filings: 67
Data license: Public court records
This data as json
| filing_id | date | doc_type | party | description | doc_type_detail | procedural_posture | chain | outcome | phase | filename | relief_requested | full_text |
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| 67 | 2024-02-02 | RSP | Pohl | Objections to Kassab JNOV | Pohl's Response in Opposition to Kassab's Motions for New Trial and for JNOV, systematically opposing all 22 grounds for new trial and all JNOV arguments. Argues: all grounds are recycled rejected arguments; witness tampering allegations identical to rejected mistrial motion and based on unsworn statements of self-professed perjurer/extortionist; multiple charge objections waived at charge conference; jury verdict supported by nearly two weeks of trial evidence; Kassab fails to cite trial record; incorporates 15 prior filings by reference. | Response filed February 2, 2024, opposing both the Motion for New Trial and Motion for JNOV filed January 19, 2024. Pohl incorporates by reference 15 prior filings spanning 2021-2023. Notes Kassab has not filed a proposed order as required by court procedures. | POST-1 | N/A | Phase 5 | 2024-02-02_RSP_Pohl-Objections-to-Kassab-JNOV_FILED.pdf | Denial of Kassab's Motion for New Trial and Motion for JNOV in their entirety | 2/2/2024 4:44 PM Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No. 84110431 By: Bonnie Lugo Filed: 2/2/2024 4:44 PM CAUSE NO. 2018-58419 MICHAEL A. POHL et al. § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiffs, § V. § HARRIS COUNTY,k TEXAS § e LANCE CHRISTOPHER § C l KASSAB et al. § § c Defendants. § 281ST JUDrICIAL DISTRICT POHL’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO THE MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL AND FOR JUDGMENT NOT WITHSTANDING THE VERDsICT AND TO DISREGARD JURY FINDINGS FILED BY THE KASSAsB DEFENDANTS Plaintiffs Michael Pohl and Law Office of Michaerl A. Pohl (collectively “Pohl”) respond in opposition to The Kassab Defendants’ Motion for New Trial (the “Motion for New Trial”) and Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdlict and to Disregard Jury Findings (the “Motion for JNOV”) filed by Defendants Lance ChMristopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C., d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm (collectively “Kassab”). I. INTRODUCTION Kassab’s Motion for New Trial and Motion for JNOV repeat Kassab’s arguments that the Court has previously considered and rejected. In these two motions, Kassab recycles arguments rejected at summary judgment, 166(g) hearings, pre-trial hearings, directed verdict, and otherwise. The Court’s judgcment and the jury verdict are supported by and consistent with ample evidence presented at trial. But Kassab would have the Court throw out a jury verdict supported by nearly two weeks’ worth of trial evidence. Because the issues that Kassab raises are without merit, the Court should deny Kassab’s Motion for New Trial and Motion for JNOV. II. STANDARDS A. Motion for New Trial “Jury trials are essential to our constitutionally provided method for resolving disputes,” and “a jury’s decision is not to be tampered with lightly, regardless of whether it favors the plaintiff or the defendant.” In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.Pl., 290 S.W.3d 204, 211 (Tex. 2009) (citing Tex. Const. art. I, § 15, art. V, § 10); see generally Hterbert v. Herbert, 754 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. 1988) (“long-established precedents in this sstate demonstrate respect for jury verdicts”). Thus, the “discretion Texas trial courts possess to overturn jury verdicts and grant new trials,” though broad, “has its limits.” In re Columbia,e 290 S.W.3d at 210. “[T]he fact that the right to jury trial is of such significance omas to be provided for in both the Federal and State Constitutions counsels against courts setting aside jnury verdicts for less than specific, significant, and proper reasons.” Id. at 210 n.3. A court’s rdiscretion in granting a new trial “should not, and does not, permit a trial judge to substitute . . . her own views for that of the jury without a valid basis.” Id. at 212. e “[N]ew trials may be granfted to a party for sufficiency or weight of the evidence, when damages are ‘manifestly’ tooy small or too large, and for ‘good cause.’” Id. at 210 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 320, 326). Rul e 320’s “good cause” standard “does not mean just any cause,” but rather a “specific, significanat, and proper” cause. See id. at 210 n.3. As for challenges to the evidentiary sufficiency of a fjury finding: A factual-sufficiency challenge can only prevail where a jury finding “is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is manifestly unjust, shocks the conscience, or clearly demonstrates bias.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002) (citing Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986)).1 A legal-sufficiency challenge 1 With respect to an issue involving the clear and convincing evidence standard, a slightly different inquiry is warranted. See Jang Won Cho v. Kun Sik Kim, 572 S.W.3d 783, 810 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) requires a party challenging a finding on which it did not bear the burden to “demonstrate that no evidence supports the finding.” Four J’s Cmty. Living Ctr., Inc. v. Wagner, 630 S.W.3d 502, 513 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, pet. denied) (emphasis added, citation omitted). If the trial court grants a new trial, it cannot “simply parrot a pro forma tekmplate.”2 In re Munsch, 614 S.W.3d 397, 400 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pelt.). Instead, a new trial order must “provide an understandable, reasonably specific explancation of the trial court’s reasons for setting aside the jury’s verdict” that “derive[s] the artsiculated reason[s] from the particular facts and circumstances of the case at hand.” Id. (citsations omitted). The trial court’s “stated reason for granting a new trial must [also] be a legally valid reason.” Id. B. Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict A court may render a judgment notwithstanding the verdict only if a directed verdict would have been proper. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 301. “A directed verdict is warranted when the evidence is such that no other verdict can be rendered and the moving party is entitled, as a matter of law, to judgment.” Zarate v. Rodriguez, 542e S.W.3d 26, 35 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (citation omitted). Put anfother way, judgment notwithstanding the verdict “is proper when the evidence is conclusive aynd one party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law, or when a legal principle precludes recCovery.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Barrow-Shaver Res. Co. v. Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc., 5a90 S.W.3d 471, 480 (Tex. 2019) (“Judgment . . . against a jury verdict is proper . . . only fwhen the law does not allow reasonable jurors to decide otherwise.”). (“factual sufficiency of the evidence under a clear and convincing standard requires us to determine based on the record whether the fact finder reasonably could form a firm conviction or belief that the allegations were proven.”). 2 Kassab has not yet filed a proposed order as required by the Court’s procedures. The Court cannot adopt a pro forma proposed order to grant a new trial. There are minimum constitutional requirements articulated by the Texas Supreme Court. See In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746, 748-49 (Tex. 2013) (“trial court must explain with reasonable specificity why it . . . circumvented a critical constitutional right” and “granted a new trial”); In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685, 688–89 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding) (“trial court abuses its discretion if its new- trial order provides no more than a pro forma template rather than the trial judge’s analysis”); see also In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d 170, 173 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding); In re Columbia, 290 S.W.3d at 212–13. III. POHL’S INCORPORATION OF PRIOR BRIEFING Because Kassab’s arguments are largely recycled arguments previously rejected by this Court and the 189th District Court, Pohl incorporates fully by reference his prior briefing—both the arguments and the attached exhibits—on these issues. This includes the followking items: • Pohl’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendants’ Counterclaims,l filed Dec. 7, 2021. • Pohl’s Reply in Support of His Motion for Summary Judgtment on Defendants’ Counterclaims, filed Feb. 4, 2022. • Pohl’s Objection to Kassab’s Motion to Designate Responsisble Third Parties, filed May 31, 2022. D • Pohl’s Response in Opposition to the Traditional Moti s ons for Summary Judgment Filed by the Kassab Defendants and the Nicholson Defendeants & Exhibits, filed Sept. 12, 2022. • Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to the Kassarb Defendants’ Three New Motions to Compel, filed Sept. 27, 2022. • Pohl’s Motion to Exclude or Limit the Testnim ony of Defendants’ Expert Witnesses, filed Nov. 30, 2022 y • Pohl’s Objection to Kassab’s Suppale r mental Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties, filed Nov. 30, 2022. M • Pohl’s Rule 166(g) Motion on fBarratry Liability and Specific Affirmative Defenses Asserted by the Kassab Defendants, filed Nov. 30, 2022. • Pohl’s Response in Opposit c ion to the Amended Motions for Summary Judgment Filed by the Kassab Defendants &f Exhibits, filed March 29, 2023. • Pohl’s Letter responding to arguments raised in Kassab’s April 13, 2023 letter, filed April 18, 2023. p • Pohl’s Rule 10C4(c) Motion Disputing the Admissibility of Lance Kassab’s Testimony as an Expert Witnesses, filed Aug. 4, 2023. • Pohl’s Letiter Brief Concerning Barratry and Pohl’s Rule 166(g) Motion, filed Aug. 15, 2023. i • Pohl’s Reply in Support of His Motion for Entry of Final Judgment, filed Sept. 18, 2023. • Pohl’s Reply to Kassab’s Post-Hearing Letter on Pohl’s Motion for Entry of Judgment, filed Sept. 22, 2023. • Pohl’s Response to Kassab’s Emergency Motion for Mistrial & Exhibits, filed Dec. 21, 2023. IV. DISCUSSION Many of the issues presented in Kassab’s motions have been previously argued by Kassab and rejected by the Court with a ruling in Pohl’s favor. The same result is proper here, and the Court should deny Kassab’s Motion for New Trial and Motion for JNOV. Manyk issues Kassab raises were waived or are boilerplate sufficiency objections without citationsl to the trial record. But Kassab has not grappled with the evidence in the trial record—nor dcoes he attach the record as support. It is apparent that Kassab gives little weight to the evidensce Pohl introduced at trial— Kassab has taken positions throughout the lawsuit that require him to reject Pohl’s testimony and evidence—but the verdict demonstrates the jury did accept Pohl’s evidence. Kassab has not carried