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55 2023-03-29 RSP Pohl Response to Amended MSJ Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to the Amended Motions for Summary Judgment Filed by the Kassab Defendants Filed March 29, 2023 in the 281st Judicial District Court (Judge Weems) by Jean C. Frizzell of Reynolds Frizzell LLP. Responds to Kassab's Amended MSJ (filing #50). Pohl argues the Amended Motion is a disguised motion to reconsider that reiterates the same arguments and evidence denied by the 189th District Court on October 31, 2022. Pohl objects to oral hearing under 281st Court Procedure I(I). MSJ-4 N/A Phase 4 2023-03-29_RSP_Pohl-Response-to-Kassab-Amended-MSJ_FILED.pdf Deny Kassab's Amended Motions for Traditional and No-Evidence Summary Judgment 3/29/2023 5:09 PM Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No. 74146534 By: Julia Adkins Filed: 3/29/2023 5:09 PM CAUSE NO. 2018-58419 MICHAEL A. POHL, et. al § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiffs, § V. § HARRIS COUNTY,k TEXAS § e LANCE CHRISTOPHER § C l KASSAB, et. al §  § c Defendants. § 281ST JUDrICIAL DISTRICT PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO THE AMENDED MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED BY THE KASsSAB DEFENDANTS Plaintiffs Michael Pohl and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl (collectively “Pohl”) respond in opposition to the Amended Motions for Traditional and No-Evidence Summary Judgment (the “Amended Motion”) filed by Defendants Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C., d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm (coallectively “Kassab”). I. INTRODUCTION The Court should not entertaien motions to reconsider filed under another name, especially when such a motion fails to makef any statement about why reconsideration is warranted. Despite its name, the Amended Motiyon does not specify what prior motions it purports to amend. But, in substance, it seeks recoCnsideration of Kassab’s previous motions for summary judgment that the 189th District Courat denied. Kassab does not explain why those prior rulings were wrong, nor does he attemptf to explain whether the facts, arguments, or law have changed from the previously denied mUotions. Kassab has not demonstrated that the Court should reconsider or revisit those rulings, or that any prior ruling was erroneous. Thus, the Court should deny the Amended Motion. Pohl also objects to the hearing on Kassab’s Amended Motion. The vast majority of the Amended Motion is directly copied and pasted from Kassab’s prior motions for traditional and no- evidence summary judgment that were denied by the 189th District Court. Kassab seeks the same relief and uses the same arguments as contained in his denied motions. Thus, the Amended Motion is a motion to “reconsider” with a different title. Under this Court’s procedures, “[a]ll motions to reconsider are heard by submission only.” Procedure I(I) of the 281st Judicial District Court. Kassab has not requested reconsideration of the prior summary judgment mkotions—instead he purports to seek a new ruling on already decided issues. See generally Amelnded Motion. This failure to request reconsideration alone warrants the Court denying the cAmended Motion. But even if the Court were to reconsider the prior denials of the summary sjudgment motions, the result would be no different. The 189th District Court reached the corsrect result, and Kassab’s failure to explain otherwise is telling. As discussed below, Pohl’s prior briefing on these issues is dispositive, and Kassab’s limited presentation of new information in the Amended Motion does not justify a different result. II. BaACKGROUND On August 29, 2022, Kassab filed motions for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment (“Kassab’s Original MSJs”e). Kassab’s No-Evidence MSJ sought judgment on Pohl’s affirmative claims.1 Kassab’s Trfa f ditional MSJ also sought judgment on Pohl’s claims, as well as on Kassab’s affirmative defyenses.2 On September 12, 2022, Pohl filed responses to Kassab’s Original MSJs that demConstrated that summary judgment in Kassab’s favor was not proper.3 Pohl’s Respaonse to Kassab’s No-Evidence MSJ—which attached over 30 exhibits of relevant evidenfce—demonstrated that there was sufficient evidence to support each element of Pohl’s afUfirmative claims.4 Pohl’s Response to Kassab’s Traditional MSJ laid out how Kassab 1 See Kassab’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, filed Aug. 29, 2022 (“Kassab’s No-Evidence MSJ”). 