filings: 48
Data license: Public court records
This data as json
| filing_id | date | doc_type | party | description | doc_type_detail | procedural_posture | chain | outcome | phase | filename | relief_requested | full_text |
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| 48 | 2023-01-04 | MTN | Kassab | Mtn to Reconsider No-Evid MSJ | Kassab Defendants' Motion to Reconsider Traditional and No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment | Filed January 4, 2023 before Judge Tamika 'Tami' Craft after case transferred from Judge Dollinger (189th District Court). Kassab seeks reconsideration of the prior judge's October 31, 2022 denial of both traditional and no-evidence summary judgment motions on Pohl's claims of conversion, trade secret theft (TUTSA), and civil conspiracy. Kassab argues the denial was erroneous and cites new case law (Taylor v. Tolbert, 2022) requiring reconsideration of attorney immunity. 90 pages with extensive exhibits. | MSJ-2R | N/A | Phase 4 | 2023-01-04_MTN_Kassab-Mtn-to-Reconsider-No-Evid-MSJ_FILED.pdf | Reconsider and grant Kassab's traditional and no-evidence motions for summary judgment; dismiss Pohl's retaliatory lawsuit with prejudice; order Pohl take nothing on his claims against Kassab | 1/4/2023 12:12 PM Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No. 71470463 By: DANIELLE JIMENEZ Filed: 1/4/2023 12:12 PM CAUSE NO. 2018-58419 MICHAEL A. POHL, et al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT V. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS SCOTT FAVRE, et al § 189th JUDICIALk DISTRICT THE KASSAB DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO RECONSIDER CTRADITIONAL AND NO-EVIDENCE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE TAMIKA “TAMI” CRAFT: t Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a/ The Kassab Law Firm file this, their Motion to Reconsideer Traditional and No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment and would respuectfully show the following. BACKGROUND This lawsuit is nothing more thaan a retaliatory suit brought by Michael A. Pohl and his law firm, Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC (“Pohl”) against Lance Christopher Kassab and Lancee Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a/ The Kassab Law Firm (“Kassab”). Kassab refpresented more than 400 clients in lawsuits against Pohl due to his illegal and unethical solicitation of these clients. It is undisputed that Pohl hired and paid runners more than five million dollars to illegally obtain clients stemminig from catastrophic auto accidents and the BP Deepwater Horizon litigation. o Based upon Pohl’s illegal and unethical solicitation of clients, Kassab filed four separate lawsuits against Pohl for civil barratry. In addition, as mandated by the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 8.03, Kassab filed and helped his clients initiate several grievance proceedings, causing the State Bar of Texas to investigate the alleged barratry, which is prohibited by the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct and the Texas Penal Code. In response, Pohl filed this lawsuit against Kassab, alleging claims of conversion, theft of trade secrets and civil conspiracy, claiming Kassab conspired with others tko steal Pohl’s property and solicit his former clients or prospective clients to sueC him for barratry.1 Pohl claims his defense costs to defend against the barratry litigation and grievances as his damages. The absurdity of Pohl’s claimsi is only surpassed by the absurdity of his claimed damages. Pohl’s claims were brought in bad faith and should be dismissed with prejudice. MOTION TO RECONSIDER Kassab files this Motion to Reconsilder to correct the erroneous ruling of the prior judge relating to the KassabM’s Traditional and No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment. Pohl will undoubtedly argue that these motions have already been reviewed and denied by iJudge Dollinger, and thus, this motion is a waste of time. To the contrary, however, this motion will actually save the Court and parties time, effort, energy aond money because the motions for summary judgment should have been grantedl in the first place. The fact that they were not, means the parties must waste tiime, energy, effort and money trying a patently frivolous retaliatory case. Moreover, trying this frivolous case is a waste of judicial economy and waste of the public’s time and trust in sitting as a jury on a patently frivolous case that has no chance of winning under the law. 1 Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, ¶¶ 19-28. The evidence presented in Kassab’s traditional motion for summary judgment is so overwhelming, that the failure to grant the motion was erroneous. Moreover, Pohl wholly failed to produce any evidence on material elements of his causes of action, thus Kassab’s no evidence motion should have bkeen granted. Therefore, the Court should reconsider Kassab’s motions for suCmmary judgment, grant the motions and dismiss Pohl’s retaliatory lawsuit with prejudice. SUMMARY Pohl got caught committing illegal and unethical barratry and now wants Kassab, who brought the barratry litigation and grievances against Pohl, to pay for Pohl’s legal fees for defending against the barratry claims and grievances. But Pohl’s claims against Kassab are barred als a matter of law and he has no evidence to support various elements of his cauMses of action because: • Pohl’s claims are predicated on Kassab’s filing of a grievance against Pohl for which Kassabe has absolute and unqualified immunity pursuant to Rule 17.09 iof the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. • Pohl’s claims again st Kassab are barred by the judicial proceedings privilege because they arise out of communications that Kassab made in prospective (osolicitation letters) and actual judicial proceedings (the barratry litigation and grievance process). • Pohl’s claiims against Kassab are barred by attorney immunity because an attoriney does not have a right of recovery, under any cause of action againost another attorney arising from conduct the second attorney engaged in as part of the discharge of his duties in representing a party. • Pohl’s claims are barred by limitations because they accrued, if at all, in the summer of 2014 as Pohl testified under oath, and Pohl did not file suit against Kassab until August 2018, more than four years later. • Pohl’s TUTSA claim is conclusively negated because his alleged trade secrets were not actually kept secret. Pohl’s claims also fail because Pohl does not own the purportedly stolen property and trade secrets which consist of client files which, as a matter of law, Pohl does not own. • Pohl’s illegal acts (barratry and unauthorized practice of law) preclude any form of recovery against the whistleblower (Kassab) beecause his acts are inexorably intertwined with Pohl’s crimes. C • Pohl is not permitted to recover as damages the attoirney’s fees he incurred in the four barratry lawsuits and two disciplintary grievances. • Pohl has no evidence to support that he owned or had possession of the property or entitlement to possession of any ofs the allegedly converted property or stolen property. e • Pohl has no evidence that the Kassab Defendants unlawfully and without authorization assumed and exercised control over the property to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with Pohl’s rights as an alleged owner. l • Pohl has no evidence that he Mdemanded return of the property from the Kassab Defendants, nor does Pohl have any evidence that the Kassab Defendants refused to return any property. • Pohl cannot produce eviidence as to the damages for the property’s loss of use during the tOime of its detention or the value of the allegedly converted property. • Pohl has no evoidence that (1) the Kassab Defendants were involved in a combination of two or more persons; (2) that any persons involved in the allegead lconspiracy sought to accomplish an object or course of action; (3)i the persons involved reached a meeting of the minds on the object of ir course of action; (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts were takeno in pursuance of the object or course of action; or (5) damages occurred as a proximate result. JOINDER AND INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE Defendants, Tina Nicholson and Baker Nicholson, LLP (“Nicholson”) moved for traditional summary judgment on August 19, 2022 (“the Nicholson Motion”). Kassab adopts the arguments set forth in the Nicholson Motion and all evidence cited therein. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 58 (“Statements in a pleading may be adopted by reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another pleading or in any motion, so long as the pleading containing such statements has not beekn superseded by an amendment as provided by Rule 65 pursuant to Texas Rule Cof Civil Procedure 58.”); Lockett v. HB Zachry Co., 285 S.W.3d 63, 72 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“Texas courts have recognized adoption oif a co-party's motion for summary judgment as a procedurally legitimate practice.”). Reference to exhibits attached to the Nicholson Motion will be “Nicholson Ex. [number], [description].” POHL’S BARRATRY SCHEME Pohl engages in an illicit barraltry scheme to personally solicit BP clients and victims of cataastrophic auto accidents. Michael Pohl and his law firm retained two non-lawyers, Scott Walker and Kirk Ladner, and their compeany, Precision Marketing Group (“Precision”), to “recruit clients for [Pohl] t o frepresent against BP”2 and provide “marking services” to auto accident victims.3 Walker testified that although he and Pohl called it “marketing services” or “marketing money” it was “clear to [him] it was barratry.”4 In fact, Walker iconsidered himself and his company “a pass-through for barratry money.”5 Alol total, Walker, Ladner and Precision Marketing received over $5 million in “barratry pass-through money” from Pohl and other lawyers to solicit accident victims and potential clients with claims, both auto-accident victims and those 2 Exhibit 2, General Operating Agreement; Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, p. 19. 3 Exhibit 2, General Operating Agreement; Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 605-07. 4 Exhibit 3-B, 2016 Deposition of Scott Walker, p. 149. 5 Exhibit 3-B, 2016 Deposition of Scott Walker, p. 197:6-7. involved in the BP Deepwater Horizon litigation.6 They would use this money to pay contract workers to solicit clients.7 They would locate and instruct contract workers on how to accomplish the solicitation.8 They trained “40 or 50 people” on how to “go out and solicit contracts.”9 k Walker would “get leads from a variety of sources” includCing “from Michael Pohl” and then he and Ladner, or one of their employees, would go try to “find the family who had lost a loved one” and “just do marketingi” to “let them know that there was help available.”10 The “help” available would be offering the victims money from Helping Hands Financing, LLC (“Helping Hands Financing”).11 Helping Hands Financing is owned by Pohl’s wife, Donalda Pohl (“Donalda”), and operated by her cousin, Jaimes.12 If one of the clienlts Precision Marketing solicited “needed monetary help” they would be referMred to Jaimes and Jaimes would “work with them to -- to help them.”13 The funds from Helping Hands Financing to pay to the auto accident victims “would hiave come through Edgar Jaimes.”14 In other words, if Walker or his team needed money to induce the auto accident victims, he would talk to Jaimes and seek hios approval.15 Walker testlified that Pohl would send him leads on the auto accident cases because he kniew that Walker and Ladner “could go out and get those type of 6 Exhibit U3-B, 2016 Deposition of Scott Walker, p. 73:21-25; 74:1-25; 75-1-15. 7 Exhibit 3-B, 2016 Deposition of Scott Walker, p. 199. 8 Exhibit 3-B, 2016 Deposition of Scott Walker, p. 77-78. 9 Exhibit 3-B, 2016 Deposition of Scott Walker, p. 196-197. 10 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 142-143. 11 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 734-735. 12 Exhibit 4, October 2018 Deposition of Edgar Jaimes, p. 28. 13 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 734-735. 14 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 201-203. 15 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 203-204, 207-208. cases.”16 Either Ladner would go to solicit the clients, or they would send Magdalena Santana (“Magdalena”), her brother Florian “Jay” Santana (“Florian”), or one of their other employees.17 Walker testified that these folks working for Precision Marketing were soliciting the victims “on behalf of Mr. Pokhl.”18 Walker and his team solicited more than 50 auto accident cases for PohlC.19 Walker always kept Pohl informed on what he and his team were doing.20 Walker testified that the runners who solicited tihe clients would get “a bonus” if they got the client to sign a contract.21 Walker testified that he and his team would receive the bonus from either Helping Hands Financing at the direction of Jaimes or Pohl and his law firm.22 The payment to the runner would come from Precision Marketing, but Walker would thlen “turn in an amount that [they] spent during the that week … to Mr. PohlM’s office.”23 Either Pohl or Jaimes would then reimburse Precision Marketing.24 Financials obtained from Precision Marketing evidence this fact, reflecting iincoming transfers from Pohl’s law firm or Helping Hands Financing with payments made to various runners.25 At times, Pohl gave direction as to some oof the bonuses or fees that Precision Marketing paid to the runners.26 And altlhough Walker did not get “permission, per se” from Pohl to make 16 Exhibit 3-nA, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 146-148. 17 ExhibitU 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 146-148. 18 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 152. 19 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 148-151. 20 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 153. 21 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 158-160, 556. 22 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 556. 23 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 160. 24 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 160-161, 556. 25 Exhibit 5, Precision Marketing Group Financials. 26 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 161-162. the specific payments to the runners, he “would tell [Pohl] after the fact what [Precision Marketing] had spent that week.”27 One runner, Magdalena Santana, exposes the barratry scheme despite being paid $50,000 by Pohl to keep quiet. Magdalena personally solicited two of the plaintiffs who woulde ultimately sue Pohl for barratry: Heraclite Bikumbu (and his minor children) and Raymond Butts. In her September 24, 2016 affidavit, Magdalena testified tthat Pohl sent her on “dozens and dozens of car wreck cases all over the country.”28 Pohl would email Magdalena the link of news coverage depicting thee accident and ask her “to go to the victim or the victim’s family and try to getu them to sign up with him.”29 Pohl offered to give Magdalena “$5,000 per case that [she] signed, plus a percentage of his attorney’s fees.”30 Magdalena was aadvised by Pohl to “be persistent even if the family ... rejected [her].”31 Magdalena was instructed by Pohl to “approach the victims and their families whilee they were vulnerable, in the emergency room, their hospital rooms or at the ffunerals.”32 Pohl told Santana that minorities “were especially vulnerable since they tended not to know that the law prohibited barratry.”33 According to Pohl, they “were easier to sign up.”34 27 Exhibit 3-A, 2018 Deposition of Scott Walker, pp. 162. 28 Exhibit 6, September 24, 2016 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana, ¶ 17. 29 Exhibit 6, September 24, 2016 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana, ¶ 17. 30 Exhibit 6, September 24, 2016 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana, ¶ 18. 31 Exhibit 6, September 24, 2016 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana, ¶ 19. 32 Exhibit 6, September 24, 2016 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana, ¶ 19. 33 Exhibit 6, September 24, 2016 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana, ¶ 19 (emphasis added). 34 Exhibit 6, September 24, 2016 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana, ¶ 19. Pohl would give Magdalena “money to give to the victims or their families” but “only if they agreed to sign a Pohl representation contract.”35 Pohl advised Santana that the money was a “foot in the door” but instructed Santana not to mention that she was there on behalf of a lawyer “until after they agreekd to take the money.”36 “If the client agreed to hire Pohl, then [Magdalena] wasC to have the client sign a ‘Helping Hands’ contract.”37 Pohl would then give Magdalena the money to pay the client “from his own Helping Hands companiy.”38 When Magdalena questioned this, Pohl told her that it “was illegal for him to pay [her] directly for cases, and that’s why the money had to go through some company.”39 Pohl may take the position that Magdalena retracted this affidavit through a subsequent December 19, 2017 affidavitl. However, this purported retraction is likely the result of Pohl paying MagdMalena to provide testimony, which is something they have done in the past.40 In fact, Jaimes testified that on one occasion Pohl sent him to Florida with a case ifilled with $50,000 cash to give to Magdalena in exchange for her signing an statement for him.41 Jaimes testified that Magdalena would only get the omoney if she signed the statement.42 Jaimes testified that Magdalena signedl the signed the statement and got the money.43 35 Exhibit 6, September 24, 2016 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana, ¶ 17. 36 Exhibit 6, September 24, 2016 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana, ¶ 24. 37 Exhibit 6, September 24, 2016 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana, ¶ 24. 38 Exhibit 6, September 24, 2016 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana, ¶ 24. 39 Exhibit 6, September 24, 2016 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana, ¶ 23. 40 Exhibit 7, June 2018 Deposition of Edgar Jaimes, pp. 371-373. 41 Exhibit 7, June 2018 Deposition of Edgar Jaimes, pp. 371-373. 42 Exhibit 7, June 2018 Deposition of Edgar Jaimes, pp. 373-374. 43 Exhibit 7, June 2018 Deposition of Edgar Jaimes, pp. 373-374. Magdalena went into more detail about this in her deposition. Magdalena testified that that the statement was an agreement for her to keep quiet and not charge Pohl with any wrongdoing or criminal or unethical conduct.44 Magdalena testified that Pohl paid her $50,000 cash to sign this statementk, which was delivered by Jaimes in three bags marked “trick or treat.”45 MagCdalena reiterated that if she didn’t sign the gag agreement, she wouldn’t get the money from Pohl.46 Magdalena attempted to indicate on the agreement that sihe was receiving $50,000 to keep quiet, but Jaimes told her Pohl demanded that she state she only received nominal consideration, like $100.47 Magdalena did not write the statement but “just signed it”48 because she felt she was “forced to sign” it49 while “under duress.”50 Magdalena’s December 19, 2017 affidavit lis likely the result of similar duress and purchased testimony. M Regardless, nowhere in Magdalena’s December 19th affidavit does she state the testimony in her former aiffidavit is untrue, only that she does not “agree with” it and that the affidavit is not “reliable.”51 Although Magdalena states in her December 19th affidavoit that her prior affidavit was drafted by a lawyer, Magdalena testified in her deplosition that the September 24th affidavit was created voluntarily with her own “itestimony.”52 Magdalena testified that, unlike with Pohl, she was not 44 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 153. 45 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 122-127. 46 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 131. 47 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 346. 48 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 153. 49 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 155. 50 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 309. 51 Exhibit 9, December 19, 2017 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana. 52 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 270-271. 