his burden to demonstrate error in the judgment or verdict, much less any error that would warrant a new trial or setting aside the judgment. A. Kassab’s alleged new evidence dida not warrant a mistrial, and it does not warrant a new trial (Motion for New TriMal Issue #1). The Court should reject Kassabo’s lead argument for a new trial—Kassab’s allegations of witness tampering—because it prescents the same arguments and evidence that the Court recently considered and found did not warrant a mistrial. Kassab presents no new material information, evidence, or argument thapt warrants reconsideration. The Court correctly ruled that Kassab’s arguments—which rely on untrue statements—did not justify setting aside the jury’s verdict. Those same argumcents do not warrant setting aside the Court’s judgment based on that verdict. Kassaob’s first argument for a new trial is that he claims there is newly discovered evidence of witness tampering that warrants a new trial. See Motion for New Trial at 4–9. He contends that “[a]lthough Walker and Ladner testified one way in the Mississippi litigation they brought against Pohl, when they were deposed in this case they reversed course on seminal issues of barratry and ownership of Pohl’s purported trade secrets.” Id. at 6. This is the same rejected argument Kassab made for a mistrial. Compare id. at 4–9 & exhibits 1–4, with Kassab’s Emergency Motion for Mistrial at 1–7 & exhibits 1–4, filed Dec. 13, 2023. Pohl responded to Kassab’s Emergency Motion for Mistrial and explained how Kassab’s arguments were misleading. See generally Pohl’s Response to Kassab’s Emergekncy Motion for Mistrial, filed Dec. 21, 2023. Despite Pohl pointing out that it is demonstrablyl untrue that Walker and Ladner changed their testimony on the issues Kassab complains abocut “in this case,” Kassab continues to push this false narrative. See id. at 7–10 (explaining how sKassab withheld information from the Court about Walker and Ladner giving testimony ins 2018 consistent with their 2022 depositions in this case); Motion for New Trial at 6–7 (demonstrating Kassab continues to wrongly suggest that a change occurred with Walker and Ladner’s testimony “in this case”). While Pohl relies on his prior arguments and evidence, the following summarizes why the Court should reject Kassab’s argument. Fiarst, Kassab suggests that Pohl agreed to share a judgment with Walker and Ladner in exchange for them sitting for depositions and changing deposition testimony on two topics ine this case. But Kassab knows this is not true. Pohl did not convince Walker or Ladner to sitf for depositions—Kassab, not Pohl, subpoenaed their testimony. And Pohl did not need to inyfluence Walker or Ladner to “change” their testimony in this case. Kassab took their depoCsitions in a different case in 2018—four years before their depositions in this case. Kassab does not discuss, let alone grapple with, the fact that Walker gave testimony in 2018 on the twfof topics at issue that is consistent with his testimony in this case. SeUcond, even if Walker changed his testimony on the relevant topics for this case—which is not true—Kassab has not provided evidence to justify granting a new trial. Kassab’s argument hinges on the truthfulness of vague, unsworn statements of Scott Walker, a self-professed perjurer and an extortionist. Walker first unsuccessfully tried to extort Pohl for a share of the eventual judgment in this case, but Pohl refused to be extorted. Walker then approached Kassab and asked Kassab repeatedly to pay him to help Kassab avoid paying any judgment to Pohl. Kassab does not mention this fact in his motion—nor did he disclose it to the Court when requesting a mistrial. In any event, Kassab cannot show that he is entitled to a new trial based solkely on unsworn statements of a self-professed perjurer who pitched a story as part of an offerl to sell Kassab his testimony to help undermine any judgment in this case. Kassab failed tco establish facts that the Court can rely on to grant a new trial and overturn the jury’s considersed verdict in this case. B. The jury properly found that Pohl owned the trades secrets (Motion for New Trial Issue #2 and Motion for JNOV Issue #1). s After reviewing the evidence and testimony prersented at trial, the jury found that (1) “[a]ttorney client fee contracts between Pohl and his clients” and (2) “[a]ny list of the identities and contact information of Pohl’s actual, potentlial or rejected clients” constituted Pohl’s trade secrets.3 The jury heard evidence supportinMg its finding that Pohl owned the relevant information, that it had economic value to Pohl as ao compilation, that it was kept secret, and that Pohl took reasonable steps to safeguard its seccrecy. There is no basis that can justify the Court setting aside the jury’s findings on this issue after a legal or factual review. As noted above, for a factual sufficiency challenge to prevail, the Court must find that the jury finding “is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is manifestly unjust, shocks thec conscience, or clearly demonstrates bias.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002). That standard is not met here, where the jury finding is based on the jury accepting the testimony of witnesses, weighing the documentary evidence, and finding in Pohl’s favor. Nor has Kassab shown as a matter of law that Pohl does not own the trade secrets as required to meet the JNOV standard. 3 See Jury Verdict, Question 1(a)–(b), attached as Exhibit A. Kassab continues to try and conflate the issues by suggesting that “Pohl cannot own a trade secret in attorney-client contracts because they are owned by the client.” Motion for New Trial at 9; Motion for JNOV at 5–6. While a client may have a right to a copy of the particular attorney– client contract the client is a party to, the lawyer also has an ownership right in eakch contract and to the collection of his contracts.4 Unlike work product, which is generated onl behalf of a client, an attorney does not act as the agent of a client when a fee contract is drafcted or before it is signed. A client certainly does not own a collection of attorney–client cosntracts or a compilation of information based on multiple attorney–client contracts. Pohl ansd other witnesses provided direct, on-point testimony on this specific issue. Kassab also ignores Pohl’s testimony about his ownership of the contracts, any lists, and the information more generally. He instead focuses on an allegation that Pohl’s office manager “testified that she did not consider the attornaey-client contracts trade secrets.” Motion for New Trial at 10. But her opinion on what constitutes trade secrets is not relevant. Kassab fails to mention that Pohl’s office manager aelso gave testimony showing that Pohl did own the contracts and any list of information comfpiled from those contracts. The jury had ample evidence to conclude Pohl owned the ryelevant trade secrets, including because Pohl’s name was on the contracts, and Pohl hadC the right to any list made by those working for him that was compiled from the information contained in those contracts. The jurfyf also saw evidence that Pohl took reasonable steps to keep his client information confidentUial and that the compilation of this information had value beyond simply the sum of its components (what Kassab refers to as a “competitive advantage”). The jury heard testimony about how client information was kept in a locked office above a bank with security. The jury heard 4 Cf. Texas Ethics Opinion No. 670 (March 2018) (discussing how an attorney can use copies of former client documents as “forms” in a new firm provided he keeps confidential information confidential). about how those who worked for Pohl understood that client information had to be kept secret. The jury heard testimony about the value of knowing the identities of persons who may participate in mass tort litigation. The jury also heard opinion testimony about how, by the very nature of the work, persons working for lawyers understand they must safeguard the secrecy kof information, especially client information. l Kassab continues to contend that Pohl’s trade secrets were “gcenerally known to third parties.” Motion for New Trial at 12. But there was a lack of evsidence showing this at trial. Instead, the jury saw evidence that Kassab was willing to pay osver six figures to get access to the attorney–client contracts (and lists of contact information based on those contracts). The jury was free to reject Kassab’s unsupported assertion that Pohl’s client list—which would have included contact information—was publicly available when Kassab failed to provide evidence demonstrating this claim. Kassab’s actionas were inconsistent with his assertion that this information was publicly available. The record at trial demonstratees that there is factually sufficient evidence to show that the attorney–client contracts and listsf of identities and contact information of Pohl’s clients constituted Pohl’s trade secrets. Kassaby’s conclusory assertions about what he thinks the evidence showed do not carry his burden toC establish that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The jury’s finding that Pohl owned the relevant trade secrets is legally proper and supported by testimony and documentary efvfidence. The jury’s finding in favor of Pohl on this issue—made after the jury weighed Uthe evidence—should not be disturbed. C. Kassab waived any objection to Question #2 (Motion for New Trial Issue #3). For the first time, Kassab complains in his Motion for New Trial that the Court erred in submitting Question #2 to the jury. This question was properly included because it was supported by evidence introduced at trial, and Kassab was on notice of the nature of Pohl’s claims against Kassab. But the Court does not need to reach those issues. Kassab failed to object to Question #2 at the charge conference and thus failed to preserve any objection to this jury question. It is blackletter law that a party must articulate its objections to the Court before the Court reads the jury charge to the jury to preserve any objection. See TEX. R. CIVk. P. 274 (“Any complaint as to a question, definition, or instruction, on account of any defectl, omission, or fault in pleading, is waived unless specifically included in the objections.”). c A party cannot raise an objection to a jury question for the first time as part of a motion fors a new trial. See Mitchell v. Bank of Am., N.A., 156 S.W.3d 622, 628 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2s004, pet. denied) (“Objections to the court’s charge in a motion for a new trial are untimely and preserve nothing for review.”); see also Zermeno v. Garcia, No. 14-17-00843-CV, 2019 WL 2063090, at *3 n.5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 9, 2019, pet. denied). In Kassab’s Motion for New Trial, hae contends that the Court erred in submitting Jury Question #2. See Motion for New Trial at 12–14. However, Kassab did not object to this question at the charge conference.5 Thus, Kasesab cannot