2 See Kassab’s Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment, filed Aug. 29, 2022 (“Kassab’s Traditional MSJ”). 3 See Pohl’s Response in Opposition to the No Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment Filed by the Kassab Defendants and the Nicholson Defendants, filed Sept. 12, 2022 (“Pohl’s Response to Kassab’s No-Evidence MSJ”); Pohl’s Response in Opposition to the Traditional Motions for Summary Judgment Filed by the Kassab Defendants and the Nicholson Defendants, filed Sept. 12, 2022 (“Pohl’s Response to Kassab’s Traditional MSJ”). 4 See generally Pohl’s Response to Kassab’s No-Evidence MSJ (including the evidence cited therein). failed to carry his summary judgment burden—Kassab did not show that there were no disputed material facts, nor did he demonstrate a right to judgment as a matter of law.5 After an oral hearing, the 189th District Court denied Kassab’s Original MSJs on October 31, 2022.6 On January 4, 2023, Kassab filed his Motion to Reconsider Traditional ankd No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment, in which he asked Judge Craft to reconsidler prior rulings on Kassab’s Original MSJs.7 Kassab filed this motion and set it for hearingc with the 189th District Court, despite the fact that this lawsuit had been transferred to this Csourt. In this motion, Kassab reiterated the same arguments and evidence contained in Kassabs’s Original MSJs—however, that motion did explicitly request reconsideration of the denial of Kassab’s Original MSJs.8 Without explanation, on February 24, 2023, Kassab filed the Amended Motion. It does not state what motion(s) it amends. See generally Amended Motion. Like Kassab’s Motion to Reconsider, that he filed the prior month, Kassaab’s Amended Motion contains the same arguments and evidence contained in Kassab’s Original MSJs.9 However, Kassab removed references to reconsideration of Kassab’s Originale MSJs. See id. On its face, the Amended Motion does not purport to be based on new evidenfce, changes in the law, or new arguments that were not presented in Kassab’s Original MSJys. See id. However, Kassab’s omission of any discussion of reconsideration does Cnot change the substance of the Amended Motion. At best, it is an amendment to Kassab’s prior request for reconsideration of the denial of Kassab’s Original MSJs. 5 See generally Pohl’s Response to Kassab’s Traditional MSJ (including the evidence cited therein). 6 See Court Order, entered Oct. 31, 2022. 7 See Kassab’s Motion to Reconsider Traditional and No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment, at 3 (“Kassab files this Motion to Reconsider to correct the erroneous ruling of the prior judge relating to the Kassab’s Traditional and No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment.”). 8 Compare Kassab’s Motion to Reconsider Traditional and No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment, with Kassab’s No-Evidence MSJ, and Kassab’s Traditional MSJ. 9 Compare Amended Motion, with Kassab’s No-Evidence MSJ, and Kassab’s Traditional MSJ. III. POHL’S OBJECTION TO KASSAB’S AMENDED MOTION Pohl objects to Kassab setting the Amended Motion for an oral hearing, as it is almost identical to and seeks the same relief as Kassab’s Original MSJs that were denied by the 189th District Court. Thus, the Amended Motion is a motion to “reconsider.” Undker this Court’s procedures, “[a]ll motions to reconsider are heard by submission only.” Procedlure I(I) of the 281st Judicial District Court. c IV. POHL’S INCORPORATION OF PRIOR BRsIEFING Pohl incorporates fully by reference his prior summary judgment briefing—both the arguments and the attached evidence—into this response teo Kassab’s Amended Motion. This includes the following briefing and exhibits: • Pohl’s Response in Opposition to the No-E n vidence Motions for Summary Judgment Filed by the Kassab Defendants and the Nichoilson Defendants & Exhibits (filed Sept. 12, 2022). • Pohl’s Response in Opposition to the Traditional Motions for Summary Judgment Filed