10 paid and had never been promised any money to provide the testimony in the September 24th affidavit.53 Magdalena reiterated to counsel for Pohl, Billy Shepherd, that she was there in her deposition to tell the truth and would not be bullied by his questioning or his efforts to confuse her.54 k Regardless, Magdalena confirmed most of the facts set foCrth in her initial affidavit in her deposition55 and this deposition testimony was not retracted.56 There, Magdalena confirmed that she was hired by Pohil to solicit auto accident cases, the first one being an accident where a woman and her unborn child lost their lives.57 Magdalena was instructed by Walker, who was instructed by Pohl, to personally visit the mother of the deceased and sign her up to sue the tire manufacturer and, if she succeeded, Pohl wlould pay her $5,000.58 Magdalena visited the funeral of the deceased and goMt the family to feel comfortable with her.59 Although the mother was grieving, Pohl told Magdalena: “take no prisoners, this is a cut throat business, you geit in there and you do whatever it takes to get this client.”60 The solicitation was successful after Pohl gave Magdalena $2,000 to “give to the client to convinoce her into signing over with the firm.”61 53 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 276-278. 54 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 176. 55 See, generally, Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II. 56 See Exhibit 9, December 19, 2017 Affidavit of Magdalena Santana. 57 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 37. 58 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 37-38. 59 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 37-38. 60 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 39. 61 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 40. 11 After that, Magdalena attempted to solicit about “forty to fifty” auto accident cases for Pohl in multiple states from Texas to Florida.62 About fifteen to eighteen cases were actually signed up.63 Just like Walker, Magdalena testified that Pohl would send her a web link with information about the accident ankd where the potential client may be found and she would hit the ground runnCing.64 Magdalena solicited clients for Pohl in “hospitals, funeral homes, you name it.”65 Pohl instructed Magdalena to target minorities because they iare “unrecognized to the law” and “they don’t know the law.”66 In an effort to circumvent the law, Magdalena was instructed to have the client call Pohl so that it would look like the client made the initial contact with the lawyer.67 Magdalena would offer the clients money to sign with Pohl but had explicit instructionls from Pohl: “If they don't sign they don't get no money.”68 Magdalena reiteraMted, “no signature, no money.”69 Magdalena testified in her deposition that she was paid $2,500 for every client she signed up and was “promised a percentaige in the back end” by Pohl and Walker.70 Pohl told Magdalena that the money would have to go through Walker’s company Precision Marketing because it o“was illegal for him to give [her] the money directly.”71 After solicitling several cases, Magdalena asked Pohl to give her the money she was “owedi” so she could “leave for good” to the Middle East to care for her 62 ExhibitU 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 43. 63 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 46-47. 64 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 54. 65 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 52. 66 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 52. 67 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 60. 68 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 42. 69 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 66. 70 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 47. 71 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II, p. 72. 12 father.72 Magdalena asked Pohl to “think it thru” if he “really wanted to take the bad route,” stating “I will go to the attorney General Texas bar ten [sic] bar Florida bar I’m not giving up … I want my money and if I have to move mountains with the justice dept so be it.”73 k Magdalena sent another email to Ladner that was forwardCed by Walker and addressed to Pohl, stating she was owed money on the cases she had solicited for them: i 74 When Pohl did not respond, Magdalena completed a questionnaire on Pohl’s law firm website, stiating “the FBI” wanted to know the “link between helping hands and Scott Woalker [and] Michael [P]ohl” and claiming that Pohl owed her “monies for 72 Exhibit 10, April 21, 2014 Email. 73 Exhibit 10, April 21, 2014 Email. 74 Exhibit 11, May 7, 2014 Email Exchange. 13 securing victims of accident for him” and questioning how she is to “collect monies owed with Out contracting [sic] The Texas bar[.]”75 It was these threats that caused Pohl to agree to pay Magdalena, but only if she promised to keep quiet.76 Magdalena received the $50,000 cash bukt didn’t keep quiet. On September 1, 2014. Magdalena sent another email toC Pohl through his website requesting more money: Michael now I have on top of reporters calling mei I had a call from attorney general. The money given to me by Edgar [Jaimes] was to keep my mouth shut. Not what was owed that’s what happens when you ruined my life. If I get supena a [sic] don’et know what will happen. Send me another 50 pls.77 Magdalena continued running cases for Pohl and sending him emails requesting payment on the cases she solicited.78 l Another runner, Kenneth TaMlley, exposes the barratry scheme. Another runner was “Coach” Kenneth Talley (“Talley”), solicited over 800 BP cases and 20 auto accident caises for Pohl,79 including several families who would ultimately sue Pohl for barratry: Mark Cheatham, Sr., Mark Cheatham, Jr., Luella Miller, Mae Berry ando Arthur Speck. Talley testiflied that he was first hired in relation to BP claims to find “folks that lost moneiy due to the oil spill” and “sign them up” and “get a fee for it.”80 Talley went to work “knocking on doors” looking for potential claimants for Pohl and his 75 Exhibit 12, May 20, 2014 Contact Form. 76 Exhibit 7, June 2018 Deposition of Edgar Jaimes, pp. 373-374. 77 Exhibit 13, September 1, 2014 Contact Form. 78 Exhibit 14, February 5, 2015 Email. 79 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 87. 80 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 10. 14 partner in the BP litigation, Jimmy Williamson.81 Talley solicited and signed up for Pohl and Williamson more than 800 BP claims.82 Talley was paid between $75 and $350 for each BP client he signed up.83 Talley eventually switched to soliciting auto accident victimsk, “calling on folks that had bad accidents.” 84 Talley recalls that the first client Che solicited was in “the hospital in intensive care.”85 Talley carried with him up to $1,000 to pay the accident victims to “help them with problems” but onlyi once they “were signed up.”86 Talley kept a list of all the auto accident cases he solicited, including cases involving the Cheathams, Berry and Speck.87 Talley followed a checklist that instructed him to, among other things, bring flowers to the initial hospital visit (but to spend no more than $50) and to offer tlhe victims money but to “make sure the funding schedule” from Helping HaMnds Financing “is filled out properly before releasing any cash.”88 Talley would advise the victims that he had attorneys who could help them, and that one iof those attorneys was Pohl.89 Talley was paid a fee of $1,400 plus his expenses by Pohl, through Walker, for any auto accident case he solicited.90 On some coases, Talley was to receive a portion of the fee paid to Helping Hands out of Pohll’s attorney’s fees.91 Talley discussed with Pohl the “percentage of 81 Exhibit 15n, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 10-11. 82 ExhibitU 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 11. 83 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 19. 84 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 37. 85 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 37. 86 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 38. 87 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 43-44; Exhibit 15-A, Talley Deposition Exhibit 165. 88 Exhibit 15-B, Talley Deposition Exhibit 168. 89 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 47. 90 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 47-48. 91 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 97-98; 102. 15 settlements” he was to receive from the cases he solicited and Pohl told Talley that the money was being placed in an “escrow account” for him.92 When asked whether Pohl knew he was getting paid to “contact vehicle accident victims,” Talley responded, “the money was coming from Edgar [Jaimes] who workekd for him.”93 Although his paycheck was from Walker’s company, “the fundinCg came by way of Edgar [Jaimes].”94 Personally soliciting clients for Pohl became so freiquent that Talley began carrying with him blank Pohl contracts to each solicitation.95 Talley would refer the potential clients to “attorneys out of Houston that were the best at handling these types of accidents” and would offer to give the potential clients “money up front.”96 Talley would have no “reason not to lmention Mr. Pohl’s name” during the solicitation.97 Talley would never recoMmmend any lawyers other than Pohl.98 Talley would not tell the clients that he was getting paid to solicit them.99 Talley would present a Pohl contract to thei potential client.100 If the client did not agree to hire Pohl, the clients would not get the money.101 Talley testified that Jaimes and Donalda (the operatoros of Helping Hands Financing) would send him the money.102 92 Exhibit 15n, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 99. 93 ExhibitU 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 100. 94 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 100. 95 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 49. 96 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 54. 97 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 108. 98 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 59. 99 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 58; 109. 100 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 89. 101 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 58-59. 102 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 86. 16 Both Talley and Pohl knew that what they were doing was illegal. In one instance, Talley was “run out of town” while soliciting clients for Pohl.103 Talley testified during the attempted solicitation he was told by a “lawyer or policeman” that “it was against the law what [he] was doing.”104 Talley mentionedk this to Pohl and Pohl told him “you’ve just got to leave...some people you can’t Chelp.”105 Pohl illegally solicited several clients who would later hire Kassab to sue Pohl for barratry. t One of the victims solicited by Talley at the instruction of Pohl was Mae Berry. Berry is the mother of Johnny Berry, a boy weho died in a tragic auto accident on or about August 17, 2014. 106 Within days ouf the accident, Berry was visited at her home by Talley.107 The visit was unsolicited.108 Talley told Berry that he was with “Helping Hands” and brought hera a gift basket.109 Talley suggested that she may have a lawsuit against the make of the vehicle that Johnny was driving and told her he knew an attorney ouet of Texas named Pohl who could represent her.110 Berry had never spoken wifth Talley or Pohl prior to this date and she did not request Talley to visit with her about the accident or any potential lawsuit.111 Talley could see that Berry was morning over the loss of Johnny and offered her $500 to pay for her son’si funeral, but only if she agreed to hire Pohl.112 In need of the money 103 ExhibiUt 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 84. 104 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 84. 105 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 85. 106 Exhibit 16, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Mae Berry. 107 Exhibit 16, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Mae Berry. 108 Exhibit 16, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Mae Berry. 109 Exhibit 16, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Mae Berry. 110 Exhibit 16, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Mae Berry. 111 Exhibit 16, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Mae Berry. 112 Exhibit 16, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Mae Berry. 17 to burry Johnny, Berry agreed to hire Pohl.113 Walker sent Pohl an email on August 21, 2014 forwarding the Helping Hands Financing documents and stating, “Coach Ken will be getting the Pohl contract signed this afternoon.”114 However, Pohl never ended up pursuing Berry’s case.115 k Talley himself testified to this solicitation. Talley admits to Csoliciting Berry at her home just three days after the accident that took Johnny’s life.116 Talley testifies that he told Berry that Helping Hands “had attorneys out iof Houston that were the best at handling these types of accidents” and that he gave Berry $500 “up front.”117 Talley solicited Berry after he got a call from Ladner who told him that a “kid was killed and it should be a good case” and that “we needed to go check it out.”118 Talley testified that he was paid $250 to solicit Blerry as a client and was also reimbursed from Helping Hands the $500 he paMid to Berry.119 Talley never told Berry he was getting paid to make contact with her.120 Berry did not know that the solicitation was wrongful or caused her leigal injury until sometime in 2017 when she received an advertisement from the undersigned counsel notifying her of her potential injury.121 o Talley also lsolicited Arthur and Lisa Speck to hire Pohl. The Specks are the parents of is Riebecca Speck, an eighteen year old who died in July of 2010 as the 113 ExhibiUt 16, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Mae Berry. 114 Exhibit 17, August 21, 2014 Email re Mae Berry. 115 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 56. 116 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 51-53, 55 (“Q. Okay. So you approached her three days after the accident. A. Yes, ma’am.”). 117 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 54. 118 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 55. 119 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 57-58; see also Exhibit 5, Precision Financials. 120 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 58. 121 Exhibit 16, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Mae Berry. 18 result of a tragic auto accident.122 Talley testified that he was notified about this case by Ladner who told him “there’s a case in the backyard he wanted [him] to go pursue.”123 Talley found the Specks’ address and he “went and knocked on their door.”124 The visit by Talley was unsolicited.125 The Specks answeredk, and Talley told them he was with Helping Hands and offered them $1,000 cCash if they would hire Pohl to pursue their claim.126 Talley testified that he “didn’t have any reason not to mention Mr. Pohl’s name” at this visit because he “kinew he was the attorney handling things for us.”127 The Specks agreed, and signed two contracts with Pohl’s law firm and funding agreements with Helping Hands.128 Sometime in August of 2014, the Specks received a letter from Pohl stating he would not pursue the claims.129 Talley never told the Specks thalt anyone was paying him to make contact with them.130 M Alphonse Bethley and Sandra Johnson are the biological parents of Ashley Bethley.131 Ahsley was killed iwhen she lost control of her vehicle and it struck a utility pole.132 Ashley was only twenty-four years old.133 In July of 2014, Ladner personally solicited thoe Bethleys at their home to hire Pohl.134 The visit by Ladner 122 Exhibit 18, Sepcteimber 14, 2018 Declaration of Arthur Speck. 123 Exhibit 15, D f eiposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 105. 124 Exhibit 15,o Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 105. 125 Exhibit 1n8, September 14, 2018 Declaration of Arthur Speck. 126 ExhibiUt 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 107-108. 127 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 108. 128 Exhibit 18, September 14, 2018 Declaration of Arthur Speck, at Exhibit 18-A, Speck Contracts and Exhibit 18-B, Speck Funding Agreement. 129 Exhibit 18, September 14, 2018 Declaration of Arthur Speck, 130 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 109. 131 Exhibit 19, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Alphonse Bethley. 132 Exhibit 19, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Alphonse Bethley. 133 Exhibit 19, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Alphonse Bethley. 134 Exhibit 19, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Alphonse Bethley. 19 was unsolicited.135 The Bethleys did not request Ladner to visit them, nor did they seek out the legal services of Pohl.136 Ladner offered them money if they would hire Pohl to pursue their claims.137 The Bethleys agreed, and signed a blank contract with Pohl and his law firm that was provided to them by Ladner.138 kIn exchange, Ladner and Walker agreed to share $5,000 for every $1,000,00C0 of the received settlement from the Bethleys’ lawsuit.139 Ladner emailed Pohl and Jaimes facts concerning these newly solicited clients and also stated ithat he spoke with the mother of the passenger of the vehicle “and will follow up on signing that family.”140 Sometime in August of 2015, however, the Bethleys received a letter from Pohl stating he would not be pursuing their claim.141 Years later, in 2017, the Bethleys received an advertisement froml the undersigned counsel notifying them the way they were contacted by LadMner and solicited to hire Pohl may have been wrongful and may have caused them legal injury.142 Prior to receiving this advertisement, the Bethleys diid not know that the way they were contacted was wrongful, or that it caused them legal injury or harm.143 Heraclite Bikuombu and his two minor children Plovyt and David were also victims of Pohl’s illlegal solicitation scheme. On or about July 6, 2013, Bikumbu and his children wiere traveling with relatives from Missouri to Iowa when the rear tire 135 ExhibiUt 19, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Alphonse Bethley. 136 Exhibit 19, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Alphonse Bethley. 137 Exhibit 19, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Alphonse Bethley. 138 Exhibit 19, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Alphonse Bethley, and Exhibit 19-A, Bethley Pohl Contract. 139 Exhibit 20, Bethley Distribution Agreement. 140 Exhibit 21, July 23, 2014 Email re Ashley Bethley. 141 Exhibit 19, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Alphonse Bethley. 142 Exhibit 19, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Alphonse Bethley. 143 Exhibit 19, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Alphonse Bethley. 20 on their van blew out, causing the van to enter the median and roll several times.144 Bikumbu and his children were hospitalized with serious injuries.145 Their relative, Simon Kumeso, was killed in the accident.146 Just days after the accident, Magdalena and her brother Floriank (also known as Jay) showed up at the hospital room to personally solicit CBikumbu and his children to hire Pohl.147 The Santanas brought Bikumbu and his children gifts, including clothes, and stated they were with Helping Handis and worked for Pohl.148 The Santanas told Bikumbu that he had a viable lawsuit against the tire manufacturer and offered Bikumbu $1,000 if he would sign a contract with Pohl to represent him and his children in the claim.149 The Santanas told Bikumbu that he would get the money only if he signed al contract of representation.150 Bikumbu agreed and signed a proposed contracMt with Pohl.151 A friend of the relative who died, Nsalambi Kkongolo, emailed Pohl days after the accident confirming tihe solicitation by the Santanas: I am helping a family whose father (Mr. Simon Kumeso) was killed in a car accident. I was then contacted my [sic] Mr. F. Jay Santana and Maggie Santanoa from St Petersburg (FL) of Tower 7 Consulting Group. They came to Jefferson City, Missouri and we did some paperwork stating thatl you will take the case and they also give $3000 to the wife of the decieased as financial aid to help with funeral (at 18% interest). I 144 Exhibit 22, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Heraclite Bikumbu. 145 Exhibit 22, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Heraclite Bikumbu. 146 Exhibit 22, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Heraclite Bikumbu. 