raise objections to this jury question for the first time in his Motion for New Trial.f While Kassab waivedy any objections he may have had, Kassab is also wrong on the merits of this issue. A signifCicant issue at trial was whether Kassab improperly obtained Pohl’s trade secrets from Favre and Precision. Pohl put on evidence showing that Precision, as a company that provided servicfefs to a lawyer, had a duty of secrecy and that Kassab should have known that Favre and PreciUsion had a duty to keep Pohl’s trade secrets confidential. But despite knowing that before obtaining the information, Kassab helped induce a breach of confidentiality by wrongfully 5 Jury Charge Conference Transcript at 6–7 (showing the Court asked if Kassab had any objections to Question #2, and Kassab’s counsel stated: “Not to Number 2.”), attached as Exhibit B. 10 purchasing Pohl’s trade secrets. Thus, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the broad-form submission of Question #2 to the jury. D. There is factually sufficient evidence for the jury’s finding that Kassab engaged in misappropriation (Motion for New Trial Issue #4 and Motion for JNOV Issue #2). The jury found that Kassab misappropriated Pohl’s trade secrets after seering and hearing ample evidence that Kassab willfully and knowingly acquired those trade secrets from persons Kassab knew were violating an obligation to keep the trade secrets conrfiidential. Kassab ignores the evidence in favor of the jury’s findings and improperly tries toD engage in burden-shifting after the fact. The Court should reject this previously disputed issuse. Kassab’s main argument is that the jury’s findring of 0% liability for Precision on misappropriation is inconsistent with a finding that he misappropriated Pohl’s trade secrets. See Motion for New Trial at 14–16; Motion for JNOVl at 10–12. As a threshold matter, Kassab waived his right to object based on any alleged inMconsistency in the jury’s verdict by not asserting any objections before the Court dismissed tohe jury. See Bryan v. Papalia, 542 S.W.3d 676, 692–93 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2c017, rev. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.). But even if Kassab had not waived the issue, Kassab’s theory fails because it was Kassab’s, not Pohl’s, burden to introduce evidence showing Precision engaged in misappropriation. There is nothing inconsistent about the jury finding that Precision did not misappropriate the information acnd that Kassab did. The jury could have found that Precision obtained the information lawfully because Precision obtained the information at the request of, while working for, and while being paid by Pohl. The jury also could have based its misappropriation finding on Kassab’s post-acquisition “use” or “disclosure” of the trade secrets. Regardless, Kassab is the party that sought to designate Precision as a responsible third party. Kassab cites no authority for the theory that his failure to persuade the jury that Precision engaged in misappropriation can be 11 used to undermine a jury finding on a separate issue where Pohl did carry the burden of proof. To find otherwise would flip the incentives in the case. Kassab would have no incentive to introduce any evidence to support a finding of liability against a party he designated as a responsible third party. Instead, it would create a conflicting incentive for Pohl to introduce evideknce potentially undermining his case to prove that some responsibility was born by someone lother than Kassab. This makes no sense, and the Court should reject Kassab’s unsupported tcheory. Kassab’s theory of factual insufficiency (and no evidence) relsies on ignoring the evidence at trial. He contends that there is insufficient (or no) evidence she was aware the information had been acquired by improper means or from someone who had acquired it improperly. See Motion for New Trial at 16; Motion for JNOV at 11. But Kassab apparently forgets that this was a major issue at trial. On their face, the documents that Kassab purchased were not the sort of documents that can be properly purchased from a non-laawyer. Pohl introduced expert opinion testimony on what a lawyer should know about the confidentiality of materials containing information about another lawyer’s clients. Kassab proevided testimony on cross-examination on this issue that the jury could have found to be nofn-credible or to support an inference that Kassab acted with awareness of the proper ownyer of Pohl’s trade secrets when Kassab purchased them. There was testaCmentary and documentary evidence before the jury supporting their finding that Kassab had misappropriated Pohl’s trade secrets. Kassab’s argument that this finding was supported by inf fsufficient or no evidence is contrary to the trial record. The Court should reject Kassab’sU arguments for a new trial and to set aside the judgment. E. Kassab did not sufficiently preserve his objection to Question #3 (Motion for New Trial Issue #5). Kassab failed to timely notify the Court of his objection to Question #3 contained in his Motion for New Trial. Pohl opposed the inclusion of Question #3. The Court chose to include 12 this question because Kassab wanted to make arguments about barratry, and he insisted on including a jury question about alleged wrongful conduct by Pohl. Kassab now objects, saying this question is not properly tied to other parts of the charge. But he waived this issue by failing to timely make this objection and alert the Court of this alleged issue. k Kassab argues that Question #3 was improper “because it was not tied lto any other part of the charge.” Motion for New Trial at 17. However, Kassab did not raisce this issue at the charge conference.6 Instead, Kassab presented the Court with a broasder, non-relevant question concerning barratry.7 The Court rightfully rejected Kassab’s srequest to use that question. But more importantly, Kassab failed to object to Question #3 on the basis that it was not tied to another part of the charge. His failure to object on this ground waived the issue. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 274 (“Any complaint as to a question, definition, or instruction, on account of any defect, omission, or fault in pleading, is waived unless specificallya included in the objections.”); see also Mitchell, 156 S.W.3d at 628. F. The Court correctly rejecteed Kassab’s proportionate responsibility question (Motion for New Trial Issue #6). Kassab claims the Court erred by not submitting Kassab’s proportionate responsibility question without citing a single legal authority to support his argument. See Motion for New Trial at 17–18. Kassab was obligated to tender a legally proper jury question to preserve any objection. But Kassab’s reqcuested jury question is contrary to the terms of the proportionate responsibility statute. Further, Kassab’s proposed question was improper because it included individuals as potentially responsible parties despite Kassab’s failure to introduce relevant evidence of their fault at trial to support their inclusion on the jury question. 6 Jury Charge Conference Transcript at 6–7, Ex. B. 7 See id.; see also Motion for New Trial Ex. 6 (containing Kassab’s proposed alternative to Question #3). 13 Unlike, for example, negligence—where a plaintiff can negligently contribute to his or her injury—Pohl could not have misappropriated his trade secrets. Thus, Pohl could not have violated an “applicable legal standard” that contributed to causing the harm for which recovery of damages is sought.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.011(4). As a result, the Court pkroperly rejected Kassab’s proportionate responsibility question, which included a line for Pohl. lKassab’s proposed question was also improper because it included lines for Walker, Seymocur, and Ladner despite a lack of evidence regarding their fault at trial. It also would have besen improperly duplicative to include those individuals alongside Precision in the question. s Because Kassab had the burden to submit a legally proper alternative question on the issue of proportionate responsibility, his failure to tender a legally proper question at the charge conference waived this issue. It was not error for the Court to reject the improper question Kassab presented to the Court at the charge conferencae. G. The statute of limitations did not run against Kassab before his wrongful conduct occurred (Motion for New Trial Issues #7–8 and Motion for JNOV Issue #3). Kassab makes two types ofc arguments concerning limitations. First, he argues that the Court erred by asking the jury about Kassab’s misappropriation of Pohl’s trade secrets rather than some alleged misappropriation by another party. See Motion for New Trial at 18. Second, and relatedly, he argues that Pohl’s claim for misappropriation of trade secrets accrued prior to Kassab engaging in any cwrongful conduct. See id. at 21–22; Motion for JNOV at 13–15. The Court should reject both of these arguments because Pohl’s claims against Kassab could not accrue prior to Kassab engaging in the wrongful conduct that gave rise to Pohl’s claims. Kassab relies on alleged conduct by third parties to argue that Pohl’s claims against Kassab accrued before Kassab engaged in wrongful conduct that gave rise to Pohl’s claims. Such a reverse discovery rule—operating to cause the limitations period to run before Pohl could have brought 14 suit—makes no sense. It is Kassab’s conduct that is relevant for determining when Pohl’s claims accrued. Here, Pohl’s claims accrued no earlier than November 2016, when the evidence shows that Kassab knowingly purchased and acquired possession of Pohl’s confidential information from a third party that Kassab knew had worked for Pohl. k While a Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“TUTSA”) claim may not ble a continuing tort, that does not mean that different people cannot commit separate acts ocf misappropriation. For example, Kassab cites Agar Corp., Inc. v. Electro Circuits Int’l, LLC, s565 S.W.3d 12 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 580 S.Ws.3d 136 (Tex. 2019), to argue that Pohl’s claim against Kassab accrued before Kassab purchased Pohl’s trade secrets. But Kassab misunderstands this case. In Agar, a third party allegedly sold Agar’s trade secrets on multiple occasions. See Agar, 565 S.W.3d at 19–20. Invoking both the continuing tort doctrine and the discovery rule, Agar argued that limitations foar its conspiracy claim did not begin to run until the last sale of its trade secrets (the last overt act) by that third party occurred. See id. The court rejected that argument for multiple reeasons, including that the misappropriation of Agar’s trade secrets was not a continuing tortf that reset upon each subsequent sale of the trade secrets by the third party. See id. at 21. y Agar stands forC the proposition that, for a specific party, the limitations period starts to run when that party first misappropriated the trade secret, not when it last used the misappropriated trade secret. Sfefe Agar, 565 S.W.3d at 21. Pohl filed suit less than two years after Kassab first misapproUpriated Pohl’s trade secrets. Agar does not support Kassab’s argument that a third party’s alleged prior misappropriation can start the limitations period before a separate party engages in any wrongful conduct. A third party’s conduct cannot cause accrual of a cause of action against Kassab before Kassab engaged in the wrongful conduct. Agar’s holding is simply not relevant. 