by the Kassab Defendants and the Nicholson Defendants & Exhibits (filed Sept. 12, 2022). fV. DISCUSSION All of the issues presented in Kassab’s Amended Motion—whether traditional or no- evidence arguments for soummary judgment—have been previously ruled on in Pohl’s favor. The same result is proper lhere, and the Court should deny the Amended Motion. Kassab’si no-evidence summary judgment arguments fail because Pohl has previously provided sunfficient evidence of every element of his claims in Pohl’s Response to Kassab’s No- Evidence MSJ. Because this addressed every element of Pohl’s claims, a subsequent no-evidence motion makes no sense—the same showing of evidence defeats such a challenge. At best, subsequent developments might give rise to disputed issues of material fact, but such issues preclude summary judgment in their own right. Kassab’s traditional summary judgment arguments fare no better. Pohl’s Response to Kassab’s Traditional MSJ raised issues of disputed material facts or exposed flaws in Kassab’s legal arguments that precluded summary judgment in Kassab’s favor. Kassab asserts the same flawed arguments in his Amended Motion. Once there are disputed issues of mkaterial fact that prevent summary judgment on an issue, additional evidence on that disputed flactual issue makes no difference in a summary judgment analysis. The five new exhibits (cout of 65 exhibits total) attached to Kassab’s Amended Motion, at best, provide additional stestimony on disputed facts. The Court should reject Kassab’s attempt to seek reconsiderastion under a different name and should deny Kassab’s Amended Motion. A. Kassab is not entitled to no-evidence summary judgment. The 189th District Court made the right decision when it denied Kassab’s No-Evidence MSJ. The Court should deny Kassab’s Amended Motion outright because, as was shown through his prior briefing, Pohl has come forward with sufficient evidence to support each element of his claims.10 Nothing has changed sincee Kassab’s No-Evidence MSJ was denied, and nothing in Kassab’s Amended Motion suggef f sts that a different result is proper here.11 In Pohl’s prior briefying, Pohl put forward evidence sufficient to, at a minimum, raise a genuine issue of materCial fact on each element of his three claims. See generally Pohl’s Response in Opposition to thea No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment Filed by the Kassab Defendants and the Nicholsfon Defendants (including the evidence attached and incorporated therein). By the 10 As stated above, Pohl incorporates fully by reference his prior briefing and evidence on the no-evidence summary judgment issue. See generally Pohl’s Response to Kassab’s No-Evidence MSJ (including the evidence cited therein). 11 The wording of Kassab’s no-evidence challenge to Pohl’s claims is almost entirely copied, word-for-word, from Kassab’s No-Evidence MSJ. Compare Amended Motion, at 88–94, with Kassab’s No-Evidence MSJ. The sole addition is a paragraph in which Kassab argues that “Pohl has no evidence that he is wholly innocent in the illegal obtainment of any client for which his claims are based.” See Amended Motion, at 93. This is not part of any element of Pohl’s claims, and Kassab does not explain otherwise. Kassab cites no authority to explain the relevance of this assertion, nor does he establish that Pohl has the burden of proof with respect to this issue. See generally id. Thus, this argument cannot be a proper basis for no-evidence summary judgment. nature of a no-evidence summary judgment, once a party has presented sufficient evidence to defeat such a motion, further no-evidence challenges on the same elements of a claim are futile. Because Kassab previously raised a no-evidence challenge to each element of Pohl’s claims, and Pohl provided sufficient evidence to support each element of his kclaims, the no- evidence challenge to Pohl’s claims in Kassab’s Amended Motion necessarilly fails.12 For this reason, and for the reasons stated in Pohl’s prior briefing incorporated hcerein, Pohl requests that the Court deny Kassab’s Amended Motion. s B. Kassab is not entitled to traditional summary judgmsent. Kassab makes no effort to explain to the Court how the 189th District Court erred when it previously denied Kassab’s Traditional MSJ. Nothing material has changed since Kassab’s Traditional MSJ was denied, and the Amended Motion reiterates the same rejected arguments and evidence. The Court should deny Kassab’s Amended Motion because, as Pohl demonstrated in his prior briefing, Kassab’s arguments and evidence do not entitle Kassab to judgment as a matter of law. Thus, Pohl requests that the Ceourt deny Kassab’s Amended Motion. 