147 Exhibit 22, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Heraclite Bikumbu. 148 Exhibit 22, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Heraclite Bikumbu. 149 Exhibit 22, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Heraclite Bikumbu. 150 Exhibit 22, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Heraclite Bikumbu. 151 Exhibit 22, September 17, 2018 Declaration of Heraclite Bikumbu and Exhibit 22-A, Bikumbu- Pohl Contract. 21 would like to make sure that Santana work with you, you will take the case and the papers the wife of the deceased signed are legitimate.152 Pohl responded, confirming that he had been asked to represent the “victims of the tragic tire failure” and vouched for the Santanas, stating “Helping Hands and Jay Santana provide valuable assistance to families involved in ethese terrible accidents.”153 Magdalena testified to the solicitation of Bikumbu atnd his children in her deposition, stating that she and her brother where there on behalf of Pohl and his law firm: e A. You were asking me about when I vuisited clients in the hospital. This was an example of one of the clients that I had visited in the hospital. They had lost -- I think the husband died in a tire blow-out, roll-over. There werle several kids in the hospital and a gentleman and a lady. Anad this was the e-mail I -- the point of contact was a professorM from the university that was going to translate from English to French to the client. And I guess he was reaching out to either Michael Pohl's firm or to -- yeah, to Mr. Pohl directly. Hee wanted to make sure that we were who we said we were basiically. Q. And this e-mail references Jay. Is that your brother? A. Yes, it iso. Q. Did hle go with you to sign up that client? A. Yies, he did. o ... Q. Okay. And in it Mr. Pohl says, “I can vouch completely for Jay and Maggie.” Do you know why he would be vouching for you? 152 Exhibit 23, July 11, 2013 Email. 153 Exhibit 24, July 11, 2013 Response Email. 22 A. Because I'm representing him. Because I was there on his behalf.154 Florian also testified that he provided “marketing services” for auto accident cases,155 and specifically testifies to soliciting the Bikumbu family just days or weeks after the accident in Missouri occurred.156 The Santanas weree paid “bonuses” for soliciting the “Kumeso” case.157 Raymond Butts was the victim of a tragic automobilte accident on or about August 7, 2013 in Clear Spring, Maryland, which claimed the life of Brenda Adams, his fiancée. Just days after the accident, and while ein the hospital recovering from his injuries and grieving the loss of his fiancé, Buutts received an unexpected phone call from Magdalena, who said she was working on behalf of Pohl. Magdalena testified about this solicitation in haer deposition, calling it “a crazy one.”158 Magdalena testified that while she and Walker were “soliciting for Michael Pohl for the client to sign,” Butts’ familey got “really irate and they called the security on [them] at the hospital.”15O9 Tfhe family told security that “these people are here soliciting for an attorney.”160 Magdalena’s persistence eventually paid off and Butts agreed to hire Pohl, signing two contracts with his law firm.161 Magdalena also had Butts sign a funiding agreement with Helping Hands Financing to obtain the money 154 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II. 155 Exhibit 25, November 9, 2016 Deposition of Florian Santana, pp. 63-67. 156 Exhibit 25, November 9, 2016 Deposition of Florian Santana, pp. 66-70. 157 Exhibit 5, Precision Financials. 158 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II p. 55. 159 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II p. 55. 160 Exhibit 8, November 8, 2016 Deposition of Magdalena Santana, Vols. I and II p. 56. 161 Exhibit 26, Butts-Pohl Contracts. 23 Magdalena promised to pay Butts if he hired Pohl.162 And of course, Magdalena had Butts execute the “Attorney Acknowledgement” listing Pohl as his lawyer and authorizing Pohl to pay back Helping Hands Financing from any settlement.163 Magdalena was paid for this unlawful solicitation. Ultimately, howevekr, Pohl never countersigned the contracts, and the claims were not pursued. C On or about Saturday, February 15, 2014, LaDonna Cheatham and her children, Destiny and Markus, were tragically killed after ai tire on the Kia Sorrento driven by LaDonna failed and caused the vehicle to cross the median and collide with an oncoming school bus.164 LaDonna’s other son, Mark Cheatham, Jr. survived the crash.165 Mark Cheatham, Sr. is the ex-husband of LaDonna, biological father to Markus and Mark, Jr., and father-figulre to Destiny.166 Luella Miller is the surviving mother to LaDonna.167 LaMDonna was only thirty-six years old, Markus was sixteen and Destiny was only six.168 Less than a week afteir the accident, Pohl and his firm entered into an agreement with Walker, Ladner and Precision to provide “marketing services” – i.e. “barratry” – relating oto the Cheatham accident wherein Pohl agreed to pay these non-lawyers an unlethical percentage of his attorney’s fees.169 Talley contracted with Precision to aiid in providing these “marketing services” to Cheatham and Miller in 162 Exhibit 27, Butts Funding Agreement. 163 Exhibit 28, Butts Attorney Acknowledgement. 164 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 1. 165 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 1. 166 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 1. 167 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 1. 168 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 1. 169 Exhibit 30, Cheatham Retention Services Agreement. 24 exchange for $10,000 for every $1,000,000 received in a settlement.170 Talley testified that was paid a fee by Pohl, through Precision, to personally solicit and sign up the Cheatham family.171 And, Talley was successful. Talley testified in his deposition that days after the accident,k he did some “snooping” and located the residence of Cheatham, Sr.172 TallCey went out and “knocked on the door” and Cheatham, Sr. answered.173 Talley told Cheatham, Sr. and Miller that he was with “Helping Hands” and could heilp them with burial costs and “getting settlements.”174 Talley told Cheatham, Sr. that he was “associated with attorneys out of Houston that were really experienced with multi-types of vehicle accidents and that [they] could do the best job of getting him a settlement.”175 Cheatham, Sr. and Miller signed the papelrwork, including the contract with Pohl, right there.176 Talley testified that heM gave the Cheatham family $24,000 to sign up with the lawyers.177 Either Pohl or Ammons brought the $24,000 and gave it to the family,178 $18,000 of which wient to Cheatham, Sr., and all of which was paid by Helping Hands Financing.179 Talley’s testimoony is consistent with that of Cheatham, Sr. who testifies that, on or about Februlary 19, 2014, just days after the accident, he and Miller were personally soliicited by Talley at his home in Schriever, Louisiana and urged to hire 170 ExhibiUt 31, Cheatham Distribution Agreement. 171 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 60-61. 172 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 64-65. 173 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 65. 174 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 64. 175 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 65-66. 176 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 66. 177 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 74. 178 Exhibit 15, Deposition of Kenneth Talley, p. 77. 179 Exhibit 32, Helping Hands Check to Mark Cheatham. 25 Pohl and Ammons in a potential lawsuit against Kia Motors.180 Neither Cheatham, Sr. nor Miller had ever met Talley before and did not request him to visit with them about the accident.181 Cheatham, Sr. and Miller did not have a previous attorney- client relationship with Pohl or Ammons at the time they were personkally solicited by Talley.182 C At the visit, Talley encouraged Cheatham, Sr. and Miller to sign an agreement with a Helping Hands to investigate a potenitial lawsuit against Kia Motors in exchange for $400 per hour or 40% of any recovery in their case.183 Talley offered Cheatham, Sr. $2,000 if he would sign the agreement and hire Helping Hands to investigate the potential lawsuit and in turn the lawyers.184 Talley encouraged Cheatham, Sr. to sign the agrleement by stating that the money could defray funeral costs and the investigMation would reveal a viable claim against Kia Motors.185 Talley told Miller and Cheatham, Sr. that if there was a viable case, they could hire Pohl and Ammonsi to represent them in the lawsuit.186 Cheatham, Sr. agreed and signed the investigation agreement with Helping Hands.187 To get the money, Cheatham, Sro. was required to sign several documents with Helping Hands Financing, Donaldla Pohl’s company.188 180 Exhibit 30, Cheatham Retention Services Agreement. 181 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 1. 182 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., pp. 1-2. 183 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 2, and Cheatham Ex. 1. 184 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 2. 185 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 2. 186 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 2. 187 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 2, at Cheatham Ex. 2. 188 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 2. 26 Days later, on or about February 21, 2014, Pohl personally visited with Cheatham, Sr. and Miller and encouraged them to sign contingency fee agreements with his firm and also confirmed that he would associate Ammons on the case.189 Pohl said that Ammons was an expert on auto accident and auto dekfect cases.190 Pohl promised to pay Cheatham, Sr. $18,000 if he agreed to hire CPohl and Ammons in the auto accident case.191 Cheatham, Sr. and Miller agreed and signed contingency fee contracts for legal services with Pohil on this same day.192 Cheatham, Sr. signed the contract for legal services individually and on behalf of Destiny, Markus, and Mark, Jr., who were all minors.193 The $18,000 was paid to Cheatham, Sr. in exchange via a check written from Donalda Pohl’s company Helping Hands Financing.194 Cheathaml, Sr. and Miller later signed joint representation agreements with PohMl and Ammons.195 Cheatham, Sr. testified that he was offered and received an additional $500 to sign this joint agreement.196 Lacy Reese lost her huisband David Reese on or about July 2, 2014 in a vehicle accident that occurred outside of Anson, Texas.197 Reese buried her husband on July 7, 2014.198 Thoat same day, Ladner personally visited Reese’s home when she was not there andl left a business card stating he was the “Associate Director” of 189 Exhibit 29, A f ffiidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 2. 190 Exhibit 29,o Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 2. 191 Exhibit 2n9, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 2. 192 ExhibiUt 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 2, at Cheatham Ex. 3; Exhibit 33, Miller-Pohl Agreement. 193 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 2, at Cheatham Ex. 3. 194 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., p. 2; Exhibit 32, Helping Hands Check to Mark Cheatham. 195 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., pp. 2-3, at Cheatham Ex. 5; Exhibit 34, Ammons- Miller Agreement. 196 Exhibit 29, Affidavit of Mark Cheatham, Sr., pp.2-3. 197 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 1. 198 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 1. 27 Helping Hands.199 The next day, July 8, 2014, Ladner again visited Reese’s home in Paris, Arkansas and met with Reese and her mother, Karen Fairbanks.200 Ladner told Reese and her mother that he was with a company called “Helping Hands” that could investigate a potential lawsuit against the vehicle manufacturker or the tire company and sue them for the death of David.201 Ladner told ReeCse that if it looked like she had a lawsuit, Pohl and his co-counsel, Rob Ammons, could handle the case.202 Reese’s mother wrote down the names of these ilawyers on the back of Ladner’s business card during this meeting.203 Ladner offered Reese money if she would hire Helping Hands Group and these lawyers, telling her the money could help with the expenses relating to David’s death.204 Reese had never met Ladner, Pohl or Ammons, or requested them tol visit with her about the accident or requested them to contact her.205 M Although Reese was grieving over the loss of her husband, Ladner pressured Reese to sign the papers he ihad brought with him that day and she did.206 The agreement that Ladner had Reese sign provided Helping Hands Group $400 per hour or 40% of any reocovery in her case.207 To get the money, Reese was required to 199 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 1, and Reese Ex. 1. 200 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 1. 201 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, pp. 1-2. 202 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 1. 203 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, at Reese Ex. 1. 204 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, pp. 1-2. 205 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 2. 206 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 2. 207 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 2, and Reese Ex. 2. 28 sign several agreements with Helping Hands Financing, Donalda Pohl’s company.208 Reese was told she would get the money after a suit had been filed.209 On July 25, 2014, unbeknownst to Reese, Pohl and his firm entered into a “Retention of Services Agreement” with Walker, Ladner and Helping kHands Group to provide “marketing services” relating to the death of DavidC.210 Among other things, Ladner was to “conduct initial interview” of the victims and “maintain contact with the victims and their family.”211 In exchanige, Pohl agreed to pay Ladner and Helping Hands Group fees not to exceed 30% of his own attorney’s fees.212 Walker and Precision Marketing then contracted with Ladner to provide “public relations services pertaining to the cases of David Reese” in exchange for $5,000 for every $1,000,000 received frolm any settlement.213 The solicitation of Reese occurred pursuant to these agrMeements. On July 18, 2014, Ladner emailed Walker and Jaimes, the manager of Helping Hands Financing anid Pohl’s paralegal, concerning the “Reese Case.”214 Ladner described the accident that occurred on July 2nd – less than three weeks prior.215 On or about Aougust 16, 2014, Reese received an email from Ladner about a contract with Pohll.216 Ladner told Reese that Pohl’s contract would “take the place” of the one thati Reese had with Helping Hands Group and requested her to send the 208 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 2, and Reese Ex. 3. 209 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 2. 210 Exhibit 36, Reese Retention Services Agreement. 211 Exhibit 36, Reese Retention Services Agreement. 212 Exhibit 36, Reese Retention Services Agreement. 213 Exhibit 37, Reese Distribution Agreement. 214 Exhibit 38, July 18, 2014 Email re Reese Case. 215 Exhibit 38, July 18, 2014 Email re Reese Case. 216 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 2, and Reese Ex. 4. 29 contract directly to Pohl’s office.217 Reese received an email two days later from Walker forwarding her Pohl’s contract.218 Reese signed the contract and sent it to Pohl.219 Ladner does not dispute this. Ladner testified that he got an alkert about the death of Reese’s husband and flew to “nowhere Arkansas” withinC seven days of the accident and “knocked on the door” to solicit her.220 Ladner solicited Reese on behalf of Precision and “to get paid” by Pohl.221 Ladner referred ithe case to Pohl and got paid a “bonus” of $2,500.222 Ladner brought with him Helping Hands Financing forms he obtained from Jaimes.223 Although Ladner could not recall whether he offered Reese money to sign up with Pohl, it was his practice to do so and the money came from Jaimes and Helping Hands Finlancing, Donalda’s company.224 And Pohl acknowledged that Ladener “was opeMrating under [his] direction to … investigate[] the incident as part of an initial case evaluation process.”225 In other words, Ladner was soliciting Reese and evaluiating her potential claim at the direction of Pohl. Pohl is sued by his Mississippi runners who expose the illegal and unethical barratry scheme and Pohl settles that litigation after unsucceossfully seeking to have it dismissed based on the illegality of his agreements. On Octobier 8, 2014, Walker and Ladner and their company Precision sued Pohl and hois law firm for breach of contract and fraud, among other claims (the 217 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 2, and Reese Ex. 4. 218 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 2, and Reese Ex. 5. 219 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese, p. 2, and Reese Ex. 6. 220 Exhibit 39, April 11, 2019 Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at p. 346-351. 221 Exhibit 39, April 11, 2019 Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at p. 347. 222 Exhibit 39, April 11, 2019 Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at p. 347, 358-359 223 Exhibit 39, April 11, 2019 Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at p. 349-350. 224 Exhibit 39, April 11, 2019 Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at p. 351-354. 225 Exhibit 40, January 19, 2016 Letter. 30 “Mississippi Litigation”).226 There, Walker and Ladner alleged they had a joint venture with Pohl to sign up clients with economic loss claims stemming from the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill.227 See Walker v. Williamson, No. 1:14cv381-KS- JCG, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61185, at *5-6 (S.D. Miss. May 9, 201k6). They also alleged that they had “conducted marketing efforts to obtain persoCnal injury clients” for Pohl228 and that Pohl received attorney’s fees from the cases they signed up, but that “Pohl did not pay any of the agreed share of hiis fees to Walker [and] Ladner.”229 More specifically, Walker, Ladner and Precision (“the Runners”) alleged that Pohl contracted with them to provide “public relations and marketing services” to potential clients impacted by the Deepwlater Horizon oil spill in exchange for “a percentage of the attorney fees for thMe claims obtained from their efforts, along with expenses and a flat fee.” Walker, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61185, at *6-7. The Runners also alleged that thiey contracted with Pohl “to provide marketing and public relations services in connection with claims for automobile rollover accidents.” Walker v. oWilliamson, No. 1:14-CV-381-KS-MTP, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59031, at *5 (S.Dl. Miss. Apr. 18, 2017). “There is evidence that the [Runners] contacted peopile and businesses in Mississippi to determine if they might have a claim against BP, encouraged those people to retain Pohl as their attorney, and were paid over $5 million in ‘barratry pass-through money’ for their services.” 226 Nicholson Exhibit 4, Walker Complaint. 227 Exhibit 41, Walker Second Amended Complaint. 228 Exhibit 41, Walker Second Amended Complaint. ¶ 118. 229 Exhibit 41, Walker Second Amended Complaint. ¶ 136. 31 Kassab v. Pohl, 612 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied). However, the Runners sued Pohl because they “procured thousands of viable BP claims” and “approximately sixty motor vehicle accident cases” for Pohl but that Pohl “did noy pay any of the agreed share of his fees” ork all expenses incurred. Walker v. Williamson, No. 1:14-cv-381-KS-JCG, 2016 CU.S. Dist. LEXIS 76488, at *5, 24 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 1, 2016). Precision transfers and assigns its assets andi claims against Pohl to Favre – Pohl counterclaims for conversion in the Mississippi Litigation but settles when he cannot obtain summary dismissal. e During discovery in the Mississippi Liutigation, Pohl discovered that the Runners allegedly “disclosed confidential and proprietary information to third parties without authorization” and proaposed “the ‘sale’ of all of [his] accumulated work product to third parties” while working for him.230 Pohl testifies that the Runners “undertook to converte, misappropriate for themselves and/or market to third parties claimant files fand other information and materials” that allegedly belonged to Pohl231 – including “marketing information and other trade secrets”232 – and then the new owner of Precision, Scott Favre, allegedly “sold those items and the information”i to Kassab.233 230 Exhibit 42, Pohl’s June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 18. 