorney’s fees. Talley discussed with Pohl the “percentage of settlements”
he was to receive from the cases he solicited and referred, and Pohl told Talley that the money was
being placed in an “escrow account” for him. aWhen asked whether Pohl knew he was getting paid
to “contact vehicle accident victims,” Talley responded, “the money was coming from Edgar
[Jaimes] who worked for him.” Ande, although his paycheck was from Walker’s company, “the
funding came by way of Edgar [Jfaimes].”
Talley testified that pyersonally soliciting clients for Pohl became so frequent that he began
carrying blank Pohl coCntracts to each solicitation. Talley testified that he never recommended any
lawyers other than Paohl. However, Talley never told the clients that he was getting paid to solicit
them. Talley wofuld present a Pohl contract to the potential client. If the client did not agree to hire
Pohl, the Uclients would not get the money. Talley testified that Jaimes and Dona (the operators of
HH Texas) would send him the money.
Talley further testified that both he and Pohl knew what they were doing was illegal. In
one instance, Talley was “run out of town” while soliciting clients for Pohl. Talley testified that
during the attempted solicitation he was told by a “lawyer or policeman” that “it was against the
law what [he] was doing.” Talley mentioned this to Pohl and Pohl told him “you’ve just got to
leave...some people you can’t help.”
Walker was eventually indicted and sent to prison. Thereafter, Pohl and hisk lawyer partners
refused to pay Walker and the other runners the ill gained fees as Pohl had prolmised. Therefore,
Walker, Seymour, Ladner and Precision filed a lawsuit in Mississippi cFederal Court (“Federal
Litigation”) against Pohl and his law partners claiming they were sowed millions of dollars in
promised fees. 
The above facts were compiled during the Federal Litigation. Thereafter, more than four
hundred clients who were illegally solicited contacted the Kassab Law Firm and requested Kassab
to represent them in litigation against Pohl and his partners. Kassab filed lawsuits on behalf of
these clients in four different courts in Harrisa County. Additionally, due to the egregiousness of
Pohl’s violation of the Texas Penal Code and violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct, Kassab was reequired to notify the Texas State Bar pursuant to Rule 8.03 of
the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Pfrofessional Conduct. Thus, Kassab filed grievances against Pohl
pursuant to Rule 8.03. Pohl’ys clients are also preparing and filing grievances against Pohl arising
out of his blatant barraCtry.
Because of athese actions in representing clients against Pohl and the grievances filed
against Pohl, Pofhl has filed a retaliatory lawsuit against the Kassab alleging conversion and theft
of trade sUecrets. Pohl alleges that Kassab and others stole his property and are using it to bring
lawsuits and grievances against Pohl. Specifically, Pohl alleges in his petition against Kassab that,
“Kassab is a lawyer who specializes in suing other lawyers”1 and “Kassab solicited
1 Pohl Original Petition, p. 6
10
clients/prospective clients [of Pohl’s] to act as Plaintiffs . . . to bring cases against Pohl for alleged
barratry and other claims.”2 Thus, Pohl has judicially admitted that he has brought his suit against
Kassab because Kassab contacted Pohl’s clients and filed suit against Pohl on behalf of these
clients. k
COUNTERCLAIM FOR CIVIL BARRATRY
Within the lawsuits that Kassab has filed against Pohl on behalf oft his former clients and
potential clients, Pohl has judicially admitted that a claim for barratryt is not a legal malpractice
case. Pohl has also admitted that a claim for barratry is not a claim for “legal malpractice,” and
thus, the discovery rule does not apply to a barratry claim. Teherefore, based upon Pohl’s judicial
admissions, the assignment of a barratry claim is permituted under Texas law.
Thus, based upon express assignments onf interest given to Kassab, Kassab brings
counterclaims against Pohl and his law firm purrsuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,
Section 16.069. Section 16.069 provides:
(a) If a counterclaim or cross claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence
that is the basis of an acction, a party to the action may file the counterclaim or
cross claim even thougfh as a separate action it would be barred by limitations
on the date the partyO’s answer is required.
(b) The counterclaipm or cross claim must be filed not later than the 30th day after
the date on which the party’s answer is required.
Kassab has been assaiglned barratry claims on behalf of 242 claimants. These counterclaims
are timely becauise they were filed within 30 days of the date Kassab filed his original
answer.
2 Id. at p. 6-7
11
DESIGNATION OF RESPONSIBLE THIRD PARTIES
A responsible third party is someone who caused or contributed to cause a portion of the
Plaintiff’s alleged damages. Defendant/Counter-Plaintiffs, Kassab, designates George W. (Billy)
Shepherd, Scott Walker, Steve Seymour and Kirk Ladner as responsible third-parties as these
individuals are the sole or proximate cause of any damages alleged by Pohl. Billy Shepherd
(“Shepherd”) represented Pohl in the Federal Litigation filed against Pohtl by Walker, Seymour,
Ladner and Precision. Shepherd knew that Walker, Seymour and Latdner had sold Precision to
Favre and knew that Walker, Seymour and Ladner had legally transferred Precision’s assets and
property to Favre. Shepherd further knew that Favre and/ore his counsel had given documents to
third parties, including Kassab and others prior to negotiauting a settlement in the Federal Litigation.
The documents, assets and all other property that Pnrecision owned that were transferred to Favre
are the subject of Pohl’s lawsuit herein. r
Shepherd negotiated the settlement in the Federal Litigation between Walker, Seymour,
Ladner, Favre and Precision on the one hand and Pohl on the other hand. If Pohl now complains
in this lawsuit that he was entiftled to the return and/or destruction of said assets/property,
Shepherd, as Pohl’s attorney in the Federal Litigation wholly failed to protect Pohl by ensuring
that all subject property was gathered from all third parties and returned to Pohl or destroyed.
Shepherd’s amlalfeasance was either negligent or intentional. Since Shepherd knew that the
subject assets/prioperty were a point of contention in the Federal Litigation and knew that the
assets/property could be used by outside third parties to garner clients as Pohl alleges, Shepherd
may have intentionally failed to protect Pohl’s interest so that he could secure future lucrative
employment for himself and his law firm for years to come by continuing to represent Pohl in the
current state court litigation after the subject property was used to garner clients to sue Pohl as
Pohl alleges. Thus, Shepherd is the sole or proximate cause of Pohl’s alleged damages.
12
Walker, Seymour and Ladner sold Precision to Favre. Walker, Seymour and Ladner also
transferred the subject assets/property of Precision to Favre. Walker testified under oath that he,
Seymour and Ladner, through Precision, owned all the assets/property, including computers and
documents that were transferred to Favre. Walker also testified that he had thek legal right and
authority, through Precision, to sell and transfer all the subject assets/property tol Favre. Moreover,
Walker, Seymour and Ladner certified that they owned all of the subjectc property/assets and had
authority to transfer all of the subject property/assets to Favre. If Wsalker, Seymour and Ladner
did not have the legal right to transfer all the subject assets/property to Favre, then they are the
sole or proximate cause of Pohl’s alleged damages. Therefore, if Pohl has been damaged in any
way as he alleges, Shepherd, Walker, Seymour and Ladner are the sole proximate cause of his
damages.
PRAYERa FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs respectfully pray that Plaintiffs recover nothing
on their claims and that the Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs recover on their claims against the
Plaintiffs and/or any Third-Party Dfefendants as follows:
i) actual and consequential damages;
ii) statutory doamages;
iii) pre- and post-judgment interest;
iv) attoirneys’ fees and costs; and
v) fall other relief to which the Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs may be justly entitled.
13
Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 0079407k0
lance@kassab.law r
DAVID ERIC KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law c
1214 Elgin Street r
Houston, Texas s77004
Telephone: 71D3.522.7400
Facsimile: 713.522.7410
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS,
COUNTErR-PLAINTIFFS LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB AND THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
CERTIFICAaTE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has been
forwarded to all parties pursuant to thoe Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this the 7th day of
November 2018. e
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
Lance Christopher Kassab
14"
11,2018-11-06,OA,Kassab,2nd Amended Answer,"Kassab's Second Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaim, and Designation of Responsible Third Parties","Filed November 6, 2018 in Cause No. 2018-58419, 189th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas. The day after the reply brief on the TCPA motion. This is the second amended responsive pleading, expanding the counterclaims from 150 to 235 assigned barratry claimants and adding a Designation of Responsible Third Parties (Billy Shepherd, Scott Walker, Steve Seymour, Kirk Ladner). Addressed to the Honorable Judge of said Court.",PLEAD-1,N/A,Phase 1,2018-11-06_OA_Kassab-2nd-Amended-Answer-CC_FILED.pdf,"Plaintiffs take nothing; Kassab recovers on counterclaims and against third-party defendants including actual and consequential damages, statutory damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, attorneys' fees and costs, and all other just relief","11/6/2018 2:08 PM
Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 28831260
By: ARIONNE MCNEAL
Filed: 11/6/2018 2:08 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIrAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS, LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAW FIRM’S SECOND AMENDED
ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND COUNtTERCLAIM,
AND DESIGNATION OF RESPONSIBLE THIRD PARTIES
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: s
COMES NOW, Defendants, Lance Christopher Kgassab and Lance Christopher Kassab,
P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm and files this theBir Second Amended Answer, Affirmative
Defenses, and Counterclaim, and Designation of Ryesponsible Third Parties, and would respectfully
show the Court as follows; a
RULfE 47 STATEMENT
The Kassab Defendants, in teheir capacity as Counter-Plaintiffs, seek monetary relief of
more than $1,000,000.00. f
y PARTIES
Plaintiff, Michael A. Pohl is an individual lawyer residing in Colorado.
Plaintiff, Laawl Offices of Michael A. Pohl is a law firm set up for the practice of law in
various states of ithe union, including Texas.
Defendant, Scott Favre is a nonresident individual residing in Mississippi.
Defendant, Scott M. Favre, PA, LLC is a nonresident limited liability company located in
Mississippi.
Defendant, Precision Marketing Group, LLC is a nonresident limited liability company
located in Mississippi.
Defendant, F. Douglas Montague III is a nonresident individual residing in Mississippi.
Defendant, Montague, Pittman & Varnado, PA is a nonresident professional association
located in Mississippi.
Defendant, Tina Nicholson is an individual residing in Texas. k
Defendant, Baker Nicholson, LLP, d/b/a Baker Nicholson Law Firm ils a limited liability
partnership located in Texas. c
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab is an sindividual residing in Texas.
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm
is a professional corporation located in Texas.
JURISDICTION ANDB VENUE
This matter is within the jurisdictional lnimits of this Court and Plaintiffs, Counter-
Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Officers of Michael A. Pohl (“Pohl”) and Defendants,
Counter-Plaintiffs, Lance Christopher Kassab (“LCK”) and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a
The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab, P.C.”) (collectively “Kassab”) are subject to the Court’s
jurisdiction. Venue is proper in thifs county because one or more of the defendants are residents of
this county and because a substantial part of the acts and/or omissions that form the basis of this
suit occurred in this county.
a l GENERAL DENIAL
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab generally denies all allegations made by Plaintiffs,
Counter-Denfendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl, and requests the Court
to require Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl to
carry their burden of proof regarding all allegations against Kassab.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab pleads the following affirmative defenses:
1. Statute of limitations
2. Justification.
3. Estoppel.
4. Waiver. t
5. Ratification. t
6. Release. 
7. Unclean hands. e
8. Contribution. u
9. Failure to mitigate damages. n
10. Lack of standing. r
11. Accord and Satisfaction.
12. Assumption of the Risk. 
13. Illegality/Criminal Actfs.
14. First Amendment. 
15. Attorney Immunity.
16. In Pari Daellicto.
17. Res juidicata.
SPECIFIC DENIALS
Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs specifically deny that all conditions precedent regarding
Plaintiffs claims of conversion and theft of trade secrets have been performed or occurred prior to
Plaintiffs filing suit against Kassab.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
LCK is a lawyer practicing law with Kassab, P.C., a law firm in Houston, Texas focusing
solely on plaintiffs’ legal malpractice. Kassab filed four lawsuits on behalf of over four hundred
clients against Pohl (the “Harris County Lawsuits”). The main allegations against Pohl is civil
barratry and conspiracy to commit barratry, a third-degree felony in Texas. Pohl conspired with
his wife, Donalda Pohl (“Dona”), his paralegal, Edgar Jaimes (“Jaimes”t), and three runners in
Mississippi to illegally solicit clients on behalf of Pohl. Dona owns at sham lending company in
Texas called Helping Hands Financing, LLC (“HH Texas”). Jaimes runs the day-to-day operations
of HH Texas. The three runners are Scott Walker (“Walkere”), Steve Seymour (“Seymour”) and
Kirk Ladner (“Ladner”). The three runners own and ouperate two other sham companies called
Helping Hands Group, LLC and Helping Hands Finnancial, LLC (collectively “HH Mississippi”).
The three runners also owned Precision Markerting Group, LLC (“Precision”) which they sold to
Scott Favre and/or his companies (collectively “Favre”).
With regard to the clients obtained in the BP Litigation, Walker, Seymour and Ladner hired
other runners to literally go up anfd down streets knocking on doors to solicit clients on behalf of
Pohl for lawsuits against British Petroleum. Precision paid these runners as much as $300-$400
for every client they obtained. Pohl then paid Precision as much as $1,500 for every client
Precision referred tao lPohl. Pohl also offered and agreed to pay Walker, Seymour and Ladner a
percentage of hisi legal fees once the cases settled. This percentage was disguised as an hourly rate
of $1,500.00 per hour.
With regard to auto accidents, Pohl set up a “Google Alerts” to be notified whenever there
was a horrific rollover crash. Pohl would then send his runners to hospitals, homes and funerals
to contact the families of the injured. The runners would use their sham companies, “Helping
Hands” to act as though they were genuinely there to help these victims. The runners would falsely
tell these victims that they were there to help the victims’ in their time of need in the form of
money for burial services, food, clothing, lodging, etc. In reality, the runners’ contacted these
families under false pretenses with the sole objective to take advantage of these victims and their
families while they were emotionally distraught and not thinking straight in ordker to lock them
into contracts which allowed the runners to select a lawyer for the victim. Tlhe victims and the
family members were encouraged to hire Pohl and told they could not gect the money unless they
agreed to hire Pohl. Pohl would pay the runners as much as $7,5s00 per client and Pohl also
promised the runners as much as 33% of Pohl’s legal fees on the back end when the case settled.
Additionally, HH Texas would pay HH Mississippi $2,500 for every client referred to HH Texas
to “loan” money to these victims and their family. Pohl used this procedure as an attempt to put
an additional layer between him and the actual runners.
Pohl also helped the runners form anaother sham entity, the GM Settlement Verification
Team (“GM Team”) after General Motors, Inc. issued a recall on cars due to faulty ignition
switches which effected the safe opereation of the airbag systems on vehicles. Thus, the GM Team
was designed to look official as iff it was part of General Motors. The conspiracy was to form an
official looking entity as if GyM was contacting people who had been harmed when airbags failed
to deploy in relation toC the ignition recall. In reality, this was just another sham company used to
trick clients into hiaring Pohl. Again, Pohl would pay Walker and Ladner, through their sham
entity, the GM Tfeam, a fee for every client it referred to Pohl, in addition to a percentage of fees
on the baUck end.
Pohl knew what he was doing was illegal barratry. Accordingly, he knowingly formed
entities that he perceived would insulate him from liability. In fact, Walker testified that although
he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or “marketing money” it was “clear to [him] it was
barratry.” In fact, Walker considered himself and his company “a pass-through for barratry
money.” All total, Walker, Ladner and Precision received over $5 million in “barratry pass-through
money” from Pohl and other lawyers to solicit potential clients with claims, both auto-accident
victims and those involved in the BP Deepwater Horizon litigation. k
One of the runners hired by Pohl and Walker to solicit illegally solicit cllients on behalf of
Pohl was Magdalena Santana (“Santana”). In her September 24, 2016 afcfidavit, Santana testified
that Pohl sent her on “dozens and dozens of car wreck cases all ovser the country.” Pohl would
email Santana the link of news coverage he obtained through Google Alerts depicting an accident
and asked her “to go to the victim or the victim’s family and try to get them to sign up with him.”
Santana swore under oath that Pohl agreed to pay her “$5,000 per case that [she] signed, plus a
percentage of his attorney’s fees.” Santana was advised by Pohl to “be persistent even if the family
... rejected [her].” Santana was instructed by Paohl to “approach the victims and their families while
they were vulnerable, in the emergency room, their hospital rooms or at the funerals.” Pohl told
Santana that minorities “were especieally vulnerable since they tended not to know that the law
prohibited barratry.” Accordingf to Pohl, they “were easier to sign up.”
Pohl would give Sanytana “money to give to the victims or their families” but would give
the money to the client C“if they agreed to sign a Pohl representation contract.” Pohl advised Santana
that the money was aa “foot in the door” but instructed Santana not to mention anything about hiring
a lawyer “untilf after they agreed to take the money.” “If the client agreed to hire Pohl, then
[Santana]U was to have the client sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.” Pohl would then give Santana
the money to pay the client “from his own Helping Hands company.” When Santana questioned
this, Pohl told Santana that it “was illegal for him to pay [her] directly for cases, and that’s why
the money had to go through some company.”
Pohl and/or his co-conspirators had Santana retract this affidavit through a December 19,
2017 affidavit. This purported retraction was likely the result of Pohl paying Santana to provide
testimony, which is something he has done in the past. In fact, Pohl’s own paralegal, Jaimes,
testified that on one occasion Pohl sent him to Florida with a suitcase filled with $k50,000 in cash
to give to Santana in exchange for her signing a statement for him. Jaimes tesltified that Santana
would only get the money if she signed the statement for Pohl. Jaimes testcified that Santana signed
the signed the statement and got the money. s
Santana went into more detail about this in her deposition. Santana testified that the
statement was an agreement for her to keep quiet and not charge Pohl with any wrongdoing,
criminal or unethical conduct. Santana testified that Pohl paid her $50,000 in cash to sign this
statement, which was delivered by Jaimes in three bags marked “trick or treat.” Very symbolic
given that Santana had been tricked by Pohla into soliciting clients for him and was now being
treated the money she claimed was due under their agreement just to stay quiet. Santana reiterated
in her deposition that if she didn’t sigen the gag agreement, she would not receive the money from
Pohl. Santana attempted to indicafte on the agreement that she was receiving $50,000 to keep quiet,
but Jaimes told her Pohl deymanded that she state she only received nominal consideration, like
$100. Santana did not wCrite the statement but “just signed it” because she felt she was being “forced
to sign” it while “unader duress.”
Notablyf, nowhere in Santana’s December 19th affidavit does she state the testimony in her
former afUfidavit is untrue, only that she does not “agree with” it and that the affidavit is not
“reliable.” Although Santana states in her December 19th affidavit that her prior affidavit was
drafted by a lawyer, Santana testified in her deposition that the September 24th affidavit was
created voluntarily with her own “testimony.” Santana testified that, unlike with Pohl, she was not
paid and had never been promised any money to provide the testimony in the September 24th
affidavit. Santana reiterated to counsel for Pohl, Billy Shepherd, that she was there in her
deposition to tell the truth and would not be bullied by his questioning or his efforts to confuse
her. k
Regardless, Santana’s sworn deposition testimony confirmed most of tlhe facts set forth in
her initial affidavit and this deposition testimony has never been rectracted. There, Santana
confirmed that she was hired by Pohl to solicit auto accident cases, thse first one being an accident
where a woman and her unborn child lost their lives. Santana was instructed by Walker, who was
instructed by Pohl, to personally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her up to sue the tire
manufacturer and, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000. Santana visited the funeral of the
deceased and got the family to feel comfortable with her. Although the mother was grieving, Pohl
told Santana: “take no prisoners, this is a cut tharoat business, you get in there and you do whatever
it takes to get this client.” The solicitation was successful after Pohl gave Santana $2,000 to “give
to the client to convince her into signeing over with the firm.”
“Coach” Kenneth Talleyf (“Talley”) was another runner hired by Pohl and Walker who
solicited over 20 auto accideynt cases for Pohl. Talley has sworn under oath that he was first hired
in relation to BP claimCs to find “folks that lost money due to the oil spill” and “sign them up” and
“get a fee for it.” Taalley testified that he went to work “knocking on doors” looking for potential
claimants for Pofhl and his partner in the BP litigation. Talley solicited and signed up for Pohl and
his co-coUnspirators more than 800 BP claims. Talley was paid between $75 and $350 for each BP
client he signed up for Pohl and his partners.
Talley eventually switched to soliciting auto accident victims, “calling on folks that had
bad accidents.” Talley recalls that the first client he solicited was in “the hospital in intensive care.”
Talley carried with him up to $1,000 to pay the accident victims to “help them with problems” but
only once they “were signed up.” Talley kept a list of all the auto accident cases he solicited so he
could keep track of the cases that he was due a fee on the back end after the case settled. Talley
also followed a checklist that instructed him to, among other things, bring flowekrs to the initial
hospital visit (but to spend no more than $50) and to offer the victims moneyl but to “make sure
the funding schedule” from HH Texas “is filled out properly before relecasing any cash.” Talley
would advise the victims that he had attorneys who could help them ssuch as Pohl. Talley was paid
a fee of $1,400 plus his expenses by Pohl, through Walker, for any auto accident case he solicited
and referred to Pohl. On some cases, Talley was to receive a portion of the fee paid to Helping
Hands out of Pohl’s attorney’s fees. Talley discussed with Pohl the “percentage of settlements”
he was to receive from the cases he solicited and referred, and Pohl told Talley that the money was
being placed in an “escrow account” for him. aWhen asked whether Pohl knew he was getting paid
to “contact vehicle accident victims,” Talley responded, “the money was coming from Edgar
[Jaimes] who worked for him.” Ande, although his paycheck was from Walker’s company, “the
funding came by way of Edgar [Jfaimes].”
Talley testified that pyersonally soliciting clients for Pohl became so frequent that he began
carrying blank Pohl coCntracts to each solicitation. Talley testified that he never recommended any
lawyers other than Paohl. However, Talley never told the clients that he was getting paid to solicit
them. Talley wofuld present a Pohl contract to the potential client. If the client did not agree to hire
Pohl, the Uclients would not get the money. Talley testified that Jaimes and Dona (the operators of
HH Texas) would send him the money.
Talley further testified that both he and Pohl knew what they were doing was illegal. In
one instance, Talley was “run out of town” while soliciting clients for Pohl. Talley testified that
during the attempted solicitation he was told by a “lawyer or policeman” that “it was against the
law what [he] was doing.” Talley mentioned this to Pohl and Pohl told him “you’ve just got to
leave...some people you can’t help.”
Walker was eventually indicted and sent to prison. Thereafter, Pohl and hisk lawyer partners
refused to pay Walker and the other runners the ill gained fees as Pohl had prolmised. Therefore,
Walker, Seymour, Ladner and Precision filed a lawsuit in Mississippi cFederal Court (“Federal
Litigation”) against Pohl and his law partners claiming they were sowed millions of dollars in
promised fees. 
The above facts were compiled during the Federal Litigation. Thereafter, more than four
hundred clients who were illegally solicited contacted the Kassab Law Firm and requested Kassab
to represent them in litigation against Pohl and his partners. Kassab filed lawsuits on behalf of
these clients in four different courts in Harrisa County. Additionally, due to the egregiousness of
Pohl’s violation of the Texas Penal Code and violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct, Kassab was reequired to notify the Texas State Bar pursuant to Rule 8.03 of
the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Pfrofessional Conduct. Thus, Kassab filed grievances against Pohl
pursuant to Rule 8.03. Pohl’ys clients are also preparing and filing grievances against Pohl arising
out of his blatant barraCtry.
Because of athese actions in representing clients against Pohl and the grievances filed
against Pohl, Pofhl has filed a retaliatory lawsuit against the Kassab alleging conversion and theft
of trade sUecrets. Pohl alleges that Kassab and others stole his property and are using it to bring
lawsuits and grievances against Pohl. Specifically, Pohl alleges in his petition against Kassab that,
“Kassab is a lawyer who specializes in suing other lawyers”1 and “Kassab solicited
1 Pohl Original Petition, p. 6
10
clients/prospective clients [of Pohl’s] to act as Plaintiffs . . . to bring cases against Pohl for alleged
barratry and other claims.”2 Thus, Pohl has judicially admitted that he has brought his suit against
Kassab because Kassab contacted Pohl’s clients and filed suit against Pohl on behalf of these
clients. k
COUNTERCLAIM FOR CIVIL BARRATRY
Within the lawsuits that Kassab has filed against Pohl on behalf oft his former clients and
potential clients, Pohl has judicially admitted that a claim for barratryt is not a legal malpractice
case. Pohl has also admitted that a claim for barratry is not a claim for “legal malpractice,” and
thus, the discovery rule does not apply to a barratry claim. Teherefore, based upon Pohl’s judicial
admissions, the assignment of a barratry claim is permituted under Texas law.
Thus, based upon express assignments onf interest given to Kassab, Kassab brings
counterclaims against Pohl and his law firm purrsuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,
Section 16.069. Section 16.069 provides:
(a) If a counterclaim or cross claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence
that is the basis of an acction, a party to the action may file the counterclaim or
cross claim even thougfh as a separate action it would be barred by limitations
on the date the partyO’s answer is required.
(b) The counterclaipm or cross claim must be filed not later than the 30th day after
the date on which the party’s answer is required.
Kassab has been assaiglned barratry claims on behalf of 235 claimants. These counterclaims
are timely becauise they were filed within 30 days of the date Kassab filed his original
answer.
2 Id. at p. 6-7
11
DESIGNATION OF RESPONSIBLE THIRD PARTIES
A responsible third party is someone who caused or contributed to cause a portion of the
Plaintiff’s alleged damages. Defendant/Counter-Plaintiffs, Kassab designates George W. (Billy)
Shepherd, Scott Walker, Steve Seymour and Kirk Ladner as responsible third-parties as these
individuals are the sole or proximate cause of any damages alleged by Pohl. Billy Shepherd
(“Shepherd”) represented Pohl in the Federal Litigation filed against Pohtl by Walker, Seymour,
Ladner and Precision. Shepherd knew that Walker, Seymour and Latdner had sold Precision to
Favre and knew that Walker, Seymour and Ladner had legally transferred Precision’s assets and
property to Favre. The assets and property that were transferered to Favre are the subject of Pohl’s
lawsuit herein. u
Shepherd negotiated a settlement in the Fnederal Litigation between Walker, Seymour,
Ladner, Favre and Precision on the one hand anrd Pohl on the other hand. If Pohl now complains
in this lawsuit that he was entitled to the return and/or destruction of said assets/property,
Shepherd, as Pohl’s attorney in the Federal Litigation wholly failed to protect Pohl by ensuring
that all subject property was gathfered from all third parties and returned to Pohl or destroyed.
Shepherd’s malfeasance was either negligent or intentional. Since Shepherd knew that the subject
assets/property were a point of contention in the Federal Litigation and knew that the
assets/property coualdl be used by outside third parties to garner clients as Pohl alleges, Shepherd
may have intentiionally failed to protect Pohl’s interest so that he could secure future lucrative
employment for himself and his law firm for years to come by continuing to represent Pohl in the
current state court litigation after the subject property was used to garner clients to sue Pohl as
Pohl alleges. Thus, Shepherd is the sole or proximate cause of Pohl’s alleged damages.
Walker, Seymour and Ladner sold Precision to Favre. Walker, Seymour and Ladner also
transferred the subject assets/property to Favre. Walker testified under oath that he, Seymour and
12
Ladner, through Precision, owned all the assets/property, including computers and documents that
were transferred to Favre. Walker also testified that he had the legal right, through Precision, to
sell and transfer all the subject assets/property to Favre. Moreover, Walker, Seymour and Ladner
certified that they owned all of the subject property/assets and had authority to traknsfer all of the
subject property/assets to Favre. If Walker, Seymour and Ladner did not havle the legal right to
transfer all the subject assets/property to Favre, then they are the sole or pcroximate cause of Pohl’s
alleged damages. Therefore, if Pohl has been damaged in anyway as hse alleges, Shepherd, Walker,
Seymour and Ladner are the sole proximate cause of his damages.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs respeuctfully pray that Plaintiffs recover nothing
on their claims and that the Defendants, Counter-nPlaintiffs recover on their claims against the
Plaintiffs and/or any Third-Party Defendants asr follows:
i) actual and consequential damages;
ii) statutory damages;
iii) pre- and post-judgment interest;
iv) attorneys’ fees aOnd costs; and
v) all other relief to which the Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs may be justly entitled.
13
Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 0079407k0
lance@kassab.law r
DAVID ERIC KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law c
1214 Elgin Street r
Houston, Texas s77004
Telephone: 71D3.522.7400
Facsimile: 713.522.7410
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS,
COUNTErR-PLAINTIFFS LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSBAB AND THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
CERTIFICAaTE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has been
forwarded to all parties pursuant to thoe Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this the 6th day of
November 2018. e
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
Lance Christopher Kassab
14"
10,2018-11-05,OBJ,Kassab,Objections to Pohl’s TCPA response evidence,Kassab's Objections to Plaintiffs' Response Evidence and Reply in Support of TCPA Motion to Dismiss,"Filed November 5, 2018 as a combined objection and reply brief in further support of Kassab's TCPA Motion to Dismiss. Responds to Pohl's November 1, 2018 opposition, challenging the admissibility of Pohl's evidence and arguing the commercial speech exception does not apply. Filed in Cause No. 2018-58419, 189th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas. Addressed to the Honorable Judge Bill Burke.",TCPA-1,N/A,Phase 1,2018-11-05_OBJ_Kassab-Objections-to-Pohl-Response_FILED.pdf,Grant the TCPA Motion to Dismiss; strike Shepherd affidavit and all attached documents; strike Pohl's declaration paragraphs 3-9; order Plaintiffs take nothing; award reasonable and necessary attorney's fees and costs as required by the statute,"11/5/2018 8:03 AM
Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 28779207
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 11/5/2018 8:03 AM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIAkL DISTRICT
THE KASSAB DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTlIFFS’
RESPONSE AND REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE BILL BURKE: r
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs Lance Christopher Kassab Dand Lance Christopher Kassab,
P.C. d/b/a/ The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab”) file this reply asnd objections in further support of
their Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to the Texas Citizens Parrticipation Act.
OBJECTIONS
A. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A (Affidavait of Billy Shepherd)
Kassab objects to Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A, the alleged affidavit of Billy Shepherd
(“Shepherd”) and all exhibits attacheed thereto. Specifically, Shepherd’s affidavit fails as an
affidavit on its face because itf is not based upon “personal knowledge” or state that the
statements therein are “true yand correct”, thus perjury does not attach, and therefore, the alleged
affidavit is nothing moCre than a statement by Pohl’s “interested” counsel. An affidavit must be
based on the affianta’s personal knowledge and must state that the facts in it are true. Humphreys
v. Caldwell, 88
8f S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex. 1994); see TEX. R. EVID. 602 (evidence must show the
witness hUas personal knowledge); Radio Station KSCS v. Jennings, 750, S.W.2d 760, 761-62
(Tex. 1988). An affidavit must contain direct and unequivocal statements that, if false, would be
grounds for perjury. Burke v. Satterfield, 525 S.W.2d 950, 955 (Tex. 1975); Hall v. Stephenson,
919 S.W.2d 454, 466 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ denied).
Additionally, Shepherd’s statement appears to attempt to prove up business records, but
this attempt fails. To introduce a business record through a witness, a party must prove the
following: (1) the record is a memorandum, report, other compilation of data; (2) the witness is
the custodian or another qualified witness; (3) the record was made from informaktion transmitted
by a person with knowledge of the facts; (4) the record was made at or near thle time of the acts,
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses appearing on it; (5) the recordc was made as part of the
regular practice of that business activity; and (6) the record was kepst in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity. See TEX. R. EVID. 101 (h)(4),
803 (6)(A)-(6)(D); Freeman v.
American Motorists Ins., 53 S.W.3d 710, 715 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001 no pet.).
The alleged affidavit fails in all respects.
The alleged affidavit also fails to conform with Texas Rules of Evidence, 902 (10), and
therefore, fails to establish the exhibits as baus r iness records.1 Specifically, the alleged affidavit
fails to adequately show that Shepherd is the custodian of records or otherwise establish how he
knows what each particular documeent is other than he is a lawyer for Pohl. This does not
establish the requisite “knowledgfe.” See id. Therefore, the documents attached as exhibits are
nothing more than hearsay yupon hearsay. TEX. R. EVID. 902 (10). Moreover, Shepherd has
failed to provide the Crequisite notice of his filing. Id. For these reasons, the “affidavit” of
Shepherd and all doacuments attached must be struck from the record.
B. Pflaintiffs’ Exhibit B (Declaration of Michael A. Pohl).
KUassab objects to Plaintiffs’ Exhibit B, the sworn declaration of Michael A. Pohl,
Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. The statements contained in this declaration are conclusory and
constitute no evidence at all. Conclusory affidavits do not raise fact issues and are incompetent
evidence as a matter of law. Ryland Group, Inc. v. Hood, 924 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. 1996);
1 Response, at Exhibit A.
Stephens v. Precision Drilling Oilfield Servs. Corp., No. 01-11-00326-CV, 2013 Tex. App.
LEXIS 5700, 2013 WL 1928797, at *19 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 9, 2013, no pet.)
(mem. op.). “A conclusory statement is one that does not provide the underlying facts to support
the conclusion.” Dolcefino v. Randolph, 19 S.W.3d 906, 930 (Tex. App. – Houskton [14th Dist.]
2000, pet. denied). Moreover, an affidavit is conclusory when it expresses “la factual inference
without stating the underlying facts on which the inference is based.” E.Ic. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 259 S.W.3d 800, 809 (Tex. App.—Houston [1sts Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
Pohl’s declaration consists of nothing but conclusory statements. Kassab objects to
Paragraph 3, which states: “I was and am the rightful owner of the confidential, privileged and
trade secrete information that Kassab obtained from Scott Favre and Tina Nicholson on which
this suit is based.”2 This statement is conclusory because Pohl fails to describe what the
purported confidential information or trade seacrets are or explain how he is the rightful owner of
this information as opposed to Scott Favre or his entities who have claimed to be the owner of
the marketing lists provided to Kassaeb. Moreover, Pohl fails to explain how the information even
constitutes a trade secret. See Gafme Sys. v. Forbes Hutton Leasing, Inc., No. 02-09-00051-CV,
2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 4098y, at *76 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth, May 26, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(statement that the softCware “constitutes a trade secret” was conclusory and not proper evidence).
Kassab objeacts to Paragraph 4 which states, “I did not provide consent for Kassab to
exercise dominifon and control over the property, and his exercise of that dominion and control is
wrongfulU.”3 Pohl does not provide any factual support for this statement or explain why Kassab’s
exercise and control over lists he obtained rightfully from Favre or his counsel is wrongful. See
2 Response, Exhibit B, ¶ 3.
3 Response, Exhibit B, ¶ 4.
McCollum v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., 481 S.W.3d 352, 362 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no
pet.) (conclusory statements in affidavit that conduct is “allegedly wrongful” is insufficient to
raise fact issue that conduct alleged is in fact wrongful).
Kassab objects to Paragraph 5 which states, “I have incurred damagesk as a result of
Kassab’s conversion of my property, through at the very least, by thel exposure of the
confidential materials and information, which results in a loss of the cintrinsic value to me as
trade secrets and confidential materials.”4 Again, Pohl does not prosvide any factual support for
the conclusion that he had been damaged. Pohl does not state what the alleged trade secrets or
confidential materials are or explain how he is allegedly damaged by Kassab’s alleged
misappropriation of the material. See Celtic Props., L.C. v. Cleveland Reg'l Med. Ctr., L.P., No.
09-13-00464-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 8051, 2015 WL 4600661, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont July 31, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.)a (statement that property was “damaged” as a result
of defendant’s conduct was insufficient as a matter of law); Chapa v. Stonehaven Dev., Inc., No.
13-13-00030-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LeEXIS 10159, at *9 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi, Aug. 15,
2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (statefment “we lost the profits we would have made” is conclusory
because it provides no undeyrlying facts to support the conclusion); see also Fraud-Tech, Inc. v.
Choicepoint, Inc., No.C 02-05-150-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 3181, 2006 WL 1030189, at *5
(Tex. App.—Fort Waorth Apr. 20, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (finding affidavit testimony that
appellants weref damaged because of the alleged conversion conclusory when affiant did “not
supply faUcts underlying its conclusions”).
Kassab objects to Paragraph 6 which states “Before they were stolen, I took substantial
measures to maintain the materials and information that Kassab obtained from Scott Favre and
4 Response, Exhibit B, ¶ 5.
Tina Nicholson as confidential and protected them as valuable trade secrets. I strictly limited
access to them and by maintaining physical copies under lock and key.”5 These statements are
conclusory. Pohl does not describe what “substantial” measures he allegedly took to maintain
information obtained by Kassab, what the information obtained by Kassab even kis, or state how
the information obtained by Kassab is allegedly a “valuable trade secret.” Polhl makes no effort
to describe how he “strictly limited” access to his alleged confidential icnformation given that it
freely ended up in the hands of Favre, who claimed ownerships of the marketing material
provided to Kassab. 
Kassab objects to Paragraph 7 which states, “The stolen materials and information have
independent economic value from not being generally known to, and not readily being
ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the
disclosure or use of the information.”6 This staat r ement is conclusory as Pohl does not provide any
facts to support this statement. Pohl does not describe how any materials were purportedly
stolen, what the materials even are, ehow the materials are not known to the general public, or
how the materials allegedly provifde economic value to Pohl.
Kassab objects to pyaragraph 8 which states “Kassab’s misappropriation of my trade
secrets has caused meC damages in both the form of actual loss of the value of my confidential
materials and of unajust enrichment to Kassab as a result of his wrongful misappropriation.”7 This
statement is confclusory. Pohl provides no facts to explain how Kassab allegedly misappropriated
the tradeU secrets, how the information even constitutes a trade secret, or how the loss of the
5 Response, Exhibit B, ¶ 6.
6 Response, Exhibit B, ¶ 7.
7 Response, Exhibit B, ¶ 8.
information allegedly caused Pohl damages or unjustly enriched Kassab. See Plas-Tex, Inc. v.
Jones, NO. 03-99-00286-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 3188, at *18 (Tex. App. – Austin, May 18,
2000, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“conclusory statements regarding the value of intangible assets
such as unidentified trade secrets” was insufficient to support claim of damages)k. The purported
loss to Pohl of any alleged misappropriation of trade secrets is also speculativel.
Finally, Kassab objects to Paragraph 9 which states “In the sacme ways that Kassab’s
conversion and misappropriation of my confidential information injusred me, I was injured by the
conspiracy to commit those torts.”8 This is a conclusory statement within a conclusory statement.
Pohl does not describe the purported conversion or misappropriation and makes no effort to
provide any facts supporting the alleged conspiracy claims. This statement is insufficient as a
matter of law. See Methodist Hosp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 329 S.W.3d 510, 530 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (caoncluding that affiant’s “bare assertion” that the
conduct of the opposing party was the “causal connection” of its damages was conclusory and
“substantively defective” and nothinge more than affiant’s subjective opinion).
f II
REPLY
A. Any documentation that Kassab obtained from Favre and/or his
counselC, Tina Nicholson come from Precision, not Pohl.
Pohl arguesa that Kassab converted and stole his files. However, the evidence is clear that
any documents fKassab obtained from Favre or Nicholson came into Favre’s possession when he
purchasedU Precision Marketing Group. Precision owned the documents, not Pohl. Even
assuming arguendo that the documents were somehow part of Pohl’s legal files, which Kassab
8 Response, Exhibit B, ¶ 9.
denies, Pohl still would not own the files because those files would belong to the client. Texas
Rule of Professional Conduct, 1.15 (d) specifically provides:
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent
reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable
notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrenkdering
papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding anyr advance
payments of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain paplers relating
to the client to the extent permitted by other law only if such retention will not
prejudice the client in the subject matter of the representation. c
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L. CONDUCT 1.15 (d) (emphasis added).s
The Rule cited above is clear and concise. Moreover, the courts enforcing this Rule are
clear and unambiguous. The Texas Supreme Court has stated, “The attorney is the agent of the
client, and the work product generated by the attorney in representing the client belongs to the
client.” In Re Kenneth George-consolidated with- In Re Epic Holdings, Inc., 28 S.W.3d 511,
516 (Tex. 2000); see also Hebisen v. State, 6a15 r S.W.2d 866, 868 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1981, no writ). Moreover, everything in the entire file having to do with a clients’
representation, i.e. attorney notes, elegal memoranda, etc., etc., etc. belongs to the client.
Resolution Trust Corp. v. H--, Pf.C., 128 FRD 647, (N.D. Tex. 1989) (holding that the attorney
may retain a copy of the filey at the attorney’s expense, however, the original file belongs to the
client); Nolan v. FCoreman, 665 F.2d 738, reh’g denied, 671 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir.
1982). Furthermorea, the contents of a client’s file must be turned over to the client promptly
upon request. Hfebisen, 615 S.W.2d at 868. The failure to do so is willful and malicious, and
constituteUs dishonorable conduct. Smith v. State, 490 S.W.2d 902, 909 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Corpus Christi 1972, writ ref’d, n.r.e.). Retention of documents is only permitted to secure a
debt if and only if such retention will not prejudice the client in the subject matter of the
representation. Smith, 490 S.W.2d at 910; TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L. CONDUCT 1.15 (d).
Therefore, Pohl lacks standing to sue Kassab for conversion or theft of trade secrets because Pohl
never owned any of the subject documents.
B. The commercial exception does not apply.
Pohl argues in his response that the TCPA does not apply to this case bekcause this case
falls under the statutory exemption for commercial speech found in sectioln 27.010(b). This
section states: c
[The TCPA] does not apply to a legal action brought againsst a person primarily
engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or servDices, if the statement or
conduct arises out of the sale or lease of goods, services, or an insurance product,
insurance services, or a commercial transaction in whisch the intended audience is
an actual or potential buyer or customer.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.010(b). “The par
ty asserting the exemption bears the burden
of proving its applicability.” See Castleman v. Internet Money Ltd., 546 S.W.3d 684, 688 (Tex.
2018); Schimmel v. McGregor, 438 S.W.3d 8a47, 857 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet.
denied). 
Pohl contends that that his ceonversion and theft of trade secrets claims fall within this
exemption because (1) Kassab wfas primarily engaged in the business of selling legal services;
(2) the claims against Kassayb arose from Kassab’s conduct in allegedly purchasing Pohl’s list of
clients and former clCients for the purpose of soliciting those clients; (3) Kassab’s conduct
occurred in the coaurse of delivering his legal services; and (4) the intended audience of his
conduct was a pfotential buyer, the clients.9 This is not accurate.
InU determining whether some of Pohl’s claims fall within the commercial-speech
exemption, the Court must examine the evidence, which in this case consists of Pohl’s own
pleadings. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.006. Pohl alleges that Favre and his counsel
9 Response, p. 11.
stole from him information about his clients and prospective clients and “secretly sold Pohl’s
stolen confidential information and property to Kassab” and that Kassab “knew that the
information and property that [he was] purchasing was stolen and not Favre’s and/or [his
counsel’s] to sell.”10 Pohl alleges that “Using the stolen confidential informatiokn and property
that he knowingly purchased, Kassab solicited those clients/prospective clientsl to act as plaintiffs
… to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and other claims.”11 Pco t hl does not allege that
the agreement between Kassab and Favre effectuated a sale of legasl services or that any of the
conduct for which he sues Kassab arises out of the sale of services that Kassab is “primarily
engaged” in.
“The exemption expressly provides that the TCPA does not apply to a legal action
brought against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or
services, but only if the statement or conducat arises out of the sale or lease of goods, services,
or an insurance product, insurance services, or a commercial transaction.” Castleman, 546
S.W.3d at 688 (emphasis added) (inteernal quotations omitted). The Texas Supreme Court opined
in Castleman that the exception fcan only apply when “(1) the defendant was primarily engaged
in the business of selling ory leasing goods, (2) the defendant made the statement or engaged in
the conduct on which Cthe claim is based in the defendant's capacity as a seller or lessor of those
goods or services, a(3) the statement or conduct at issue arose out of a commercial transaction
involving the kifnd of goods or services the defendant provides, and (4) the intended audience of
the statemUent or conduct were actual or potential customers of the defendant for the kind of
goods or services the defendant provides. Id. Pohl has failed to prove establish each of these
elements.
10 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, ¶ 21.
11 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, ¶ 22.
More specifically, even if the alleged conduct at issue (i.e., conduct amounting to
conversion or theft of trade secretes) “arose out of” Kassab’s alleged theft of trade secrets or
conversion of files, as Pohl alleges, Pohl has nevertheless failed to establish that this type of
conduct is a “commercial transaction involving” legal services or any other type kof services that
Kassab is primarily engaged in. See id. In other words, Pohl has not establlished that Kassab
“engaged in the conduct on which the claim is based in the defendant'cs capacity as a seller or
lessor of those goods or services.” Id. Stated another way, Kassab sis not primarily engaged in
purchasing marketing lists and client files, which is the business which Pohl alleges these claims
arise. Similarly, with respect to the fourth element of the commercial exception, Pohl has failed
to demonstrate that the intended audience of Kassab’s alleged conduct (i.e., the conversion and
theft of trade secrets) were actual or potential customers of Kassab for the kind of goods or
services that Kassab is “primarily engaged” ina. See id. Consequently, Pohl has therefore failed to
establish that his conversion and theft of trade secret claims fall within the commercial-speech
exemption. e
f III
CONCLUSION & PRAYER
For the reasons set forth herein and in the initial motion, Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs
Lance Christopher Kassab and The Kassab Law Firm respectfully request the Court to grant this
Motion to Dismiscs Pursuant to the Texas Citizens Participation Act and order that Plaintiffs take
nothing in their claims against Lance Christopher Kassab and The Kassab Law Firm and award
reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs as required by the statute.
10
Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 0079407k0
lance@kassab.law r
DAVID ERIC KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 24071351
david@kassab.law c
1214 Elgin Street r
Houston, Texas s77004
Telephone: 71D3.522.7400