1. Pohl’s prior briefing dfefeats Kassab’s Amended Motion. The 189th District Cyourt was right on the law and the facts when it denied Kassab’s Traditional MSJ. The Court should deny Kassab’s Amended Motion because, excluding the handful of exceptiaons discussed below, Kassab relies on the same arguments, exhibits, and authority contaifned in Kassab’s No-Evidence MSJ to seek the same relief a second time. Nothing has changed since this relief was first denied, and neither should the Court’s ruling on these issues. As stated above, Pohl incorporates fully by reference his prior briefing and evidence on the traditional summary judgment issues.13 Because the portions of the Amended Motion addressing 12 See Court Order, entered Oct. 31, 2022 (denying Kassab’s No-Evidence MSJ). 13 See generally Pohl’s Response to Kassab’s Traditional MSJ (including the evidence cited therein). traditional summary judgment are largely identical to Kassab’s prior motion, further briefing on this issue would be unnecessarily duplicative. Compare Amended Motion, at 2–88, with Kassab’s Traditional MSJ. For the reasons stated in Pohl’s Response to Kassab’s Traditional MSJ the Court should deny Kassab’s Amended Motion. k 2. Kassab’s citations to limited new materials does not justify recon silderation or suggest that summary judgment is proper. While the issues, arguments, and the vast majority of the wordinrgi and exhibits are directly copied from Kassab’s Original MSJs, Kassab does cite five new exDhibits and two new cases in the Amended Motion. However, even if this new material were reslevant and applicable—which Pohl disputes—it makes no difference, because disputed issuers of material fact or flaws in Kassab’s legal arguments prevent summary judgment. Kassab cites the limited new material in clonnection with three arguments in the Amended Motion: (1) Pohl’s trade secret claim fails aMs a matter of law due to a failure to sufficiently protect the trade secrets; (2) Pohl’s trade secreto claim fails as a matter of law because Pohl does not own the trade secrets and property at issuce in his claims; and (3) that Pohl cannot recover on his claims because Kassab’s affirmative defense of illegality or the unlawful acts doctrine is conclusively established as a matter of law. None of these arguments support granting summary judgment. i. Pohl reasonably protected his trade secret information, including information concaerning clients. Kassab fargues that Pohl’s claim for theft of trade secrets fails because Kassab has established as a matter of law that “Pohl did not take any measures, let alone reasonable measures, to keep his alleged information or client lists secret.” See Amended Motion, at 59–62 (citing Exs. 61–64 to the Amended Motion). Kassab’s evidence does not establish this fact. Even if Kassab’s presentation of the testimony were accurate—and it is not—it would at most raise issues of disputed material facts that preclude the Court from granting Kassab’s Amended Motion. Pohl’s prior briefing presented controverting evidence on this precise issue that precludes summary judgment.14 Pohl testified in his deposition regarding the reasonable steps he took to protect the client information, confidential information, and trade secrets that are the subject mattekr of this suit.15 This alone is sufficient to raise a fact issue for the jury to decide regarding whelther the steps Pohl took were reasonable under the circumstances to protect Pohl’s trade secrects. However, additional evidence supports Pohl’s position that he protected the confidentisality of his trade secrets— including the testimony of the same individuals that Kassab relises on to argue otherwise. Kassab cites the testimony of Scott Walker, Kirk Ladner, and Steve Seymour to suggest that Pohl failed to sufficiently protect information related to clients. See Amended Motion, at 61 (citing