231 Exhibit 42, Pohl’s June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 28. 232 Exhibit 42, Pohl’s June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 28. 233 Exhibit 42, Pohl’s June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 29. 32 As a result, Pohl “asserted multiple claims against” the Runners in the Federal Court Case based on their alleged “fraudulent and bad faith conduct.”234 Pohl did not assert claims against Kassab in the Federal Court Case, even though he testified under oath that he knew Kassab allegedly was part of kthe “team of thieves” who broke into Pohl’s office in 2014 and stole his confidCential information and purported trade secrets.235 Pohl attempted to dismiss the Mississippi Litigationi, arguing the agreements between he and the runners were illegal and unenforceable.236 More specifically, Pohl argued that under both Texas and Mississippi law “it is illegal for a non- lawyer to accept or agree to accept money to improperly solicit clients for a lawyer.”237 The Mississippi federal courlt denied Pohl’s motion to dismiss and concluded that he was in a partneMrship with Walker and Ladner and further concluded that the agreements to solicit clients would only be a violation of the Texas disciplinary rules andi Texas law, which did not apply to Walker and Ladner.238 Having failed to obtain summary dismissal, Pohl settled the Mississippi Litigation, hoping too forever conceal the barratry operation.239 The Mississippi Litigation was dismlissed with prejudice on April 24, 2017.240 234 Exhibit 42, Pohl’s June 19, 2018 Affidavit, at ¶ 19; see also Exhibit 43, Pohl’s Amended Counterclaim. 235 Exhibit 44, May 15, 2018 Deposition of Michael Pohl, pp. 85-93. 236 Exhibit 45, Walker Memorandum Opinion (Doc. No. 475); Exhibit 46, Walker Pohl Memorandum (Doc. No. 175). 237 Exhibit 46, Walker Pohl Memorandum, at ¶ 18. 238 Exhibit 47, Walker Order on Pohl Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 252). 239 Exhibit 48, Walker Judgment (Doc. No. 499). 240 Exhibit 48, Walker Judgment (Doc. No. 499). 33 Kassab exposes Pohl’s illegal and unethical barratry and more than 400 victims of Pohl’s barratry scheme hire Kassab to file civil claims and grievances against Pohl. Kassab was tipped off to the allegations in the Mississippi Litigation by an acquaintance of his, F. Douglas Montague of the Mississippi law firkm Montague Pittman & Varnado, PA (“Montague”).241 Kassab obtained much inCformation related to the Mississippi Litigation from the federal court’s online system, PACER.242 Kassab also associated Precision and its new owner, iFavre, and its counsel, Nicholson, and obtained information directly from them, including the names and addresses of Pohl’s former or prospective clients.243 Favre informed Kassab that, when he bought Precision, he acquired files related to Pohl and Favre transferred that information to Kassab.244 l Kassab prepared advertisemenMt letters approved by the State Bar of Texas and sent it to people who had been illegally solicited by Pohl, informing them that they may have potential barriatry claims against Pohl.245 Hundreds of Mississippi residents responded to Kassab’s advertisement letter and more than 400 signed representation contraocts with Kassab’s firm to pursue barratry claims against Pohl.246 Kassab filled four separate lawsuits on behalf of these barratry victims in Harris Countiy, Texas (the “Barratry Lawsuits”).247 Additionally, due to the 241 Exhibit 49, Declaration of Lance Christopher Kassab, at 2-3. 242 Exhibit 49, Declaration of Lance Christopher Kassab, at 2-3. 243 Exhibit 49, Declaration of Lance Christopher Kassab, at 2-3. 244 Exhibit 49, Declaration of Lance Christopher Kassab, at 2; Exhibit 50, Affidavit of Scott Favre. 245 Exhibit 49, Declaration of Lance Christopher Kassab, at 2; Exhibit 51, Advertisement Letters. 246 Exhibit 49, Declaration of Lance Christopher Kassab, at 2. 247 Exhibit 52 (Brumfield Third Amended Petition), Exhibit 53 (Gandy Second Amended Petition), Exhibit 54 (Berry Fifth Amended Petition), Exhibit 55 (Cheatham Fourth Amended Petition) (without exhibits). 34 egregiousness of Pohl’s violation of the Texas Penal Code and violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, Kassab was required to notify the Texas State Bar pursuant to disciplinary rule 8.03.248 Thus, Kassab filed grievances against Pohl pursuant to this rule, and also at the request of some of kPohl’s former clients.249 C Pohl files this retaliatory lawsuit against Kassab seeking as damages the costs he incurred to defend againstt the Barratry Lawsuits and grievances filed against him. i In retaliation, Pohl filed this litigation against Kassab, Favre, Nicholson, Precision, and others, for conversion, misappropriation of trade secrets and conspiracy.250 Pohl rehashes his allegations from the Mississippi Litigation, claiming that “Precision gained access lto Pohl’s confidential and proprietary information and property, including tMrade secret materials” and “work product” and “illegally misappropriated” this information and then allegedly “secretly sold Pohl’s confidential information to Kaissab and [another lawyer named] Montague”251 who then “solicited clients/prospective clients [of Pohl’s] to act as Plaintiffs . . . to bring cases against Pohl foro alleged barratry and other claims.”252 As damages, Pohl seeks the costs and explenses he incurred defending against the Barratry Lawsuits and grievances fileid against him. 248 Exhibit 49, Declaration of Lance Christopher Kassab, at 1. 249 Rule 8.03 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct provides: “. . . a lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of applicable rules of professional conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate disciplinary authority.” 250 See Pohl’s First Amended Petition (on file with the Court). 251 First Amended Petition, at ¶¶ 20-21. 252 First Amended Petition, at ¶ 29. 35 SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD The purpose of summary judgments is to eliminate patently unmeritorious claims and untenable defenses. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlie v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004). To prevail, the movant must show thakt no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment aCs a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Lujan v. Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2018). “If the movant carries this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmiovant to raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.” Lujan, 555 S.W.3d at 84; see Maldonado v. Maldonado, 556 S.W.3d 407, 414 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). “A genuine issue of material fact exists if more than a scintilla of evidence establishing the existence of thle challenged element is produced.” Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598M, 600 (Tex. 2004). ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES Although Pohl’s claimsi against Kassab lack merit because Kassab did not misappropriate Pohl’s trade secrets or otherwise engage in any misconduct, the Court need not decideo that issue to dispose of Pohl’s claims against Kassab. Rather, Pohl’s claims can ble dismissed for several independent reasons. A. Piohl’s claims against Kassab are barred by immunity ounder Rule 17.09 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. First, Pohl’s claims against Kassab must be dismissed based on immunity provided in Rule 17.09 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. That rule provides: 36 No lawsuit may be instituted against any Complainant or witness predicated upon the filing of a Grievance or participation in the attorney disciplinary and disability system. … The immunity is absolute and unqualified and extends to all actions at law or in equity. TEX. R. DISC. P. 17.09 (emphasis added). Even “allegations of wrongdoking” done “in connection with [the] prosecution of disciplinary actions” are absoClutely immune, so long as they are “predicated upon” the filing of a grievance. Crampton v. Farris, 596 S.W.3d 267, 274-75 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, nio pet.). Here, it is undisputed that Pohl’s allegations of wrongdoing against Kassab are predicated upon Kassab’s filing of grievances against Pohl. Pohl testified that he has sued Kassab because Kassab allegedly “used information from [Pohl’s] files in the grievance proceedings that [Kassab] lpersonally filed or had clients file and [Kassab allegedly] shared [Pohl’s] stoMlen property with Ms. Nicholson so she could defend a grievance against herself, according to her own testimony.”253 Pohl seeks as damages in the form of “coists and expenses of … serial grievances that arose from the use of the [allegedly] misappropriated trade secrets.”254 Pohl intends to have his biased expoert, John Zavitsanos,255 “testify that Defendants, including [Kassab], sought tlo profit from the use of [Pohl’s information] by … using it … to facilitate the ibringing of grievances and litigation against Pohl.”256 Zavitsanos is purportedly going to “opine that [Pohl’s] attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred … in 253 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 122. 254 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 122. (emphasis added). 255 Mr. Zavitsanos is bias because he was an advocate for Pohl’s co-defendant in the underlying barratry cases that Kassab brought and because Kassab had previously sued Mr. Zavitsanos and his firm. See Cause No. 20191510, Bragg v. Zavitsanos, in the 270th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas. The Court is requested to take judicial notice of this case. 256 Exhibit 57, Pohl’s Second Amended Designation of Expert Witnesses, at 5. 37 defending related matters including against invalid grievances … are fair, reasonable, necessary and recoverable under the circumstances.”257 But Rule 17.09 makes clear that “[n]o lawsuit” may be instituted against Kassab that is “predicated upon” the filing of a grievance or particikpation in the attorney disciplinary and disability system. TEX. R. DISC. P. 17.0C9. Because Pohl’s claims against Kassab and the damages that he seeks are “predicated upon” the grievances that Kassab caused to file against Pohl, thie claims are barred by “absolute and unqualified” immunity that “extends to all actions at law or in equity.” Id.; Crampton, 596 S.W.3d at 276 (claim for destruction of evidence and property related to grievance proceeding barred by immunity under Rule 17.09); Burch v. State Bar of Tex., No. 07-19-0022l4-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 1409, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 19, 2020, pMet. denied) (immunity under Rule 17.09 barred claim that attorneys for commission, in relation to a grievance proceeding, who purportedly “engaged in miscionduct related to a bankruptcy proceeding in which [plaintiff] was involved”). Since all of Pohl’s claims are related to the grievance proceedings, they areo all barred by Rule 17.09 and summary judgment may be and should be granted lbased upon Rule 17.09 alone. B. Piohl’s claims against Kassab are barred by the judicial oproceedings privilege. “The judicial-proceedings privilege is an absolute privilege that covers any statement made by the judge, jurors, counsel, parties or witnesses, and attaches to all aspects of the proceedings, including statements made in open court, pre-trial 257 Exhibit 57, Pohl’s Second Amended Designation of Expert Witnesses, at 6. 38 hearings, depositions, affidavits and any of the pleadings or other papers in the case.” Landry's, Inc. v. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 631 S.W.3d 40, 46 (Tex. 2021) (internal quotations omitted). “The judicial-proceedings privilege exists to facilitate the proper administration of the justice system. It does so by krelieving the participants in the judicial process from fear of retaliatory lawsuCits for statements they make in connection with the proceeding itself.” Id. at 48. Moreover, the judicial-proceedings privilegei attaches even to “communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding” if “the communication has some relation to a proceeding that is actually contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration by the witness or a possible party to the proceeding.” Id. at 48-49. “Even in the prle-suit context, however, the privilege protects communications that arMe themselves preparatory to the lawsuit.” Id. (emphasis added). The privilege protects all communications that are “necessary to set the judiicial machinery in motion.” Id. at 50 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) O F TORTS § 586 cmt. a) (emphasis added). Here, Pohl haos sued Kassab in retaliation for Kassab “solicit[ing] … clients/prospectivel clients to act as plaintiffs … to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barratiry and other claims.”258 Pohl admits that he is suing Kassab for statements Kassab made to prospective clients which spawned the litigation and grievance proceedings:259 258 Amended Petition, at ¶ 29. 259 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 122. 39 Because Pohl’s claims against Kassab arisne out of communications that Kassab made in prospective (solicitation letterrs) and actual judicial proceedings (the barratry litigation and grievance process), Pohl’s claims against Kassab are barred by the judicial proceedings privielege. See Crain v. Smith, 22 S.W.3d 58, 62-63 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, fno pet.) (holding that statements in letter sent before the lawsuit began were protected by the judicial-proceedings privilege). It matters not how Pohl characterized his claims against Kassab because “the privilege shouldi be extended beyond defamation when the essence of a claim is damages tohat flow from communications made in the course of a judicial proceeding.” Laub v. Pesikoff, 979 S.W.2d 686, 691 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). Here, Pohl seeks as damages “the costs and expenses of serial litigations and serial grievances” that Kassab filed against Pohl, including attorney’s fees for his lawyers who represented him in that litigation and “[a]ny 40 fees, any expenses [Pohl] had, hotel rooms, long-distance phone calls, copy costs, [Pohl] intend[s] to sue Mr. Kassab for all of it.”260 Because Pohl’s alleged damages “flow from” communications that Kassab made in the barratry litigation and grievance proceedings, his claims are barred regardless of label. Seek id. (holding privilege applied to claims for “intentional interference, civil consCpiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and constitutional violations”); Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ray Ferguson Interests, Inc., No. 01-02-00807-CiV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 2001, at *27-28 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 16, 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that absolute privilege applied in deceptive insurance practices claim under Texas Insurance Code because “although [plaintiff] did not plead defamation, its theory of damages was that its clilents, creditors, and bonding companies abandoned it, in part, because of the M[insurer's] allegations and assertions . . . made in the course of this judicial proceeding”). Thus, summary judgment must be granted based upon the judiciail proceedings privilege. C. Pohl’s claims against Kassab are barred by attorney immunity. Under the doctrine of attorney immunity, “an attorney does not have a right of recovery, undier any cause of action, against another attorney arising from conduct theo second attorney engaged in as part of the discharge of his duties in representing a party.” Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 72 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (emphasis added). “[A]n attorney is immune from liability to nonclients for conduct within the scope of his representation of his clients.” 260 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 121. 41 Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 681 (Tex. 2018). The inquiry “focuses on the kind of conduct at issue rather than the alleged wrongfulness of said conduct.” Id. “That is, a lawyer is no more susceptible to liability for a given action merely because it is alleged to be fraudulent or otherwise wrongful.” Id. “Merekly labeling an attorney’s conduct ‘fraudulent’ does not and should not remove itC from the scope of client representation or render it ‘foreign to the duties of an attorney.’” Id. at 483. Even “criminal conduct is not categorically excepted from thie protections of attorney civil immunity when the conduct alleged is connected with representing a client in litigation.” Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C., 595 S.W.3d 651, 657 (Tex. 2020); Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 483 (Tex. 2015) (“an attorney’s conduct may be wrongfull but still fall within the scope of client representation”). M Although the Court previously denied Kassab summary judgment on this defense, the Texas Supreme Ciourt’s recent decision in Taylor v. Tolbert, 644 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. 2022) requires reconsideration. Taylor held that even “conduct prohibited by statute” is subject oto attorney immunity if the “statute does not expressly, or by necessary implicaltion, abrogate the immunity defense, and the attorney met her burden to estaiblish its applicability to the conduct at issue.” Id. at 642. In Taylor, the attorney was accused of violating state and federal laws prohibiting wiretapping because the attorney obtained and used the plaintiff’s communications in violation of the statute. Id. at 643. The plaintiff brought a statutory claim against the attorney which permitted recovery of civil damages. Id.; 42 see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 18A.502. The attorney moved for traditional summary judgment, “arguing she is immune from liability as a matter of law because the plaintiffs’ claims all stem from her role as an attorney in the modification proceeding.” Id. at 644. The trial court agreed, but the coukrt of appeals reversed. Id. The Supreme Court granted review and reversed thCe court of appeals. Id. It concluded that the attorney was, “in all respects, engaging in the office, professional training, skill, and authority of an attorneiy in the ways that she allegedly used and disclosed the materials her client provided.” Id. at 649. “Because [the attorney’s] conduct falls squarely within the confines of attorney immunity, the alleged criminality or wrongfulness of the conduct does not perforce preclude its availability as an affirmative defense.” Id.l The court also held that “Texas’s wiretap statute does not expressly repudiatMe the common law or the attorney-immunity defense.” Id. Here too, Kassab’s coinduct which forms the basis of Pohl’s claims fall squarely within the confines of attorney immunity, regardless of whether it is alleged to have violoated the TUTSA because that statute does not expressly repudiate the defelnse. Pohl isi suing Kassab because he allegedly obtained purportedly stolen information in violation of the TUTSA and then “solicited [Pohl’s] clients/prospective clients to act as plaintiffs … to bring cases against Pohl for alleged barratry and other claims.”261 The essence of Pohl’s claims against Kassab are “that Kassab bought Pohl’s client list from [Precision] so that Kassab could send 261 Amended Petition, ¶ 29. 43 advertisements to Pohl’s former clients and solicit them to become Kassab’s clients in barratry suits against Pohl.” Kassab v. Pohl, 612 S.W.3d 571, 578 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied) (characterizing Pohl’s claims against Kassab). Pohl seeks as damages “the costs and expenses of serial litigationks and serial grievances” that Kassab filed against Pohl, including attorney’s feCes for his lawyers who represented him in that litigation and “[a]ny fees, any expenses [Pohl] had, hotel rooms, long-distance phone calls, copy costs, [Pohil] intend[s] to sue Mr. Kassab for all of it.”262 Pohl has even designated Mr. Zavitsanos to testify to these damages, and “the reasonableness and necessity of the attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred by Pohl in defending against invalid grievances and stale claims.”263 l Moreover, in this very case, tMhe court of appeals opined that “the alleged purchase of Pohl[’s] client list for those clients’ contact information, followed by the mailing oif attorney advertisements to those individuals about specific types of claims they might be able to pursue against a specifically identifoied attorney, qualifies as statements or conduct that arose out of a colmmercial transaction involving the type of legal services Kassab proviides.” Kassab, 612 S.W.3d at 578 (emphasis added). The court opined that, “the intended audience of [Kassab’s alleged] statement or conduct were individuals with potential legal claims who Kassab sought to represent in barratry suits against Pohl.” Id. at 579 (emphasis added). 