15 Because the relevant issue for limitations is Kassab’s misappropriation of Pohl’s trade secrets, the Court properly asked the jury about misappropriation “by Kassab.”8 Further, Kassab’s discussion of unproven alleged wrongful conduct by persons other than Kassab has no bearing on when limitations began to run. Kassab has not established his affirmative defensek, and the Court should reject Kassab’s recycled limitations arguments.9 l H. The Court properly declined to submit Kassab’s jury questicons related to non- applicable affirmative defenses (Motion for New Trial Issure #9 and Motion for JNOV Issues ## 4–5). s Kassab was not entitled to jury questions on his unlawful acts doctrine and privilege defenses. The proportionate responsibility statute preempts the unlawful acts doctrine. Kassab’s privilege defense has no support in Texas law, and he relies on out-of-state authority taken out of context to support the idea that the defense exists in the first place. The Court properly declined to submit these defenses to the jury, given the lack of support for such questions. 1. The unlawful acts doctrine is preempted and does not apply. Kassab first argues that he waes entitled to a jury question to help him establish a defense based on the unlawful acts doctrinfe. See Motion for New Trial at 22–23; Motion for JNOV at 15– 17. This issue has been exteyns ively briefed and discussed with the Court.10 To the extent that the unlawful acts doctrine could have any relevance to this case, it is preempted by Texas’s proportionate respoansibility statute. In Dugger v. Arredondo, the Texas Supreme Court explicitly found that “the cfommon law unlawful acts doctrine is no longer a viable defense.” See 408 S.W.3d 825, 831–32 (Tex. 2013). While its holding did not deal with TUTSA claims, its reasoning is 8 See Jury Verdict, Question 5, Ex. A. 9 See Pohl’s Letter responding to arguments raised in Kassab’s April 13, 2023 letter, filed April 18, 2023; Pohl’s Response in Opposition to the Traditional Motions for Summary Judgment Filed by the Kassab Defendants and the Nicholson Defendants & Exhibits at 14–19, filed Sept. 12, 2022. 10 See Pohl’s Letter Brief Concerning Barratry and Pohl’s Rule 166(g) Motion at 5–6, filed Aug. 15, 2023; Pohl’s Rule 166(g) Motion at 8–10, filed Nov. 30, 2022; Pohl’s Response in Opposition to the Traditional Motions for Summary Judgment Filed by the Kassab Defendants and the Nicholson Defendants & Exhibits at 19–27. 16 based on the applicability of the proportionate responsibility statute, and that reasoning applies squarely to this case. Kassab cannot claim the benefit of the proportionate responsibility statute while simultaneously seeking to apply the conflicting unlawful acts doctrine defense.11 But even if this defense were not preempted, it would not be applicable.k It would only apply if Pohl needed to rely on a purported illegal act to establish his claims. Slee Carcamo-Lopez v. Does 1 through 20, 865 F. Supp. 2d 736, 767 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (“But cwhen the illegal conduct arises in a defense and not in the plaintiff’s case, the unlawful acts rsule will not bar a plaintiff’s claims.”). Kassab contends that barratry provides the support fsor this defense. But Pohl did not need to rely on establishing acts of barratry to prove his case. Thus, this defense has no application, and the Court properly did not submit a question to the jury on this defense. 2. Kassab did not enjoy a privilege to engage in misappropriation of trade secrets. Kassab’s second argument is that he had a privilege to disclose Pohl’s trade secrets and enjoys immunity from Pohl’s claims as a result. See Motion for New Trial at 24–25; Motion for JNOV at 17–19. Kassab cannot coenspire to misappropriate and acquire information for his commercial benefit and then claimf that he was justified or privileged to do so because he believed Pohl had improperly soliciteyd some clients. That is the privilege that Kassab is asking the Court to be the first Court inC Texas to adopt—parties can be justified or privileged to engage in the misappropriation ofa trade secrets if they believe it will help uncover the wrongdoing of others. The Court has, afnd should continue to, reject this novel theory. TUhere is a reason that Kassab relies on out-of-state case law to support his argument. No Texas case law demonstrates that Kassab’s defense exists. Even the authority that Kassab does discuss is distinguishable. For example, Kassab cites Alderson v. United States, 718 F. Supp. 2d 11 It is notable that Kassab primarily relies on caselaw that pre-dates Dugger, and he cites no caselaw grappling with the implications of Dugger yet finding that the unlawful acts doctrine remains applicable. 17 1186, 1200 (C.D. Cal. 2010), for the statement that “[t]here simply cannot be any trade secret about ongoing illegality.” See Motion for New Trial at 24; Motion for JNOV at 19. But as discussed in prior briefing,12 the reasoning of Alderson has no application to this case. Alderson dealt with whether the plaintiff had a protectable property interest in his knowledge of “infkormation about ongoing illegal activities”—that is, how a Medicare fraud occurred that was lthe basis of a prior False Claims Act action. See Alderson, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1200. The fcacts of this case are not analogous. Here, Pohl does not claim trade secret protection concersning how any alleged illegal conduct was undertaken. Instead, Pohl contended, and the jurys found, that Pohl’s customer lists and related information were entitled to trade secret protection. Because Kassab’s supposed affirmative defenses were not legally viable, the Court did commit error in refusing to submit them to the jury. But regardless, Kassab failed to introduce evidence at trial sufficient to establish these deafenses. The Court should reject Kassab’s arguments related to these defenses. I. A barratry finding would ehave had no legal effect, so the Court properly limited opinion evidence on whether barratry occurred and it has no impact on causation (Motion for New Trialf Issue #10 and Motion for JNOV Issue # 10). As has been extensivyely argued throughout this lawsuit, an opinion on whether barratry occurred has no bearinCg on Pohl’s right to recover on his claims. Contrary to Kassab’s repeated protestations otherwaise, a finding that barratry occurred would not change the fact that Pohl had an ownership infterest in his contracts and the information they contain. It would not make Pohl any moreU or less responsible for attorneys’ fees in the barratry proceedings. Nor is it a defense to any other aspect of Pohl’s claims. As a result, on relevance grounds alone, the Court was permitted 12 See Pohl’s Letter Brief Concerning Barratry and Pohl’s Rule 166(g) Motion at 2, filed Aug. 15, 2023; Pohl’s Response in Opposition to the Amended Motions for Summary Judgment Filed by the Kassab Defendants at 11–12, filed March 29, 2023. 18 to limit opinion evidence on barratry at trial. Pohl’s prior briefing on file addresses this issue in more detail.13 Kassab’s alternative argument is that barratry defeats proximate cause. Motion for JNOV at 34–35. Kassab did not preserve this proximate cause issue by objecting durinkg trial or at the charge conference. But even if Kassab had not waived this issue and prolximate cause is a necessary part of Pohl’s claims, the jury heard evidence sufficient tco establish that Kassab proximately caused Pohl’s injuries. Some of Pohl’s damages are dirsectly linked to Kassab. For example, the reasonable royalty and development cost damagses are directly linked to Pohl no longer having exclusive use and control over compilations of his client information. There is a direct causal connection between that occurring and Kassab wrongfully acquiring Pohl’s trade secrets from Favre, who was duty-bound to keep that information confidential. Pohl’s damages based on attorneys’ faees in separate proceedings were also proximately caused by Kassab’s conduct. The jury heard evidence about the lengths that Kassab went to when soliciting large numbers of people eto find a small number of people who would allege Pohl committed barratry. He tried unfsuccessfully to solicit such people through letters sent based on public information, but he onyly successfully obtained clients after he purchased Pohl’s trade secrets and used them to engagCe in a mass-solicitation effort. Finally, Kassab argues that “Pohl’s former clients’ decision to bring the barratry proceedings wfefre a superseding or new and intervening causes of Pohl’s damages.” Motion for JNOV at U35. But the actions of those persons were foreseeable by Kassab, as their actions to bring suit were his specific goal and they acted with Kassab’s assistance. As a result, they were not a 13 See Pohl’s Rule 104(c) Motion Disputing the Admissibility of Lance Kassab’s Testimony as an Expert Witnesses at 4–9, filed Aug. 4, 2023; Pohl’s Letter Brief Concerning Barratry and Pohl’s Rule 166(g) Motion, filed Aug. 15, 2023; Pohl’s Rule 166(g) Motion at 2–8, filed Nov. 30, 2022; Pohl’s Motion to Exclude or Limit the Testimony of Defendants’ Expert Witnesses at 2–6, filed Nov. 30, 2022. 19 superseding or intervening cause. See Dew v. Crown Derrick Erectors, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Tex. 2006) (stating that “the threshold, and often controlling, inquiry when distinguishing between a concurring and a superseding cause remains ‘whether the intervening cause and its probable consequences were such as could reasonably have been anticipated kby the original wrongdoer.’” (citation omitted)). l Pohl has never been found by any adjudicatory body to have ccommitted barratry. Yet Kassab continues to state conclusively that Pohl’s supposed barratry iss responsible for every harm Pohl suffered. That is not the case, and the Court properly impossed limits on Kassab’s attempts to inject barratry as an issue at trial. J. Kassab is not entitled to immunity for his tortious conduct that occurred before the existence of an attorney–client relationship (Motion for New Trial Issues ## 11–12 and Motion for JNOV Issues ## 6–8). Kassab argues that he is entitled to relief based on his defenses of attorney immunity, immunity under the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, and the judicial proceedings privilege. See Motion for New Trial at 27–29; Meotion for JNOV at 19–26. Kassab’s arguments are legally incorrect, as demonstrated througfh f the ample briefing of these issues.14 1. Kassab’s theory oyf attorney immunity is contrary to Texas Supreme Court precedent. Kassab complains that the jury instruction on attorney immunity used the phrase “while in an attorney relationaship” and that the evidence showed that his use of Pohl’s trade secrets occurred in the context off attorney–client relationships. See Motion for New Trial at 27–29; Motion for JNOV at 23–26. Kassab argues that the Court erred by using language from the Texas Supreme Court in the jury question. It makes no sense to object to this language when the Texas Supreme 14 See Pohl’s Rule 166(g) Motion at 12–14, filed Nov. 30, 2022; Pohl’s Response in Opposition to the Traditional Motions for Summary Judgment Filed by the Kassab Defendants and the Nicholson Defendants & Exhibits at 27–31, filed Sept. 12, 2022. 