Legal Theories
Data license: Public court records
33 rows where party = "Pohl" and role = "defense"
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| theory_id ▼ | filing_id | theory | party | role | basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 23 | 3 3 | Defense against barratry allegations — characterizing agreements as legitimate PR/marketing service contracts | Pohl | defense | Pohl asserts his contracts with PR Consultants were for legitimate hourly-rate public relations and client liaison services with a percentage-of-fees cap, not barratry fee-sharing agreements. PR Consultants' own claims in Federal Court Lawsuit confirmed hourly-rate basis. |
| 24 | 3 3 | PR Consultants acted independently and in violation of their contracts | Pohl | defense | PR Consultants were solely responsible for hiring, supervising, and controlling employees; any improper solicitation was done in violation of their contractual obligations to comply with all applicable rules. Their Mississippi attorneys reviewed and approved all contracts. |
| 26 | 3 3 | Unauthorized use of Pohl's name by third parties | Pohl | defense | Julia Porter and Monica Chaney operated unauthorized website using Pohl's name; some client contacts may have been made by unauthorized individuals, not by or at direction of Pohl |
| 83 | 9 9 | TCPA Does Not Apply — Claims Not Based on Protected Conduct | Pohl | defense | Pohl's conversion, TUTSA, and conspiracy claims are based on wrongful acts (purchasing stolen property, misappropriating trade secrets), not on protected speech, petition, or association |
| 84 | 9 9 | TCPA Commercial Speech Exception (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.010(b)) | Pohl | defense | Even if TCPA applies, Kassab is primarily engaged in selling legal services, his solicitation of Pohl's clients arose from commercial transactions, and the intended audience was potential customers — satisfying all four Castleman elements |
| 88 | 9 9 | Statute of Limitations Not Expired | Pohl | defense | Favre-Kassab Agreement executed November 10, 2016; suit filed August 2018 — within 2-year conversion period and 3-year TUTSA period |
| 89 | 9 9 | Attorney Immunity Inapplicable | Pohl | defense | Attorney immunity protects conduct within scope of client representation; Kassab had no clients at the time of the wrongful purchase |
| 90 | 9 9 | Res Judicata Inapplicable | Pohl | defense | Kassab was not a party to the Mississippi settlement; claims against Kassab are not the 'same as' claims settled in that case |
| 145 | 15 15 | Mandatory Stay Under Interlocutory Appeal — Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(b) | Pohl | defense | Kassab's interlocutory appeal of TCPA denial triggers automatic stay of all trial court proceedings; actions taken during stay are voidable |
| 146 | 15 15 | TCPA Untimely Filing — Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.003(b) | Pohl | defense | TCPA motion must be filed within 60 days of service; Favre/Precision filed late without showing good cause; Defendants actually benefited from late filing |
| 147 | 15 15 | TCPA Inapplicability — Claims Not Based on Protected Conduct | Pohl | defense | Pohl's claims for conversion, TUTSA violations, conspiracy, and breach of contract target wrongful sale of stolen property, not exercise of free speech, petition, or association rights |
| 148 | 15 15 | TCPA Commercial Speech Exception — Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.010(b) | Pohl | defense | TCPA does not apply because Precision is primarily in the marketing business, conduct arose in that capacity, transaction involved marketing goods/services, and intended audience was Kassab as actual buyer |
| 150 | 15 15 | Statute of Limitations Not Expired | Pohl | defense | Settlement Agreement executed April/May 2017 (4-year breach of contract period); Favre-Kassab Agreement November 10, 2016 (within 2-year and 3-year periods); Pohl was not aware of claims in the two-year period prior to filing |
| 154 | 17 17 | Limitations Rebuttal — Separate Accrual for Each Defendant | Pohl | defense | Claims against Kassab accrued from his specific conduct (November 2016 purchase and subsequent use), not from prior conduct of others. Each possession is a new conversion. TUTSA accrues upon commercial use. Kassab must conclusively establish accrual and negate the discovery rule, which he has not done. |
| 155 | 17 17 | Res Judicata Rebuttal — No Privity, Different Subject Matter | Pohl | defense | Kassab was not a party to the Federal Court Case. Under Texas three-part privity test, mere allegations of conspiracy are insufficient. Kassab provides no evidence of control, representation of interests, or successor-in-interest status. The factual bases differ: Federal Counterclaim addressed conversion of funds (billing fraud), not theft of confidential information. |
| 156 | 17 17 | Attorney Immunity Rebuttal — No Attorney-Client Relationship; Conduct Outside Scope | Pohl | defense | Kassab had no clients when he purchased stolen information. His conduct of buying stolen property is not uniquely lawyerly. The doctrine requires both scope of representation and attorney-client relationship at the time of conduct. Solicitation preceding the 'meeting of the minds' cannot be within scope of client representation. Kassab provided no evidence of an attorney-client relationship at the time of wrongful conduct. |
| 177 | 21 21 | Lack of Legal Capacity — Tex. R. Civ. P. 93(1) and 93(2) | Pohl | defense | Kassab lacks legal capacity to sue on assigned barratry claims because such assignments (whether complete or partial) are void |