Exs. 62-64 to the Amended Motions). But Kassab’s citations to their testimony lacks context. Those same three individuals testifiaed that Pohl limited access to his trade secrets, and that Pohl ensured that those who had access to that information understood the confidential character of that information.16 Thise testimony is also sufficient to raise a fact question on this issue and prevent summary judgmfent. Kassab also omits relyevant testimony from Mary Arnold—a former employee of Pohl’s— to suggest that she didC not protect the confidentiality of Pohl’s trade secret information. See Amended Motion, at 59–60. But Kassab fails to note that, in the same deposition he cites, Mrs. Arnold testifiefdf about how she understood that Pohl owned the relevant information and that it was not tUo be shared or discussed around third parties.17 The omitted portions of Mrs. Arnold’s 14 See Pohl’s Response to Kassab’s Traditional MSJ, at 25–26 (including the evidence cited therein). 15 See Pohl Deposition, at 15:21-16:18, attached as Ex. U to Pohl’s Response to Kassab’s Traditional MSJ. 16 See Deposition of Scott Walker, at 283:17-284:22, 321:5-324:7; Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at 355:18–358:10, 372:7–374:24, 377:4–23; Deposition of Steve Seymour, at 96:16-24, 223:1-20, attached as Exs. D, V, & W, respectively, to Pohl’s Response to Kassab’s Traditional MSJ. See also Pohl Declaration ¶¶ 14-15, attached as Ex. A to Pohl’s Response to Kassab’s Traditional MSJ. 17 See Deposition of Mary Arnold, at 83:14–24, 159:24–160:21, attached as Exhibit A. testimony help demonstrate that there are disputed issues of material fact that prevents summary judgment on this issue. Kassab cannot show that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Pohl’s trade secret claim by selectively citing testimony that is contradicted, often by the same witnkess in the same deposition. Even if Kassab’s evidence were relevant to showing that Pohl’s inlformation was not reasonably protected—and it is not at all clear that the factors discussed bcy Kassab are relevant or dispositive of this inquiry—there is ample controverting evidence abosut the measures took by Pohl to protect the confidentiality of his trade secret information. Thesse disputed issues of material fact prevent summary judgment on this issue. ii. Kassab has not conclusively refuted, as a matter of law, Pohl’s ownership of the relevant trade secrets and confidential information. Kassab also argues that Pohl’s claims for ltheft of trade secrets and conversion fail because Kassab can conclusively establish that “PohMl does not own the purported trade secrets or property that he alleges had been converted.” Seoe Amended Motion, at 64. Kassab cites four new exhibits in support of this argument. See id.c at 65 (citing Exs. 62–65 to the Amended Motion). However, this issue was already addressed, and there are disputed issues of material fact that prevent summary judgment. Kassab’s “new” evidence does not demonstrate that he can carry his burden to establish this issue as a matter of law. Kassab clcaims that “Walker, Ladner and Seymour all testified that all of their marketing assets, including client contact information and lists were created by them and their marketing companies and belonged to them.” See id. This statement is misleading at best. To the extent that the cited testimony even concerns Pohl’s trade secrets and confidential information at issue in this case—a fact Kassab fails to establish, despite it being his burden to do so—those same individuals gave conflicting testimony stating the relevant documents and information were Pohl’s, belonged to Pohl, and were kept confidential at his request.18 Such testimony—which Pohl cited in his prior briefing—at a minimum raises a fact issue that precludes summary judgment on this issue.19 iii. Kassab not only fails to conclusively prove his affirmative defense of “unlawful acts,” but the defense fails as a matter of law under binding precedent. The final issue is Kassab’s argument that he conclusively established hris unlawful acts doctrine affirmative defense, which he contends precludes any recovery by Pohl. See Amended Motion, at 66. For this argument, Kassab cites four of the five new exhriibits. Id at 69 (citing