20 Court held that one of the two relevant inquiries for establishing attorney immunity is whether a party demonstrates “the existence of an attorney–client relationship at the time.” Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 683 (Tex. 2018). The jury rejected Kassab’s other argument—that the evidence shows his kacquisition and use of Pohl’s trade secrets occurred in the context of attorney–client relationshlips.15 Kassab used and disclosed Pohl’s trade secrets as part of a mass solicitation used to acttempt to sign up Pohl’s former clients. An attorney–client relationship cannot pre-date contasct between the attorney and a prospective client. Thus, there was no attorney–client relationsship at the time Kassab used and disclosed Pohl’s trade secrets by soliciting people through a mass-mailing campaign. 2. Pohl’s claims accrued prior to Kassab participating in the grievance process, so Pohl’s claims cannot be predicated on Kassab’s participation in that process. Kassab argues that he is entitled to immulnity because he participated in filing grievances against Pohl. See Motion for JNOV at 19–M20. But Rule 17.09 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure does not grant Kassab absoluote immunity for anything he does with some connection to the grievance system. Instead, it cprovides that: “No lawsuit may be instituted against any Complainant or witness predicated upon the filing of a Grievance or participation in the attorney disciplinary and disability system.” TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 17.09. It does not provide immunity simply because there is some connection between a case and the grievance process. For Rule c17.09 to have any application, this lawsuit would need to have been “predicated upon” Kassab’s involvement in the grievance process. But Pohl’s claim for misappropriation accrued upon Kassab’s acquisition or use of Pohl’s client information, which occurred no later than when Kassab used that client information to solicit Pohl’s clients. This undisputedly occurred prior to any grievance being filed by Kassab. Because the claims asserted pre-date the filing or 15 See Jury Verdict, Question 6, Ex. A. 21 participation in any grievance by Kassab, this lawsuit cannot have been “predicated upon the filing of a Grievance,” and Rule 17.09 does not apply. The Court should reject Kassab’s arguments.16 3. The judicial proceedings privilege has no application to the facts of this case. The judicial proceedings privilege applies only to communications “in the kdue course of a judicial proceeding,” and the privilege protects against a claim for libel or slanlder. Landry’s, Inc. v. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 631 S.W.3d 40, 46 (Tex. 2021). Given that tche basis of Pohl’s claim is not a communication made in the due course of a judicial proceesding, and Pohl has not sued Kassab for libel or slander, the judicial proceedings privilege does not apply. Kassab argues that even though Pohl’s claims do not assert claims for libel or slander, the judicial proceedings privilege should apply because Pohl’s claims arise out of communications. But even to the extent that Pohl’s claims relate to communications, the gravamen of Pohl’s complaint is not reputational harm or a theory equivalent to libel or slander. Pohl suffered actual losses as the result of Kassab’s misappropriation of Pohl’s trade secrets that occurred prior to any proceeding existing and prior to Kasesab having an attorney–client relationship with a client who could even initiate a relevant judifcial proceeding. The judicial proceedyings privilege is not a get-out-jail-free card. Kassab is not free to engage in tortious condCuct with impunity simply because that wrongful conduct eventually led to Kassab helping brinag numerous failed judicial proceedings against Pohl. The Court should not extend the appflication of this privilege to not only a time before the initiation of a judicial proceedinUg but a time before a relevant attorney–client relationship existed whereby a relevant judicial proceeding could even be contemplated. 16 See also Pohl’s Rule 166(g) Motion at 12–14, filed Nov. 30, 2022. 22 K. The Court properly allowed Pohl to present evidence of his “actual losses” suffered as a result of Kassab’s violations of TUTSA (Motion for New Trial Issue # 13 and Motion for JNOV Issue #9(A)). Pohl suffered losses in the form of attorneys’ fees in multiple unsuccessful separate proceedings that Pohl may recover as “actual losses” under TUTSA. Kassab akrgues that such damages are barred and that Pohl should not have been permitted to put forwalrd evidence of his damages. See Motion for New Trial at 29–34; Motion for JNOV at 27–c32. However, the plain meaning of “actual damages,” which Pohl is statutorily authorizeds to recover, supports Pohl’s recovery. Further, the tort-of-another doctrine permits Pohl to recover fees incurred in a separate proceeding as damages in this case. The Court should take note that Kassab continues to cite case law in a misleading fashion despite being on notice that he had falsely characterized cases in his briefing with the Court. For example, Kassab cites LaCore Enterprises, LLC v. Angles, No. 05-21-00798-CV, 2023 WL 2607562, at *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 23, 2023, no pet.) to suggest that Texas courts have rejected the idea that “attorneys’ feees in other cases [can] be recovered as actual damages in a trade secret claim.” See Motion fofr New Trial at 31; Motion for JNOV at 28–29 (emphasis added). But that case did not deal wiyth attorneys’ fees from “other cases,” it dealt with the uncontroversial proposition that fees frCom the same proceeding are not damages. LaCore, 2023 WL 2607562, at *9. Kassab was tolda that his use of this case was inaccurate, yet he continues to cite it to the Court in a misleading fmanner.17 PoUhl’s damages are recoverable under two alternative theories. First, the fees from other cases constitute “actual losses” under TUTSA. Contrary to Kassab’s suggestion that these damages are rigidly limited to specific categories, a “‘flexible and imaginative’ approach is applied 17 See Pohl’s Reply to Kassab’s Post-Hearing Letter on Pohl’s Motion for Entry of Judgment at 10 n. 6, filed Sept. 22, 2023. 23 to the calculation of damages in misappropriation-of-trade-secrets cases.” Sw. Energy Prod. Co. v. Berry-Helfand, 491 S.W.3d 699, 710 (Tex. 2016). Second, Pohl’s damages are also recoverable under the tort of another doctrine. Kassab relies on non-binding caselaw to suggest this doctrine does not apply. But he ignores precedent stating otherwise. See Dixon Fin. Skervices, Ltd. v. Chang, 325 S.W.3d 668, 678 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. dlenied) (“Equitable principles allow the recovery of attorney’s fees as actual damages whenc a party was required to prosecute or defend a prior legal action as a consequence of a wrongfsul act of the defendant.”). Kassab’s recycled arguments on damages have alreadys been made to the Court. Pohl’s prior briefing addresses the arguments in more detail.18 The Court should reject Kassab’s arguments on this issue, many of which rely on twisting or ignoring applicable case law that Kassab is aware of through prior briefing in this case. L. There is sufficient evidence to supaport the jury’s various calculations of damages (Motion for New Trial Issues ##M 14–15 and Motion for JNOV Issue #9(B)). Kassab argues that there was “oinsufficient evidence” and “no evidence” to support the jury’s findings of market value ancd development cost damages and that the Court improperly allowed Pohl to provide opinion testimony. See Motion for New Trial at 34–37; Motion for JNOV at 32–34. Even assuming Kassab’s objections on these issues were preserved at trial, Kassab’s arguments fall short. The record supports the jury’s damages findings, and Pohl’s limited opinion testimony on damcages was proper. 1. The jury’s findings of market value damages or reasonable royalty damages are Usupported by evidence. The jury heard testimony and saw evidence that supported its award of reasonable royalty or market value damages. Kassab contends that the only evidence before the jury of the so-called 18 See, e.g., Pohl’s Reply in Support of His Motion for Entry of Final Judgment at 9–12, filed Sept. 18, 2023; see also Pohl’s Reply to Kassab’s Post-Hearing Letter on Pohl’s Motion for Entry of Judgment at 4–5, filed Sept. 22, 2023. 24 market value of Pohl’s trade secrets was evidence of the “purchase price” Kassab paid to obtain them. See Motion for New Trial at 35; Motion for JNOV at 33. But that is not true. Pohl provided competent opinion testimony as the owner of the relevant property on the market value of his trade secrets. His opinion was informed by not only the cost tok Pohl to obtain the relevant trade secrets, but also multiple attempts to purchase the property alnd an actual sale of the property that was contemporaneous with the misappropriation of Pohlc’s trade secrets. See Red Sea Gaming, Inc. v. Block Investments (Nevada) Co., 338 S.W.3d 5s62, 572–73 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, pet. denied) (showing it is appropriate for a propesrty owner to consider unaccepted offers to purchase the property, knowledge of the relevant market, and the price at which the sale of property occurred). Contrary to Kassab’s assertions, it was proper for Pohl to provide this opinion testimony under the property owner rule. Binding preceadent confirms the property owner rule applies even when dealing with intangible property. See Custom Transit, L.P. v. Flatrolled Steel, Inc., 375 S.W.3d 337, 352 (Tex. App.—Housteon [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (citations omitted). And though it may be more difficult tof put a value on Pohl’s trade secrets, that is not a per se bar to his opinion testimony. See Jabryi v. Alsayyed, 145 S.W.3d 660, 667 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (allowiCng a property owner to testify regarding the market value of business goodwill, which is intangible property). Pohl was properly permitted to present evidence on this issue, and the jfufry was free to weigh the bases for his opinions. TUhe jury also saw documentary evidence relevant to the price a willing buyer would pay for Pohl’s trade secrets. The Favre affidavit discussed multiple offers to buy Pohl’s trade secrets and that the information could be sold multiple times. The jury also saw a document a federal judge described as a contract to purchase Pohl’s trade secrets. That document not only had a lump 25 sum price, but it also provided for continuing payments under the contract. Finally, the jury also heard testimony from Kassab personally that went to the value he placed on Pohl’s trade secrets at the time he purchased the trade secrets. 