262 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 121. 263 Exhibit 57, Pohl’s Second Amended Designation of Experts, at 3. 44 The acquisition of clients and filing of lawsuits are actions taken “to facilitate the rendition of legal services.” Youngkin, 546 S.W.3d at 682; Clayton v. Oldcastle Materials Tex., Inc., No. 09-18-00063-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 1112, at *12, 15 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 14, 2019, no pet.) (applying attorney kimmunity to attorney’s conduct which included “selling his legal services Cto the City as a potential client” and subsequent conduct which “occurred in the course of his undertaking to represent” those clients). The fact that Kiassab is alleged to have committed the misconduct prior to any litigation is immaterial because “attorney immunity applies to claims based on conduct outside the litigation context[.]” Haynes & Boone, LLP v. NFTD, LLC, 631 S.W.3d 65, 78-79, 81 (Tex. 2021); Cantey Hanger, 467 S.W.3d at 485 (concluding tlhat attorney was immune from conduct that occurred after litigation had endMed). In other words, Pohl’s characterization of Kassab’s activities as part of a business transaction that occurred prior to litigation does not negate attorney immiunity because Kassab engaged in the conduct as part of his ultimate provision of legal services to his client. See Haynes & Boone, 631 S.W.3d at 78-79, 81 (oapplying attorney immunity to lawyer conduct committed as part of business tlransaction). Indeed, in this case, the court of appeals concluded that all of Kasisab’s conduct for which Pohl complains “arose out of a commercial transaction involving the type of legal services Kassab provides.” Kassab, 612 S.W.3d at 578 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Pohl’s claims against Kassab are barred by attorney immunity. See Taylor, 644 S.W.3d at 648 (attorney could not be held civilly liable for conduct 45 which was “criminal in nature” because it was committed while discharging duties to client); Highland Capital Mgmt., LP v. Looper Reed & McGraw, P.C., No. 05-15- 00055-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 442, at *10-11 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 14, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (applying attorney immunity to claim that attokrney engaged in “malicious conduct with respect to its illegal acquisition, reCtention, use, and threatened disclosure of [the plaintiff’s] proprietary and confidential information” that “it knew to be stolen and proprietary in furtherancei of its scheme to extort, slander, and disparage [the plaintiff]” and “refusing to return and cease use of [the plaintiff’s] proprietary information”). The law of the case, as outlined by the court of appeals in this matter, demonstrates that the alleged conduct for which Pohl basis his claims is clearly covered by the atltorney immunity doctrine. D. Pohl’s claims are barrMed by limitations. A defendant moving for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of limitations bears the burdeni of conclusively establishing the elements of that defense. Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Pasko, 544 S.W.3d 830, 833 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam). To do so, thoe defendant must (1) conclusively prove when the cause of action accrued andl (2) negate the discovery rule if it applies and has been pleaded or otherwise riaised. KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cnty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999). A cause of action accrues when (1) “the allegedly tortious act was committed and caused an injury;” or (2) “facts come into existence that authorize a party to seek a judicial remedy.” United Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. First St. Hosp. LP, 570 S.W.3d 323, 335 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. 46 denied) (citing Pasko, 544 S.W.2d at 834). This is true even if all resulting damages have not yet occurred. Pasko, 544 S.W.3d at 834. Determining the accrual date is a question of law. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 221 (Tex. 2003). As demonstrated below, all of Pohl’s claims against Kassab akre barred by limitations. C 1. Facts relevant to limitations. Pohl testified that he and Precision shared an officie in Gulfport, Mississippi from 2013-2014.264 Pohl called this his “satellite law office.”265 The owners of Precision in 2014 were Scott Walker, Kirk Ladner, and Steve Seymour.266 Pohl testified that he closed his Gulfport, Mississippi office in the summer of 2014.267 He testified that he asked lPrecision to arrange to have his office equipment and files sent to him in HMouston, Texas.268 Pohl testified that Precision made excuses for why they could not get his property moved to Houston.269 In June or July of 2014, Pohl “gave upi” asking Precision to arrange the move and hired his own mover to go to Gulfport and get everything that was in the office: “every pencil, every paper, every fiole, every file cabinet, every icebox.”270 Pohl testified that the mover was to bringl the property back to Pohl in Houston, Texas.271 When the mover arrived in Gulifport, he found the office almost empty, and Precision told him that 264 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 7-10. 265 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 6-8. 266 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 16. 267 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 11. 268 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 12. 269 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 12. 270 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 12. 271 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 12. 47 Precision removed all files and was not returning them.272 Pohl testified that he contacted Precision and was told Precision was “keeping” the files.273 Pohl asserts that Kassab and other Defendants orchestrated and participated directly in the 2014 theft of files.274 Pohl testified that Kassab aknd the other Defendants “robbed my office [and] stole my clients’ names” in 2C014.275 He further testified: A. That group of criminals stole about 11,00i0 files out of my Mississippi office. They also stole my computers and hired a third party, whose name slips my mind right now, to hack into my office computers and steale all of my confidential information, internal documents. And they also stole my forms that I created for BP and outher litigation, among other things. Q. And when you’re saying “this group of criminals,” who did that include? r A. It would be Scott Favre, Tina Nicholson, Lance Kassab, Doug Montague, and poteontially the people that they either bribed or coerced into doineg their dirty work.276 Pohl alleges that Kassab fis a co-conspirator with Nicholson to unlawfully misappropriate his tradye secrets.277 Pohl testified that “Tina Nicholson demanded that Scott Walker steal my files or, because he got in trouble with the law, Tina Nicholson was goaing to take his two baby children away from him and forced him to cooperate witfh [Kassab’s] crew to rob me and hack my computers.”278 272 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 6, 12-14. 273 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 15. 274 Amended Petition, at ¶¶ 21-24. 275 Exhibit 58, May 2018 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 94-97. 276 Exhibit 59, April 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 37-39. 277 Amended Petition, at ¶ 43. 278 Exhibit 58, May 2018 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 94. 48 Pohl testified that the alleged theft of trade secret information occurred in the summer of 2014 when Kassab and his “crew” allegedly broke into Pohl’s office in Gulfport and hacked his computers, stole his clients’ names and information, and then solicited his clients: k Q. Okay. And you think I'm an unethical lawyer? C A. Yes. You stole my files. You robbed me. You tried to destroy my practice. So I don't believe you should sutbmit any more materials, particularly false affidavits that hiave been retracted by the witnesses who made them and other verifiably false accusations. And you've solicited my clients like Mr. Cheatham, and you've told him lies to get him to suee me. A. If the question is did you steal myu files and rob my office, the answer is that you and your co-counsel and your crew robbed my office, stole my clients' names, contacted my clients and told them lies to initiate suits agalinst me. Q. Okay. How did I steal Myour files, sir? Did I break into your house? A. You broke into my elaw office. Q. I did personallyf? A. You and your crew. Q. And when did I do that? A. I doin't know the exact date, but I believe it was in 2014 when yiou robbed me. Q. I robbed you in 2014? A. Yes, sir. Q. So I broke into your office and stole your stuff in 2014 at your Gulfport, Mississippi office, right? 49 A. You and your crew.279 In this case, Pohl admitted under oath that he knew in 2014 that his trade secrets had been misappropriated: Q. You knew as of the summer of 2014, then, that thek trade secrets that you claim in this lawsuit were teaken by Precision Marketing. Is that correct? C A. Yes, I knew they were not being made available to me.280 Pohl also expressly testified that he knew in the summer 2014 that his files – which he claims are the purported trade secrets – had been stsolen from him: Q. Who stole the files? g A. Well, originally it would have beeBn Precision Marketing. Q. Did you form the opinion thaty they had stolen the files when Mr. Blanton informed you that ihle learned that the files were not available to be moved to Haouston? A. Well, I certainly had af suspicion, so I followed up and spoke to somebody at Precision about it. Q. And once you spoike to the person at Precision, that’s when you formed your opfinion that the files had been stolen from you. Is that correct? A. Yes. o Q. And that would have been sometime in the summer of 2014? A. Yecs.281 Accordingly, it is undisputed that the alleged trade secret property was removed from the Gulfport office no later than July 2014, that Precision – who Pohl alleges 279 Exhibit 58, May 2018 Deposition of Michael Pohl, pp. 85-93. (emphasis added) 280 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 14. (emphasis added) 281 Exhibit 56, December 2021 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 18-19. 50 was part of Kassab’s “crew” – took it, and that by July 2014 Pohl was aware that Precision had taken it in an alleged conspiracy with Kassab. After Pohl discovered the taking of the alleged trade secrets in the summer 2014, he took no immediate action to recover it, find out what happenedk to it, or find out if anyone else was involved in the taking. Pohl testified that Calthough he knew the alleged conduct by Kassab occurred in 2014, he did not file a lawsuit against Kassab because he “wanted to spend time to reflect on it biefore taking action [and] didn’t want to do anything that was precipitous.”282 On October 8, 2014, Precision and its owners, Scott Walker, Kirk Ladner and Steve Seymour, filed a breach of contract lawsuit against Pohl in federal court in Mississippi.283 Pohl’s only reaction to the llawsuit was to send Walker and Ladner a mild email two days later asking theMm to return his “original documents, evidence and keys.”284 From that point forward, Precision and its owners proceeded to publish Pohl’s alleged propriietary information in the lawsuit. For example, in November 2014, one month after filing the lawsuit, they published his alleged marketing materials,o285 communications and contracts between Pohl and other lawyers,286 commulnications between Pohl and his clients or potential clients,287 and Pohl’s BP clieint solicitation letter,288 all without any complaint from Pohl. Thus, Pohl acquiesced to the publication and use of his alleged trade secrets. 282 Exhibit 58, May 2018 Deposition of Michael Pohl, p. 93. 283 Nicholson Ex. 4, Federal Original Complaint. 284 Nicholson Ex. 5, Doc. 19-1. 285 Nicholson Ex. 6, Doc. 19-5 and 19-6. 286 Nicholson Ex. 7, Doc. 19-3. 287 Nicholson Ex. 8, Doc. 19-7. 288 Nicholson Ex. 9, Doc. 19-10. 51 Pohl took no action to recover his allegedly stolen property nor attempt to stop the dissemination of his alleged trade secrets: he did not file a counterclaim for theft, conversion, or violation of a trade secrets act, nor did he move for injunctive or other relief to reacquire or protect his trade secrets, nor did move fork a protective order regarding his alleged trade secrets or (until the March 20C17 confidentiality order that was expressly not retroactive) enter into a confidentiality agreement to protect and keep secret the documents produced during ithe lawsuit.289 In short, Pohl failed to do any of the things that a person exercising reasonable diligence regarding the theft of trade secrets would do. On or about May 12, 2015, Walker, Ladner and Seymour sold Precision to Scott Favre, and in conjunction with tlhe sale, they transferred the allegedly misappropriated materials to Favre’sM office in Kiln, Mississippi.290 On May 12, 2015, Nicholson entered an appearance in the Mississippi litigation as the attorney for Precision.291 i The sale of Precision to Favre apparently stimulated Pohl to determine whether Nicholson haod the alleged trade secret materials. On May 15, 2015, Pohl’s attorney sent Nichlolson a letter demanding that Walker, Ladner and Seymour turn over to Pohl thie contracts between him and his BP clients. The letter stated, “The contracts do not belong to your clients.”292 Pohl’s attorney sent Nicholson a second letter on May 20, 2015. The letter repeated Pohl’s demand that Nicholson provide 289 Nicholson Ex. A, Nicholson Affidavit. 290 Nicholson Ex. 10, Doc. 396-2. 291 Nicholson Ex. 11, Doc. 77. 292 Nicholson Ex. 12, 2015 Communications. 52 the contracts to him. By way of explanation, the letter said, “As you may know, the British Petroleum claim filing deadline is June 8, 2015. Mr. Pohl needs the contracts to address client matters relating to the deadline.”293 Of course, this was a lie because Pohl had access to all contact information, if not from hkis own home office where contracts were sent to him, his co-counsel who was adCministering all of their claims in Houston had copies of all contracts and contact information. On May 27, 2015, Nicholson emailed a letter to Poihl’s attorney, confirming that the contracts in Precision’s possession were being held at the office of Scott Favre, Precision’s new owner.294 In pertinent part, it said: This letter responds to your faxed letters and addresses matters which we discussed in our telephone conversation last Friday. Your client, Michael Pohl, has demanded thalt my client, Precision Marketing Group, LLC, hand over the oraiginals and copies of . . . contracts between him . . . and the BP/DMeepwater Horizon claimants. . . Mr. Pohl asserts that the documents do not belong to PMG or the other Plaintiffs.295 Nicholson’s letter went on to istate that “PMG will not relinquish possession of the original contracts at this time.”296 Nicholson stated that the documents in question were being held at theo office of Scott Favre, Precision’s new owner.297 Nicholson also mentioned that a lcomputer containing some of the information had been sent to a forensic experti for recovery of date.298 293 Nicholson Ex. 12, 2015 Communications. 294 Nicholson Ex. 12, 2015 Communications. 295 Nicholson Ex. 12, 2015 Communications. 296 Nicholson Ex. 12, 2015 Communications. 297 Nicholson Ex. 12, 2015 Communications. 298 Nicholson Ex. 12, 2015 Communications. 53 Pohl swore to his lawyer’s letters being sent to Nicholson requesting return of the materials in his interrogatory answers: i 299 Accordingly, at least as of May 2015, Pohl knew that WaDlkier and Ladner (who Pohl contends was part of Kassab’s “crew”) had transferresd the alleged trade secrets to Favre who was represented by Nicholson (who Pohl contends are other members of Kassab’s “crew”), and that Nicholson had refused Pohl’s demand for return of the information. More than 3 years later, on Alugust 28, 2018, Pohl filed this lawsuit. As explained below, Pohl’s TUTSA claim against Kassab, along with his conversion and conspiracy claim, are barred by the statute of limitations, and thus, summary judgment must be granted. i 2. Pohl’s TUTSA is barred by the three-year statute of limpitations. TUTSA has a three-year statute of limitations: “A person must bring suit for misappropriationi of trade secrets not later than three years after the misapproproiation is discovered or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.010(a). “Misappropriation” means, among other definitions, the acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by 299 Nicholson Ex. 13, Pohl’s Interrogatory Answers at No. 4. 54 improper means. Id. at § 134A.002(3). “Improper means” includes theft. Id. at § 134A.002(2). “A misappropriation of trade secrets that continues over time is a single cause of action and the limitations period … begins running without regard to whether the misappropriation is a single or continuing act.” Id. at § 1k6.010(b). Accordingly, the first act of misappropriation is whCen the statute of limitation accrues for misappropriation of a trade secret. See Gen. Universal Sys. v. HAL Inc., 500 F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2007) (recognizinig the TUTSA “explicitly precludes treating trade secret misappropriation as a continuing tort.”); Guajardo v. Freddie Records, Inc., No. CV H-10-02024, 2014 WL 12603179, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 15, 2014) (“[T]he Texas Legislature decided not to make this type of claim a continuing tort. Specifically, the Texas lLegislature enacted a three-year statute of limitations for suits alleging misaMppropriation of trade secrets in May 1997.”). Accordingly, “the tort of misappropriation, as viewed under Texas law, occurs at the moment of misappropriation.”i Bianco v. Globus Med., Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 929, 938 (E.D. Tex. 2014) In this case, tohe limitation period on the TUTSA claim began to run in summer 2014, wheln Precision and allegedly Kassab, to use Pohl’s own word, “stole” the trade seicrets.300 Pohl testified that he had actual knowledge of the misappropriation of his claimed property no later than July 2014.301 Accordingly, the misappropriation occurred more than four years before Pohl filed this lawsuit in August 2018. 300 Exhibit 58, May 2018 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 18-19. 301 Exhibit 58, May 2018 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 18-19. 55 This is not a case where the date of the misappropriation is unclear. This is not an instance where an employee secretly copies information from an employer, stealthily shares it with a competitor, and the owner of the trade secret finds out in a roundabout way at some later point in time when a similar prokduct hits the market. In this case, Precision physically removed all of the doCcuments from the office it shared with Pohl. Pohl admits that he unequivocally discovered the alleged theft of the trade secrets no later than July 2014. And whiat’s more, Pohl testified, that Kassab and his “crew” participated in the theft of his trade secrets in 2014. Thus, based upon Pohl’s own testimony, Pohl’s TUTSA claim against Kassab expired in July 2017, over a year before Pohl filed this lawsuit. The statutory language is very speclific as to when the statute begins to run. It says that the limitation period staMrts when “misappropriation is discovered or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 16.010(a). Pohl diiscovered the theft of his trade secrets no later than July 2014. Accordingly, the statute began to run on the misappropriation in July 2014, meaning Pohl’so TUTSA claim was barred by the time he filed suit in August 2018. l Alternaitively, even if the statute began to run in May 2015, Pohl’s claim is still barred. The May 2015 letters prove that Pohl knew in May 2015 that Walker, Ladner and Seymour had transferred the disputed documents and information to Favre and Nicholson.302 Nicholson’s letter of May 27, 2015, informed Pohl that Favre had the hard copies of the trade secret documents at his Kiln, Mississippi 302 Nicholson Ex. 12, 2015 Communications. 