Filing Sections
Data license: Public court records
8 rows where filing_id = 34
This data as json, CSV (advanced)
| section_id ▼ | filing_id | heading | summary |
|---|---|---|---|
| 257 | 34 34 | Introduction | Pohl committed illegal barratry and wants Kassab to pay for his defense costs. Pohl seeks partial traditional summary judgment on justification, unclean hands, illegality, and unlawful acts defenses, but has not negated them as a matter of law. His no-evidence challenge to the remaining defenses is global and conclusory, which is insufficient under Texas law. Kassab can demonstrate that each applicable defense is supported by evidence. |
| 258 | 34 34 | General Objection | Pohl inappropriately suggests all barratry suits were resolved on the merits. The Berry case settled (suggesting merit). The Cheatham case was reversed on appeal with fact issues on barratry. Brumfield and Gandy were dismissed on limitations, not the merits. An affirmative defense bars recovery even if plaintiff's claims are true (Man Engines v. Shows). None of the barratry suits have been adjudicated on the merits, and neither has the issue of whether Pohl committed barratry. Kassab incorporates all evidence and argument from his August 29, 2022 MSJ, the Nicholson MSJ, and Nicholson's response. |
| 259 | 34 34 | A. Justification Defense | Justification is not limited to tortious interference — it has been applied to anti-trust claims (Money Masters v. TRW) and trade secret claims (Lamont v. Vaquillas Energy). Justification can be based on (1) exercise of party's own legal rights or (2) good-faith claim to colorable right, and when legal right is conclusively established, motive is irrelevant (Tex. Beef Cattle Co. v. Green). Kassab was justified in obtaining information to pursue legitimate barratry claims based on Precision Marketing's ownership. Kassab had legal right to acquire evidence for barratry claims without liability (Taylor v. Tolbert). Kassab had obligation to investigate potential claims or risk Rule 13 sanctions. Kassab was also justified in obtaining information to report Pohl to the State Bar under Rule 8.03 and Rule 17.09 (which provides immunity for grievance filings). |
| 260 | 34 34 | B. Unclean Hands Defense | Pohl's MSJ falsely claims he 'does not seek equitable relief.' This is rebutted by Pohl's own pleadings: (1) TUTSA requires 'legal, or equitable' title under § 134A.002(3-a); (2) Pohl seeks injunctive relief per his First Amended Petition ¶ 45; (3) Pohl's prayer requests 'other and further or alternative relief (legal and equitable)' per ¶ 50. Because Pohl seeks equitable relief, he must come to court with clean hands (Fetter v. Wells Fargo). |
| 261 | 34 34 | C. Illegality Defense | Two sub-parts: (1) Objection to Pohl's lack of supporting evidence — Pohl provides no evidence, only unsupported attorney arguments, and is unwilling to swear to any facts in an affidavit (Johnson v. Scott: motions and arguments of counsel are not evidence). (2) Pohl has not negated the defense — illegality is commonly applied to bar claims stemming from barratry (Luong v. McAllister; Plumlee v. Paddock). Pohl's own lawyers successfully used this exact defense in Duncan Litig. Invs. v. Baker, Donelson, and in the Mississippi Litigation. TUTSA requires plaintiff to own the trade secret with 'rightful, legal, or equitable title' (§ 134A.002(3-a)), but Pohl obtained information illegally through barratry, negating ownership. Same ownership deficiency applies to conversion and conspiracy claims (Freezia v. IS Storage). Pohl's string cite of unrelated authority (White, Lewkowicz, Niles, Reid, Montgomery Ward, Lawson) is distinguished as irrelevant. |
| 262 | 34 34 | D. Unlawful Acts, Criminal Acts, In Pari Delicto | Two sub-parts: (1) Objection — Pohl's barratry and unauthorized practice of law have not been disposed of on the merits; Pohl provides no evidence and won't swear he didn't commit barratry. (2) The Unlawful Acts Rule provides that if plaintiff was engaged in illegal act contributing to injury, he may not recover (Andrew Shebay v. Bishop). Evidence shows Pohl violated laws by illegally soliciting clients, splitting fees with non-lawyer, and failing to protect client information. Three expert reports (Hardwick, Cooper, Cleveland) establish Pohl committed barratry. The Cheatham court of appeals found the same Walker deposition testimony constituted 'some evidence' that Pohl and co-counsel coordinated the barratry scheme and Pohl directly funded solicitation. The doctrine ensures the wrongdoer 'should not even entertain the hope of indemnity' (Houston Ice & Brewing Co. v. Sneed). Court can deny recovery to Pohl even if defendants also committed unlawful acts (Dover v. Baker, Brown). |
| 263 | 34 34 | Response to No-Evidence Summary Judgment | Two sub-parts: (A) Pohl's global no-evidence challenge is procedurally defective — it simply lists 16 defenses and claims no evidence exists, without identifying specific elements lacking evidence, violating Rule 166a(i) and Timpte Industries v. Gish. A defective no-evidence motion must be treated as traditional motion under 166a(c), shifting burden to movant (Weaver v. Highlands Ins. Co.). Pohl hasn't met that burden either (Hillis v. McCall), and with burden unmet, Kassab need not respond (Chavez v. Kansas City S. Ry.). (B) Kassab has evidence for all defenses: June 2021 MSJ established limitations, res judicata, attorney immunity; August 2022 MSJ established Rule 17.09 immunity, judicial proceedings privilege, attorney immunity, limitations, unlawful acts bar, and that trade secrets are owned by Precision Marketing. Ladner testified client information was owned by Precision Marketing; Walker testified client list was Precision Marketing's 'work product.' Assumption of risk: Pohl placed trade secrets with Walker, a known convicted felon (pled guilty to federal program fraud), without confidentiality/NDA agreements. Contract-related defenses (release, accord and satisfaction, estoppel) don't apply to Kassab but incorporates Nicholson's response to extent applicable. |
| 264 | 34 34 | Alternative Request for Continuance | Under Rule 166a(g), Kassab requests continuance because Pohl has unreasonably resisted discovery on the illegality defense. Kassab served discovery beginning May 2021; Pohl amended responses through October 2021; additional sets served September and December 2021 with responses into January 2022; Pohl then refused to amend despite conferral, necessitating Kassab's Motion to Compel filed August 25, 2022. Pohl cannot simultaneously withhold discovery while moving for summary judgment on same issues (Specialty Retailers v. Fuqua). Movant's withholding of information in discovery weighs in favor of additional time (McInnis v. Mallia; Tempay v. TNT Concrete). |
Advanced export
JSON shape: default, array, newline-delimited, object
CREATE TABLE filing_sections (
section_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
filing_id INTEGER REFERENCES filings(filing_id),
heading TEXT,
summary TEXT
);