Facsimile: 713.522.7410
ATTORNEYS FOR LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB rAND THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
CERTIFICAaTE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has
been forwarded to all parties pursuant too the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this the 5th day of
November, 2018. e
f / s / Lance Christopher Kassab
Lance Christopher Kassab
11"
9,2018-11-01,RSP,Pohl,Pohl’s response opposing TCPA MTD,Pohl's Response in Opposition to Kassab's TCPA Motion to Dismiss,"Filed November 1, 2018 in response to Kassab's October 24, 2018 TCPA Motion to Dismiss. Pohl opposes dismissal on three grounds: (1) the TCPA does not apply to his claims, (2) even if it did, the commercial speech exception bars application, and (3) Pohl has established a prima facie case. Includes alternative motion for continuance and discovery. Filed in Cause No. 2018-58419, 189th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas.",TCPA-1,N/A,Phase 1,2018-11-01_RSP_Pohl-Response-to-Kassab-MTD-TCPA_FILED.pdf,"Deny the TCPA Motion to Dismiss in all respects; award Pohl costs and fees of $33,352; alternatively, grant continuance and permit discovery under §§ 27.004(c) and 27.006(b)","11/1/2018 7:18 PM
Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 28744115
By: Deandra Mosley
Filed: 11/1/2018 7:18 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL AND LAW OFFICE OF § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
MICHAEL A. POHL, PLLC, §
Plaintiffs, §
V. § k
§ e
SCOTT FAVRE and SCOTT M. FAVRE PA, § C l
LLC; PRECISION MARKETING GROUP, § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
LLC; LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB and § c
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, P.C. d/b/a § r
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM; TINA § s
NICHOLSON and BAKER NICHOLSON, §
LLP d/b/a BAKER NICHOLSON LAW § s
FIRM; and DOUGLAS MONTAGUE III and § s
MONTAGUE PITTMAN & VARNADO, P.A., §
Defendants. § r189TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PLAINTIFFS MICHAEL POHL AND LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL A. POHL’S
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
PURSUANT TO THE TEXAS CITlIZENS PARTICIPATION ACT
Plaintiffs Michael Pohl and Law OfMfices of Michael A. Pohl (collectively, “Pohl”) respond
in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance
Christopher Kassab, P.C., d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm (collectively, “Kassab”). Kassab’s Motion
to Dismiss (the “Motion”) purports to find its basis in the Texas Citizens’ Participation Act, TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODEo § 27.001 et. seq. (“TCPA”), but as set forth below the TCPA does not
apply to Pohl’s claims, and even if it did, the Motion would fail.
c I.
INTRODUCTION
Kassab paid $250,000 to obtain the stolen names, addresses, and in some instances actual
client files of Pohl’s former clients and potential clients so that Kassab could solicit those clients
to assert barratry claims. Kassab attempted to disguise the purchase as the engagement of a
putative “expert witness,” whom he agreed to indemnify in the event that Pohl asserted claims for
the theft. Now that Pohl has asserted the anticipated claims, Kassab asks the Court to hold that his
actions and communications in purchasing and using the stolen materials are protected by the
TCPA.
Despite having advocated directly inconsistent positions regarding the kTCPA in other
litigation with Pohl in front of this Court, Kassab brought a meritless Motionl.1 In an attempt to
contort the application of the TCPA and delay this lawsuit, Kassab assercts that the TCPA applies
to Pohl’s causes of action for conversion of confidential information asnd misappropriation of trade
secrets because of the purported motivation behind the assertions of those claims. The TCPA does
not apply because of a defendant’s mere assertion of the motivation for the filing of a claim;
instead, courts consider only whether the factual bases for a claim implicate the statutory
protections. Otherwise, every defendant could simply claim—as Kassab has done here without
evidence—that a particular case had been filead in retaliation for an action protected by the TCPA
and invoke the entire process. 
Instead, a court must examinee the claims that are asserted. Pohl’s claims in no way target
Kassab for the exercise of any rigfhts of free speech, petition, or association. Pohl brings claims to
hold Kassab responsible for yhis wrongful conversion of Pohl’s information and misappropriation
of trade secrets, togethCer with his participation in a conspiracy to commit both torts. The claims
on their face do not implicate the TCPA, and the inquiry should end there.
Perhapsf fbecause the factual bases of Pohl’s claims so clearly do not implicate the TCPA,
Kassab exUpends much time and effort attempting to reframe those claims as acts of retaliation for
Kassab’s actions after he committed the torts for which Pohl sues. More specifically, Kassab
1 See generally Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP Motions to Dismiss, Dezzie Brumfield d/b/a LAD
Enterprises, et al., v. Law Offices of Michael Pohl, et al., No. 2017-38294 (189th Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex. Sept.
29, 2017) (filed by the Kassab firm), attached as Exhibit 1 to the affidavit of Billy Shepherd (“Shepherd Affidavit”),
which is attached as Exhibit A to this Response.
contends that Pohl brought tort claims against Kassab not because Kassab stole confidential and
trade secret information and materials but because of what Kassab did with those materials after
he stole them. Kassab has the burden of demonstrating the applicability of the TCPA by a
preponderance of the evidence. See LFMC Enterprises, LLC v. Baker, 546 S.W. 3dk 893, 897 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied). Kassab offers no evidence of alny kind to support
his contention that the lawsuit is retaliatory. Kassab’s failure to sustain hics burden of proof is fatal
to his Motion. s
Moreover, even if the TCPA jurisprudence permitted tshis type of exercise, and even if
Kassab had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the purported motivations for
Pohl’s suit implicated one of Kassab’s rights protected by the statute, Kassab’s claim under the
TCPA would nevertheless fail. If, as Kassab contends, Pohl sued Kassab because “Kassab legally
and ethically contacted Pohl’s former clients aor prospective clients and filed suit against Pohl on
behalf of these individuals,”2 then Pohl’s suit would be exempt from the TCPA by virtue of the
commercial exception to that statute. e TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.010(b). Because Kassab
was at all times acting as a persofn primarily engaged in the business of selling his services as an
attorney, his contacts with Pyohl’s clients and former clients to solicit them to bring barratry suits
fall squarely within theC commercial exception to the statute. Kassab’s actions in filing a grievance
against Pohl also fall within the commercial exception and are not protected by the TCPA. It is
apparent on thef f face of the grievance itself—which Kassab attached to his Motion even though it
is designaUted by the State Bar as “strictly confidential3—that Kassab uses the State Bar grievance
mechanism as a part of his litigation strategy.4
2 Motion at 15.
3 See Grievance, attached as Exhibit 21 to the Motion, at 6 (“Disciplinary Proceedings are strictly confidential”).
4 See id. at 8, n. 1 (Kassab describes his history of filing grievances in connection with civil lawsuits).
Although it is clear that the TCPA does not apply to Pohl’s claims, Pohl fully sets forth his
prima facie case for each element of his causes of action. The pleadings and the affidavits Pohl
supplies can leave no question that he has satisfied the second prong of the TCPA analysis.
Kassab argues but fails to conclusively establish the affirmative defensesk that he asserts
entitle him to dismissal. Limitations has not run even as of today. The attorneyl immunity doctrine
does not apply to conduct undertaken outside the scope of representing ac client. And res judicata
does not apply in these circumstances to bar the claims. s
Finally, Pohl is entitled to his fees and costs in respondsing to Kassab’s Motion. Kassab
clearly knew upon filing the Motion that it would fail, given his experience on the opposite side
of the issue in this very Court.
II.
ARGaUMENT
A. KASSAB’S MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD BE DENIED
The Texas Legislature enaceted the Texas Citizens Participation Act (“TCPA”) “to
encourage and safeguard the confstitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate
freely, and otherwise particiypate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law and, at
the same time, protect Cthe rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.”
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.002 (emphasis added). The TCPA is intended to identify and
dispose of lawsfufits that are “designed to chill First Amendment Rights, not to dismiss meritorious
lawsuits.”U In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 589 (Tex. 2015).
“Courts use a ‘two-step procedure to expedite the dismissal of claims brought to intimidate
or to silence a defendant’s exercise of these First Amendment rights.’” Wayne Dolcefino &
Dolcefino Communications, LLC v. Cypress Creek EMS, 540 S.W.3d 194, 198 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (quoting ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman, 512 S.W.3d 895,
898 (Tex. 2017)). The first step of the TCPA analysis requires that the movant establish by “a
preponderance of evidence that the suit he is seeking to dismiss ‘is based on, relates to, or is in
response to the [movant’s] exercise of: (1) the right of free speech; (2) the right tok petition; or (3)
the right of association.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting TEX. CIV. P CRAlC. & REM. CODE §
27.003). c
If the movant sustains its burden of demonstrating by a preponsderance of the evidence that
the claims fall within the ambit of the TCPA, and only then, thse court turns to the second step in
the process. That step shifts the burden to the non-movant to provide by clear and specific evidence
a prima facie case supporting the elements of its claim.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(c).
In examining whether a plaintiff has sustained its burden of demonstrating a prima facie case, a
court is obligated to consider “the pleadings aand supporting and opposing affidavits stating the
facts on which the liability or defense is based.” Id. § 27.006(a). A prima facie case is established
when the pleadings and evidence suppely the “‘minimum quantum of evidence necessary to support
a rational inference that the allegfation of fact is true.’” In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590 (quoting
In re E.I DuPont de Nemourys & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex. 2004)).
As set forth belCow, neither of the two prongs of the TCPA is satisfied here, and Kassab’s
Motion should be denied.
1. fPohl’s allegations on their face do not implicate the TCPA
PoUhl asserts three claims against Kassab in his Original Petition: (1) conversion, (2)
violations of the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“TUTSA”), and (3) civil conspiracy. Original
Petition at 9–11. To determine whether Kassab has met the preponderance of the evidence
standard, the Court should start with the petition to determine the basis of the legal action. Hersh
v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017) (the “basis of a legal action is not determined by the
defendant’s admissions or denials but by the plaintiff’s allegations”). Courts “do not blindly accept
attempts by the [defendants] to characterize [plaintiff’s] claims as implicating protected
expression.” Sloat v. Rathbun, 513 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015k, pet. dism’d).
Instead, courts should “favor[] the conclusion that [the plaintiff’s] claims arel not predicated on
protected expression.” Id. Further, “any activities by the [defendantsc] that are not a factual
predicate for [the plaintiff’s] claims are simply not pertinent to the insquiry.” Id.
Although Kassab baldly asserts that Pohl’s claims were bsrought “in retaliation” for certain
of his actions and that Pohl has somehow admitted as much, the Court may not “blindly accept”
that characterization of Pohl’s allegations. Instead, the Court must keep in mind that there needs
to “be a connection between the claims in the lawsuit and the alleged protected conduct.” Wayne
Dolcefino, 540 S.W.3d at 201. The Court muast view the evidence “in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant.” Id. at 199. In sum, the Court’s inquiry should be (1) what the factual bases for
Pohl’s claims are, based on the pleadeings and evidence viewed in the light most favorable to him,
and (2) the extent to which these ffactual bases, as a matter of law, are protected expression within
the TCPA’s definition. Sloayt, 513 S.W.3d at 504.
As the pleadingCs make clear, Pohl sues Kassab for conversion because Kassab knowingly
purchased confiden a tial information and materials that were stolen from Pohl.5 Kassab’s liability
for this wrongffufl conduct is not based on facts related to the exercise of the rights of free speech,
petition, Uor association. Instead, his liability is based on his knowing and intentional acts of
conversion and theft of trade secrets.
5 See Original Petition at ¶¶ 4, 30, 31, 32, 33.
Similarly, Pohl’s TUTSA claim is based on the same underlying conduct as the conversion
claim, except it is limited to conduct related to the stolen trade secrets.6 For the same reasons as
above, the factual basis of liability for this claim does not trigger protections under the TCPA.
Pohl’s conspiracy claim involves Kassab’s and the other Defendants’ ovkert acts in their
plan to steal and misappropriate Pohl’s trade secrets and other proprietary informlation.7 Yet again,
nothing in the factual basis of liability for this claim is based on or targetsc Kassab for the exercise
of the rights of free speech, petition, or association. s
For all three of Pohl’s claims against Kassab, the thesory of liability is predicated on
wrongful acts, not protected speech or conduct. The lawsuit was brought to vindicate Pohl’s rights,
not in retaliation for any TCPA protected conduct. The pleadings and evidence which the Court
must use to determine if the TCPA applies makes this clear. The Texas Supreme Court has held
that the petition is the “best and all-sufficient eavidence of the nature of the action.” Hersh v. Tatum,
526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017) (quoting Stockyards Nat. Bank v. Maples, 95 S.W.2d 1300, 1302
(Tex. Comm’n App. 1936)), and Pohel’s Original Petition establishes that the nature of the action
does not implicate the TCPA. f
2. Kassab has nyot sustained his burden of demonstrating the applicability of the
TCPA to Pohl’s Claims.
As the movant, Kassab has the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
Pohl’s claims arec “based on, relate[] to, or [are] in response to [Kassab]’s exercise of” some
protected sp
eech or act. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(b). As set forth above, Pohl’s
claims on their face do not support Kassab’s invocation of the TCPA. Given that the claims do
not clearly fall within the statute, Kassab is required to show a “connection between the claims in
6 See id. ¶¶ 34–37.
7 See id. ¶ 38.
the lawsuit and the alleged protected conduct.” Wayne Dolcefino, 540 S.W.3d at 201. And Kassab
must demonstrate that the protected conduct on which Kassab relies must be connected to the
“facts on which the liability or defense is based.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.006(a).
In spite of the substantial volume of “evidence” he filed in support of his Mkotion, Kassab
has supplied no evidence—much less a preponderance of the evidence—that lPohl’s lawsuit was
asserted solely or even partly in retaliation for any act or communicatcion protected under the
TCPA. Instead, Kassab resorts to asserting (without support) thats he knows the reasons and
motivations for Pohl’s claims in this suit and that the suit wass motivated by Kassab’s protected
speech and actions.8 Courts have explicitly rejected this very tactic, holding that a defendant
cannot rely on a purported motivation for bringing a claim to support a motion to dismiss under
the TCPA. See Sloat, 513 S.W.3d at 504 (rejecting the defendant’s effort to “recast [the Plaintiff’s]
petition as complaining principally” of actioans of protest instead of the actions on which the
petition was based). 
Kassab’s mere allegation thate the suit is retaliatory is not enough to make it so. Perhaps
recognizing this problem, Kassabf asserts that “Pohl has judicially admitted that he has brought his
suit against Kassab solely beycause Kassab legally and ethically contacted Pohl’s former clients or
prospective clients anCd filed suit against Pohl on behalf of these individuals.”9 Kassab cites
language in Pohl’s Original Petition alleging that “Kassab solicited clients/ prospective clients [of
Pohl’s] to act afsf Plaintiffs. . . . to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and other claims.”10
This quotUation from Pohl’s Original Petition does not constitute a judicial admission of anything,
much less an admission concerning the motivating force behind Pohl’s suit. Pohl’s recitation of
8 See, e.g., Motion at 1, 19, 21.
9 See id. at 15.
10 Id. (alterations in original).
true facts regarding Kassab’s actions—facts that Kassab has acknowledged—is not enough to
show a connection between the claims Pohl has alleged and Kassab’s protected conduct. See
Wayne Dolcefino, 540 S.W.3d at 201.
In various places in his Motion, Kassab cites to Pohl’s Original Petitionk purportedly in
support of his argument that Pohl’s motive was retaliatory, but those citatiolns do not support
Kassab’s conclusion. Instead, the portions of Pohl’s Original Petition Kascsab cites simply set forth
Kassab’s actions, without mentioning a “motive” for bringing suit. As fair reading of the petition
in the light most favorable to Pohl does not support Kassab’s chsaracterization of these additional
factual allegations. See Sloat, 513 S.W.3d at 507 (rejecting attempts to recharacterize every factual
allegation in a petition as providing the basis for a claim); see also LFMC Enterprises, LLC v.
Baker, 546 S.W.3d 893, 898 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (requiring that
the defendant demonstrate the specific connecation between the plaintiff’s claim and the protected
right). 
Kassab provides no support eat all to his theory that Pohl’s suit is tied to any grievance
Kassab may have filed. Pohl’s Ofriginal Petition does not even mention any grievance, much less
make a claim in any way relyating to a grievance. Kassab has no basis at all on which to contend
that the grievance is inC any way related to Pohl’s case.
Kassab’s wholesale failure to support by a preponderance of the evidence his position that
the TCPA applfifes is fatal to his Motion. The Court should deny the Motion on that basis alone.
3.U Even if the TCPA otherwise applies, the commercial exception precludes
dismissal here.
Kassab contorts Pohl’s claims in his effort to assert that they fall within the TCPA. To the
extent, if any, that Kassab succeeds in that effort, the recharacterized claims would fall directly
within the commercial exception to the TCPA. Although Kassab cannot show that any TCPA
protected speech or conduct is connected to Pohl’s claims—as required by the TCPA—even if a
connection could be shown, the speech and conduct would fall within the commercial speech
exception in the statute. The TCPA provides an exception to its general applicability:
This chapter does not apply to a legal action brought against a person pkrimarily
engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, if the steatement or
conduct arises out of the sale or lease of goods, services, or an insuranlce product,
insurance services, or a commercial transaction in which the intended audience is
an actual or potential buyer or customer. c
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.010(b). The Texas Supreme Csourt has interpreted this as
requiring the following four-part test: s 
(1) the defendant was primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods
[or services], (2) the defendant made the statemernt or engaged in the conduct on
which the claim is based in the defendant’s capacity as a seller or lessor of those
goods or services, (3) the statement or conduct at issue arose out of a commercial
transaction involving the kind of goods or services the defendant provides, and (4)
the intended audience of the statemenlt or conduct were actual or potential
customers of the defendant for the kinda of goods or services the defendant provides.
Castleman v. Internet Money Ltd., 546 S.W.3d 684, 688 (Tex. 2018).
As set forth above, Kassab repeeatedly insists that Pohl’s claims were brought in retaliation
for Kassab’s stealing Pohl’s propferty and soliciting his former clients and prospective clients to
file barratry claims and grievyances. See, e.g., Motion at 2, 19–21, 25–26. Kassab’s solicitation of
Pohl’s clients and formCer clients falls squarely within the commercial exception to the TCPA. See
Miller Weisbrod, L.L.P. v. Llamas-Soforo, 511 S.W.3d 181, 191 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no
pet.) (attorney fafdvertising falls within the commercial exception to the TCPA). Where a lawyer
is primarUily engaged in selling legal services to clients, and the speech arises from the sale of
services where the audience is an actual or potential client, the solicitation falls outside the TCPA’s
protections. See NCDR, L.L.C. v. Mauze v. Bagby, P.L.L.C., 745 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 2014)
(applying Texas law).
10
It is beyond dispute that Kassab is primarily engaged in the business of selling legal
services. He purchased Pohl’s list of clients and former clients, together with the attorney fee
contracts for the purpose of soliciting those clients. In his capacity as a provider of legal services,
Kassab advertised and sought out Pohl’s potential and former clients. The akdvertising and
solicitation were part of a commercial transaction involving Kassab’s effolrt to provide legal
services. The advertising and solicitation was directed at potential custcomers of Kassab’s legal
services. Kassab’s solicitation of Pohl’s clients and former clientss is commercial speech and
outside the protections of the TCPA. In fact, Kassab has tasken this position himself in his
representation in another case.11
To the extent that the Court is convinced by Kassab’s effort to reframe Pohl’s Original
Petition as retaliation for Kassab’s actions in contacting and soliciting Pohl’s clients and former
clients, Kassab’s Motion nevertheless fails. Kaassab’s actions were entirely commercial in nature
and fall squarely within the commercial exception to the TCPA.
Kassab further contends thate Pohl’s suit is brought in retaliation for Kassab’s filing of
barratry suits and grievances agaifnst Pohl. As an initial matter, Kassab’s filings do not implicate
Kassab’s protected rights; thyey instead implicate the protected rights of Kassab’s clients, who are
not parties here. See CLFMC Enterprises, LLC v. Baker, 546 S.W.3d 893, 898 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (requiring that the rights being protected be the rights of the
party, and not af f third party to the action). Without an assertion of Kassab’s own protected rights,
the TCPAU is not implicated.
In addition, the commercial exception should extend to an attorney’s action in filing a
lawsuit on behalf of another. The attorney’s purpose in that instance is undeniably commercial—
11 See Brumfield Litigation Plaintiffs’ Response, Exhibit 1 to the Shepherd Affidavit, Exhibit A, at 22.
11
as Kassab’s clearly was in bringing the barratry actions. The statute creates an exception for
commercial activity that should apply to an attorney’s actions in pursuit of a client’s case. The
grievance against Pohl also falls within the commercial exception because Kassab’s use of the
State Bar grievance process is as a tactic to increase pressure on the lawyers that hke sues.12
At the end of his unsupported argument that the TCPA applies to Pohll’s claims, Kassab
discusses two cases. Motion at 19–21 (discussing Collins v. Collins, No.c 01-17-00817-CV, 2018
WL 1320841 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 15, 2018, pet. filsed) (mem. op.) and Reeves v.
Harbor Am. Cent., Inc., 552 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. App.—Housston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.)).
Neither case is supportive of Kassab’s position. The court in Collins addressed whether the right
to petition required a nexus to a matter of public concern. Collins, 2018 WL 1320841 at *2. The
lawsuit itself in Collins was factually predicted on claim that a party filed a fraudulent affidavit in
a divorce proceeding. Id. a
The Reeves case is similarly unhelpful. The court in that case simply held that the trial
court was required to conduct a TCPAe analysis as required by the statute and could not summarily
conclude that “[t]he [TCPA] asf a matter of law does not allow a party to avoid contractual
obligations such as the onesy at issue here.” Reeves, 552 S.W.3d at 392. The court remanded the
case to the trial court tCo conduct a full TCPA analysis. Id. at 396. Pohl does not deny that this
Court should conduct a TCPA analysis; instead Pohl asserts that that the TCPA does not apply and
that Kassab hasf f failed to carry his burden under prong one of the TCPA.
12 See Grievance, attached as Exhibit 21 to the Motion, at 8, n. 1 (Kassab describes his history of filing grievances in
connection with civil lawsuits).
12
4. There is clear and specific evidence demonstrating a prima facie case.
Kassab’s failure to satisfy the first prong of a motion pursuant to the TCPA relieves Pohl
of any burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of his claims. Pohl nevertheless sets forth below
the clear and specific evidence in his pleading and the attached affidavits for eachk element of the
claims he has asserted against Kassab.13 l
Pohl asserts three causes of action against Kassab: (1) conversicon; (2) violations of the
Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE Cshap. 134A (“TUTSA”); and
(3) conspiracy to commit conversion and to violate TUTSA. Thes elements of the conversion claim,
as asserted in the Original Petition against Kassab, are that (a) Pohl owned and owns certain
property and information; (b) Kassab purchased that information knowing that it had been stolen
from Pohl; and (c) Kassab wrongfully exercised dominion and control over Pohl’s property in
contravention of Pohl’s rights. The elements aof a violation of TUTSA against Kassab are that (a)
Kassab purchased Pohl’s trade secrets knowing that they had been acquired by improper means;
and (b) and knowing that he did neot have Pohl’s express or implied consent. Finally, the
conspiracy claim alleges that Kfassab acted in combination with the other defendants and
committed overt acts towardy unlawful conversion and misappropriation.
In examining wChether a plaintiff has sustained its burden of demonstrating a prima facie
case, the Court is obligated to consider “the pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits
stating the factfsf on which the liability or defense is based.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §
27.006(a)U. Where a plaintiff provides enough detail in his pleading to “show the factual basis for
its claim,” such a pleading “is sufficient to resist a TCPA motion to dismiss.” In re Lipsky, 460
S.W.3d 579, 591 (Tex. 2015). A prima facie case is established when the pleadings and evidence
13 In support of this Response, Pohl has attached three sworn documents, the affidavit of Billy Shepherd, Exhibit A;
the declaration of Michael Pohl, Exhibit B; and the declaration of Jean C. Frizzell, Exhibit C.
13
supply the “‘minimum quantum of evidence necessary to support a rational inference that the
allegation of fact is true.’” Id. at 590 (quoting from In re E.I DuPont de Nemours & Co., 136
S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex. 2004)).
Pohl’s pleading—the Original Petition—sets forth in abundant detaikl each of the
allegations against Kassab. Pohl alleges that he hired defendant Precision Marlketing Group, LLC
(“Precision”) to assist him in gathering and preserving evidence and liaicse with Pohl’s clients.14
Precision thereby gained access to Pohl’s confidential and proprietarsy information relating to his
client’s identity and contact information as well as his engagsement agreements, contacts with
clients and various of Pohl’s proprietary forms.15 Pohl alleges that Defendants Precision and Scott
Favre, with the assistance of Defendant Tina Nicholson, stole physical copies of certain
information, stole Pohl’s computers, and misappropriated electronic data to which they had access
through Precision’s work for Pohl, includinga actual attorney–client fee agreements protected by
the attorney–client privilege.16 Precision and Favre entered into a settlement agreement with Pohl
in which they agreed to return to Poehl or delete the confidential and proprietary information in
their possession, custody and conftrol.17
Precision and Favre hyad secretly entered into an agreement with Kassab and defendants F.
Douglas Montague III Cand Montague Pittman & Varnado, P.A. (collectively, “Montague”) to sell
Pohl’s stolen confid a ential information and property.18 Kassab and Montague paid Favre $250,000,
together with sfufbstantial bonuses knowing that they purchased stolen information and property.19
These spUecific, detailed allegations of each element of conversion, theft of trade secrets, and
14 Original Petition at ¶¶ 19, 20.
15 Id. ¶ 20.
16 Id. ¶ ¶ 20, 21.
17 Id. ¶ 3.
18 Id. ¶ 21.
19 Id.
14
conspiracy are by themselves sufficient to set forth a prima facie case meeting the requirements of
the TCPA. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(a); see also Hicks v. Group & Pension
Administrators, Inc., 473 S.W.3d 518, 526 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2015, no pet.).
Although Pohl’s Original Petition establishes a prima facie case without thke necessity for
further inquiry, Pohl also submits affidavits containing substantial prima facie elvidence supporting
those claims. As an initial matter, Kassab has admitted certain factual acspects of Pohl’s claims.
Kassab states in his Declaration: s
Upon learning of the Mississippi Litigation, I and staff ats my office obtained a large
amount of information related to the Mississippi Litigastion from the federal court’s
online public access to court records system, PACER. I also met with Scott Favre
(“Favre”), who I understood became the owner of Prrecision Marketing Group, LLC
(“Precision Marketing”) through a purchase agreement he had with the prior
owners. Favre and his counsel, Tina Nicholson (“Nicholson”) provided me with
information from Precision Marketing’s files, including the names and addresses
of Pohl’s former clients or prospective clilents.
See Declaration of Lance Christopher KassMab, attached as Exhibit 1 to his Motion. Kassab freely
admits that he obtained from Favre and Favre’s counsel, Tina Nicholson, information that included
the names and addresses of Pohl’s former clients and prospective clients. Kassab has also
admitted, at least implicitly, that he paid Favre. In a pleading filed in Cause No. 2017-38294,
Debbie Brumfield d/b/a Lad Enterprises, et. Al. v. Jimmy Williamson, Jimmy Williamson, PC,
Williamson & Rusnak, Cyndi Rusnak, Cyndi Rusnak PLLC, and Law Offices of Michael Pohl, in
the 189th Judiciacl District Court of Harris County, Texas (the “Brumfield Litigation”), Kassab
stated,
Prior to the settlement, however, Favre was hired by the undersigned counsel [i.e.
Kassab] and a Mississippi law firm to provide consulting services regarding the
value of any underlying claim against BP.20
20 See Brumfield Litigation Plaintiffs’ Response, Exhibit 1 to the Shepherd Affidavit, Exhibit A, at 18.
15
On a separate occasion, Kassab described his arrangement with Favre differently, as “an agreement
with an expert witness.”21
Kassab does not deny that he (1) obtained from Favre and Precision the confidential
information and materials that are the subject of Pohl’s conversion and misappropkriation of trade
secrets claims, and (2) that he entered into an agreement with Favre pursuant tol which Kassab paid
Favre. Given these admissions, many aspects of Pohl’s prima facie ccase are uncontroverted.
Kassab has admitted that he acquired the “names and addresses sof Pohl’s former clients or
prospective clients,” which provides prima facie support for ksey elements of Pohl’s claims of
conversion and theft of trade secrets.
The attached affidavits provide prima facie evidence of the following facts. Scott Favre,
PA LLC, the Kassab Law Firm and Montague, Pittman and Varnado, P.A. entered into an
Agreement, dated November 10, 2016, eaxecuted by Lance Kassab (the “Favre–Kassab
Agreement”).22 The Favre–Kassab Agreement contains many relevant provisions, including:
• That Kassab and Montague weill pay Favre an hourly rate of $250, a large per-case fee,
and an “upfront advancef pay retainer to Favre forin [sic] the amount of $250,000 to be
credited against firsyt fees earned by Favre. This retainer is fully earned at the time of
payment and isC not refundable. Subsequent hourly fees are not to be credited against the
retainer.”23a
• That Kfassab and Montague “shall indemnify and hold harmless Favre for from [sic] any
aUnd all costs he incurs in defending claims relating to an/or arising from the disclosure of
any client information where such claims are asserted by . . . Michael Pohl. . . . Favre
21 See Kassab’s Letter, dated July 20, 2018, to Timothy J. Baldwin, attached as part of Exhibit 21 to Kassab’s Motion.
22 A copy of the Favre–Kassab Agreement is attached as Exhibit 3 to the Shepherd Affidavit, Exhibit A.
23 See Favre-Kassab Agreement, Exhibit 3 to the Shepherd Affidavit, Exhibit A, p. 1.
16
certifies that he is not aware of any contractual or legal provision that prohibits him from
making such disclosure to [Kassab and Montague]”24
• That the parties “agree that this Agreement is confidential and shall remain confidential
for all times.”25 k
On its face, the Favre–Kassab Agreement proves that Kassab agreed to payC Flavre an enormous
upfront payment of $250,000, together with substantial sums over timce. The amount of the
payment alone is prima facie evidence that Kassab knew that the confidential information and
material he was buying was not publicly known and that it belosnged to Pohl.
The Favre–Kassab Agreement also obligates Kassab to indemnify Favre from claims that
Pohl might bring—making clear that Kassab contemplated that Pohl might assert such claims at
the time he executed the agreement. What possible reason could there be for Kassab to agree to
indemnify if Favre owned the materials and inaformation that was the subject of the Favre–Kassab
Agreement? Why would indemnity be necessary if the information and materials were publicly
known? Again, these facts support Peohl’s prima facie case of misappropriation.
Similarly, the requiremefnt in the Favre–Kassab Agreement that the parties keep the
agreement confidential suggyests that the parties understood that disclosure of the existence of the
agreement and its termCs might raise substantial issues. If the materials and information were
publicly known and belonged to Favre, what was the necessity for confidentiality? Each of these
facts supports fPohl’s allegation that the materials and information were trade secrets and that
Kassab kUnew that the confidential information and material he purchased from Favre was stolen.
Favre’s testimony regarding the parties’ performance of the Favre–Kassab Agreement
provides additional support for Pohl’s contentions. In a hearing conducted on October 25, 2017
24 Id. p. 3.
25 Id.
17
in Cause No. 1:14-cv-381-KS-JCG, Scott Walker, et al. v. Jimmy Williamson, et al., in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Southern Division (“Walker v.
Williamson Litigation”),26 Favre confirmed that Kassab, Montague or their firms had in fact paid
the $250,000 to Scott M. Favre, P.A.27 Favre testified that he did not sell attokrney/client fee
contracts to Kassab and Montague but instead gave them away to Tina Nlicholson.28 Favre
acknowledged that an email, dated December 7, 2016 and sent from Mcontague to Kassab and
others, reflected that Favre had called to check that Kassab’s office shad been receiving Dropbox
deliveries of contracts over the last several days.29 Favre testifieds that between the time he received
the payment of $250,000 and April 2017, he had received no fees, provided no work and
exchanged no documents under the Favre–Kassab Agreement.30
Nicholson’s testimony contradicts Favre’s testimony in at least one enlightening way.31
Nicholson testified that Favre did not give hera the Pohl fee contracts; instead, she believes he gave
them to “one of her co-counsel in the Texas cases against Mr. Pohl.”32 Favre’s and Nicholson’s
testimony and the emails about whiech they testify further support Pohl’s prima facie case of
intentional misappropriation, confversion and conspiracy. The emails and testimony confirm that
Scott M. Favre, P.A. was iny fact paid $250,000, and that Kassab and Montague understood that
they were to receive DCropbox deliveries of contracts. The large amount of the payment to Scott
26 A copy of the relevant portions of the October 25, 2017 hearing transcript in the Walker v. Williamson Litigation
is attached hereto as Exhibit 2 to the Shepherd Affidavit.
27 Walker v. Williamson Litigation transcript, Exhibit 2 to Shepherd Affidavit at 63.
28 Id. at 92–93.
29 Id. at 95; see also email dated December 7, 2016, attached as Exhibit 4 to the Shepherd Affidavit. To the extent, if
any, that Kassab suggests that this email may be hearsay and therefore inadmissible, Pohl responds that the email is
not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. It is instead offered to demonstrate Kassab’s knowledge of the volume
and nature of the materials Favre transmitted.
30 Walker v. Williamson Litigation transcript, Exhibit 2 to Shepherd Affidavit at 121–27.
31 See Deposition of Tina Nicholson, dated November 27, 2017, attached as exhibit 5 to the Shepherd Affidavit at
65:11–66:10.
32 Id. at 66:7–9.
18
M. Favre, P.A., in advance of the delivery of contracts to the Dropbox and the absence of any
further work by Scott M. Favre, P.A., supports a strong inference that the payment was in fact in
exchange for the contracts and not for any future services. Favre’s testimony that he had given the
attorney/client fee contracts to Nicholson and Nicholson’s disavowal of that testkimony strongly
suggests that each witness hopes to distance him or herself from the ultimate ltransfer to Kassab.
This contradiction supports Pohl’s allegation that all parties to the Favre–Kcassab Agreement knew
that the files and information being transferred had been converted ors misappropriated.
Finally, Kassab’s efforts to explain the purpose of thse Favre–Kassab Agreement also
support Pohl’s prima facie case that Kassab knew that the material and information he received
from Favre was stolen. As described above, Kassab explained the Favre–Kassab Agreement to
this Court as reflecting Favre being hired “to provide consulting services.”33 More recently,
Kassab described the agreement as constitutinga “an agreement with an expert witness.”34 Kassab’s
inability to stick to an explanation of the agreement suggests that he does not have a legitimate
one. The notion that the Favre–Kasseab Agreement constitutes the retention of an expert witness
defies all logic. At the time Kassfab purportedly hired Favre, who is not a lawyer, as an “expert,”
Kassab did not have a singlye client, much less a case. Without known clients, Favre could not
possibly have ethicallyC been engaged as an expert because he could not have determined the
presence of potential conflicts. And even though Kassab had no clients and Favre is not a lawyer,
Kassab paid Ffafvre $250,000 up front with the promise of additional future payments. The
evidence Udemonstrates that the stolen materials and information were available for sale.35 In fact,
Favre and his counsel Nicholson had expressly threatened to sell the materials to “Texas barratry
33 See Response to Motion in Brumfield, Exhibit 1 to the Shepherd Affidavit, Exhibit A at 18.
34 See Letter in support of Grievance, attached as part of Exhibit 21 to the Motion.
35 See Five Letters discussing potential sale of information, attached as Exhibit 6 to the Affidavit of Billy Shepherd.
19
lawyers” before they actually did so.36 The more plausible explanation of these facts is that the
Favre–Kassab Agreement reflects Favre’s sale and Kassab’s knowing purchase of Pohl’s stolen
files.
As lawyers, Kassab and Montague knew that the materials they purckhased included
confidential information protected by the attorney–client privilege, includinlg actual attorney–
client fee agreements.37 Scott Favre has confirmed under oath that he macintained the materials as
confidential and protected them as valuable trade secrets.38 s
In sum, Pohl’s prima facie evidence in the form osf both pleadings and affidavits
demonstrates each element of each of Pohl’s causes of action as set forth below:
CONVERSION
• The information and materials Kassab obtained was personal property subject to
conversion.39 a
• Pohl owned the information and materials Kassab obtained.40
• Kassab wrongfully ex e ercised dominion and control over the property.41
• Pohl has incurreOd f actual damages caused by Kassab’s conversion by at a minimum
his loss of the intrinsic value of the materials.42
36 Id.
37 Id. ¶ 20.
38 See Affidavit of Scott Favre, filed in Cause No. 1:14-cv-381-KS-JCG, Scott Walker, et al. v. Jimmy Williamson, et
al., in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Southern Division, and attached as
Exhibit 7 to the Affidavit of Billy Shepherd.
39 Original Petition at ¶¶ 20, 21, 27; Favre-Kassab Agreement, Exhibit 3 to the Shepherd Affidavit; Email, Exhibit 4
to the Shepherd Affidavit.
40 Original Petition ¶¶ 20, 21, 27, 33; Affidavit of Michael Pohl.
41 Original Petition ¶¶ 20, 21, 27; Affidavit of Michael Pohl.
42 Original Petition ¶ 33; Favre Kassab Agreement, Exhibit 3 to Shepherd Affidavit (demonstrating that Kassab placed
a value on the materials of at least $250,000; Affidavit of Michael Pohl.
20
MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS
• Pohl owned trade secrets.43
• Pohl maintained that information as a secret, taking substantial measures to
maintain its confidentiality.44 k
• The information has independent economic value from not beCin l g generally known
to, and not readily being ascertainable through proper mceans by, another person
who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information.45
• Kassab obtained the trade secrets with knowlesdge that they had been acquired
through improper means—i.e., by theft.46 g
• The misappropriation damages Pohl iBn the form of both actual loss and unjust
enrichment.47 y
• Kassab’s misappropriation was a willful and malicious.48
CONSPIRACY f
• Kassab was a membcer of a combination of two or more persons.49
• The agreed objeOct of the combination was to accomplish the unlawful purposes of
conversion pand misappropriation of trade secrets.50
• Kassab and the other conspirators committed tortious overt acts to further the object
of thie conspiracy.51
43 Original Petition ¶¶ 20, 21, 34; Affidavit of Michael Pohl.
44 Original Petition ¶ 34; Affidavit of Michael Pohl.
45 Original Petition ¶ 34; Affidavit of Michael Pohl.
46 Original Petition ¶¶ 35, 36; Affidavit of Michael Pohl.
47 Affidavit of Michael Pohl.
48 Original Petition ¶ 37; Affidavit of Michael Pohl.
49 Original Petition ¶¶ 27, 35.
50 Original Petition ¶ 38.
51 Original Petition ¶¶ 27, 32, 36, 38.
21
• Pohl suffered injury as a result.52
Pohl denies that Kassab has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Pohl
has asserted a legal action based on related to or in response to Kassab’s exercise of his right to
free speech, petition, or association. To the extent that the Court disagrees, Pohkl has provided
clear and specific evidence to support his petition, and the Court should denyC Klassab’s Motion.
B. ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE ANcD DISCOVERY
Kassab filed his Motion on October 24 and set it for hearing twelve days later. While Pohl
denies that Kassab has met the threshold necessary for requirinsg him to provide the Court with a
prima facie case, and Pohl contends that he has set forth such a case, to the extent that the Court
disagrees and believes that additional evidence is necessary, Pohl seeks a continuance of the
hearing and an order permitting discovery. The TCPA permits the Court to allow discovery on
the Motion, and if discovery is granted, a contianuance of up to 120 days from service of the Motion.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 27
.004(c) (permitting 120-day continuance), 27.006(b)
(permitting discovery). In the event ethat the Court is inclined to grant the Motion, there is good
cause for a continuance and discofvery because both oral and written discovery would be relevant
to obtaining additional cylear and specific evidence of Pohl’s claims for conversion,
misappropriation of trCade secrets, and conspiracy. Given that the contested issues primarily
involve Kassab’s state of mind, discovery relating to that issue would be necessary in the form of
both documentfary evidence relating to Precision’s sale of materials to Kassab and deposition
testimonyU relating to that sale.53
Specifically, the discovery that Pohl would seek includes (1) document discovery from
Kassab relating to his purchase of the materials and information, and in particular drafts of the
52 Original Petition ¶ 38; Affidavit of Michael Pohl.
53 Original Petition ¶¶ 27, 38.
22
Favre–Kassab Agreement and correspondence regarding the same; (2) an initial limited deposition
of Lance Kassab regarding his purchase of materials and information from Favre.
This request for continuance is sworn by the attached Declaration of Jean Frizzell and is
sought not for purposes of delay alone but so that justice can be done. k
C. KASSAB CANNOT CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISH HIS DEFCElNSES
Kassab may argue that, even though Pohl can establish a prima faccie case, he is still entitled
to dismissal because he has established by a preponderance of the evisdence each essential element
of certain affirmative defenses, including limitations, attorney ismmunity, and res judicata. None
of these defenses is available, and Kassab has not established any of them—let alone by a
preponderance of the evidence.
1. The Statute of Limitations has Not Run.
Kassab purchased the stolen materaial from Favre by virtue of the Favre–Kassab
Agreement, which was executed on November 10, 2016, much less than two years prior to the
filing of this suit. All of Pohl’s claimes against Kassab are based on that purchase, and no claim
has a limitations period of less tfhan two years. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a)
(two-year limitation period fyor conversion); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.010(a) (three-year
limitation period for TCUTSA violations); Mayes v. Stewart, 316 S.W.3d 715, 719 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Discussions about other older potential wrongful conduct
Kassab may hafvfe engaged in related to Pohl does not alter the limitations analysis for the specific
claims PoUhl brought in this case. See Motion at 26–28. It is clear that limitations does not bar
Pohl’s claims.
23
2. The Attorney Immunity Doctrine does Not Apply.
Kassab claims that as an attorney, he is immune from liability for converting the property
of others and misappropriating trade secrets. Here again, Kassab relies on a mischaracterization
of Pohl’s claims to invoke the attorney immunity doctrine. That doctrine protectsk attorneys from
civil liability for certain actions taken while representing a client in litigation. Clanty Hanger, LLP
v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. 2015). Pohl’s suit asserts claims cfor actions taken before
Kassab had a single client, much less a client in litigation. Because tshere is no way for Kassab to
show that his wrongful actions were within “the scope of clsient representation,” the attorney
immunity doctrine on its face does not apply to Pohl’s claims. Id. at 482.
3. Res Judicata Does Not Apply.
Kassab makes a contorted argument to contend that Pohl’s claims are barred by res
judicata. Kassab was not a party to the Settlemaent Agreement to which he refers, and had he been,
Pohl would include him in his breach of contract claim. There is no basis on which to contend that
Pohl’s claims against Kassab are “thee same as” the claims settled in the other case, nor that Kassab
is a party or privy to a party in thfat case. Res judicata is not an available defense.
D. REQUEST FOR AyTTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS
The TCPA expCressly contemplates an award of costs for the filing of a motion that is
frivolous or brought solely for the purpose of delay. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.009(b).
The history anfdf circumstances surrounding Kassab’s Motion conclusively establish that it is
frivolousU and Kassab brought it solely for the purpose of delay.
As the Court is aware, Kassab was involved in bringing the Brumfield Litigation against
Pohl and others alleging barratry and other causes of action. The defendants moved for dismissal
24
pursuant to the TCPA, and the Court denied those motions by order signed November 6, 2017.54
At the time defendants filed those motions, they had a good faith basis on which to believe that
the motions were well taken and should be granted, but the Court disagreed and defendants lost
their motions. The Anti-SLAPP motions in the Brumfield Litigation are highlky relevant here
because of the positions Kassab took in response to those motions and the Colurt’s resolution of
those motions. Kassab clearly knew and understood when he filed the incstant Motion that he did
not have a basis for his filing and that the Court would undoubtedly dseny his Motion.
In response to the Motion to Dismiss in Brumfield, Kassasb asserted a number of arguments
including arguing at length that the commercial speech exemption applied to prevent application
of the TCPA to his claims.55 In arguing that the commercial speech exemption applied, Kassab
argued vigorously that a lawyer’s solicitation of clients constitutes commercial speech not within
the protection of the TCPA. In making this aargument, Kassab cited multiple Texas state court
cases, Fifth Circuit cases, and cases from out of state.56 Kassab contended that “when the
communication concerning provisioen of legal services is made for the primary purpose of
attracting clients . . . the communifcation is not a matter of public concern.”57 On that basis, Kassab
argued that the commercialy exception applied to exempt his claims from coverage under the
TCPA.58 Having succCessfully asserted these arguments in Brumfield, Kassab can hardly suggest
that he was unaware of their merit.
Neverthf feless, in this case, Kassab contends that Pohl brought suit against him in retaliation
for KassaUb’s solicitation of Pohl’s former clients. Kassab argues that Pohl brought his suit against
54 A copy of the Order is attached as Exhibit 8 to the Shepherd Affidavit.
55 Brumfield Response, Exhibit 1 to Shepherd Affidavit, at 33–37.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 22.
58 Id.
25
Kassab “because Kassab legally and ethically contacted Pohl’s former clients.”59 Kassab contends
that his solicitation of those clients is protected by the TCPA, and he does not even mention the
commercial exception set forth in section 27.010 of the statute. Given that Kassab definitively
is aware of the commercial exception and its direct applicability to the claims Pohl bkrings, Kassab’s
failure even to mention the exception reveals his bad faith. His Motion is not juslt frivolous, Kassab
was demonstrably aware that it was frivolous. There can have been noc legitimate purpose for
bringing the Motion apart from creating unnecessary delay. s
The Court is empowered in these circumstances to awasrd Pohl his costs and reasonable
attorney’s fees in responding to the Motion. As set forth fully in the attached Declaration of Jean
Frizzell, those reasonable and necessary fees total $33,352. That total includes the necessary time
of lawyers in reviewing Kassab’s Motion, reviewing the TCPA, and researching and drafting a
response to the Motion. a
Kassab requests costs, attorneys’ fees and sanctions against Pohl and his law firm,
Reynolds Frizzell. Kassab is not entietled to any of the relief he requests because his Motion fails.
Furthermore, Kassab’s recitatiofn of the alleged basis for his request for sanction contains
substantial mischaracterizatiyons of the record of this case and the other cases to which he refers.
Kassab get a single facCt right: that he previously sought but was denied sanctions in an unrelated
case involving Reynolds Frizzell LLP. Kassab’s effort to relitigate that here is an entirely
inappropriate ufsfe of the TCPA and should not be countenanced.
59 Motion at 15.
26
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Michael Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl
respectfully request that the Motion be in all respects denied and that they be awarded costs and
fees in the amount of $33,352. k
Dated: November 1, 2018 Respectfully submitted, l
REYNOLDS FRIZZELL LLP c
By: /s/ Jean C. Frizzsell
Jean C. FrizzeDll
State Bar Nso. 07484650
1100 Louisiana Sst., Suite 3500
Houston, Texas 77002
Tel. 713.485r.7200
Fax 713.485.7250
jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com
Attolrneys for Plaintiffs Michael Pohl
and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC
CERTIoFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true acnd correct copy of this document was served on all counsel of
record pursuant to the Texas Rulefs of Civil Procedure on this 1st day of November, 2018.
/s/ Jean C. Frizzell
C Jean C. Frizzell
27"
5,2018-10-24,DEPO,Kassab,Pohl deposition filed by Kassab (TCPA exhibit),"Excerpts from the Oral Videotaped Deposition of Michael A. Pohl taken May 15, 2018 in Cheatham v. Pohl (Cause No. 2017-41110), filed as Exhibit 23 in connection with Kassab's TCPA motion in Pohl v. Kassab","Deposition taken in a related case (Cheatham v. Pohl, Cause No. 2017-41110, 55th Judicial District, Harris County) on May 15, 2018, subsequently filed as an exhibit (Exhibit 23) in the Pohl v. Kassab TCPA proceedings. The deposition was taken by Lance Kassab as counsel for the Cheatham plaintiffs, with Pohl represented by Billy Shepherd. Only pages 85-93 and 318-319 are included in this exhibit.",TCPA-1,N/A,Phase 1,2018-10-24_DEPO_Pohl-Deposition_FILED.pdf,,"E
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H
I
BIT
23
iA