56 office, they also had the computer with the alleged trade secrets, and that Nicholson refused to return Pohl’s alleged information.303 Hence, Pohl “discovered” Nicholson’s alleged “misappropriation” when he received her May 2015 letter confirming her refusal to give them to Pohl, despite his assertion of ownership. Howekver, Pohl did not file this lawsuit until August 28, 2018, around three monthCs after the latest possible limitation period expired on May 27, 2018. It is also important to understand that the allegedi subsequent use, sale or purchase of the trade secrets did not restart the clock on the TUTSA limitations period. The fact that, after the trade secrets were purportedly misappropriated in 2014, or alternatively 2015, they were allegedly subsequently used or transferred did not restart the limitation period. Thel case Agar Corp. v. Electro Circuits Int'l, LLC, 565 S.W.3d 12 (Tex. App.—HouMston [14th Dist.] 2016), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 580 S.W.3d 136 (Tex. 2019) is instructive on this point. In Agar, the plaintiff initially suied more than a dozen defendants in April 2008 in connection with the defendants’ alleged misappropriation of the plaintiff’s proprietary informatioon and use of that information to create knock-off products for sale to its customlers. Id. at 19. The plaintiff added alleged co-conspirators who allegedly purchiased and sold some of the trade secrets as defendants to the existing lawsuit in November 2011 — more than three years after plaintiff initially filed suit for the misappropriation. Id. The plaintiff argued that his claim against the co- conspirators did not accrue until July 2009 because that is when the co-conspirators were still selling the allegedly stollen trade secret information. Id. The court 303 Nicholson Ex. 12, 2015 Communications. 57 rejected this argument, stating: “[a] continuing tort does not arise from one’s copyrighting a song that another wrote and then repeatedly selling the song and reaping profit from each sale. While it may be said that the injury continues with each sale and receipt of a royalty, the act that caused the continuing inkjury was the one act of copyrighting the song.” Id. at 21 (quoting Rogers v. ACrdella Veigel Inter Vivos Trust No. 2, 162 S.W.3d 281, 290 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2005, pet. denied)). Pohl “discovered” “the misappropriation” in tihe summer 2014, or alternatively when he exchanged letters with Nicholson in May and June 2015. If anyone subsequently disclosed the trade secrets, it did not give rise to a new cause of action. The express language of the TUTSA statute of limitation expressly precludes “continuing tort” theories. TEXl. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.010(a). Accordingly, Pohl’s TUTSA claim aMgainst Kassab is barred by limitations and summary judgment must be granted. 3. Pohl’s coniversion and conspiracy claims are barred by limitaftions. Pohl’s common-law claims against Kassab for conversion and civil conspiracy are also barred by the statute of limitations. A person imust bring suit for the conversion of personal property “not later than two yoears after the day the cause of action accrues.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a). Generally, the limitations period for a conversion claim begins to run at the time of the unlawful taking. Wells Fargo Bank Nw., N.A. v. RPK Capital XVI, L.L.C., 360 S.W.3d 691, 700 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). As established above, whether his claim accrued in 2014 or 2015, more than two years had passed 58 by the time Pohl filed suit in August 2018. Therefore, his conversation claim is barred. Pohl’s conspiracy claim is also barred by limitations. The Texas Supreme Court has established that a claim for civil conspiracy accrues when thke underlying tort accrues, and the limitation period for the conspiracy claim beCgins to run at the same time as that for the underlying tort. Agar Corp., Inc. v. Electro Circuits Int’l, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136, 138 (Tex. 2019). “Understanding tihat civil conspiracy is a theory of derivative liability, it follows that a civil conspiracy claim should share both accrual and the limitations period of the underlying wrong.” Id. at 144. Because the underlying conversion and TUTSA claims are barred by limitations, Pohl’s derivative conspiracy claim againlst Kassab is barred as well, and thus, summary judgment must be granted.M E. Pohl’s claims are conclusively negated. 1. Pohl’s TiUTSA claim is conclusively negated because fhis alleged trade secrets were not actually kept secret. Kassab adopts othe argument made and evidence identified on pages 45-49 of the Nicholson M otlion as if set forth verbatim herein. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 58. That argument andi evidence is equally applicable to Kassab and establishes that, as a matter of law, Pohl did not take any measures, let alone reasonable measures, to keep his alleged information or client lists secret. Accordingly, Poh’s TUTSA claim against Kassab fails as a matter of law, especially regarding the four barratry lawsuits. 59 2. Pohl’s claims fail because Pohl does not own the purportedly stolen property and trade secrets. “To bring a successful TUTSA claim, the claimant must first show that it owns a trade secret in the information it seeks to protect.” Title Source, Inc. v. HouseCanary, Inc., 612 S.W.3d 517, 527 (Tex. App.—San Antoenio 2020, pet. denied); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.002(3-a), (6); M organ v. Clements Fluids S. Tex., Inc., 589 S.W.3d 177, 186-87 (Tex. App.—Tytler 2018, no pet.). The claimant must also demonstrate that it is “the person or entity in whom or in which rightful, legal, or equitable title to, or the right to eneforce rights in, the trade secret is reposed.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134uA.002(3-a). Similarly, “[a] plaintiff who has not shown title or some other right to possession of the property allegedly converted may not maintain a suit in aconversion.” Catania v. Garage de Le Paix, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Pohl’s TUTSA and conversion claims aegainst Kassab fail because, as a matter of law, he is not the owner of the purportefdly stolen property that he alleges is his trade secrets. Pohl alleges that his trade secrets that were allegedly misappropriated are “attorney–client fee agreements with clients/prospective clients, compilations of clients, other coinfidential communications between the clients/prospective clients and Pohl, sopecialized legal forms …, … proprietary administrative client forms, fee- agreement forms …, internal emails, propriety marketing information … and other work product relating to claims of Pohl’s clients and prospective clients.”304 But this 304 Amended Petition, at ¶ 20. 60 information makes up the client file that is the property of the client, not Pohl, under Texas law. “[T]he Texas Supreme Court recognized explicitly that an attorney is an agent of his client and implicitly that a client owns the contents okf his or her file.” In re McCann, 422 S.W.3d 701, 704-705 (Tex. Crim. ACpp. 2013) (citing Thomson v. Findlater Hardware Co., 205 S.W. 831, 832 (Tex. 1918)) (emphasis added). “The attorney is the agent of the client, and the wiork product generated by the attorney in representing the client belongs to the client.” In re George, 28 S.W.3d 511, 516 (Tex. 2000) (emphasis added). Under the disciplinary rules, an attorney does not own and is therefore required to promptly surrender “papers and property to which the client is entitled.” lTEX. DISC. R. PROF'L COND. 1.15. Texas courts have interpreted the word “prMoperty” to mean “the client’s papers and other documents that the lawyer had in his file.” TEX. COMM. ON PROF'L ETHICS Op. 570 (citing Hebisen v. State, 615 Si.W. 2d 866 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ)). In other words, all documents and information in the client file is property of the client and not Pohol. See George, 28 S.W.3d at 516. Moreover, wlork product and attorney-client communications are owned by the client as p iart of the client’s file, and not the attorney. See TEX. COMM. ON PROF'L ETHICS Op. 570 (noting that communications made to or on behalf of a client is work product); Resolution Tr. Corp. v. H___, P.C., 128 F.R.D. 647, 648 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (considering the issue of the ownership of files generated by a law firm during its representation of a client and determining that the entire contents of the law firm’s 61 files concerning the representation of the client belonged to the client and ordering the law firm to turn over the entire contents of the firm’s files, including work product generated by the lawyer such as notes and legal memoranda). Therefore, Pohl does not own the “internal emails … and other work product relakting to claims of Pohl’s clients and prospective clients” that he claims is a trade sCecret. While client lists can be considered a trade secret, the lists that Precision solicited to hire Pohl are owned by Precision, not Pohl.305 Sicott Favre, the owner of Precision, testified that Precision “solicited many of the marketing contacts (individuals and businesses) on these lists for representation” by Pohl.306 Favre testified that the “marketing lists contain the names of thousands of persons who eventually became [Pohl’s] former clielnts, and/or whom [Pohl] solicited for representation.”307 Favre made clear Mthat the very information that Pohl claims are the trade secretes allegedly converted by Kassab “were and are solely the work product and property of Pirecision, developed during the normal course of its marketing business.”308 Because Pohl dooes not own the purported trade secrets or property that he alleges had been clonverted, his TUTSA and conversion claims fail as a matter of law. And becaiuse the conversion and statutory claims fail, Pohl’s claim for civil conspiracy also fails. See Trammel Crow Co. No. 60 v. Harkinson, 944 S.W.2d 631, 635 (Tex. 1997) (to prevail on a civil conspiracy claim, the plaintiff must show that 305 Exhibit 50, August 10, 2016 Affidavit of Scott Favre, ¶ 15. 306 Exhibit 50, August 10, 2016 Affidavit of Scott Favre, ¶ 15. 307 Exhibit 50, August 10, 2016 Affidavit of Scott Favre, ¶ 15. 308 Exhibit 50, August 10, 2016 Affidavit of Scott Favre, ¶ 12 (emphasis added). 62 the defendant was liable for some underlying tort). Accordingly, Kassab is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. F. Pohl’s illegal acts (barratry and unauthorized practice of law) precludes any form of recovery against the whistleblowers because his acts are inexokrably intertwined with his crimes. e Pohl committed barratry and wants his whistleblowers to pay for his barratry defense costs. But the well-established and common-sense tunlawful acts doctrine precludes any recovery for Pohl’s crimes. Pohl violated the Texas laws and rules governing lawyers by committing barratry and peracticing in other jurisdictions without a license, sharing an office and fees wuith non-lawyers, and he failed to protect confidential client information in the process. Pohl also committed the unauthorized practice of law in multaiple states, including Louisiana, Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi where he maintained an unauthorized law office. All of Pohl’s claims for recovery are einextricably intertwined with his violations of the laws of Texas and other jufrisdictions. According, his claims are barred by their illegality. 1. The Unlawful Acts Doctrine. More thani a century ago, Texas developed the Unlawful Acts Rule, which provides: o no action will lie to recover a claim for damages, if to establish it the plaintiff requires aid from an illegal transaction, or is under the necessity of showing or in any manner depending upon an illegal act to which he is a party. 63 Gulf, C. & S. F. RY. Co. v. Johnson, 621, 9 S.W. 602, 602-03 (1888). Courts have simplified this analysis to whether the claim or damages are “inextricably intertwined” with the illegal act or whether the illegal act “contributed to the injury.” McNally v. McNally, No. 02-18-00142-CV, 2020 WL 5241189k, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 3, 2020, pet. denied) (recognizing that tChe Unlawful Acts Rule remains good law and using intertwined language); Andrew Shebay & Co., P.L.L.C. v. Bishop, 429 S.W.3d 644, 648–49 (Tex. App.—Hiouston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). The purpose of this rule is to deter unlawful acts by making certain “that the person should not even entertain the hope of indemnity for the offense committed.” Dover v. Baker, Brown, Sharman & Parker, 859 S.W.2d 441, 450 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (ilnternal quotations omitted). The rule can be applied even if one or more defendMants have also committed an unlawful act. Id. at 450-451 (denying recovery to plaintiff who sued his attorney for malpractice claiming he signed a false afifidavit on the advice of his attorney who knew the affidavit was unlawful). 2. Poohl knew his acts were illegal. Pohl is welll aware that his barratry precludes his claims. He asserted “illegality and/ior public policy” as a defense to paying his runners in the Mississippi Litigation. As Pohl himself explains in his Motion to Dismiss Precision’s Amended Complaint: The gist of Precision’s claims, as plead in the Amended Complaint, is that Walker/Seymour/Ladner agreed to accept or accepted money to improperly solicit BP clients for the alleged “Pohl/Williamson joint 64 venture” and automobile accident clients for the alleged “Pohl/Ammons joint venture.” Neither Walker/Seymour/Ladner nor Precision, as their assignee, can recover from Pohl under any cause of action. This is because: (1) under Mississippi law, it is illegal and against public policy for a non-lawyer to accept or agree to accept money to improperly solicit clientks for a lawyer; (2) under Mississippi law, it is illegal and against pubelic policy for lawyers to share legal fees with non-lawyers; andC (3) under Mississippi law, a claimant may not recover under any theory (including contract, tort, or equity) for illegal conduct or conduct that is violative of public policy.309 t And as Pohl himself further argued, he should be judicially estopped from arguing against this position now. To allow him to do so, ase he says, “would allow [him] to ‘play fast and loose with the Court,’ which, in uturn, would negatively impact the reputation of the judicial system.”310 The Mississippi Litigation courta agreed that illegality would apply to law firms because Mississippi laws “make it illegal to accept or agree to accept money to commence or further prosecutee a judicial action.”311 Additionally, the court went onto explain that the Missisfsippi Rules of Professional conduct 5.4(a), 7.2(i), 7.3(a), and 8.4(a) preclude attorneys from entering into fee-splitting arrangements with non-lawyers. Precision could not violate attorney misconduct rules “as they are neither lawyers inor a law firm. The only ‘immoral or illegal act,’ then, would have been commoitted by [Pohl].”312 Pohl’s illegal acts precluded him and his co- 309 Nicholson Ex. 23, Pohl’s Motion to Dismiss in the Mississippi Litigation, Doc. 192 ¶ 6. 310 Nicholson Ex. 23, Ex. 23: Doc. 192 ¶ 5 311 Nicholson Ex. 25, Order on Pohl’s Motion to Dismiss in the Mississippi Litigation, Doc. 252 at 5. 312 Nicholson Ex. 25, Doc. 252 at 6. 65 conspirators from asserting a defense of illegality because of his unlawful conduct.313 3. Texas courts have applied the Unlawful Acts Rule to preclude claims arising from barratry. Texas courts have also applied Unlawful Acts Rule in BP soelicitation cases. In Truyen Luong v. McAllister, the appellate court affirmed summary judgment where, as here, solicitation was an essential purpose of a tfee-sharing agreement that rendered the contract void for illegality. No. 01-17-00198-CV, 2018 WL 3651103, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Auge. 2, 2018, pet. denied). Luong, a paralegal, sued attorney McAllister for work uperformed on Gulf Coast Claims Facility, BP, and Deepwater Horizon claims. Id. at *1. Luong alleged that he brought a lot of customers to McAllistaer in return for an oral agreement to split attorney’s fees. Id. at *1-2. McAllister moved to dispose of the claim arguing that any summary judgment claime was barred by illegality, which the trial court granted. Id. The court of apfpeals agreed, stating “[t]his type of barratry contract is prohibited by statute as well as by disciplinary rule.” Id. at *3. The court explained: [A] contract between an attorney and one not an attorney, providing that the [noln-attorney] shall procure the employment of the [attorney] by a thirid person for the prosecution of suits to be commenced in consideriation of a fee to be procured or collected therein, is void as againost public policy, independent of statutes prohibiting the same. Id. at *3. In turn, any such contract is void “to benefit and protect the public.” Id. Luong’s agreement to solicit was an “essential purpose” of their agreement, much as the solicitation was an essential part of Pohl’s barratry practice. Id. at *4. 313 Nicholson Ex. 25, Doc. 252 at 6. 66 Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for McAllister, and this trial court should grant summary judgment here. 4. Texas courts have applied the Unlawful Acts Rule to preclude claims for those who obtain property illegally. k Pohl is precluded from recovering damages on trade secretCs that he obtained through illegal solicitation and the unauthorized practice of law. The case Sharpe v. Turley, 191 S.W.3d 362 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. deniied) is instructive on this point. In Sharpe, the plaintiff, Sharpe, removed financial documents from a Roman Catholic Diocese’s dumpster before alerting attorney Turley, who was suing the Diocese. Turley obtained the documents from Sharpe via subpoena and following the lawsuit both the Diocese and Sharpe clontended they were the rightful owners of the documents. Sharpe subsequentMly sued Turley for obtaining the documents through fraud. The trial court granted summary judgment under the Unlawful Acts Rule and Fort Worth Court oif Appeals affirmed. Id. at 363-364. As the appellate court explained, “Because [Sharpe’s] conduct in removing the Diocese’s items from Diocesan property witohout its permission is the foundation of his allegation that he has a superior riglht to the items and that alleged right is the basis of his fraud claim against Tiurley, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Turley [under the unlawful-acts rule].” Id. at 369. As discussed above, Pohl admits to engaging runners to illegally solicit clients with offers to pay legal fees and bounties to the runners in states where he is not licensed. Ladner, Talley, Santana, and Maxwell also testified that Pohl offered 67 to pay them bounties for signing up clients. Former clients who hired Pohl, including Barry, Speck, Bethley, Bikumbu, Cheatham Sr. and Reese, all testified that they were illegally and unethically solicited to hire Pohl. And, Pohl admitted in the Mississippi Litigation that such conduct would be illegal and akgainst public policy. C A person cannot “receive trade secret protection for information about ongoing illegal activities.” Alderson v. United States, 718i F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1200 (C.D. Cal. 2010), aff'd, 686 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2012) (construing the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and rejecting a claim of trade secret protection for fraudulent accounting practices in connection with Medicare fraud); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §134A..008 (The Texas Uniforml Trade Secrets Act “shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general puMrpose to make uniform the law . . . among the states enacting it.”). “[T]here simply cannot be any trade secret about ongoing illegality.” Alderson v. Uniteid States, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1200. “Notably, this conclusion is consistent with the underlying justifications of trade secrets law, which include ‘[t]he moaintenance of standards of commercial ethics.”’ Id. (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. lv. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481–482 (1974)). ‘“Commercial ethics’ are not imaintained if businesses are able to conceal illegality.’” Id. The existence of a privilege to disclose another's trade secret depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, including the nature of the information, the purpose of the disclosure, and the means by which the actor acquired the information. A privilege is likely to be recognized, for example, in connection with 68 the disclosure of information that is relevant to public health or safety, or to the commission of a crime or tort, or to other matters of substantial public concern. Merckle GmbH v. Johnson & Johnson, 961 F. Supp. 721, 733 (D.N.J. 1997); Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 40, cmt. c (1995). The Repkorters’ Notes to Section 40 indicate that “the policies underlying the privilege aCre similar to those supporting the numerous state and federal 'whistleblower' statutes that prohibit retaliatory personnel actions by employers against eimployees who disclose violations to public officials.” Merckle GmbH, 961 F. Supp. at 733 quoting Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 40, Reporters’ Notes, cmt. c. Thus, Kassab was privileged to disclose the illegal acts of Pohl even if to do so was to disclose his alleged trade secrets. lAccordingly, Pohl cannot recover against anyone for anything because be Macquired his client files and purportedly confidential and protected information through illegal solicitation and unauthorized practice of law. Thus, summairy judgment must be granted. 5. Pohl is precluded from claiming protection over information he obtained through the unauthorized proactice of law. Moreover, Tlexas courts have consistently applied the Unlawful Acts Rule to preclude recoviery by one who unlawfully practices a profession or occupation without a required license, even if the illegal practice was not the direct cause of the injury. Rule 5.05 of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct makes it unlawful for a Texas lawyer to commit the unauthorized practice of law in any other jurisdiction or to assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the unauthorized practice of 69 law. See TEX. DISC. R. PROF’L COND. 5.05. Consequently, this Court should preclude recovery for any claim arising from his unlawful practice in other jurisdictions. For instance, the Dallas Court of Appeals refused to permit a car dealership to recover from a sales agent that fraudulently withheld money relatinkg to the sale of cars because the dealership did not have the proper county licenCse to sell cars: Appellants argue allowing the Credit Union to prevail on the illegality defense allows it to walk away with a windfall. Althotugh this may be true under these facts, to hold otherwise would aillow individuals to indirectly profit from a business they are directly prohibited from engaging in unless properly licensed by statute. This we will not do. . . . We agree with the Credit Uenion that the rule applies and bars appellants’ claims arising in tort because they are inextricably intertwined with their illegaul contract to sell automobiles in Dallas County without a license. Denson v. Dallas Cnty. Credit Union, 262 lS.W.3d 846, 855 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (emphasis added). M The law is even stricter when applied to regulated professions. The Supreme Court of Texas refused to permiit an engineer to recover a fee where he had failed to pay the renewal fee for his license and was, therefore, practicing engineering without a current licoense and in violation of the Texas Occupational Code. The Court noted thatl the requirement of proper licensure for engineers was to “safeguard lifei, health and property.” M. M. M., Inc., v. Mitchell, 265 S.W.2d 584, 585–86 (1954). Similarly, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a denial of recovery for a person who practiced architecture without a license and then sued his partner in the architectural firm. The Court stated that to permit recovery was to undermine 70 the purpose of licensure, which was “to safeguard life, health, property and the public welfare, and to protect the public against the irresponsible practice of the profession of architecture.” Farha v. Elam, 385 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex. Civ. App.— Fort Worth 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.). k As member of Texas Bar, Pohl is subject to the requiremenCts imposed by the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 5.05 prohibits Texas attorneys from committing the unauthorized practice of law in other jurisdiictions: Rule 5.05. Unauthorized Practice of Law A lawyer shall not: (a) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction; or (b) assist a person who is not a maember of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the Munauthorized practice of law. TEX. DISC. R. PROF’L COND. 5.05. The comment to the Rule explains, “Courts generally have prohibited thei unauthorized practice of law because of a perceived need to protect individuals and the public from the mistakes of the untrained and the schemes of the uonscrupulous, who are not subject to the judicially imposed disciplinary standlards of competence, responsibility and accountability. . . Limiting the practice ofi law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified persons.” Id. at cmt. 1. By his own admission, Pohl has never been licensed to practice law in any state except Texas and Colorado.314 Yet, Pohl solicited and signed up auto accident 314 Nicholson Ex. 31, Pohl Aug 2016 Depo at 8. 71 clients in Mississippi,315 Louisiana,316 Missouri,317 and Arkansas.318 Santana testified that she solicited BP clients for Pohl all across the Gulf Coast, including Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi.319 Further, Pohl assisted Walker, Ladner, and the other runners in engaging in the unauthorized practice of law throkugh soliciting and signing up clients in those jurisdictions. In doing so, Pohl hasC violated the laws regulating Texas lawyers. Accordingly, Pohl cannot recover any fee related to his unauthorized practice of law states in Louisiana, Alabamai, Florida, and Mississippi where he maintained an unauthorized law office. Pohl alleges that the Defendants “stole” his documents and information from his “satellite law office” in Mississippi in 2014. In Mississippi, it is a misdemeanor for a person to practice law without a licelnse. The Mississippi Supreme Court has established that “the ‘practice of lawM’ has been defined to be as little as advising a person of his legal rights.” In re Williamson, 838 So.2d 226, 234 (Miss. 2002) (citing Darby v. Miss. State Bar, 185 iSo.2d 684, 687 (Miss. 1966)). The practice of law also includes the solicitation of clients and the investigation of a potential client’s claim. Forbes v. St. Martin, 1o45 So.3d 1184 (Miss. App. 2013). Pohl’s admiltted solicitation of Mississippi clients and his admitted visits to Mississippi to iconfer with actual and potential clients constituted the unauthorized practice of law in Mississippi. Pohl’s operation of a “law office” in Mississippi, and even its very existence, violated Mississippi law. Pohl admitted that he was not 315 Exhibit 16, Declaration of Mae Berry; Exhibit 18, Declaration of Arthur Speck. 316 Exhibit 19, Declaration of Alphonse Bethley; Exhibit 29, Declaration of Mark Cheatham, Sr. 317 Exhibit 22, Declaration of Heraclite Bikumbu. 318 Exhibit 35, Declaration of Lacy Reese. 319 Exhibit 6, September 26, 2016 Affidavit; Exhibit 8, Santana Depositions. 72 admitted to practice law in Mississippi and the law office was not associated with any Mississippi lawyer.320 Further, Pohl violated the law by sharing his office with non-lawyers. Pohl admitted that he unlawfully shared his office space, telephones and computers with a non-lawyer company, Precision, in violation of thke Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct.321 In addition to his practice of lawC in the Mississippi office and his meetings with potential and actual Mississippi clients, Pohl admits that, in 2012-2014, he spent the majority of his timei practicing law at his Mississippi “law office.”322 Further, Pohl assisted Walker, Ladner and the other runners in engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in Mississippi by paying them for soliciting and signing up clients on his behalf. Pohl aldmits that he gave Walker and Ladner advertising brochures for them to disMtribute as widely as possible in Mississippi and other states. He admits that he gave Walker and Ladner blank contracts that they were to use to sign up clients fior him. Walker, Ladner and the other runners illegally solicited on Pohl’s behalf all of the Mississippianso listed in the Gandy and Brumfield Petitions.323 Of the 133 plaintiffs in the Glandy lawsuit, 103 of them were Mississippians.324 Of the 272 Brumfield plaiintiffs, 153 were Mississippians. Those Petitions list people whom Pohl illegally solicited in Mississippi, either directly or through his runners. Since solicitation of work for an attorney 320 See Nicholson Ex. 2, Pohl May 2018 Depo 112:19-13:10. 321 Nicholson Ex. 1, Pohl Dec 2021 Depo at 16:15-21. 322 Exhibit 60, Sept. 17 2018 Deposition of Michael Pohl, at 292-293. 323 Nicholson Ex. 29, Brumfield Petition and Nicholson Ex. 30, Gandy Petition. 324 Nicholson Ex. 30, Gandy Petition at 2-6. 73 constitutes the unauthorized practice of law in Mississippi, Pohl committed that crime, or assisted the runners in committing it, as to every one of the Mississippi plaintiffs in those two Petitions. Pohl also committed the unauthorized practice of law in regard kto Mae Berry and Lisa and Arthur Speck, former clients who subsequently suedC Pohl for illegally soliciting them in Mississippi.325 Pohl sent a runner, Ken Talley, to each of their homes to solicit them as clients for Pohl regarding theiri personal injury claims. Talley solicited these people for Pohl and induced them to sign a Pohl attorney- client contract. Pohl committed a misdemeanor and violated other Mississippi laws by engaging in the unauthorized practice of llaw in Mississippi while soliciting these clients. Since all of the “trade secreMt” information regarding Mississippians and others was gathered during Pohl’s illegal solicitation activities, he cannot show his ownership of the information iwithout referencing his illegal activities. Pohl cannot show that documents at his Mississippi “law office” were misappropriated without showing that he opeorated an illegal law office in Mississippi. Consequently, the Unlawful Acts Rulle precludes Pohl from recovering in this court for the alleged misappropriatiion of “trade secrets” relating to Mississippians, or any others. In Louisiana, it is a felony for a person or any entity not licensed to practice law in Louisiana to engage in the practice of law; hold oneself out as being entitled to practice law; provide legal advice; use language in advertising suggesting the person is a lawyer or in any way suggesting that the person is entitled to practice 325 Nicholson Ex. 32, Berry Petition at 9-12. 74 law; or advertise the existence of a “law office of any kind.” LA Rev. Stat. 37:213. Further, it is against Louisiana law for anyone not licensed to practice law to solicit and sign up clients, or to investigate claims, in that state. In re Guirard, 11 So.3d 1017 (La. 2009). k Walker, Ladner and the other runners illegally solicited oCn Pohl’s behalf all of the Louisianans listed in the Gandy and Brumfield Petitions. Of the 133 plaintiffs in the Gandy lawsuit, 7 of them were Louiisianans.326 Of the 272 Brumfield plaintiffs, 54 were Louisianans.327 Those Petitions list people whom Pohl illegally solicited in Louisiana, either directly or through his runners. Since solicitation of work for an attorney constitutes the unauthorized practice of llaw in Louisiana, Pohl committed that crime, or assisted the runners in coMmmitting it, as to every one of the Louisiana plaintiffs in those two Petitions. In addition, Pohl commiitted the unauthorized practice of law in Louisiana in relation to Mark Cheatham, Mark Cheatham, Jr. and Luella Miller, Louisianans who filed the Cheathoam lawsuit against Pohl. As demonstrated above, Pohl sent runner Ken Talleyl to solicit them in Louisiana, which means he assisted Talley in engaging in thie unauthorized practice of law in Louisiana. Pohl personally traveled to Louisiana to solicit and give legal advice to the Cheathams on at least two occasions. 326 Nicholson Ex. 30, Gandy Petition at 2-9. 327 Nicholson Ex. 29, Brumfield Petition at 2-6. 75 Pohl also committed the unauthorized practice of law in regard to Sandra Johnson and Alphonse Bethley, Louisiana residents who filed the Gandy lawsuit against Pohl. Pohl sent runner Kirk Ladner to their home in Louisiana, where he solicited them to hire Pohl for their personal injury claim and inducedk them to sign a Pohl attorney-client contract. Accordingly, Pohl assisted LadnCer in engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in Louisiana. Pohl committed a misdemeanor and violated otiher Louisiana laws by engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in Louisiana while soliciting these clients. Since all of the alleged “trade secret” information regarding Louisianans was gathered during Pohl’s illegal solicitation activities, he cannot show his ownership of the information witholut referencing his illegal activities. Consequently, the Unlawful Acts RuMle precludes Pohl from recovering in this court for the alleged misappropriation of “trade secrets” relating to Louisianans. It is a misdemeanor ini Alabama to engage in the unauthorized practice of law. AL Code § 34-3-1 (2021). It is also against Alabama law to provide assistance to a person engaging ino the unauthorized practice of law, which includes soliciting, interviewing and lsigning up clients. Davis v. Alabama State Bar, 676 So.2d 306 (Ala. 1996). i Walker, Ladner and the other runners illegally solicited on Pohl’s behalf all of the Alabamians listed in the Gandy and Brumfield Petitions. Of the 133 plaintiffs 76 in the Gandy lawsuit, 21 of them were Alabamians.328 Of the 272 Brumfield plaintiffs, 39 were Alabamians.329 Those Petitions list people whom Pohl illegally solicited in Alabama, either directly or through his runners. Since solicitation of work for kan attorney constitutes the unauthorized practice of law in Alabama, PohCl committed that crime, or assisted the runners in committing it, as to every one of the Alabama plaintiffs in those two Petitions. i The unauthorized practice of law in Florida is a felony. Fla. Stat. 454.23. The practice of law includes soliciting and interviewing clients. The Florida Bar v. Meserve, 372 So.2d 1373 (Fla. 1979). It is a violation of Florida law to assist someone engaging in the unauthorized pralctice of law. Id. Walker, Ladner and the otherM runners illegally solicited on Pohl’s behalf all of the Floridians listed in the Gandy and Brumfield Petitions. Of the 133 plaintiffs in the Gandy lawsuit, 3 of theim were Floridians.330 Of the 272 Brumfield plaintiffs, 22 were Floridians.331 Those Petitionos list people whom Pohl illegally solicited in Florida, either directly or throulgh his runners. Since solicitation of work for an attorney constitutes thei unauthorized practice of law in Florida, Pohl committed that crime, or assisted the runners in committing it, as to every one of the Florida plaintiffs in those two Petitions. 328 Nicholson Ex. 30, Gandy Petition at 2-9. 329 Nicholson Ex. 29, Brumfield Petition at 2-6. 330 Nicholson Ex. 30, Gandy Petition at 2-9. 331 Nicholson Ex. 29, Brumfield Petition at 2-6. 77 6. All of Pohl’s claims fail because he cannot show ownership of the alleged trade secrets or damages without showing that he acquired the information through barratry or the unauthorized practice of law. Simply put, Pohl cannot prove that he is the owner of the ktrade secret information without showing how he acquired it. The evidence Cpresented herein, and in the Nicholson Motion, demonstrates that Pohl acquired the information through illegal activity which included barratry and the iunauthorized practice of law in multiple states and assisting others to engage in the unauthorized practice of law. Since Pohl cannot prove his case without relying on his illegal activity, the Unlawful Acts Rules bars his claims. Pohl claims as damages his expenlses in defending against the Cheatham, Berry, Gandy and Brumfield lawsuMits. He claims as damages the expenses he incurred in defending against the Barratry Litigation and grievance filed by Kassab. Pohl also claims thati publicity about his illegal activities caused economic harm to his “law practice.” Thus, Pohl’s claimed damages flow solely from the fact that people discoveredo his unlawful acts. Pohl cannotl claim the expense of defending against the Cheatham, Berry, Gandy and Briumfield lawsuits without addressing what the lawsuits are about. All four of those lawsuits were filed against him by persons who were illegally solicited by him, including some of his former clients. One of the cases (Barry) settled, and two of the cases (Brumfield and Gandy) were dismissed on limitations. See Brumfield v. Williamson, 634 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, pet. 78 denied); Gandy v. Williamson, 634 S.W.3d 214, 219 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, pet. denied). Although the last case (Cheatham) was dismissed on summary judgment, the court of appeals recently reversed because there was evidence of a “barratry scheme.” See Cheatham v. Pohl, No. 01-20-00046-CV, 20k22 Tex. App. LEXIS 649, at *25-26 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 27,C 2022, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Pohl cannot claim that Defendants caused him to defend against these lawsuits without showing these people sued him for commiitting barratry. Likewise, the Texas Bar grievance which Kassab submitted against Pohl is based on Pohl’s illegal acts, which included barratry. Pohl cannot claim that Defendants caused him to defend against a bar complaint without showing that it concerned his unlawful activities. Regardlelss, Pohl’s claim for damages arising from any grievances are barred by immuniMty, as stated above. Finally, Pohl claims that publicity about his illegal activities damaged his law practice. Pohl has not andi cannot prove these damages without showing that he committed unlawful acts. Since his claimed damages all spring from his former clients and others beocoming aware of his barratry and other illegal activities, he cannot prove any olf his damages without discussing barratry. G. Piohl is not permitted to recovery as damages the oattorney’s fees he incurred in the four barratry lawsuits and two disciplinary grievances. Damages in a TUTSA suit are generally comprised of losses such as “the value of the plaintiff’s lost profits, the defendant’s actual profits from the use of the secret, the value a reasonably prudent investor would have paid for the trade secret, 79 the development costs the defendant avoided by the misappropriation, and a reasonable royalty.” Sw. Energy Prod. Co. v. Berry-Helfand, 491 S.W.3d 699, 710–11 (Tex. 2016). There are no differences between existing Texas common lakw and TUTSA regarding the economic damages available for traede secret misappropriation. Under Texas common law, the plCaintiff was permitted to recover damages based on the value of what has been lost by the plaintiff (lost profits) or the value of what has been gained by the defendant (unjust enrichment). The plaintiff alsot could recover a reasonable royalty for the defendant’s use of the plaiintiff’s trade secret. Joseph F. Cleveland, Jr., J. Heath Coffman, The Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Tex. J. Bus. L. 323, 328 (2013). Nonetheless, Pohl here seeks as damages the fees he incurred in defending against the four underlying barratry suitsl and two disciplinary grievances. Nothing the TUTSA statute permits recoverMy of such “damages”—indeed, the prevailing party is not even entitled to recovery of its attorney’s fee under TUTSA, but instead, the trial court has discretion wihether to award fees and only if willful and malicious misappropriation exists. T EX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.005. If the TUTSA plaintiff is not guaraonteed recovery of fees in the actual TUTSA suit, there is no reason to permit thle TUTSA plaintiff to recover fees incurred in other suits. Moreoveir, even applying common-law, Pohl is not entitled to attorney’s fees as damages. “Whether a party is entitled to attorney’s fees is a question of law.” Sunchase IV Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Atkinson, 643 S.W.3d 420, 422 (Tex. 2022). “In Texas, attorney’s fees expended in prior litigation generally are not recoverable as damages; attorney’s fees are recoverable only when an agreement 80 between the parties so provides.” Martin-Simon v. Womack, 68 S.W.3d 793, 797–98 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). As the Supreme Court has explained, “For more than a century, Texas law has not allowed recovery of attorney’s fees unless authorized by statute or contract. This rule isk so venerable and ubiquitous in American courts it is known as ‘the American CRule.’” Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 310–11 (Tex. 2006). The Supreme Court of Texas has never adopted that equitable “tort of another” eixception to the American Rule. See Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. Nat’l Dev. & Research Corp., 299 S.W.3d 106, 119 (Tex. 2009) (declining to address whether the “tort of another” exception set out in section 914(2) of the Restatement should be adopted in Texas); see also Alvarez v. Agyemang, No.l 02-19-00301-CV, 2020 WL 719440, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 13, 2020M, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“We do not hold that the equitable exception allows the recovery of a prevailing party’s attorney’s fees even in the absence of a contract or iauthorizing statute. Indeed, the Texas Supreme Court’s language in Gullo and that court’s failure to expressly adopt oor reject this equitable theory indicate that equity does not extend this far.”); lRiner v. Neumann, 353 S.W.3d 312, 323 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (“Givein the supreme court’s faithful adherence to the American Rule, and its strong statement in Tony Gullo that trial courts lack the inherent authority to award attorney’s fees contrary to the Rule, we decline to adopt a new equitable exception to the Rule.”); Naschke v. Gulf Coast Conference, 187 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (declining to 81 adopt the “tort of another” exception to the American Rule because “we are bound to follow the existing laws of the State, we are not at liberty to adopt a theory of recovery that has not been enacted by the Legislature or adopted by the Texas Supreme Court”).332 k No statute or contract provides Pohl the right to recover hisC attorney’s fees in the two barratry suits he prevailed on, nor on the barratry suit he settled and the ongoing suit. Application of the American Rule to preiclude Pohl’s request for attorney’s fees damages makes sense here especially because Pohl was sued by persons accusing him of improperly soliciting them in violation of barratry laws and ethical rules—those persons exercised their right and choice to file suit against Pohl for his wrongdoing. Under such circumstalnces, it would be inequitable and violate public policy to allow Pohl to insuMlate himself from responsibility for his own wrongdoing. In a similar vein, even iif some equitable exception could apply here to permit a plaintiff to recover its attorney’s fees defending an underlying lawsuit, it would apply only if Pohl owere wholly innocent relative to the barratry suits and grievances. See Pelr-Se Techs., Inc. v. Sybase, Inc., No. 01-03-01293-CV, 2005 WL 1539291, at *8i (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 30, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) 332 Prior to Tony Gullo and Akin Gump, the First Court of Appeals recognized the equitable “tort of another” exception to the general rule. See Massey v. Columbus State Bank, 35 S.W.3d 697, 701 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.). Tony Gullo and Akin Gump have driven home that the general rule against allowing recovery of fees as damages is firm and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals’ rejection of the “tort of another” exception in Martin-Simon and Naschke should be applied here, especially because Pohl’s own wrongdoing caused him to be sued for barratry. See also Stumhoffer v. Perales, 459 S.W.3d 158, 168 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (“Texas has long adhered to the American Rule with respect to awards of attorney’s fees, which prohibits the recovery of attorney’s fees from an opposing party in legal proceedings unless authorized by statute or contract.”). 82 (“[U]nder the ‘tort of another’ exception, BSG is not entitled to recover attorney’s fees incurred in the arbitration because it is not a wholly innocent party.”); Pacesetter Pools, Inc. v. Pierce Homes, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 827, 834–35 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (holding trial court properly refused kto award fees to plaintiff because it was found partly negligent in underlyCing suit); Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Eldridge, 742 S.W.2d 482, 488 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ denied) (“Therefore, in the present case, Eldridge is not ani innocent party forced to incur costs and expenses, including attorneys’ fees, to be treated as the legal consequences of some original wrongful act of another and permitted to be recovered as damages.”). As an initial matter, the Cheathalm barratry suit is ongoing, with Pohl recently losing the appeal in that caMse, even on rehearing, meaning, putting aside all the other reasons why his claims fail, it is premature for him to be seeking fees related to Cheatham. Regaridless, the fact the Pohl violated ethical rules and committed barratry in having others solicit the persons who filed the barratry suits proves he was not whoolly innocent. Finally, beclause, as established above, Pohl failed to maintain the secrecy of his alleged traide secrets, he cannot recover any damages involving those alleged trade secrets even if attorney’s fees could be recovered as damages: Like injunctive relief, a monetary recovery for trade secret misappropriation is appropriate only for the period in which information is entitled to protection as a trade secret, plus the additional period, if any, in which a misappropriator retains an advantage over good faith competitors because of misappropriation. Actual damage to a complainant and unjust benefit to a 83 misappropriator are caused by misappropriation during this time alone. See Conmar Products Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150 (CA2, 1949) (no remedy for period subsequent to disclosure of trade secret by issued patent); Carboline Co. v. Jarboe, 454 S.W.2d 540 (Mo. 1970) (recoverable monetary relief limited to period that it would have taken misappropriator to discover trade secret without misappropriation). k Uniform Trade Secrets Act at § 3 DAMAGES, comment. HenCce, for numerous reasons, Pohl’s cannot recover his attorney’s fees as damages in this suit. NO-EVIDENCE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUiDGMENT As stated above, Pohl sued the Kassab Defendants for (1) conversion, (2) violations of the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Actg (“TUTSA”), and civil conspiracy. Because Pohl, after an adequate time for discovery, can produce no evidence to support each of these claims he has alleged against the Kassab Defendants, the Court should grant this motion and dMismiss Pohl’s claims with prejudice. oSTANDARD Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i), after an adequate time for discovery has elapsed, the party without the burden of proof may, without presenting evidence, omove for summary judgment on the grounds that there is no evidence to supporl t an essential element of the non-movant’s claim. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). The buirden then shifts to the non-movant to produce evidence that raises a fact issue non the challenged elements. Howell v. Hilton Hotels, 84 S.W.3d 708, 711- 12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). “If the proffered evidence [in response to a motion for summary judgment] is so weak as to create no more than a ‘mere surmise or suspicion’ of a vital fact, less than a scintilla of evidence exists because such evidence lacks probative force, and in legal effect, is no evidence at 84 all.” Boales v. Brighton Builders, Inc., 29 S.W.3d 159, 164 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (citing Kindred v. Conn/Chem., Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983)). Further, “some suspicion linked to other suspicion produces only more suspicion, which is not the same as some evidence.” Marathon Cokrp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 727–28 (Tex. 2003) (quoting Johnson v. Brewer C& Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 210 (Tex. 2002)). An adequate time for discovery has passed for Poihl to obtain evidence to prove his affirmative claims. Indeed, “[a] discovery period set by pretrial order should be adequate opportunity for discovery unless there is a showing to the contrary[.]” TEX. R. CIV P. 166a cmt. That date has long passed. Therefore, this no- evidence motion for summary judgment onl Pohl’s affirmative claims is proper. RGUMENT A. Pohl has no evidence to support his conversion claims against the Kassaeb Defendants. To establish a claim ffor conversion, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) plaintiff owned or had possession of the property or entitlement to possession, (2) defendant unlawfully and without authorization assumed and exercised control over the property to the eixclusion of, or inconsistent with, the plaintiff's rights as an owner, (3) plaintiffo demanded return of the property, and (4) defendant refused to return the property. Freezia v. IS Storage Venture, LLC, 474 S.W.3d 379, 386-87 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). Pohl has no evidence of elements (1), (2), (3) or (4). 85 First, Pohl has no evidence that he owned or had possession of the property or entitlement to possession of any of the allegedly converted property. Second, Pohl has no evidence that the Kassab Defendants unlawfully and without authorization assumed and exercised control over the property to the exclusion of, ork inconsistent with Pohl’s rights as an alleged owner. Third, Pohl has no Cevidence that he demanded return of the property from the Kassab Defendants. Fourth, Pohl has no evidence that the Kassab Defendants refused to return thie property after demand was allegedly made. Accordingly, Pohl’s conversion claim against the Kassab Defendants must be dismissed on summary judgment. Moreover, a plaintiff who establishes conversion is entitled to either (1) the return of the property and damages forl its loss of use during the time of its detention, or (2) the value of the pMroperty. See Wiese v. Pro Am Svcs. Inc., 317 S.W.3d 857, 862 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.). Pohl cannot produce evidence as to the damiages for the property’s loss of use during the time of its detention or the value of the allegedly converted property. For these reasons too, Pohl’s conversion claoim against the Kassab Defendants must be dismissed on summary judgmenlt. B. Piohl has no evidence to support his claims of TUTSA oviolations. The elements of a cause of action for trade-secret misappropriation under TUTSA are the following: (1) the plaintiff owned a trade secret; (2) the defendant misappropriated the trade secret; and (3) the misappropriation proximately caused plaintiff damages. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 134A.002(1), (3), (6), 86 134A.004(a); Malone v. PLH Group, Inc., No. 01-19-00016-CV, 2020 WL 1680058, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 7, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Morgan v. Clements Fluids S. Tex., Ltd., 589 S.W.3d 177, 186 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2018, no pet.). Pohl has no evidence to support elements (1), (2) or (3). k First, Pohl must produce evidence that he owned a purpoCrted trade secret. Pohl complains that the Kassab Defendants stole his “client files” to solicit his clients. However, Pohl cannot produce any evidence thiat he owns a client file because a lawyer does not own his client’s files as a matter of law. Under TUTSA, for something to be a “trade secret,” the owner must have taken reasonable measures under the circumstances to keep the information secret, and the information must derive indepenldent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to,M and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information. TEiX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.002(6). Pohl can present no evidence to establish this element. Pohl has no evidence that, for each purported trade secreot, Pohl took reasonable measures under the circumstances to keep the informatlion secret or that the information derived independent economic value, actual oir potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information. Moreover, a person must have rightful, legal, or equitable title to trade secrets in order to be an “owner.” Id. at § 87 134A.002(3-a). Pohl has no evidence that he had a rightful, legal, or equitable title to the purported trade secrets. Second, Pohl has no evidence that the Kassab Defendants misappropriated any of Pohl’s purported trade secrets. Additionally, to prove “willful aknd malicious misappropriation,” a plaintiff must show defendant engagedC in “intentional misappropriation resulting from the conscious disregard of the rights of the owner of the trade secret.” Id. at § 134A.002(7). Pohl has no eividence that the Kassab Defendants engaged in willful and malicious appropriation of any alleged trade secret or that the Kassab Defendants engaged in intentional misappropriation resulting from the conscious disregard of the rights of Pohl. Pohl can produce no evidence of the Kassab Defendants’ intent.l Third, Pohl has no evidenMce that the Kassab Defendants’ alleged misappropriation of any alleged trade secrets proximately caused Pohl injury or actual damages recoverable uinder TUTSA. Pohl has no evidence supporting his claim for attorney’s fees. Pohl has no evidence of business losses. Additionally, aossuming, arguendo, that the law allowed Pohl to recover as damages the attolrney’s fees he incurred in defending against the four barratry lawsuits, Pohli has no evidence (1) showing as to each of the plaintiffs in each of those lawsuits that he had rightful, legal, or equitable title to their names and contact information—meaning he properly and ethically came to possesses and can properly and ethically use that information—(2) he took reasonable measures under the circumstances to keep secret their names and contact information, and the 88 information derived independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information, (3) the Kassab Defendants misappropriated their namesk and contact information, and that (4) the Kassab Defendants’ misappropriatiCon of their names and contact information proximately caused plaintiff actual damages recoverable under TUTSA. i Fourth, Pohl has no evidence that he is wholly innocent in the illegal obtainment of any client for which his claims are based. Meaning, Pohl has no evidence to show that he was not breaking the law when he obtained a client for which his claims are based. The fact thatl he admittedly violated the unauthorized practice of law during the entire perMiod for which he obtained clients or potential clients, proves there is no evidence of his legally obtaining the clients for which he basis his claims. i C. Pohl has no evidence to support his conspiracy claim. An action for coivil conspiracy has five elements: (1) a combination of two or more persons; (2) lthe persons seek to accomplish an object or course of action; (3) the persons reiach a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts are taken in pursuance of the object or course of action; and (5) damages occur as a proximate result. Tri v. J.T.T., 162 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. 2005); Haynes v. Bryan, No. 01-20-00685-CV, 2022 WL 2024837, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 7, 2022, no pet. h.). 89 Pohl has no evidence that (1) the Kassab Defendants were involved in a combination of two or more persons; (2) that any persons involved in the alleged conspiracy sought to accomplish an object or course of action; (3) the persons involved reached a meeting of the minds on the object or course of actikon; (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts were taken in pursuance of the object oCr course of action; or (5) damages occurred as a proximate result. CONCLUSION & PRAYER For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant Kassab’s Motion to Reconsider Kassab’s Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment and order that Plaintiffs, Michael A. Pohl and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC take lnothing on their claims against Lance Christopher Kassab and The Kassab MLaw Firm. i Respectfully submitted, THE KASSAB LAW FIRM a LANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB c Texas State Bar No. 00794070 f lance@kassab.law DAVID ERIC KASSAB U Texas State Bar No. 24071351 david@kassab.law NICHOLAS R. PIERCE Texas State Bar No. 24098263 nicholas@kassab.law 1214 Elgin Street Houston, Texas 77004 Telephone: 713-522-7400 90 Facsimile: 713-522-7410 E-Service: eserve@kassab.law ATTORNEYS FOR KASSAB DEFENDANTS CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE e I certify that on this date, January 4, 2023, I electronically filed this document with the Clerk of the Court using the eFile.TXCourts.gov electronic filing system which will send notification of such filing to all partiets or counsel of record. LBANCE CHRISTOPHER KASSAB 91 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. David Kassab Bar No. 24071351 david@kassab.law r Envelope ID: 71470463 Status as of 1/4/2023 1:23 PM CST Case Contacts r i Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Solace Southwick ssouthwick@reynoldssfrizzell.com 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldgsfrizzell.com 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Harris Wells hwells@reynouldsfrizzell.com 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Scott M.Favre scott@yfavrepa.com 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Lawyer Wade lawayerwade@hotmail.com 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Andrea Mendez andrea@kassab.law 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Lance Kassab olance@kassab.law 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT David Kassab david@kassab.law 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Jason M.Ciofalo f jason@ciofalolaw.com 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Todd Taylor p ttaylor@jandflaw.com 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Misty Davis C mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Nicholas Pierce a l nicholas@kassab.law 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrar.com 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Murray Fogler o mfogler@fbfog.com 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Andrew JohnsUon ajohnson@thompsoncoe.com 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Benjamin Ritz britz@thompsoncoe.com 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Zandra EFoley zfoley@thompsoncoe.com 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Dale Jefferson 10607900 jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Raul Herman Suazo 24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Kevin Graham Cain 24012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT D Kassab david@kassab.law 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. David Kassab Bar No. 24071351 david@kassab.law r Envelope ID: 71470463 Status as of 1/4/2023 1:23 PM CST Case Contacts r i L Kassab lance@kassab.law 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Kelly Skelton reception@kassab.lasw 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbgrar.com 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Non-Party Witness Billy Shepherd bshepherd@supcounsel.com 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT Lance Kassab eserve@kassab.law 1/4/2023 12:12:54 PM SENT |
Links from other tables
- 1 row from filing_id in chain_steps
- 17 rows from filing_id in filing_sections
- 15 rows from filing_id in legal_theories
- 86 rows from filing_id in citations
- 22 rows from filing_id in statutes
- 22 rows from filing_id in key_assertions
- 22 rows from filing_id in key_facts
- 37 rows from filing_id in evidence_referenced
- 26 rows from filing_id in defenses_raised
- 0 rows from filing_id in rulings
- 0 rows from filing_id in appellate_issues