Exs. 61–64 to the Amended Motion). Kassab also cites two new, out-Dof-state federal court decisions that he claims support the application of his affirmative defensse. See id at 72–73. But even with this new material, Kassab fails to carry his burden to estarblish his affirmative defense as a matter of law. Rather, binding precedent demonstrates that his defense fails as a matter of law. While Pohl disputes whether Kassab’s alrguments about barratry and the unlawful acts doctrine have any relevance to this lawsuit aMt all, to the extent that the unlawful acts doctrine could have any relevance to this case, it is preeompted by Texas’s proportionate responsibility statute. In Dugger v. Arredondo, the Texas Sucpreme Court explicitly found that “the common law unlawful acts doctrine is no longer a viable defense.” See 408 S.W.3d 825, 831–32 (Tex. 2013). This issue was briefed previously, and Pohl directs the Court’s attention to that prior briefing, which Pohl incorporates fully by reference.20 At the outset, the fact that this defense has been preempted justifies denying cKassab’s Amended Motion on this issue. Even if his defense were not preempted and Kassab’s evidence did suggest that Pohl engaged in improper solicitation—two things Kassab has not demonstrated—Kassab would still 18 See Deposition of Scott Walker, at 283:17-284:22, 316-319; 321:5-324:7, 327-329; Deposition of Kirk Ladner, at 119:21-120:15, 340:10-342:17, 350:11-351:21, 355:18–358:10, 372:7–374:24, 377:4–23; Deposition of Steve Seymour, at 96:16-24, 223:1-20, attached as Exs. D, V, & W, respectively, to Pohl’s Response to Kassab’s Traditional MSJ. 19 See Pohl’s Response to Kassab’s Traditional MSJ, at 27; Pohl’s Response to Kassab’s No-Evidence MSJ, at 9–10. 20 See Pohl’s Response to Kassab’s Traditional MSJ, at 19–23. 10 not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this defense. First, as discussed throughout the prior briefing, there is controverting evidence on this issue that raises disputed issues of material fact.21 Furthermore, even if Kassab were able to show that some illegal act occurred, Pohl does not need to rely on any purported illegal act to establish his claims in this lawsuit.k22 Kassab does not even attempt to establish otherwise. See Amended Motion, at 69. Thus, thel application of this defense is not triggered in the first place. See Carcamo-Lopez v. Does 1 tchrough 20, 865 F. Supp. 2d 736, 767 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (“But when the illegal conduct arisess in a defense and not in the plaintiff’s case, the unlawful acts rule will not bar a plaintiff’s cslaims.”). The two new cases Kassab cites are not binding and have no application to the facts of this case. The first new case Kassab cites is Alderson v. United States, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1200 (C.D. Cal. 2010). See Amended Motion, at 72. Quoting dicta, Kassab argues that: “A person cannot ‘receive trade secret protection for infaormation about ongoing illegal activities.’” See id. (quoting Alderson, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1200). But the reasoning of Alderson has no application to this case. Alderson dealt with a plainetiff who, in a prior case, filed a False Claims Act action on behalf of the federal government fconcerning Medicare fraud uncovered by the plaintiff. Alderson, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1188. Ayt issue was whether the proceeds obtained by the plaintiff from the prior False Claims ActC action were “correctly characterized as ordinary income” or capital gains for purposes of taxation. See id. at 1201. It was in this context that the court considered whether the plaintiff hafdf a protectable property interest in his knowledge of “information about ongoing illegal acUtivities”—that is, how the Medicare fraud occurred that was the basis of the prior False Claims Act action. See id. at 1200. The facts of this case are not analogous. Here, Pohl does not 21 See id. at 4–12, 23–27 (including the evidence cited therein). 22 See Pohl’s Response to Kassab’s No-Evidence MSJ, at 4–17 (discussing each element of Pohl’s claims without requiring reference to or reliance on any illegal acts). 