Michael Pohl
5/15/2018
CAUSE NO. 2017-41110

MARK KENTRELL CHEATHAM, ) IN THE DISTRICT COURT
SR., AND LUELLA MILLER, )
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS )
WRONGFUL DEATH ) N=
BENEFICIARIES OF LADONNA ) oe
CHEATHAM, DESTINY CHEATHAM) )
AND MARKUS CHEATHAM, )
DECEASED ) , &

) Ss
vs. ) HARRIS counry,, TEXAS

) ©)
MICHAEL A. POHL, DONALDA ) &
POHL, LAW OFFICE OF ) @
MICHAEL POHL, PLLC, ROBERT) @
AMMONS AND THE AMMONS LAW ) Le)
FIRM, LLP ) STR gMDICIAL DISTRICT

ORAL VIDEOTAPED pebosrz0n OF
MICHAEL BS OHL
May Be 2018
©)

ORAL VIDEOTAPED BRPOSTTION OF MICHAEL A. POHL,
produced as a witedee at the instance of the
Plaintiff and ox sworn, was taken in the
above-styled and numbered cause on May 15, 2018, from
9:26 a.m. to 5:05 p-m., before Laurie Carlisle,
Certified ‘Shorthand Reporter in and for the State of

SS
Texas, Feported by computerized machine shorthand, at
the 6éfices of Shepherd Prewett, 770 South Post Oak
Lane, Suite 420, Houston, Texas, pursuant to the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and the provisions
stated on the record or attached hereto.
Omni Litigation
713-864-4443

Michael Pohl
5/15/2018
85
1 malicious act by an unethical lawyer, and I don't
2 think anything should be -- further should be
3 submitted by you.
4 Q. Okay. And you think I'm an unethical ee
a
5 lawyer? G
6 A. Yes. You stole my files. You robed me.
7 You tried to destroy my practice. So I believe
8 you should submit any more materials, popVicularty
9 false affidavits that have been retracted by the
10 witnesses who made them and othe erifiably false
11 accusations. And you've soticiead my clients like
12 Mr. Cheatham, and you've told hin lies to get him to
13 sue me. LV
14 Q. Okay. And you State on the record under
15 oath, subject to pesiey, that I stole your files,
16 | right? O
17 A. You and your co-counsel and your team of
18 thieves. ou
19 OR. L. KASSAB: Objection, nonresponsive.
20 Q. ‘< that a yes to my question?
21 os MR. SHEPHERD: Form.
22 A. That's what I said it was.
23 Q. I just need a yes or no, sir. Is thata
24 yes?
25 MR. SHEPHERD: Form.
Omni Litigation
713-864-4443

Michael Pohl
5/15/2018
86
1 A. Read it back.
2 Q. I just want to make a clear record so that
3 I have a clear record, sir. So you stated under oath
4 that I stole your files, correct? AS
XA
5 A. Read back the answer that I gave, and f'11
6 see if I made a mistake. &
7 Q. Sir, I'm asking if that was vou testinony
8 You don't remember whether or not it was”
9 MR. SHEPHERD: Form. &
10 A. If the question is “ge steal my files
11 and rob my office, the answer ist at you and your
12 co-counsel and your crew obi ay office, stole my
13 clients' names, contacted. ily clients and told them
14 lies to initiate suits éRinst me.
15 Q. Okay. How, did I steal your files, sir?
16 Did I break into house?
17 A. You broke into my law office.
18 Q. I did personally?
19 A. You and your crew.
20 Q. Sind when did I do that?
21 ae I don't know the exact date, but I believe
22 it was in 2014 when you robbed me.
23 Q. I robbed you in 2014?
24 A. Yes, sir.
25 Q. And where did I rob you at?
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1 A. Mississippi.

2 Q. And what location did I rob you at?

3 A. Our Gulfport, Mississippi office at the

4 time. I do not remember the street address where I

5 had my office. )

6 Q. So I broke into your office and etoile your

7 stuff in 2014 at your Gulfport, Wissiecipet office,

8 right? &

9 A. You and your crew. &
10 Q. Well, let's just talk seat me right now.
11 A. No, I can't talk aborts Poo without your
12 co-counsel and your crew peciins you're one and the
13 same. LV
14 Q. Well, I want @ talk about me, sir.
15 A. You ask ta siatione, I'll give you the
16 truthful answers. ()
17 Q. That's\ what I just said. So you're telling
18 all the folks in this room that I stole -- that I
19 broke into.(your office and I stole your files,
20 correct {And you're stating that under oath, right?
21 a I'm saying that you, your co-counsel and
22 your crew robbed me, hacked my computers, stole my
23 client names and then solicited my clients with
24 material omissions to get them to sue me which, as a
25 consequence, caused them to suffer damages in their

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1 own case and not get the money they were entitled to.

2 MR. L. KASSAB: Objection, nonresponsive.

3 Q. The question was that you're telling all

4 the folks in this room that I broke into your office

5 and stole your files, correct? )

6 A. I believe that was the question you asked

7 previously, to which I answered. S&

8 Q. Is that a yes?

9 MR. SHEPHERD: Form. &
10 A. I believe that was the quastion you asked
11 previously, to which I gave rowel full and complete
12 answer. SS
13 Q. Sir, I need to gat a clear record on this
14 so there's no gray area (later when -- okay, that's
15 | why I'm asking. SF
16 A. Sure. chive no problem answering.
17 Q. I just heed to know -- I just want to make
18 sure that I daderstand what you're saying. You're
19 telling everybody in this room that I personally
20 broke iS your Gulfport office in Mississippi
21 someting in 2014 and stole your files, right?
22 A. I didn't say you as a person. I said you
23 and your crew, and I made that clear in each answer.
24 And your co-counsel, by the way.
25 Q. So I'm asking about me. Is it your

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1 testimony that I personally broke into your office?
2 A. I wasn't there, and I didn't see who
3 actually broke in and I didn't see who hacked my
4 computer. So I'm not a witness to it. I just know
5 the event occurred. ©
6 Q. Okay. Did you file a police report?
SS
7 A. No. °@
8 Q. Did you file a grievance witty the State Bar
. @
9/ against me? @
©
10 A. I have not yet done woo
11 Q. Have you contacted the a's office?
12 A. I did speak to a District Attorney.
©)
13 Q. Which one? LV
14 A. It happened tebe a retired District
15 Attorney in Oklaho (and I spoke to him about the
16 | feasibility of riiyy charges.
17 Q. Okay. My question is a little different.
18 Have you talked to the Harris County District
19 Attorney regarding the fact that you claim I stole
AS)
20 your files?
©
21 AS I claim that you and your co-counsel and
22 your crew robbed my office, hacked my computers,
23 solicited my clients and, to be clear, and I have not
24 talked to the Harris County District Attorney.
25 MR. L. KASSAB: Objection, nonresponsive
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1 to everything other than ""I have not talked to the
2 Harris County District Attorney.""
3 Q. Have you talked to the Attorney General's
4 office in Texas regarding your allegation and &
5 testimony, sworn testimony today that I have stole
6 your files, broke into your office in cultpoxe,
7 Mississippi in 2014 and stole your files2©
8 MR. AKERS: Objection, rome”
9 MR. SHEPHERD: Form. &
10 Q. And everything else roped I did.
11 MR. SHEPHERD: roms”
12 MR. COLLMER: objdction, form.
13 Q. Have you done nat?
14 A. I have not tarda to the Attorney General
15 about the fact that yon, your co-counsel and your
16 crew robbed me, née my computers, solicited my
17 clients to turn them against me, and done various
18 things associated with the theft of my client files.
19 OR. L. KASSAB: Objection, nonresponsive
20 other eneer 1 have not talked to the Attorney
21 Genexd.
22 Q. Okay. So this happened approximately four
23 years ago, correct?
24 A. I don't know the date it happened because
25 nobody told me we're about to go into your office and
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1 steal your files.
2 Q. Well, did you go into your office and find
3 out that your office had been ransacked?
4 A. No, I did not because we closed the office,
5 and it was in connection with the closing of the)
6 office that the thefts occurred. And they ait didn't
7 occur at once. Some of them continued into as late
8 as probably 2016, maybe '15. I don't a) because
9 they did not communicate to me that sey were robbing
10 me. ©
11 MR. L. KASSAB: Obj Vion, nonresponsive.
12 Q. And who is the cxoi Ghat you're talking
13 about? Give me specific nines, please.
14 A. Well, it would Be you, it would be Tina
15} Nicholson. It wong. Doug Montague. It would be
16|} June Allison. It (would be Kirk Ladner and Scott
17 Walker. At least that group of thieves.
18 Q. oKdy I got me, Tina Nicholson, June
19 Allison, scott Walker, Doug Montague and who else?
20 Is that ie?
21 ac I believe I mentioned Kirk Ladner and Scott
22 Walker.
23 Q. I got Scott Walker.
24 A. Oh, I'm sorry. Scott Favre, who paid --
25 who paid Scott Walker and Kirk Ladner, from what I
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1 found in some of their private documents that I got,
2 $85,000 to rob my office and then possibly some more
3 money to actually hack my computers and sell to you
4 or your co-counsel my passwords so you could rob
5 of my electronic information as well. )
6 Q. So this happened approximately rout years
7 ago, and it's your testimony that you cia ot contact
8 the police department to file a report an
9 Mississippi, correct? Cn
10 MR. SHEPHERD: Form. ©
11 A. It happened esmnaneiing Sout four years ago
12 and continuing onward, and ye correct, I did not
13 contact the Mississippi police.
14 Q. Right. And y&SYhaven't filed a police
15 report anywhere, rigge
16 A. I have filed a police report.
17 Q. Why not?
18 A. I don't know. I haven't thought about it.
19 I prayed about it and hoped that, you know, a just
20 result Goi ensue. But I did not go to the police.
21 oe You just decided you'd take matters in your
22 own hands?
23 MR. SHEPHERD: Form.
24 A. I have not taken matters in my own hands.
25 I wanted to spend time to reflect on it before taking
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1 action because I didn't want to do anything that was

2 precipitous.

3 Q. And why haven't you gone to the State Bar

4 to report my theft activities? NS

a

5 A. I simply haven't. ©

6 Q. And why haven't you talked to the Mazris

7 County DA's office about the fact that Lina thief,

8 as you state?

9 A. Well, these events didn't secur in Texas,
10 so they would have nothing to do it anyway. So
11 why would I go talk to them? K
12 Q. Why didn't you go an to the DA -- the
13 County DA's office in Gulgport to report my thievery?
14 A. I would have, Gat I was preoccupied because
15 the criminals involyed in this were extorting money .
16 from me and they wanting millions of dollars for
17 the return of my stolen goods and I was so upset and
18 so preoccupiéd,- that I neglected to do that.

19 Q. ‘And what evidence do you have -- please
20 tell the Judge, jury, State Bar, DA's office and
21 overstody else out there that you have regarding your
22 testimony under oath today that somebody sold me your
23 passwords so that I could hack into your computers?
24 MR. SHEPHERD: Form.
25 A. I haven't marshaled all the evidence and,

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1 CAUSE NO. 2017-41110
2 MARK KENTRELL CHEATHAM, ) IN THE DISTRICT COURT
SR., AND LUELLA MILLER, )
3 INDIVIDUALLY AND AS )
WRONGFUL DEATH ) N=
4 BENEFICIARIES OF LADONNA ) oe
CHEATHAM, DESTINY CHEATHAM) )
5 AND MARKUS CHEATHAM, )
DECEASED ) ey
é ) S
7/ vs. ) HARRIS COUNTY) TEXAS
)
8 MICHAEL A. POHL, DONALDA ) &
POHL, LAW OFFICE OF ) @
9 MICHAEL POHL, PLLC, ROBERT) Ke)
AMMONS AND the AMMONS LAW ) es
10 FIRM, LLP ) S57H JUDICIAL DISTRICT
11 6
S
12 REPORTER ' 6sr IF ICATE
ORAL VIDEOTAPED DEPOSTSTON OF MICHAEL A. POHL
13 May 15, 2018
14 @
»>O
15 I, Laurie capers Certified Shorthand Reporter
16 in and for the ss e of Texas, hereby certify:
17 That the witness, MICHAEL A. POHL, was duly
18 sworn and that the transcript of the deposition is a
na)
19 true record of the testimony given by the witness;
20 That the deposition transcript was duly
21 submitted on —t—“‘C‘éECO «CME ~WiittNl@SSSS OF tO thee
22 attorney for the witness for examination, signature,
23 and return to me by .
24 That pursuant to information given to the
25 deposition officer at the time said testimony was
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1 taken, the following includes all parties of record
2 and the amount of time used by each party at the time
3 of the deposition:
4 Mr. Lance Kassab (5h59m) NS
Attorney for Plaintiff NZ)
5 Mr. Billy Shepherd (0hOm) ©
Attorney for Defendant Michael Poh}.
6 Mr. Brock Akers (0h0m) cS
Attorney for Defendants Robert Aginons and
7 The Ammons Law Firm NS
Mr. Mark Collmer (h0m) ©)
8 Attorney for Defendant Donalda’ Pohl
9 I further certify that I am neither counsel for,
10 related to, nor employed by any of the parties in the
11 action in which this pare taken, and
12 further that I am not financial y or otherwise
©)
13 interested in the outcome this action.
14 Further certification requirements pursuant to
15} Rule 203 of the - an of Civil Procedure will be
16 | complied with aftér) ey have occurred.
17 Certified to by me on this day of
18 lau , 2018.
19 , ~S
OS
20 &S
21 & Laurie Carlisle, CSR
S Texas CSR 2205
22 Firm No. CRF 10402
Expiration: 12/31/19
23 Omni Litigation
832 Tulane Street
24 Houston, Texas 77007
25
Omni Litigation
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6,2018-10-24,EX,Kassab,Exhibit: bar grievance pleadings against Pohl,"State Bar of Texas Grievance filed by Lance Christopher Kassab against Michael Pohl (File No. 201801825), including grievance form, detailed Exhibit 'A' statement of facts and violations, and two supplemental letters to the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel dated July 3 and July 20, 2018","Bar grievance filed by Kassab against Pohl with the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the State Bar of Texas, pursuant to Rule 8.03(a) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. Filed on behalf of approximately 10,000 alleged victims. Companion grievance No. 201801826 filed against Cyndi Rusnak. Subsequently filed as Exhibit 21 in the Pohl v. Kassab TCPA proceedings.",TCPA-1,N/A,Phase 1,2018-10-24_EX_Grievance-Pleadings-Against-Pohl_FILED.pdf,Disciplinary action against Michael Pohl by the State Bar of Texas for violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct and Texas Penal Code barratry and commercial bribery statutes,"EXHIBIT 21 .
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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL
STATE BAR OF TEXAS
GRIEVANCE FORM
I. GENERAL INFORMATION
Before you fill out this paperwork, there may be a faster way to resolve the isgue-you are
currently having with an attorney.
@
If you are considering filing a grievance against a Texas attorney for any ofthe following
reasons: 5 G
S
~ You believe your attorney is neglecting your case. XZ)
~ Your attorney does not return phone calls or keep you informed <a the status of your case.
~ You have fired your attorney but are having problems getting you ile back from the attorney.
You may want to consider contacting the Client-Attorne Aséistance Program (CAAP) at
1-800-932-1900. &
CAAP was established by the State Bar of Texas to help people resolve these kinds of issues
with attorneys quickly, without the filing of a formal-griévance. CAAP can resolve many
problems without a grievance being filed by prov information, by suggesting various self-
help options for dealing with the situation, or byeon cting the attorney either by telephone or
letter. >
I have Ihave not X __ wc Client-Attorney Assistance Program.
II. INFORMATION ABOUT YOu -- Praase KEEP CURRENT
wS
COMPLAINANT # 1: &
1. Name and address: ©)
Lance Christophe Kassab, pursuant to Rule 8.03 (a) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
rrofessional Co ct and on behalf of approximately 10,000 victims surrounding the
Gulf Coast. &
Re,
Lance topher Kassab
THE AB LAW FIRM
1 abama
ton, Texas 77004
2. Employer and address:
The Kassab Law Firm
1420 Alabama
Houston, TX 77004

3. Telephone number: Residence: | Work: 713-522-7400
4. Drivers License # NA Date of Birth: NA
5. Name, address, and telephone number of person who can always reach you. Ne
EN
Lance Christopher Kassab NZ)
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM ©
1420 Alabama, Houston, Texas 77004 Re
Telephone: 713-522-7400 “GO
Facsimile: 713-522-7410 XG
6 @
6. Do you understand and write in the English language? Yes ©)
. ®
If no, what is your primary language? GP
Who helped you prepare this form? ©
Lance Christopher Kassab
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM &
1420 Alabama S\
Houston, Texas 77004 es
Telephone: 713-522-7400 ~\
Will they be available to translate future @S}respondence during this process? N/A
7. Are you a Judge? No 5 S
If yes, please provide Court, oes City, State: N/A
ILL. INFORMATION anour ATtonvey
Note: Grievances are Hot accepted against law firms. You must specifically name the attorney
against whom you omplaining. A separate grievance form must be completed for each
attorney against you are complaining.
wS
1. Attorney nae and address:
©)
Michael Pohl
2254 Stratton Forest Heights
Colorado Springs, CO 80906
2. Telephone number: Work: (713) 652-0100 Home: Unknown Other: Unknown
3. Have you or a member of your family filed a grievance about this attorney previously?

Yes__ No_X_If “yes”, please state its approximate date and outcome.
4. Please check one of the following:
This attorney was hired to represent me.
This attorney was appointed to represent me.
_X__ This attorney was hired to represent someone else. NS
Please give the date the attorney was hired or appointed and what the tomes hired or
appointed to do: O)
See Exhibit “A” attached hereto. eS
5. What was your fee arrangement with the attorney? S
See Exhibit “A” attached hereto. &
If you signed a contract and have a copy, please atach,
See Exhibit “A” attached hereto,
If you have copies of checks and/or receipts, please attach
IN
N/A es
6. If you did not hire the attorney, what 1h camnection with the attorney? Explain briefly:
©
See Exhibit “A” attached hereto,
2>O
7. Are you currently represented byan attorney?
See Exhibit “A” sche,
If yes, please provide sain about your current attorney:
Lance Christopher Kassab
THE Kass AW FIRM
1420 a, Houston, Texas 77004
Telep : 713-522-7400
Facsimile: 713-522-7410
8. Do yo. Bam the attorney has an impairment such as depression or a substance use disorder?
If yes, please provide specifics (your personal observations of the attorney such as slurred
speech, odor of alcohol, ingestion of alcohol or drugs in your presence etc., including the date
you observed this, the time of day, and location).

No
9. Did the attorney ever make any statements or admissions to you or in your presence that
would indicate that the attorney may be experiencing an impairment such as depression or a
substance use disorder? If so, please provide details.
x we
@
IV. INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR GRIEVANCE ©
1. Where did the activity you are complaining about occur? ©
Harris County, Texas. However, activity also occurred in thrighout the Gulf Coast
including Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and F lotida, See Exhibit “A” attached
hereto. &
Z)
2. If your grievance is about a lawsuit, answer the following, @knovm:
a. Name of court:
See Exhibit “A” attached hereto for oe
b. Title of the suit: WS
©
See Exhibit “A” attached hereto rte explanation.
c. Case number and date suit was me ©
See Exhibit “A” attached Heres for further explanation.
d. If you are not a party to this () what is your connection with it?
See Exhibit “A” wie hereto for further explanation.
If you have copies of gourt documents, please attach.
2
See Exhibit “A” attached hereto and all documents attached thereto.
©
3. Explain if detail why you think this attomey has done something improper or has failed to do
somethi hich should have been done. Attach additional sheets of paper if necessary.
If you have copies of letters or other documents you believe are relevant to your grievance,
please attach. Do not send originals.
See Exhibit “A” attached hereto and all documents attached thereto.

In a nutshell, Michael Pohl, Cyndi Rusnak and Jimmy Williamson (deceased) entered a
joint venture and conspiracy to commit barratry by violating the Texas Penal Code, Section
38.12, Rule 7.03 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct and various other
rules of professional conduct. This was Accomplished by paying, giving and/or offering
to pay or give money to numerous runners not licensed to practice law for soliciting
prospective clients and/or referring clients or prospective clients to the Nor pecuniary
gain. Please see Exhibit “A” and all other documents attached ert for further
explanation and documentary proof. ©
Include the names, addresses, and telephone number of all persons who Know something
about your grievance. SS
6 @
Lance Christopher Kassab ©)
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM ©
1420 Alabama ®
Houston, Texas 77004 ®
713-522-7400 Ke)
The documents attached to Exhibit “A” list ménypersons with knowledge of relevant
facts. However, I will provide a ENS list during your investigation.
Also, please be advised that a copy of your griginice will be forwarded to the attorney
named in your grievance. VW
V. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE Warver
I hereby expressly waive any attorneylient privilege as to the attorney to the extent it is, the
subject of this grievance, and aut such attorney to reveal any information in the
professional relationship to the e of Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the State Bar of Texas
regarding same.
I understand that DisilnyProcetings are strictly confidential.
Signature: 5 © Date:
e©)
TO ENSURE PROMPT ATTENTION, THE GRIEVANCE SHOULD BE MAILED TO:
©
The Office 6f Chief Disciplinary Counsel
P.O. Bow 13466
Austin, Texas 78761

STATEMENT OF THE GRIEVANCE

Attorney, Michael Pohl violated Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, 1.04
(f), (1) & (2), & (g); 1.15 (a)(1) & (d); 5.04 (a); 7.01(a); 7.03 (b) & (d); 7.06 (a) & (b); 8.04
(a)(1)(2)(3)(4)(9) & (12), & (b). Specifically, Michael Pohl conspired with CyniiRusnak and
Jimmy Williamson to improperly solicit approximately ten thousand prospec} ents and refer
these prospective clients to their joint venture solely for pecuniary sins This was accomplished
by hiring and paying runners to organize crews which would illegall sGanetbicaly and improperly
“knock on doors” and otherwise canvas the entire Gulf Coast KS) obtain and refer potential
clients who had potential claims against British Petroleum sist defendants arising out of the
Deep-Water Horizon Explosion. Se

Additionally, Michael Pohl on the one hand and Rusnak and Williamson on the other hand
were lawyers practicing law in two distinct wt en law firms, entered into a joint venture to
pay the runners for their illegal tan ad aed to split fees in complete degredation of Rule

1.04 by intentionally failing to oe. (Hient consents in writing outlining the terms of their
attorney’s fee split prior to the tim ofthe association between Michael Pohl on the one hand and
Rusnak and Williamson on theotiler hand.

Furthermore, both a and Rusnak offered, promised and agreed to pay non-lawyers (the
Runners) a portion of the atomey' fees generated from the representation arising from the illegal
gathering of potent lents

| ani a —

This uct, violating the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct and other
rules of ta) Sbsolutely occurred and is painstakingly outlined in detail in Exhibit “A” along with
sworn statements from the Runners themselves, all attached thereto. The conduct outlined in this
grievance is the very conduct that the State Bar and the Texas Legislature has attempted to curb
through recent legislation. Although it appears that there is an unwritten rule at the State Bar to

take no action against lawyers when a civil case has been filed against lawyers arising out of the

same conduct,! this conduct and these violations should not be condoned by the State Bar, any

other agency or anyone else. Action must be taken, otherwise the erosion of the nobility in the

practice of law will continue to occur, the perception that lawyers are above the awl continue

to grow and lawyers will be emboldened by the fact that the State Bar will a6 nothing in light of

clear violations of its Rules. ©

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'T have Ss law exclusively in the field of legal malpractice for more than 20 years and in every civil malpractice
case I have been involved with there have been the conduct alleged also violated the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct. However, I have filed and/or helped file (on behalf of clients) only a small number of
grievances (compared to civil cases), only to have them summarily dismissed. In each one of these grievances, there
were clear violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, yet the State Bar dismissed the vast majority of them.
When I finally inquired as to why the State Bar would summarily dismiss cases with clear violations, I was told that
there was an unwritten rule to dismiss cases when there was a civil case filed arising out of the same conduct. Out of
all the grievances I have been involved with, only a handful have not been summarily dismissed by the State Bar.

EXHIBIT “A”
I
Facts
After the tragic Deepwater Horizon oil tig explosion occurred in the Gulf of Mexico on
April 20, 2010 (the “Oil Spill”), the National Pollution Fund Center (“NPFC”) ofthe United States
Coast Guard issued a letter of designation to BP Exploration and Paton Inc. (“BP”)
designating it as a responsible party under the Oil Pollution Act COPa"") and advising BP to
advertise for and receive claims as a result of the Oil Spill. BP scepied this designation in writing
and established the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“GCCF”) for the purpose of administering,
processing and settling claims by individuals and busing had been impacted by the Oil
Spill. Ss
Seizing upon the opportunity to line his pockets Michael Pohl (“Pohl”) orchestrated a
conspiracy and barratry scheme with J omy Yann (Williamson) (now deceased) and Cyndi
Rusnak (Rusnak) to hire and pay runners tO organize crews which would illegally, unethically and
improperly “knock on doors” and otherwise canvas the Gulf Coast area to obtain and refer potential
clients who had potential clei British Petroleum and other defendants arising out of the
Deep-Water Horizon Explosion,
Williamson engkeol in a joint venture and/or partnership with Rusnak of Cindi Rusnak,
PLLC, practicing ne inde the trade name “Williamson & Rusnak” to illegally solicit and
represent clients the BP Deepwater Horizon litigation.! Williamson and Rusnak also engaged
another Texas lawyer, Michael A. Pohl (“Pohl”) of the Law Office of Michael Pohl, PLLC to aid
in what would ultimately be unethical and illegal barratry violations relating to thousands of
i aba 1 — Deposition of Jimmy Williamson, 23:14-23; Exhibit 2 ~ Walker Memorandum Opinion (Doc. No.
»p.5.
1

potential clients.” Pohl, Williamson and Rusnak agreed that they would split the profits from any
fruits of the barratry joint venture with 40% of any attorney’s fees derived from the BP litigation
going to Pohl and 60% going to Williamson and Rusnak.3 Williamson and Rusnak agreed to split
their 60% of the fees according to the amount of resources each put into the cases
Beginning approximately in April of 2012, Pohl, in furtherance ote joint venture,
arranged a meeting with Scott Walker (“Walker”), a consultant who was-well connected with
several companies in Pascagoula, Mississippi.> Pohl indicated hath Williamson wanted to
hire Walker to use his contacts to obtain potential BP clients.° Witiamson met with Walker and
Pohl and confirmed the barratry venture, telling Walker thatBP had structured the settlement to
include the whole state of Mississippi and thus there ws Peaty thousands of businesses and
individuals who could be targeted for solicitation slits Pohl and Williamson wanted to hire
another person with government contacts to view Walker who could solicit governmental
entities as part of the barratry conspiry® Walker introduced Pohl and Williamson to Steve
Seymour (“Seymour”) of Diamond Consulting who, at the time, was a public official in Hancock
County, Mississippi.? Pohl ns en advised Seymour that they “were trying to get clients
&
2 Exhibit 1 — Deposition oc Fly Williamson, 58:6-25, 59:1-11,
3 Exhibit 3 — Affidavit 8 Son Walker, ¥ 2.
4 Exhibit 1 -Deveion of Jimmy Williamson, p. 32:6-20.
5 Exhibit 3 <i of Scott Walker, 2.
6 Exhibit 3 — Affidavit of Scott Walker, ff 4, 5.
7 Exhibit 3 — Affidavit of Scott Walker, { 4.
* Exhibit 3 — Affidavit of Scott Walker, 5.
° Exhibit 3 — Affidavit of Scott Walker, { 5; Exhibit 4 — Affidavit of Steve Seymour, § 2.
2

with BP oil spill claims in Mississippi” and convinced him that Williamson was the “absolute best
lawyer in the field for handling BP oil spill claims.””!°
To aid in the barratry conspiracy, Williamson and Pohl provided Walker and Seymour with
“Advertisements” promoting the legal services of Williamson, Rusnak and Pohl & Lawyers).!!
Williamson instructed Walker and Seymour to use the advertisements in thei Stes pitches to
potential clients in an effort to sell them on hiring the Lawyers. ! Willian and Pohl instructed
Walker and Seymour to call all of their friends and sequntances toby to get them to hire the
Lawyers on their BP claims, and to make cold calls on people ond sins they didn’t know.?
Williamson told Walker and Seymour that he also had a po@se point presentation to be used to
“seal the deal” on potential clients that were hesitant.!4 wie con provided Walker and Seymour
with Williamson & Rusnak’s attorney-client sonatas used for signing up potential clients. !5
Williamson instructed Walker and Seymour to ib ta clients sign the blank contracts and
to email the signed contracts to Wiliams
The parties agreed that Williamson was to decide which groups of claimants should be
targeted; direct the joint venture marketing efforts; provide marketing materials to use in
soliciting potential clients; od with and market himself, his firm, and his partner Rusnak,
Q
©
10 Exhibit 4 — a Seymour, ] 3.
1 Exhibit 3- arate Walker, {| 6; Exhibit 4 — Affidavit of Steve Seymour, §f 6, 7; Exhibit 5 —
Williamson and P on P Advertisements.
12 Exhibit 3 <li of Scott Walker, J 6; Petition Exhibit 4 — Affidavit of Steve Seymour, J 7.
13 Exhibit 3 — Affidavit of Scott Walker, {J 6, 7; Exhibit 4 — Affidavit of Steve Seymour, { 7.
4 Exhibit 3 — Affidavit of Scott Walker, {{] 6, 7; Exhibit 4 — Affidavit of Steve Seymour, ] 7.
'S Exhibit 3 — Affidavit of Scott Walker, {J 6, 7; Exhibit 4 — Affidavit of Steve Seymour, q 7.
'© Exhibit 3 — Affidavit of Scott Walker, f] 6, 7; Exhibit 4 — Affidavit of Steve Seymour, 7.
3

to claimants with larger claims.'’ Williamson stated that he would “handle the overhead
expenses” including “intake” and “staffing.”'® The parties agreed that Pohl would handle
Walker’s and Seymour’s compensation.!? Rusnak’s contribution to the barratry conspiracy was to
assist with the intake of the claims, review the claims, reject any unsuitable claims, ane to generally
handle the processing of the claims throughout the BP Settlement Claim rose his included
supervising a large staff.”° In addition, Rusnak directed the barratry conspipacy, instructing Walker
to “go after the claims that would produce the highest legal fees” and ibacted Walker to “market
NS

to clients in certain geographic locations.”””!

In early May 2012, Walker introduced Pohl and Williamson to Dane Maxwell
(“Maxwell”).”” Maxwell provided lawyers with svesidged services via his company called
CMV Investigations (“CMV”).”> Pohl and Winsor erste Maxwell and CMV to obtain
potential BP clients.24 Maxwell assembled a en of contract workers to make cold calls on

O,
potential clients on behalf of the Lawyen 2 he Lawyers agreed to pay Maxwell a flat fee of
$1,000 for each BP client that he or his team working for CMV obtained for the Lawyers, plus
&
©
7 ima nana toageli. 116; Exhibit 4 — Affidavit of Steve Seymour, 10.
'8 Exhibit 3 — Affidavit oF Se Was {| 6; Exhibit 4 — Affidavit of Steve Seymour, 10.
19 Exhibit 3 — AfidavifScou Walker, {| 6; Exhibit 4 ~ Affidavit of Steve Seymour, q 10.
20 Exhibit 6 — May 20 16 Affidavit of Scott Walker, 99 5, 6, 7.
21 Exhibit 6 <M 3, 2016 Affidavit of Scott Walker, q 5.
*? Exhibit 7 — Deposition of Michael Pohl, pp. 51-52.
*3 Exhibit 7 — Deposition of Michael Pohl, pp. 51-52, 70.
*4 Exhibit 8 - Maxwell Amended Verified Complaint.
* Exhibit 8 — Maxwell Amended Verified Complaint, § 18.
4

expenses.*° The Lawyers paid Maxwell and CMV as much as $2.47 million for the illegal
barratry.?7
On or about May 25, 2012, the Lawyers, Walker and Seymour reduced their agreement to
commit barratry in writing.”® The agreement included another runner, Terry Robingen of Robinson
Holdings, LLC (“Robinson”).”° Per the agreement, Pohl, on behalf of the fin Ger agreed to
pay Walker, Seymour and Robinson (and/or their respective companies) 30% of the 40% interest
in attorney’s fees he was to receive from his agreement with Wilaio in the BP litigation.*°
Walker, Seymour and Robinson (collectively the “Solicitation Group"") all non-lawyers, agreed to
split the 30% attorney’s fees as follows: 12% to Walker (Maxwell & Walker Consulting Group,
LLC); 12% to Seymour (Diamond Consulting); and cosb Pinon (Robinson Holdings, LLC).
This written agreement was, of course, completely sock and illegal. See TEx. DISCIPLINARY
RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.04(a)(“A lawyer sw firm shall not share or promise to share legal
fees with a non-lawyer”). Over the next month, Walks Seymour and Robinson “hit the ground
running” and “distributed information abou Williamson to hundreds of Mississippians.”?!
Williamson, on behalf of the conspiracy later recruited another individual, Kirk Ladner
(“Ladner”) to join the tat dou” Ladner had been in the seafood industry his entire life.23
f
26 Exhibit 9 — Deposition af Soot Walker, p. 200.
27 Exhibit 9 — Deposition oF Seo Walker, p. 73-74.
28 Exhibit 3 — Aft Scott Walker, at Exhibits 1 & 2 (Operating Agreements).
29 Exhibit 3 <n of Scott Walker, at Exhibits 1 & 2 (Operating Agreements).
3° Exhibit 3 — Affidavit of Scott Walker, at Exhibits 1 &2 (Operating Agreements).
*! Exhibit 4 — Affidavit of Steve Seymour, ¥ 13.
° Exhibit 4 — Affidavit of Steve Seymour, 4 15; Exhibit 10 — Affidavit of Kirk Ladner, {ff 8-9.
33 Exhibit 10 — Affidavit of Kirk Ladner, ff 8-9.
5

Williamson and Pohl convinced Ladner to join their barratry organization, telling him that he,
along with Seymour and Walker, would all be “multi-millionaires.”*4 Thus, on July 15,2012, Pohl,
on behalf of the joint venture, signed a new unethical and illegal partnership agreement with
Ladner, Walker and Seymour.*’ In this new agreement, Ladner, Walker and Seymour agreed to
accept a 22.5 % interest in the attorney’s fees Pohl was to obtain from BF representation
agreement between Williamson and Pohl.*° One of the reasons for this pew agreement was that
Williamson wanted to end the relationship with Robinson.27 , &

The Lawyers paid roughly $5 million in “barratry pass ou money” to Walker, Ladner
and Seymour to solicit and accumulate potential clients.** Althotgh the money was labeled on the
books as “marketing money” for “marketing services,” wie candidly admitted that it is “clear
to [him] it was barratry.”3? Walker, Ladner and see wed this money to solicit BP clients on
behalf of the Lawyers’ joint venture.”° RS

The barratry money distributed oar, Walker, Seymour and CMV would be used to
pay case runners who worked below then in what can only be described as a barratry pyramid
scheme. While CMV would rece $1,000 per potential client, the mid-level runners would
receive $100-$250 of this sit per potential client. The mid-level runners would also recruit

runners to work below ogre pay the low-level runners $20-$30 per potential client while
34 Exhibit 4 — sn teve Seymour, {ff 16-19; Exhibit 10 ~ Affidavit of Kirk Ladner, $f 10-16.
35 Exhibit 4 — aside of Steve Seymour, at Exhibit 2 Operating Agreement.
36 Exhibit 4 Ala of Steve Seymour, at Exhibit 2 Operating Agreement.
37 Exhibit 3 — Affidavit of Scott Walker, ¥ 14.
38 Exhibit 9 — Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 73-76.
* Exhibit 9 — Deposition of Scott Walker, p. 149.
40 Exhibit 9 — Deposition of Scott Walker, p. 200.
6

working under their umbrella. Thus, while the lowest level runners would receive a mere $20 from
the Williamson-Pohl-Rusnak conspiracy, the mid-level runners would receive $100-$250 per
potential client and CMV would receive the remainder of the $1,000.
One of the low level runners was Jacqueline Taylor (“Taylor”) PR State Line,
eS
Mississippi.*' Taylor was recruited to solicit clients for the lawyers through EMV by another
runner, Karen Boykin (“Boykin”).*” Taylor owned a beauty salon and wag Sontacted in person by
S
Boykin who was targeting small business owners on behalf of the Layiyers.® Boykin told Taylor
NS
that she had a claim against BP and convinced her to hire the Lane to file the claim.“ Taylor
agreed and completed the blank Williamson & Rusnak contract fiat Boykin had brought with her.
Boykin then told Taylor about all the money she was vst to solicit clients and gave her the
business card of another lady working for CMV, Mons Chaney:**
a
pune Se es
Monica Chaney - g
Cell: 228-219-988 ~\
fama e ee KR
CVi/ Cell: 601-470-2331 ©
mr BP Claims Conguitat
, ones mneranseh
Fax, 228-87 2-i
rota rie |)
D'bervite, MS '
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aN
3
4! Exhibit 11 — Sw tatement of Jaqueline Taylor, p. 5.
2 Exhibit 1 1 Sgn Statement of Jaqueline Taylor, pp. 5-6.
“3 Exhibit 11 — Swom Statement of Jaqueline Taylor, pp. 6-7.
“ Exhibit 11 — Sworn Statement of Jaqueline Taylor, pp. 7-8.
** Exhibit 11 — Sworn Statement of Jaqueline Taylor, pp. 7-8.
“© Exhibit 11 — Sworn Statement of Jaqueline Taylor, p. 6, and at Taylor Exhibit 1.
7

Taylor called Chaney who hired her to solicit clients.47 Chaney told Taylor that Williamson and
Pohl employed CMV to solicit clients.*® Taylor was given blank Williamson & Rusnak and Pohl
contracts”? and was trained on how to obtain potential clients on behalf of the Lawyers and what
to say.©” Taylor was trained to target business owners and then, when those claimsyan out, farmers
and land owners.*’ Taylor was provided a map and told to focus on pri Taylor was
paid $20-$30 per potential client®? while Chaney was paid $100-$1 50 foreach potential client
brought in by Taylor.*4 Taylor would send the clients information Bane each week and was
paid through a cash card from Wal-Mart. Taylor was ribet fo any expenses associated
with the solicitation. All total, Taylor was paid to solicit overine hundred potential clients.5”
Another runner under the Lawyer’ barratry schenéive Magdalena Santana (“Santana”).°8
Santana was approached by Seymour in July of sores recruited by Williamson and Pohl for a
“marketing position” which required her to “9 Brat clients and sign them up for legal
w
EN
©
“7 Exhibit 11 — Sworn Statement of Jaqucling Payor, pp. 9-10.
“8 Exhibit 11 — Sworn Statement of agen Taylor, pp. 11-13.
Exhibit 11 — Sworn Statement of Zagieline Taylor, pp. 9-10.
°° Exhibit 11 — Sworn Statement of Jaqueline Taylor, pp. 17-19.
5! Exhibit 11 — Sworn Sateen Jaqueline Taylor, p. 20.
* Exhibit 11 — Sworn Satnen of Jaqueline Taylor, p. 31-32.
3 Exhibit 11 — Swit Sitemen of Jaqueline Taylor, p. 13.
* Exhibit 1 1 Sein Statement of Jaqueline Taylor, p. 23, 50.
°° Exhibit 11 — Sworn Statement of Jaqueline Taylor, p. 13-14.
°° Exhibit 11 — Sworn Statement of Jaqueline Taylor, p. 26-27.
*7 Exhibit 11 — Sworn Statement of Jaqueline Taylor, p. 16.
°8 Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit.
8

representation.”°° Santana testified that the job required her to “make cold calls on business owners
and managers trying to get them to sign blank legal representation contracts with Pohl and
Williamson.”® Santana “would be paid $250 for each claim [she] signed up.”*! Santana was
instructed by Pohl to target “businesses in the high-paying settlement zones” une “beachfront
properties, hotels, taxi companies, commercial fisherman, nightlubs, a other tourism
businesses.” Williamson likewise instructed Santana to “go business to,bpsiness, door to door”
GS
asking people “if they had losses from the oil spill.” Separate from Pati, Williamson instructed
Santana to “target businesses in high paying zones and in tourign Zones since they were getting
higher payouts.” Santana was provided a map showing he high-paying settlement zones.®
Santana was told to target churches because they were “sy as they “didn’t have to provide tax
9966
returns. <
ON
Like other runners, Santana was provided a binder with blank Williams-Pohl-Rusnak
O,
contracts and advertisements (similar to hese above) with Williamson’s name on them to
distribute to potential clients, Santana Was also emailed blank Williamson-Pohl contracts.
&
— 8
*° Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit, ] x
6° Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit 4
6! Exhibit 12 — Santana asian 14.
© Exhibit 12 — Santana Afidavit, 5.
wS
© Exhibit 12 — Sa sans Afi 13.
“ Exhibit 12 Sania Affidavit, ] 13.
6 Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit, ] 6, see also Santana Exhibit B.
° Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit, q{5.
*’ Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit, {] 6, see also Santana Exhibit A.
68 Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit, J 8, see also Santana Exhibit C. .
9

Santana was told that if she had trouble soliciting a “big fish” client, Williamson and Pohl would
visit them personally.® Santana solicited seventy-seven (77) claims her first week on the job.”
Santana was paid bonuses personally by Williamson for obtaining the “big fish” clients. 7!
Williamson told Santana that they “were all going to make lots of money.”” Santana testified how
cS
“Williamson and Pohl both knew that [she] was cold-calling businesses to sep BK claims.” “Both
Williamson and Pohl gave [her] specific instructions to knock on doors to-drum up clients for
SS
them.””4 5 ss
NS
All total, Santana obtained approximately 1,500 cases for Wiliamson, Rusnak and Pohl.”
None of them were friends, family or colleagues.” After sein would solicit the clients, Pohl
would meet Santana at restaurants to sign the contracts ao illegally and unethically obtained.””
Santana was not paid by Pohl and Williamson pas but through a company called Precision
Marketing Group, LLC (“Precision”).’8 This xe a company formed by Walker, Ladner and
O,
Seymour to serve as the “center of operons for the solicitation.”” The lease, furnishings and
©
@
GS
© Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit, 7. &
” Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit, J EN
” Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit 92.
? Exhibit 12 — Santana asia q 13.
73 Exhibit 12 — Santana Advi 138.
SS
4 Exhibit 12 — Sa ans Affidavit, 7 38.
® Exhibit 12 Sanians Affidavit, 38.
7 Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit, J 38.
” Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit, J 22.
” Exhibit 12 — Santana Affidavit, | 23.
” Exhibit 3 — Affidavit of Scott Walker, § 32.
10

staff of this company was paid for by the Lawyers.®° When Santana asked Pohl why she was not
paid by him directly, Pohl stated “that it was illegal for him to pay [her] directly, and that’s why
the money had to go through some company.”®! Santana and Taylor were just two of the many
runners. Eventually the Lawyers’ joint venture had illegally solicited appeeemately 9,800
potential or actual BP clients.®2 oy
On October 18, 2014, Walker, Ladner, Seymour and their related entities, including
Precision, filed suit against Pohl and Williamson, alleging they “inal ogther in a joint venture
or partnership in order to represent Mississippi clients in their lis against [BP] in connection
with the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill” and “contracted vith [them] to provide public relations
services for this joint venture.”®? The runners alleged nde lawyers breached their agreement,
engaged in bad faith, breached their duties of soog and fair dealing and became unjustly
enriched after they refused to pay them fees fc whiting the clients on the lawyers’ behalf.°4
Rusnak was eventually added to this last under the claim that she too was part of the joint
venture or partnership.®* Walker, Seymour and Ladner later assigned their right in the action to
Precision®® and Precision was purchased by an individual named Scott F avre (“Favre”).87
©
ry
80 Exhibit 3 — Affidavit of Scout alker, J 32.
8! Exhibit 12 — Santana doit, 23.
® Exhibit 1 — Depoftion of Jimmy Williamson, 186:6-22.
83 Exhibit 2 we Memorandum Opinion (Doc. No. 475), p. 2; Exhibit 13 — Walker First Amended Complaint.
84 See Exhibit 13 — Walker First Amended Complaint.
* Exhibit 2 ~ Walker Memorandum Opinion (Doc. No. 475), p. 2.
*° Exhibit 2— Walker Memorandum Opinion (Doc. No. 475), p. 2.
*” Exhibit 14 — Affidavit of Scott Farve.
11

The Lawyers attempted to dismiss that litigation, arguing that they were not partners or in
a joint venture with one another or the runners and that the agreements between them and the
runners were illegal and unenforceable.** The federal court rejected these contentions, finding
prima facia evidence that Pohl, Williamson and Rusnak to be in a partnership or j cugt venture with
each other and also concluding that the agreements to solicit clients would ae a violation of
Texas law and the Texas disciplinary rules, which did not apply to Walker, Seymour and Ladner.®?
Having failed to obtain summary dismissal, the Lawyers settled the pation with Precision and

NS

Favre, hoping to forever conceal their barratry conspiracy.”

