assertion_id,filing_id,assertion
949,57,"Rule 166(g) is intended for pretrial conferences to dispose of issues founded upon admitted or undisputed facts, not for determining merits of controverted issues"
950,57,"Pohl previously moved for summary judgment on Kassab's affirmative defenses but withdrew the notice after Kassab responded, and the motion was never reset"
951,57,A person cannot own or enforce trade secret rights for information about ongoing illegal activities (citing Alderson)
952,57,"TUTSA requires 'rightful, legal, or equitable' title — if Pohl acquired information through barratry, he cannot be the legal owner"
953,57,Pohl must prove 'willful and malicious misappropriation' for fees and exemplary damages — Kassab's state of mind about barratry is directly relevant
954,57,Tort of another damages theory has never been embraced by the Texas Supreme Court and was flatly rejected by the Houston Court of Appeals
955,57,Tort of another is an equitable doctrine requiring the claimant to be an innocent party
956,57,Pohl seeks over $2.4 million in actual loss damages including fees from defending barratry proceedings
957,57,Pohl also seeks $1 million paid under settlement with Precision in the Mississippi litigation
958,57,Dugger v. Arredondo expressly limited its holding to personal injury and wrongful death cases
959,57,Texas courts have continued to apply the unlawful acts doctrine outside personal injury/wrongful death contexts
960,57,Pohl's claims are inextricably intertwined with his illegal contract with Precision to commit barratry
961,57,"Pohl contracted with Precision to 'provide public relations services ... to screen and liaise with Pohl's clients/prospective clients' — i.e., commit barratry"
962,57,"Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 40 cmt. c recognizes privilege to disclose trade secrets relating to crime, tort, or matters of substantial public concern"
963,57,The Reporters' Notes to § 40 compare the privilege to whistleblower statutes
964,57,The First Court of Appeals already opined Kassab's conduct 'arose out of a commercial transaction involving the type of legal services Kassab provides'
965,57,Attorney immunity applies even to conduct outside the litigation context and even to alleged criminal conduct
966,57,Taylor v. Tolbert held attorney immune from wiretapping claims because conduct fell within scope of client representation
967,57,TUTSA does not expressly repudiate the attorney-immunity defense
968,57,Judicial proceedings privilege is absolute and covers all aspects of proceedings including preliminary communications
969,57,The privilege protects communications 'necessary to set the judicial machinery in motion'
970,57,Rule 17.09 applies to 'the Complainant or witness' — not just State Bar officials as Pohl argues
971,57,Pohl admits that Kassab was both a complainant and witness in the grievance process
972,57,Pohl concedes a 'small portion' of his damages are connected to the grievance process
973,57,"Under Rule 17.09, because at least part of Pohl's claims are predicated on grievance proceedings, the entire suit is barred"
974,57,Pohl's injunctive relief claim is still live because he has not filed an amendment removing it
975,57,"TUTSA requires 'legal, or equitable' title, making unclean hands defense applicable"
976,57,"Kassab incorporates arguments from his August 29, 2022 Traditional MSJ and Nicholson's September 12, 2022 Response (pp. 9-14) on unlawful acts doctrine"