2. The jury’s development cost damages are supported by evidence. k Kassab suggests that no evidence exists to support the jury’s award ofl development cost damages, but he ignores the multiple categories of evidence admitted at trcial. See Motion for New Trial at 35–36; Motion for JNOV at 33–34. One such category is Kasssab’s testimony and related evidence that Kassab proffered to suggest that he did not need to purchase Pohl’s trade secrets. The jury was permitted to weigh this evidence, and the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s award of development cost damages. Kassab testified and claimed that he did not need to purchase Pohl’s trade secrets because he could independently gather contact information for Pohl’s clients. The jury heard and saw evidence concerning the time Kassab’s office expended to compile contact information to send a small number of initial advertisemenet letters in 2015. The jury also saw evidence of the hourly rates for Lance and David Kassabf. The jury was free toy look at this evidence and conclude that if Kassab had the names of Pohl’s clients, but notC the contact information, $200,000 was the value of the avoided costs to Kassab. He avoideda the need to manually research and compile contact information (the jury saw evidence that thfis required sending the same letter to multiple alternative addresses) by instead obtainingU accurate contact information from Pohl’s attorney–client contracts. Even if Kassab preserved this objection on this issue, he failed to demonstrate that the jury’s finding is unsupported by the trial record. 26 M. The jury properly found that Kassab engaged in a willful and malicious misappropriation of Pohl’s trade secrets (Motion for New Trial Issue #16). Contrary to Kassab’s assertion, the jury unanimously found that Kassab engaged in a “willful and malicious” misappropriation by “clear and convincing evidence.”19 And the testimony and documentary evidence shown to the jury at trial constituted “clearr and convincing evidence of outrageous, malicious, or otherwise reprehensible conduct” by Kassab that supports a finding of exemplary damages based on malice.20 See Horizon Health Croirp. v. Acadia Healthcare Co., Inc., 520 S.W.3d 848, 867 (Tex. 2017). D Kassab dismissively suggests that there are only two castegories of evidence relevant to this issue. While there was ample evidence on these issues prresented at trial, one of the categories of evidence that Kassab highlights demonstrates that the evidence supports the jury’s finding of malice. Contrary to what Kassab may think, the levidence showing that Kassab filed “a grievance against Pohl and cop[ied multiple] news ouMtlets and the District Attorney” is highly probative of malice. See Motion for New Trial at 39o. First, Kassab downplays thec scope of his conduct. While Kassab may have personally only filed a single grievance against Pohl, he was involved in drumming up seven failed grievances against Pohl. Even after Kassab was aware that the grievances Kassab assisted in bringing were without merit, Kassab filed another grievance that reasserted previously rejected allegations of wrongdoing againcst Pohl. Not content with attacking Pohl through the grievance process and court system, Kassab also sought to destroy Pohl and his reputation publicly and within the professional community of Texas lawyers. After filing a meritless grievance based partially on conduct already found to not 19 See Jury Verdict, Question 17 (instructing jury that to respond “Yes,” jury’s “answer must be unanimous.”), Ex. A. 20 Here, for the relevant conduct, Mr. Kassab acted on behalf of his firm at all times. Thus, the evidence is equally applicable to Mr. Kassab and his law firm. 27 constitute ethical violations, Kassab took the unprecedented step of publicizing the unreviewed grievance to the Texas Attorney General, the Harris County District Attorney, the Houston Chronicle, The Texas Lawyer, and a then-candidate for Texas State Bar President. The jury saw this evidence and heard about the unprecedented nature of Kassab publicizing a gkrievance in this manner. This is evidence the jury could view as clearly demonstrating lKassab wanted to improperly inflict unnecessary pain, inconvenience, public shame, and mconetary cost on Pohl. Kassab argues the “evidence is further insufficient because Poshl ‘adduced no evidence that [Kassab] caused [Pohl] an injury independent of and qsualitatively different than the misappropriation itself.’” Motion for New Trial at 40 (alterations in original) (citation omitted). But the Texas Supreme Court said that “this type of malice might exist ‘where the employer circulates false or malicious rumors about the employee before or after the discharge ... or actively interferes with the employee's ability to find otaher employment.’” Safeshred, Inc. v. Martinez, 365 S.W.3d 655, 662 (Tex. 2012), as corrected (June 8, 2012) (cleaned up). That is analogous to the situation here. Kassab sought to infliect reputational harm on Pohl outside the litigation process. Other evidence showed tfhe jury that Kassab was willing to go to great lengths to target Pohl. For example, undery the guise of a phony expert witness agreement, Kassab secretly purchased Pohl’s clienCt files and trade secrets for his own benefit. He then lied saying it was not a purchase agreement—including lying to the jury’s faces—despite a federal judge saying it was a purchase agrefefment. The jury also saw that, in that agreement, Kassab was willing to indemnify Favre agaUinst claims related to the disclosure of Pohl’s client information. This demonstrated Kassab’s knowledge of the breach of client confidentiality and duty of confidentiality owed by Favre when he acquired Pohl’s trade secrets. 28 The jury saw evidence of Kassab’s conduct towards Pohl beyond merely misappropriating Pohl’s trade secrets. Kassab attacked Pohl and tried to destroy him professionally and personally. The jury was empowered to consider this, and other evidence, and form a firm conviction that Kassab acted with malice towards Pohl when he misappropriated Pohl’s trade secrkets. N. The jury properly awarded exemplary damages against KassabC (lMotion for New Trial Issue #17 and Motion for JNOV Issue #12). The jury unanimously awarded Pohl exemplary damages againr ist Kassab after receiving considerable evidence regarding the blatant and offensive nature Dof Kassab’s wrongful conduct. Kassab’s argument otherwise ignores the testimony at trial asnd impermissibly assumes that the jury ignored the Court’s instructions to only award exemplrary damages if the jury were unanimous in finding such damages proper. Pohl previously responded to Kassab’s arglument that the jury was not unanimous with the necessary findings to support an award of Mexemplary damages. See Pohl’s Reply in Support of His Motion for Entry of Final Judgmeont at 2–8, filed Sept. 18, 2023; see also Pohl’s Reply to Kassab’s Post-Hearing Letter on Pochl’s Motion for Entry of Judgment at 1–4, filed Sept. 22, 2023. Pohl will not reiterate those recently briefed issues here and instead relies on his prior briefing. Kassab’s factually sufficiency arguments also fall short. The jury’s award of exemplary damages complies with the statutory requirement that exemplary damages not exceed twice the amount of actualc damages. Here, the jury found that Pohl suffered over $2 million in actual damages, so t o he jury’s award of $3 million in exemplary damages is proper.21 The remainder of Kassab’s factual argument relies on him making the conclusory assertion that “the jury probably considered improper items of alleged damages in assessing exemplary damages.” See Motion for New Trial at 41. But Kassab ignores evidence that went to multiple 21 See Jury Verdict, Question 7, Ex. A. 29 factors relevant to an award of punitive damages, and he ignores the potential scenario where the jury simply disagreed with him on what the evidence at trial suggested. For example, Kassab does not give any weight to the evidence at trial that showed Kassab’s malice. See supra Part IV(M). The jury saw evidence that despite the various persons involved, Kassab bore perskonal culpability for the wrongful conduct as the person orchestrating the conspiracy against Pohll. Kassab also lied to the jury by misrepresenting the nature of his contract to purchase Pohl’cs trade secrets. Finally, the jury saw other evidence relevant to establishing thast Kassab’s conduct offended a public sense of justice and propriety. Kassab holds himself oust as someone who upholds ethical rules and ensures lawyers act honestly. He proudly professes that he is aware of the ethical duties of lawyers. The jury saw this evidence, and they also saw evidence of Kassab acting unethically and deceitfully—he improperly accessed another lawyer’s confidential client information—in orchestrating a scheme to misappropriate Pohal’s trade secrets and harass Pohl personally. Kassab’s suggestion that none of the evidence supported the factors weighed in awarding exemplary damages is belied by the etrial record. The jury was well within its rights to find that the record supported an award off $3 million in exemplary damages against Kassab. O. Pohl’s conspiracyy claim was not preempted (Motion for New Trial Issue #18 and Motion for JNOV Issue #11). The Court has previously ruled that Pohl’s conspiracy claim is not preempted. Kassab argues that TUTScA conflicts with and preempts Pohl’s conspiracy claim. See Motion for New Trial at 41–43; Motion for JNOV at 35–36. Kassab’s argument is inconsistent with his position that proportionate responsibility applies to the TUTSA claim, and he does not address that inconsistency. Kassab’s argument was rejected by the Court before, and the Court should reject it again. 