In addition to illegally soliciting unsuspecting people for the BP oil spill, Pohl also illegally
solicited victims of rollover accidents. Specifically, rent er Santana, her brother Jay Santana,
Ladner, Seymour and Walker to solicit families whenever were killed or severely injured in
rollover accidents. Incredibly, and with cin dls Pohl helped set up companies like “The
Helping Hands Group”! and the “GM stoma Verification Team”** in order to make people
believe these companies and their employees (the Runners) were there to actually help rollover
accident victims. &

Pohl would direct be Runes to specific accidents as soon as they happened and
typically pay these Ranmes 2.5% of his attorney’s fees from each case they signed up on his
88 Exhibit 2— Wa emorandum Opinion (Doc. No. 475); Exhibit 15 — Williamson Memorandum (Doc. No.

178); Exhibit 1 hl Memorandum (Doc. No. 175).
89 Exhibit 2SWulker Memorandum Opinion (Doc. No. 475); Exhibit 17 — Walker Order on Pohl and Williamson
Motions to Dismiss (Doc. No. 252); Exhibit 18 — Walker Order on Rusnak Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 273).
* Exhibit 19 — Walker Judgment (Doc. No. 499).
°! Exhibits 25, 28 and 29.
2 Exhibit 40.
12

behalf.”? As an example, on September 29, 2012, Michael Pohl sent Walker an article about a
death in a rollover accident that occurred two days earlier.°* Walker immediately sent the article
to his Runners about two hours later stating, “See below article. We need to try and sign the family
of the deceased mentioned in the article. If you think you can make this happen, cajlme and I will
cN
send you a contract from Michael. We need to move fast on this.” That sine aflemoon, Pohl
forwarded a contract to Walker who forwarded it to the field Runners.** Asan extra incentive to
SS
motivate the Runners, Walker told Jay Santana to go to Pohl’s wobte to see “the cases that
NS
Michael has won.”®” The list of rollover cases on the website shows that Pohl has settled or
obtained judgments on rollover cases in excess of 43 ming gie
Another example is a rollover case in Towa Ko where eleven people were injured
on April 14, 2013. By April 19, 2013, MagdalenaSantana had been sent to Kansas and signed
‘ 100 : AS) . cc . .
up the entire group. By April 29, 2013 “ee ael Pohl signed a “Retention of Services
O,
Agreement” with Ladner, Walker and Seow agreeing to pay them a fee of $1,500 an hour, not
to exceed 22.5% of Pohl’s attorney’s fe. On the same day, Ladner, Walker and Seymour signed
an “Operating Agreement with Mafiatene Santana and Florian Santana agreeing to pay them 25%
3 Exhibits 20, 41 & 42. SS
4 Exhibit 20. ©
5 Td. Note, Pohl was on the email.
eO)
6 Exhibit 21. Po os $ copied on this email as well.
97 Exhibit 2205S""
8 Id.
°° Exhibit 41.
100 7g,
101 Td.
13

each from the 22.5% of Pohl’s attorney’s fees.'°? The Operating Agreement does not provide for
an hourly rate, it simply states that, “The parties hereto agree that the fees paid under this Operating
Agreement shall not exceed twenty-two and one-half percent (22.5%) of LOMAP’s 40% interest
in the representation agreement of the above mentioned victims.”!™ x
Another example involved a rollover in Muskogee, Oklahoma on 2, 2014 where

Cynthia Shannon was ejected from the vehicle and killed.! Within sins of the accident,
Helping Hands visited the mourning family and convinced the fay to sign an agreement
allowing for them to “hire independent experts or attorneys” as otping Hands deems necessary
and charge the family up to 40% of any recovery the storey sbi for them.'° By June 20,

2014, Michael Pohl signs the “Retention of Services Agreement with Walker and Ladner of the

“Claim Verification Team (an affiliate of The oe cae Group, LLC)” wherein Pohl agrees

to pay the “Claims Verification Team” up to 28% of his attorney’s fees for soliciting and referring
the case to Pohl.!% &

Michael Pohl’s barratry scheme Was choreographed to a science. The Runners were told
precisely what to do when a rllov€é necured, such as “go to the wreck as early as you can to find
blown tires,” “take pictures” in personal items (cell phone, iPods, eye wear, anything
personal) to take to teh al when you meet the families.”'®’ They were instructed to “meet

&
a
102 Td. &
108 Id,
104 Exhibit \
105 Td,
106 Tq.
107 Exhibit 23 (emphasis added).

14

with the family of the deceased and have them sign the contract” and to “[g]et all the other
members that were in the case to sign additional contracts because they will receive funds also
from the settlement.”’”* The Runners were also instructed “to inquire if the deceased’s family may
need help from HELPING HANDS for the burial.”! le

Helping Hands is an organization run by none other than Donalda rn ish Pohl’s
spouse. The Runners were instructed to offer funds from Helping Hands ¥f they would sign a
contract with Helping Hands. The contract with Helping Hands oid Helping Hands to hire
attorneys for the family’s rollover case and earn a percentage of any settlement recovery. Of
course, the attorney chosen by Helping Hands was always Michael Pohl.

One example of this relates to Mark Cheatham Tragically, on February 15, 2014,
Mark Cheatham’s ex-wife, LaDonna, whom Mark kad reunited with and Mark’s three children
(one biological) were involved in a rollover oii"" Mark’s biological son, Markus was the only
one to survive. One of Pohl’s Runners, Keine Talley (Talley) arrived in Louisiana on February
18, 2014 to solicit Mark and his grieving family just three days after he lost the majority of his
family.!’° On February 19, 2014, alley stopped at My Rouses to pick up flowers on his way to
Mark’s home.!!! Talley’s vis uninvited and unsolicited by Mark. However, after gaining
Mark’s confidence vile a was dealing with the tragic loss of LaDonna and his two daughters,
and dealing with his, son’s serious injuries, Talley convinced Mark to sign an agreement with

SO
iS
&
eS ee
108 Td.
109 7d (emphasis in original)
HO Exhibit 24
11 Iq.
15

Helping Hands,'""” sign a limited power of attorney! and sign the crashed vehicle over to Talley
for $2,000.00.'* Remarkably, the $2,000.00 for the purchase of the vehicle came from Helping
Hands which charged Mark 18% per annum for the very funds Talley paid to Mark for the
vehicle.'!° Talley also had Mark sign an “Attorney Acknowledgment” form for Helping Hands.!!6
cS
The form provides that, “{i]n the event of a dispute, my attorney shall be epi to his fee and
expenses.”''7 And that if Mark wanted to change his attorney, the “Funding Agent [Helping
SS
Hands] may declare the subject debt due and payable.”!!® Of course attorney being referred
to was Michael Pohl, Donalda Pohl’s (owner of Helping Hands) sand This is known because
the attorney signature line on the form is signed with the igQear for Michael A. Pohl.!!? This
barratry conspiracy between husband and wife is und by the fact that Helping Hands has
a form that protects the attorney’s interests. In furtherance of the conspiracy is the Helping Hands
“Funding Agreement.”!?° This agreement rv tt the “Funding Agent agrees that it will be
O,
repaid only if as and when Chimant’s over is funded.” And that, IF THERE IS NO
@
RECOVERY, CLAIMANT HAS NO.OBLIGATION TO REPAY THIS DEBT.!2! However,
&
112 Exhibit 25, <\
113 Exhibit 26. S
114 Exhibit 27. ©
&
115 Exhibit 28. >
wS
N6 Exhibit 29. ES
©
118 7g. ,
119 Td.
120 Exhibit 30.
'21 Td. (emphasis in original).
16

in small-unemboldened script, the document states, “If I decide to drop my case and my Attorney
[Michael Pohl] believes my case is meritorious and economically justifiable, then I must repay the
indebtedness hereby created.”'”? Thus, the document obligates the client (Mark Cheatham in this
instance) to pay Helping Hands up to 40% of any recovery regarding the accident pursuant to the
Helping Hands agreement attached hereto as Exhibit 25.!3 In fact, the sing agreement
marked as Exhibit 25 also allows Helping Hands to hire experts and attorneys’ as Helping Hands
deems necessary.'** Michael Pohl signed an attorney/client cont ith Mark on February 21,
2014, just six (6) days after the tragic accident and two days afer Talley showed up at Mark’s
home uninvited.’?> Notably, Tally brought a notary from Kini On-Site-Notary with him.!*6
The Runners of course were not to be left wit bing their percentage of fees
recovered from these lucrative rollover cases. Mid Pohl signed a “Retention of Services
Agreement” (Retention Agreement) with san Wa and Kirk Ladner of Precision Marking
Group (Precision) with regard to Mark Chatham's case.'?” In the Retention Agreement, Pohl
agreed to pay Precision $1,500 an hous. up to 30% of Pohl’s 40% contingency fee.'""8 However,
Pohl and Precision both knew tha the fee for soliciting and referring cases would not be based
upon an hourly rate, but her apr of attorney’s fees recovered. This is so, because the
Retention Agreement sae tt “any and all such fees shall be apportioned by and between the
—
122 Td. 5 &
123 Exhibit 25, @
©
124 Tq Sy
125 Exhibit 32.
126 Td.
27 Exhibit 31.
128 7.
17

parties hereto as follows: Ladner (15%) and Walker (15%).”!?° If the parties to the agreement
actually thought Precision’s fee was based upon an hourly rate the split between Ladner and
Walker would be 50/50 and not listed a 15% for each. Kenneth Talley was to be rewarded as well.
He was to receive $10,000.00 for every one-million recovered for Cheatham and his family.!*°
This is not based upon any hourly rate. oe
Underscoring the fact that Precision was to be paid a percentage of the attorney’s fees
recovered as opposed to an actual hourly rate is the numerous cherie when Pohl paid Ladner
and Walker for there solicitation and referral of rollover cases. Unie the Cheatham case, most
agreements for referring cases to Pohl outlined a fee to Precisigir of 22.5% instead of 30%.'3! On
November 28, 2014, Pohl sent an email to Walker won “Diaz/Curran” case stating the
case settled for $875,000.00.!32 Pohl disclosed the@mount of settlement so that Walker could
manufacture his hours to fit 22.5% of Pohl’s £2 om can clearly see the calculation of legal
fees from the $875,000 to be $306,250. Then that number was multiplied by 22.5% to come up
with $68,906.25 and then divided by $1,500 per hour to come up the number of hours (45.93
hours).!°> Of course, Walker rounds up to an even 46 hours.'*° If Pohl actually believed that he
was paying Precision by be oi he would not have disclosed the amount of the recovery; he
&
Id. | ~S
130 Exhibit 33. NS
©
131 Exhibit 34, &
132 Exhibit rs
133 Tq.
134 Tq.
135 Tq.
136 Td.
18

would have simply requested a detailed account of the hours spent by Precision. If Precision’s
time actually surpassed 22.5% of the attorney’s fee, Pohl could have simply reduced the amount
to no more than 22.5%.

The same thing was done with the “Sanchez” case. On J anuary 1, 2015, Pall sent an email
to Walker informing him that the Sanchez case had settled for $680,000.37 Poi ats “In order
to compute the ceiling on your hourly fees and expenses, the attorney feesnet of local counsel
charges was $250,129.90.”!38 Pohl provides this figure without knowin that Precision’s hours
would even reach the 22.5% threshold. This is because everyone knew that the real fee to Precision
was 22.5% of Pohl’s net attorney’s fee. Of course, 22.5% of 250,129.90 is 56,279.90.!5° After
deducting the $5,000 owed to Pohl for personal loans, wine divides the remainder to calculate
Precision’s hours instead of providing a setaledenccty billing. '*° In fact, the “Operating
Agreement” Pohl signed with Precision, viv the Sanchez case, does not mention an
hourly “rate,” it simply states that, “The pais here agree that the fees paid under this Operating
Agreement shall not exceed twenty-two and one-half percent (22.5%) of LOMAP’S [Law Offices
of Michael A. Pohl] representatioi agreement with victims in cases where Precision Marketing
Group, LLC is retained.” Th Agreement clearly contemplates that Ladner, Walker and
Seymour, of Precision wax receive 7.5% for a total of 22.5%.'"" The “Operating Agreement”
137 Exhibit 36. ©
138 1a, Sy
139 Tq.

140 Td.
141 Exhibit 34,
142 Td.
19

between Precision and the Runners who actually signed up the Sanchez case shows that Precision
is to receive 50% percent of the 22.5% and Florian Santana and Magdalena Santana were to each
receive 25% of the 22.5%.'*? These documents prove, without doubt, that Pohl agreed share his
fees with non-lawyers for soliciting and referring rollover cases. Ne

In October of 2014, Pohl was caught attempting to steal a rollover asm a lawyer in
Mississippi. On October 15, 2014, Richard Shenkan of the Shenkan Law Fitm sent a letter to Pohl
stating, “On September 16, 2014, your salesman, Kirk Ladner, came wide home of Michael Lucas
under the disguise of a member of the GM Settlement Verification Fea, LLC, offering to ‘inform’
the resident about a potential legal claim.”!44 Mr. Shenkan alsy states, “Remarkably, Mr. Ladner
explained that he typically earns $25,000 for every ce for you [Pohl] which involves
a catastrophic injury potentially involving the GM rte defect claims.”!*5 Attached hereto is
the contract between Pohl and Michael Lucas wi was the subject of Mr. Shenkan’s letter.!*

Pohl’s remarkable unconsciousness undscore by the creation of the “GM Settlement
Verification Team” as referred to in Ms, Shenkan’s letter.47 As stated by Mr. Shenkan, Pohl’s
runner acted as if he was part oO Genera Motors and was simply contacting people to “inform”

ee
&
©
143 Exhibit BS
144 Exhibit 38.
145 Tq.
146 Exhibit 39.
47 Td.
20

them about potential legal claims.'** Another example of this pertains to the Hart family."" This
tactic was used by Pohl and his Runners on numerous occasions. !%°
The history of what is known as “barratry” in Texas is long. Although it has recently
become the subject of civil statutes, barratry has been considered a crime in Texgs since 1876.
EN
Reynolds v. State, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 11059, *1-2.; Katherine A. Laroe, gosilent Much Ado
About Barratry: State Regulation of Attorneys’ Targeted Direct-Mail Solicitation, 25 St. Mary's L.J.
S
1514, 1519-20 n.28 (1994)(also tracing historical basis of offense throigh pre-colonial times). As
NS
far back as 1917, Texas outlawed a distinct form of barratry oF third party (a ""runner"") to
solicit clients on behalf of a lawyer. Jd. at 1524 n.30; Remote 17 Tex. App. LEXIS 11059, *1-
2. In a different form, that prohibition exists today ope PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.12(d)(West
2016) which criminalizes a lawyer knowingly — a third party to improperly solicit on the
lawyer's behalf employment from a victim witha iyo days of an accident. Under the text
O,
of the statute, a lawyer commits an fens hen he or she:
(d)(2) with the intent to obtai “Gro fessional employment for the person or for
another, provides or knowi iy permit to be provided to an individual who has not
sought the person's employment, legal representation, advice, or care a written
communication or a solicitation, including a solicitation in person or by telephone,
that: \
(A) concerns an Goivtor personal injury or wrongful death or otherwise relates
to an accident of disaster involving the person to whom the communication or
solicitation isprovided or a relative of that person and that was provided before
the 31st day-atter the date on which the accident or disaster occurred.
gS
<
M48 Td.
149 Exhibit 40.
‘50 There are numerous documents supporting this fact that have not been attached hereto, but are available upon
request.
21

Stated otherwise: (1) a lawyer, (2) cannot with intent to obtain professional employment,
(3) provide or knowingly permit to be provided to someone who hasn't sought the lawyer's services,
(4) a written communication or a solicitation (in person or by phone), (5) in the first thirty days
following some accident or disaster. Jd. ve

“The ordinary meaning of barratry is vexatious incitement to tigation especially by
soliciting potential legal clients.” Neese v. Lyon, 479 S.W.3d 368, 376 (Te -App—Dallas 2015,
no pet.) (citations omitted). In an effort to curtail this crime, the Least, in 1989, enacted §
82.065 of the Texas Government Code, which allowed clients to seid contingent fee contract “if
it is procured as a result of conduct violating the laws of this ie or the Disciplinary Rules of the
State Bar of Texas regarding barratry by attorneys or ti ys Neese, 479 S.W.3d at 376-
77. The 1989 version of section 82.065 provided: &

A contingent fee contract for legal servi SY vant by the client if it is procured

as a result of conduct violating the 1 f this state or the Disciplinary Rules of

the State Bar of Texas regarding rd attorneys or other persons.

See id.; Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 866, givett Sept. 1, 1989 (amended 2011).

In 2011, the Legislature pésed Senate Bill 1716 which amended § 82.065 and enacted
section 82.0651 to create eo “liability arising from conduct constituting barratry and
provid[ing] a civil peng? Se JUDICIARY & CIVIL JURISPRUDENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, 8.B.
1716, Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 94 (S.B. 1716), § 3(a), eff. Sept. 1, 2011 (“S.B. 1716 Analysis”)
(emphasis added Nees 479 §.W.3d at 377. The purpose of S.B. 1716 was to create a civil
cforement pa statutes and disciplinary rules prohibiting barratry, the “vexatious incitement
to litigation, especially by soliciting potential legal clients.” See S.B. 1716 Analysis.'>* The bill
'S! Exhibit 44 — A true and correct copy of S.B. 1716 Analysis.

192 Td.
22

itself specifically stated that it was intended to provide “liability arising from conduct constituting
barratry; providing a civil penalty.” See S.B. 1716, Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 94 (S.B. 1716), §
3(a), eff. Sept. 1, 2011 (“S.B. 1716”), #53
The legislative intent and “purpose” of S.B. 1716 was set forth in ne Gepon of the
Judiciary & Civil Jurisprudence Committee to “add a civil enforcement opfon to “help curtail”
the practice of barratry: 5 &
&s
Barratry is commonly known as vexatious incitement to litigation, typically by
soliciting potential legal clients. Many refer to the pract®oy a “case running.”
Under Section 38.12, Penal Code, “barratry” is genery. efined as the illegal
solicitation of professional employment. The Texas; isciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct of the State Bar of Texas prohibit\these solicitations as well.
Adding a civil enforcement option would help cua is practice.
S.B. 1716 adds a cause of action for a client Wo has been unlawfully solicited to
void the contract and recover any actual d s and any fees and expenses paid.
The bill allows a potential client to rec civil penalty of $10,000 from any
person who committed barratry but not succeed in getting the potential
client to sign a contract. Actual d. Ss and attorney's fees are also recoverable
by a potential client. we
See S.B. 1716 Analysis (emphasis added): House Bill 1890, the companion and preceding bill
2 O
to 8.B. 1716, also provided that ‘the purpose of the legislation was to create “[c]ivil action for
conduct constituting barratry “ee HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION BILL ANALYSIS OF HB
1890, April 20, 2011 coe 890 Analysis”) (emphasis added).'°° Under the enacted statute,
“(victims of barratry w ho did not enter a contract could recover $1 0,000 penalty, actual damages,
NS
and attorney’s fees” See id. (emphasis added).!%
<
‘93 Exhibit 45 — A true and correct copy of S.B. 1716
154 See Exhibit 44 — A true and correct copy of S.B. 1716 Analysis.
‘SS Exhibit 46 — A true and correct copy of H.B. 1890 Analysis.
156 See Id.
23

Texas Government Code section 82.0651, the enacted section to create the civil
enforcement, is specifically titled “Civil Liability for Prohibited Barratry.” See TEx. Gov’T CODE
§ 82.0651(c) and (€) (eff. Sept. 1, 2011 to Aug. 31, 2013) (emphasis added).!57 Section 82.0651
enacted in 2011 provided:

BS

(c) A person who was solicited by conduct violating the laws of tips or the

Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bay of Texas

regarding barratry by attorneys or other persons, but who did Cipenter into a

contract as a result of that conduct, may file a civil action againet y person who

committed barratry. A

NS
(d) A person who prevails in an action under Subsection (sal recover from each
person who engaged in barratry: G
@

(1) a penalty in the amount of $10,000; Ke)

(2) actual damages caused by the prohibited obriduct; and

(3) reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees

&s

See id. (emphasis added). To promote its Purpose to deter barratry and to create a civil liability, §
82.065 1(e) expressly provided that the section was to “liberally construed.” Id. at § 82.0651(e)
(emphasis added). 5 S

In 2013, the Legisatan( pie House Bill 1711, which the bill described as “relating to
barratry,” to amend sections 82.068 and 82.0651. See Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., ch. 315, H.B. 1711,

©
§ 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2013, CHB, 1711”).'°8 The reason for the amendment was stated in the
“background and pitpose” of H.B. 1711:
SS

Recent eisatin established civil liability for prohibited barratry and provided

for ility of a client to void any contract for legal services that was procured

t such prohibited conduct. Concern has been raised over reports that some

attorneys have found a loophole in the law to avoid one of the civil penalties for

barratry by releasing their client after a case is “run” and a contract for legal
‘57 Exhibit 47 — A true and correct copy of TEX. Gov’T CODE § 82.065 (eff. Sept. 1, 2011 to Aug. 31, 2013).
188 Exhibit 48 — A true and correct copy of H.B. 1711.

24

services is signed. Interested parties note that the $10,000 penalty currently
assessed applies only when a person is illegally solicited but no legal services
contract is signed as a result of that conduct and that there is no such penalty if a
legal services contract is signed as a result of that illegal solicitation. In an effort
to close this loophole and hold attorneys who commit barratry accountable for
their actions, C.S.H.B. 1711 authorizes a client who enters into a legal services
contract to recover certain damages and amounts from a person who cempmits
barratry. KN
a @
See HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION BILL ANALYSIS OF HB 171 1, Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., ch. 315,
H.B. 1711, § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2013 (“H.B. 1711 Analysis).!° HB. 114 also amended Section
eZ)
82.0651 from “conduct violating the laws of this state or the Disciplinary Rules of the State Bar
of Texas” to “conduct violating Section 38.12(a) or (b), Penab’Cdde, or Rule 7.03 of the Texas
@
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar6ey exas.” See H.B. 1711; TEX. Gov’T
Cope § 82.0651 (eff. Sept. 1, 2013).!
H.B. 1711 was codified into Section S065) and became effective Sept. 1, 2013. The
Ss
Statute is again titled “Civil Liability for Paiva Barratry” the relevant portion of which
provides: S
(c) A person who was solicited by conduct violating Section 38.12(a) or (b), Penal
Code, or Rule 7.03 of thé Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct of
the State Bar of Texas, tegarding barratry by attorneys or other persons, but who
did not enter into a coiract as a result of that conduct, may file a civil action
against any person why ommitted barratry.
©
(d) A person whbphevails in an action under Subsection (c) shall recover from each
person who engaged in barratry:
NS
(Dhapenalty in the amount of $10,000;
Xe actual damages caused by the prohibited conduct; and.
(3) reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees.
'®? Exhibit 49 — A true and correct copy of H.B. 1711 Analysis.
'©0 Exhibit 50 — A true and correct copy of TEX. Gov’T CODE § 82.0651 (eff. Sept. 1, 2013).
25

See id. (emphasis added). Even as amended, § 85.0651 was to be “liberally construed” to
promote its underlying purpose of deterring barratry. Jd. at § 82.0651 (e). This section has not been
repealed or amended since 2013. See Id.

Unfortunately, however, as shown herein, Michael Pohl believes he is abaye the clear and
unequivocal laws of Texas which are outlined in the Texas Penal Code and beta Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct. This is a textbook case for the violations ofthese laws and rules,
and the evidence is overwhelming. , Ss

i)
II
VIOLATIONS &

The evidence cited to above and attached hereto ceil shows that Michal A. Pohl violated
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, Ss (1) & (2), & (g), 1.15 (a)(1), 5.04 (a)
& (d)(1), 7.03 (b) & (d), 7.05 (a) & (c), 7.06 @eo, 8.04 (a)(1)(2)(3)(9) & (12), & (b). Pohl
and his wife, Donalda also violated the Tea en Code, Sections 38.12(a)(4), 38.12(b)(1), (2)
& (3) which are third-degree felonies in Texas and considered “serious crimes” pursuant to the
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, 8.04(b). Pohl also violated Section 32.43(b) of
the Texas Penal Code. Moreové ti evidence attached outlines an egregious conspiracy between
Michael Pohl and his wife Donald Pohl to take advantage of grieving individuals in despicable
fashion. ou

N
A. TEXAS Discs INARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT VIOLATIONS:
1. Rule L040, (1) & (2), & (g) provides:
a division or agreement for division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the
same firm may be made only if:
(1) the division is:
(i) in proportion to the professional services performed by each lawyer; or
26

(ii) made between lawyers who assume joint responsibility for the

representation; and
(2) The client consents in writing to the terms of the arrangement prior to the time of the
association or referral proposed, including

(i) The identity of all lawyers or law firms who will particips in the fee-
sharing arrangement; and

@

(ii) | Whether fees will be divided based on the proportio Sfservices performed
or by lawyers agreeing to assume joint responsibility fo the representation;
and SS

(iii) | The share of the fee that each lawyer. or firm will receive, or if the
division is based on the proportion of services performed, the basis on which
the division is based on the proportion ab services performed, the basis on
which the division will be made; . . .

(g) Every agreement that allows a lawyer or to associate other counsel in the
representation of a person, or to refett e person to other counsel for such
representation, and that results in suclran association with or referral to a different
law firm or a lawyer in such a diffeeeat firm, shall be confirmed by an arrangement
conforming to paragraph (f). Consent by a client or a prospective client without
knowledge of the informatio ified in subparagraph (f)(2) does not constitute
a confirmation within the g of this rule. No attorney shall collect or seek to
collect fees or expenses connection with any such agreement that is not
confirmed in that way, io t for:

(1) the reasonable value ofteal services provided to that person; and

(2) the reasonable and recdssary expenses actually incurred on behalf of that person.
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. Prom’ Conpuct 1.04(f), (1) & (2), & (g).

©

As shown, Pohl Williamson and Rusnak agreed to share fees arising out of their joint

representation of cen in the BP litigation. The contracts attached hereto as Exhibit 43 are
SS

completely devoid of the language mandated by Rule 1.04, and therefore, prove that Pohl,
Williamson and Rusnak knowing failed to comply with Rule 1.04(f), (1) & (2), & (g).'®!

2. Rule 1.15 (a)(1) provides:

(a) A lawyer shall decline to represent a client or, where representation has commenced,

shall withdraw, except as stated in paragraph (c), from the representation of a client, if:
161 Exhibit 43,
27

(1) the representation will result in violation of Rule 3.08, other applicable rules of
professional conduct or other law; .. .
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.15(a) (1).

The Lawyers rejected many of the potential clients illegally obtained eae was
convicted of a felony and sent to prison in Mississippi in an attempt to estan themselves from
him. However, Pohl, Williamson and Rusnak kept many of the ill-gotten clients, failing to
withdraw as mandated by and in violation of Rule 1.15. 5 &

Rule 5.04 (a) provides:

(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share or promise tire legal fees with a nonlawyer, .
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 5.04(a). ss

As shown above, Pohl agreed to share fees we share fees regarding his rollover cases
with Walker, Ladner, Seymour, Santana, Talley and numerous others, all of which are non-
lawyers.'© Also shown above, Pohl, Witians and Rusnak shared fees with these individuals
regarding their BP litigation! o

3. Rule 7.03 (b) & (d) i es:

(b) A lawyer shall not pay, give, or offer to pay or give anything of value to a person not
licensed to pace la for soliciting prospective clients for, or referring clients or
prospective om o, any lawyer or firm, . . .

(d) A focal not enter into an agreement for, charge for, or collect a fee for
profess} employment obtained in violation of Rule 7.03(a), (b), or (c).

TEX. Dwscrunyey R. PROF’L CONDUCT 7.03(b) & (4).
Sy
1© See Exhibits 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38,41 & 42.
163 See Exhibits 3, 4, 6, 8 & 9.
28

Clearly, the evidence provided herein demonstrates that Pohl violated this Rule by paying,
giving and offering to pay money to Ladner, Walker, Seymour, Santana, Talley and others.! The
agreements attached hereto also prove that Pohl entered into agreements for, charged for and
collected a fee for professional employment obtained in violation of Rule 7.03 PEL!

4. Rule 7.06 (a) & (b) provides: oy

(a) A lawyer shall not accept or continue employment in a matter When that employment
was procured by conduct prohibited by any of Rules 7.01 gh 7.05, 8.04(a))2), or
8.04(a)(9), engaged in by that lawyer personally or by, other person whom the
lawyer ordered, encouraged, or knowingly permitted tocenzage in such conduct.

(b) A lawyer shall not accept or continue employment in matter when the lawyer knows
or reasonably should know that employment w ocured by conduct prohibited by
any of Rules 7.01 through 7.05, 8.04(a)(2), or SS a)(9), engaged in by any person or
entity that is a shareholder, partner, or me ex , an associate in, or of counsel to that
lawyer’s firm; or by any other person wh y of the foregoing persons or entities
ordered, encouraged, or knowingly pee to engage in such conduct.

IN

TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 7 06(3) & (b).

The evidence above makes it sonal clear that Pohl, Williamson and Rusnak illegally
obtained clients through runners. Only.fter Walker was convicted of a felony and sent to prison

2 O
did these Lawyers attempt to “ee themselves from the runners and some of the ill-obtained
cases. However, Pohl, walgqson and Rusnak kept many of these clients in violation of Rule
7.06(a) & (b). In fact, Po conned to use the same runners with regard to the rollover accident
cases he was receiving nd then failed to withdraw in violation of the Rule.!®
NS
&
<
164 See Exhibits 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41 & 42
165 dd.
166 Td.
29

5. Rule 8.04 (a)(1)(2)(3)(9) & (12), & (b) provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not:

(1) Violate these rules, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through
the acts of another, whether or not such violation occurred in the course of a client-
lawyer relationship;

FS

(2) Commit a serious crime, or commit any other criminal act that fefec adversely
on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;

(3) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit orinisrepresentation, ..

(9) engage in conduct that constitutes barratry as defined by the law of this state; . . .

(12) violate any other laws of this state relating to théprofessional conduct of lawyers
and to the practice of law. GP

(b) As used in subsection (a)(2) of this Rule, “seri @erime” means barratry; any felony
involving moral turpitude, any misdem involving theft, embezzlement, or
fraudulent misappropriation of money or o property, or any attempt, conspiracy, or
solicitation of another to commit any <i crimes.

TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 7.066940, ),(3),(9) & (12), & (b).
O,
The overwhelming evidence provided erin, proves that Pohl, Williamson and Rusnak
violated each of these Rules. o
B. TEXAS PENAL CODE ViouAtio NS
1. Section 38.1204)
As shown above, Poht violated Section 38.12(a)(4) of the Texas Penal Code. This section
is violated if a ""ean intent to obtain an economic benefit...pays or gives or offers to pay
oS
or give a persggefebney or anything of value to solicit employment.” TEX. PENAL CODE §
38.12(a)(4). As demonstrated herein, Pohl paid runners, Ladner, Walker, Seymour, Santana, Talley
and others Wlions of dollars to solicit and gather clients for Pohl and his cohorts, not only for the
30

BP litigation, but also with regard to rollover cases.!§7 Pohl did so with the intent to obtain the
economic benefit of attorney’s fees. Thus, Pohl violated Section 38. 12(a)(4).
2. Sections 38.12(b)(1), (2) & (3):
Pohl violated Section 38.12(b)(1), (2) & (3) as well. These sections are viglated when one
(1) knowingly finances the commission of an offense under Subsection (a) oF Sesion 38.12, (2)
invests funds the person knows or believes are intended to further the commission of an offense
under Subsection (a) of Section 38.12 or (3) is a professional who kneel accepts employment
within the scope of the person’s license, registration, or crifation that results from the
solicitation of employment in violation of Subsection (a) of Seétion 38.12. TEX. PENAL CODE §
38.12(b). Clearly, the evidence provided herein sonst Pohl violated this section of the
Texas Penal Code as well.!® KR
3. Section 32.43(b): RS
Pohl further violated Section 22.43 th Texas Penal Code (commercial bribery). Section
32.43(b) of the Texas Penal Code prohibits fiduciary — such as a lawyer — from “intentionally or
knowingly” soliciting, accepting “or agrecing to accept any benefit from another person on
agreement or understanding bart benefit will influence the conduct of the fiduciary in relation
to the affairs of his bea TEX. PENAL CODE § 32.43(b). Pohl intentionally or knowingly
solicited, accepted, or agreed to accept a benefit from the Runners (the ability to represent Plaintiffs
in the rollover sete cases and to obtain the subsequent attorney’s fees therefrom) on the
serene’ oF ndestanding that the benefit received would influence the conduct of Pohl in
relation to the representation of clients in that Pohl breached duties to his clients as outlined above
by engaging in the deceptive barratry scheme.
167 See Exhibits 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41 & 42.
168 Tq.
31

it
CONCLUSION

Although many believe the contrary, no lawyer is above the law. And, although many look
the other way when it comes to case running, the violations outlined in this grievance cannot be
ignored. To do so, would make a mockery of the profession we call the pate fie It would
also serve as a shining example that Texas lawyers are incapable of slyegulaton and that the
State of Texas is incapable of preventing our lawyers from not only ting advantage of those in
need of legal services in Texas, but in other states as these Lawyef have.

The conduct outlined above is some of the most egregious conduct I have seen in more
than twenty-years of practicing legal malpractice. If en of these Lawyers is condoned,
the State Bar and the Texas Supreme Court should fepeal all of the Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct and issue an opinion ning all Texas lawyers that this type of conduct
is the standard for how lawyers may obtain a ie cases in Texas. Additionally, the statutes
regarding barratry will have no meaning and thus, the legislature should simply abolish those
statutes as well. 5 &

&
=) Respectfully submitted,
S&
&S a
, > Lance Christopher Kassab
iS
S$
32

Ih
LAW FIRM
July 3, 2018
ae
VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL (timothy.baldwin@texasbar. com) oy
Timothy J. Baldwin Be
Administrative Attorney “GO
The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel XG
4801 Woodway Drive, Suite 315-W °@
Houston, TX 7705661 ©)
: ®
Re: File No. 201801826: Grievance Concerning di Rusnak
File No. 201801825: Grievance Concerning ichael Pohl
Dear Mr. Baldwin:

Sent with this letter is a copy of the Re ito Ms. Rusnak’s response to the grievance.
Attached to the Reply as Exhibit “A” is a copy of M gdalena Santana’s deposition with all of the
exhibits.’ The deposition is more than 350 ges long and confirms everything in Ms. Santana’s
first affidavit. Of course, Rusnak and Poh-wil undoubted claim that Ms. Santana was coached
to say everything she said in her depositién, Owever, Common sense dictates that that would be
an impossibility due to the length, breadth and detail within of the deposition.

i)

Attached to this letter are bits “A,” “B,” “C,” “D,” “EB,” “EF” & “G”. Exhibit “A” is a
copy of a transcribed conversati etween Lance Kassab and Magdalena Santana wherein she
confirms that she was hired by—Precision Marketing to run cases for Pohl and Williamson2
Santana also confirms that Walker, Kirk Ladner and Steve Seymour were hired by Pohl
and Williamson.’ Jd. Eve himself has testified in an affidavit that Walker, Ladner and
Seymore were his représefitatives.4 The affidavit is attached hereto as Exhibit “B.” In his
affidavit, Pohl states, Ch addition to performing permissible public relations services for me,
Walker, Seymour, Ladner, and Robinson (and/or their companies) were my representatives for
purposes of perforthing client liaison services, client screening services, and evidence gathering
services in co on with BP oil spill claims and/or motor vehicle accident claims.” All this
corroborates x Santana has said in her first affidavit which Rusnak and Pohl now argue the
Bar should fe} consider.

1 Exhibit “A”
* Rusnak has been determined to be Williamson’s partner and a partner in the joint venture to obtain BP cases. See
Order from the Mississippi Federal Court attached to grievance.
3 Exhibit “A,” pp. 2, 4
* Exhibit “B,” par. 7
1214 Elgin Street | Houston | Texas | 77004 | p. 713.522.7400 f. 713.522.7410 | www.TexasLegalMalpractice.com

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 3, 2018
Page 2 of 3

Attached as Exhibit “C,” is the affidavit of Andrew Paul Mozingo who is an expert in
computer forensics. Mr. Mozingo pulled the text messages from Scott Walker’s cell phone. The
text messages between Walker and Pohl and Walker and Pohl’s paralegal, Edgar Jaimes also
corroborates Santana’s testimony from her first affidavit and deposition and shows how these
folks would visit hospitals, funerals and homes to sign up clients.

Exhibit “D” attached hereto is a spreadsheet showing the prentgs nP and his
joint ventures, Williamson and Rusnak paid to non-lawyers. As the Spreads indicates, these
runners were always paid their contract percentages of either 30% of the f or 22.5% of the
fees.° “GS

&

Exhibits “E”* and “F”” are documents which show that Pohl, Gniacted clients within days
of tragic accidents which claimed the lives of loved ones. These @optacts are clear violations of
the Texas Penal Code, Section 38.12(d)(2)(A). This section-de nes one act of barratry as
follows: oP

(d) A person commits an offense if the persone)

(1) Is an attorney, .. .

(2) With the intent to obtain Sonal employment for the person or for
another, provides or knowi permist to be provided to an individual who
has not sought the perso ployment, leg! representation, advice, or care a
written communication, 0 a solicitation, including a solicitation in person or
by telephone, that: ©
(A) Concerns Gon for personal injury or wrongful death or otherwise

relates to Ge rocident or disaster involving the person to whom the
communication or solicitation is provided or a relative of that person and
that vad provided before the 31% day after the date on which the accident
or ion occurred;

Clearly, Poh Violated the penal code in this manner® and thus, violated Texas
Disciplinary Rule of Pofesional Conduct, Rule 8.04 and then violated Rule 7.06 by continuing
employment. Po cepted employment of these two clients and continued employment with
these two clien ark Cheatham, Sr. and Lacy Reese). Moreover, Pohl violated Rule 1.03 by
failing to eee this material information to these two clients.
> Exhibit “D”
® Exhibit “E” (Email regarding contacting Lacy Reese within days of losing her husband in a rollover accident)

7 Exhibit “F” (Declaration of Mark Cheatham, Sr. wherein he states that he was contacted within a couple of days of
the tragic accident that claimed the lives of his loved ones, by people who he later found out were sent there by
Michael Pohl)

8 See Exhibits “E” & “F.” See also Pohl deposition (Exhibit “G,” pp. 80-83; 271-273 and 275). Thus, Pohl
contacted Mark Cheatham, Sr. and Lacy Reese within days from the tragic accidents that took the lives of their
loved ones in violation of the Texas Penal Code.