| 178 | 21 21 | Special Exceptions for Defective Pleading — Texas fair notice pleading standard | Pohl | defense | Kassab's counterclaim is obscure and fails to provide fair notice of the nature, basic issues, and potentially relevant evidence of the controversy; fails to identify cause of action, assignors, or supporting facts |
| 187 | 22 22 | Res Judicata | Pohl | defense | Prior final judgments on the merits in Brumfield and Gandy cases dismissed the same barratry claims; Kassab is in privity with Assignors as successor-in-interest; Kassab admits claims are the same; judgment final even if appealed; dismissal on limitations is on the merits |
| 188 | 22 22 | Statute of Limitations (four-year bar on barratry claims) | Pohl | defense | Claims accrued when clients were solicited (no later than May 2013 for most; no later than 2014 for Clemons and Riggs), making them time-barred by May 2017 or 2016 respectively, before this lawsuit or the counterclaim was filed |
| 189 | 22 22 | Section 16.069 Inapplicability — Same Transaction or Occurrence Not Met | Pohl | defense | The logical relationship test is not satisfied because facts of alleged barratry (2012-2014) are not significant and logically relevant to Pohl's conversion/trade secret claims regarding Kassab's 2016 conduct; separated by years, different parties, no common elements of proof |
| 190 | 22 22 | Section 16.069 Inapplicability — No Fair Notice Within 30 Days | Pohl | defense | Kassab's counterclaim failed to identify the assignors or state facts giving rise to the claims, failing the Rule 47 fair notice requirement under Rogers; Pohl could not determine until discovery in 2021 that claims were identical to those rejected |
| 191 | 22 22 | Section 16.069 Inapplicability — Post-Lawsuit Assignment Cannot Revive Claims | Pohl | defense | The statute's purpose of preventing tactical delay is not served when claims were assigned after litigation commenced; applying Code Construction Act factors (Ball), allowing this would frustrate the object, purpose, and public interest underlying § 16.069 |
| 192 | 22 22 | Non-Assignability of Punitive Statutory Claims (PPG Industries framework) | Pohl | defense | Civil barratry claims are personal and punitive statutory claims analogous to DTPA claims; the statute is silent on assignability; the legislature knew how to make them assignable but did not; purpose is to protect a specific class (clients); penalties are punitive in nature; assignments increase litigation |
| 193 | 22 22 | Public Policy Invalidity of Assignments | Pohl | defense | Assignments that tend to increase or prolong litigation unnecessarily, serve as transparent devices to circumvent limitations, or injure the public good violate public policy and are void (Sw. Bell, LAKXN, Am. Homeowner, Wright v. Sydow, State Farm v. Gandy) |
| 194 | 22 22 | Violation of Ethical Rules — Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof'l Conduct 1.08(h) | Pohl | defense | A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client; Kassab obtained assignments from his own clients concerning their pending litigation |
| 201 | 24 24 | Res Judicata — Dispositive | Pohl | defense | Kassab confirmed his counterclaims are the same claims previously adjudicated; Marino (subsequently recognized claim) and Stubbs (new ordinance, different land use) are distinguishable because the barratry claims existed and were dismissed before the second action; under Hernandez, focus is on whether claim existed and could have been raised |
| 202 | 24 24 | Statute of Limitations — Section 16.069 Inapplicable | Pohl | defense | Kassab does not dispute the underlying claims are time-barred; § 16.069 does not apply because the claims are from different transactions, fair notice was not given, and post-lawsuit assignments cannot trigger the savings clause |
| 203 | 24 24 | Logical Relationship Test — 'Significant' Requirement | Pohl | defense | Kassab selectively omitted the requirement that facts must be 'significant and logically relevant' (not merely logically relevant) to both claims; how Precision acquired information is not significant to Pohl's claims about Kassab's 2016 purchase and use |
| 204 | 24 24 | Non-Assignability of Punitive Statutory Claims (PPG framework) | Pohl | defense | PPG's four-factor analysis applies beyond DTPA claims to any statutory punitive claims; barratry claims are personal and punitive; legislature was silent on assignability; risks of distortion apply to the class of claims; Kassab ignored the four factors |
| 205 | 24 24 | Public Policy Invalidity — Assignments as Transparent Devices | Pohl | defense | Kassab's own admissions show the Assignments 'tend to increase or prolong litigation' and are 'transparent devices' to circumvent limitations, violating public policy under Sw. Bell and LAKXN; Kassab's 'unclean hands' argument is not competent evidence |
| 206 | 24 24 | Judicial Estoppel Inapplicable to Pohl | Pohl | defense | Pohl did not take an inconsistent position (referred to 'purported' assignments) and did not prevail on the argument in the Texas Supreme Court; Ferguson requires 'successfully maintained' position, which Kassab selectively omitted |
| 339 | 47 47 | Insufficient pleading of responsible third party allegations under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004(g)(1) | Pohl | defense | Pohl argues Kassab failed to plead sufficient facts showing the alleged RTPs were responsible for the harms underlying Pohl's claims, and the Supplemental RTP Motion merely recycles previously rejected allegations with no new factual content |
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CREATE TABLE legal_theories (
theory_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
filing_id INTEGER REFERENCES filings(filing_id),
theory TEXT,
party TEXT,
role TEXT,
basis TEXT
);