30 As discussed in Pohl’s prior briefing,22 after Texas adopted TUTSA, Texas trial courts continued to submit TUTSA and conspiracy claims to the jury. This is because conspiracy, like proportionate responsibility, does not provide a conflicting remedy that is preempted under TUTSA. Pohl’s TUTSA claim provides the remedy—damages for misappropriatikng Pohl’s trade secrets. Conspiracy makes the same remedy apply jointly and severallly among multiple defendants. That is no more objectionable or inconsistent with TUTSAc than the proportionate responsibility statute—which Kassab argues is applicable—that smodifies the remedy so a defendant is responsible for a percentage of the harm. s Because there is no conflict between TUTSA and the joint and several liability imposed by a finding of conspiracy, the Court properly submitted Pohl’s conspiracy claim to the jury. Kassab’s arguments otherwise are inconsistent with his position on the applicability of proportionate responsibility, and the Court should deny Kaassab’s request for a new trial or to set aside the judgment on these grounds. P. The Court properly deniede Kassab’s request to designate non-relevant persons as responsible third parties (Motion for New Trial Issue #19). The Court properly denied Kassab’s request to designate five additional persons as responsible third parties after Kassab failed to plead sufficient facts demonstrating their liability. Despite being given the opportunity to re-plead and satisfy his pleading burden, Kassab chose not to comply with thce legal standard to designate these persons as responsible third parties, and the Court properly denied his request to designate additional responsible third parties as a result. Kassab first attempted to designate the five people at issue as responsible third parties in early 2022.23 Pohl objected because Kassab failed to plead sufficient facts showing the alleged 22 See Pohl’s Reply in Support of His Motion for Entry of Final Judgment at 13–15, filed Sept. 18, 2023; see also Pohl’s Reply to Kassab’s Post-Hearing Letter on Pohl’s Motion for Entry of Judgment at 6, filed Sept. 22, 2023. 23 See generally Kassab’s Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties, filed May 13, 2022. 31 responsible third parties were responsible for the harms underlying Pohl’s claims.24 The 189th District Court agreed with Pohl’s objections and denied Kassab’s motion.25 Later that year, Kassab filed two supplemental motions to designate responsible third parties. Pohl did not oppose designating certain persons listed in Kassab’s second supplemental motion as reksponsible third parties. However, in Kassab’s first supplemental motion, Kassab sought to dlesignate the same five people as responsible third parties that were at issue in his first moticon and that Kassab now complains about in his Motion for New Trial. s Pohl filed a response in opposition to Kassab’s second attsempt to designate the five relevant people as responsible third parties.26 Despite the 189th District Court finding that Kassab failed to meet the pleading standard—which required Kassab to plead sufficient facts showing that the alleged responsible third parties were responsible for the harms underlying Pohl’s claims—Kassab pled the same facts. Kassab tried to disguisea this fact by reordering and lightly paraphrasing or modifying the allegations.27 In such circumstances, it was not an abuse of this Court’s discretion to deny Kassab’s Supplemental Motieon to Designate Responsible Third Parties. The Court’s decision to dfeny Kassab’s motion was proper on other grounds as well. For example, the limitations periyods on Pohl’s torts claims passed with respect to the persons at issue, and Kassab failed to coCmply with his obligations “to timely disclose that the[se] person[s] may be designated as a responsible third party under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. fCf ODE § 33.004(d). Because Kassab’s responses to Pohl’s requests for disclosure 24 See generally Pohl’s Objection to Kassab’s Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties, filed May 31, 2022. 25 See Court Order, dated Oct. 31, 2022 (denying Kassab’s first motion to designate responsible third parties). 26 See generally Pohl’s Objection to Kassab’s Supplemental Motion to Designate Responsible Third Parties, filed Nov. 30, 2022. 27 See id. at 3–5 (discussing how Kassab failed to plead any new substantive factual allegations). 32 did not include the necessary information, this was an independent basis to not designate the persons at issue as responsible third parties. See In re Dawson, 550 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex. 2018). Q. The Court properly exercised its discretion to not abate this case (Motion for New Trial Issue #20). In the fall of 2022, Kassab filed his Motion to Abate. The 189th Districrt Court correctly found that abatement of this case was not proper or necessary. Kassab then sought reconsideration of that ruling from this Court, and the Court exercised its discretion anrdi denied Kassab’s request to abate this case. Kassab’s arguments for why this lawsuit shoulDd have been abated pending the resolution of another lawsuit were not squarely presenteds in his prior motion requesting abatement.28 Even if Kassab’s arguments were not waiverd, the Court properly chose not to abate this case before,29 and Kassab’s two current arguments do not demonstrate it was an abuse of this Court’s discretion to deny his request for abatemelnt. First, Kassab claims that “the outcomMe of Cheatham could alter the course of this litigation because if it resulted in a judgment agaoinst Pohl for barratry, Pohl could not have argued that all the barratry claims brought against hcim were frivolous.” Motion for New Trial at 45. But barratry is not a defense to Pohl’s claims. In each of the other cases and grievances alleging barratry, Kassab failed to obtain a finding of barratry against Pohl. But even if there were eventually a liability finding against Pohl in Cheatham, it would not have changed Pohl’s right to recover on his claims in this clawsuit.30 Second, Kassab argues that abatement was proper because Pohl’s damages in this case involved Pohl’s attorneys’ fees from Cheatham, “[b]ut if Pohl had been found liable for barratry 28 Compare Motion for New Trial at 44–45, with Kassab’s Motion to Abate Trial Setting at 1–5, filed Sept. 6, 2022, and Kassab’s Motion to Reconsider or Rule at 2, filed Feb. 23, 2023, 29 See Plaintiff’s Response to Kassab’s Motion to Abate Trial Setting, filed Sept. 15, 2022; see also Plaintiffs’ Response in Partial Opposition to Kassab’s Motion to Reconsider or Rule at 3, filed March 8, 2023. 30 See also Pohl’s Letter Brief Concerning Barratry and Pohl’s Rule 166(g) Motion, filed Aug. 15, 2023; Pohl’s Rule 166(g) Motion at 2–8, filed Nov. 30, 2022. 33 in Cheatham, then he would have been required to pay attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs in that case.” See id. This, again, has no materiality to the issues in this case. Kassab’s hypothetical world, in which Pohl paid third parties for their attorneys’ fees in Cheatham, does not impact whether Kassab is liable in this lawsuit for Pohl’s attorneys’ fees in Cheatham. Kassab isk conflating two separate categories of attorneys’ fees. This does not provide a basis for abatelment and certainly does not establish that the Court abused its discretion in denying Kassab’cs request for abatement. R. Pohl did not waive the attorney–client privilege throughs offensive use, and he presented proper evidence of his fees (Motion for New Trial Issues #21 & #23). Kassab makes two types of arguments related to prsivilege and attorneys’ fees. First, Kassab argues that the offensive use doctrine applies, anrd Pohl waived privilege with respect to multiple categories of privileged information related to Billy Shepherd. Motion for New Trial 45– 47. Second, Kassab argues that Pohl’s evidence alt trial concerning attorneys’ fees was conclusory and improperly redacted. Id. at 49–54. KaMssab’s arguments do not survive scrutiny. As a threshold point, Kassab’s ocaselaw recognizes that “attorney invoices are routinely redacted when offered into evidencce to protect attorney–client and work-product privileges.” KBIDC Investments, LLC v. Zuru Toys Inc., No. 05-19-00159-CV, 2020 WL 5988014, at *22 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 9, 2020, pet. denied). See Motion for New Trial at 53 (citing KBIDC). Despite citing this case law, Kassab wrongly suggests that such redactions are per se inappropriate. 1. Kassacb did not establish the applicability of offensive use waiver. Pohl doid not engage in offensive use that could waive the attorney client privilege because he did not improperly use or take advantage of privileged materials to support his claims. The Texas Supreme Court established a three-part test for offensive use waiver that required Kassab to establish (1) Pohl sought affirmative relief that implicated privileged materials; (2) the withheld privileged materials would be outcome determinative; and (3) disclosure of the privileged 34 materials is the only way to obtain the evidence. See Republic Ins. Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. 1993); see also In re Microvast, Inc., No. 01-18-00049-CV, 2018 WL 4131068, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 30, 2018, no pet.). Kassab never established the three relevant factors to show offensive usek waiver. Thus, the Court properly declined to compel the production of privileged materials.l It is worth noting that Mr. Shepherd became a witness in this case at Kassab’s request. Kcassab subpoenaed Billy Shepherd’s deposition and documents in this case and then designasted Mr. Shepherd as a trial witness in November 2022. Mr. Shepherd complied with Kassabs’s subpoena—he produced nearly a half million pages of documents and was deposed at Kassab’s request. Kassab was not happy with the voluminous information he requested, so he filed a motion to compel.31 Kassab wanted the 189th District Court to overrule privilege objections, require the production of additional documents, and requaire the production of unredacted invoices. But the record was clear that Kassab sought to pierce privilege to obtain discovery about the mental impressions of his opposing counsel ein a different lawsuit and engage in a fishing expedition in the hopes that privileged communfications and documents would be relevant to his defenses. Pohl responded and pointed out tyhat Kassab failed to carry his burden to establish the applicability of the offensive use doctrCine.32 This Court agreed when it properly rejected Kassab’s prior request to reconsider this ruling. Kassabf aflso failed to demonstrate that the offensive use doctrine applied at trial. Redaction of invoicUes is common, and Kassab could not articulate any specific examples of over-redaction 31 Kassab’s Motion to Compel Testimony & Documents Pursuant to the Offensive Use Doctrine, filed Sept. 20, 2022. 32 See Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to the Kassab Defendants’ Three New Motions to Compel, at 7–16, filed Sept. 27, 2022. 35 to the Court that were inappropriate. See KBIDC Investments, 2020 WL 5988014, at *22. As a result, the Court properly allowed Pohl to submit appropriately redacted invoices at trial. 