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 3, 2018
Page 3 of 3

Exhibit “G” is the deposition of Michael Pohl that was recently taken with all exhibits.
The deposition is telling in that he conveniently could not recall numerous pertinent fact, refused
to answer certain questions, and was generally combative throughout the deposition. Mr. Pohl
also accused Kassab of personally breaking into his office in Gulfport Mississippi and stole his
files and computers.” Here, Mr. Pohl admits that he was running a law office Mississippi”
Mr. Pohl also admits that he has an office in Tennessee.!! However, he i t licensed to
practice law in Tennessee. Mr. Pohl is also not licensed to practice law i Mississippi 2 By
operating a law firm in Tennessee and Mississippi without a license to practic law in those
states appears to violate Rules 5.05 and 7.01. XG)

&

Additionally, during Mr. Pohl’s deposition he came over to where my client, my nephew,
David Kassab and my client were talking and told my client that pe ever wanted to settle his
case to give him a call without his lawyers present.!? This appe S to be a violation of Texas
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 4.02. G

@

- Santana’s affidavit and the corroborating testimony-of Michael Pohl’s paralegal, Edgar
Jaimes, prove that Pohl paid Santana $50,000.00 in c rt her agreement not to testify against
him.'* This is not only a criminal act, it is a violationof Rules 3.04 and 8.04.

RY
es Sincerely,
S THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
© o FZ
ES “
O Lance Christopher Kassab

Cec: Billy Shepherd (bs So spcounsel.com)

Steve Bailey (sbailey(@spcounsel.com)

Gregg Weinberg gweinberg(@rmwbhlaw.com)

John Zavitsae ey (jzavitsanos(@azalaw.com)

Patrick “we ough (pyarborough@azalaw.com)

©

LCK/sg Sy
9 Exhibit “G,” pp. 87-93.
10 Td.
1] Exhibit “G,” pp. 44-46 (Pohl likely did have his Tennessee website approved by any state bar as well.)
12 Exhibit “G,” pp. 17-18.
13 Exhibit “G,” pp. 226-229,
'4 Edgar Jaimes’ deposition transcript will be forwarded next week after it has been transcribed.
15 See Chapter 36 of the Texas Penal Code.

LAW FIRM
July 20, 2018
ewe
ViA ELECTRONIC MAIL (timothy.baldwin@texasbar.com) oy
Timothy J. Baldwin 5 &
Administrative Attorney eS
The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel °F
4801 Woodway Drive, Suite 315-W &
Houston, TX 7705661
®

Re: File No. 201801825: Grievance Concerning Michael Pohl
Dear Mr. Baldwin: ©

[am in receipt of Michael Pohl’s Reply sted ly 17, 2018. Again, rather than address
the actual merits of the alleged rule violating Pod and his counsel throw more disparaging
remarks against me. In fact, essentially all 22 pages of the reply act out against me personally
rather than addressing the merits. So

)

Of course, there are too MG iicutons remarks to address in a short time, nonetheless,
there are several that should bé mentioned. First of all, they criticize me for asking for additional
time to address all of te disparaging remarks against me personally in addition to
supplementing the gribwanc and then they also criticize me for not addressing the disparaging
remarks. As you inay remember, on July 2, 2018, I requested an additional 30 days to respond,

wS
however, shesy thereafter you told me that I could not be granted 30 days. Therefore, I
attempted tp cobble together additional documents that I thought would be pertinent for your
review in a short amount of time. With not much time to respond, I thought the documents
pertaining to the grievance were more important than addressing Pohl’s personal attacks.
Obviously, Pohl and his counsel disagree.
1214 Elgin Street | Houston | Texas | 77004 |p. 713.522.7400 f. 713.522.7410 | www.TexasLegalMalpractice.com

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 2 of 17
Additionally, Pohl and his lawyers state that I have “blatantly” mischaracterized Pohl’s
50,000.00 payment to Magdalena Santana (“Santana”). Unbelievably, Pohl and his lawyers state
that the $50,000.00 cash payment was for what they attempt to describe as ajo release”
that “included a standard non-disparagement clause. . . .”! Notably, nownefe.in the “agreement”
are the words, “non-disparagement.” What is also notable is that Senin crossed out the words
“in order to clear my conscience and set the record straight.” She also crossed out the words,
“These charges [(referring to the previous claims and ategsion she made against Pohl and
others concerning barratry)] were made by me when Sra in dire need of money and not
thinking clearly.”? The only inference that can be nade Santana crossing out these statements
was that she was thinking with a clear mind win se made the allegations against Pohl and
others, that she wanted to set the record seat and that she was not in dire need of money.

Not only are my characterizations of the $50,000.00 cash payment accurate, Pohl and his
lawyers are hypocrites in that they blatantly” mischaracterize my agreement with an expert
witness. Pohl and his lawyers éapanery lie to you by stating over and over and over again that
I “knowingly purchased cident records stolen from Pohl and improperly solicited Pohl’s
clients based on that itGopiation.” Any examination of the agreement that these lawyers cite to
as their proof i assertion contradicts this statement. These lawyers cannot cite to or
provide any poo! of their claim. Yet, they contort the truth to disparage me in a feeble ad
hominem aitempt to direct the focus away from Pohl. This is truly shameful.

1 Pohl’s Reply, p. 14.
? Exhibit 16 to Pohl’s Reply.
3 Pohl’s Reply, p. 1.

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 3 of 17
In any event, in order to make their statement that I have “blatantly” mischaracterized the
$50,000.00 cash payment to Santana, these lawyers state, “Rather, the agreement sought to
prevent Santana from further ‘publishing’ or relating to third parties her allegations of wrongful
eS
conduct.” Actually, the agreement that Santana was forced to sign before Reon get paid
states: ES
nS)
FOR THE SUM OF $100 AND OTHER CONSIDERATIO $50,000.00 IN
CASH] RECEIVED I AGREE TO TODAY AND FROM EFORTH NOT
TO PUBLISH IN WRITING OR BY ELECTRONIC ANY CHARGES
OF WRONGDOING, CRIMNAL CONDUCT, ILLEGAL CONDUCT OR
UNETHICAL CONDUCT AND SHALL NOT RELATE SUCH CHARGES TO
ANYONE VERBALLY .* S
Agreeing “not publish in writing or by cect mail any charges of wrongdoing,
criminal conduct, illegal conduct or unethical uct” against Pohl, and agreeing “not to
INN
relate such charges [regarding Pohl] to anyovie verbally” is an agreement not to testify against
Pohl. Who are these guys kidding? What does this mean? Yet, incredibly, these same
lawyers argue to you that a retainer agreement with an expert witness means I “knowingly
purchased confidential records sdien from Pohl and improperly solicited Pohl’s clients based on
that information.” Their ey remarkable.
Another cul tendency to skew the truth may be found on page four of Pohl’s
Reply. There, they Eapsesent to you and this forum that: .
of
NS
It is also(uncontroverted that Walker and his partners in the alleged “barratry
conspiracy,” Steve Seymour (Seymour”) and Kirk Ladner (“Ladner”), held
the es out as having expertise in marketing/public relations services,
repre nted to Pohl that they operated under the guidance of experienced
issippi attorneys to ensure the propriety of their marketing activities, and
did, in fact, obtain review and approval of their marketing activities from
several Mississippi lawyers.°
* Exhibit 16 to Pohl’s Reply (emphasis added).
> Page 4 of Pohl’s Reply (emphasis added).

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 4 of 17
First, these lawyers cite you to page 194-195 of Mr. Walker’s deposition as support for
this representation. They make this representation to you as though Mr. Walker testified that he,
Ladner and Seymour “operated under the guidance of experienced Mississippi. ‘attorneys to
‘ . . . age . NS
ensure the propriety of their marketing activities, and did, in fact, obtain review and approval of
their marketing activities from several Mississippi lawyers.” Yet, Mr. Walker says nothing of
the sort. In fact, Mr. Walker states the complete opposite. He sate
They—when you say approved by many attorneys, that~Qhat’s the contracts, the
May 25"" and July 15"" contracts that have been wri by -- that were written
by Pohl and looked at by five or six attorneys. T, are the contracts. Now,
the inner workings of $5 million of barratry mate that came through, that’s
not attorneys approving that. I mean, this — ) re approving the little generic
one-page contracts that I know now today, not’on June 17"" of ’13 but today, I
know were written just to protect Mr. Pohl abd Mr Williamson.°
| WS
In fact, Mr. Walker continues to state under oath"" We were training the field workers of Jimmy
Williamson and Michael Pohl to go agen solicit contracts.”’ Of course, Pohl and his
lawyers fail to direct you to this portion, of the testimony. These lawyers must believe that you
eO)
will simply take their word fae is written in the Reply and not care to read the actual
testimony. Additionally, they would rather criticize and disparage me for bringing this conduct to
the State Bar’s tention ae the State Bar the truth.
Pohl and his Nawyers go on to state that I concealed from Pohl and this forum my
of
NS
possession of atelephone recording of Ms. Santana that “contradicts the factual premise” of the
grievance. These lawyers then cherry pick a portion of the transcript they believe contradicts the
factual wee of the grievance (which it does not). Again, of course, these lawyers fail to cite
the portion of the transcript that fully supports the “premise of the grievance.” Moreover, they
6 Exhibit 3 to Pohl’s Reply, (excerpt of Walker’s depo, p. 195, In. 16 through p. 196, In. 3) (emphasis added).
7 Exhibit 3 to Pohl’s Reply, (excerpt of Walker’s depo, p. 196, Ins. 23-26) (emphasis added).

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 5 of 17
fail to cite to you another transcribed recording of Ms. Santana that further supports the “premise
of the grievance.”
Regarding the statements made in the first Santana transcript that these layers conceal
EN
from you, the conversation is this: oy
Ms. Santana: Is there any way that I can sue them at all? &
S
Mr. Kassab: Sue Pohl and those guys? ES
°@
Ms. Santana: Pohl and the guys that actually started the Scheme. Scott Walker, Steve
Seymore, Kirk Latner (sic). &
Mr. Kassab: And Williamson and all those guys? &
S
Ms. Santana: Yes®
ah
Mr. Kassab: Yeah, my understandin from talking to you and to other people, was
that Pohl and Willia are the ones who came up with it and they just
hired Walker and thes olks.
Ms. Santana: The marketing?
SE)
Mr. Kassab: Yeah, the marketing company.
Ms. Santana: Chain ef mma I guess.
Mr. Kassab: Yost and hired people like you to go out and actually do it. But the
iat eting company, my understanding is the marking (sic) guys, were
hired by Pohl and Williamson to do all this. They didn’t know how to do
Ort. I mean, it wasn’t their idea. Isn’t that your understanding?
ge
Ms. Santana Yeah.
©
Mi Kassab: But isn’t that your understanding?
Ms. Santana: it makes sense now. I guess it went through a chain of command.’
® Exhibit 13 to Pohl’s Reply, p. 2-3.
° Exhibit 13 to Pohl’s Reply, pp. 4-5.

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 6 of 17
There was no “coax” of Santana. She made these statements of her own free will. In
fact, as can be seen in the transcript, the question is asked, “Isn’t that your understanding?”
Santana was free to say “no” but she didn’t. Santana confirmed that it was through a chain of
command with Pohl and Williamson at the top. Of course, Pohl himself confined this point
when he finally admitted in his own affidavit that Walker, Ladner Sr were his
representatives.'° In his affidavit, Pohl stated under oath that, “Sk addition to performing
permissible public relations services for me, Walker, Seymour, {adner, and Robinson (and/or
their companies) were my representatives for purposes of verfoming client liaison services,
client screening services, and evidence gathering services connection with BP oil spill claims
and/or motor vehicle accident claims.” This admicton confirms what Santana stated in the
transcript. Interestingly, although Pohl sie tt hired to Walker, Seymour, Ladner and
Robinson to perform “permissible” public ton services for him, Pohl fails to state that he
hired these folks to perform “permissible"" “client liaison services, client screening services, and
evidence gathering services in conneetion with BP oil spill claims and/or motor vehicle accident
claims.” Most likely because knew that the services these folks were providing was not
“permissible.” ©)
Additionally, Pht and his lawyer’s statement that I “concealed” this transcript from the
OCDC is preposten@: The transcript supports the grievance, thus, there would be no reason to
conceal it. re a so many documents that support the grievance and only so much time to
prepare a Btievance, It is surprising that Pohl and his lawyers do not cite some of the thousands
of other documents that did not make it into the grievance and state that I “concealed” those as
well in their attempt to shine the focus away from Pohl.
'° Exhibit “B,” par. 7 attached to July 3, 2018 letter to Mr. Baldwin.

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 7 of 17
The second conversation with Santana also supports the “premise of the grievance.”
Since Pohl and his lawyers failed to provide you a copy of this conversation, I guess they
“concealed” it from you as well. It makes sense that they would intentional} conceal this
because it is not only devastating to their position, it shows that one of the awe zo her to sign
the second affidavit"" that Pohl and his lawyers attempt to use as evidence that the first affidavit
SS
is false. In the transcript, Santana infers that I should pay her for het help and pay her for the
; SS
documents she is in possession of. Of course, I decline. Noneties it is obvious from the full
conversation t that she was paid by one of the lawyers to sign the second affidavit. Pohl and his
lawyers know this, yet have done nothing to bring this tote tight Rather, they have suppressed
this information and even concealed this conversation om you even though they had a copy of
the recording when they filed their Reply on sly 7,201 8.1?

In any event, I have transcribed the seording and it is attached hereto as Exhibit “1.” In
the conversation, Santana states that there aire numerous lawyers in Texas that have approached
her to do what she was doing ee She states, “I can name ten lawyers right now that do
the same thing in Texas. The thing.”'* Ms. Santana also states, “Michael Pohl was not the
only attorney that spproacied me."" Santana also states that after researching that I handle
malpractice claims agdinst lawyers and what that means in the law industry, she said to herself,

IN
o
I Exhibit 1, per
2 A copy Sao oduced to them on July 9, 2018.
'3 Exhibit 1, pp. 7-8
4 Id. p.7.
15 Td.

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 8 of 17
“oh, my God, these guys then should be punished. .. ””!* She goes on to state that, “After [Pohl]
taught me the ropes, then I would run into other attorneys doing his dirty work. I — other
attorneys approached me, you know.”!” She stated that “They’ve even got diplomates involved,
embassy. Consulate lawyers and diplomats. It’s a big scheme.”!® Santana sii and states,
“Yeah. Well, this is a nationwide scheme, and they’re all over the place. Chey're in New York,
they’re in Washington, they’re in Florida. They’re in Texas. Oktaidm, They’re in Mexico
over the border, the Paisano brothers, those brothers, these other snore. It’s unreal.””!9
To further support the “premise of the grievance fei Pohl, and to assist you in
combing through this evidence, I will cite to you speciforton of the testimony and evidence
already provided. If it is not something previously prove it is being provided in the email or a
by way of a link referenced therein. If I have invertenty omitted any of the items that I cite,
please let me know and I will provide it. LV
Walker testified that although he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or “marketing
money” it was “clear to [him] it, was barratry? In fact, Walker considered himself and his
iS
company “a pass-through fot barratry money.””! All total, Walker, Ladner and Precision
Marketing received over $5 lion in “barratry pass-through money” from Pohl and other
lawyers to solicit acciept victims and potential clients with claims, both auto-accident victims
©
16 Td, p. 6. &S
7 Td, pp. 18.0
18 Id. p. SS
19 Id, p. 10.
© Deposition of Scott Walker, p. 149.
""1 Deposition of Scott Walker, p. 197:6-7.

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 9 of 17
and those involved in the BP Deepwater Horizon litigation.” They would use this money to pay
contract workers to solicit clients.”> They would locate and instruct contract workers on how to
accomplish the solicitation. They trained “40 or 50 people” on how to “go gen solicit
contracts,” oy
One of these workers was Magdalena Santana (“Santana”). In her September 24, 2016
; Ss
affidavit, Santana testified that Pohl sent her on dozens and dozens ofe r wreck cases all over
the country.”* Pohl would email Santana the link of news covedSp depicting the accident and
ask her “to go to the victim or the victim’s family and try Ke them to sign up with him.”27
Pohl offered to give Santana “$5,000 per case that [a Sane plus a percentage of his
attorney’s fees.”** Santana was advised by Pohl to be peste even if the family ... rejected
[her].”’° Santana was instructed by Pohl to “apse the victims and their families while they
were vulnerable, in the emergency room the hospital rooms or at the funerals.”2° Pohl told
Santana that minorities “were especially vilnerable since they tended not to know that the law
prohibited barratry.”>! Aco Fo they “were easier to sign up.”22
©
*2 Deposition of Scott Walker, reas 74:1-25; 75-1-15,
3 Deposition of Scott vate
4 Deposition of Scott vale p. 77-78.
25 Deposition of Set Water p. 196-197,
26 Santana atid 17.
cal Santana Aiigavi 417.
*8 Santana Affidavit, J 18.
?° Santana Affidavit, { 19.
%° Santana Affidavit, 7 19.
*! Santana Affidavit, {| 19 (emphasis added).

Timothy J. Baldwin

July 20, 2018

Page 10 of 17

Pohl would give Santana “money to give to the victims or their families” but “only if they

agreed to sign a Pohl representation contract.”33 Pohl advised Santana that the money was a “foot
in the door” but instructed Santana not to mention that she was there on behalf or erver “until
after they agreed to take the money.”*4 “If the client agreed to hire Pohl, the [Stang was to
have the client sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.”°5 Pohl would then give Santana the money to
pay the client “from his own Helping Hands company.” When Saplina questioned this, Pohl
told Santana that it “was illegal for him to pay [her] directly for ce) and that’s why the money
had to go through some company.”37 &

Defendants may take the position that Santa rate this affidavit through a
December 19, 2017 affidavit produced in this case. Thi purported retraction is likely the result
of Pohl paying Santana to provide testimony, wich is something he has done in the past.3? In
fact, Pohl’s own paralegal, Edgar Jaimes Caimes, testified that on one occasion Pohl sent him
to Florida with a suit case filled with $50,000 cash to give to Santana in exchange for her signing
an affidavit for him.*° Jaimes ian Santana would only get the money if she signed the

©

2 Santana Affidavit, 19. S

33 Santana Affidavit, J 17. ©

34 Santana Affidavit, so

5 Santana Aerial 24

36 Santana ‘ee 424.

*7 Santana Affidavit, § 23.

*8 December 19, 2017 Santana Affidavit.

39 Exhibit 2 - Deposition of Edgar Jaimes, pp. 371-373.
* Exhibit 2 - Deposition of Edgar Jaimes, pp. 371-373,

Timothy J. Baldwin

July 20, 2018

Page 11 of 17

statement for Pohl.*’ Jaimes testified that Santana signed the signed the statement and got the
money.”

Santana went into more detail about this in her deposition. Santana teste at that the
statement was an agreement for her to keep quiet and not charge Pohl with ny srongdoing or
criminal or unethical conduct.*? Santana testified that Pohl paid her $50,000 cash to sign this
statement, which was delivered by Jaimes in three bags marked “tick reat."" Very symbolic
given that Santana had been tricked by Pohl into soliciting aliens him and was now being
treated the money she claimed was due just to stay quite. Sen iterated that if she didn’t sign
the gag agreement, she wouldn’t get the money from Pohl Santana attempted to indicate on the
agreement that she was receiving $50,000 to keep quik Jaimes told her Pohl demanded that
she state she only received nominal consideain, like $100.%° Santana did not write the
statement but “just signed it’4” because ob ta she was “forced to sign” it*® while “under
duress.””? Santana’s December 19, 2017 affidavit produced by Pohl in this case is likely the

result of similar duress and pacino

©

“| Exhibit 2 — Deposition of Eager Jaitnes, pp. 373-374.
“ Exhibit 2 — Deposition of Bdgar Jaimes, pp. 373-374,
4 Exhibit 3 — Sentane XSi, Vol. I, p. 153.

“4 Exhibit 3 — seis Deposition, Vol. I, p. 122-127.

4° Exhibit 3 ~ Sento Deposition, Vol. I, p. 131.

7 echt Sdcotan Deposition, Vol. II, p. 346.
47 Exhibit 3 — Santana Deposition, Vol. I, p. 153.
“8 Exhibit 3 — Santana Deposition, Vol. I, p. 155.
“? Exhibit 4 — Santana Deposition, Vol. II, p. 309.

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 12 of 17
Notably, nowhere in Santana’s December 19"" affidavit does she state the testimony in
her former affidavit is untrue, only that she does not “agree with” it and that the affidavit is not
“reliable.”°? Although Santana states in her December 19"" affidavit that her priox affidavit was
drafted by a lawyer, Santana testified in her deposition that the Stone 2 affidavit was
created voluntarily with her own “testimony.”>' Santana testified that, unbike- with Pohl, she was
not paid and had never been promised any money to provide the testing in the September 24
affidavit.** Santana reiterated to counsel for Pohl, Billy sheph& that she was there in her
deposition to tell the truth and would not be bullied by his aeftioing or his efforts to confuse
her. ©
Regardless, Santana confirmed most of the fa set forth in her initial affidavit in her
deposition™ and this deposition testimony was na etracted. There, Santana confirmed that she
was hired by Pohl to solicit auto accident the first one being an accident where a woman
and her unborn child lost their lives.° Senfana was instructed by Walker, who was instructed by
Pohl, to go to personally visit thec mother of the deceased and sign her up to sue the tire
manufacturer — if she suits fo would pay her $5,000.°’ Santana visited the funeral of the
s\
a
°° December 19, 2017 Sant ffidavit,
> Exhibit 4 — Santana 2G Ston, Vol. II, p. 270-271.
52 Exhibit 4 — Sane Deposition Vol. II, p. 276-278.
3 Exhibit 3 — Sontans Deposition, Vol. I, p. 176.
4 Exhibit SQ vane Deposition, Vol. I; Exhibit 4 — Santana Deposition, Vol. II.
55 See December 19, 2017 Santana Affidavit.
°° Exhibit 3 — Santana Deposition, Vol, I, p. 37.
°” Exhibit 3 — Santana Deposition, Vol, I, p. 37-38.

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 13 of 17
deceased and got the family to feel comfortable with her.°® At first the mother was grieving, but
Pohl told Santana: “take no prisoners, this is a cut throat business, you get in there and you do
whatever it takes to get this client.”°° The solicitation was successful after Pohl gave Santana
$2,000 for her to “give to the client to convince her into signing over with he
After that, Santana attempted to solicit about “forty to fifty” auto accident cases for Pohl
from Texas to Florida.®' About fifteen to eighteen cases were sul signed up. Pohl would
send Santana a web link with information about the accident and dre the potential client may
be found and she would hit the ground running.® Santana sid clients for Pohl in “hospitals,
funeral homes, you name it.” Pohl instructed Santana tng minorities because they are
“unrecognized to the law” and “they don’t know he In an effort to circumvent the law,
Santana was instructed to have the client call Polis that it would look like the client made the
initial contact with the lawyer. Santana wold oer the clients money to sign with Pohl but had
explicit instructions from Pohl: “If they don't sign they don't get no money.”®” In short, “no
ee
*8 Exhibit 3 — Santana Deposition, @) p. 37-38.
°° Exhibit 3 — Santana a.) I, p. 39.
% Exhibit 3 — Santana Dep4eitidn, Vol. I, p. 40.
5! Exhibit 3 — Santana So, Vol. I, p. 43.
6 Exhibit 3 — Sane Depstn Vol. I, p. 46-47
© Exhibit 3 — Sine Deposition, Vol. I, p. 54.
84 er ee Deposition, Vol. I, p. 52.
°° Exhibit 3 — Santana Deposition, Vol. I, p. 52.
°° Exhibit 3 — Santana Deposition, Vol. I, p. 60.
§7 Exhibit 3 — Santana Deposition, Vol. I, p, 42.

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 14 of 17
signature, no money.”® Santana testified in her deposition that was paid $2,500 for every client
she signed up and was “promised a percentage in the back end” by Pohl and Walker.© Pohl told
Santana that the money would have to go through Walker’s company Precisiqn, Marketing
because it “was illegal for him to give [her] the money directly.””° oe
Another of Pohl’s solicitors was Kenneth Talley (“Talley”), who Solicited over 20 auto
accident cases for Pohl.’ Talley testified that he was first hired by! Walker in relation to BP
claims to find “folks that lost money due to the oil spill” and «si hem up” and “get a fee for
it.””? Talley went to work “knocking on doors” looking for Sn claimants for Pohl and his
partner, Jimmy Williamson (“Williamson”).” Talley sélcted and signed up for Pohl and
Williamson more than 800 BP claims.” Talley wa between $75 and $350 for each BP
client he signed up.” ~
Talley eventually switched to soliciting aut accident victims and “calling on folks that
had bad accidents” with the first being @ Victim that was in “the hospital in intensive care.”
Talley carried with him up to get pay the accident victims to “help them with problems”
©
68 Exhibit 3 — Santana Deposit, Vol I, p. 66.
© Exhibit 3 — Santana Depbsition, Vol. I, p. 47.
7 Exhibit 3 — Santana Depion Vol. I, p. 72.
7 Exhibit 5 — Dep of Kenneth Talley, p. 87.
” Exhibit 5 — Depebition of Kenneth Talley, p. 10.
73 Exhibit SS Merosition of Kenneth Talley, p. 10-11.
™ Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 11.
® Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 19.
7 Exhibit 5 ~ Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 37.

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 15 of 17
once they “were signed up.””’ Talley kept a list of all the auto accident cases he solicited.78
Talley followed a checklist that instructed him to, among other things, bring flowers to the initial
hospital visit (but to spend no more than $50) and to offer the victims money butte “make sure
the funding schedule” from Helping Hands Financing — Donalda Pohl’s cose managed by
Pohl’s paralegal Jaimes — “is filled out properly before releasing any cash” Talley would
S
advise the victims that he had attorneys who could help them, and that ne of those attorneys was
NS
Pohl.*° Talley was paid a fee of $1,400 plus his expenses by Poh{thtough Walker, for any auto
accident case he solicited.*! On some cases, including the Chesifiam case, Talley was to receive a
portion of the fee paid to Helping Hands Group out of Poh atomey’ fees.* Talley discussed
with Pohl the “percentage of settlements” he was to ser from the cases he solicited and Pohl
told Talley that the money was being placed iin “escrow account” for him.®? When asked
whether Pohl knew he was getting paid to “ntact vehicle accident victims,” Talley responded,
“the money was coming from Edgar [laintes] who worked for him.”** Although his paycheck
was from Walker’s company, “tates came by way of Edgar [Jaimes].”®
77 Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kenifedt alley, p. 38.
Or
78 Exhibit 5 — Deposition ofKehneth Talley, p. 43-44; Exhibit 6— Talley Exhibit 165.
7 ~~
9 Exhibit 7 — Talley Exhibit 168.
8 Exhibit 5 — Destin of Kenneth Talley, p. 47.
8! Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 47-48.
82 Exhibit 3 Serosition of Kenneth Talley, p. 97-98; 102.
* Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 99.
%4 Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 100.
* Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 100.

Timothy J. Baldwin

July 20, 2018

Page 16 of 17

Personally soliciting clients for Pohl became so frequent that Talley began carrying with

him blank Pohl contracts to each solicitation.® Talley would refer the potential clients to
“attorneys out of Houston that were the best at handling these types of soared would
offer to give the potential clients “money up front.”®” Talley would only rcopinii Pohl and no
other lawyer.** Talley would have no “reason not to mention Mr. Pohl’s fame.” Talley would
not tell the clients that he was getting paid to solicit them.” Talley weil present a Pohl contract
to the potential client.”' If the client did not sign up, the clients wid ot get the money.” Talley
testified that Edgar and Donalda would send him the money 3?

Both Talley and Pohl knew that what they were ding a illegal. In one instance, Talley
was “run out of town” while soliciting clients for Poh Talley testified during the attempted
solicitation he was told by a “lawyer or police that “it was against the law what [he] was
doing.”** Talley mentioned this to Pohl and Pod tol him “‘you’ve just got to leave...some people
you can’t help.” S

Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kenneth Tate, p. 49.

87 Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kennet ‘oy p. 54.

88 Exhibit 5 — Deposition of coh p. 59.

% Exhibit 5 — Deposition ofKehneth Talley, p. 108.
5° Exhibit 5 — Deposit Kenneth Talley, p. 58; 109.
5! Exhibit 5 — Destin of Kenneth Talley, p. 89.

92 Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 58-59.
3 Exhibit 3S position of Kenneth Talley, p. 86.

* Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 84.

°5 Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 84.
*6 Exhibit 5 — Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 85.

Timothy J. Baldwin
July 20, 2018
Page 17 of 17
Mr. Baldwin, this is just a fraction of the evidence that I have mounted against Pohl and
his conspirators through my efforts to bring my clients justice. I continue to gather evidence as
my cases proceed, but I believe the information that has been submitted already. provides more
eS
than just cause to discipline Pohl and keep him from engaging in these peedtory barratry
practices. We are supposed to be a self-regulating profession. I am taking fixe out of my practice
eS
and my life with my family to inform the State Bar of the unethical coe that I have witnessed
WS
as I have an obligation to do under the disciplinary rules. I do this Sveh though I get ridiculed and
Z)
threatened by opposing counsel. I do this because I am hopefuf that the State Bar will protect the
public from lawyers like Pohl. ©
sheet
<a KASSAB LAW FIRM
&
© r
© oo
@ Lance Christopher Kassab
&
Cc: Billy Shepherd (shedaspcounselcom
Steve Bailey “ee spcounsel.com)
aN
O
LCK/dek &
&

a
1) <assab
LAW FIRM
October 19, 2018
vs
VIA ELECTRONIC MAU. (timothy.baldwin ‘@texasbar.com) oy
Timothy J. Baldwin . &
Administrative Attorney ~S
The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel 5 eS
4801 Woodway Drive, Suite 315-W &
Houston, TX 7705661 a
Re: File No. 201801826: Grievance Concernin: di Rusnak
File No. 201801825: Grievance Concerni ichael Pohl
Dear Mr. Baldwin:

J am in receipt of your letters dated October 15, 2018, notifying me that the complaints I
filed against Cyndi Rusnak and Michael Pohl een placed on a Summary Disposition Panel
docket. My understanding of what this is that the Chief Disciplinary Counsel has
recommended that the grievances be summatily dismissed.

I have informed you and the Seis Bar that I have a plethora of documents and swom
testimony from witnesses and even the actual Tunners who were hired and paid by these lawyers
to conduct their illegal and im Oper solicitation of clients and invited you to peruse this
evidence as part of your investi mn because it was too much to simply put in the complaint.
However, I have never been acted by anyone to come view this evidence, Therefore, no
effort to review evidence and/or conduct a meaningful investigation has occurred. Obviously,

there truly are good reasongy, our State Bar gets a D minus compared to other State Bars.
©

I have brought these grievances as I am required to do pursuant to Rule 8.03. However,
instead of a thorough vestigation, I have been subjected to insults, criticisms, lies and outright
slander as to my°’edrduct and integrity in attempting to uphold the rule of law, the rules of

professional duct and the barratry statutes created by the Texas Legislature. It appears to me
that the oppo side only needs to state that I have filed these grievances to “gain an advantage
in litigation?and the State Bar then summarily dismisses the grievances. Lawyers like me, who
handle | alpractice cases, are the ones that see the violations of the rules, yet when we file
grievances-we are immediately accused of attempting to gain an advantage in litigation. I can
assure you there is never an advantage to filing a grievance while civil litigation is pending. In
fact, in my experience, it is a detriment. A while back a lawyer from the State Bar actually
admitted to me that there is an unwritten rule at the State Bar to summarily dismiss bar violations
when civil litigation is pending. Apparently, this is the case here as well.