11 claim trade secret protection concerning how any illegal conduct was undertaken. Instead, Pohl contends his customer lists and related information are entitled to trade secret protection.23 The second new case Kassab cites is Merckle GmbH v. Johnson & Johnson, 961 F. Supp. 721, 733 (D.N.J. 1997). See Amended Motion, at 72. Kassab cites to this case clakiming that there is a privilege to disclose trade secrets “in connection with the disclosure of linformation that is relevant to public health or safety, or to the commission of a crime or tocrt, or to other matters of substantial public concern.” See Amended Motion, at 72 (citing Mserckle GmbH v. Johnson & Johnson, 961 F. Supp. 721, 733 (D.N.J. 1997) & Restatement (Tshird) of Unfair Competition § 40, cmt. c). However, there is a reason that Kassab cites this non-precedential opinion. No Texas case has adopted this statement from the Restatement. Even if Texas were to adopt this privilege, Kassab’s conclusory discussion does not carry his burden to establish this defense. Kassab’s unlawful acts doctrine defensae fails as a matter of law under the binding precedent of Dugger v. Arredondo. But even if this remained a proper defense, Kassab’s evidence does not conclusively establish this defense eas a matter of law. The facts put forth by Kassab are controverted by other evidence, afnd even if Kassab’s purported facts could be established, Kassab has not conclusively shown tyhat they would trigger application of the unlawful acts doctrine, given that Pohl’s claims do nCot require reference to or reliance on any purported unlawful act. VI. CONCLUSION For the fforegoing reasons, and for the reasons stated in Pohl’s prior briefing—which is incorporaUted fully herein by reference—Plaintiffs Michael Pohl and Law Offices of Michael A. Pohl respectfully request that the Court deny Kassab’s Amended Motion. 23 See Pohl’s Response to Kassab’s No-Evidence MSJ, at 9–10 (discussing how “the materials at issue included Pohl’s client lists, client files, and thousands of contracts between Pohl and his clients”). 12 Dated: March 29, 2023 Respectfully submitted, REYNOLDS FRIZZELL LLP By: /s/ Jean C. Frizzell Jean C. Frizzell State Bar No. 07484650 k 1100 Louisiana St., Suite 3500 e Houston, Texas 77002 l Tel. 713.485.7200 Fax 713.485.7250 c jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.rcom Attorney for PlaintifDfs Michael Pohl and Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC CERTIFICATE OF SERrVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document was served on all counsel of record pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this 29th day of March, 2023. M /s/ Jean C. Frizzell  Jean C. Frizzell 13 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Suni Blue on behalf of Jean Frizzell Bar No. 7484650 sblue@reynoldsfrizzell.com r Envelope ID: 74146534 Filing Code Description: Answer/ Response / Waiver Filing Description: Plaintiffs' Response to Kassab Defendantst Amended Motions for Summary Judgment i Status as of 3/30/2023 8:24 AM CST s Case Contacts  Name BarNumber Email TimgestampSubmitted Status Jean C.Frizzell jfrizzell@reynoldsfrizzell.com 3/29/2023 5:09:20 PM SENT Harris Wells hwells@reynoldsfrizzell.com3/29/2023 5:09:20 PM SENT Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 3/29/2023 5:09:20 PM SENT Scott M.Favre scott@favrepa.coma 3/29/2023 5:09:20 PM SENT Lawyer Wade lawyerwade@hotmail.com 3/29/2023 5:09:20 PM SENT Todd Taylor ttaylor@jandflaw.com 3/29/2023 5:09:20 PM SENT Misty Davis mdavis@creynoldsfrizzell.com 3/29/2023 5:09:20 PM SENT Lance Kassab eservef@kassab.law 3/29/2023 5:09:20 PM SENT Lance Kassab lance@kassab.law 3/29/2023 5:09:20 PM SENT David Kassab david@kassab.law 3/29/2023 5:09:20 PM SENT Nicholas Pierce Cnicholas@kassab.law 3/29/2023 5:09:20 PM SENT Andrea Mendez a andrea@kassab.law 3/29/2023 5:09:20 PM SENT Murray JFogler mfogler@foglerbrar.com 3/29/2023 5:09:20 PM SENT Murray Fogler o mfogler@fbfog.com 3/29/2023 5:09:20 PM SENT D Kassab U david@kassab.law 3/29/2023 5:09:20 PM SENT Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 3/29/2023 5:09:20 PM SENT L Kassab lance@kassab.law 3/29/2023 5:09:20 PM SENT Kelly Skelton reception@kassab.law 3/29/2023 5:09:20 PM SENT Murray J. Fogler 7207300 mfogler@foglerbrar.com 3/29/2023 5:09:20 PM SENT

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