2. Pohl’s evidence of attorneys’ fees was proper and factually sufficient. Kassab argues that Pohl presented insufficient evidence of attorneys’ fees ikn this lawsuit at trial because Pohl used redacted invoices, and Kassab contends that certain exlpert testimony was conclusory. The issue of redacted invoices was discussed at trial, acnd the Court found the redactions appropriate. Kassab’s other argument is his unsupportsed assertion that the expert testimony supporting fees was conclusory. Neither argument has merit. Kassab cherry-picked redacted entries from Pohl’s invoices, but he did not demonstrate that any such redactions were material or improper. He also does not account for the fact that Pohl’s attorneys’ fees expert applied a blanket discount to the fees reflected in the redacted invoices. In addition to excluding certain invoice entries entirely, in reaching an opinion on the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees, Pohl’s expert applied a 10% discount to the total amount of fees to account for any unnecessarye or unrecoverable entries on the fee invoices that were not otherwise removed. To the extenft that some entries were arguably over-redacted, such an issue is harmless when a substantialy blanket deduction is applied like it was here. For the same reason, although the conversioCn and TUTSA claims were intertwined, any time entries that advanced only the conversion claima were resolved by this blanket, catch-all deduction. Finally, fKassab’s contention that Mr. Zavitsanos’s testimony was conclusory is without evidentiaUry support. When Mr. Zavitsanos’s testimony was fresh in the Court’s recollection, the Court found his testimony sufficient to submit the issue of attorneys’ fees to the jury. Kassab’s argument to the contrary lacks any evidentiary support. Pohl contends that the record will show that Mr. Zavitsanos’s testimony was not conclusory and that he provided “opinion testimony about 36 the services [he] reasonably believes will be necessary to defend the appeal and a reasonable hourly rate for those services.” See Yowell v. Granite Operating Co., 620 S.W.3d 335, 355 (Tex. 2020). Additionally, the case law that Kassab cites is inapplicable to the circumstances of this case. Kassab cites Desio v. Del Bosque, No. 05-21-00022-CV, 2022 WL 50002k5 (Tex. App.— Dallas Feb. 18, 2022, no pet.) on the issue of conclusory evidence. Motion folr New Trial at 53. But that case dealt with a fee affidavit where the attorney “did not specifyc the amount of time any person spent on particular tasks and no billing records were submitteds.” Desio, 2022 WL 500025, at *2. At trial, Pohl provided precisely this type of evidence to sthe jury. The Court should reject Kassab’s unsupported objection to the sufficiency of the evidence on attorneys’ fees. S. The 189th District Court properly dismissed Kassab’s counterclaim for civil barratry (Motion for New Trial Issue #22). Before this case was transferred to the lCourt, Kassab asserted counterclaims for civil barratry against Pohl. Despite asserting coMunterclaims for barratry, Kassab tried to withhold the identity of who assigned him barratry oclaims—and thus, he withheld information on who Pohl allegedly committed barratry againsct. After seeking to compel production of this basic information about Kassab’s counterclaims, Pohl learned that Kassab’s counterclaims were assigned claims from Kassab’s clients, and those same claims were also asserted in a separate still-pending lawsuit. Once Pohl learned that the counterclaims were the same claims asserted in another lawsuit, he quickly discovcered that there was already a judgment in his favor on those claims at the trial court level, although the claims were still part of an ongoing appeal. Despite his duties as a lawyer in both this lawsuit and the other lawsuit involving the same barratry claims, Kassab did not notify the courts involved of his duplicative assertion of the barratry claims in a separate lawsuit. After uncovering Kassab’s inappropriate behavior with these counterclaims, Pohl moved for summary 37 judgment on multiple grounds, and the 189th District Court properly dismissed Kassab’s counterclaims.33 First, it was undisputable that Kassab’s counterclaims were the very same claims as those resolved by prior final judgments on the merits. Res judicata applies to such claimks, and the prior judgments dismissing those barratry claims precluded Kassab from re-litigatinlg them through his counterclaim in this lawsuit. Kassab’s argument otherwise relies on a ccase that “addressed the issue of whether res judicata can bar a subsequent suit on a cause of acstion that was not recognized until after judgment was rendered in the first suit.” Marino v. sState Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 948, 949 (Tex. 1990). That has no application to the facts of this case, where claims existed and were directly ruled on in a prior proceeding. Second, Kassab argues that limitations on the counterclaims were tolled by section 16.069 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Tahis issue should not be reached because the claims were barred by res judicata. But even if the Court reaches this issue, the counterclaims do not meet the requirements of section 16.0e69 because they do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as Pohl’s claims, andf Kassab did not give fair notice of the facts giving rise to the counterclaims within the 30y-day period prescribed by section 16.069. Kassab did not give fair notice of the claims inC part because he concealed the identity of who assigned him the claims to avoid disclosing tha a t his claims had been asserted and ruled on against him in a separate lawsuit.34 Third, af fclaim for civil barratry is a punitive statutory claim that is not expressly assignable. Kassab pUrocured the assigned claims from his then-current clients to evade the statute of 33 See Pohl’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendants’ Counterclaims, filed Dec. 7, 2021; see also Pohl’s Reply in Support of His Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendants’ Counterclaims, filed Feb. 4, 2022. 34 This issue is discussed in more detail in the original briefing. See Pohl’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendants’ Counterclaims at 11–12; see also Pohl’s Reply in Support of His Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendants’ Counterclaims at 6–7. 38 limitations and in violation of ethical rules concerning attorney–client transactions. As authorized by the Texas Supreme Court, the 189th District Court was empowered to refuse to recognize the assignments, as “assignments may be invalidated on public policy grounds.” See Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Mktg. on Hold Inc., 308 S.W.3d 909, 916 (Tex. 2010); see also PPG Indus., Inc. vk. JMB/Houston Centers Partners Ltd. P’ship, 146 S.W.3d 79, 87 (Tex. 2004) (“[T]he assignabillity of most claims does not mean all are assignable; exceptions may be required due to equicty and public policy.”). Kassab’s counterclaims for barratry were barred for multiple sreasons. After reviewing the evidence submitted by the parties, the 189th District Cousrt correctly dismissed Kassab’s counterclaims. That ruling should not be disturbed now, after trial, and after a jury reached a verdict. V. CONyCLUSION For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in Pohl’s prior briefing—which is incorporated fully herein by reference—Plaintiffs Michael Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl respectfully request that the Ceourt deny Kassab’s Motion for New Trial and Motion for JNOV. f 39 Dated: February 2, 2024 Respectfully submitted, REYNOLDS FRIZZELL LLP By: /s/ Jean C. Frizzell Jean C. Frizzell State Bar No. 07484650 k 1100 Louisiana St., Suite 3500 e Houston, Texas 77002 l Tel. 713.485.7200 Fax 713.485.7250 c jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.rcom Attorney for PlaintifDfs Michael Pohl and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC CERTIFICATE OF SERrVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document was served on all counsel of record pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this 2nd day of February, 2024. M /s/ Jean C. Frizzell Jean C. Frizzell 40 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Suni Blue on behalf of Jean Frizzell Bar No. 7484650 sblue@reynoldsfrizzell.com r Envelope ID: 84110431 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: Pohl's Response to MNT JNOV t Status as of 2/2/2024 4:54 PM CST i Case Contacts D Name BarNumber Email e TimestampSubmitted Status Harris Wells hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Andrew Johnson ajohnson@Bthompsoncoe.com 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Benjamin Ritz britz@thnompsoncoe.com 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Murray JFogler mfoglielr@foglerbrar.com 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Murray Fogler mfogler@fbfog.com 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Dale Jefferson 10607900jefferson@mdjwlaw.com 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Raul Herman Suazo 24003021 suazo@mdjwlaw.com 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Kevin Graham Cain 2O4012371 cain@mdjwlaw.com 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Todd Taylor y ttaylor@jandflaw.com 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Scott M.Favre o scott@favrepa.com 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Lawyer Wade lawyerwade@hotmail.com 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Chris C.Pappas cpappas@krcl.com 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Non-Party Witness Bfilily Shepherd bshepherd@spcounsel.com 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Non-Party Dona Pohl DonaLyann@yahoo.com 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Non-Party Edgar Jaimes edgarsroom@gmail.com 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Kevin Dubose 6150500 kdubose@adjtlaw.com 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Marisa Barrera Cruz Hurd 24041157 mhurd@adjtlaw.com 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Andrea Mendez andrea@kassab.law 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Lance Kassab lance@kassab.law 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT David Kassab david@kassab.law 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Nicholas Pierce nicholas@kassab.law 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Suni Blue on behalf of Jean Frizzell Bar No. 7484650 sblue@reynoldsfrizzell.com r Envelope ID: 84110431 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: Pohl's Response to MNT JNOV t Status as of 2/2/2024 4:54 PM CST i Case Contacts D Nicholas Pierce nicholas@kassab.law 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Lance Kassab eserve@kassab.law 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT D Kassab david@kasBsab.law 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT L Kassab lance@knassab.law 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Kelly Skelton recepitlion@kassab.law 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Thallia Malespin tmalespin@reynoldsfrizzell.com 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Misty Davis mdavis@reynoldsfrizzell.com 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Harris Wells hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT David Kassab O david@kassab.law 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Harris Wells y hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT Harris Wells o hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com 2/2/2024 4:44:54 PM SENT |
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