1214 Elgin Street | Houston | Texas | 77004 | p. 713.522.7400 £7 13.522.7410 | www.TexasLegalMalpractice.com

Timothy J. Baldwin
October 19, 2018
Page 2 of 2
The State Bar should abolish Rule 8.03 if it has no meaning. Why follow Rule 8.03 or
have the Rule if the State Bar is set on summarily dismissing grievances filed under that Rule
without any investigation? Why file ethics complaints at all if there is pending civil litigation if
litigation nullifies ethics rules in the eyes of the State Bar? Why bring blatant S violations to
the State Bar’s attention if the State Bar refuses to even look at the evid Why have the
State Bar “enforce” disciplinary rules when it refuses to any more than wea district attorney’s
office can do already, as with theft of client property? AG)
SS
You can go ahead and file a grievance against me and sanctips me right now because I
will no longer follow Rule 8.03. [ will no longer waste my tig pid effort trying to help the
State Bar keep unscrupulous lawyers in check by filing ethics plaints when I see corrupt
behavior. Instead, I will work harder on exposing lawyers t public at large so, hopefully,
Texans will not be harmed by unscrupulous lawyers since tate Bar refuses to do the job it
has been given. And, I will work harder on exposing the Texas State Bar’s failings until the day”
the State Bar actually tries to protect Texans. Apparently, this is the only way lawyers can
actually self-regulate to help the public at large.
sh
s Sincerely,
< THE KASSAB LAW FirM
© PP
& ~~ Lance Christopher Kassab
S
Cc: — Randy Sorrels ©
aN
3
&
<
LeK/amS"
7,2018-10-24,MTD,Kassab,TCPA Motion to Dismiss,"Kassab's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to the Texas Citizens Participation Act (Anti-SLAPP), filed October 24, 2018","Filed simultaneously with Kassab's First Amended Answer on October 24, 2018, before Judge Bill Burke, 189th Judicial District. This is an early dispositive motion seeking dismissal of all of Pohl's claims under the TCPA's anti-SLAPP framework. The motion was ultimately denied.",TCPA-1,DENIED,Phase 1,2018-10-24_MTD_Kassab-TCPA_FILED.pdf,"Dismiss all of Pohl's claims under the TCPA; award Kassab $36,750 in attorney's fees ($31,500 for Kassab at $450/hr for 70 hours, $5,250 for associate at $350/hr for 15 hours); conditional appellate fees totaling $90,000; and sanctions of at least $50,000 against Pohl and his counsel Reynolds Frizzell","10/24/2018 2:11 PM
Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 28523758
By: ARIONNE MCNEAL
Filed: 10/24/2018 2:11 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIAkL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND LANCE CHlRISTOPHER
KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAW FIRM’S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT
TO THE TEXAS CITIZENS PARTICIPATION AcCT
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE BILL BURKE: s
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab,
P.C. d/b/a/ The Kassab Law Firm files this, their Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to the Texas
Citizens Participation Act set forth in Chapter 27 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
SUMMlARY
This is a retaliatory lawsuit filed bMy Plaintiff, Michael A. Pohl and his law firm, Law
Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC (“Poohl”) that is based on, related to, and in response to the
rights to free speech, petition and association, and should therefore be dismissed pursuant to the
Texas Citizens Participation Act (the “TCPA”). Defendants, Lance Christopher Kassab and
Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a/ The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab”) represent more than
400 clients who were illegally and unethically personally solicited to hire Pohl for representation
of them in claimcs stemming from catastrophic auto accidents or the BP Deepwater Horizon
litigation. Kassab filed four separate lawsuits against Pohl on behalf of these clients alleging
claims for civil barratry. In addition, Kassab filed and initiated several grievance proceedings on
behalf of these clients, causing the State Bar of Texas to investigate the alleged barratry, which is
prohibited by the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct and the Texas Penal Code.
In response, Pohl filed this lawsuit against Kassab, alleging claims of conversion, theft of trade
secrets and civil conspiracy, claiming Kassab conspired with others to steal Pohl’s property and
solicit his former clients or prospective clients to sue him for barratry.1 Because this lawsuit is
related to Kassab’s right to free speech, right to associate with his own clients, and right to
petition, it must be dismissed pursuant to the TCPA and attorney’s fees must be awkarded.
II l
EVIDENCE
A motion to dismiss pursuant to the TCPA may be supported bry evidence. See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(b). Attached hereto and incorporateDd by reference for all purposes
herein is the following evidence: s
Exhibit 1 – Declaration of Lance Christopher Kasrsab.
Exhibit 2 – Second Amended Petition filed in Walker v. Pohl.
Exhibit 3 – Affidavit of Scott Walker datled April 29, 2017.
Exhibit 4 – Scott Walker DepositioMn Excerpts (August 24, 2016).
Exhibit 5 – Scott Walker Deposoition Excerpts (September 2018).
Exhibit 6 – Affidavit of Magdalena Santana dated September 24, 2016.
Exhibit 7 – Edgar Jaimes Deposition Excerpts (June 26, 2018).
Exhibit 8 – Magdalena Santana Deposition Excerpts, Vol 1 (November 8, 2016).
Exhibit 9 – Magdalena Santana Deposition Excerpts, Vol 1I (November 8, 2016).
Exhibit 1c0 – Affidavit of Magdalena Santana dated December 19, 2017.
Exhibit 11 – Kenneth Talley Deposition Excerpts (November 16, 2016).
Exhibit 12 – Walker Memorandum Opinion (Doc. No. 475)
Exhibit 13 – Walker Pohl Memorandum (Doc. No. 175)
Exhibit 14 – Walker Order on Pohl Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 252)
1 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, ¶¶ 19-28.
Exhibit 15 – Walker Judgment (Doc. No. 499).
Exhibit 16 – State Bar Approvals.
Exhibit 17 – Brumfield Third Amended Petition.
Exhibit 18 – Gandy Third Amended Petition. r
Exhibit 19 – Berry Fifth Amended Petition.
Exhibit 20 – Cheatham Fourth Amended Petition. r
Exhibit 21 – Grievance Pleadings Filed Against Pohl. D
Exhibit 22 – August 10, 2016 Affidavit of Scott Favres.
Exhibit 23 – May 15, 2018 Deposition of Michaerl A. Pohl.
Exhibit 24 – June 19, 2018 Affidavit of Michael Pohl.
Exhibit 25 – August 30, 2016 Depositionl of Michael Pohl.
Exhibit 26 – Pohl Amended ComplMaint in Mississippi Litigation.
Exhibit 27 – Gauthia Motion foor Sanctions.
Exhibit 28 – Gauthia Response to Motion for Sanctions.
Exhibit 29 – June 28, 2018 Order Denying Sanction.
Exhibit 30 – August 24, 2018 Order Denying Counter-Sanctions.
Exhibit 31 – Pohl’s Third Party Petition filed in Cheatham.
Exhibit 3c2 – June 23, 2018 Order Denying Motion to File Third Party Petition.
U III
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Kassab is a licensed Texas attorney who has been practicing law for more than twenty
years.2 Kassab graduated from law school with honors and was editor-in-chief of law review.3
2 Exhibit 1 (Declaration of Lance Christopher Kassab), p.
Kassab was formerly a Briefing Attorney for the First Judicial District Court of Appeals in
Houston, Texas and is a former intern for the First Judicial District Court of Appeals and the
Texas Supreme Court.4 For the past twenty years, Kassab’s practice has focused primarily on
representing victims of legal malpractice and publicly exposing attorney miscondukct.5
A. Michael Pohl is sued by Mississippi runners who expose lthe illegal
and unethical barratry scheme.
On October 18, 2014, three Mississippi residents, Scott Walkerr (“Walker”), Kirk Ladner
(“Ladner”) and Steve Seymour (“Seymour”), and their relatedD entities, including Precision
Marketing Group, LLC (“Precision Marketing”), filed suit agasinst Pohl and others in Mississippi
federal court, styled Cause No. 14-cv-381-KS-JCG; Scortt Walker, et al. v. Michael A. Pohl, et
al.; In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Southern Division
(the “Mississippi Litigation”).6 There, Walker, lLadner and Seymour alleged they had a joint
venture with Pohl to sign up clients with ecMonomic loss claims stemming from the BP Deepwater
Horizon oil spill.7 They also alleged othat they had “conducted marketing efforts to obtain
personal injury clients” for Pohl8 c and that Pohl received attorney’s fees from the cases they
signed up, but that “Pohl did not pay any of the agreed share of his fees to Walker [and]
Ladner.”9
3 Exhibit 1, p. 1.
4 Exhibit 1, p. 1.
5 Exhibit 1, p. 1.
6 Exhibit 2 (Walker Second Amended Petition).
7 Exhibit 2.
8 Exhibit 2, ¶ 118.
9 Exhibit 2, ¶ 136.
During the course of the Mississippi Litigation, Walker testified that Pohl retained him
and Precision Marketing to “provide marking services to auto accident victims[.]”10 Walker
testified that although he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or “marketing money” it was
“clear to [him] it was barratry.”11 In fact, Walker considered himself and his cokmpany “a pass-
through for barratry money.”12 All total, Walker, Ladner and Precision Markelting received over
$5 million in “barratry pass-through money” from Pohl and other lawcyers to solicit potential
clients with claims, both auto-accident victims and those involved sin the BP litigation.13 They
would use this money to pay contract workers to solicit clients.14 They would locate and instruct
contract workers on how to accomplish the solicitation.15 They trained “40 or 50 people” on how
to “go out and solicit contracts.”16
Walker later testified that he and his team at Precision Marketing were first retained by
Pohl to “recruit clients” with losses resultinga f r rom the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.17 When the
work concerning that litigation dwindled down, Pohl and Walker shifted their focus to auto
accident cases, knowing that the grouep at Precision Marketing “could go out and get those types
of cases” for Pohl.18 To accomplfis f h this task, the folks at Precision Marketing would get Google
10 Exhibit 3 (April 29, 2016C Affidavit of Scott Walker), ¶ 3.
11 Exhibit 4 (August 24a, 2l016 Deposition of Scott Walker), p. 149.
12 Exhibit 4, p. 197:6-7.
13 Exhibit 4, p. 73:21-25; 74:1-25; 75-1-15.
14 Exhibit 4, p. 199.
15 Exhibit 4, p. 77-78.
16 Exhibit 4, p. 196-197.
17 Exhibit 5 (September 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker), p. 19.
18 Exhibit 5, p. 148.
alerts or leads from Pohl on auto accidents.19 Walker testified that he or Ladner would go to the
victims of the auto accident themselves or send someone working for them like Magdalena
Santana (“Santana”) to “do marketing” and “let them know that there was help available.”20
More specifically, that “there were attorneys that could – that could help.”21 Variokus case runners
were used aside from Magdalena, including her brother Florian Santana (“Jlay”) and Kenneth
Talley (“Talley”).22 In exchange, these runners – who ever visited thce t victims – where paid
between $2,500 and $5,000 to solicit the client.23 Walker testified sthat these runners were sent
out on behalf of Pohl.24 These payments flowed from Pohl through his wife’s sham company,
Helping Hands Financing, to Precision Marketing to each individual runner.25 Walker would
simply submit to Pohl the amount that Precision Marketing paid its runners and Pohl would pay
it.26
Santana supported these barratry allegaat r ions in her September 24, 2016 affidavit.27 There,
Santana testified that Pohl sent her on “dozens and dozens of car wreck cases all over the
country.”28 Pohl would email Santanea the link of news coverage depicting the accident and ask
19 Exhibit 5, p. 142-147.
20 Exhibit 5, p. 143. C
21 Exhibit 5, p. 143. a l
22 Exhibit 5, p. 149-150.
23 Exhibit 5, p. 151-152.
24 Exhibit 5, p. 152.
25 Exhibit 5, p. 153-160.
26 Exhibit 5, p. 161.
27 Exhibit 6 (Santana September 24, 2016 Affidavit).
28 Exhibit 6, ¶ 17.
her “to go to the victim or the victim’s family and try to get them to sign up with him.”29 Pohl
offered to give Santana “$5,000 per case that [she] signed, plus a percentage of his attorney’s
fees.”30 Santana was advised by Pohl to “be persistent even if the family ... rejected [her].”31
Santana was instructed by Pohl to “approach the victims and their families wkhile they were
vulnerable, in the emergency room, their hospital rooms or at the funerals.”32l Pohl told Santana
that minorities “were especially vulnerable since they tended not to knowc that the law prohibited
barratry.”33 According to Pohl, they “were easier to sign up.”34 s
Pohl would give Santana “money to give to the victims or their families” but “only if they
agreed to sign a Pohl representation contract.”35 Pohl advised Santana that the money was a “foot
in the door” but instructed Santana not to mention that she was there on behalf of a lawyer “until
after they agreed to take the money.”36 “If the client agreed to hire Pohl, then [Santana] was to
have the client sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contraac r t.”37 Pohl would then give Santana the money to
pay the client “from his own Helping Hands company.”38 When Santana questioned this, Pohl
29 Exhibit 6, ¶ 17.
30 Exhibit 6, ¶ 18. C
31 Exhibit 6, ¶ 19. a l
32 Exhibit 6, ¶ 19.
33 Exhibit 6, ¶ 19.
34 Exhibit 6, ¶ 19.
35 Exhibit 6, ¶ 17.
36 Exhibit 6, ¶ 24.
37 Exhibit 6, ¶ 24.
38 Exhibit 6, ¶ 24.
told Santana that it “was illegal for him to pay [her] directly for cases, and that’s why the money
had to go through some company.”39
Pohl had Santana retract this affidavit through a December 19, 2017 affidavit. This
purported retraction is likely the result of Pohl paying Santana to provide testimkony, which is
something he has done in the past.40 In fact, Pohl’s own paralegal, Edgar lJaimes (“Jaimes”),
testified that on one occasion Pohl sent him to Florida with a case fillecd with $50,000 cash to
give to Santana in exchange for her signing an statement for him.41 sJaimes testified that Santana
would only get the money if she signed the statement for Pohl.42 Jaimes testified that Santana
signed the signed the statement and got the money.43
Santana went into more detail about this in her deposition. Santana testified that the
statement was an agreement for her to keep quiet and not charge Pohl with any wrongdoing or
criminal or unethical conduct.44 Santana testaif r ied that Pohl paid her $50,000 cash to sign this
statement, which was delivered by Jaimes in three bags marked “trick or treat.”45 Very symbolic
given that Santana had been trickede by Pohl into soliciting clients for him and was now being
treated the money she claimed wafs due just to stay quite. Santana reiterated that if she didn’t sign
the gag agreement, she woulydn’t get the money from Pohl.46 Santana attempted to indicate on the
39 Exhibit 6, ¶ 23. a l
40 Exhibit 7 (June 26, 2018 Deposition of Edgar Jaimes), pp. 371-373.
41 Exhibit 7, pp. 371-373.
42 Exhibit 7, pp. 373-374.
43 Exhibit 7, pp. 373-374.
44 Exhibit 8 (Deposition of Santana, Vol. I), p. 153.
45 Exhibit 8, p. 122-127.
46 Exhibit 8, p. 131.
agreement that she was receiving $50,000 to keep quiet, but Jaimes told her Pohl demanded that
she state she only received nominal consideration, like $100.47 Santana did not write the
statement but “just signed it”48 because she felt she was “forced to sign” it49 while “under
duress.”50 k
Notably, nowhere in Santana’s December 19th affidavit does she statle the testimony in
her former affidavit is untrue, only that she does not “agree with” it andc that the affidavit is not
“reliable.”51 Although Santana states in her December 19th affidavits that her prior affidavit was
drafted by a lawyer, Santana testified in her deposition that the September 24th affidavit was
created voluntarily with her own “testimony.”52 Santana testified that, unlike with Pohl, she was
not paid and had never been promised any money to provide the testimony in the September 24th
affidavit.53 Santana reiterated to counsel for Pohl, Billy Shepherd, that she was there in her
deposition to tell the truth and would not be abullied by his questioning or his efforts to confuse
her.54 
Regardless, Santana confirmeed most of the facts set forth in her initial affidavit in her
deposition55 and this deposition tfe f stimony was not retracted.56 There, Santana confirmed that she
47 Exhibit 9 (Deposition of Santana, Vol. II), p. 346.
48 Exhibit 8, p. 153.
49 Exhibit 8, p. 155. i
50 Exhibit 9, p. 30f9 f .
51 Exhibit 10 (December 19, 2017 Santana Affidavit).
52 Exhibit 9, p. 270-271.
53 Exhibit 9, p. 276-278.
54 Exhibit 8, p. 176.
55 See generally Exhibit 8 and Exhibit 9.
56 See Exhibit 10.
was hired by Pohl to solicit auto accident cases, the first one being an accident where a woman
and her unborn child lost their lives.57 Santana was instructed by Walker, who was instructed by
Pohl, to personally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her up to sue the tire manufacturer
and, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000.58 Santana visited the funeral kof the deceased
and got the family to feel comfortable with her.59 Although the mother was lgrieving, Pohl told
Santana: “take no prisoners, this is a cut throat business, you get in therec and you do whatever it
takes to get this client.”60 The solicitation was successful after Pohl gsave Santana $2,000 to “give
to the client to convince her into signing over with the firm.”61 
“Coach” Kenneth Talley (“Talley”) was another runner hired by Pohl and Walker who
solicited over 20 auto accident cases for Pohl,62 including two families who hired Kassab to sue
Pohl.63 Talley testified that he was first hired in relation to BP claims to find “folks that lost
money due to the oil spill” and “sign them au r p” and “get a fee for it.”64 Talley went to work
“knocking on doors” looking for potential claimants for Pohl and his partner in the BP
litigation.65 Talley solicited and signeed up for Pohl and his partner more than 800 BP claims.66
Talley was paid between $75 andf f $350 for each BP client he signed up.67
57 Exhibit 8, p. 37.
58 Exhibit 8, p. 37-38.
59 Exhibit 8, p. 37-38. i
60 Exhibit 8, p. 39f. f
61 Exhibit 8, p. 40.
62 Exhibit 11 (Deposition of Kenneth Talley), p. 87.
63 Specifically, Mae Berry and Arthur Speck.
64 Exhibit 11, p. 10.
65 Exhibit 11, p. 10-11.
66 Exhibit 11, p. 11.
10
Talley eventually switched to soliciting auto accident victims, “calling on folks that had
bad accidents.” 68 Talley recalls that the first client he solicited was in “the hospital in intensive
care.”69 Talley carried with him up to $1,000 to pay the accident victims to “help them with
problems” but only once they “were signed up.”70 Talley would advise the victikms that he had
attorneys who could help them, and that one of those attorneys was Pohl.71 Tallley was paid a fee
of $1,400 plus his expenses by Pohl, through Walker, for any auto accicd t ent case he solicited.72
On some cases, Talley was to receive a portion of the fee paid to Hselping Hands out of Pohl’s
attorney’s fees.73 Talley discussed with Pohl the “percentage of settlements” he was to receive
from the cases he solicited and Pohl told Talley that the money was being placed in an “escrow
account” for him.74 When asked whether Pohl knew he was getting paid to “contact vehicle
accident victims,” Talley responded, “the money was coming from Edgar [Jaimes] who worked
for him.”75 Although his paycheck was froma W r alker’s company, “the funding came by way of
Edgar [Jaimes].”76 
67 Exhibit 11, p. 19.
68 Exhibit 11, p. 37. C
69 Exhibit 11, p. 37. a l
70 Exhibit 11, p. 38.
71 Exhibit 11, p. 47.
72 Exhibit 11, p. 47-48.
73 Exhibit 11, p. 97-98; 102.
74 Exhibit 11, p. 99.
75 Exhibit 11, p. 100.
76 Exhibit 11, p. 100.
11
Talley testified that personally soliciting clients for Pohl became so frequent that he
began carrying with him blank Pohl contracts to each solicitation.77 Talley would refer the
potential clients to “attorneys out of Houston that were the best at handling these types of
accidents” and would offer to give the potential clients “money up front.”78 Talkley would have
no “reason not to mention Mr. Pohl’s name” during the solicitation.79 Tlalley would never
recommend any lawyers other than Pohl.80 Talley would not tell the clice t nts that he was getting
paid to solicit them.81 Talley would present a Pohl contract to the psotential client.82 If the client
did not agree to hire Pohl, the clients would not get the money.83 Talley testified that Jaimes –
Pohl’s paralegal – would send him the money.84
Talley further testified that both he and Pohl knew what they were doing was illegal. In
one instance, Talley was “run out of town” while soliciting clients for Pohl.85 Talley testified
during the attempted solicitation he was told aby a “lawyer or policeman” that “it was against the
law what [he] was doing.”86 Talley mentioned this to Pohl and Pohl told him “you’ve just got to
leave...some people you can’t help.”8e7
77 Exhibit 11, p. 49. 
78 Exhibit 11, p. 54.
79 Exhibit 11, p. 108.
80 Exhibit 11, p. 59. i
81 Exhibit 11, p. 5f8 f ; 109.
82 Exhibit 11, p. 89.
83 Exhibit 11, p. 58-59.
84 Exhibit 11, p. 86.
85 Exhibit 11, p. 84.
86 Exhibit 11, p. 84.
87 Exhibit 11, p. 85.
12
Pohl attempted to dismiss the Mississippi Litigation, arguing the agreements between he
and the runners were illegal and unenforceable.88 More specifically, Pohl argued that under both
Texas and Mississippi law “it is illegal for a non-lawyer to accept or agree to accept money to
improperly solicit clients for a lawyer.”89 The Mississippi federal court denied Pkohl’s motion to
dismiss and concluded that he was in a partnership with Walker and Lladner and further
concluded that the agreements to solicit clients would only be a cviolation of the Texas
disciplinary rules and Texas law, which did not apply to Walker ansd Ladner.90 Having failed to
obtain summary dismissal, Pohl settled the Mississippi Litigation, hoping to forever conceal the
barratry operation.91
B. The victims of Michael Pohl’s barratry hire Lance Kassab to bring
claims and file grievances against Michael Pohl.
Kassab was tipped off to the Mississippli Litigation by an associate of his F. Douglas
Montague of Hattiesburg, Mississippi.92 KMassab obtained a large amount of information related
to the Mississippi Litigation from the ofederal court’s online public access to Court records.93
Kassab also obtained information directly from Precision Marketing and its counsel, including
the names and addresses of Pohl’s former clients or prospective clients.94 Kassab used this
information to send advertisement letters to these individuals, informing them that they may have
88 Exhibit 12 (Walker Miemorandum Opinion (Doc. No. 475)); Exhibit 13 (Walker Pohl Memorandum (Doc. No.
175)).
89 Exhibit 13, at ¶ 18.
90 Exhibit 12; Exhibit 14 (Walker Order on Pohl Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 252)).
91 Exhibit 15 (Walker Judgment (Doc. No. 499)).
92 Exhibit 1, pp. 1-2.
93 Exhibit 1, p. 2.
94 Exhibit 1, p. 2.
13
been a victim of barratry, that barratry is illegal and unethical in Texas, and that, if in fact
victims of barratry, they would be entitled to file civil claims against Pohl.95 Kassab sent the
advertisement letters to the Texas State Bar and the bars of other states in which the
advertisements were distributed for approval.96 Hundreds of individuals responkded, indicating
that they had been in fact personally solicited to hire Pohl in their auto accidelnt or BP claims.97
Kassab then entered into contracts with more than four hundred individucals to represent them in
their claims against Pohl for civil barratry.98 s
Kassab associated with and consulted his clients and eventually filed four separate
lawsuits on behalf of these barratry victims in Harris County, Texas (the “Barratry Lawsuits”).99
The Barratry Lawsuits communicated matters of public concern, namely that Pohl and others
conspired to commit and did in fact commit barratry, which can carry a third-degree felony
charge in Texas.100 See TEX. PEN. CODE § 3a8 r .12(h). Additionally, due to the egregiousness of
Pohl’s violation of the Texas Penal Code and violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct, Kassab was reequired to notify the Texas State Bar pursuant to disciplinary
rule 8.03.101 Thus, Kassab filed f f grievances against Pohl pursuant to this rule, and also at the
request of some of Pohl’s foyrmer clients.102 In the grievances, Kassab, individually and on behalf
95 Exhibit 1, p. 2. a l
96 Exhibit 1, p. 2; Exhibit 16 (Sample Letters and State Bar Approvals).
97 Exhibit 1, p. 2.
98 Exhibit 1, p. 2.
99 Exhibit 17 (Brumfield Third Amended Petition), Exhibit 18 (Gandy Second Amended Petition), Exhibit 19 (Berry
Fifth Amended Petition), Exhibit 20 (Cheatham Fourth Amended Petition) (without exhibits).
100 Exhibit 1, p. 1.
101 Exhibit 1, p. 1.
102 Rule 8.03 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct provides: “. . . a lawyer having knowledge
that another lawyer has committed a violation of applicable rules of professional conduct that raises a substantial
14
of his clients, petitioned the State Bar of Texas to reprimand and discipline Pohl in order to
protect the public.103
In direct retaliation to the Barratry Lawsuits and the grievance proceedings, Pohl filed
this litigation alleging that Kassab and others stole his property and are using it tok bring lawsuits
and grievances against him.104 Specifically, Pohl alleges in his petition aglainst Kassab that,
“Kassab is a lawyer who specializes in suing other lawyers”105 ca t nd “Kassab solicited
clients/prospective clients [of Pohl’s] to act as Plaintiffs . . . to bsring cases against Pohl for
alleged barratry and other claims.”106 Thus, Pohl has judicially admitted that he has brought his
suit against Kassab solely because Kassab legally and ethically contacted Pohl’s former clients
or prospective clients107 and filed suit against Pohl on behalf of these individuals.
e IV
ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES
The purpose of the Anti-SLAPP108 statute “is to encourage and safeguard the
constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise
participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect
question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the
appropriate discipflinary authority.”
103 Exhibit 1, p. 2; Exhibit 21 (grievance pleadings filed against Pohl).
104 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition.
105 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, p. 6.
106 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, at p. 6-7
107 Exhibit 16.
108 This is an acronym for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation.
15
the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 27.002. To effectuate the purpose of the TCPA, the Legislature included an
expedited manner of dismissing claims brought to intimidate or to silence a defendant’s exercise
of an enumerated First Amendment right. See id. at § 27.003; see also ExxonMobkil Pipeline Co.
v. Coleman, 512 S.W.3d 895, 898 (Tex. 2017). l
The first step of a TCPA analysis is to determine whether the defecndant has demonstrated
by a preponderance of the evidence that the TCPA applies to the plasintiff's claims. See Adams v.
Starside Custom Builders, LLC, 547 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tex. 2018). The Texas supreme court has
made clear that trial courts should be mindful that the statute “casts a wide net,” and that
“[a]lmost any imaginable form of communication, in any medium, is covered.” Id. (citing §
27.001(1)). In order for the TCPA to be applicable, a defendant moving to dismiss must show by
a preponderance of the evidence that the palaintiff’s claims are based on, relate to, or are in
response to the defendant’s exercise of: (1) the right of free speech, (2) the right to petition, or
(3) the right of association. TEX. CIVe. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(b). In considering whether
the TCPA is applicable, the trial fcourt is statutorily required to consider all pleadings, as well as
supporting and opposing affyidavits stating the facts on which a claim of liability is based. Id. at §
27.006; see also BedCford v. Spassoff, 520 S.W.3d 901, 904 (Tex. 2017). If the record
demonstrates that thae plaintiff's claim implicates one of these rights, then the statute is applicable
as to that claim,f and the trial court must proceed to the second step.
AUt the second step of a TCPA analysis, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish by
“clear and specific evidence” a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in
question. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(c). Dismissal of the claim is mandatory if the
plaintiff fails to satisfy this burden. Id. § 27.005(b). Even if the plaintiff succeeds by establishing
16
a prima facie case, the trial court must still dismiss the claim if the defendant further establishes
by a preponderance of the evidence each essential element of a valid defense. Id. § 27.005(d).
And, if the court dismisses a legal action pursuant to the TCPA, the Court must award the
moving party “court costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, and other expenses incurrekd in defending
against the legal action” as well as sanctions “sufficient to deter the party whlo brought the legal
action from bringing similar actions[.]” Id. at § 27.009(a). c
A. Step one – This lawsuit is based on, relates to and sis in response to the
exercise of protected activities. D
The TCPA applies if Pohl’s suit is “based on, relatess to, or is in response to” Kassab’s
exercise of the right of free speech. Id. at § 27.001(3). Thre exercise of the right of free speech is
defined as a “communication made in connection with a matter of public concern.” Id. at §
27.001(3). A “communication” is defined as lthe “making or submitting of a statement or
document in any form or medium includinMg oral, visual, written, audiovisual, or electronic.” Id.
at § 27.001(1); Deaver v. Desai, 483 So.W.3d 668, 672 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015,
no pet.). The definition encompasses both public and private communications. See Lippincott v.
Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 509 (Tex. 2015). A “matter of public concern” includes an issue
related to “health or safety, environmental, economic, or community well-being, the government,
a public official or public figure, or a good, product, or service in the marketplace.” Id. §
27.001(7)(A). Thce provision of legal services by a legal service professional constitute
matters of public concern. See Deaver, 483 S.W.3d at 673 (holding statements relating to legal
services offered by attorney in the marketplace addressed matters of public concern); see also
Avila v. Larrea, 394 S.W.3d 646 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (statement relating to
legal services was “a matter of public concern” because attorney’s services constituted a “service
in the marketplace.”). The lawsuits and grievances that Kassab filed against Pohl on behalf of
17
these former clients discussed or related to the legal services provided by Pohl – namely the
alleged illegal and unethical barratry committed by Pohl.109
The TCPA also applies if Pohl’s suit is “based on, relates to, or is in response to”
Kassab’s right to petition. Id. at § 27.001(4). Communications made in or abkout a judicial,
legislative, executive or other governmental proceeding are protected by the rlight to petition. Id.
There is no requirement that the subject matter of the proceeding must cconcern the government
or a public interest for the protection to apply. See Watson v. Harsdman, 497 SW3d 601, 606
(Tex. App. – Dallas 2016, no pet.). Moreover, “the remedies provided by the TCPA extend to
attorneys who are acting as agents for their clients when they communicate information about
others during the course of judicial proceedings.” Johnson-Todd v. Morgan, 480 S.W.3d 605,
611 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2015, pet. denied). Accordingly, the filing of the Barratry Lawsuits
by Kassab on behalf of his clients constitute athe “exercise of the right to petition” as defined by
the TCPA. See Beving v. Beadles, No. 02-17-00223-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 8540, at *12
(Tex. App. – Fort Worth, Oct. 18, 20e18, no pet.) (concluding deposition and affidavit testimony
provided in the underlying lawsufit constituted a communication made in a judicial proceeding
and was an exercise of the riyght to petition).
Finally, the TCCPA also applies if Pohl’s suit is “based on, relates to, or is in response to”
Kassab’s right of asasociation. Id. at § 27.001(2). A right to association protects communications
“between indivfiduals who join together to collectively express, promote, pursue, or defend
common Uinterests.” Id. The right to associate protects communications which do not relate to a
public purpose and even those communications which are alleged to be wrongful, such as the
sharing of purportedly confidential information for an improper purpose. See Elite Auto Body
109 Exhibit 1, p. 2; Exhibit 17, 18, 19, and 20 (petitions filed in the Barratry Litigation); Exhibit 21 (grievance
pleadings filed against Pohl).
18
LLC v. Autocraft Bodywerks, Inc., 520 S.W.3d 191, 206 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. dism'd)
(holding the right of association protection applied to claims that a company’s employees
improperly shared confidential information with their new employer for purposes of the new
employer obtaining an unfair advantage in the marketplace). k
This lawsuit is based on, related to or in response to these protected lactivities. Pohl has
filed this retaliatory lawsuit against Kassab for conversion and theft of ctrade secrets, seeking in
excess of $1,000,000.00 in purported actual damages.110 Pohl allegses that Kassab obtained the
names and addresses of Pohl’s former clients/prospective clients, solicited them and brought
“cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and other claims.”111 In other words, Pohl’s lawsuit
against Kassab would not have arisen but for the fact that Kassab exercised his right to free
speech and right to petition on behalf of his injured clients and filed suits and grievances against
Pohl for civil barratry. Because Pohl’s convearsion-related claims arise out of Kassab’s right to
petition and associate, this lawsuit must be dismissed. See James v. Calkins, 446 S.W.3d 135,
147-48 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Diest.] 2014, pet. denied) (claims for fraud against attorney and
client arising out of prior litigatifon were protected as the exercise of the right to freely speak,
freely associate, and to petitiyon).
The recent caseC Collins v. Collins, No. 01-17-00817-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1932,
2018 WL 1320841a (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 15, 2018, pet. filed) (mem. op.) is
instructive. In fCollins, the ex-wife of the deceased, Corinna, sued the deceased’s surviving
spouse anUd administrator of the estate, Kelly, for fraud and conversion based on part on the
deceased’s alleged misrepresentation or nondisclosure of assets during their divorce. Id. at *1.
Kelly filed a motion to dismiss under the TCPA “based on exercise of the right to petition,
110 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, p. 3.
111 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, p. 6-7
19
because Corinna’s claims were based on communications made during a judicial proceeding.” Id.
The probate court denied the motion to dismiss and Kelly appealed. Id. at *1-2. The First Court
of Appeals reversed, concluding that the deceased “was exercising his right to petition when he
served the affidavit and inventory in the divorce” and because Corinna’s claimsk for conversion
and fraud were based on matters relating to this divorce, they were subject to dlismissal under the
TCPA. Id. at *12-13. c
The recent case Reeves v. Harbor Am. Cent., Inc., 552 S.W.3sd 389 (Tex. App. – Houston
[14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) is also instructive. In that case, an employer sued a former employee
for breach of contract, conversion and theft of trade secrets alleging the employee stole
confidential information and solicited customers away from the employee in violation of their
agreement. Id. at 392. The employee, Reeves, filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to the TCPA
alleging the claims were “based on, relate toa, or are in response to [his] right to associate with
others” to “promote and pursue their common interest in developing a competing business.” Id.
The trial court denied the motion, staeting the TCPA “as a matter of law does not allow a party to
avoid contractual obligations sufch as the ones at issue here.” Id. Reeves appealed, and the
Fourteenth Court of Appeayls reversed, stating “[w]hether the TCPA allows a party to avoid
contractual obligationsC is not the proper inquiry.” Id. at 395. Rather, “when a TCPA motion has
been filed, the TCPaA requires trial courts to determine whether a legal action is ‘based on, relates
to, or is in respofnse to a party's exercise of’ the right of free speech, right to petition, or right of
associatioUn and must be dismissed.” Id.
Like the claims at issue in Collins and Reeves, the purported conversion and theft of trade
secrete claims brought by Pohl arise out of and relate to Kassab’s right to petition and associate
with his clients to promote and carry out their common interest in developing and pursing the
20
claims and grievances against Pohl. The allegations in the petitions and the grievances relate to
matters of public concern. This is a retaliatory lawsuit designed to chill the rights of Kassab and
his clients and silence them from speaking out against Pohl and other lawyers in legal
malpractice cases. This is the very type of retaliatory lawsuit the TCPA was inteknded to protect
against. See Reeves, 552 S.W.3d at 393 (“The TCPA protects citizens from rletaliatory lawsuits
that seek to silence or intimidate them on matters of public concern.”). Acccordingly, this lawsuit
must be dismissed. See Collins, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1932, ats *15 (trial court abused its
discretion by denying TCPA motion relating to conversion claims arising out of divorce
proceeding).
B. Step two – Pohl cannot establish by clear and specific evidence a
prima facia case against Kassab.
Because the claims alleged by Pohl falll within the purview of the TCPA, this lawsuit
must be dismissed unless Pohl “establishesM by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for
each essential element of the claim in quoestion.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(c). This
Pohl cannot do. But, even if he can, the Court must still dismiss Pohl’s claims because Kassab
has established the defenses of limitations, attorney immunity and res judicata as a matter of law.
Id. § 27.005(d).
1. Pohl cannot establish his claims for civil conspiracy,
aconversion or theft of trade secrets as a matter of law.
Pohl adfmits that he engaged Precision Marketing, although he claims that it was to
provide “Upublic relations services” to “screen and liaise with Pohl’s clients/prospective clients”
rather than to straight up personally solicit the clients to hire Pohl.112 Pohl claims that Precision
Marketing “gained access to Pohl’s confidential and proprietary information and property,
112 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, ¶ 20.
21
including trade secret materials, that included the identities of Pohl’s clients/prospective clients,
as well as their detailed contact information.”113 Pohl claims that Favre then sold this information
to Kassab who used this information – the names and addresses of the clients/prospective clients
– “to contact and solicit Pohl’s clients/prospective clients” to “act as plaintiffs andk … bring cases
against Pohl for alleged barratry and other claims.”114 Pohl claims that this conlduct is a breach of
the settlement agreement he entered with Favre and Precision Markecting in the Mississippi
Litigation and constitutes conversion and violation of the Texas sUniform Trade Secrets Act
(“TUTSA”).115 As a matter of law, these claims fail. 
First, Kassab obtained the names and addresses of the victims of Pohl’s barratry from
Precision Marketing (and/or its counsel), who was the owner of this property, not Pohl.116 Favre,
the owner of Precision Marketing, testified that Precision Marketing “solicited many of the
marketing contacts (individuals and businesase r s) on these lists for representation” by Pohl.117
Favre testified that the “marketing lists contain the names of thousands of persons who
eventually became [Pohl’s] former celients, and/or whom [Pohl] solicited for representation.”118
Favre made clear that the very infformation that Pohl claims are the trade secretes converted by
Kassab “were and are solelyy the work product and property of Precision [Marketing], developed
during the normal couCrse of its marketing business.”119 In other words, Pohl does not own the
113 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, ¶ 20.
114 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, ¶ 22.
115 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, ¶¶ 23-27.
116 Exhibit 1, p. 2.
117 Exhibit 22 (August 10, 2016 Affidavit of Scott Favre), ¶ 15.
118 Exhibit 22, ¶ 15.
119 Exhibit 22, ¶ 12.
22
information or trade secrets he claims was converted by Kassab and thus, these claims fail as a
matter of law. See FCLT Loans, L.P. v. Estate of Bracher, 93 S.W.3d 469, 482 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (“To bring a conversion claim, the aggrieved party must have
either ownership, possession, or the right to immediate possession of the propertky.”); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.002(3-a) (defining owner as “the person or e
nltity in whom or in
which rightful, legal, or equitable title to, or the right to enforce rightcs in, the trade secret is
reposed.”). s
Pohl’s claims for theft of trade secrets fails for different reasons, namely that the client
lists and information were not trade secrets and were not wrongfully misappropriated. Under the
TUTSA, information is not a trade secret if it is gene
rally known to the public. TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE § 134A.002(6)(A). The names and addresses of the barratry victims who were
solicited to hire Pohl are not confidential anda are certainly known to the public. Moreover, the
TUTSA requires Pohl to show that, at the time Kassab allegedly disclosed the trade secrets,
Kassab “knew or had reason to knowe” that the trade secret was acquired by improper means. Id.
§ 134A.002(3). Here, the evidenfce establishes, as a matter of law, that Precision Marketing and
not Pohl owned the purporteyd trade secrets.120 At minimum, the evidence establishes that Kassab
believed, based on FCavre’s testimony and his discussions with Favre or his counsel, that
Precision Marketinga was the owner of the client lists, and therefore Kassab did not know or have
reason to knowf that they had been acquired from Pohl by improper means.121 Therefore, this
claim failUs as a matter of law.
Because the conversion and statutory theft of trade secret claims fail, Pohl’s claim for
civil conspiracy also fails. See Trammel Crow Co. No. 60 v. Harkinson, 944 S.W.2d 631, 635
120 Exhibit 22.
121 Exhibit 1, p. 2.
23
(Tex. 1997) (to prevail on a civil conspiracy claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
was liable for some underlying tort). Accordingly, Pohl cannot establish all elements of his
claims against Kassab by clear and convincing evidence, and this lawsuit must be dismissed as to
Kassab. See Collins, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1932, at *15. k
2. Pohl’s claims are barred as a matter of law by thle attorney
immunity doctrine.
Even if Pohl can establish a prima facie case on each element orf each cause of action by
clear and convincing evidence, his claims must still be dismissedD because they are barred by the
attorney immunity doctrine. The Texas supreme court hass recognized that “attorneys are
authorized to practice their profession, to advise theirr clients and interpose any defense or
supposed defense, without making themselves liable for damages.” See Cantey Hanger, LLP v.
Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. 2015) (internall quotations omitted). “This attorney-immunity
defense is intended to ensure loyal, faithfulM, and aggressive representation by attorneys employed
as advocates.” Id. (internal quotations oomitted). Thus, “attorneys are immune from civil liability
to non-clients for actions taken in connection with representing a client in litigation.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted). “Merely labeling an attorney’s conduct ‘fraudulent’ does not and should not
remove it from the scope of client representation or render it ‘foreign to the duties of an
attorney.’” Id. at 483. Rather, in determining immunity, the inquiry “focuses on the kind of
conduct at issue crather than the alleged wrongfulness of said conduct.” Youngkin v. Hines, 546
S.W.3d 675, at *11 (Tex. 2018) (emphasis in original). An attorney is not liable to third
parties when the complained of actions relate to the filing of lawsuits. See Cantey Hanger,
467 S.W.3d at 483 (“an attorney's conduct may be wrongful but still fall within the scope of
client representation”); see also Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398, 408
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (holding that a claim against an attorney for
24
conspiracy to defraud was not actionable where “the complained-of actions involve the filing of
lawsuits” were “made to facilitate the rendition of legal services to [the client]”).
The recent case Highland Capital Mgmt., LP v. Looper Reed & McGraw, P.C., No. 05-
15-00055-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 442, 2016 WL 164528 (Tex. App.—Dallaks Jan. 14, 2016,
pet. denied) (mem. op.) is instructive. In Highland Capital, the plaintiff attlempted to sue the
lawyer for the defendant alleging the lawyer obtained stolen propertcy of the defendant and
threatened to disclose this confidential information to extort a sesttlement. Highland Capital,
2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 442, 2016 WL 164528, at *2. The plaintiff, Highland, argued that the
lawyer, Looper Reed, engaged in “malicious conduct with respect to its illegal acquisition,
retention, use, and threatened disclosure of Highland’s proprietary and confidential information”
including “reviewing, copying, and analyzing information it knew to be stolen and proprietary in
furtherance of its scheme to extort, slander, aand disparage Highland, threatening Highland that it
would disclose proprietary information and disparage Highland if a monetary sum was not paid,
and refusing to return and cease use oef Highland’s proprietary information after receiving written
notice of the proprietary and conffidential nature of these documents and Highland's demand that
the stolen materials be returyned.” Id. at *10-*11. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s
dismissal of these claiCms on the pleadings122 based on attorney immunity because the alleged
conduct fell “squaraely within the scope of Looper Reed’s representation” in the lawsuit. Id. at
*16. f
TUhe entire basis for Pohl’s lawsuit against Kassab is that he allegedly purchased the
purportedly stolen information and “solicited [Pohl’s] clients/prospective clients to act as
122 The dismissal was via Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a.
25
plaintiffs … to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and other claims.”123 Pohl’s
characterization of this conduct as wrongful is immaterial. See id. (“That [a party] characterized
the firm’s conduct as fraudulent or otherwise wrongful was immaterial to [the court’s] evaluation
of the immunity defense.”). Mischaracterizations aside, the essence of Pohl’s kclaims against
Kassab are that he used information he obtained from Favre, the owner of Prlecision Marketing,
to determine which clients had been illegally solicited by Precision Macrketing to hire Pohl and
then proceeded to bring such barratry claims against Pohl on behaslf of these clients.124 These
claims fall squarely within attorney immunity. See Highland Capital, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS
442, at *16. This is true regardless of whether the conduct occurred prior to the actual litigation
of these claims. See Cantey Hanger, 467 S.W.3d at 485 (attorney was immune from conduct that
occurred after litigation had ended because it was related to the representation).
3. Pohl’s claimse are barred as a matter of law by the statute of
limitations.
The statute of limitations for conversion is two years from the date the property is
allegedly taken. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a); Burns v. Rochon, 190 S.W.3d 263,
271 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). The statute of limitations for civil conspiracy
is also two yearsc. Mayes v. Stewart, 316 S.W.3d 715, 719 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2010, no pet.). The statute of limitations for misappropriation of trade secrets is three years from
the date the misappropriation was discovered. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.010(a).
123 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, ¶ 22.
124 See Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, ¶¶ 21-27.
26
Pohl testified in his deposition that the basis of his alleged claims against Kassab
occurred in 2014 when Pohl alleges that Kassab and his “crew” allegedly broke into Pohl’s
office in Gulf Port, Mississippi, hacked his computers, stole his clients’ names and then solicited
his clients.125 Pohl testified that although he knew the conduct occurred in 2014, hke did not file a
civil or criminal case against Kassab or his “crew” because he “wanted to splend time to reflect
on it before taking action [and] didn’t want to do anything that was cpr t ecipitous.”126 In other
words, Pohl sat idly by while the statute of limitations clock ticked sand did nothing to preserve
his purported claims. 
Further, Pohl signed an affidavit admitting he learned of the basis of his purported claims
during discovery in the Mississippi Litigation, which began in October of 2014.127 Specifically,
Pohl testified that he learned through discovery that Walker and Ladner allegedly
“misappropriated the services [he] had contraacted and paid for as well as [his] client contracts
and existing and/or expected contractual relationships (including actual executed client contracts
as well as my contract forms and reelated work product)” and “hundreds of claimants” were
allegedly “surreptitiously referrefd f ” by Precision Marketing.128 Pohl alleged in this affidavit that
he discovered in the Mississyippi Litigation that the owners of Precision Marketing “undertook to
convert, misappropriatCe for themselves and/or market to third parties claimant files and other
information and maaterials” from his office in Gulfport, Mississippi.129 Importantly, Pohl testified
at a August 30,f 2016 deposition in the Mississippi Litigation that he found out from a Precision
MarketinUg secretary in 2014 that his clients were being diverted to other lawyers and/or non-
125 Exhibit 23 (May 15, 2018 Deposition of Michael Pohl), pp. 85-93.
126 Exhibit 23, p. 93.
127 Exhibit 24 (June 19, 2018 Affidavit of Michael Pohl).
128 Exhibit 24, ¶ 27.
129 Exhibit 24, ¶ 28.
27
lawyers.130 Pohl also testified that he closed his Gulfport office in February of 2014.131
Accordingly, Pohl would have known of his potential claims against Kassab at that time (2014)
that his purportedly confidential information had been stolen when he moved out of his Gulfport
office and the computers and boxes containing this information were missing. k
“The statute of limitations begins to run when a party has actuall knowledge of a
wrongful injury.” Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3dc 194, 207 (Tex. 2011).
“Once a claimant learns of a wrongful injury, the statute of limitatiosns begins to run even if the
claimant does not yet know the specific cause of the injury; the party responsible for it; the full
extent of it; or the chances of avoiding it.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
Pohl knew or should have known of his potential claims against Kassab (and the other
defendants in this lawsuit) in 2014 when he moved from his office in Gulfport, Mississippi and
learned from a secretary of Precision Markeating that his clients were being diverted to other
lawyers and/or non-lawyers. Pohl filed this lawsuit against Kassab on August 28, 2018.132
Accordingly, Pohl’s claims, filed moere than three years later, are barred by limitations. See TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.00f3; Id. at § 16.010.
4. Pohl’ys claims are barred as a matter of law by res judicata.
“Res judicata, oCr claims preclusion, prevents the relitigation of a claim or cause of action
that has been finallya adjudicated, as well as related matters that, with the use of diligence, should
have been litigafted in the prior suit.” Barr v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex.
1992). PUohl sued Precision Marketing and other “potential” defendants in the Mississippi
130 Exhibit 25 (August 30, 2016 Deposition of Michael Pohl), p. 21.
131 Exhibit 24, ¶ 31.
132 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition.
28
Litigation for conversion, fraud and unjust enrichment alleging, among other things, that
Precision Marketing misappropriated, converted or stole property from Pohl by means of
misrepresentation, deception, or failure to disclose.133 Pohl voluntarily settled and the parties
dismissed the claims against each other with prejudice on April 21, 2017.134k Pohl’s claims
against Kassab are the same that he filed in the Mississippi Litigation and alrise from the same
alleged transactions and are against the same alleged co-conspirators.135 cT t herefore, Pohl’s claims
are barred by res judicata. See Lemon v. Spann, 633 S.W.2d 568, 570s-71 (Tex. App. – Texarkana
1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (“The judgment in the first suit precludes a second action by parties and
their privies not only on matters actually litigated but also on causes of action or defenses which
arise out of the same subject matter and which might have been litigated in the first suit.”).
C. The Court must award attorneys fees and sanctions.
After the Court dismisses Poehl’s claims against Kassab, the Court “must” award Kassab
“court costs, reasonable attorneyf’s fees, and other expenses incurred in defending against the
legal action” and issue “sanyctions against the party who brought the legal action as the court
determines sufficient Cto deter the party who brought the legal action from bringing similar
actions described ina this chapter.” Id. § 27.009(a). Kassab has spent approximately sixty (60)
hours reviewingf Pohl’s petition, drafting an answer, reviewing the TCPA, and researching and
drafting tUhis motion to dismiss. Kassab will undoubtedly expend another ten (10) hours reading
133 Exhibit 26 (Pohl Amended Complaint in Mississippi Litigation), ¶ 6.
134 Exhibit 15.
135 See Plaintiffs’ Original Petition.
29
Pohl’s responses, drafting and filing a reply, and preparing for and attending a hearing regarding
this motion. Therefore, Kassab will have incurred (or will likely incur) approximately seventy
(70) hours defending against Pohl’s legal action, or $31,500 in legal fees.136 In addition,
Kassab’s associate has spent approximately fifteen (15) hours reviewing Pkohl’s petition,
researching and editing this motion to dismiss, researching relevant case lawl and authority and
providing edits, equating to $5,250 in legal fees.137 c t
Moreover, Kassab is entitled to conditional appellate fees. s“If trial attorney’s fees are
mandatory under [the statute], then appellate attorney’s fees are also mandatory when proof of
reasonable fees is presented.” Ventling v. Johnson, 466 S.W.3d 143, 154 (Tex. 2015). Because
the TCPA mandates an award of reasonable attorney’s fees, the trial court does not have
discretion to disallow an award when proof of reasonable appellate attorney’s fees is presented.
See Urquhart v. Calkins, No. 01-17-00256-CaV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 5145, at *11-12 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 10, 2018, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Kassab testifies that a
reasonable attorney’s fee for a futuree appeal to the court of appeals is $45,000; a reasonable fee
for responding to and/or briefingf regarding a motion for rehearing at the intermediate court of
appeals, if such is necessaryy, is $5,000; a reasonable fee for filing a petition or response in the
Texas Supreme CourtC is $10,000; if the Texas Supreme Court requests briefing, a reasonable
attorney’s fee is $2a5,000; and a reasonable attorney’s fee for responding to and/or briefing a
motion for rehefaring at the Texas Supreme Court, if such is necessary, is $5,000.00.138 These
conditionUal appellate fees should be awarded. See id.
136 Exhibit 1, p. 3.
137 Exhibit 1, p. 3.
138 Exhibit 1, p. 3.
30
Finally, this Court should sanction Pohl and his counsel for the egregiousness of his
conduct, including the filing of this retaliatory lawsuit. Pohl believes he is above the rules of law
and that the rules of professional conduct do not apply to him. This is demonstrated by the fact
that he intentionally and shamelessly paid runners millions of dollars to illegallky run cases for
him and has paid off and bribed potential witnesses with tens of thousands olf dollars, including
$50,000.00 to Santana. Pohl’s counsel likely agreed to represent Pohl cbecause they have their
own bone to pick with Kassab. The law firm representing Pohl, Reynsolds Frizzell, has attempted
to sanction Kassab personally in another matter after Kassab sued Reynolds Frizzell’s client,
Arnold & Itkin, alleging claims of barratry.139 Kassab responded by filing a counter-motion for
sanctions not only against Arnold & Itkin, but lawyers at Reynolds Frizzell, requesting a the
lawyers to show cause as to why they should not be sanctioned for filing a groundless
pleading.140 Judge Baker denied the motiona r for sanctions against Kassab filed by Reynolds
Frizzell and ordered the lawyers at Reynolds Frizzell to show cause as to why they should not be
sanctioned.141 Although Judge Bakeer ultimately denied Kassab’s counter-motion for sanctions,
she made clear to point out thef inaccuracies alleged by Reynolds Frizzell in its motion for
sanctions and admonished Ryeynolds Frizzell regarding its inaccuracies.142 This lawsuit against
Kassab is not only retaCliatory for Pohl, it is seemingly retaliatory for his counsel.
The ill motaive of Pohl and his counsel is further evidenced by their conduct in the
Barratry Lawsufits. Pohl’s counsel, Jean Frizzell (“Frizzell”), previously attempted to file this
lawsuit inU the 55th Judicial District solely to create a conflict of interest between Kassab and his
139 Exhibit 27 (Motion for Sanctions in Gauthia).
140 Exhibit 28 (Response to Motion for Sanctions in Gauthia).
141 Exhibit 29 (June 28, 2018 Order Denying Sanctions).
142 Exhibit 30 (August 24, 2018 Order Denying Counter-Sanctions).
31
clients who had sued Pohl.143 Judge Shadwick recognized the gamesmanship of Pohl and Frizzell
in their attempt to create a conflict of interest and outright denied their frivolous motion to file a
third-party petition against Kassab.144 Frizzell knew this by colluding with Pohl’s other counsel,
Billy Shepherd, and having access to all of the discovery taken in the Barratry Lkawsuits and the
Mississippi Litigation by virtue of his representation. Therefore, Frizzell had alccess to and knew,
without a doubt, all the facts and sworn testimony cited to in this moticon, and thus, knew how
frivolous and retaliatory this lawsuit is against Kassab when he filed sthe lawsuit.
This Court should not take kindly to lawyers and their lawyer-clients fabricating lawsuits
simply to create conflicts, harass, create delay, increase the cost of litigation and as a retaliatory
tool against lawyers, like Kassab, who attempt to help victims of illegal conduct perpetrated by
lawyers by enforcing the statutes created by the Texas Legislature. Therefore, this Court should
sanction Pohl and Frizzell in an amount sufaficient to deter them from bringing similar actions
and/or filing similar frivolous pleadings in the future. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §
27.009(a). The Court should sanctioen Pohl and Frizzell a minimum of fifty thousand dollars
($50,000.00) in addition to the afttorney’s fees and costs listed above so that Pohl and Frizzell
will fully understand that thyeir actions have consequences and that the rule of law has meaning.
To do otherwise, will sCimply reinforce lawyers like Pohl and Frizzell to continue to harass, create
delay, increase the acost of litigation and create conflicts with impunity, and send a message to
lawyers like Pofhl and Frizzell that the rule of law does not matter, the practice of law is simply a
game andU the truth is meaningless.
CONCLUSION & PRAYER
143 Exhibit 31 (Pohl’s Third Party Petition filed in Cheatham).
144 Exhibit 32 (July 23, 2018 Order Denying Pohl’s Motion for Leave to File Third Party Petition).
32
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs Lance Christopher Kassab and
The Kassab Law Firm respectfully request the Court to grant this Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
the Texas Citizens Participation Act and order that Plaintiffs take nothing in their claims against
Lance Christopher Kassab and The Kassab Law Firm. In addition, the Court shoukld award Lance
Christopher Kassab and The Kassab Law Firm attorney’s fees as requelsted and sanction
Plaintiffs and/or their counsel in an amount sufficient to deter themc from bringing similar
frivolous and retaliatory lawsuits in the future. s
Respectfully submitted,
THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
L ANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 00794070
llance@kassab.law
a DAVID ERIC KASSAB
M Texas State Bar No. 24071351
 david@kassab.law
o 1214 Elgin Street
e Houston, Texas 77004
Telephone: 713.522.7400
f Facsimile: 713.522.7410
y ATTORNEYS FOR LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB AND THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
a CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I herebyf certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has
been forwarded to all parties pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this the 24th day
of OctobeUr, 2018.
/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
Lance Christopher Kassab
33"
8,2018-10-24,OA,Kassab,1st Amended Answer with Counterclaims,"Kassab's First Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim for Civil Barratry, filed October 24, 2018 simultaneously with TCPA Motion to Dismiss","Filed October 24, 2018 simultaneously with the TCPA Motion to Dismiss. This amends Kassab's original answer (Filing #2) by adding res judicata as a 17th affirmative defense. Maintains general denial, 17 affirmative defenses, specific denials regarding conditions precedent, and counterclaims for civil barratry on behalf of 150 assigned claimants.","PLEAD-1, CC-1",N/A,Phase 1,2018-10-24_OA_Kassab-1st-Amended-Answer-CC_FILED.pdf,"Plaintiffs take nothing on their claims; Kassab recovers on counterclaims including actual and consequential damages, statutory damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, attorneys' fees and costs, and all other just relief","10/24/2018 2:33 PM
Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 28526297
By: ARIONNE MCNEAL
Filed: 10/24/2018 2:33 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIrAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS, LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAW FIRM’S FIRST AMENDED
ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND COUNtTERCLAIM
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
COMES NOW, Defendants, Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab,
P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm and files this their First Armended Answer, Affirmative Defenses,
and Counterclaim, and would respectfully show the Court as follows;
RULE 47 SiT l ATEMENT
The Kassab Defendants, in their caMpacity as Counter-Plaintiffs, seek monetary relief of
more than $1,000,000.00. o
PARTIES
Plaintiff, Michael A. PoOhl is an individual lawyer residing in Colorado.
Plaintiff, Law Offipces of Michael A. Pohl is a law firm set up for the practice of law in
various states of the union, including Texas.
Defendant, iScott Favre is a nonresident individual residing in Mississippi.
Defenodant, Scott M. Favre, PA, LLC is a nonresident limited liability company located in
Mississippi.
Defendant, Precision Marketing Group, LLC is a nonresident limited liability company
located in Mississippi.
Defendant, F. Douglas Montague III is a nonresident individual residing in Mississippi.
Defendant, Montague, Pittman & Varnado, PA is a nonresident professional association
located in Mississippi.
Defendant, Tina Nicholson is an individual residing in Texas.
Defendant, Baker Nicholson, LLP, d/b/a Baker Nicholson Law Firm is a klimited liability
partnership located in Texas. l
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab is an indicvidual residing in Texas.
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C.s d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm
is a professional corporation located in Texas. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
This matter is within the jurisdictional limitsu of this Court and Plaintiffs, Counter-
Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices onf Michael A. Pohl (“Pohl”) and Defendants,
Counter-Plaintiffs, Lance Christopher Kassab (“rLCK”) and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a
The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab, P.C.”) (collectively “Kassab”) are subject to the Court’s
jurisdiction. Venue is proper in this county because one or more of the defendants are residents of
this county and because a substanftial part of the acts and/or omissions that form the basis of this
suit occurred in this county. 
GENERAL DENIAL
Defendant, Clounter-Plaintiff Kassab generally denies all allegations made by Plaintiffs,
Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl, and requests the Court
to require Pnlaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl to
carry their burden of proof regarding all allegations against Kassab.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab pleads the following affirmative defenses:
1. Statute of limitations
2. Justification.
3. Estoppel.
4. Waiver. t
5. Ratification. t
6. Release. 
7. Unclean hands. e
8. Contribution. u
9. Failure to mitigate damages. n
10. Lack of standing. r
11. Accord and Satisfaction.
12. Assumption of the Risk. 
13. Illegality/Criminal Actfs.
14. First Amendment. 
15. Attorney Immunity.
16. In Pari Daellicto.
17. Res juidicata.
SPECIFIC DENIALS
Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs specifically deny that all conditions precedent regarding
Plaintiffs claims of conversion and theft of trade secrets have been performed or occurred prior to
Plaintiffs filing suit against Kassab.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
LCK is a lawyer practicing law with Kassab, P.C., a law firm in Houston, Texas focusing
solely on plaintiffs’ legal malpractice. Kassab filed four lawsuits on behalf of over four hundred
clients against Pohl (the “Harris County Lawsuits”). The main allegations against Pohl is civil
barratry and conspiracy to commit barratry, a third-degree felony in Texas. Pohl conspired with
his wife, Donalda Pohl (“Dona”), his paralegal, Edgar Jaimes (“Jaimes”t), and three runners in
Mississippi to illegally solicit clients on behalf of Pohl. Dona owns at sham lending company in
Texas called Helping Hands Financing, LLC (“HH Texas”). Jaimes runs the day-to-day operations
of HH Texas. The three runners are Scott Walker (“Walkere”), Steve Seymour (“Seymour”) and
Kirk Ladner (“Ladner”). The three runners own and ouperate two other sham companies called
Helping Hands Group, LLC and Helping Hands Finnancial, LLC (collectively “HH Mississippi”).
The three runners also owned Precision Markerting Group, LLC (“Precision”) which they sold to
Scott Favre and/or his companies (collectively “Favre”).
With regard to the clients obtained in the BP Litigation, Walker, Seymour and Ladner hired
other runners to literally go up anfd down streets knocking on doors to solicit clients on behalf of
Pohl for lawsuits against British Petroleum. Precision paid these runners as much as $300-$400
for every client they obtained. Pohl then paid Precision as much as $1,500 for every client
Precision referred tao lPohl. Pohl also offered and agreed to pay Walker, Seymour and Ladner a
percentage of hisi legal fees once the cases settled. This percentage was disguised as an hourly rate
of $1,500.00 per hour.
With regard to auto accidents, Pohl set up a “Google Alerts” to be notified whenever there
was a horrific rollover crash. Pohl would then send his runners to hospitals, homes and funerals
to contact the families of the injured. The runners would use their sham companies, “Helping
Hands” to act as though they were genuinely there to help these victims. The runners would falsely
tell these victims that they were there to help the victims’ in their time of need in the form of
money for burial services, food, clothing, lodging, etc. In reality, the runners’ contacted these
families under false pretenses with the sole objective to take advantage of these victims and their
families while they were emotionally distraught and not thinking straight in ordker to lock them
into contracts which allowed the runners to select a lawyer for the victim. Tlhe victims and the
family members were encouraged to hire Pohl and told they could not gect the money unless they
agreed to hire Pohl. Pohl would pay the runners as much as $7,5s00 per client and Pohl also
promised the runners as much as 33% of Pohl’s legal fees on the back end when the case settled.
Additionally, HH Texas would pay HH Mississippi $2,500 for every client referred to HH Texas
to “loan” money to these victims and their family. Pohl used this procedure as an attempt to put
an additional layer between him and the actual runners.
Pohl also helped the runners form anaother sham entity, the GM Settlement Verification
Team (“GM Team”) after General Motors, Inc. issued a recall on cars due to faulty ignition
switches which effected the safe opereation of the airbag systems on vehicles. Thus, the GM Team
was designed to look official as iff it was part of General Motors. The conspiracy was to form an
official looking entity as if GyM was contacting people who had been harmed when airbags failed
to deploy in relation toC the ignition recall. In reality, this was just another sham company used to
trick clients into hiaring Pohl. Again, Pohl would pay Walker and Ladner, through their sham
entity, the GM Tfeam, a fee for every client it referred to Pohl, in addition to a percentage of fees
on the baUck end.
Pohl knew what he was doing was illegal barratry. Accordingly, he knowingly formed
entities that he perceived would insulate him from liability. In fact, Walker testified that although
he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or “marketing money” it was “clear to [him] it was
barratry.” In fact, Walker considered himself and his company “a pass-through for barratry
money.” All total, Walker, Ladner and Precision received over $5 million in “barratry pass-through
money” from Pohl and other lawyers to solicit potential clients with claims, both auto-accident
victims and those involved in the BP Deepwater Horizon litigation. k
One of the runners hired by Pohl and Walker to solicit illegally solicit cllients on behalf of
Pohl was Magdalena Santana (“Santana”). In her September 24, 2016 afcfidavit, Santana testified
that Pohl sent her on “dozens and dozens of car wreck cases all ovser the country.” Pohl would
email Santana the link of news coverage he obtained through Google Alerts depicting an accident
and asked her “to go to the victim or the victim’s family and try to get them to sign up with him.”
Santana swore under oath that Pohl agreed to pay her “$5,000 per case that [she] signed, plus a
percentage of his attorney’s fees.” Santana was advised by Pohl to “be persistent even if the family
... rejected [her].” Santana was instructed by Paohl to “approach the victims and their families while
they were vulnerable, in the emergency room, their hospital rooms or at the funerals.” Pohl told
Santana that minorities “were especieally vulnerable since they tended not to know that the law
prohibited barratry.” Accordingf to Pohl, they “were easier to sign up.”
Pohl would give Sanytana “money to give to the victims or their families” but would give
the money to the client C“if they agreed to sign a Pohl representation contract.” Pohl advised Santana
that the money was aa “foot in the door” but instructed Santana not to mention anything about hiring
a lawyer “untilf after they agreed to take the money.” “If the client agreed to hire Pohl, then
[Santana]U was to have the client sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.” Pohl would then give Santana
the money to pay the client “from his own Helping Hands company.” When Santana questioned
this, Pohl told Santana that it “was illegal for him to pay [her] directly for cases, and that’s why
the money had to go through some company.”
Pohl and/or his co-conspirators had Santana retract this affidavit through a December 19,
2017 affidavit. This purported retraction was likely the result of Pohl paying Santana to provide
testimony, which is something he has done in the past. In fact, Pohl’s own paralegal, Jaimes,
testified that on one occasion Pohl sent him to Florida with a suitcase filled with $k50,000 in cash
to give to Santana in exchange for her signing a statement for him. Jaimes tesltified that Santana
would only get the money if she signed the statement for Pohl. Jaimes testcified that Santana signed
the signed the statement and got the money. s
Santana went into more detail about this in her deposition. Santana testified that the
statement was an agreement for her to keep quiet and not charge Pohl with any wrongdoing,
criminal or unethical conduct. Santana testified that Pohl paid her $50,000 in cash to sign this
statement, which was delivered by Jaimes in three bags marked “trick or treat.” Very symbolic
given that Santana had been tricked by Pohla into soliciting clients for him and was now being
treated the money she claimed was due under their agreement just to stay quite. Santana reiterated
in her deposition that if she didn’t sigen the gag agreement, she would not receive the money from
Pohl. Santana attempted to indicafte on the agreement that she was receiving $50,000 to keep quiet,
but Jaimes told her Pohl deymanded that she state she only received nominal consideration, like
$100. Santana did not wCrite the statement but “just signed it” because she felt she was being “forced
to sign” it while “unader duress.”
Notablyf, nowhere in Santana’s December 19th affidavit does she state the testimony in her
former afUfidavit is untrue, only that she does not “agree with” it and that the affidavit is not
“reliable.” Although Santana states in her December 19th affidavit that her prior affidavit was
drafted by a lawyer, Santana testified in her deposition that the September 24th affidavit was
created voluntarily with her own “testimony.” Santana testified that, unlike with Pohl, she was not
paid and had never been promised any money to provide the testimony in the September 24th
affidavit. Santana reiterated to counsel for Pohl, Billy Shepherd, that she was there in her
deposition to tell the truth and would not be bullied by his questioning or his efforts to confuse
her. k
Regardless, Santana’s sworn deposition testimony confirmed most of tlhe facts set forth in
her initial affidavit and this deposition testimony has never been rectracted. There, Santana
confirmed that she was hired by Pohl to solicit auto accident cases, thse first one being an accident
where a woman and her unborn child lost their lives. Santana was instructed by Walker, who was
instructed by Pohl, to personally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her up to sue the tire
manufacturer and, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000. Santana visited the funeral of the
deceased and got the family to feel comfortable with her. Although the mother was grieving, Pohl
told Santana: “take no prisoners, this is a cut tharoat business, you get in there and you do whatever
it takes to get this client.” The solicitation was successful after Pohl gave Santana $2,000 to “give
to the client to convince her into signeing over with the firm.”
“Coach” Kenneth Talleyf (“Talley”) was another runner hired by Pohl and Walker who
solicited over 20 auto accideynt cases for Pohl. Talley has sworn under oath that he was first hired
in relation to BP claimCs to find “folks that lost money due to the oil spill” and “sign them up” and
“get a fee for it.” Taalley testified that he went to work “knocking on doors” looking for potential
claimants for Pofhl and his partner in the BP litigation. Talley solicited and signed up for Pohl and
his co-coUnspirators more than 800 BP claims. Talley was paid between $75 and $350 for each BP
client he signed up for Pohl and his partners.
Talley eventually switched to soliciting auto accident victims, “calling on folks that had
bad accidents.” Talley recalls that the first client he solicited was in “the hospital in intensive care.”
Talley carried with him up to $1,000 to pay the accident victims to “help them with problems” but
only once they “were signed up.” Talley kept a list of all the auto accident cases he solicited so he
could keep track of the cases that he was due a fee on the back end after the case settled. Talley
also followed a checklist that instructed him to, among other things, bring flowekrs to the initial
hospital visit (but to spend no more than $50) and to offer the victims moneyl but to “make sure
the funding schedule” from HH Texas “is filled out properly before relecasing any cash.” Talley
would advise the victims that he had attorneys who could help them ssuch as Pohl. Talley was paid
a fee of $1,400 plus his expenses by Pohl, through Walker, for any auto accident case he solicited
and referred to Pohl. On some cases, Talley was to receive a portion of the fee paid to Helping
Hands out of Pohl’s attorney’s fees. Talley discussed with Pohl the “percentage of settlements”
he was to receive from the cases he solicited and referred, and Pohl told Talley that the money was
being placed in an “escrow account” for him. aWhen asked whether Pohl knew he was getting paid
to “contact vehicle accident victims,” Talley responded, “the money was coming from Edgar
[Jaimes] who worked for him.” Ande, although his paycheck was from Walker’s company, “the
funding came by way of Edgar [Jfaimes].”
Talley testified that pyersonally soliciting clients for Pohl became so frequent that he began
carrying blank Pohl coCntracts to each solicitation. Talley testified that he never recommended any
lawyers other than Paohl. However, Talley never told the clients that he was getting paid to solicit
them. Talley wofuld present a Pohl contract to the potential client. If the client did not agree to hire
Pohl, the Uclients would not get the money. Talley testified that Jaimes and Dona (the operators of
HH Texas) would send him the money.
Talley further testified that both he and Pohl knew what they were doing was illegal. In
one instance, Talley was “run out of town” while soliciting clients for Pohl. Talley testified that
during the attempted solicitation he was told by a “lawyer or policeman” that “it was against the
law what [he] was doing.” Talley mentioned this to Pohl and Pohl told him “you’ve just got to
leave...some people you can’t help.”
Walker was eventually indicted and sent to prison. Thereafter, Pohl and hisk lawyer partners
refused to pay Walker and the other runners the ill gained fees as Pohl had prolmised. Therefore,
Walker, Seymour, Ladner and Precision filed a lawsuit in Mississippi cFederal Court (“Federal
Litigation”) against Pohl and his law partners claiming they were sowed millions of dollars in
promised fees. 
The above facts were compiled during the Federal Litigation. Thereafter, more than four
hundred clients who were illegally solicited contacted the Kassab Law Firm and requested Kassab
to represent them in litigation against Pohl and his partners. Kassab filed lawsuits on behalf of
these clients in four different courts in Harrisa County. Additionally, due to the egregiousness of
Pohl’s violation of the Texas Penal Code and violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct, Kassab was reequired to notify the Texas State Bar pursuant to Rule 8.03 of
the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Pfrofessional Conduct. Thus, Kassab filed grievances against Pohl
pursuant to Rule 8.03. Pohl’ys clients are also preparing and filing grievances against Pohl arising
out of his blatant barraCtry.
Because of athese actions in representing clients against Pohl and the grievances filed
against Pohl, Pofhl has filed a retaliatory lawsuit against the Kassab alleging conversion and theft
of trade sUecrets. Pohl alleges that Kassab and others stole his property and are using it to bring
lawsuits and grievances against Pohl. Specifically, Pohl alleges in his petition against Kassab that,
“Kassab is a lawyer who specializes in suing other lawyers”1 and “Kassab solicited
1 Pohl Original Petition, p. 6
10
clients/prospective clients [of Pohl’s] to act as Plaintiffs . . . to bring cases against Pohl for alleged
barratry and other claims.”2 Thus, Pohl has judicially admitted that he has brought his suit against
Kassab because Kassab contacted Pohl’s clients and filed suit against Pohl on behalf of these
clients. k
COUNTERCLAIM FOR CIVIL BARRATRY
Within the lawsuits that Kassab has filed against Pohl on behalf oft his former clients and
potential clients, Pohl has judicially admitted that a claim for barratryt is not a legal malpractice
case. Pohl has also admitted that a claim for barratry is not a claim for “legal malpractice,” and
thus, the discovery rule does not apply to a barratry claim. Teherefore, based upon Pohl’s judicial
admissions, the assignment of a barratry claim is permituted under Texas law.
Therefore, based upon express assignmentns of interest given to Kassab, Kassab brings
counterclaims against Pohl and his law firm purrsuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,
Section 16.069. Section 16.069 provides:
(a) If a counterclaim or cross claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence
that is the basis of an acction, a party to the action may file the counterclaim or
cross claim even thougfh as a separate action it would be barred by limitations
on the date the partyO’s answer is required.
(b) The counterclaipm or cross claim must be filed not later than the 30th day after
the date on which the party’s answer is required.
Kassab has been asasilgned 150 barratry claims as of this date. These counterclaims are
being filed conteimporaneously with the Kassab’s answer and are therefore timely. The
remaining barratry counterclaims will be filed by November 7, 2018, within thirty (30)
days from the date Kassab’s answer is filed.
2 Id. at p. 6-7
11
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs respectfully pray that Plaintiffs recover nothing
on their claims and that the Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs recover on their claims against the
Plaintiffs as follows:
i) actual and consequential damages;
ii) statutory damages; 
iii) pre- and post-judgment interest; r
iv) attorneys’ fees and costs; and i
v) all other relief to which the Defendants, Counters-Plaintiffs may be justly entitled.
Respecutfully submitted,
THnE KASSAB LAW FIRM
r i/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 00794070
f lance@kassab.law
 DAVID ERIC KASSAB
c Texas State Bar No. 24071351
f i david@kassab.law
O 1214 Elgin Street
 Houston, Texas 77004
p Telephone: 713.522.7400
o Facsimile: 713.522.7410
a l ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS,
i COUNTER-PLAINTIFFS LANCE CHRISTOPHER
f i KASSAB AND THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has been
forwarded to all parties pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this the 24th day of
October 2018.
/ s / Lance Christopher Kasesab
Lance Christopher KassCabl
13"
3,2018-10-15,AFF,Pohl,Pohl’s affidavit in support of claims,"Affidavit of Michael Pohl filed as Exhibit 24, sworn June 19, 2018 in Montgomery County, Texas, in response to Kassab's State Bar grievance (File No. 201801825), providing Pohl's version of facts regarding his relationship with PR Consultants and denying barratry allegations","Sworn affidavit prepared by Pohl in the State Bar of Texas grievance proceeding (No. 201801825, Kassab as Complainant, Pohl as Respondent), later filed in the Pohl v. Kassab litigation as Exhibit 24 in connection with TCPA proceedings. Sworn June 19, 2018.",TCPA-1,N/A,Phase 1,2018-10-15_AFF_Pohl-Affidavit_FILED.pdf,,"EXHIBIT 24
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NO. 201801825
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB, § STATE BAR OF TEXAS
Complainant. §
§
MIKE A. POHL, §
Respondent. § GRIEVANCE : COMPLAINT
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AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL POHL G
Rey
THE STATE OF TEXAS § ~S
COUNTY OF MONTGOMERY § ; &
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared
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Michael Pohl, who upon being duly sworn, deposes says:
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1. My name is Michael Pohl. I am eighteen years old and am fully
capable of making this affidavit. I have pergonal knowledge of the facts addressed
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herein except as otherwise specifically eo and they are true and correct.
2. Iam a lawyer. My law Geta was at all times material to the allegations
herein called the Law Office, ‘Gf Michael A. Pohl (sometimes referred to as
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“LOMAP”). &
3. I was introduced to Scott Walker (“Walker”) and Robbie Maxwell, the
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principals of Maxwell W alker Consulting Group, LLC (“Maxwell-Walker”), as well
as Terry Robinsoi, and Steve Seymour (“Seymour”) in April 2012. I was introduced
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to Kirk Lady Laine’ approximately six to eight weeks later. These parties all
held theiasdlves out to me as professional, experienced marketing consultants who
had prior experience providing marketing and client-relations services on behalf of
lawyers and law firms generally and in connection with claims asserted against
British Petroleum arising from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill (“BP claims”) in

particular. Robinson’s father-in-law, who Pohl was informed by Walker, Robinson
and Seymour was a prominent local attorney who advised their group, met with
Pohl on one occasion to discuss the services to be provided.

4. I initially contracted with Maxwell-Walker for it to prove exclusive

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public-relations and client-liaison services in connection with existing and potential
BP claims by signing what was represented by Walker tobe Maxwell-Walker’s
customary services agreement. I was informed that Magiwell-Walker had retained
Mississippi attorneys to advise it and confirm that its agreement with me as well as
the public relations and marketing services it was aiticipated to provide under the
agreement were in compliance with Missiasipp law

5. Thereafter, Walker, Seymour Ladner (and/or their respective
companies) and I entered into additichal torme for specifically identified services,
including a Public Relations Conlin Agreement and subsequent agreements
made subject to the terms of the Public Relations Consulting Agreement.

6. Ladner andlor is companies) joined Walker and Seymour (and/or
their companies) on duly 15 2012, when Terry Robinson withdrew. The remaining
group of Walker, Seymour and Ladner are sometimes hereinafter referred to as the
Public Relatofé Consultants or “PR Consultants.”

7. Yves informed by the PR Consultants that their independent attorney
or attorneys had reviewed and approved each of the contracts I signed with them. In
fact, the PR Consultants and/or their independent attorneys prepared or redrafted
several subsequent “Retention of Services Agreement[s]” and “Operating

Agreement(s]” such as those attached to the Complaint! filed herein. I maintained
frequent communication with the PR Consultants and often travelled to Mississippi
to meet with them at the satellite law office I had leased there, which was used by
the PR Consultants and staff in connection with the PR Consultants’ services under
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their agreement with Pohl as the operations expanded. Th PR Consultants
designated Walker as their business manager, spokesperscin and administrator.
More specifically, Walker was assigned to lead their communications with third
parties and handle all financial matters for theitGonsulting/public relations
business. Walker was also in charge of the hiring-énd day-to-day supervision of the
staff, although Ladner undertook all or most ofthe staff training in connection with
the services rendered by the PR Consultaits in connection with the BP claims. The
PR Consultants were solely responsible for hiring, paying, tax withholding and
supervising all employees and contactor hired by them for purposes of providing
services under their agreements with me, and retained sole and exclusive control of
such employees and contain

8. The PR. Consultants represented that, in addition to their public
relations services, they were competent to handle client liaison services and claims
management ith respect to clients who retained me and Jimmy Williamson to
investigate“ and potentially prosecute their BP claims. This included initial
interviews and document aggregation to determine whether the clients/potential
clients even met the minimum requirements for filing a claim with the Court
Supervised Settlement Program administrator. The PR Consultants undertook to
' See Complaint, Exs. 32, 34.

provide those services in connection with the BP claims through their jointly owned
company, Precision Marketing Group, LLC (“Precision”), which succeeded Maxwell-
Walker in January 2013.

9. With respect to those services, the PR Consultants represented to me

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that they would be, and were, providing their marketing and client-relations
services in connection with the BP litigation exclusively. #0ime and that they
understood that their work and communications with clint potential clients and
me related to matters of pending and anticipated litigation, was confidential and
was not to be disclosed to third parties without iy express consent. I relied upon
those assurances in retaining and continuing 0 ia the PR Consultants’ services.

10. I have reviewed the Afidagiis of Scott Walker, Steve Seymour and
Kirk Ladner attached to the grievance bomplaint (the “Complaint”) filed against me
by Lance Kassab (“Kassab”), oa as the May 25, 2012 Public Relations
Consulting Agreement and ‘the May 25, 2012 Operating Agreement between
LOMAP, Maxwell & Walker Diamond Consulting and Robinson Holdings, LLC
(hereinafter, jointly, te May 25, 2012 Contract”); and the July 15, 2012 Operating
Agreement between LOMAP, Ladner, Walker and Steve Seymour (“Seymour”)
(hereinafter, tJ 15, 2012 Contract”), attached to the Complaint as Exhibits
3-1, 3-2 and 2 respectively, and sometimes collectively referred to as the parties
“agreement.”

11. The agreement was, as expressed in the writings, that I would pay the
PR Consultants a retainer as well as hourly fees and expenses so long as “such

hourly fees, retainer and expenses shall not exceed twenty-one percent (21%) of
LOMAP’s forty percent (40%) interest in the British Petroleum representation
agreement between Jimmy Williamson, P.C. and LOMAP.”

12. The assertions in the Complaint? that the agreement with the PR

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Consultants was a “barratry agreement” and that I agreed to pay the PR
Consultants any percentage of the attorney's fees I was toneceive is not true. I
made no such agreement on May 9, 2012, May 25, 2012, July 15, 2012 or at any
other time. The agreement between the parties provided, as expressed in the
writings, that I would pay a specified retainer as wel as hourly fees and expenses so
long as “such hourly fees, retainer and expenses shall not exceed twenty-one percent
(21%) of LOMAP’s forty percent (40) interest in the British Petroleum
representation agreement between sieny Williamson, P.C. and LOMAP.”

13. Accordingly, the sertion in the Complaint? that I ever agreed to pay
any percentage of my attorndy’'s fees to the PR Consultants are not true. The May
25, 2012 and July 15, aon Contracts accurately reflect the agreement orally
discussed and understood by all of the parties before their execution. The agreement
required that the oer Consultants “shall keep accurate daily time records of all
efforts expendédon behalf of LOMAP.” The %-of-attorney’s-fees clause was simply
to impose @ “cap on amounts that may be due under the other terms of the
agreement, not an independent promise to pay any percentage of the attorney’s fees
earned by LOMAP on the subject claims. This was orally discussed and understood
2 See Complaint, p. 5.

3 See Complaint, p. 6.

by the parties before the May 25, 2012 and July 15, 2012 Contracts were executed. I
never agreed to simply pay a percentage of attorney’s fees to the PR Consultants
and the May 25, 2012 and July 15, 2012 Contracts were intended to be enforced as
written. NS
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14. Pursuant to their contractual obligations, on more tha one occasion I
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reminded the PR Consultants to keep accurate daily time redords of their services
rendered in connection with the BP cases as they had agreed (as reflected in the
May 25, 2012 Contract and the July 15, 2012 Contr After PR Consultants
submitted invoices that I believed were unreasonable, I requested that the PR
Consultants provide me with their daily time records Instead, the PR Consultants
filed suit against me in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi (the “Federal Court Lawsuit), in which I counterclaimed against the PR
Consultants for numerous instant fraud and misrepresentation that are further
addressed below. Notably, in fhe claims the PR Consultants asserted against me in
the Federal Court Law the alleged that the agreement with me required them
to be paid on an howlirrat basis and specifically denied that they were ever
promised or otherwise entitled to any percentage of my attorney's fees. Exhibit 1-A.

15. 1 other instances pertaining to non-BP accident claims (sometimes
referred bo “rollover cases”), the PR Consultants also demanded a specific hourly
rate. The specific rate eventually charged by the PR Consultants was, in my
opinion, unreasonably high but I nevertheless agreed to it in return for the PR
Consultants’ agreement that the maximum amount I might owe them would be

capped pursuant to the specified percentage-of-attorney’s-fees language used in the
agreement. In this manner, I would limit my maximum contractual liability to the
PR Consultants notwithstanding that they wanted to charge what I considered to be
an unreasonable specified hourly rate. For example, I would have never agreed to
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an hourly rate of $1,500, which I considered to be excessive( without the PR
Consultants’ agreement that the maximum amount I mien Ge them would be
capped pursuant to the percentage-of-attomney’s-fees"" language that the PR
Consultants had agreed to in writing. &

16. Further with respect to the terme agreoment and services to be
provided under the May 25, 2012 Contract and the July 15, 2012 Contract, I was
informed by the PR Consultants that they. wanted to confer with their attorneys
before finalizing and executing the Gereement documentation. We specifically
discussed that the inclusion of the Seed maximum-price provisions was essential
to me in agreeing to either a fbaeonabl rate” formula or a specified contract rate.
The PR Consultants saben confirmed to me that they had conferred with
their Mississippi storeys, who had advised that the terms of the agreement and
anticipated serviggs thereunder were lawful, and executed the agreement
accordingly ro

17. Neverthees, the services rendered by the PR Consultants under the
May 25, 2012 Contract and the July 15, 2012 Contract were substandard in many
respects. Among other things, the PR Consultants improperly vetted potential
claims for supporting, or disqualifying, information, improperly or inadequately

trained employees and contract staff retained by the PR Consultants to perform
services rendered under the PR Consultants’ contracts with me, and improperly or
inadequately supervised employees and contract staff retained by the PR
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Consultants to perform services rendered under the PR Consultants’ coniracts with
me. The PR Consultants, who were primarily supposed to be whtng information
booths at various public events (such as boat shows, local festivals, etc.) and
answering follow-up telephone calls from interested perso had specifically touted
to me their familiarity with Mississippi rules regafing the marketing of legal
services on behalf of lawyers and law firms as elt as their access to counsel in
neighboring jurisdictions to advise with regard to any activities there. That is,
before I entered into any contracts witb PR Consultants, it was specifically
discussed, and the PR Consultant * asctically agreed, that they were to comply
with all applicable rules in that regaid and to supervise all hired staff accordingly.
18. However, based @n later admissions made by the PR Consultants in
connection with the Federal Cour Lawsuit, it appears that that may not have been
done in some instano§ although I relied upon the PR Consultants’ representations
and was unaware that they were acting in violation of their agreement with me. I
have since leS4, primarily through discovery in the Federal Court Lawsuit, that
the PR Coitants also misrepresented to me and my staff information relating to
claimants and potential claimants, disclosed confidential and _ proprietary
information to third parties without authorization, and otherwise acted in a
dishonest and disloyal manner toward me from the outset of our agreement,

including entering into undisclosed arrangements to provide the same or similar
services to my direct competitors, referring claimants and potential claimants to my
direct competitors and evefi proposing the “sale” of all of my accumulated work
product to third parties — all while being paid by me for what was represented to me
to be their exclusive services and while I was being billed by the PR Consultants for
(and paying) business expenses and overhead. &
19. It now appears that, from the outset of theif tolationship with me, the
PR Consultants also immediately began violating thelr contracts with me by failing
to keep accurate daily time records of efforts expended on my behalf as well as
making materially false representations to regarding the nature of services
performed and the nature of expenses ince, representations which I relied upon
to my detriment by paying PR Constant amounts that were not owed and to
which they were not entitled. This included the PR Consultants’ sending me
falsified and inflated invoices‘and expense information. It was also later discovered
that the PR Consultants had eytematialy overcharged me on all amounts I paid
them under the publczlation agreement. As a result, I asserted claims against
the PR Consultants in the Federal Court Lawsuit based on their multiple material
breaches of thir express and implied agreements, and their otherwise fraudulent
and bad ti onan towards me.
20. Moreover, the whole notion of alleged “barratry fees” was only
concocted by the PR Consultants after they had been caught stealing from me. The
term “barratry fees” was never used or mentioned by the PR Consultants at any

time prior to the institution of my counterclaims against them in the Federal Court
Lawsuit, and there is not a single contemporaneous record of any mention of alleged
barratry fees or payments. Indeed, Complainant Kassab’s co-counsel, Tina
Nicholson, as well as her former client Scott Favre (“Favre”), have both stated that
the PR Consultants even admitted to them that they had been & Castine from me.
Exhibit 1-B. The PR Consultants never disclosed to me that they were taking a
“skim” from all funds invoiced to me as actual expenses‘@nd concealed the theft by
misrepresenting to me the actual cost of the goodarand services for which they
sought reimbursement. In reality, the PR Consultants were simply inflating the
purported expense charges and keeping the exose above their actual cost.

21. In reliance on PR Consultants representations that the costs charged
to me were real and legitimate, ato funds into accounts owned or
controlled by the PR Consultants,"" These accounts were in the name of Maxwell-
Walker and Precision and wie eontrolled by the PR Consultants.

22. Thus, from the inept of my relationship with PR Consultants, they
consistently overstate the amount of all of the actual costs they charged me
for, and then misappropriated, converted and/or stole the inflated amounts for their

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own use and benetit

24. The fraudulent nature of the PR Consultants’ activities was further
established by the fact that bogus invoices produced in connection with the Federal
Court lawsuit actually bear stamped “PAID” dates that are days or weeks before the _

invoices were even prepared, according to the other information contained thereon.
Exhibit 1-C.

24. The PR Consultants also misappropriated, converted and/or stole
money from me by misrepresentation by charging me as much as Thousand
Dollars ($1,000.00) per week for what they described je rien expense
itemizations that were actually sent to me as “miscellaneous marketing” expenses

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supposedly incurred under the terms of the contracts. Although I requested back-up
receipts substantiating these purported expenses, (none were ever provided. I
subsequently discovered that the “miscellaneous  harketing” expenses were not real
expenses at all; the PR Consultants wore. simply keeping the “miscellaneous
marketing” money for themselves or otha using it for purposes that I had not
authorized or agreed to. &

25. The PR Consultants taade multiple affirmative representations in
communications to me and mi office staff regarding these fictitious expense charges
from approximately March 201 through September 2013 until I confronted Walker
and Walker cdmitted’ that the communications in which PR Consultants had
characterized certain charges as “miscellaneous marketing” expenses were not
truthful andar he had simply been keeping the money and/or using it for
purposes that were not authorized under the contracts. When I demanded that the
PR Consultants return the fraudulently induced payments, Walker told me that
they longer had the funds.

26. As part of the business of Maxwell-Walker, and later Precision
Marketing Group (now owned by Favre), the PR Consultants hired an unknown
number of employees and subcontractors in connection with the services rendered
in connection with the BP claims. The PR Consultants paid the individals it hired,

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trained and supervised and to whom it issued IRS Form 1098s. None of those
persons were employed by me. The PR Consultants represeiited to me that such
persons would be and were properly trained and supervised regarding necessary
and permissible marketing activities and restrichioné ¢ Gséxeon. But notwithstanding
those representations, they have since disclosed in connection with the Federal
Court Lawsuit that such training either ad not occur or was incompletely and/or
negligently performed and the employees and contractors were not properly
supervised by the PR Consultants, These deficiencies apparently continued
notwithstanding my repeated ci to the PR Consultants to carefully train
and supervise the employees and staff working on the BP matters. I relied on
assurances from the PR Consltnt regarding their supposed training and
supervision in continuing t utilize the PR Consultants’ services. However, I later
came to learn that the PR Consultants were knowingly working against my
interests purstiant to agreements they had entered into with other attorneys who I
was in sre vompetition with.

27. Through discovery in the Federal Court Lawsuit, I learned that the PR
Consultants diverted actual and potential BP claimants who had signed contracts
with me to other persons and entities for the purpose of prosecuting their claims

and thereby misappropriated the services I had contracted and paid for as well as
my client contracts and existing and/or expected contractual relationships
(including actual executed client contracts as well as my contract forms and related
work product). According to the documents produced by the PR Consultants,
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hundreds of claimants whose claims were investigated and docuimented by the PR
Consultants — while I was paying them for full-time sorvives and all of their
overhead ~ were surreptitiously referred by the PR Consultant to other attorneys
pursuant to agreements the PR Consultants had entered into with them that had
also not been disclosed to me. The documents prodiced by the PR Consultants in
discovery reflect that, on some occasions, PR Consultants even sought to utilize the
fact the I was paying overhead and expenies in an attempt to procure agreements
for themselves with third parties té\ whom they intended to wrongfully divert
existing and potential clients ia rated compensation rates based on the PR
Consultants’ supposed assursption of responsibility for all overhead and expenses
when, in fact, most of hon on were intended by the PR Consultants to be, and
were being, entirely, bore by me. In other words, the PR Consultants were
marketing their one services to other attorneys in return for a higher compensation
rate based onthe fact that the other attorneys would not have to pay for expenses
or overhead teens those expenses were being charged by the PR Consultants to
me).
28. During the course of discovery in the Federal Court Case, it was also
revealed that the PR Consultants undertook to convert, misappropriate for

themselves and/or market to third parties claimant files and other information and
materials that belong to me. Those items include original client contingency fee
contracts between my clients and me (and to which PR Consultants are not parties),
documentation of contact and personal information, claim information and
supporting materials. These files were at one time maintained in approximately
seventeen clear plastic file containers. Ladner admitted abseainding with those files
from my satellite law office and, without my consent, them at his residence
until they were later delivered, also without my content, to Scott Favre. The PR
Consultants and Tina Nicholson also refused to rebum and converted to their own
use four computers that I purchased for ny ofc and which the PR Consultants’
used while there performing services auider the May 25, 2012 and July 15, 2012
Contracts. Those computers held software and stored data that I had paid for,
specialized legal forms (that hag eS, prepared in compliance with various state
law after consultation with Tocal counsel in those jurisdictions), marketing
information and other trade sere, my proprietary administrative client forms,
various ue agreement forms prepared in accordance with the laws of various states,
internal emails agther work product relating to the BP claims and other matters
the PR Consufiants rendered services in connection with under the May 25, 2012
Contract aid the July 15, 2012 Contract.
29. This theft and unlawful disclosure was made even more egregious by
the fact that, from the outset of their contractual relationship with me, the PR
Consultants expressed their understanding of the confidential nature of the

information based on their prior experience in providing litigation-related services
to attorneys, a field in which PR Consultants held themselves out to me as
experienced professionals. Nevertheless, without my consent, and although they
were without legal title to the contracts, documents, computers, passwords or data
stored thereon, PR Consultants purported to sell the contacts documents,
computer, passwords and/or stored data to Scott Favre (even'aiter I had informed
Favre that the materials had been stolen from me by mre PR Consultants), who it
appears eventually sold those items and the information therein to Complainant
Kassab. ©

30. In the Spring of 2013, British Petroleum sued the administrator of the
Court Supervised Settlement Program & lnpropeny administering the global
settlement and, as a result, activity inconntto with the BP claims was halted. To
the best of my recollection, after Apri 2013, Jimmy Williamson and I did not agree
to represent any additional BE claimants who had requested our services as a result
of the public relations ond markting services performed by the PR Consultants.

31. After the publi relations and claims administration services in
connection with the BP claims had wound down, the PR Consultants offered their
assistance in déonection with other legal matters I was handling. I have for many
years proud claims arising from automobile and tire design and manufacturing
defects and agreed to retain the PR Consultants’ services in connection with various
faulty-ignition and “rollover cases.” However, I never instructed the PR Consultants
to improperly solicit any persons and specifically deny that I engaged in any

conspiracy with the PR Consultants or anyone else for the purpose of committing
barratry. In February 2014, I made the decision to close my satellite law office in
Mississippi.

32. Because of my years of experience in the field of désign and

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manufacturing defect litigation, I have developed attorney contadés in many states
who refer cases to me from time to time. In addition, I nae tomerous business
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contacts in Texas, Oklahoma and elsewhere related tepy ranching and horse
breeding business who have from time to time reconunénded my services to their
family members and acquaintances. It was tar not unusual for me to be
contacted by a claimant from outside the State of Texas even though that is where I
had maintained my practice for many years)

33. With respect to the family of Cynthia Shannon (referred to on page 14
of the Complaint), to the best of e knowledge, I believe I was contacted by an
acquaintance or family meme of the decedent and may have requested Walker
and/or Ladner to assist {connection with securing the vehicle, tires and other
evidence related to tec Beident and may also have referred the family to Helping
Hand Financing, ERC (which I have no ownership interest in) for the purpose of
arranging nonifecourse loan against any potential recovery on the wrongful death
claim. Howeres I did not refer anyone to Helping hand Group, LLC, which was a
Mississippi business entity apparently formed by Walker and/or Ladner without my
knowledge or assistance. I did not instruct or advise Walker, Ladner or The Helping
Hands Group, LLC to improperly solicit the family of Cynthia Shannon, nor did I

otherwise enter into any conspiracy with Walker, Ladner, The Helping Hands
Group, LLC or anyone else to commit barratry in connection with any claims
arising from Cynthia Shannon’s death.

34. I would add that it is also possible that the PR Consultants or other

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persons may have contacted the family of Cynthia Shannon, or tthe Semily of Emily
Zubalik (mentioned in connection with the letter from Richard Shenken on page 20
of the Complaint),4 using my name without my knowledge consent. In particular,
two individuals who I had no contact with and never$ éuthorized to use my name or
my firm name actually set up and operated a website using my name and my firm
name. Those individuals were later sscovered to be Julia Porter and Monica
Chaney, who it appears (from the statomnt of Jacqueline Taylor attached to the
Complaint) may have been associated With the PR Consultants or their associates.

35. In fact, I had to ote Porter and Chaney several times and
eventually sent them a ceaseland desist letter demanding that they stop using my
name or my firm’s name in comecton with any website or otherwise. Exhibit 1-D. I
later learned that, eboeh Porter and/or Chaney, certain individuals may have
actually signed fog parcements or other claims-related documentation bearing my
name and, agtin, demanded that Porter and Chaney inform any such persons that
the use oy name was unauthorized. Exhibit 1-E.
4] have no specific recollection of ever instructing Ladner or anyone else to contact Michael Lucas or any member
of Emily Zubalik’s family. The Power of Attorney (attached as Exhibit 39 to the Complaint) appears to be a form |
have used but is not signed by me and, upon receipt of Mr. Shenken’s letter (attached as Exhibit 38 to the
Complaint), I immediately disclaimed any interest in claims arising from the subject accident. See Exhibit 1-G.

36. On still another occasion, my firm was contacted by an individual
named Christopher Forrest inquiring as to the status of his case. When we informed
Mr. Forrest that we had no record of having represented him, he stated that he had
been promised at least $30,000 if he signed certain documentation and forwarded to

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me a document indicating that someone had presented him with a fee agreement
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bearing my name in May of 2017, more than three years’ after I had stopped
accepting BP claims and more than two years after the BP claims administrator
had closed the application process. Exhibit 1-F. After reviewing the document he
had forwarded, we inquired of Mr. Forrest who had povided it to him, but he stated
that he did not want to get anyone in troubies refused to identify the individual
that had given it to him. ~

37. I further deny the attogaddon that I divided a fee between myself and a
lawyer or lawyers who are not in ym without the client’s consent (as alleged on
pages 26-27 of the Complaisit)- Fist the Complaint does not even identify any
client whose fee was supose improperly divided. Second, the fee-agreement
submitted by the Complainant in support of this allegation (Exhibit 43 to the
Complaint) does pobappear to have been prepared or signed by me. Third, even if I
had prepared’ signed Exhibit 483 or a substantively similar fee agreement, it
would noe constiate the “division” of a fee without the client’s consent because
Jimmy Williamson and I were both identified on the fee agreement and therefore
would both have been knowingly retained by the client/potential client.

38. In this regard, Mr. Williamson and I did agree generally to share fees
earned on our joint BP clients on a 60/40 percentage basis consistent with Texas
law.5 Accordingly, we envisioned that the services and value contributed by each
would approximate a 60 percent contribution by Williamson and a 40 percent

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contribution by me. However, consistent with Texas law, when the circumstances
occasionally varied from our estimate, or otherwise in fairness required a different
proportion, the fee, if any, would be divided accordingly. [a yome instances, I did not
receive any fee at all on a BP claim notwithstanding tat both Williamson and I had
been retained by the client and I had contributed to the investigation and/or
prosecution of the claim. I have no way of knowing what the circumstances were
with respect to the client who supposedly retained me pursuant to the fee
agreement attached as Exhibit ado the Complaint because all identifying
information has been redacted ty hl Complains. However, I deny that I violated
Texas Disciplinary Rule of Prffessional Conduct 1.04 with respect to that individual
or any other client or potenti client. In connection with the BP claims and other
matters made the basis 0 the Complaint, the fees and expense reimbursement I
received reflected the actual value of my legal services and the actual expenses I
had incurred

29. In this regard, I am familiar with the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct (the “Rules”) and have made it my practice to comply with
them at all times.

5 See e.g. Exhibit 10 (J. Williamson depo., pp. 58-59).

40. Ideny that I violated Rules 1.04(((1), 1.04(H(2) or 1.04(g) in connection
with any fees earned in connection with the BP claims and other matters made the
basis of the Complaint.

41. I further deny that I violated Rules 1.15(a)(1) or 115 @ in connection
with my withdrawal from or other termination of any reresention in connection
with the BP claims and other matters made the basis of the Céinplaint

42. I further deny that I violated Rule 5.04(a) by sharing attorney’s fees
with a non-lawyer in connection with the BP claims’ and other matters made the
basis of the Complaint. ©

43. I further deny that I violated Ral 7.01(a) with respect to my firm
name or letterhead in connection with the BP claims and other matters made the

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basis of the Complaint. &

44, I further deny that I violated Rules 7.03(b) or 7.03(d) by paying any
non-lawyer to solicit or refer dhionts to me, except for reasonable public relations
and marketing services reper in accordance with the Rules, in connection with
the BP claims and ot ater made the basis of the Complaint.

45. I further deny that I violated Rules 7.06(a) or 7.06(b) by continuing
employment &Siolation of the Rules in connection with the BP claims and other

matters nde the basis of the Complaint.

46. I further deny that I violated Rules 8.04(a)(1), 8.04(a)(2), 8.04(a)(3),
8.04(a)(4), 8.04(a)(9), 8.04(a)(12) or 8.04(b) by committing any crime or illegal act,
engaging in conduct involving fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, engaging in

obstruction of justice, engaging in barratry or violating any other law relating to
lawyers or the practice of law.

47. Ihave attempted in good faith to address all of the material allegations
set forth in Mr. Kassab’s grievance complaint; however, to the extent. ani material

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allegation is not specifically addressed above it is denied. ae
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© .
Ss"
4,2018-10-15,OA,Montague,Montague’s answer subject to special appearance,"Defendants F. Douglas Montague III and Montague Pittman & Varnado, P.A.'s Original Answer Subject to Their Special Appearance, including general denial, 12 affirmative defenses, and request for disclosure","Montague Defendants' initial responsive pleading filed October 15, 2018, subject to their previously filed Special Appearance challenging personal jurisdiction. This answer preserves their jurisdictional objection while also responding to the merits of Pohl's Original Petition.",PLEAD-1,N/A,Phase 1,2018-10-15_OA_Montague-Answer-Subject-to-Appearance_FILED.pdf,"Grant of special appearance dismissing Montague Defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction; alternatively, denial of all relief against Montague Defendants with a take-nothing judgment; costs of court; and all other relief to which they may be justly entitled","10/15/2018 10:49 AM
Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 28273574
By: ARIONNE MCNEAL
Filed: 10/15/2018 10:49 AM
NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL POHL, ET AL § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
Plaintiffs, §
v. §
§ HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
LANCE KASSAB, ET AL § r
§ C l
Defendants. § 189TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS F. DOUGLAS MONTAGUE IItI AND
MONTAGUE PITTMAN & VARNADO, P.A.’S ORDIGiINAL ANSWER
SUBJECT TO THEIR SPECIAL APPEARANCE
Subject to the their previously filed Special Appearance, Defendants F. Douglas
Montague III and Montague Pittman & Varnado, P.AB. (“Defendants”) file this Original Answer
to Plaintiff’s Original Petition and respectfully show the following:
aI.
GENERAL DENIAL
1.1. Pursuant to Rule 92, Defendants denies the material allegations made in the
Plaintiffs’ Original Petition and aniy petition that may be filed hereinafter by way of amendment
or supplement, and demand strict proof thereof by a preponderance of the evidence at trial.
o II.
AFFIRMATIVE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSES
Defendancts further assert the following additional and affirmative defenses in the
alternative subject to their special appearance:
2.1. In the alternative, Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by a lack of standing. Specifically,
Plaintiff did not have an attorney-client relationship with the Defendants nor were these
Defendants a party or an attorney for a party to the underlying Pohl litigation with Favre and
Precision. Therefore, these Defendants owe no duty to Plaintiffs. Moreover, the referral of cases
to specialists are the type of professional services that routinely and commonly fall within the
services that an attorney would provide and that the Defendants do provide, which would thereby
provide immunity to these Defendants from liability. Consequently, there is no basis to assert a
claim of liability whether by way of conversion, theft of trade secrets, conspiracky or otherwise
against attorneys who are simply discharging traditional legal tasks. l
2.2. In the alternative, Plaintiffs’ claims for conspiracy and reclated torts are barred in
whole or in part for failure to state a claim on which relief can be sgranted. Under Texas law,
“[i]f the defendant’s liability for the alleged underlying tort is fosreclosed as a matter of law, there
is no claim for conspiracy.” Frankoff v. Norman, 448 S.W.3d 75, 87 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2014, no pet.). In this instance, Plaintiffs’ only link to the Montague Defendants for each
pled tort hinges on the bald assertion that the Montague Defendants “knew it (confidential
information) had been stolen.” In fact, Plaintaiffs have no basis to allege this as to the Montague
Defendants. And, the Montague Defendants were not parties to the Pohl settlement agreement
let alone the underlying case. Becauese the referral of a possible case is not an unlawful act, there
is no basis to assert the tort claimfs against these Defendants.
2.3. In the alternaytive, Plaintiffs’ claims are barred in whole or in part by the doctrine
of comparative responsCibility and/or contributory negligence. In particular, Plaintiffs’ are barred
by their own actions and decisions, which were not reasonable under all of the circumstances
involved and cfhfarted the course for this dispute. Defendants assert their rights under Chapter 33
of the TeUxas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, including the reduction of liability based on the
comparative responsibility of Plaintiffs or other Defendants in the instant case, any subsequent
settling Defendant and/or any responsible third parties.
2.4. Plaintiffs’ claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of excuse, legal
justification, and good faith.
2.5. Plaintiffs’ claims are barred, in whole or in part, because it has suffered no legally
cognizable damages and/or Plaintiff failed to mitigate damages. k
2.6. The Plaintiffs’ claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the flailure to satisfy all
necessary conditions precedent. c
2.7. The Plaintiffs’ claims are barred, in whole or in part, bsy the defense of estoppel.
2.8. The Plaintiffs’ claims are barred, in whole or in psart, by the defense of waiver.
2.9. The Plaintiffs’ claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the defense of unclean
hands.
2.10 The Plaintiffs’ claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the defense of illegality.
2.11 The Plaintiffs’ claims are barread, in whole or in part, by the defense of the statute
of limitations. 
2.12. Defendants assert theier rights under Chapter 41 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code including the limfitations on exemplary damages.
y III.
REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURE
Subject to thleir special appearance, pursuant to Rule 194 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure, Plainitiffs are requested to disclose, within thirty (30) days of service of this request,
the informantion or material described in Rule 194.2. Defendants specifically request Plaintiffs
produce all responsive documents and information at the undersigned law office within thirty
(30) days of service of this request.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Defendants respectfully pray that this
Court grant their special appearance or, alternatively, if denied, deny all relief sought against
these Defendants and render a take nothing judgment against Plaintiffs as well as awarding the
Defendants their costs and all such other relief to which they may be justly entitlekd.
Respectfully submitted, l
MARTIN, DISIERE, JEFFERSOcN & WISDOM, L.L.P.
/s/ Dale Jefferson i
Dale Jefferson 
Texas State Bar Nso. 10607900
jefferson@mdjwlaw.com
Raul H. Suazor
Texas StatBe Bar No. 24003021
suazo@nmdjwlaw.com
Kevin G. Cain
Texras State Bar No. 24012371
Mcain@mdjwlaw.com
808 Travis Street, 20th Floor
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 632-1700 Telephone
f i (713) 222-0101 Facsimile
y ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS F. DOUGLAS
MONTAGUE III AND MONTAGUE PITTMAN &
C VARNADO, P.A.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served
upon all counsel of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, on the 15th
day of October, 2018 as follows:
Jean C. Frizzell r
Reynolds Frizzell LLP C l
1100 Louisiana St., Suite 3500 
Houston, Texas 77002
Via Electronic Filing and Email: jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.comt
/s/ Dale Jeffersson
Dale Jeffersong"
2,2018-10-08,OA,Kassab,Kassab’s initial answer with counterclaims,"Kassab Defendants' Original Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim for Civil Barratry, including general denial, 16 affirmative defenses, specific denials, and counterclaims based on assigned barratry claims","Kassab's initial responsive pleading to Pohl's Original Petition, filed October 8, 2018, approximately six weeks after suit was commenced. Includes both defensive pleading (general denial, 16 affirmative defenses, specific denials) and offensive counterclaims for civil barratry based on assigned claims from Pohl's former clients.","PLEAD-1, CC-1",N/A,Phase 1,2018-10-08_OA_Kassab-Answer-and-CC_FILED.pdf,That Plaintiffs recover nothing on their claims; actual and consequential damages on counterclaims; statutory damages; pre- and post-judgment interest; attorneys' fees and costs; and all other relief to which Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs may be justly entitled,"10/8/2018 1:34 PM
Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 28104847
By: Brianna Denmon
Filed: 10/8/2018 1:34 PM
CAUSE NO. 2018-58419
MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIrAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS, LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB AND LANCE CHRISTOPHER
KASSAB, P.C. D/B/A THE KASSAB LAW FIRM’S ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES AND COUNTERCLAIM t
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
COMES NOW, Defendants, Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab,
P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm and files this their Origirnal Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and
Counterclaim, and would respectfully show the Court as follows;
RULE 47 SiT l ATEMENT
The Kassab Defendants, in their caMpacity as Counter-Plaintiffs, seek monetary relief of
more than $1,000,000.00. o
PARTIES
Plaintiff, Michael A. PoOhl is an individual lawyer residing in Colorado.
Plaintiff, Law Offipces of Michael A. Pohl is a law firm set up for the practice of law in
various states of the union, including Texas.
Defendant, iScott Favre is a nonresident individual residing in Mississippi.
Defenodant, Scott M. Favre, PA, LLC is a nonresident limited liability company located in
Mississippi.
Defendant, Precision Marketing Group, LLC is a nonresident limited liability company
located in Mississippi.
Defendant, F. Douglas Montague III is a nonresident individual residing in Mississippi.
Defendant, Montague, Pittman & Varnado, PA is a nonresident professional association
located in Mississippi.
Defendant, Tina Nicholson is an individual residing in Texas.
Defendant, Baker Nicholson, LLP, d/b/a Baker Nicholson Law Firm is a klimited liability
partnership located in Texas. l
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab is an indicvidual residing in Texas.
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C.s d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm
is a professional corporation located in Texas. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
This matter is within the jurisdictional limitsu of this Court and Plaintiffs, Counter-
Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices onf Michael A. Pohl (“Pohl”) and Defendants,
Counter-Plaintiffs, Lance Christopher Kassab (“rLCK”) and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a
The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab, P.C.”) (collectively “Kassab”) are subject to the Court’s
jurisdiction. Venue is proper in this county because one or more of the defendants are residents of
this county and because a substanftial part of the acts and/or omissions that form the basis of this
suit occurred in this county. 
GENERAL DENIAL
Defendant, Clounter-Plaintiff Kassab generally denies all allegations made by Plaintiffs,
Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl, and requests the Court
to require Pnlaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Michael A. Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl to
carry their burden of proof regarding all allegations against Kassab.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff Kassab pleads the following affirmative defenses:
1. Statute of limitations
2. Justification.
3. Estoppel.
4. Waiver. t
5. Ratification. t
6. Release. 
7. Unclean hands. e
8. Contribution. u
9. Failure to mitigate damages. n
10. Lack of standing. r
11. Accord and Satisfaction.
12. Assumption of the Risk. 
13. Illegality/Criminal Actfs.
14. First Amendment. 
15. Attorney Immunity.
16. In Pari Daellicto.
i SPECIFIC DENIALS
Defnendants, Counter-Plaintiffs specifically deny that all conditions precedent regarding
Plaintiffs claims of conversion and theft of trade secrets have been performed or occurred prior to
Plaintiffs filing suit against Kassab.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
LCK is a lawyer practicing law with Kassab, P.C., a law firm in Houston, Texas focusing
solely on plaintiffs’ legal malpractice. Kassab filed four lawsuits on behalf of over four hundred
clients against Pohl (the “Harris County Lawsuits”). The main allegations against Pohl is civil
barratry and conspiracy to commit barratry, a third-degree felony in Texas. Pohl conspired with
his wife, Donalda Pohl (“Dona”), his paralegal, Edgar Jaimes (“Jaimes”t), and three runners in
Mississippi to illegally solicit clients on behalf of Pohl. Dona owns at sham lending company in
Texas called Helping Hands Financing, LLC (“HH Texas”). Jaimes runs the day-to-day operations
of HH Texas. The three runners are Scott Walker (“Walkere”), Steve Seymour (“Seymour”) and
Kirk Ladner (“Ladner”). The three runners own and ouperate two other sham companies called
Helping Hands Group, LLC and Helping Hands Finnancial, LLC (collectively “HH Mississippi”).
The three runners also owned Precision Markerting Group, LLC (“Precision”) which they sold to
Scott Favre and/or his companies (collectively “Favre”).
With regard to the clients obtained in the BP Litigation, Walker, Seymour and Ladner hired
other runners to literally go up anfd down streets knocking on doors to solicit clients on behalf of
Pohl for lawsuits against British Petroleum. Precision paid these runners as much as $300-$400
for every client they obtained. Pohl then paid Precision as much as $1,500 for every client
Precision referred tao lPohl. Pohl also offered and agreed to pay Walker, Seymour and Ladner a
percentage of hisi legal fees once the cases settled. This percentage was disguised as an hourly rate
of $1,500.00 per hour.
With regard to auto accidents, Pohl set up a “Google Alerts” to be notified whenever there
was a horrific rollover crash. Pohl would then send his runners to hospitals, homes and funerals
to contact the families of the injured. The runners would use their sham companies, “Helping
Hands” to act as though they were genuinely there to help these victims. The runners would falsely
tell these victims that they were there to help the victims’ in their time of need in the form of
money for burial services, food, clothing, lodging, etc. In reality, the runners’ contacted these
families under false pretenses with the sole objective to take advantage of these victims and their
families while they were emotionally distraught and not thinking straight in ordker to lock them
into contracts which allowed the runners to select a lawyer for the victim. Tlhe victims and the
family members were encouraged to hire Pohl and told they could not gect the money unless they
agreed to hire Pohl. Pohl would pay the runners as much as $7,5s00 per client and Pohl also
promised the runners as much as 33% of Pohl’s legal fees on the back end when the case settled.
Additionally, HH Texas would pay HH Mississippi $2,500 for every client referred to HH Texas
to “loan” money to these victims and their family. Pohl used this procedure as an attempt to put
an additional layer between him and the actual runners.
Pohl also helped the runners form anaother sham entity, the GM Settlement Verification
Team (“GM Team”) after General Motors, Inc. issued a recall on cars due to faulty ignition
switches which effected the safe opereation of the airbag systems on vehicles. Thus, the GM Team
was designed to look official as iff it was part of General Motors. The conspiracy was to form an
official looking entity as if GyM was contacting people who had been harmed when airbags failed
to deploy in relation toC the ignition recall. In reality, this was just another sham company used to
trick clients into hiaring Pohl. Again, Pohl would pay Walker and Ladner, through their sham
entity, the GM Tfeam, a fee for every client it referred to Pohl, in addition to a percentage of fees
on the baUck end.
Pohl knew what he was doing was illegal barratry. Accordingly, he knowingly formed
entities that he perceived would insulate him from liability. In fact, Walker testified that although
he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or “marketing money” it was “clear to [him] it was
barratry.” In fact, Walker considered himself and his company “a pass-through for barratry
money.” All total, Walker, Ladner and Precision received over $5 million in “barratry pass-through
money” from Pohl and other lawyers to solicit potential clients with claims, both auto-accident
victims and those involved in the BP Deepwater Horizon litigation. k
One of the runners hired by Pohl and Walker to solicit illegally solicit cllients on behalf of
Pohl was Magdalena Santana (“Santana”). In her September 24, 2016 afcfidavit, Santana testified
that Pohl sent her on “dozens and dozens of car wreck cases all ovser the country.” Pohl would
email Santana the link of news coverage he obtained through Google Alerts depicting an accident
and asked her “to go to the victim or the victim’s family and try to get them to sign up with him.”
Santana swore under oath that Pohl agreed to pay her “$5,000 per case that [she] signed, plus a
percentage of his attorney’s fees.” Santana was advised by Pohl to “be persistent even if the family
... rejected [her].” Santana was instructed by Paohl to “approach the victims and their families while
they were vulnerable, in the emergency room, their hospital rooms or at the funerals.” Pohl told
Santana that minorities “were especieally vulnerable since they tended not to know that the law
prohibited barratry.” Accordingf to Pohl, they “were easier to sign up.”
Pohl would give Sanytana “money to give to the victims or their families” but would give
the money to the client C“if they agreed to sign a Pohl representation contract.” Pohl advised Santana
that the money was aa “foot in the door” but instructed Santana not to mention anything about hiring
a lawyer “untilf after they agreed to take the money.” “If the client agreed to hire Pohl, then
[Santana]U was to have the client sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.” Pohl would then give Santana
the money to pay the client “from his own Helping Hands company.” When Santana questioned
this, Pohl told Santana that it “was illegal for him to pay [her] directly for cases, and that’s why
the money had to go through some company.”
Pohl and/or his co-conspirators had Santana retract this affidavit through a December 19,
2017 affidavit. This purported retraction was likely the result of Pohl paying Santana to provide
testimony, which is something he has done in the past. In fact, Pohl’s own paralegal, Jaimes,
testified that on one occasion Pohl sent him to Florida with a suitcase filled with $k50,000 in cash
to give to Santana in exchange for her signing a statement for him. Jaimes tesltified that Santana
would only get the money if she signed the statement for Pohl. Jaimes testcified that Santana signed
the signed the statement and got the money. s
Santana went into more detail about this in her deposition. Santana testified that the
statement was an agreement for her to keep quiet and not charge Pohl with any wrongdoing,
criminal or unethical conduct. Santana testified that Pohl paid her $50,000 in cash to sign this
statement, which was delivered by Jaimes in three bags marked “trick or treat.” Very symbolic
given that Santana had been tricked by Pohla into soliciting clients for him and was now being
treated the money she claimed was due under their agreement just to stay quite. Santana reiterated
in her deposition that if she didn’t sigen the gag agreement, she would not receive the money from
Pohl. Santana attempted to indicafte on the agreement that she was receiving $50,000 to keep quiet,
but Jaimes told her Pohl deymanded that she state she only received nominal consideration, like
$100. Santana did not wCrite the statement but “just signed it” because she felt she was being “forced
to sign” it while “unader duress.”
Notablyf, nowhere in Santana’s December 19th affidavit does she state the testimony in her
former afUfidavit is untrue, only that she does not “agree with” it and that the affidavit is not
“reliable.” Although Santana states in her December 19th affidavit that her prior affidavit was
drafted by a lawyer, Santana testified in her deposition that the September 24th affidavit was
created voluntarily with her own “testimony.” Santana testified that, unlike with Pohl, she was not
paid and had never been promised any money to provide the testimony in the September 24th
affidavit. Santana reiterated to counsel for Pohl, Billy Shepherd, that she was there in her
deposition to tell the truth and would not be bullied by his questioning or his efforts to confuse
her. k
Regardless, Santana’s sworn deposition testimony confirmed most of tlhe facts set forth in
her initial affidavit and this deposition testimony has never been rectracted. There, Santana
confirmed that she was hired by Pohl to solicit auto accident cases, thse first one being an accident
where a woman and her unborn child lost their lives. Santana was instructed by Walker, who was
instructed by Pohl, to personally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her up to sue the tire
manufacturer and, if she succeeded, Pohl would pay her $5,000. Santana visited the funeral of the
deceased and got the family to feel comfortable with her. Although the mother was grieving, Pohl
told Santana: “take no prisoners, this is a cut tharoat business, you get in there and you do whatever
it takes to get this client.” The solicitation was successful after Pohl gave Santana $2,000 to “give
to the client to convince her into signeing over with the firm.”
“Coach” Kenneth Talleyf (“Talley”) was another runner hired by Pohl and Walker who
solicited over 20 auto accideynt cases for Pohl. Talley has sworn under oath that he was first hired
in relation to BP claimCs to find “folks that lost money due to the oil spill” and “sign them up” and
“get a fee for it.” Taalley testified that he went to work “knocking on doors” looking for potential
claimants for Pofhl and his partner in the BP litigation. Talley solicited and signed up for Pohl and
his co-coUnspirators more than 800 BP claims. Talley was paid between $75 and $350 for each BP
client he signed up for Pohl and his partners.
Talley eventually switched to soliciting auto accident victims, “calling on folks that had
bad accidents.” Talley recalls that the first client he solicited was in “the hospital in intensive care.”
Talley carried with him up to $1,000 to pay the accident victims to “help them with problems” but
only once they “were signed up.” Talley kept a list of all the auto accident cases he solicited so he
could keep track of the cases that he was due a fee on the back end after the case settled. Talley
also followed a checklist that instructed him to, among other things, bring flowekrs to the initial
hospital visit (but to spend no more than $50) and to offer the victims moneyl but to “make sure
the funding schedule” from HH Texas “is filled out properly before relecasing any cash.” Talley
would advise the victims that he had attorneys who could help them ssuch as Pohl. Talley was paid
a fee of $1,400 plus his expenses by Pohl, through Walker, for any auto accident case he solicited
and referred to Pohl. On some cases, Talley was to receive a portion of the fee paid to Helping
Hands out of Pohl’s attorney’s fees. Talley discussed with Pohl the “percentage of settlements”
he was to receive from the cases he solicited and referred, and Pohl told Talley that the money was
being placed in an “escrow account” for him. aWhen asked whether Pohl knew he was getting paid
to “contact vehicle accident victims,” Talley responded, “the money was coming from Edgar
[Jaimes] who worked for him.” Ande, although his paycheck was from Walker’s company, “the
funding came by way of Edgar [Jfaimes].”
Talley testified that pyersonally soliciting clients for Pohl became so frequent that he began
carrying blank Pohl coCntracts to each solicitation. Talley testified that he never recommended any
lawyers other than Paohl. However, Talley never told the clients that he was getting paid to solicit
them. Talley wofuld present a Pohl contract to the potential client. If the client did not agree to hire
Pohl, the Uclients would not get the money. Talley testified that Jaimes and Dona (the operators of
HH Texas) would send him the money.
Talley further testified that both he and Pohl knew what they were doing was illegal. In
one instance, Talley was “run out of town” while soliciting clients for Pohl. Talley testified that
during the attempted solicitation he was told by a “lawyer or policeman” that “it was against the
law what [he] was doing.” Talley mentioned this to Pohl and Pohl told him “you’ve just got to
leave...some people you can’t help.”
Walker was eventually indicted and sent to prison. Thereafter, Pohl and hisk lawyer partners
refused to pay Walker and the other runners the ill gained fees as Pohl had prolmised. Therefore,
Walker, Seymour, Ladner and Precision filed a lawsuit in Mississippi cFederal Court (“Federal
Litigation”) against Pohl and his law partners claiming they were sowed millions of dollars in
promised fees. 
The above facts were compiled during the Federal Litigation. Thereafter, more than four
hundred clients who were illegally solicited contacted the Kassab Law Firm and requested Kassab
to represent them in litigation against Pohl and his partners. Kassab filed lawsuits on behalf of
these clients in four different courts in Harrisa County. Additionally, due to the egregiousness of
Pohl’s violation of the Texas Penal Code and violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct, Kassab was reequired to notify the Texas State Bar pursuant to Rule 8.03 of
the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Pfrofessional Conduct. Thus, Kassab filed grievances against Pohl
pursuant to Rule 8.03. Pohl’ys clients are also preparing and filing grievances against Pohl arising
out of his blatant barraCtry.
Because of athese actions in representing clients against Pohl and the grievances filed
against Pohl, Pofhl has filed a retaliatory lawsuit against the Kassab alleging conversion and theft
of trade sUecrets. Pohl alleges that Kassab and others stole his property and are using it to bring
lawsuits and grievances against Pohl. Specifically, Pohl alleges in his petition against Kassab that,
“Kassab is a lawyer who specializes in suing other lawyers”1 and “Kassab solicited
1 Pohl Original Petition, p. 6
10
clients/prospective clients [of Pohl’s] to act as Plaintiffs . . . to bring cases against Pohl for alleged
barratry and other claims.”2 Thus, Pohl has judicially admitted that he has brought his suit against
Kassab because Kassab contacted Pohl’s clients and filed suit against Pohl on behalf of these
clients. k
COUNTERCLAIM FOR CIVIL BARRATRY
Within the lawsuits that Kassab has filed against Pohl on behalf oft his former clients and
potential clients, Pohl has judicially admitted that a claim for barratryt is not a legal malpractice
case. Pohl has also admitted that a claim for barratry is not a claim for “legal malpractice,” and
thus, the discovery rule does not apply to a barratry claim. Teherefore, based upon Pohl’s judicial
admissions, the assignment of a barratry claim is permituted under Texas law.
Therefore, based upon express assignmentns of interest given to Kassab, Kassab brings
counterclaims against Pohl and his law firm purrsuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,
Section 16.069. Section 16.069 provides:
(a) If a counterclaim or cross claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence
that is the basis of an acction, a party to the action may file the counterclaim or
cross claim even thougfh as a separate action it would be barred by limitations
on the date the partyO’s answer is required.
(b) The counterclaipm or cross claim must be filed not later than the 30th day after
the date on which the party’s answer is required.
Kassab has been asasilgned 150 barratry claims as of this date. These counterclaims are
being filed conteimporaneously with the Kassab’s answer and are therefore timely. The
remaining barratry counterclaims will be filed by November 7, 2018, within thirty (30)
days from the date Kassab’s answer is filed.
2 Id. at p. 6-7
11
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs respectfully pray that Plaintiffs recover nothing
on their claims and that the Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs recover on their claims against the
Plaintiffs as follows:
i) actual and consequential damages;
ii) statutory damages; 
iii) pre- and post-judgment interest; r
iv) attorneys’ fees and costs; and i
v) all other relief to which the Defendants, Counters-Plaintiffs may be justly entitled.
Respecutfully submitted,
THnE KASSAB LAW FIRM
r i/ s / Lance Christopher Kassab
LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB
Texas State Bar No. 00794070
f lance@kassab.law
 DAVID ERIC KASSAB
c Texas State Bar No. 24071351
f i david@kassab.law
O 1214 Elgin Street
 Houston, Texas 77004
p Telephone: 713.522.7400
o Facsimile: 713.522.7410
a l ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS,
i COUNTER-PLAINTIFFS LANCE CHRISTOPHER
f i KASSAB AND THE KASSAB LAW FIRM
12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has been
forwarded to all parties pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this the 8th day of
October 2018.
/ s / Lance Christopher Kasesab
Lance Christopher KassCabl
13"
1,2018-08-28,OP,Pohl,"Original Petition — breach of settlement, conversion, TUTSA, conspiracy","Plaintiffs' Original Petition asserting breach of settlement agreement, conversion, TUTSA trade secret misappropriation, and civil conspiracy against multiple defendants","Initial filing commencing the lawsuit. Pohl and his law firm sue Favre, Precision, Kassab, Nicholson, and Montague for conduct arising from alleged theft and misuse of confidential client information and trade secrets. Filed August 28, 2018, assigned to the 189th District Court of Harris County, Texas, Cause No. 2018-58419.",PLEAD-1,N/A,Phase 1,2018-08-28_OP_Pohl-Original-Petition_FILED.pdf,Judgment in Pohl's favor against all Defendants on all counts; actual damages within jurisdictional limits; injunctive relief under TUTSA § 134A.003; exemplary damages under §§ 41.001 et seq. and 134A.004(b); attorney's fees under §§ 38.001 et seq. and 134A.005; pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; trial by jury; and all other legal and equitable relief to which Pohl may be entitled,"8/28/2018 5:05 PM
Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 27116535
- . By: Walter Eldrid
2018-58419 / Court: 189 ried ate at
Cause No.
MICHAEL POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
§
Plaintiff, § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
§ NG
LANCE KASSAB, et al § ©
Defendants. § JUDICIAE DISTRICT
a,
PLAINTIFFS MICHAEL POHL’S AND LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL A. POHL,
PLLC’S ORIGINAL PETITION
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SUMMARY”
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1. Plaintiffs Michael Pohl and Law Ome of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC (sometimes
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collectively “Pohl”) sue Defendants Scott Favre and cott M. Favre PA, LLC (collectively “Favre”);
Precision Marketing Group, LLC crisis Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher
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Kassab, P.C. D/B/A The Kassab ae (collectively “Kassab”); Tina Nicholson and Baker
Nicholson, LLP D/B/A Baker Nso Law Firm (collectively “Nicholson”); and F. Douglas
Montague III and Montague ear & Varnado, P.A. (collectively “Montague’”). Favre, Precision,
Kassab, Nicholson, and Montague are collectively called “Defendants.”
2. Defendait engaged in a scheme pursuant to which they illegally obtained,
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maintained, and asd trade secrets and other confidential information and property belonging to
Pohl. Favre'sand Precision’s actions are in breach of a settlement agreement to which Pohl, Favre,
and Precision are parties, and all Defendants’ actions constitute the torts of conversion and
violations of the uniform trade secrets act, as well as conspiracy.

3. More specifically, Favre and Precision executed a settlement agreement with Pohl
pursuant to which they agreed to return to Pohl certain information in their and their counsel’s
possession, custody, or control; to permanently delete such electronically-stored information; and
not to cause any claim to be made or filed against Pohl. Favre and Precision also warranted that
they had not caused any suit or action to be filed against Pohl. At the time, Ene and Precision
had possession, custody, or control of all such information that they had previously provided to

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Kassab and/or Montague because Favre’s and Precision’s agent and atoiney, Nicholson, was (and
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currently is) Kassab’s and Montague’s co-counsel in the matters ag8 t Pohl. Pohl fully complied
with his obligations under the agreement. Favre and Pei greased their obligations under
the agreement.

4. Defendants knowingly and illegally<obtained and/or maintained confidential
information and property that belongs to Pom exercised dominion and control over the
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information and property in a manner incon with Pohl’s rights of ownership—each of which

constitutes actionable conversion. @

5. The actions of a Defendants relative to the confidential information and
property that they obtained, Ryaimtained, and used constitute misappropriation and violate the
Texas Uniform Trade Spefet ‘hot Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code, § 134A.001, et seg. (““TUTSA”).

6. Defendants entered into a combination with the object of unlawfully

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misappropriating Poh’ trade secrets and, in so doing, they engaged in one or more unlawful overt
acts, inching stealing Pohl’s confidential information/property and using the
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information/property for their own gain. Pohl has suffered damages as a proximate result of
Defendants’ conduct.

7. Pohl brings this action to recover damages and other relief for Defendants’ breach of
contract, conversion, violations of TUTSA, and conspiracy. Pohl seeks monetary reli ef in an amount

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over $1,000,000.00. All conditions precedent to Pohl maintaining this action gee peeovering from
Defendants have been performed or have occurred. &
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DEFENDANTS eS
Or

8. Scott Favre is a nonresident individual who is a hheegs public adjuster in Texas and
who engages in business in Texas. He does not maintain a a place of business in Texas or a
designated agent for service of process in Texas. Me By be served with citation and this
petition: (a) at his office address at 7044 Stennis nee Kiln, Mississippi 39556; or (b) through
the Texas Secretary of State under Tex. Civ. Prac Rem Code § 17.044(a) (1) and (b).

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9. Scott M. Favre PA, LLC sf vonresiden limited liability company that engages in

business in Texas. It does not maintain ayezular place of business in Texas or a designated agent for
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service of process in Texas. scoaR ere PA, may be served with citation and this petition: (a) by
serving Scott Favre, the personae charge of Scott M. Favre PA, LLC’s business, at the address of the
business, 7044 Stennis shor SSroad Kiln, Mississippi 39556; or (b) through the Texas Secretary of
State under Tex. Ciy. Prac. & Rem. Code § 17.044(a)(1) or (b).
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10. Precision is anonresident limited liability company that engages in business in Texas.
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It does not eegihain a regular place of business in Texas or a designated agent for service of process
in Texas. Precision may be served with citation and this petition: (a) by serving Scott Favre, the
person in charge of Precision’s business, at 7044 Stennis Airport Road, Kiln, Mississippi 39556; or
(b) through the Texas Secretary of State under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 17.044(a)(1) or (b).
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11. | Lance Christopher Kassab 1s an individual and resident of Texas. He may be served
with citation and this petition: (a) at 1214 Elgin Street, Houston, Texas 77004; or (b) at 5314
Navarro Street, Houston, Texas 77056.

12. Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. D/B/A The Kassab law Firm is a Texas professional
corporation. It may be served with citation and this petition by serving its ga agent, Lance
Christopher Kassab: (a) at 1214 Elgin Street, Houston, Texas 77004; or (b) ass 14 Navarro Street,
Houston, Texas 77056. 5 Ss

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13. Tina Nicholson is an individual and a resident of Tex Tina Nicholson may be
served with citation and this petition: (a) at 4306 Yoakum Blvdz Suite 400, Houston, Texas 77006;
or (b) at 1607 Dove Ridge Drive, Katy, Texas 77493. ©

14. Baker Nicholson, LLP D/B/A Baker wes Law Firm is a Texas limited liability
partnership. It may be served with citation and wd paton (a) by serving its partner, Allison Baker,
at 4306 Yoakum Blvd., Suite 400, Hous, Tvs 77006; or (b) by serving its partner, Tina
Nicholson, at 4306 Yoakum Blvd., Suite 400, Houston, Texas 77006.

15. F. Douglas Mons a nonresident individual who engages in business in Texas.
He does not maintain a regular place of business in Texas or a designated agent for service of process
in Texas. Mr. Monae yb served with citation and this petition: (a) at his office address at 525
Main Street, Hattiesburg, Mississippi 39401; or (b) through the Texas Secretary of State under Tex.

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Civ. Prac. & Ret Code § 17.044(a)(1) or (b).

16 << Moa Pittman & Varnado, P.A. is a non-resident professional association that
engages in business in Texas. It does not maintain a regular place of business in Texas or a designated
agent for service of process in Texas. Montague Pittman & Varnado, P.A. may be served with citation
and this petition: (a) by serving F. Douglas Montague III, its registered agent for services of process

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and the person in charge of its business, at 525 Main Street, Hattiesburg, Mississippi 39401; or (b)
through the Texas Secretary of State under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 17.044(a) (1) or (b).
JURISDICTION/VENUE

17. The damages that Pohl seeks in this case are within the Junsdictional ‘mits of this
Court. The Court has jurisdiction over Defendants because they have the on minimum
contacts with Texas, which include engaging in business in Texas, committing torts in Texas and, as
to some of them, residing in Texas. Further, Favre and Precision conlinted with Pohl, a Texas

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resident at the time, for Pohl to perform the contract at issue in we in part in Texas. This case
arises out of business done in Texas by Defendants. GP

18. Venue is proper in Harris County under ress? Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 15.002 and
15.062. ’

BACKGRO SOND

19. Pohl is a lawyer who reseed various persons and entities in claims arising from
motor vehicle accidents and the British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Scott Favre,
individually and/or through Scott nd Pare PA, LLC, is the managing member of Precision, a public
relations and marketing firm. Nein is a lawyer who represented Favre and Precision, including
for purposes of the lent agresnen mentioned above. At the time the agreement was entered
into and still today, Nieholson was also Kassab’s and Montague’s co-counsel in connection with

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claims that theyre prosecuting against Pohl.

20. Pol engaged Precision for a period of time to provide public relations services, to
gather and preserve evidence, and to screen and liaise with Pohl’s clients/prospective clients. While
working for Pohl, Precision gained access to Pohl’s confidential and proprietary information and
property, including trade secret materials, that included the identities of Pohl’s clients/prospective

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clients, as well as their detailed contact information. The information and property also included
actual attorney-client fee agreements with clients/prospective clients, other confidential
communications between the clients/prospective clients and Pohl, specialized legal forms that had
been prepared in compliance with various state laws after consultation with local <qunsel in those
jurisdictions, Pohl’s proprietary administrative client forms, eset prepared in
accordance with the laws of various states, internal emails, propriety marketing ¢nformation and other
trade secrets, and other work product relating claims of Pohl’s clients and prospective clients. Favre
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and Nicholson also gained access to the information. a

21. Favre and Precision, with Nicholson or with Nighdlson’s active and knowing and
intentional assistance, illegally misappropriated Pohl’s woibeey and confidential information and
property, which included information about and/or sxinsicaons with as many as 10,000 or more
of Pohl’s clients/prospective clients. Favre and rch with Nicholson or with Nicholson’s active
and knowing and intentional assistance, ase physical copies of certain of the information, stole
Pohl’s computers, and misappropriated electronic data to which they had access through Precision’s
work for Pohl. Favre, with Nichison or with Nicholson’s active and knowing and intentional
assistance, then secretly iB stolen confidential information and property to Kassab and
Montague, striking a eh arin Kassab and Montague paid Favre $250,000.00 in cash together
with substantial bonuses Kassab and Montague knew that the information and property that they

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were purchasing was stolen and not Favre’s and/or Nicholson’s to sell.

22 Kast is alawyer who specializes in suing other lawyers and who, upon information and
belief, has worked with Montague in this connection in the past. Kassab saw the value of Pohl’s
stolen and misappropriated confidential information and property because it provided him the ability
to contact and solicit Pohl’s clients/prospective clients. Using the stolen confidential information and

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property that he knowingly purchased, Kassab solicited those clients/prospective clients to act as
plaintiffs and, joined by Nicholson and Montague, to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and
other claims.

23. The actions of Favre and Precision, in addition to being tortious and in viglation of Texas
law, were in direct violation and breach of the settlement agreement, which salhindn contract.
More specifically, a dispute arose resulting in a lawsuit in federal court in Mississippi, styled No.
1:14-cv-381-KS-JCG, Scott Walker, et al. v. Jimmy Williamson, et al. ee United States District
Court For The Southern District of Mississippi, Southern Division That lawsuit was resolved
pursuant to a Confidential Settlement Agreement, executed ny late April/early May 2017 (the
“Settlement Agreement’). Nicholson represented raya? Precision in connection with the
Settlement Agreement, including its execution, sige same time serving as co-counsel with
Kassab and Montague for the claims now being so against Pohl.

24. The Settlement Agreement as cute by Favre, as managing member of Precision
and on behalf of Scott M. Favre PA, Ligand by Pohl. The Settlement Agreement expressly provides
that Favre and Precision will return 6 Poh all originals and all copies of documents in their and their
counsel’s possession, custody, er Sn that concern and/or identify all past or current clients and/or
prospective clients of Poland that Favre and Precision will delete all such electronically-stored
information. At the ine Nicholson was not only Favre’s and Precision’s agent and counsel in
connection with ite Settlement Agreement; she was also Kassab’s and Montague’s co-counsel in
coecon hh claims now being made against Pohl in various cases. At the time, therefore,
Favre and Precision (and their counsel, Nicholson) had possession, custody, or control of all such
documents and information that they had previously provided to Kassab or Montague. All of those
documents and all of that information were subject to the Settlement Agreement.

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25. Favre and Precision, with Nicholson’s active and knowing and intentional assistance,
violated the express terms of the Settlement Agreement by failing to return all of the documents and
information as required by the agreement and by failing to permanently delete all of the electronically-
stored information as required by the agreement. This includes documents and information that they
had previously sold or otherwise provided to Kassab or Montague. oe

26. The Settlement Agreement also provided that Favre and Precisigi would not cause any
claim, complaint, or legal action to be filed or made against Pohl. Five and Precision further
warranted and represented that they had not caused any suit or sion oe filed against Pohl. Favre
and Precision breached these provisions of the Settlement Agreantent by, inter alia, causing claims,
complaints, and legal actions to be filed and/or row in Pohl. The very existence of the
cases that Kassab, Montague, and/or Nicholson wegeuing against Pohl is a breach of the
Settlement Agreement. iS

27. In addition, all Defendants cower Pohl’s confidential information/property by
knowingly and unlawfully assuming, “and exercising dominion and control over that
information/property in a way thas nconsistent with Pohl’s ownership. Each of the Defendants,
individually and in cba each other, misappropriated Pohl’s trade secrets in violation of
the TUTSA by nl obtaining and using Pohl’s confidential and trade secret
information/property ipluding using that information/property to file cases against Pohl.

28. Paraaphs 1 through 7 and 17 through 27 are incorporated into all following paragraphs
of this ri

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CAUSES OF ACTION
Count One: Breach of Contract (Against Favre And Precision)

29. Favre and Precision are bound by the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Pohl timely
and fully performed the Settlement Agreement. Favre and Precision breached the Settlement
Agreement. Their breaches include causing claims to be made against Pohl; custom and
legal actions to be filed against Pohl; Favre’s assisting Kassab and his co-gounsel, Montague and
Nicholson, in pursuing claims, complaints, and actions against Pohl; not ern to Pohl the required
information, including information that had previously been provided‘ Kassab or Montague; and
not permanently deleting the required electronically-stored inf@tyation, including information that
had previously been provided to Kassab. Favre’s and Pes breaches resulted in damages to
Pohl. <

Count Two: Cones ein A Defendants)

30. In stealing Pohl’s a confidential information, Favre, Precision, and
Nicholson have wrongfully assumed and exercised dominion and control over Pohl’s property in
contravention of Pohl’s rights as otis that property.

31. In knowingly purchasing the stolen information, Kassab and Montague have
wrongfully exercised sei and control over Pohl’s property in contravention of Pohl’s nghts as
owner of that property, ©

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32. In Knowingly maintaining and using the stolen information, all Defendants have
vrngtly eerie dominion and control over Pohl’s property in contravention of Pohl’s nghts as
owner of that property.

33, Pohl owned and owns the information/property, and Favre and Precision (with
Nicholson or with Nicholson’s active and knowing and intentional assistance) stole the

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information/property and sold it to Kassab and Montague. Kassab and Montague knowingly
purchased the stolen information/property. Pohl has been damaged thereby.
Count Three: Violation of TUTSA (Against All Defendants)

34, Pohl maintained information regarding his clients/prospective clients oa contact
information and related data, as well as other information concerning his (rte of law, as
confidential trade secret information. Pohl took substantial measures to main the confidentiality
of that information. That information has independent economic alu om not being generally
known to, and not readily being ascertainable through proper means by another person who can
obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the fomation

35, Favre, Precision, and Nicholson vaya maliciously misappropriated Pohl’s
trade secrets by acquiring them through improper RO specifically, by theft. See Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code § 134A.002(2), (3)(A). ~S

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36. Favre, Precision, and Nihon wily and maliciously misappropriated Pohl’s
trade secrets by disclosing them to Kassab and Montague (who purchased the trade secret information
knowing that it had been stolen) van i express or complied consent of Pohl. See Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code § 134A.002(3)(B),

37. All Detnts willfully and maliciously misappropriated Pohl’s trade secrets by
using them without, the expres or implied consent of Pohl. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §
1344. 0028 ,B)

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Sy Count Four: Civil Conspiracy (Against All Defendants)

38. Acting in combination with the agreed object of misappropriating Pohl’s trade secrets

and converting Pohl’s property, each of the Defendants committed overt acts toward the unlawful
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misappropriation of Pohl’s trade secrets, which were unlawful and which proximately caused
damages to Pohl.
DAMAGES
39, Pohl seeks actual damages within the jurisdictional limits of this Coury
AO. Pohl seeks injunctive relief pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. goes 134A.003.
4l. Pohl seeks exemplary damages pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 41.001,
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et seg, and 134A.004(b). 5 ss
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42. Pohl seeks attorney’s fees pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prag, $ em. Code §§ 38.001, e¢ seq,
and 134A.005 &
43. Pohl seeks pre-judgment and ros udameitces
TRIAL BY Y
44. Pohl requests trial by jury and supe the appropriate jury fee.
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CONCLUSION
45, Pohl requests that judgprent be entered in Pohl’s favor and against Defendants on
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the counts and as requested “oe for such other and further or alternative relief (legal and
equitable) to which Pohl may be cntitled.
Dated: August 28, 218. Respectfully submitted,
OS Reynolds Frizzell LLP
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&S By: _/s/ Jean C. Frizzell
© Jean C. Frizzell
GW State Bar No. 07484650
S 1100 Louisiana St., Suite 3500
Houston, Texas 77002
Tel. 713.485.7200
Fax 713.485.7250
jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Michael Pohl
and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC
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